Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė: bendrasis ir terminologinis aspektai

The Lithuanian Language and Society: General and Terminological Aspects JONAS KLIMAVIČIUS Institute of the Lithuanian Language Straipsnio tema skaičiusiam Simo Karaliūno monografiją Kalba ir visuomenė (1997) gal pasirodytų reikalaujanti tik paprastos dedukcijos. Tačiau literatūros šia tema nepaprastai gausu, daug naujos (apie globalizaciją iki 1997 m. Lietuvoje dar mažai rašyta). Straipsnio autorius taip pat nestokoja minčių, ką ir kaip l i e t u v i š k o j e šios temos problematikoje reikėtų aktualizuoti ir kokius konkrečios situacijos akcentus dėlioti. Vis dėlto beveik viskas straipsnyje, nors siekiama aktualumo, dėstoma daugiausia konceptualumo lygmeniu, be jokios gausios empir ikos ir konkretikos – tai irgi svarbu, reikšminga, tvarkytina, bet tai jau kito lygmens dalykas. Šiuo atžvilgiu straipsnis labai skiriasi ir nuo Ritos Miliūnaitės knygos Apie kalbą ir mus (2006), nors jos tema ir panaši: „Visuomenės gyvenimo pokyčiai, pirmiausia – išorinis ir vidinis laisvėjimas, atsivėrimas pasauliui, nepalieka nuošaly ir kalbos. Kad geriau suvoktume, kas darosi kalboje, kaip mes ją veikiame ir kaip ji veikia mus, atrodo pravartu žvilgterti, kaip sugyvenome su savo kalba pastaruosius penkiolika metų“ (Miliūnaitė 2006: 6). I 1. Globalization The echoes of danger and the call to mobilize have been sounding for about 20 years in Lithuania as well. Various questions concerning language use, change, the future, and even fate are very directly linked to globalization, with the increasingly frequent (Arnold Toynbee) word c r i e s being brandished all the while. Of course, one can and must do something, and some things work, although the r e s p o n s e s are not as resonant, and are moreover rather vague. The directness is such that people often do not even bother to understand what this globalization is. In Lithuanian linguistics, echoes of globalization arrive belatedly, in fragmentary observations. Aldonas Pupkis discusses it somewhat more extensively, though quite concisely, and with complete accuracy and clarity, in section 6.1, Studies in Language Culture 6, subsection The Lithuanian Language in Contemporary Society, entitled 6.1. International 56 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:… context of the functioning of the Lithuanian language, subsection 6.1.1, Globalization (Pupkis 2005: 206–209). First, it is noted that this is “a phenomenon of the global economy,” but that it “essentially changes social relations among people” (Pupkis 2005: 206, 207); the discussion then turns to language: “In a consumer society, language acquires a new—c o n s u m e r—f u n c t i o n. This function clearly orients the speech act toward the buyer—<...>. In certain cases, language begins to resemble packaging—<...>. The consumer function is prominent in advertising” (Pupkis 2005: 207). “In a consumer society, language itself becomes a commodity, <...> (Pupkis 2005: 208). The belief that “globalization provokes a local backlash and strengthens local identity” (Pupkis 2005: 208) is merely one of the difficult possibilities, while in essence it is simply an anti-globalization movement. Having assessed globalization as one aspect of the international context in which Lithuanian functions (and thus not a direct factor), Pupkis goes on, in subsection 6.1.2, The Lithuanian Language in the European Union, to argue: “Thus, all the causes of threats to the Lithuanian language are internal; they lie in our own living conditions and attitudes. <...>. <...>. The entire policy of the European Union institutions is favorable to the Lithuanian language. There is not a single European Union legal act that in any way restricts the use of Lithuanian in Lithuania. <....>. <...> The (official) languages of all countries have been declared official languages of the European Union. Lithuanian is used at official European Union events, and legal acts and other documents are translated into it. This enhances the authority of our language from outside and accelerates its development” (Pupkis 2005: 210). However, in those institutions “unofficial communication takes place mainly in English,” and “in many fields of science, it is used not only privately but also officially” (Pupkis 2005: 211). In Lithuania itself, “English-language scholarly output received financial support, whereas Lithuanian scholarly texts did not” (Pupkis 2005: 211). Therefore, “we must actively contribute to international initiatives to establish equality among languages” (Pupkis 2005: 211). Echoes of globalization reached Lithuanian terminology through presentations by foreign terminologists at conferences organized by us and through their articles in Terminologija journal. It is said that, alongside the globalist and anti-globalist positions, a third view is now emerging: “the natural development of globalization and a common international material and spiritual culture can be achieved by cultivating culture at the national or at least regional level: <...>” (Leitchik 2006: 34), though global dimensions are not forgotten either—“the creation of a common world language” and “international scientific, technical, and economic terminology” (Leitchik 2006: 34, 34–35). These are highly abstract assessments. Much more concrete statements on language policy include “the possibility of creating an optimal artificial international language, machine translation, and the international selection of one of the most widely used languages” Terminologija | 2008 | 15 5 7 “creation, machine translation, and the international selection of one of the most widely used languages,” as well as “the possibilities of a policy for coordinating the convergent development of terminology in related languages” (Griniewicz 2006: 16). It is unclear why problematic machine translation is proposed while ordinary translation—known to European culture for more than 2,000 years—is forgotten. Speaking of the direct socioeconomic impact of globalization on terminology (Fóris 2006: 21) is rather straightforward, while the fact that the languages of small nations can use only a portion of the world’s terms” (Fóris 2007: 53) is hardly directly dependent on globalization. The following are sound ideas: “Only languages with official state status can be used in a wide variety of ways” and “Terminology is a guarantee of a language’s survival”; yet the threats—“the intensification of globalization” and “the practical displacement of national languages” (Пустай 2006: 41)—remain menacing and constant. Thus, when discussing the effects of such a menacing planetary phenomenon on language (and culture in general), we cannot continue to rely solely on generalities—we need to gain a more thorough understanding of it, its origins, history, and likely future. Let us first look at an encyclopedic definition: globalization – “the intensifying movement of goods, capital, people, information, and technologies among the countries of the world, affecting various spheres of life. – – – <...> owing to the uneven impact of Δ, economic development disparities around the world have increased. – – – – According to critics of Δ, strengthening ties among the countries of the world adversely affect the culture of each country, encourage the disappearance of traditional differences, homogenization, standardization, or the dominance in other countries of the popular culture of the leading world power—the United States. Contrary to the claims of anti-globalists, the EU—<...> example shows that removing barriers to the movement of goods, services, persons, and capital has not reduced cultural differences among member states; rather, trends toward successful national cultural development have become apparent (at the beginning of the 21st century the popularity of the Irish language became apparent, – – – Scotland’s role in EU policy) (VLE VI 2004, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas). A very benevolent and rather optimistic definition, but one that is also deficient. First, the content of the concept is presented somewhat schematically, while the assessment of the phenomenon’s causes and effects is partly improved by desirable hopes and goals; criticism is attributed only to anti-globalists. Second, the phenomenon’s origins and history are not without gaps, and there is virtually no prediction. Another encyclopedic definition places considerably different emphasis: globalization – “the intensification and expansion of human and social relations, primarily economic ones, as a result of which interdependence increases rapidly, the significance of states and their borders diminishes, and the world becomes more integrated” (PolEncŽ 2007). 58 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... Globalization is carried out and developed by transnational corporations, the internet, military forces capable of “detecting and destroying enemies thousands of kilometres away”, and the vague “etc.” (PolEncŽ 2007). A positive feature of globalization is that “the ‘shrinking’ of the world increases the interdependence of states and shapes a new world community with many shared interests”; its negative aspect, however, is that “the increasing uniformity of the world results in a loss of diversity and vitality” (PolEncŽ 2007). It is rightly distinguished from globalism—“a theory of international politics asserting that international politics is a unified process taking place on a planetary scale, in which the dominant global economic system—capitalism—plays the principal and decisive role”; under this system, some states dominate while others are dependent (PolEncŽ 2007). Global governance is also partly in operation—a “system and ongoing process of making and implementing global decisions”—addressing problems of war and peace, environmental protection, transport, and the like on a human scale (PolEncŽ 2007). In considering the origins of the concept of globalization, I cannot help recalling the metaphor global village (global village), introduced as early as 1964 by the Canadian sociologist, literary scholar, and philosopher Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980): “Our specialized and fragmented civilization, with its centre–periphery structure, suddenly experiences the instantaneous joining of all its mechanized parts into an organic whole. This is the new world of the global village” (McLuhan 2003: 103). “Radio <...> continues to lead us backward in the direction of implosion, or reintegration <...>. The extreme form of this implosion, or contraction, is the image of an astronaut enclosed in a tiny space surrounding him on all sides. Far from expanding our world, it proclaims that it has contracted to the size of a village” (McLuhan 2003: 284). M. McLuhan developed this image further in 1968 in his book War and Peace in the Global Village (War and Peace in the Global Village): “At a time when there was neither mass computerization nor the internet, the author understood that the latest means of communication were changing the prevailing conception of time and space” (Kopaliński 2001). In Lithuanian discourse, global village is rather rare and somewhat unusual—it is so-called, sometimes mythical, for example: Another model worth mentioning, <...>: Europe is not a state, because state institutions gradually disappear, the system operates on its own, and people address the most important tasks of everyday life in their small local communities. Such a Europe may emerge if the world truly develops in the direction of the so-called global village, and that is quite likely NŽA 2008 6 286 (translated by E. Vareikis, the same translator of M. B. Steger’s book Globalization). <...> the world will indeed increasingly come to resemble the mythical global Terminologija | 2008 | 15 59 village with its own local communities NŽA 2008 3 139 (E. Vareikis). The original content of globalization was by no means rosy: “That globalization is changing the world: the mafia is gaining more power; drug smuggling is spreading; the modernization of production is reducing the number of jobs; the technological revolution is harming democracy, as millions of antisocial people emerge; people are moving from production into services; trade unions are dissolving; the economy is becoming increasingly privatized; expenditure on research and development, as well as information technology, is rising; and budget, monetary, and treasury policies are becoming increasingly international and global” (Kopaliński 2001). One area stood out in particular at the time, designated by a similar but distinct term, globalism—“the Cold War phase covering the period 1958–1990, when the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, competed to become leaders in world politics <...>” (Kopaliński 2001). In general, globalism now means “the ideology and propaganda of globalization.” One can also recall one of the earliest concepts in this field—N. Khrushchev’s global bomb. When Kurt Waldheim, the future UN Secretary-General (1972–1981), was writing his book Der Österreichische Weg in 1971, he did not yet mention the concept of globalization, but did refer to the phenomenal pace of scientific and technological progress and the worldwide expansion of the industrial revolution (Вальдхайм 1976: 216), as well as the overcoming of isolation: “Today, the world is crisscrossed by streams of information in the form of images, sounds, vast migrations of goods, people, styles, ideas, inventions and—in recent times—public opinion” (Вальдхайм 1976: 217). In Kurt Waldheim’s honour, it should be said that he also clearly saw the other side of the phenomenon: “the trend towards greater unity on our planet is accompanied by a profound interest in preserving the distinctiveness of peoples, cultures and nations. <...>, another feature is the desire of groups, cultures, nations and languages to resist the leveling tendency, <...>. Thus, the outlines are emerging of a world with both greater unity and greater diversity, greater attention to the future and the past, greater wealth and greater concern for preserving nature, culture and the arts” (Вальдхайм 1976: 220). “Peace, justice and progress on our planet do not require uniformity or the destruction of values inherited from the past” (Вальдхайм 1976: 221). The literature on globalization is vast. One should begin with the book written in 2003 by Manfred B. Steger, a professor at the University of Illinois in the USA— 60 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... titled Globalization: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press (Globalization. A Very Short Introduction, 2008, 208 pp.). A very concise introduction is difficult to condense further, but there is no alternative to making the attempt. The first step is to establish the basic conceptual framework: g l o b a l: global market 61, 75, 84, 103 (and integrate the market 89), global markets 102 (and international markets 102), global financial markets 9, global currency markets 80, global capital markets 102; global exchanges 144, global financial exchanges 80; global investors 172; global economy 89, 102, global economic order 69, global economic development 102, global order 149; global flows of goods 66, global flows of goods and ideas 12; gigantic firms and their global strategies 86; global connections 43, global interdependence 24, 67; interdependence between the global and the local 27; global networks 40, 101, global network of political interdependence 99; global infrastructure 63, global internet 164; global media participant [Al Jazeera] 23; global capitalism 85, 101, global consumer capitalism 120; global expansion of commercial products 58; global social structures 101, global social interactions 42, global cooperation 195, global forces 173, global problems 113, global theses 148, global phenomena 21; global processes 25, global economic process 184, global actions 36, global environment 12, 142, global level 85, global scale 134, global arena 118; a rapidly g l o b a l i z i n g world 19, a g l o b a l i z e d w o r l d 105; global world 36, our entire global world 36, Global South 27, Global North 40; global governance 106, global governing bodies 105, global governance structures 177 [At the beginning of the 21st century, the world found itself in a transitional position between the system of modern nation-states and postmodern forms of global governance 106]; the nature of global governance structures is also shaped by “global civil society” 109; global cities 103 [“Global cities,” such as Tokyo, London, Niu- Terminologija | 2008 | 15 61 York and Singapore seek to be more interconnected with each other than with many cities in their own countries 107]; in perspective – global parliament 111; an integrated global legal system capable of operating from the global level 111; the cultural possibility of implementing global democracy 111 and numerous pejoratives: global economic depression 66, global economic instability 72, global economic decline 83; global speculators 80, a global decline in labor protection 76, a conflict on a global scale 195; global human impact on the environment 136, global environmental degradation 135 / global environmental degradation 136 // degradation of the global natural environment 175, environmental degradation 136; global warming 137, global climate warming 142, global temperature rise 138; global terrorist network 104–105 [the Kalashnikov is their weapon of global choice 26]; globalization, e.g.: the globalization of social relations worldwide 34–35,... and the globalization of organized crime 26,... The author of the book explains the distinction between globalization and globality as follows: “<...>, the awkward conflation of the process itself with the conditions that enable it to occur leads to an illogical definition that explains very little. For example, the widespread view that g l o b a l i z a t i o n (p r o c e s s) creates the conditions for even greater g l o b a – l i z a t i o n (c o n d i t i o n s) makes it impossible to distinguish cause from effect (=consequence). I therefore propose using the term g l o b a l i t y to define a social situation characterized by the interactions and trends of the g l o b a l economy, politics, culture, and natural environment, <...>. Thus, we should not claim that g l o b a l i t y denotes a state—a final point that precludes further development” (Steger 2008: 28–29). Globalization—like other deverbal nouns with the suffix “-ization” (Steger 2008: 30)—denotes an action in progress. Globalizacijos terminas pradėtas vartoti XX a. septintajame dešimtmetyje (Steger 2008: 28), nors globalizacijos istorija sparti globalių mainų plėtra šuoliu pradėjusi aštuntajame dešimtmetyje (Steger 2008: 44). Although the term globalization is attributed only to the present day, for a long time “the world has seen a growing number of interconnections that make it possible to recognize and affirm a common 62 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... visiems žmogiškąją prigimtį“ (Steger 2008: 12), todėl „globalizacija yra tokia pat sena, kaip ir pati žmonijos istorija“ (Steger 2008: 45). Globalizacijos chronologija (Steger 2008: 46) pradedama, kai žmonės pasiekė kiekvieno žemyno įvairias vietas. Skiriami jos 4 periodai: priešistorinis (10 000 m. pr. Kr.–3500 m. pr. Kr.), priešmodernėjimo (3500 m. pr. Kr.–1500 m.), ankstyvasis modernėjimo (1500 m.–1750 m.), modernėjimo (1750–1970) ir dabartinis (nuo 1970); laikotarpį nuo 1960 m. kai kas apibūdina kaip „radikalios politikos taisyklių ir valdymo „deteritorializacijos“ (Steger 2008: 95) laiką. Leaping into the future, one may recall: “globalization is irreversible” (Bill Clinton) (Steger 2008: 152). And say: but!.. To begin with, one may list 4 (3+1) characteristics of globalization: 1) it is a “multifaceted complex of social processes” (Steger 2008: 10), 2) it “is not simply an objective phenomenon, but a multitude of opinions” (Steger 2008: 10), and “the conceptualization of globalization is itself an ongoing process, not a static state” (Steger 2008: 30), 3) it is a “geographically limited and uneven process” (Steger 2008: 40), 4) what also stands out is an “ideology that imbues the concept of globalization with neoliberal values and meanings” (Steger 2008: 145) – this is globalism. Manfred B. Steger, having first noted the “fundamental indeterminacy of the global” (Steger 2008: 29), offers the following definition: “Globalization is a multidimensional set of social processes that creates, multiplies, differentiates, and intensifies social interdependence and social exchanges while at the same time fostering a deeper awareness of the growing connections between what is local and distant” (Steger 2008: 36). University of Pittsburgh sociology professor Roland Robertson describes it very concisely: “Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the increasing consciousness of the world as a whole” (Steger 2008: 33). An even more concise expression is the well-known saying: “Globalization compresses space and time” (Steger 2008: 35). Now we can turn to a more detailed (though most concise) structure of globalization, in which we will also find the cultural and linguistic globalization that is of greatest concern to us: E c o n o m i c (69) or e c o n o m y (74) globalization is often described, especially by critics, as “corporate globalization” or “globalization from above” (84). If we were to call economic globalization the engine, and technologies the fuel, Terminologija | 2008 | 15 63 finances—as oxygen, global markets—as roads, then political globalization (94) would be the engines—wheels or tracks. There is no need to dwell on this any longer; it is only worth drawing attention to one striking thought: “<...>, Wilson reluctantly legitimized radical nationalist forces that pushed the great powers into another war on a global scale” (Steger 2008: 99). Globalization is proclaimed irreversible, but not without wars (though now already local ones)?.. Cultural globalization (112), in the view of some commentators, “constitutes the essence of contemporary globalization” (Steger 2008: 113), while in the view of others—the pessimistic hyperglobalists—“we are not moving toward a cultural rainbow reflecting the differences among the world’s cultures. We observe (=We see) rather the expansion of some increasingly homogenized popular culture, <...>” (Steger 2008: 114). Goethe had already introduced the concept of world literature (Fridental is 1977: 651); it spread and took root, but its essence—originality and uniqueness, national character, and especially universality—in this sense had already been captured by V. Bielinskis’s term world poet (Bielinskis 1948: 288–289), which is why the concept of global culture (113) seems a ghastly contradictio in adjecto. Although, for the book’s author, “the expansion of American popular culture seems unstoppable” (Steger 2008: 115), and the new American “Francis Fukuyama openly welcomes the spread of Anglo-American values and way of life, comparing the Americanization of the world with the expansion of democracy and the free market” (Steger 2008: 118), efforts to resist “cultural imperialism” (Steger 2008: 11)—the onslaught of American popular culture—persist and are partly fruitful, while the old American Roland Robertson argues that “cultural globalization always takes place in a local context,” “is not about ‘globalization’ but about ‘the interaction of global and local elements’” and “rejects the thesis of cultural homogenization” (Steger 2008: 120). Another matter is cultural “hybridization, most evident in fashion, music, dance, film, food culture, and language” (Steger 2008: 120) [incidentally, the food culture of the new Lithuanians is servile, simian, and horribly eclectic...]. Global cultural flows (120, 122) are indisputable, global cultural space (122) is hardly attainable, while global culture would be cultural impoverishment (in the best of the bad cases). The media, as a cultural phenomenon, if commercial only—that is, non-cultural—then only in that case is it global media (122): “the emergence of a global commercial media market encourages global oligopoly” (Steger 2008: 123)—then TV programs become a global ‘marketplace of chatter’ (Steger 2008: 123), and their “disseminated values not only ensure the indisputable cultural hegemony of popular culture, but also encourage the depoliticization of social life, weaken 64 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... bendruomenės vidinius ryšius“ (Steger 2008: 129). Žurnalistikos doktrina – žinių ir verslo interesų atskyrimas – paminama ir pakasama. The globalization of languages (129) essentially consists of global trends in language use (129): a decline in the number of languages in different parts of the world, the migration of languages (along with migrants), the role of tourism and especially the internet in the spread and predominance of certain languages, international scholarly publications in the “languages of global intellectual discourse” (Steger 2008: 130). The importance of English, Chinese, Spanish, and French is increasing, while English is regarded as the XXI-century lingua franca (132). The ideological dimension of globalization (143) is the aforementioned globalism (145). The promotion of globalization (145) is based on 5 slogans: 1) globalization means market liberalization and global integration (Steger 2008: 148), 2) globalization is inevitable and irreversible (Steger 2008: 152) [“it seems that the forces of globalism are reviving the nineteenth-century paradigm of the Anglo-American avant-garde role” (Steger 2008: 155)], 3) no one is responsible for globalization—it is determined by the “invisible hand of the market” (Steger 2008: 155), 4) globalization benefits everyone (Steger 2008: 158), yet: “Even World Bank data show that income disparities between individual nations are increasing faster than ever before” (Steger 2008: 159), 5) globalization helps democracy spread throughout the world (Steger 2008: 166), yet: “The more countries become democratic, the more American business opts for dictatorial countries” (Steger 2008: 169). Thus, the conclusion is more or less anti-sloganistic: “Globalization consists of numerous compelling little stories that promote neoliberal views and shape collective consciousness and a popularly understood identity” (Steger 2008: 170). In the section Challenges to Globalism (171–195), it is stated: “Globalism—the dominant ideology of our time—has driven a neoliberal conception of globalization into the minds of many people around the world, which in turn has been reinforced and confirmed by powerful political institutions and economic corporations” (Steger 2008: 171). Although this phenomenon is understood as “American globalization” (173) or the Americanization of the world (173), a danger to America’s own traditional order is also discerned: “In recent years, the number of nationalist organizations in America has grown considerably, <...>. <...>. Viewing globalism as a forei- Terminologija | 2008 | 15 6 5 gn and godless ideology gradually consuming their country, they fear that transnational forces are ruthlessly destroying the “traditional American way of life” (Steger 2008: 176). And a critical conclusion is drawn with good reason: “The differences between ideological slogans and real human experience can cause a crisis in the dominant paradigm” (Steger 2008: 171). Here, the conceptual apparatus of globalization is substantially expanded: globalists 151–153, 155, 166, 174; anti-globalists 173, 175, 207, anti-globalist alliance 185, anti-globalist movements 198, anti-globalist protests 170, anti-globalist attitudes 176, anti-globalist non-governmental organizations 175; hyperglobalists 101–103, 205, optimistic hyperglobalists 118, hyperglobalist camp 95, hyperglobalist prediction of a borderless world 104, hyperglobalization 205, 206 (2x); global disparities in wealth and living standards 171, global inequality 174, 200, “victims of globalization” 179, corporate globalization 180, global solidarity 173, “globalization from below” 174. The point here is also that “even those who oppose modernization cannot escape the process of globalization, which they publicly condemn. In order to spread their views and attract new supporters, anti-modernists must use the instruments (—the means) of globalization” (Steger 2008: 25). Chapter 8, Predictions for the Future of Globalization (196–201), instructively begins by looking to the past: “The ‘golden age’ of globalization was the period from 1860 to 1914, <...>. <...>. <...>. Great Britain—the world’s greatest superpower—spread its political system and cultural values throughout the world. But all the concentrated efforts to create a market controlled by the British Empire turned into a devastating backlash against globalization and ended with the First World War” (Steger 2008: 197). In his study The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi argues that anti-globalist “particularist protectionism” suddenly manifested itself in the most extreme forms of Italian fascism and German National Socialism” (Steger 2008: 198)1. In discussing the possibility of globalization becoming a truly democratic and egalitarian world order, a global development plan is mentioned among other measures (201). The book by prominent US political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control, has a clearly critical subtitle, Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (Vilnius, 1998, XVI+240 pp.). In it, globalization itself 1 This terrible past makes us cautious about such hopes for a better future: “A wave of nationalism usually always follows a wave of globalization—as European history shows” (Vaišnienė 2004: 7 48). 66 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... is not written (only the globalization of political morality is mentioned, 91), but there are many and varied global matters: global politics XIV, 99, 221, global political awakening XI, 53, 54, 75, 95, 154, the global awakening of humanity XIII, global political community 51, global political perspective 55, global political consensus 84, global political power 87, global consensus 226, global political process 91(2x), 92, 94, 99, 130, 147, 152, 153(2x), 223, 227, global process 100, global political process of interdependence 97, a miniature of global politics 97, global political weight 134, global political problems 220, global geopolitical dynamics 200; global power XIV, 48, 85 (Part Three. Unrivalled Global Power 85–148), 87, 90, 97, 105, 117, 152, 164, 197, 207, 225, global American power 100(2x), the structure of global power 3, shifts in global power 154, global incapacity 97; global governance (: global American power does not yet mean American global governance) 100; global economic influence 87, global economic prosperity 211, global economic and financial advantage 121, global economic leadership 124, global economic fragmentation 210; global military capability 87, global cultural and ideological appeal 87, global appeal 115, global primacy 103, global authority 102, 116, 127; global superpower 97, 124, 125, a state with a global mission of salvation 83–84, global confederation 152, global hierarchy 37, 97, global anarchy 197, global disorder (Part Four. Problems of Global Disorder 149–200), global catastrophe 185; global system 198, global reality 153, global status quo 199, 206; global stability 133, global instability XIV, 167, global role 129(2x), global attention 193, global impact 100, global influence 206, global cooperation 100, 200, global consensus 48, global affairs 206, global conversations 94, 132; global thinking 94, global awareness XV, global outlook 226; global poverty XVI, global injustice 77, global inequality 115, 154, 182, 183, global differences 84, global revolt of the masses 198, global cohesion 77, global social cohesion 77, global divide 211, 226; global changes X, 89, 111, 151, 231, global ideological challenge 155, global social problems 81, global educational exchanges 94; Terminologija | 2008 | 15 6 7 global television 49, global environmental protection 221; global American leadership 101, global American superiority 111, global American advantages 115, global Japanese primacy 125, global Japanese status 129; a globally significant system of values XIV, globally destructive 151, globally more responsible 224. As we can see, Brzezinski’s purposeful and well-founded critical outlook is expressed through negative concepts—global disability, global instability, global injustice, global inequality, global poverty, global economic division, global chaos, global mass revolt. This critique is crowned by a global crisis of the spirit 230 (and a universal crisis of the spirit 54). The direction of hope is indicated by a moral imperative: “<...> humanity, if it wishes to control its own destiny, needs a moral compass and a sense of moderation or balance” (Brzezinski 1998: 228). In concluding this theoretical and critical overview of globalization, it can be said that global ambitions existed even before the phenomena under discussion emerged and took root. For example: <...> for those who inspire revolutions, the turmoil of change and upheaval is the only element they enjoy; they can do without bread—just give them some global, world-scale idea (Pasternak 1991: 315). On the other hand, globalization may be neutralized or even halted by the “concept” developed in Samuel P. Huntington’s (1927–2009) 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order), which argues that “after the end of the Cold War and the ideological confrontation between liberalism and communism that prevailed during it, international conflicts will be determined mainly by cultural and civilizational differences among Western and Eastern Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, Hinduism, and others”—“states belonging to one particular civilization will gather into regional blocs” (PolEncŽ 2007). The 1998 book by Zygmunt Bauman (born 1925 in Poland), professor at the University of Leeds in Great Britain from 1971 to 1990 and subsequently an honorary professor, Globalization: The Human Consequences (2002; 2nd ed. 2007, Vilnius, 208 pp.), adds relatively few concepts; there are not many overall: “global people” 9, global elites 11, the global elite 84, global elite 152, global elite 189, “globalized” elite 154, the elite’s “globality” 189, globalized intellectuals 9, global entrepreneurs, global cultural managers, and global scholars 136, the globalized summit 10, the supremacy of global forces 187, a globalizing world 118, a “globalized” world 153, a “globalizing” world 153; 68 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:… a globalized economy 11, the “globalization” of all aspects of the economy, global companies 106, global finance 106, 181, global financial markets 103, global capital 106; the globalization of markets and information 109, a global information network 32; global laws 198, “global politics” 97, “global order” 91, 98, global affairs 92, 93, global phenomena 156, global freedoms 192, freedom of global movement 107, 183, global horizons 98, globalizing tendencies 105, “globalizing” processes 109, global symbols 154, “the global stage” 97, 99; global initiatives and ideas 94, global consequences 94. New are the oppositions: globality and locality 183, the global and local poles of the hierarchy 183; the “local” globalized world 9; the domestic and global market 102; global causes of local poverty 115: G l o b a l i z a t i o n fragments just as it unites; it divides by uniting <...>. <...>, the process of “l o c a l i z a t i o n” begins, defining space 8. <...> communication between increasingly g l o b a l i z e d and extraterritorial elites and other people who are ever more l o c a l i z e d is collapsing at an accelerating pace 10. <...> the image of “g l o b a l o r d e r” evaporated and turned into the sum total of local orders, <...> 98. Wealth is g l o b a l, while poverty is l o c a l, <...> 115. G l o b a l financial resource flows 116 and the l o c a l traces those flows leave <...>—the destruction of local economies 116. G l o b a l law, l o c a l orders (chapter title) 156. The g l o b a l dimension of investors’ choices, compared with the strictly l o c a l constraints on the choices of “labor” suppliers, creates the asymmetry that in turn underpins the domination of the former 159. Moreover, this opposition is also a unity—glocalization: “What is free choice for some falls upon others as a cruel fate. And since the number of these ‘others’ keeps growing and they sink into despair at an existence with ever fewer prospects, one may speak of ‘glocalization’ (a felicitous term by Roland Robertson, expressing the indissoluble unity of the ‘globalizing’ and ‘localizing’ decisions, — <...>” (Bauman 2007: 109). This painful and unjust opposition is often expressed in another way: “<...> the technological abolition of distances in time / space does not homogenize the human condition, but rather polarizes it. – – – For some, this foretells the freedom to create m e a n i n g s, while condemning others to m e a n i n g l e s s n e s s. At present, some can leave whenever they wish Terminologija | 2008 | 15 6 9 — no matter where they are from — while others helplessly watch as the only place they inhabit slips out from under their feet” (Bauman 2007: 33). “<...> globalization is a paradox: by giving a great deal to a small group, it repels and marginalizes two-thirds of the world’s population” (Bauman 2007: 111). “The widely known and increasingly alarming polarization of the world and its inhabitants <...> is a consequence of globalization itself” (Bauman 2007: 143). “When entire nations are deprived of their resources, this is called ‘promoting free trade’; when families and communities are deprived of their means of subsistence, this is called ‘downsizing’ or simply ‘rationalization’” (Bauman 2007: 186). <...> fragmentation and distancing “at the bottom” and globalization “at the top” are twins (Bauman 2007: 193). Thus Bauman presents a fairly compelling anti-globalist platform. Like Brzezinski, he speaks of global chaos: “The image of global chaos perhaps reflects a new understanding (facilitated, though not necessarily caused, by the sudden end of bloc politics) that things previously thought to be firmly under control <...> are essentially spontaneous and accidental” (Bauman 2007: 91). “Globalization is another name for [Kenneth] Jowitt’s ‘new world disorder’ [the title of this author’s book]” (Bauman 2007: 93). Bauman sees globalization not as the failure or distortion of an attempt to realize a good idea, but as fundamentally misguided: “world affairs are uncertain, uncontrollable, and left to run their course” (Bauman 2007: 92). He understands globalization as a deviation from the original idea of universalization, which “expressed the hope, intention, and resolve to impose order,” and “proclaimed the intention to change the world and make it better than it was, and to extend changes and improvements globally, on the scale of the entire human race” (Bauman 2007: 93). Bauman explains how things took such a wrong turn; what matters to us here is only the failed outcome: “‘Globalization’ is not what we all, or at least the most enterprising and resourceful among us, want and hope to do. Globalization is what is happening to all of us” (Bauman 2007: 94). The author also speaks with bitter irony of the state’s helplessness before the omnipotence of globalization: “In the globalization cabaret, the state performs a striptease and at the end of the show is left with only the bare essentials — its own repressive powers <...> — so the nation-state becomes a mere security service for megacorporations...” (Bauman 2007: 103). “Weak quasi-states can easily be compelled to play the (useful) role of local police stations; <...>” (Bauman 2007: 106). “Poverty is criminalized” (Bauman 2007: 190), while “imprisonment is more an alternative to employment: a way of getting rid of a large population 70 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... dalies (ar ją neutralizuoti), <...>“ (Bauman 2007: 169). Tai globalizacijos atstumtieji bei globalizacijos atliekos (171). Now, when books are being written even in Lithuania arguing that politics without values is immoral (Jokubaitis 2008), Monsignor Gianfranco Girotti, regent of the Apostolic Penitentiary of the Vatican, speaks of social sins associated with globalization: “Genetic manipulation, environmental pollution, social inequality, unbearable social injustice: these are new forms of sin that have emerged on humanity’s horizon, as if crowning the unstoppable process of globalization. — — — In short, repentance today is understood more in the social sphere, especially after social relations have weakened and become more complicated. And this is one of the consequences of globalization” (Nuodėmė 2008: 12 6). The concise conclusion of this review and these assessments would be as follows: globalization is a historically закономерный phenomenon, but its inevitable consequences include major negative effects, among them the rapid and drastic depletion of the world’s languages and their classification into global, regional, official / state languages, and domestic languages with limited functions (all of these are perennial processes), although the vocabularies or grammars of surviving languages are affected not directly, but only as a fateful context or unfavorable background. In Lithuanian discourse, assessments of globalization and globalism are only occasionally addressed rationally: “It is not insularity but expansiveness, engagement with the environment of modern nations, and a sensible openness to it that will save national culture. When speaking of a nation’s heritage today, and even more so tomorrow, priority must be given to affirmation, not negation (Treinys 2000: 18). But this cannot be done alone, without ‘goodwill exchange partners, cultural allies’; these would be ‘people and nations unwilling to lose their identity and become merely consumers of McDonald’s and Teletubbies culture’ (Treinys 2000: 18). Terrorist anti-globalists cannot be allies, since they ‘seek to turn national identity into an instrument of revenge, terror, or other aggression, and thus <...> act as a convenient argument for the apologists of total globalization to deny any expression of the ideology of national identity’ (Treinys 2000: 20). The concepts of globalization and globalism are almost entirely absent from public discourse, for example: a globalizing world MokslL 2008 6 2, a globalized economy NŽA 2008 11–12 480, globalization of the world financial system Vd 2008 45 13, mass globalization Vd 2008 24 53, the tsunami of globalization Vd 2008 15 38, the dark side of globalization NŽA 2008 11–12 501, “global governance” Vd 2008 31 41, global order NŽA 2008 11–12 501, global commerce L ir M 2008 44 3, Terminologija | 2008 | 15 7 1 global culture GŽ 2008 1 1 25, global fashions L ir M 2008 44 3, global security NŽA 2008 11–12 501, global pragmatic peace NŽA 2008 6 286. Negative issues are now highly topical: global warming Sav su TV 2008 33 15, threats on a global scale MokslL 2008 16 7, global crisis Sav su TV 2008 11 6, crisis of global capitalism NŽA 2008 11–12 501, global financial crisis Sav su TV 2008 46 16, global price increases Sav su TV 2008 11 6, global demand for food products Sav su TV 2008 11 7. The paucity of these concepts is a sign of a poor understanding of the significance of globalization. Most often, what is written about and shown are riots and rampages by anti-globalists. Only Donatas Katkus dares to say: I am a cultural anti-globalist L ir M 2008 44 3. To conclude, two purely linguistic points. The main concept globalization systematically calls for the adjective global (but not globalistic), rather than universal, for example: a pandemic of corruption, global bribery Vd 2008 51 45; and the adjacent use of universal bribery seems somehow off. It is highly questionable whether it is appropriate to replace the computing term internationalization — “the design of software and its data structures so that all of this can be easily adapted to different languages and cultures” EncKompŽ 2005 — with globalization, for example: “The possibilities for applying information technologies in knowledge management offer much hope, where the concept of localization is becoming increasingly important <…>. <…> localization means adapting a product to a language and culture. Localization is not the same as globalization (adapting market strategies to the requirements of all regions) or internationalization (producing a product, such as software, that can be adapted to the requirements of various locales)” (Crystal 2005: 148). Global name, global variable would be unobjectionable. 2. Focusing everyone’s attention solely on the effects (challenges) of globalization is highly misguided not only because of its one-sidedness, but also because it leaves other important factors unmentioned. There was more than one, and they were of different kinds. Behind the Iron Curtain, harmful phenomena of the twentieth century flourished vigorously; at least in part, they could be regarded as an unfavorable, irrational background for the functioning of language in general and of particular languages, especially smaller ones: the cult of consumption and the concentration of capital — “this is the velvet tyranny of twentieth-century democracy. – – – Today, people express the meaning of their existence by shopping. Hypermarkets are the shrines of our cult of shopping. – – – Late twentieth-century capitalism creates needs, <…>”; consumer society — “In a consumer society, there must necessarily exist a two- 72 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... slaves of its kinds: slaves of habit and slaves of envy.” Thus wrote Ivan Illich (Illich; b. 1926) in his book “Tools of Conviviality” (1973)”; mass society – “a critically evaluated modern society—spineless, conformist, lacking both ideals and traditional values, concerned only with material gain, passive, alienated, bureaucratized, and susceptible to propaganda and advertising. <...>”; throwaway civilization – “the uneconomical, wasteful, errant, reckless civilization of the twentieth century, acquiring ever more things, even those not very necessary, which, after being used once, must be thrown away, <...>. – – –”; marketing (English marketing) – “<...>. It requires <...> analyzing consumer psychology and knowing how to influence it, stimulating society’s needs <...>”; advertising – “— — — twentieth-century advertising is no longer based on rational arguments. It rarely discusses a product’s qualities, but more often appeals to the consumer’s character, targeting their weaknesses, dreams, desires, and fears.” “<...> In the 1970s, the art of television advertising flourished, employing more ingenious rhetoric and a more sophisticated style. Political propaganda also adopted television advertising methods: the politician’s televised image (image) became more important than what they had to say. By the 1980s, television advertising techniques were already influencing many feature films as well – <...>”; agitator – “The agitator’s art is to pretend to be as stupid as his listeners, so that they think they are as intelligent as he is” (Karl Kraus (1874–1936), Austrian playwright, poet, and publicist), <...>”; mass media (English mass media) – “the means of public information, <...>. The theory holds that the mass media are effective only when there are many listeners (readers, viewers), sufficiently educated to understand and take an interest in the information they receive. However, <...> most recipients of information seek in them not so much knowledge as the cheapest entertainment. Consequently, media organizers, who depend mainly on advertising for their income, are compelled to provide poorer, lower-quality information, <...>. All this, one must assume, impoverishes the intellect of less resilient consumers of information, especially children and young people, and spoils their taste”; mass culture (English mass culture) – “a term that emerged in the United States in the early 1950s: it refers to the body of intellectual, artistic, and entertainment publications characteristic of contemporary urbanized society, supplied to the masses by the mass media. These publications are criticized for their low intellectual, aesthetic, and moral standards, and for the vulgarization and oversimplification of works <...>”; Terminologija | 2008 | 15 7 3 three-minute culture – “a torrent of short, superficial messages that overwhelms the average recipient of information from radio, television, and the internet, disorienting them; ordinary citizens can no longer follow one topic attentively for more than 3 minutes. Knowing this, television presenters (...) interrupt even the most interesting and substantive expert commentary after three minutes, preventing the speaker from getting to the heart of the matter <...>”; star-making – “<...>. The most valuable attribute of a film star became not so much acting ability and talent as an actor, but rather their aura, the atmosphere surrounding the star, and the ability to entice audiences through personal charm, physical attractiveness, and sexuality. In Hollywood <...> there were specialists capable of modeling a star as an unattainable object of dreams with whom the viewer would wish to identify, as one of the archetypes of modern mythology, changing along with fashions and customs. – – –” (Kopalįnski 2001). The common denominator of all these phenomena is the dumbing down of human beings and their lives. The century’s quotations aptly complement and highlight similar distortions: “Today’s celebrities can neither be shamed nor humiliated. What was once called shame and humiliation is now called advertising” (from P. J. O’Rourke’s (P. J. Rourke; b. 1947) book “Gine War a Chanse” (“Give War a Chance”; 1992)) (Kopalįnski 2001: 79). “(What is) interesting is more important today than what is true; what is strange and exciting triumphs over what is real. <...>. In truth, there is nothing cheaper in our century than truth. And truth, undoubtedly, entails obligations.” So said the French writer René Daumal (René Daumal; 1908–1944) <...>” (Kopalįnski 2001: 173). Filosofas Karlas Raimundas Popperis (1902–1994) paskutiniame savo darbe – esė Nepiktnaudžiauti televizija (paskelbtame 1995 m.) nustatė televizijos maro diagnozę: „<...> televizija yra blogio jėga, ji galėtų tapti gėrio jėga. Deja, tai beveik neįtikimas dalykas. Priežastis paprasta: apskritai bet kokią kultūrinę jėgą yra be galo sunku priversti tarnauti gėriui“ (Popper 1995: 14). Kol televizijų konkurencija buvo nedidelė, tol ir paklausa buvo maža, tad „pirmaisiais savo gyvavimo metais laidų kokybei televizija buvo kur kas reiklesnė“ (Popper 1995: 15). Dabar gausybė k o m e r c i n i ų televizijų varžosi, kad „prisiviliotų kuo daugiau publikos, o šis siekimas, savaime suprantama, jokių auklėjamųjų tikslų neturi“ (Popper 1995: 14). Žiūrovų masėms jų nė nereikia – tik circenses. Kultūros paklausa nedidelė... Transliuotojams rūpi pelnas, o jį užtikrina reklama, duodama į tas laidas, kurių žiūrimumo rodikliai aukšti. Popperis greičiausiai klysta, kad transliuotojai n u o š i r d ž i a u s i a i įsitikinę, jog rodyti reikia tai, ko žmonės nori. Žiūro- 74 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... Television addiction among young people, especially children and adolescents, as well as pensioners, is certainly unhealthy. The paradox is that competition in manufacturing ensures the quality of goods, whereas competition among television channels lowers the quality of programmes. Not much better is the Americanization of culture – “One of the most important cultural developments of the twentieth century is that the direction of transatlantic influence changed. The culture of the United States, which Europe had nourished up to the beginning of the century, subsequently flooded Europe and the whole world, together with the economic and political influence resulting from two world wars and the decline of Europe they brought about, particularly since the United States greatly helped both to win those wars and to rebuild what they had destroyed.” The phenomena of this culture include jazz, rock, pop music, Hollywood films, westerns, television series, thrillers, crime fiction, cars, brash advertising, soap operas, fast food, and jeans. “Under Anglo-Saxon influence, language changes beyond recognition” (Kopaliński 2001). France tries to resist, but the result is Franglais – “the French language, full of English words and expressions. The name, formed from the blended French words français (French) and anglais (English), was popularized around 1965 by René Etiemble, professor of comparative linguistics at the Sorbonne, <…>. The professor urged replacing English words with French ones, <…>. <…>. In present-day Poland, the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza took the initiative in November 1996 to Polonize English terms, with readers’ help, but the results were not particularly encouraging: <…>” (Kopaliński 2001). Another result is wooden language – “language full of banalities and hackneyed phrases. <…>” (Kopaliński 2001). After the Iron Curtain fell, these phenomena also swept into Lithuania, whose spiritually depleted population, alas, saw everything from the West as good. True, not everything was unfamiliar. Some things were crudely derided by Soviet anti-American propaganda; some were somewhat familiar from more serious Lithuanian philosophical discourse, and some from our émigré literature. But serious criticism often came late. As early as 1969, in America, one of the pioneers of Lithuanian essay writing and a perceptive publicist, the poet Jonas Aistis, wrote: “Advertising is a great power of our time; before it all denominations, all thrones, and all dominions must bow” (Aistis 1991: 418). The critical efforts demonstrated in recent years by the Institute of the Lithuanian Language and the Lithuanian Language Society should also be mentioned (RekK 2004). Although this field of advertising language is not without its apologetic assessments. Terminologija | 2008 | 15 75 Reklamos sesuo mada į XX a. mitų (Kopaliński 2001) tarpą nepateko, nes smarkiai reiškiasi nuo daug anksčiau. Jau rusų rašytojas N. Gogolis, Romoje lygindamas senojo meno grožį su savo laiku, rašė: „Ir kokia netauri, žema prieš šitą didingą, gražią prabangą pasirodė jam dabar XIX šimtmečio prabanga, smulki, niekinga prabanga, tinkanti tik krautuvės puošti – <...>. – – Kokie menki atrodė jam prieš šitą pastovią palaimingą prabangą, supančią žmogų daiktais, kurie kilmina ir auklėja jo sielą, nūdieniai smulkmeniški papuošalai, kuriuos laužo ir išmeta lauk nenuorama mada, tasai keistas, nesuprantamas XIX amžiaus padarinys [t. y. reiškinys], prieš kurį tyliai nusilenkę išminčiai, šitas žudyt ojas ir griovėjas visko, kas kolosalu, didinga, šventa“ (Gogolis 19541: 236). Savo kūrybos ataskaitoje Šešiasdešimt mano literatūrinio gyvenimo metų prancūzų akademikas A. Maurois teigia, kad dėl mados išpuolių pasidarė nuoseklus moralistas: „Tokiu metu, kai mada reikalavo nepaisyti doros normų ir dėsnių, be kurių negali egzistuoti jokia visuomenė, aš tiesiog savaime pasijutau priverstas, profesijos įpareigotas jas ginti. Todėl tapau moralistu. Vėliau rašiau romanus, biografijas, tačiau manyje romanisto ir biografo nugarkaulį sudaro moralistas“ (Morua 1991: 18). Kitam prancūzui – mokslinių esė knygos Viduramžių vaizduotė autoriui Jacques’ui Le Goffui mados gynimas ir gyrimas (gal pergy­rimas) irgi neišeina be naikinamos kritikos: „Po Roland’o Barthes’o esu pasiryžęs ginti madą. Ji dėmesinga naujovei, modernumo variklis, gali būti atsinaujinimo priemonė. Tai istorijos varomoji jėga. Kaip kiekvienas reiškinys, ji gali išsigimti ir nugrimzti į snobizmą – tiesą sakant, jaudinantį iškrypimą vyrų ir moterų, kurie stengiasi sustabdyti bėgantį laiką ir atitolinti mirties grėsmę apgailėtinu ir beviltišku noru visada būti mados viršūnėje ir užmiršti laiko jausmą, diena iš dienos keisdami išvaizdą“ (Le Goff 2003: 26). Šitai yra nuolat. O išlyga – daugiau teorinė: „Tačiau mada – tai pirmiausia Zeitgeist, laiko dvasios, apraiška, susiejanti išvaizdą su giluminiais istoriniais poslinkiais“ (Le Goff 2003: 26). Mados uniformizmas ir meninė, štampinė kalba – kalbos uniformizmas yra susiję paliegusios mūsų laiko dvasios ženklai. Vėl galima prisiminti mūsų guvųjį J. Aistį: „Kultūra turi kruvinu prakaitu išeiti iš tautos iščių. Kita vertus, mada visada išeina iš mados. – – – Labai madingi dalykai, išėję iš mados, yra juokingi ir kvaili“ (Aistis 1991: 476). Only after the Iron Curtain fell did truths reach us from the West about our own lives in the empire of evil—truths almost half a century old: newspeak (Lith. newspeak) – “a new language created by monopolistic power 76 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... whose words change meaning in accordance with the state’s official political views. In Newspeak, it is impossible not only to express but even to formulate disloyal views, because the necessary words do not exist. The term comes from George Orwell’s (1903–1950) novel Nineteen Eighty-Four; thought police – “an institution of the Party depicted in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, which monitors the thoughts of members of the Outer Party. Upon noticing (=masc. – J. K.) any deviation from the prescribed ‘line’, it (=fem. – J. K.) ensures that the culprit is arrested, tortured (in the Ministry of Love), and destroyed”; doublethink (English doublethink) – “the simultaneous perception of two opposing thoughts or opinions and conscious belief in both. The term comes from the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) by the English writer George Orwell (1903–1950); it describes the influence of Newspeak on the ‘enslaved mind’;” The Captive Mind – “a book by Czesław Miłosz (1953), in which the author analyzes the psychological defense mechanisms of writers in the Polish People’s Republic, which compel them to publish slogans conforming to official propaganda and carefully conceal their true thoughts and feelings, <...>” (Kopaliński 2001). The enslavement of the mind begins with emptiness (an environment without religion) and the absurdity of a purposeless life, proceeds through the necessity of a new life, and reaches compulsory success (Miłosz 1995: 20, 22, 24, 30). Yet success does not come without sad consequences: “deep down, old moral and aesthetic demands still remain, and as a result a person becomes divided” (Miłosz 1995: 36) – “everyone acts before everyone else, and everyone knows that the others are acting” (Miłosz 1995: 76); “It would be untrue to claim that values are no longer divided, but resistance is emotional and can rarely withstand the competition of rationalized reflexes” (Miłosz 1995: 244). The disastrous preceding era could be succinctly characterized by two dreadful period catchphrases, symbols of values—from the East: хлам (junk) – an abbreviation of the words художники, литераторы, артисты, музыканты; from the West: Wenn ich Kultur höre… entsichere ich meinen Browning (author: Hans Johst; popularizer: Hermann Göring). It was only on 26–27 November 1988 that David Glencross expressed a true thought for the era: “It is incredible that any government, on hearing the word ‘culture’, would reach for a pistol. I think it should reach for a dictionary” (Kopaliński 2001: 197–198). Of a world polarized into two antagonistic camps, with its fluctuating and Terminologija | 2008 | 15 77 transformation into a vegetating Third World2, the disintegration of the Stalinist empire, in which, by the Brezhnev era, the convergence and merging of languages were already openly being planned and proclaimed, the restoration of Lithuanian independence and the establishment of Lithuanian as the state language (its designation as the state language and the state’s provision of protection, as well as programs and projects for its use and development), national revival, the democratization of society and the formation of civil society, Lithuania’s European and transatlantic integration and the ensuing Anglicization, as well as computerization and internetization—all are more specific factors; their significance for national identity and self-awareness, culture and language, science and linguistics, language culture and terminology has been decisive and epoch-making for 20 years, and will remain so for a long time. II 3. The material world is one. Although there are many and substantial differences in landscape, vegetation and wildlife, climate, and the ways of life associated with them, on the one hand people diminish them (which is also a kind of globalization), and on the other, human material reality is already very extensive and not so diverse. Logic is one throughout the rational world, although there is more of it in some places and less in others. The third form of world-being—language (Лукшите 1981: 166)—is an enormous plurality, impossible to count precisely (whether 3,000 or 7,000). Every living language is ethnic or national—a mother tongue. A nation’s character, spirit, customs, and way of life are also native. One must simply be able to sense this and understand the reasons. Here is one particularly apt insight: “Differences in customs showed through in every action and step. People’s gestures reflected geographical zones, parallels, meridians; they expressed the everyday lives of shepherds, farmers, merchants, and sailors; the roasting spit moved in a Spartan’s hands as a battle spear would, an Argive sat on a bench as if on horseback, and a forest dweller could be recognized by his quiet gait” (Parandovskis 1984: 118). 2 The term “Third World” (French Tiers monde) was used around 1950 by the French sociologist and demographer Alfred Sauvy: he used it to designate more than 130 postcolonial states in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Oceania, distinguishing them from developed market-economy states and the countries of the then (until 1990) Communist bloc” (Kopalįnski 2001). Incidentally, a quite different Third World later emerged: “According to K. Popper [Popper K. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford, 1972], the ‘third world’ is the world of ideas in general, linked by the rules of logic. It encompasses all the theories and concepts created throughout human history, and those yet to be created, as well as all hypotheses, all problems and equations—solved, being solved, and still to be solved” (Joninas 1987: 69). A still different form is third being: “А. Ф. Лосев говорит, что „языковое и словесное бытие есть третий вид бытия, наряду с чисто логическим и чисто вещественным, или материальным“ [Лосев 1976, с. 399] (Лукшите 1981: 166). In 1959 Charles P. Snow formulated the conflict between two cultures—the humanities and the sciences—while in 1995 John Brockman wrote in his book The Third Culture about those taking over “the mission of the intellectual elite to seek answers to questions that have long troubled humanity: what is life, who are we, where are we going (...) <...>” (Kopalįnski 2001). 78 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... The mother tongue and other native things preserve one’s identity. However, they cannot ensure complete purity, because foreign languages and all kinds of other foreign influences surround us: “And yet, despite these diversities, mother Greece seemed almost homogeneous amid the fantastic ferment of the colonies: Africa, Iberia, Gaul, Illyria, Scythia, Sarmatia, Syria, and Egypt breathed their own scent from the mysterious depths of history and civilization into hundreds of Greek cities, <...>. In daily dealings with barbarians, on caravan journeys, amid the bustle of harbors, foreign thoughts, superstitions, and vices clung to people, just as street dust works its way into the pores of the skin” (Parandovskis 1984: 118–119). “The language, split into an innumerable multitude of dialects and subdialects and overgrown with foreign weeds in the colonies, gave rise to terrible misunderstandings” (Parandovskis 1984: 119). Our mother tongue—Lithuanian—under conditions of continuous subordinative bilingualism had extensive contact with Polish; it was simply inundated by it, so that only remote pockets untouched by the church and manor remained less affected. As a result, it acquired numerous foreignisms and lost considerable areas of its native-language domain and a large proportion of its speakers—not only the magnates and nobility, but also the common people. Only a fraction of the consequences has been remedied; most represent irreversible losses. After the partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the same process began with Russian (there had already been plenty of borrowings from it before then) and continued for two centuries, with only brief periods of respite (but no complete breaks) during the First and Second Republics. Now, with independence regained, an era of contact with English has begun. It is therefore useful to become at least somewhat acquainted with these languages from within—with how Russians and English speakers themselves understand and evaluate them. The main concern is the (self-)critical aspect. Russian–French bilingualism is well known, more precisely, the French-speaking culture of the Russian upper classes. Closely related to this is the distinction of standard Russian from the phenomenon called просторечие—“words, expressions, turns of phrase, and inflectional forms that do not conform to the norms of literary speech; they are often permitted in literary works and colloquial speech to create a particular color”—English popular language, German Volkssprache (Ахманова 1966); Latvian vienkāršruna (ValTV 1963)—although разговорная речь, обиходно-разговорная речь means ‘colloquial speech’ (ValTV 1963), while vienkāršruna – šnekamoji kalba means ‘colloquial language’ (LaLieŽ 1977). The German equivalent Volkssprache is also questionable. A rather imprecise and overly broad Lithuanian equivalent of Russian просторечие is non-literary speech—“the speech characteristic of inhabitants of large cities, differing to a greater or lesser extent from the norms of literary language. The lexical, grammatical, and phonetic features of this speech arise from dialectal Terminologija | 2008 | 15 79 and the mixing of literary language elements, also often due to the noticeably greater influence of other languages.” Cf. slang – English non-standard speech, popular language (Gaivenis, Keinys 1990). It is inaccurate to translate просторечие as colloquial speech Gudavičius 2000: 40, popular, colloquial language RLKŽ II 1967. Russian просторечие is inseparable from простонародье, a noun – common folk, lower classes RLKŽ II 1967, common people RLKŽ III 1984, простолюдин, a noun – commoner, person of low social status, member of an unprivileged class RLKŽ III 1984, простонародный, an adjective – common, low-class, of the common people: простонародная речь – colloquial [common people's] speech RLKŽ III 1984, and thus просторечие – colloquial speech, low [commoners'] language (not bookish or literary) RLKŽ III 1984 (colloq. – colloquial word, expression – просторечное RLKŽ I 1982: 15), low colloquial speech – просторечие LRKŽ 1988. It should not be forgotten that low colloquial speech is a Russian term applied only to the Russian language. Since Russian просторечие is permitted in literary works, Russian writers fought vigorously for the popular character of the language—its Russianness. V. Bielinskis understood the reason very well in Literary Reveries (1834): “That is to say, the n a t i o n or, better put, the p e o p l e, and s o c i e t y among us have gone their separate ways. The former continued living its primitive, harsh, semi-wild life and singing its sorrowful songs, in which its soul overflowed with grief and joy; the latter, it seems, changed, if not improved, forgot everything Russian, forgot e v e n t o s p e a k R u s s i a n; <...>” (Bielinskis 1948: 71). “<...> the upper classes had reason to despise their native language, because the written language clashed with the spoken language” (Bielinskis 1948: 95). Bielinskis recognized the diversity of Russian purism and assessed its forms in a differentiated way, while taking a moderate view of purism as a whole: “The word ‘progress’ was naturally bound to meet with particular hostility from those Russian language purists who were predisposed against it; they took offense at every foreign word, regarding it as heresy or schism within the orthodoxy of the native language. Such purism has a legitimate and serious basis; and yet it is one-sidedness taken to the extreme” (Bielinskis 1948: 530). “There is no doubt that the desire to clutter the Russian language with foreign words without need, without sufficient grounds, runs counter to common sense and good taste; <...>. But the opposite extreme—that is, unlimited purism—produces the same consequences, because extremes meet” (Bielinskis 1948: 532). N. Gogol also viewed the aristocratic Francophony of the Russian upper classes critically: “The ladies of N. were noted for <...>, extraordinary caution and propriety in their words and expressions. <...>. It was quite impossible to sa- 80 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... y: ‘This glass or this plate stinks,’ <...>. To make the Russian language even more refined, almost half of its words were completely banished from it, and so it was very often necessary to resort to French; yet French was another matter: there, words much coarser than those just mentioned were permissible” (Gogol 19542: 183). In telling a painful truth, he does not shy away from bitter irony: “But although the author bows with fearful reverence before the saving benefits that the French language brings to Russia, and although he bows with equal reverence before the praiseworthy custom of our upper classes, whose representatives express their thoughts in that language at every hour of the day, naturally out of great love for their fatherland, he still does not dare insert any foreign-language expression into this Russian poem of his” (Gogol 19542: 211). Russians of the upper classes, from whom “you will never hear a single decent Russian word, but they will quite likely shower you with French, German, and English ones <...>, while retaining every possible manner of pronunciation: French through the nose and with a lisp, English as a bird would say it, even making their faces birdlike,” have a very peculiar view of cultivating their native language: “They insist that everything be written in the strictest, purest, and noblest language—in a word, they want the Russian language suddenly to descend from the clouds, fully refined, and land directly on the tongue, so that all they need do is open their mouths and stick out their tongues” (Gogol 19542: 190). As the storm of the Russian Revolution gathered, low-class speech was already (in 1914) understood as a terrifying threat of barbarism and lack of culture: “В тягостные дни <...> варвар и дикарь с гаканием устремились на все, что нам дорого, и едва ли не первейшей задачей стремительного своего набега поставили уничтожение русской речи, оплевание и заушение нашего изумительного, чарующего, свободного языка, <...>” (Соболев 2001: 330). The language of the revolutionary period was a mixture of all kinds of changes and the most unexpected features: “В качестве характерных признаков языка революционного времени разными исследователями отмечались обилие заимствованных слов и выражений, большое количество разного рода сокращений, использование, с одной стороны, грубой, бранной и нецензурной, а с другой – высокой и архаичной лексики, повышенная экспрессивность и эмоциональность речи, достигаемая разными средствами (перифразы, метафоры и др.), интонационная близость к ораторской речи, влияние канцелярского стиля, штампованность; многие современники жаловались и на самую обыкновенную безграмотность (это касается Terminologija | 2008 | 15 81 в первую очередь языка газеты)“ [*См., напр.: Винокур Г. О. Культура языка. Очерки лингвистической технологии. М., 1925; Горнфельд А. Т. Новые словечки и старые слова. <...>. Петербург, 1922; Гус М., Загорянский Ю., Каганович Н. Язык газеты. М., 1926; Селищев А. М. Язык революционной эпохи. <...>. М., 1928; Mazon A. Lexique de la guerre et de la révolution en Russie (1914–1918). Paris, 1920; Mendras Ed. Remarques sur la vocabulaire de la révolution russe [<...>. Paris, 1925. P. 257–269] (Риникер 2001: 638–639). This decisive decline in language, though later somewhat slowed, proved irreversible. At the solemn 1962 commemoration of the 125th anniversary of A. Pushkin’s death, A. Tvardovsky dared to speak even of writers’ speechlessness – безъязыклость, as well as “скудость, сглаженность и обезличение языка” (Твардовский 1979: 14, 15). His concern that “вопрос об охране языка должен встать в государственном масштабе” (Твардовский 1979: 14) naturally went entirely unheeded, since the authorities at every level were precisely at the forefront of corrupting the language. During the years of Soviet stagnation and collapse, the decline of language recurred as an entrenched relapse: “В последние десятилетия наблюдается активное вхождение жаргонной лексики во все сферы речевого общения – литературу (художественную и публицистическую), тексты СМИ, парламентскую речь и др. В связи с этим многие говорят о жаргонизации русского языка” (КРусР 2003: 1862). English, once an imperial and colonial language, and now the leading international and global language, is an important subject when considering what—what characteristics make it so, elevate it, and sustain it. The Englishman Thomas Stearns Eliot speaks plainly: “Every language has its own resources and its own limits of possibility,” although it strives “to realize its possibilities as fully as possible” (Eliot 1990: 4 222). Arguing that “the maturity of a language will coincide with the maturity of mind and manners” (Eliot 1990: 4 222), he sees the maturity of English as highly distinctive and atypical: “In England we have neither an age of classicism nor a classical poet; if we understand why this is so, we shall immediately lose the desire to lament it; <...>. The genius of the English language has not embodied such an ideal—it has always had other aims” (Eliot 1990: 4 222). And this is regarded as a cause for delight: “<...>, have we not been fortunate to have a language which, instead of producing a classic, can boast a rich diversity in the past and foreseeable innovations in the future?” (Eliot 1990: 4 224). Eliot aptly reveals the distinctiveness of the native language through comparison: “<...>, the Romance languages may come closer to classicism—not because they are of Latin origin, but because they are more homogeneous than English and already 82 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... by nature inclined toward a general style; English, in its constituent parts, is the most varied of the major languages, tending more toward diversity than perfection; it needs more time to reveal its potential, and perhaps it still has more untapped possibilities. It is perhaps distinguished by the greatest capacity for change while always remaining itself” (Eliot 1990: 4 224). Rather than tending toward the classical, the norm (standard), it “allows great freedom for stylistic variation: it seems that in this language no age and, clearly, no writer will be able to establish norms. French seems much more constrained by normative style and to have finally settled in the eighteenth century, but even within it lurks esprit gaulois* [*the mighty spirit], that abundance of resources which distinguished Rabelais and Villon” (Eliot 1990: 4 225). Eliot’s praise of his native English can be regarded not as something rationally grounded, but as “an elemental loyalty” (Chesterton 1998: 76): “People did not love Rome because it was great. It became great because people loved it” (Chesterton 1998: 77). Eliot, however, had another love, which brought him back to England—classical languages and ancient culture: “It is necessary to turn to both dead languages: their being dead is precisely what matters, for it was only after their death that we could inherit their legacy; the fact of their death would give them no value if all the nations of Europe were not their heirs” (Eliot 1990: 4 225). And it is precisely where Eliot finds the first (and perhaps the only true) classic, Virgil, who created the criterion of the classical, that we also find the true ideal of language—the norm (standard), rather than unlimited diversity and boundless possibilities for change. Eliot merely laments that in modern times this inheritance becomes quite problematic, even unreal and distorted: “In our age, when people seem more inclined than ever to confuse wisdom with knowledge, and knowledge with being informed <...>, a new kind of provincialism is taking shape, <...>. This is not provincialism of place, but of time: history is merely a record of human inventions, registered, worn out, and thrown on the scrap heap; the world is exclusively the property of the living, in which the dead have no rights of co-ownership. <...> all of us together, all the people of the globe, may turn out to be provincials, and those who do not wish to be so have no choice but to become hermits. <...> it [this provincialism] encourages our indifference when we ought to preserve a clear, unimpaired dogma or standard, <...>” (Eliot 1990: 4 226). Thus, there is a mother tongue and there are foreign languages. To know many languages is like having many keys for one lock (Voltaire). A person who knows two languages is worth two people, says French wisdom (Crystal 2005: 50). However, polyglotism is not common. Foreign Terminologija | 2008 | 15 83 language proficiency comes in many degrees: being able to translate, write, speak, or understand well or a little. “By learning another language, we acquire a new perspective on the world, <...>” (Gudavičius 2000: 19). Ivan Bunin, who knew several languages and translated literary works from English, French, Polish, and Ukrainian, was emphatic: “Пишите на том языке, с которым родились и выросли. Двух языков человек знать не может” (Бунин 2001: 224). A major problem in the functioning of languages is their coexistence and contact. Isolated coexistence of languages was probably never very characteristic, since both peaceful relations—exogamy and the exchange of goods—and wars and the taking of captives are ancient phenomena. Thus, interlingual communication takes the form of language contact, bilingualism (of various kinds), translation, calques, borrowings, foreign words, and, ultimately, assimilation (of individuals or of a tribe or nation). Translation is the most cultured and most egalitarian form of interlingual communication. The history of translations of the Holy Scriptures and of literary and scholarly works is long and extensive. First and foremost, translations introduce new content—concepts, words, meanings (Genzelis 1980: 90). They also stimulate the resources of the native language: foreign content recast in the native language ensures “the possibility of deeper understanding” (Laumenskaitė 2007: 11–12 551). Bilingualism is of two types—coordinate and subordinate. Bilingualism involving a native language and a regional or international language is closer to the coordinate type, while bilingualism involving a native and an imperial language is closer to the subordinate type. After the fall of the Roman Empire and the disappearance of classical Latin and decline of Vulgar Latin, two waves of bilingualism arose in Europe. One was the division of functions between classical Latin and native languages, and their parallel use. Other forms of bilingualism also existed: “For example, in the Middle Ages there were regional languages—Latin, Arabic, and Old Church Slavonic. They were used by the official institutions of the time: the church, educational institutions, and state chanceries. <...>. The choice of language was determined by religious affiliation: Catholicism—Latin, Islam—Arabic, the Orthodox Church of the northern peoples—Old Church Slavonic. <...>. <...>, while Latin was generally only a written language; no people spoke it. All medieval writers, poets, and philosophers of Western and Central Europe wrote in Latin. <...>. Latin was abandoned in philosophy only in modern times. This transitional period produced many bilingual cultural figures. Dante wrote the “Divine Comedy” in Italian, but his philosophical treatise “On Monarchy” in Latin. F. Bacon and R. Descartes wrote philosophical treatises in two languages: in Latin for the scholarly community, and in their native languages for readers in their own countries” (Genzelis 1980: 92). 84 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... Another wave was created by lingua franca (“(Italian lingua franca—the language of the Franks, a West Germanic tribe that later formed the basis of the populations of West Germany and eastern France; in a broader sense, the language of European Christians)”); specifically: 1. “A mixed, pidgin language. It is based on Italian, mixed with Provençal, Spanish, Portuguese, as well as French, Greek, and Arabic. It was used from the 11th to the 19th century in the Mediterranean basin, mainly in North Africa (present-day Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, i.e. the Maghreb countries), by Jews and merchants speaking different languages as an international language of trade, and also by pirates, captives, galley slaves, prisoners, and visitors from Europe. The synonymous name sabir is also known (‘I know’; French savoir, Spanish saber); <…>”; later, in a broader sense: 2. “Any language used for communication among people who speak different native languages, if it performs only one function of language—that of a means of communication. It is the language of the most prestigious, influential, or economically powerful nation (ethnic group, community) in a particular period or region. It is usually used in trade, but may also be a language of culture (e.g. Latin) or diplomacy (e.g. French). In the 20th century such a language also came to be called international or global (e.g. International English, Global English, Globish) [also 4. ‘specially created artificial languages intended for international communication’ (Volapük, Esperanto, Latino sine flexione, Ido (a reformed Esperanto), Occidental, Novial, Interlingua 2, etc.)] (VLE XIII 2008, Laima Kalėdienė). Here the essence of lingua franca is very correctly identified—as performing only a communicative function. Incidentally, and regrettably, this—the communicative function alone—is generalized to language as a whole: „трактовка средства общения как средства, обслуживающего общество, является слишком узкой“, because „становление общества предполагает это средство как социальный продукт, как коллективное творчество, происходящее неотделимо от речевой деятельности отдельного индивида“ (Лукшите 1981: 164). Even definitions of language sometimes mistakenly feature only this one function. Or they begin with it somewhat incautiously: language – 1. “A system of signs (or symbols) used for communication between people, the ability to use it as a means of information” and only then: “Language is an individual and social phenomenon: a means of communication between people and, at the same time, of an individual's thinking, expression, and creativity; that is, it performs both social and cognitive functions. <…> – being social in nature, ∆ is also a cognitive and epistemological phenomenon. – – –” (VLE IX 2006, Axel Holvoet). Even more boldly, in Lithuania speaks the otherwise still shy field of ethnolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, cultural linguistics (it, like psycholinguistics, is still absent from LKENc 1999 and 2008, although sociolinguistics is) – “lingu- Terminologija | 2008 | 15 85 ology, which studies the links between language and the culture of the community that uses it, especially group mentality and traditional behavior. <...>. <...>. It consolidates society’s recognized knowledge of reality and a particular worldview. At the same time, language helps to analyze, classify, and interpret culture, preserve the community’s memory of the past, <...>. – – –” (VLE V 2004, Vincas Urbutis). The basis of ethnolinguistics is the hypothesis of E. Sapir and B. L. Whorf, “consisting of two principles: linguistic determinism (our language determines our thinking) and linguistic relativity (certain features of one language are not found in other languages)” (Crystal 2005: 60). More broadly, language is seen as the foundation of culture and a condition for cultural development, as a recorder of cultural content; scholars consider how a nation appears in language and how distinctive and relative the worldview of a national language is—not a reflection of reality, but its interpretation (Gudavičius 2000: 7, 8, 10, 11), even if this were only “relativism within defined boundaries of universalism” (Gudavičius 2000: 43). Thus, “the object of ethnolinguistics is the nation in language, the reflection in language of the nation’s mental and spiritual life, since language is one of the essential characteristics of a nation” (Gudavičius 2000: 10). Even the “isomorphism of the structure and functional regularities” of language and culture is revealed (Gudavičius 2000: 40). The native language is national by its very nature, and the emergence of national literatures consolidated national languages. “<...>, under the influence of the ideas of Enlightenment philosophy, state languages came to the fore” (Genzelis 1980: 93). “The origins of nations lie in languages” (Crystal 2005: 48), and the state is language: “Paraphrasing Louis XIV, Pluche [in 1751] asserts that l’etat c’est la langue” (Eco 2001: 310). There may be slightly more state or official languages than states, but there are many times fewer of them than languages overall. Non-state languages are unprotected, but they are not without value. In Einar Haugen’s 1971 collection of essays The ecology of language, ecological thinking was applied to language as well: just as “the purpose of human ecology is to try to relate the structure of a human community to its environment” (Crystal 2005: 13), the ecology of language is described as the relations between language and its environment, as the connection between the collective consciousness of language users and the social and natural environment (Crystal 2005: 104). Ecolinguistics (Crystal 2005: 9), or “green linguistics” (Crystal 2005: 39), inevitably turns toward preventive linguistics, or perilinguistics (Crystal 2005: 93), and even clinical linguistics (Crystal 2005: 150). Living and dead (extinct) languages are known. The maintenance or loss of a native language, rarely its recovery, language death, and rarely its revitalization, extend beyond the boundaries of linguistics. The Lithuanian language 86 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... has a dead sister—the Prussian language. The area of the Lithuanian language itself has eroded both in the west and especially in the southeast; the islands left on the periphery are still a living Troy for linguists, but their vitality is fragile. After many centuries in which an unknown number of languages disappeared or were wiped out, at the end of the 20th century, even before all the world’s living languages had been counted exactly (3,000, 6,000, or 6,900–7,000), the threat of an ecological catastrophe of languages was announced (only one in ten would survive), and in 1996 the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was proclaimed in Barcelona (Crystal 2005: 97). Languages die not because they become ill or old; they rarely die because all or most of their speakers disappear or perish, but rather because of cultural assimilation. The mechanism is simple and sometimes works quite quickly: “There are three major stages. The first is characterized by immense pressure on people to speak the dominant language. <…>. It may come “from the top down,” <…>; or “from below,” – – – (Crystal 2005: 84). Incidentally, pressure from above can foster resistance, whereas pressure from below—material prosperity or cultural superiority—can bring about assimilation even more easily. The second stage is bilingualism, which ultimately becomes: “Within one generation, and sometimes in just a decade, thriving bilingualism imperceptibly turns into conscious semilingualism (self-conscious semilingualism), and then into monolingualism” (Crystal 2005: 85). Naturally, in this mechanism only the speakers of the assimilated language become bilingual: “Over the long centuries of their cultural dominance, an attitude has formed in the mindset of [monolingual] speakers that others must learn their language, while they have no need for other languages. It has been observed that monolingual nations committed to monolingualism are those that once had many colonies and pursued religious expansion” (Crystal 2005: 51). “Monolingualism, simply as part of a long tradition of colonizers, became the customary way of life” (Crystal 2005: 85). Hence D. Crystal says: “<…> the concept of dominance must disappear” (Crystal 2005: 86). The world is inherently multilingual, which is a guarantee of its success: “we inhabited the planet precisely because of our ability to create diverse cultures adapted to different environments” (Crystal 2005: 40). “The loss of diversity in the linguistic world is probably a greater loss than the loss of diversity in the biological world, because the structure of language bears witness to human intellectual abilities (Committee on Endangered Languages and Their Preservation 1984: 5)” (Crystal 2005: 41). Most importantly, a part of humanity’s linguistic heritage is lost: “All human wisdom is not found in any one language, and no language can convey all of humanity’s knowledge” (Crystal 2005: 58). A dying language is erased from the past; people lose their personal history, and a nation loses its heart (Crystal 2005: 48, 41, 43). Terminologija | 2008 | 15 87 D. Crystal argues that there are two understandings of language as part of culture: “language is an essential feature of national identity” and “a non-essential feature of national identity” (Crystal 2005: 125, 126). The non-essentialists also dispute this: “<...>, in Wales there is heated debate about whether one can be Welsh without knowing Welsh” (Crystal 2005: 46). It is more than obvious that the second view rests on very few examples, if not exceptions—unfortunate ones, and only occasionally tolerable. It is tragically obvious that when the Prussian language disappeared, the Prussian people disappeared with it; when Lithuanian nobles and gentry adopted Polish en masse, this estate disappeared from the Lithuanian nation, leaving only a few scattered individuals. Thus, in the 20th century, Lithuania was restored and the modern Lithuanian nation was built by people who had come from the common folk. I doubt that it is the business of linguists to decide which languages ought to die. For one thing, no one knows this for certain (perhaps the great languages will perish, while small ones survive in some remote jungles); for another, would it not be better to discuss how languages can survive? The Lithuanian Literary Society (Litauische literarische Gesellschaft), founded in Tilsit in 1879, declared its purpose to be gathering the linguistic and cultural heritage of a dying nation, and was consequently nicknamed the gravediggers’ society (Zemlickas, Kaunas 2008: 3 9). Perhaps it would suffice for linguists to say this: languages that have the status of a state or official language develop all possible functions and styles; those with a writing system, literature, and schools have a future, but function less robustly and more narrowly; while those without a writing system, literature, or schools remain at the level of spoken languages, although their future, too, may be long. A world without the dominance of national languages does exist, though it is different, and is also bilingual: “A world in which people speak at least two languages—their own national language and an international lingua franca—is entirely possible and (...) desirable. Two languages—two different purposes. One to preserve identity, the other to be understood. These purposes do not conflict” (Crystal 2005: 37). In reality, however, things are far from what is possible and needed. Subordinative bilingualism persists, too. Although “half the people in the world speak at least two languages” (Crystal 2005: 51), “47.3 percent of people throughout the EU do not know any foreign language,” and “two thirds of Britons do not know any foreign language,” whereas “in Luxembourg the figure is only 2.2 percent, and in Denmark 12.3 percent” (TautGyvY 2008: 49 29). The European Union’s ideal—the ability to speak two foreign languages—remains shrouded in declarations, if it is not merely a mirage. The assessment of interlingual communication by Eduardo Glissano, editor-in-chief of UNESCO Courier, is: “То, что человек говорит на своем языке, не исключает его способности понимать других людей и ценить их культуры...” and the formula “Я говорю с тобой на твоем языке,” 88 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... но понимаю тебя на своем“ (Глиссан 1983: 8 9) tam tikrais atvejais galėtų būti dar pagerinta – kalbu su tavimi savo kalba, tave klausau tavo kalba: „Daugiakalbė Europa – <...> tai žemynas, kuriame žmonės galėtų susitikti ir kalbėtis kiekvienas savo kalba ir suprasti kito kalbą“ (Eco 2001: 320). Tai būtų visiška bendravimo lygybė. 4. On changes in the use and functions of the Lithuanian language, and in the language system itself, much is said, in many places (not only in linguistics). Lithuanian linguistic theory clearly states that “language is a polyfunctional phenomenon” (Karaliūnas 1997: 119) and “a tradition, a cultural phenomenon” (Karaliūnas 1997: 48). A deviation that arose long ago and has also become entrenched is explained: “The understanding that language is the primary means of communication took root in the European linguistic tradition <...> around 1930. <...>. <...>. The study of language functions then passed from psychology into the province of linguistics. Once language was recognized as a means of communication, people rushed to the opposite extreme—the communicative role of language was exaggerated and made absolute, and the communicative function was regarded as its sole function” (Karaliūnas 1997: 109). Some even think that “language is a monofunctional phenomenon and all other purposes for which language is used are manifestations of the communicative function” (Karaliūnas 1997: 109). However, “the communicative function of language itself, it seems, depends on other functions performed by language, for example, the designative and representative functions. To say or communicate something to someone, one must first designate and name it” (Karaliūnas 1997: 110). These two functions are related: “<...> Darstellungsfunktion should be understood as both the communicative and the representative (R. Jakobson’s referential) function. <...>. In the scholarly literature on the subject, the communicative and representative functions of language are very often not sharply distinguished and are collectively called the symbolic function of language” (Karaliūnas 1997: 134). That “the essential property of human language is representation” is also shown by the fact that “animal communication involves expression and appeal, but not representation” (Karaliūnas 1997: 190). S. Karaliūno dar skiriama etninė kalbos funkcija (Karaliūnas 1997: 159) – tapatinamoji-vienijamoji, tautinio atribojimo, tautinės individualybės, kalbos tautinio priklausymo funkcija (Karaliūnas 1997: 163, 164). Nors „bendroji tautos kalba ir kalba, kaip etninio priklausymo reiškėja, yra skirtingi dalykai“, bet tik gana retais atvejais „vartojamoji kalba ir kalba – etnoso reiškėja – nesutampa“ (Karaliūnas 1997: 164) ir pastarosios „netekimas laikomas pirmąja tautybės praradimo pakopa“ (Karaliūnas 1997: 168). Terminologija | 2008 | 15 89 The duality of the relationship between language and society is obvious: “It is not language planners but society that determines the success of implementing language planning, although without the former there would be no deliberate planning, only the natural development of language” (Grumadienė 1996: 13). Yet here the understanding of society itself is not dual but simply ambiguous: “At present, many language planners traditionally continue to orient themselves toward an abstract user of the standard language, whereas society is not homogeneous” (Grumadienė 1996: 13). But the standard language is not used by all that heterogeneous society—only by a small part of it, the educated classes, and even they are not homogeneous. Moreover, the large part of society that does not use the standard language is generally a force hostile to it, sometimes even an opposing one. It is not without reason that this is noted: “the general attitude of society and its lack of linguistic sophistication” are “a factor that makes it necessary to foster linguistic awareness in society” (Miliūnaitė 2006: 63). As early as 1994, Pranas Kniūkšta noted the deteriorating state of language in society: “The foundations, undermined by bilingualism, lax discipline, and opportunistic pollution of language, have thrown current usage into disarray and degraded it” (Kniūkšta 2001²: 199). “The linguistic culture of society has not improved much so far” (Mikulėnienė 1998: 8). Debunking the myth of the natural development of language, which some journalists and cultural commentators foist on society and even on some linguists, Rita Miliūnaitė says: “With regard to the standard language of the past decade, we could not say that it is changing naturally: the influence of other languages is very strong” (Miliūnaitė 2006: 166). Speaking more precisely, one might say that the influence of Russian has changed—it is no longer external but internal, with an inertial character—while the influence of English comes more from within ourselves, from Lithuanians’ use of English, and likewise comes not from above but from below—from poor English, often not that of native speakers. Rather than addressing an abstract user of the standard language, Albertas Rosinas targets its very specific non-users or corrupters, asking Will the state defend the state language?: “Promoters of illiteracy and semi-literacy include not only officials at every level, many journalists, scholars, and lecturers, but also some heads of new publishing houses who irresponsibly publish old works written in poor language and new unedited publications, <…>” (Rosinas 1992: 2 28). Here we may once again recall that the state is language: “If the state fails to defend its state language against the arbitrary actions of the illiterate and semi-literate, it will not deserve the name of a state” (Rosinas 1992: 2 8). After independence was restored, Legal Protection of the State Language in 1918–1940: was recalled: “By means of the Press Law (1935), the state required from 90 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... to encourage press workers to safeguard the distinctiveness of the Lithuanian language and care for its vitality and correctness” (Rosinas 1998: 10). Efforts are also being made to strengthen and expand the theoretical basis for language planning—first and foremost, to “develop a general theory of language cultivation constructively, taking into account the conditions for the use of Standard Lithuanian and society’s needs, and abandoning a defensive strategy (...)” (Rosinas 1996: 6). Of course, language defence is not being abandoned altogether—the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language (VLKK) responds administratively to violations of the rights of the Lithuanian language, while the Language Inspectorate’s primary function is indeed defensive and protective. The theoretical basis could be expanded by language criticism, which became popular in post-war Western Europe, two-pronged—both philosophical and stylistic or textual—and concerned with both norms and deficient usage (Rosinas 1996: 4–5); but in Lithuania it does not exist, at least not under that name, and is not even mentioned by the theorist A. Pupkis (2005); the level of constructive criticism in Lithuania is low overall. Although the VLKK has been entrusted with “the areas of state language planning: scientific (normative), administrative and legal”; although “language administration encompasses both language usage and the use of language(s)” (Mikulėnienė 1996: 18), “...not everything has been done to implement the status of the language de facto,” the Government was therefore asked to create the conditions for implementing the provision set out in the Law on Science and Studies: “The State always recognizes the priority of fundamental research into the Lithuanian language” (Resolution 1996: 242 3). The commission itself is perhaps more concerned with language planning (in Bronys Savukynas’s term, language regulation), its aims, strategy and theoretical foundations (Kniūkšta 1995: 3–5), although these are not entirely new: “Systematicity makes it possible to evaluate linguistic phenomena as if from within, from the perspective of language itself, while purposefulness does so from without, from a social perspective” (Kniūkšta 1996: 15). What is newer is institutionalized—administrative—language planning, but it has a downside too: “The commission’s work is not the opposite of ordinary planning, <...>. Yet, on the other hand, language planning is forced into rigid frameworks and bureaucracy, and not only the public but also a considerable number of linguists are pushed away from it” (Kniūkšta 2001: 7). A sound foundational measure has been administered: “Since 1996, a compulsory course in language culture and the language of one’s specialty has been introduced in all higher, post-secondary and vocational schools (...)” (Mikulėnienė 1998: 8). Now there is already a desire not only to revise and consolidate the subject, but also to do more: “At master’s level, a course in the fundamentals of terminology taught under a separate programme would be appropriate, <...>” (Akelaitis 2008: 12 5). Good aims are set for secondary school—“1) to instil an understanding of language as a national value, 2) to explain to pupils the purpose and functions of the standard language, Terminologija | 2008 | 15 91 3) to encourage motivation to learn the standard language, 4) to strengthen pupils’ confidence in their mother tongue and its creative powers” (Miliūnaitė 2006: 63). But how can this be done if “the systematic teaching of language culture has disappeared from the Lithuanian-language curriculum in general education schools” (Akelaitis 2008: 12 4)? For now, the overall picture of new linguistic phenomena, as well as new understandings of familiar matters, is rather superficial, fragmented and full of gaps. Yet the general conclusions reached at different times by three eminent linguists are very clear, very similar and very sad: “the trunk of our mother tongue is cracking painfully and ominously” (Ambrazas 1990: 2 6). “The state language is barely breathing” (Vitkauskas 2008: 17 7). The third considers “direct preaching” and “appealing to the speaker’s or writer’s sense of shame” entirely ineffective; only irony remains (Rosinas 2005: 3). When clearer links between language changes and more specific factors and causes are lacking, it is unlikely that more precise recommendations can emerge on how to regulate changes appropriately, especially those that are undesirable (disrupting the system and so on). The imperative predominates—one must—rather than practical guidance on how. Broad language-use and language-cultivation projects are easier to see (and to demonstrate), even though they are often quite ordinary. It can be argued that the Lithuanian language is becoming polarized: a still broad, but ever thinner, stratum of excellent standard language remains (though it is hardly growing stronger), while a fairly aggressive stratum of slang and the slangification of the standard language itself are expanding. An emotionally stirred reviewer lacked the resources of standard language to assess a poor slang lexicon (Zaikauskas 2007), and boldly resorted to a male slang expression (Mataitytė 2007: 28), unacceptable in mixed company. What can one expect—love of slang is longstanding: “In her memoirs, Marija Mašiotaitė-Urbšienė vividly recounts that speaking a mixed Russian-Lithuanian slang was fashionable in interwar Kaunas—and all this not among the lower classes, but in the circles of the highest echelons of power!” (Sakalavičiūtė 2007: 8–9 398). Lithuanian really is deteriorating and becoming vulgarized: “the complex, subtle and expressive linguistic phenomena are the most vulnerable. They are the first to, <...>, fail to withstand competition from more primitive constructions and cruder phenomena” (Piročkinas 2004¹: 8 4). The principle of state protection of the Lithuanian language is being implemented, but not entirely consistently. An alternative “theory” of language is also beginning to emerge, supported by the pseudo-principle much can be corrected, but... In other words, let us correct it as much as is allowed, as much as meets no resistance. Norm-setting is badly in need of systematicity; quite a few decisions are ad hoc. One is surprised—pleasantly, yet also with mistrust—to see the position of the new Minister of Culture, Remigijus Vilkaitis: “Correct Lithuanian must 92 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... to dominate in the public sphere, state institutions, and schools” (Vd 2008 48 20). Will this be fulfilled? Society’s relationship with language is a very broad topic. One could begin with a general observation: “This creates a kind of scissors effect: linguists write ever more about language culture and offer ever more advice, while society makes ever less use of that advice” (Piročkinas 20042: 9 7). This generalization needs considerable qualification—the situation is stratified and not as it ought to be. Some linguists write only theories (often quite derivative), without offering any advice; they work only in white gloves, never getting their fingers dirty with concrete corrections. The broader public receives advice less directly—not from linguists’ articles and short pieces in Kalbos kultūra, Terminologija, Gimtoji kalba, and Gimtasis žodis, but through intermediaries: dictionaries, reference books, and language-advice books and booklets. The people acting as intermediaries would also be very important here—municipal language advisers, and editors at publishers, in the media, ministries, and elsewhere. Yet it is appalling to have to acknowledge their inadequacy, their linguistic incapacity and even disqualification, their negligence, and their lack of authority. Without this important link in the chain, stirring society’s “indifferent majority” (Piročkinas 20042: 9 7) into action is only wishful thinking... Lithuanian-language professionals in Brussels also act as intermediaries of a kind. The Seimas Chancellery has organized a conference entitled Lietuvių kalba Europos Sąjungos erdvėje (Urnėžiūtė 2008: 12 20–24). However, the voices coming from that quarter, claiming that Lithuanian thus “gains opportunities and opens itself to change” (Morkus 2008: 7–8 347), because they s h a p e the language and its system of terminology (Morkus 2008: 7–8 348, 349), also give some cause for concern. Society—or, more precisely, users of the standard language, and those who ought to be—has insufficient linguistic awareness and, consequently, insufficient activism. There is, however, plenty of harmful activism, even aggression. First, though, we should recall the unforgettable words of Jonas Basanavičius in the 1883 Aušra preface, Priekalba: “<...>: Lithuania is gradually fading away, because its language is fading away” (Basanavičius 1970: 695). And we could hardly say that it is no longer fading away at all. Nor should we forget Jonas Aistis. Having ingeniously defended his pen name Kossu, but having harshly attacked and insulted all linguists, he admitted in his mature years: “I do not know my own language well” (Aistis 1991: 310), and ultimately stated a great but terrible truth: “A Lithuanian does not give a damn about two things: his native language and the history of his nation” (Aistis 1991: 457). And when he does give a damn, more than one person writes terrible nonsense. The most frivolous instances of this occur when those with status stand behind it Terminologija | 2008 | 15 9 3 and the West is assumed to be the only wise one—so there is no need to think, for example: “Tok Pisin is the official language of Papua New Guinea, better known as Pidgin English (simplified English, slang). Elements of English, German, and Portuguese are mixed in it with 720 completely different languages spoken by the island’s indigenous inhabitants. Based on the free evolution of this language, unregulated by academic grammar rules, <...>” (Tok pisin 2003: 37 52). Praise of free-form pidgin sounds like a reproach against Lithuanian, constrained by linguists—a well-intentioned ignorance, as V. Bielinskis puts it. What if the learned look deeper: “<...> books are once again retreating, language is becoming impoverished. Even the British, with their great tradition, complain that the language of their press is growing ever poorer. The highest-circulation tabloid, The Sun, has even installed a special computer program to ensure that texts contain no words that are too long—those with eight letters. If there are too many of them and too few four-letter words, the computer automatically returns the text to the author” (Gadeikis 2005: 6 4). Sometimes bitter experience helps people come to their senses: “We get along perfectly well with the Spaniards about work,” the men explain. “Film jargon is international, a word in one language, a word in another... But when <...> we try <...> to talk about life—stop, nothing works anymore. <...>” (Vd 2005 3 57). I have long described the youngest generation, who regard themselves as provincial New Lithuanians, through words they never utter but which seem to hover in all their conceit: before us there was a flood—well, perhaps Greimas, but certainly not Jablonskis. In an essay competition for aspiring—but already beginning—journalists, organized by the European Parliament Information Office, the topic that attracted the most interest was Multilingualism in the EU: an opportunity or a divide? (Vd 2008 48 46). So be it, although the alternative wording seems to leave no room for a third possibility. But why should a publication that proclaims itself a quality magazine, though it is already in decline, publish childish, well-intentioned ignorance such as: “<...> one ought to understand that adopting words borrowed from other languages and making them our own benefits our nation. It is hopeless to try to replace them with Lithuanian neologisms, which often sound simply absurd” (Vd 2008 48 47). Yet that same magazine rightly notes that even the most talented, including polyglots, “find the Lithuanian language difficult,” specifically because of the faulty use of international words (Laurinėnaitė 2008: 15 49, 50). Could it be because Lithuanian has little prestige and is also disparaged alongside nationality and patriotism? Linguists, meanwhile, are sometimes mercilessly battered. Journalist Renata Baltrušaitytė gleefully ridicules how Vytautas Petkevičius, in his kodėlčiuką, “explained the enemy to the specialists,” and how the “experts on Lithuanian morphology” failed to withstand him (Vd 2008 51 52). D. Crystal’s 94 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... translation of the book Kalbos mirtis evokes in Dalia Zabielaitė no associations whatsoever with the decline or destruction of the Lithuanian language, but only an angry opposition: “will reveal a broader field of language problems than the one into which the narrow purism of linguists’ teaching confines us” (NŽA 2005 10 502). The scathing linguists’ criticism in , in Tomo Daugirdas’s dreary articles, is theorized in an indescribably strange way. He begins almost humanely: “What is the Lithuanian language to us today: an element of Lithuanian identity, one of the instruments that helps exchange thoughts and information [,] or a means of controlling thought and expression?” (Daugirdas 2004: 11 535). After that, he says not a word about the element of identity, but talks at length about “a means of a person’s relationship with the world and another person,” “an instrument for providing and receiving information” (Daugirdas 2004: 11 535, 536). The whole article’s polemical thrust is against some unknown person’s attempt to create an idol of the Lithuanian language, and against the fact that linguists supposedly create a language “as a repository of truth and an expression of the essence of the world,” even though “the world is diverse, meaningful in various ways or meaningless”; against the purity and authenticity of the Lithuanian language supposedly found only “in linguists’ heads”; against “all sorts of invented norms”; and against linguists who “aspire to become the wardens of a language prison in which contemporary Lithuanian society will be incarcerated,” since after the Soviet era “all external threats” to the language “disappeared,” and now… the Lithuanian language faces “further degeneration” at the hands of linguists, while Lithuanians face the fate of being “struck dumb” (Daugirdas 2004: 11 535–536). It seems you are reading some kind of petty but irresponsible prattle, not a “monthly journal of religion, culture and social life”—neither elementary culture nor Christian love of one’s neighbor… The worst thing is when Lithuanian linguists are maliciously accused of things that simply never happened, for example: “they tried to ban the foreign companies’ trademarks” (Daugirdas 2004: 11 536). The author criticizes equivalents and calques supposedly created by linguists (?!), but the example is laughably offensive: “For some reason, even today we do not call a pedagogue by the supposedly precise and beautiful [?! – J. K.] Lithuanian equivalent proposed, ‘child-blossomer,’ though it does somewhat resemble ‘child-killer’” (Daugirdas 2004: 11 535). Who proposed it, and is every proposer already a linguist?! Jonas Varnauskas paklausė tiesiai – Ima šokas nuo gimtosios kalbos? (NŽA 2005: 3–4 140–141) ir ar čia taisomas išmaltas „bromininkų kelias“ (Varnauskas 2005: 3–4 140) – be „kontrolės“, be „kalėjimo“, tik vedantis į ištautėjimą. But Tomas Daugirdas is not done—he writes again about what should be done so that “language may be a suitable and convenient tool” (Daugirdas 2008: 1–2 8). The author muses drearily about the computer “mouse,” which does not chew through wires, while its appearance resembles Terminologija | 2008 | 15 9 5 the real thing, instead of recalling how lively and nimble it is (that little mouse scurrying under the broom). Here he also recalls substitutes for mouse proposed by who knows whom—indicator and runner—and the laptopper proposed by who knows which linguists instead of a laptop computer, and that “the ‘wire-scratcher’ proposed by the linguists [which ones, anyway?! – J. K.] would say much more <...> than ‘trolleybus’” (Daugirdas 2008: 1–2 8). He wrote and wrote it out; now he writes off the top of his head... And idols keep haunting him—of language one moment, of patriotism the next (Daugirdas 2005: 3–4 121–122). He writes and writes, and gets things done—turning the linguist into a bogeyman. Then journalist R. Baltrušaitytė steps in to mediate, listing the stereotypes: 1) the threat to Lithuanian is greater now than in Soviet times; 2) young people and slang do the most damage to the language; 3) the linguist is a bogeyman (Baltrušaitytė 2004: 7 46). She seats a cultural scholar (and journalist), a writer (and lawyer), with two female linguists opposite them, so that the stereotypes can be refuted: the first group is to accuse all linguists, while the latter are not to defend them, merely to make excuses for themselves—no, not us two; perhaps one of us once was a black “Pupkis-follower”, but both “demolished the m y t h of language regulators who impose a s t r i c t choice” (Baltrušaitytė 2004: 7 46). A sad spectacle all round: to one, incorrect usage is nothing; all that matters is vividness—from small towns and slang. He says marketing, not marketology, yet he himself would use... grammatical errors in place of marketology (Savukynas 2004: 7 46, 47, 48). Another, who reads the Russian press, still thinks, like some great expert, that “they are much less afraid of all sorts of foreign words”; from this “no tragedy is made, many things are legalized with a light hand”—“there, it is understood that language is first and foremost a means of communication” and that “beautiful Lithuanian expressions are born in slang” (Puklevičius 2004: 7 46). One linguist blames Soviet-era linguists, who “put a couple of generations off speaking Lithuanian” [??!! – J. K.], while “slang is not bad; it just needs to be allowed to develop”; dūrei—“a word entirely permissible in the context [for the prime minister!]” [Savukynas praises her: “the linguistics establishment [i.e. bureaucrat linguists] is already tolerant,” 47]; bambalis, “heard in Ž e m a i t i j a three years ago”—already “a s t a n d a r d language unit” (Smetonienė 2004: 7 47, 48). Yet Savukynas cannot find it “after looking through dictionaries,” though neither of them bothers to consult LKŽ, where the northern Samogitian bambalis has long meant 1. “a vessel for milk, <...>, a can,” 2. “a vessel for kerosene.” And only one linguist interjects: “The public is no longer interested in the process of creating language”; “the language is impoverished in words also because young people do not read”; “I will always disagree with those who say that Lithuanian is not suited to the modern world, that people can no longer communicate in it”; “we alone can kill our language—and no one else” (Vaišnienė 2004: 7 46, 48). So perhaps she is a little bogeywoman?.. 96 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... Ir mokinys, pasak Smetonienės, ne prieš šimtą metų sukurtas (Okmanas 2004: 8 40), o vartotas jau ir K. Sirvydo, Krauzės žodyne, ir A. Juškos dainose (Drotvinas 2001: 113, 114, 115). An extralinguistic cancer has long been gnawing away at linguists and, more broadly, the academic community. They remain silent, while a Polish colleague speaks: “Sitting in a café, Lithuanian linguists are able to point out many of the ills of this field in the country, but none of it becomes a socially significant discussion in the press. It follows that we live, as it were, in two systems—the private and the official. This is not good for scholarship. <...>. <...>. One can draw only this conclusion: by expressing his opinion openly, a person feels that he is risking his academic career. – – – This is a kind of corruption, and the truth about it must be told” (Smoczyński 2008: 13 5). No comments are needed—action is. There is also some reason for optimism, even some victories. Lithuanian linguists and, more broadly, people in the humanities and social sciences dare to challenge anti-cultural globalization—and win. I will mention two victories. Through great effort and after long battles, the evident truth has been defended: the principal international (and sole domestic) language of Lithuanian studies is Lithuanian. Therefore, research in Lithuanian studies primarily intended for the public of Lithuania no longer needs to be published in English as a matter of course. The international database for these fields, Lituanistika, is being compiled in Lithuanian, with summaries in English (the project is being carried out by two women—Ingė Lukšaitė and Danguolė Mikulėnienė—and I am pleased that my moral advances to the strengthening sex have proved so successful, at least in this case). This is also the place to recall: “The nation is in the hands of mothers” (Aistis 1991: 160). Sometimes it is worth appreciating that one can learn what a norm is from someone who is not a linguist: “<...>, unwittingly we may find ourselves in danger of treating a statistical fact as the point of departure for defining a norm: <...>,” although “a human norm is grounded in what is good for human beings, what arises from their nature, about which anthropology gives far more reliable testimony than statistical data” (Laumenskaitė 2007: 11–12 550). The ranks of linguist terminologists are disproportionately small. It is unavoidable to cover every direction. In contemporary linguistics, terminologists ought to make up one tenth of the field. Yet the scholarly journal Terminologija is published (14 issues have appeared); since issue XIII it has been international (trilingual). International conferences are being organized. Nevertheless, there is a notable quantitative breakthrough. A modest store of experience has accumulated. The next generation is growing. A major body of terminology work is being carried out, supported by the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language and backed by the Terminology Centre. Terminologija | 2008 | 15 97 On a new undertaking, Lithuanian language and its literate society, linguistics and terminology, perhaps taking note at the crossroads, may be drawing closer to a half-blind destination that can satisfy both linguists and society. One must only overcome the nature that “has bestowed on mortals, especially those somewhat more intelligent, the inclination to disdain what is their own and cherish what is foreign” (Erazmas 1963: 45). CONCLUSIONS 1. Questions concerning the use, change, future, and even fate of languages are often linked to globalization in a very direct way, with the word “challenges”—another increasingly fashionable word (Arnold Toynbee’s)—being tossed in at every turn. The answers are less impressive, and people often do not even bother to understand what globalization is. Its genesis and conceptual apparatus allow us to distinguish cultural globalization, and within it the globalization of languages, i.e. global trends in language use. A distinction is also made between globalism—the ideology of globalization or a theory of planetary international politics—and anti-globalism, which, at least for now, lacks a clearer and more positive theoretical foundation, while involving too many aggressive protests and even acts of terror. Thus, globalization is a fairly direct threatening factor only for language use; for the functioning and usage of a language, it is an unfavorable background. 2. Focusing everyone’s entire attention solely on the effects of an undefined globalization is highly misguided, not only because it is one-sided, but also because other, more important and specific factors are forgotten or left unmentioned. There have been, and still are, plenty of them. Behind the Iron Curtain, resilient phenomena of the twentieth century flourished, which must also be distinguished both as an unfavorable, irrational background to the functioning of language in general and of particular languages, especially smaller ones, and as direct factors: these include consumer and mass society, disposable civilization, marketing, advertising, propaganda, the mass media and, in particular, the commercialization of television, mass culture, three-minute culture, fashion, the making of stars, and also the Americanization of culture (pop music, Hollywood films, westerns, serials, thrillers, soap operas,...). The common denominator of these phenomena is the simplification of human beings and life, and, specifically, wooden language. Having been severely battered by Soviet anti-American propaganda and assessed somewhat scientifically in Lithuanian philosophical discourse, these phenomena surged into Lithuania once the Iron Curtain fell. In a country spiritually impoverished, everything from the West unfortunately seemed good. At the same time, truths about our own life in the evil empire, nearly half a century old, also reached us from the West: Newspeak, the thought police, doublethink, the enslavement of reason. They reached us, but did not have the necessary effect. The disintegration of the evil empire, the restoration of Lithuania’s independence— 98 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... and the establishment of Lithuanian as a state language, national revival, the democratization of society and the emergence of civil society, Lithuania’s European and transatlantic integration, as well as excessive, though unofficial, Anglicization, and also computerization and internetization—these are now very specific factors whose significance for national identity and self-awareness, culture and language has been evident for 20 years and will remain decisive and epoch-making for a long time. 3. Every language is ethnic or national—a mother tongue. Our mother tongue, Lithuanian, has had extensive contact with Polish under several centuries of continuous, subordinative bilingualism: the entire Lithuanian-language area was quite literally inundated by it. Only some of the consequences have been remedied; most of them (and part of the area) are irreversible losses, although those contacts have almost entirely ceased for quite some time. For two centuries, Russian performed similar destructive work in the Lithuanian-language area. Now the era of contact with English has begun: the area is not being lost, but some users of Lithuanian are. It is therefore useful to become acquainted with these languages—imperial, colonial, and international (and as linguae francae)—from within, as they are understood and evaluated by Russians and English speakers themselves. It is important to remember that the essence of linguae francae is simply to perform a communicative function. That is not enough for a national language to live and survive; indeed, it may be precisely what causes it to die. Lithuanian has a dead sister, Prussian; the area of Lithuanian itself has been eroded in both the west and the southeast and is not even continuous within the state borders. Speakers of major languages can theoretically debate whether language is an essential or nonessential feature of nationality and statehood. A Lithuanian can speak here only of exceptions that are fortunate or unfortunate (for oneself!). The only guarantee is the old, almost universal order: only a national state language is secure; or, a state is its own language. Although the world is bilingual (again, mostly only for the purpose of communication), bilingualism is characteristic not of major languages but of smaller ones, and it is subordinative, and thus not without dangers. 4. In the theory of Lithuanian linguistics, the function of a means of communication is no longer considered either the only or even the primary function, and S. Karaliūnas also distinguishes an ethnic function of language. Yet all kinds of journalists, cultural commentators, and people who are simply provincial in their thinking (before us there was a flood) speak off the cuff only of a means of communication, demand unfettered language development, proclaim anti-codification stances, the rights and merits of slang, and similar well-intentioned ignorance; they berate linguists and turn them into bogeymen. They also wear down some linguists, because the most basic solidarity and culture are lacking. Lithuanian linguists nevertheless dare to challenge anti-cultural globalization and sometimes win. The ranks of linguist terminologists are disproportionately small. But a scientific journal is published Terminologija | 2008 | 15 9 9 Terminologija (international since no. XIII). 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Morkūnas, redagavo V. Ambrazas, Vilnius. LRKŽ 1988: A. Lyberis. Lietuvių–rusų kalbų žodynas, Vilnius. Mataitytė I. 2007: Rec.: E. Zaikauskas. Kalbos paribiai ir užribiai: lietuvių žargono žodynėlis. McLuhan M. 2003: Kaip suprasti medijas. Žmogaus tęsiniai. Vertė D. Valentinavičienė, Vilnius. Mikulėnienė D. 1996: Kalbos tvarkyba: norminimas ir administravimas. – Lietuvių kalbos tvarkyba: teorinės ir praktinės problemos. Seminaro tezės, Vilnius, 18. Mikulėnienė D. 1998: Valstybinės kalbos statusas de jure ir de facto: jo įgyvendinimo ir tvarkybos problemos. – Valstybinė kalba ir integracija (Estija, Latvija, Lietuva). Seminaro tezės, Vilnius, 7–8. Miliūnaitė R. 2006: Apie kalbą ir mus. Straipsniai ir pokalbiai, Vilnius. Miłosz Cz. 1995: Pavergtas protas. Vertė A. Grybauskas, Vilnius. Morkus J. 2008: Lietuvių kalba Europos Sąjungoje. – Naujasis židinys-Aidai 7–8, 347–349. Morua A. 1991: Esė. Vertė J. Mikelinskas, Vilnius. Nuodėmė 2008: Nuodėmė vis labiau tampa kolektyvine. – Savaitė 12. 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Sudarė Ch. Lemchenas, Vilnius. RLKŽ III 1984: Rusų–lietuvių kalbų žodynas. Sudarė J. Kardelytė, J. Macaitis, A. Mankevičienė, Vilnius. Rosinas A. 1992: Ar valstybė gins valstybinę kalbą? – Lietuvos aidas 2, 8. Rosinas A. 1996: Kalbos priežiūra, kalbos kritika ir kalbos kultūra. – Gimtoji kalba 10, 1–7. Rosinas A. 1998: Valstybinės kalbos teisinė globa 1918–1940 metais. – Valstybinė kalba ir integracija (Estija, Latvija, Lietuva). Seminaro tezės, Vilnius, 9–10. Rosinas A. 2005: Tik prasėu be isterijos, 2005. Sakalavičiūtė K. 2007: Tarpukario Lietuvos periodika: ar rusiška spauda lygu rusų spauda? – Naujasis židinys-Aidai 8–9, 391–398. Savukynas V. 2004: Kalbos normintojas: tikras ar išgalvotas baubas [pokalbis]. – Veidas 7, 46–48. Smetonienė I. 2004: Kalbos normintojas: tikras ar išgalvotas baubas [pokalbis]. – Veidas 7, 46–48. Terminologija | 2008 | 15 101 Smoczyński W. 2008: Laringalai mano moksliniame gyvenime (Su prof. V. Smočinskiu kalbėjosi G. 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Its genesis and concepts allows us to separate cultural globalization and within it – globalization of languages, i.e. global tendencies of the usage of languages. Also globalism – an ideology of globalization or a theory of global international politics – stands out together with anti-globalism, which at least for now has a confused and negative theoretical background and is associated with too many aggressive actions of protest and even terror. Thus globalization is a rather direct threatening factor for the usage of languages and an unfavourable background for the functioning and usage of the language. Concentration of everybody’s full attention only on the impact of undefined glo- 102 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:... balization is wrong not only because of its one-sidedness, but also because other more important and specific factors are forgotten or hushed up and they are and were abundant. On the other side of the iron curtain the ugly phenomena of the 20th century were flourishing, directly impacting upon as well as causing a negative background for the functioning of language in general and small languages in particular. Such phenomena include consumer and mass society, disposable civilization, marketing, advertising, agitation, mass media and especially commercialisation of television, mass culture, three minute culture, fashion, creation of stars, Americanization of culture (pop music, Hollywood films, westerns, TV serials, soap operas,...). In general terms a common denominator of these phenomena is their tendency to make a man and a life primitive, specifically the creation of a wooden language. These phenomena, strongly attacked by soviet anti-American propaganda and to some extent evaluated in Lithuanian philosophical discourse after the fall of the iron curtain swept into Lithuania, to the weary spirit of which everything coming from the West seemed to be good. At the same time fifty year old truths about our own life in the evil empire – new language, thought police, double think, enslavement of the mind – reached us from the West as well. These truths reached us, but did not have the right impact on us. Together with such things as the disintegration of the evil empire, restoration of the independence of Lithuania, status of the Lithuanian language as a state language, national rebirth, democratisation of the society and the creation of a civil society, European and transatlantic integration of Lithuania, came unofficial Anglization, computerization and internetization which are now very specific factors, the importance of which to national identity and self-awareness, culture and language has been considerable for twenty years and will remain crucial and epochal for a long time. Every language is ethnic or national – native. Our native language – Lithuanian – for a few centuries under the conditions of continuous subordinate bilingualism had very many contacts with the Polish language – the whole area of the Lithuanian language was flooded with it. Only a few consequences have been eliminated, and although contacts with Polish have for some time been almost broken, the majority of losses are, like loss of national territory, irreversible. For two centuries a similar destructive work in the Lithuanian language area was done by the Russian language. Now a new era of contacts with the English language has arrived – territory is not being lost, but a part of the Lithuanian language speakers are. Therefore it is useful to get acquainted with these imperial, colonial as well as international languages (and linguae francae) from inside – how they are perceived and judged by Russians and English themselves. It is important to remember that the essence of linguae francae is only the performance of the communicative function. This is not enough for the national language to live and survive – it could cause death. The Lithuanian language has a dead sister – the Prussian language. The area of the Lithuanian language has crumbled away in the west and in the south-east and it is not even continuous within the state borders. Speakers of a big language can have a theoretical discussion if the language is or is not an obligatory element of nationality and statehood. A Lithuanian can speak here only about lucky or unlucky (for himself!) exceptions. Only the old nearly universal order provides guarantees: only a national state language is safe or: a state is its own language. Although the world is Terminologija | 2008 | 15 1 0 3 bilingual (mostly in that communicative function), bilingualism is a characteristic not of big, but of small languages and it implies subordination, thus some dangers. In the theory of Lithuanian linguistics, the communicative function is considered to be neither the only, nor the main one. Simas Karaliūnas separates the ethnic function as well. Various journalists, specialists of culture and other provincials of the time (avant nous, le Déluge) are talking only about the means of communication, demanding unrestricted development of the language, declaring anticodification attitudes, rights and validity of jargon and similar good willed ignorance and demonising linguists. They defeat some linguists because of the lack of solidarity and culture of the latter. Lithuanian linguists dare to challenge anti-cultural globalization and sometimes win. The force of terminologists is small, but they publish the scientific (international from the 13th issue) magazine Terminologija (Terminology). The principle of state protection of the Lithuanian language is being implemented although not consistently. Gauta 2008-12-15 Jonas Klimavičius Lietuvių kalbos institutas P. Vileišio g. 5, LT-10308 Vilnius E. paštas: [email protected] 104 Jonas Klimavičius | Lietuvių kalba ir visuomenė:…