¿Who in the world am I?: Liminality and Identity in Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There and, Tim Burton's 2010 Film Sequel.

“Who in the world am I?”: Liminality and Identity in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There and Tim Burton’s 2010 Film Sequel. Malena Alburquerque de Pablo Supervised by Dr Amaya Fernández Menicucci Degree in English Studies 2023/2024 Department of English and German, Translation and Interpreting Studies 2 Abstract: In the present dissertation, I intend to analyse Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871) and Tim Burton’s film sequel Alice in Wonderland (2010). My goal is to apply Victor Turner’s concept of liminality to these texts in order to prove that the surreal dimension in which the three texts in question are set is constructed as a liminal space. In particular, I contend that Alice uses the liminal space of Wonderland as a locus of self-construction and that Wonderland is configured as an interstitial space of endless potentiality through which all three versions of Alice transition from an imposed identity to a self-constructed one. In the hypotexts, Alice, though still a child, has already undergone a significant transformation; it is, however, in the hypertext that this process of self-construction culminates in her emancipation as a self-sufficient adult. Alice’s journey is, therefore, as intertextual as it is intratextual: in each text, Alice’s transition into the next stage of her development is articulated through an initial phase of detachment followed by one of self-construction. Consequently, the analysis addresses Alice’s Wonderland as a space of transition, of alienation and of identity construction. Key words: liminality; identity; Alice in Wonderland; Lewis Carroll; Tim Burton. 3 Resumen: El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar Las Aventuras de Alicia en el País de las Maravillas (1865) y A través del espejo y lo que Alicia encontró allí (1871) de Lewis Carroll, así como la secuela cinematográfica de Tim Burton Alicia en el País de las Maravillas (2010). El principal objetivo de análisis es aplicar el concepto de liminalidad de Victor Turner a estos textos para demostrar que la dimensión surrealista en la que se desarrollan se construye como espacio liminal. En concreto, sostengo que Alicia utiliza el espacio liminal del País de las Maravillas como un locus de autoconstrucción y que dicho país está configurado como un espacio intersticial de potencialidad infinita a través del cual las tres versiones de Alicia transitan de una identidad impuesta a una auto-construida. En los hipotextos, Alicia, aunque todavía niña, ya ha experimentado una transformación significativa; sin embargo, es en el hipertexto donde el proceso de autoconstrucción culmina con su emancipación en calidad de adulta autosuficiente. El viaje de Alicia es, por lo tanto, tan intertextual como intratextual, y en cada texto, la transición de Alicia a la siguiente etapa de su desarrollo se articula a través de una fase inicial de desapego seguida por una de autoconstrucción. En consecuencia, el análisis aborda el País de las Maravillas de Alicia como un espacio de transición, de alienación y de construcción de la identidad. Palabras clave: liminalidad, identidad, Alicia en el País de las Maravillas, Lewis Carroll, Tim Burton. 4 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 5 2. Liminality in theory 6 3. Liminality in Wonderland 11 3.1. Wonderland as a transitional space 11 3.2. Wonderland as a space of alienation 14 3.3. Wonderland as a space of self-identification 17 4. Conclusions 21 5. Works cited__________________________________________________________22 5 1. Introduction In the present dissertation, I intend to analyse the hypotexts by Lewis Carroll Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871), as well as their cinematic hypertext Alice in Wonderland (2010) directed by Tim Burton. My goal is to apply Victor Turner’s concept of liminality to these texts in order to analyse the way in which identity is questioned, deconstructed and reconstructed in the liminal space at the heart of all three texts. In particular, I contend that Wonderland is configured as an interstitial space of endless potentiality through which all three versions of Alice transition from an imposed identity to a self-constructed one. Alice’s journey in Carroll’s second novel comes sequentially after the first, and Burton’s film is set approximately a decade after Carroll’s second novel. It follows that Alice’s development takes place intertextually. However, I also contend that each leg of Alice’s journey—Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (henceforth, Adventures in Wonderland), Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (henceforth, Through the Looking-Glass), and Burton’s Alice in Wonderland—also shares a similar intratextual development. The phases of this development are reflected in the organisation of my analysis of Wonderland as a transitional space, as a space of alienation, and as a space for the individual to self-construct. Lewis Carroll draws a liminal space in which Alice undergoes abnormal event after abnormal event and this gradually changes her understanding of her surroundings and of her own self, as she questions the nature and logic of everything, and, consequently, of her own self-perception. In the literary texts, young Alice is not yet confronted with the need to emancipate herself and become a young Victorian woman, settling into the social norms of that era. She simply drifts off into that liminal space as she is trying to figure out who she is: her friend Mabel (Carroll Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 11), a figment of the White King’s unconscious (Carroll Through the Looking-Glass 157), or the “right Alice” (Alice in Wonderland 00:16:28). This is such a crucial, yet frightening question for her that she needs to 6 confront it in a way she feels comfortable: in a dream. She shuts her senses to an external world she does not understand and falls asleep to embark on a journey inwards. A dream allows Alice to recall these experiences while simultaneously having control over them. Yet, Burton chooses a different motivation for Alice’s urge to escape reality. Burton’s Alice, who is no longer ten but rather on the verge of turning eighteen, is overwhelmed by the pressure of what Victorian adulthood means. She is burdened with expectations of marriage and adherence to Victorian social norms, of becoming a functional adult like the ones around her. She is neither prepared nor inclined to follow this path. Consequently, she chooses to follow the White Rabbit, embarking on an alternative path, far from the traditional expectations imposed upon her. She finally finds shelter in her own liminal space: Wonderland. Since I intend to establish a comparative dialogue between Carroll’s and Burton’s texts, I am also interested in exploring the media-specific ways in which liminality and the process of self-construction are represented in the literary and the cinematic versions of Alice and her Wonderland. To this end, I will investigate how literary devices are translated to the silver screen, e.g., how focalisation is conveyed differently in the hypertext than it is in the hypotexts. From a methodological point of view, I have first considered the notion of liminality as defined by English anthropologist Turner. I have chosen his approach to the concept because Turner not only conceived it as a tool for anthropological research, but also for literary analysis. I then crosschecked the results of such application with those of an inductive analysis of the mediaspecific strategies deployed to create Wonderland in each novel and in the film. The result is a literary analysis divided, as already noted, in three sections: Wonderland as a liminal space of transition, as a liminal space of alienation, and as a space of self-construction. 2. Liminality in theory Liminality describes a space both in praesentia and in potential, in which one can be anything, something, nothing or everything. This space reflects an ontological, cognitive, social and even physical state of in-betweenness that challenges dichotomous thinking. To relocate one’s self in such a space is to observe and experience reality from a position beyond blackand-white logic; it is to start appreciating the shades of grey that exist in between polar opposites. A space where one’s position is not fixed gives one the privilege of not being bound to one thing or another; one just is. The idea of bounding is already at the root of the concept 7 of liminality, as the latter comes from the Latin noun limen, which means boundary or limit (Wels et al 2). English anthropologist Victor Turner developed the concept of liminality, which still prevails as one of "Turner's enduring legacies in the anthropological conceptual repertoire" (Wels et al 1). Turner’s theory of the liminal offers a framework for the interstitial context in which Alice finds herself as she moves from Victorian reality to the meta-reality in which Wonderland exists, and back again to Victorian reality (Wels et al 1). The term liminality indicates "a state or process that is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day cultural and social states and processes of getting and spending, preserving law and order, and registering structural status" (Turner, “Frame, Flow and Reflection” 465). In other words, this concept can be illustrated with the image of a threshold expanding into a dimension in its own right; the space that results from such expansion of a boundary allows the individual to exist in between two realities or to explore the process of moving from one to the other. Liminality is, in fact, also understood as "the middle phase of any ritual process [...] during which an individual undergoes a transition from one social status to another" (Wels et al 1). This shift entails a transformation of the individual's existence and identity (Fernández Menicucci). The individual that finds themselves in this opening gap is thus confronted with the need for growth and evolution, with the inevitability of a metamorphosis. Carroll’s Alice is in a liminal state between the blissful unconsciousness of childhood and a conscious understanding of the adult world. She is caught in between those states as she initially refuses to accept the change, but rather fights against it. The transition into the next phase is not necessarily physical, although Alice does undergo anatomical changes—shrinking and growing abnormally, for instance— but it can also be emotional and even metaphorical, as showcased by Alice’s internal focalisation of Wonderland in both Carroll’s novels and Burton’s film. The term focalisation is employed by Gerard Gennete to refer to the point of view of a literary text, i.e., the “angle of vision through which the story is focused” (qtd. in Grellet 100). The focalisation of any given text is articulated on the relative position of the following components; the narrating agent—the character that tells the story—the focaliser—the one who sees—and the focalised—the object and/or character that is being perceived and narrated (Cohan & Shires 95). In short, focalisation helps the reader and the viewer to better understand the story, the writer’s intention, and the character’s thoughts and feelings. In Lewis Carroll’s texts, the sequence of events is narrated by a heterodiegetic narrator with an internal focalisation through Alice. This enables the hypotextual narrator to give the reader an insight into Alice’s first impressions in the space of Wonderland, but it also limits the reader’s access to Wonderland to Alice’s perceptions of and experiences in it. In other words, Carroll is not 8 introducing Wonderland to the reader via Alice, but Alice via Wonderland. In Burton’s film, there are certain scenes in which Alice’s character is physically absent; in those instances, either there is “zero” focalisation, or the scene is focalised through a character other than Alice. This may suggest that Burton is leaning towards a more choral, perhaps even polyphonic version of Carroll’s text. Yet, and as we shall see in detail in the analysis, Alice is indeed present in those scenes; her presence and, most importantly, her perspective, impregnates the whole film, for every setting, every character, every detail is a manifestation of Alice’s consciousness and/or of her unconscious. In Alice’s dream—or memory, as Wonderland is dubbed at the end of Burton’s film—everything is born of and visualised because of her. Before becoming liminal, Wonderland is first conceived by the focaliser as a liminoid space, an alternate reality where she simply escapes from the pressure of social and interpersonal life. The term liminoid was coined by Turner and it significantly differs from the concept of liminality. When individuals evade their everyday reality but are not transformed by the experience, they have entered a liminoid space. The liminoid does not have the sacred aspect that the liminal space holds. The individual enters the liminoid space of a concert hall or a cinema to disconnect from their busy urban lives, not necessarily to change and evolve (Fernández Menicucci). Turner developed the term liminoid “to describe similar experiences and circumstances in modern post-enlightenment societies where such experiences did not, as he saw them, have the same society-wide salience that the liminal had in pre-modern societies (Spiegel 12). In the process of refining the concept of liminality, first introduced by Van Gennep, Victor Turner explored the possibility of applying the concept of “rites of passage” to events that are “associated with seasonal changes for an entire society” rather than only applied to rituals concerning “practices of symbolic reversals and inversions” where the notion of time was suspended (Spiegel 12). In principle, both “Alices”—Carroll’s and Burton’s—wanted to enter a liminoid space to escape from their reality. A space free from the urge to transform or undergo any kind of sacred change, which, of course, includes growing into an adult. However, Alice soon discovers that her oneiric dimension behaves like a liminal space forcing her to grow and evolve. Carroll’s Alice falls sleep due to pure boredom and starts dreaming; therefore, this initial space originates from a conflict. She cannot comprehend the value of a book with no illustrations or dialogues, finding adult logic tiresome and inexplicable. Her adult sister is not willing to clarify or resolve this confusion, so she can only withdraw into her inner world and seek the answers in herself. The initial evasion to the liminoid eventually evolves into a transitional and thus liminal space. 9 Turner coined the term liminoid with the aim of emphasising the importance of avoiding structuralist analysis, of recognizing social processes as determinative of cultural practices, and of seeking analytical tools that do not produce images of rigidly constraining structures (Spiegel 14). The terms liminoid and liminal, while distinct, are not oppositional to each other but rather complementary. While the liminal is related to transitional phases in more traditional, ritualistic contexts that bring forth a change in the state or identity of the individual, the liminoid refers to pracrices of evasion that are normally associated with creativity and hobbies and do not entail a metamorphosis. According to Turner (“Frame, Flow and Reflection” 487), the ‘flow’ during a liminal experience is a mental state in which the notion of time and one's self-awareness are lost. The tasks performed in this state need to be rather precise, concise and structured, so that they are stimulating enough to keep the individual focused, but so difficult as to frustrate them. The consequence is that one forgets about one’s personal, social, economic and physical struggles as one becomes completely absorbed in the execution of each task in a seamless succession, to the point that it can be said that one loses one’s self in the process, as is the case with Alice in all three texts in question. If that is so, then it is even possible to find an/Other self at the end of the process: to become someone else (Fernández Menicucci). Immersing in a state of flow also contributes to participating in a state of communitas, which enables the individual to forget about social hierarchy so that a feeling of stronger communal connection can emerge (Fernández Menicucci). Interpersonal and collective connections within the liminal space lack structure and promote equality, straightforwardness, spontaneity, even anarchy or an inversion of norms, as is the case with Mardí Gras celebrations (Pentikäinen 156) and Carroll’s and Burton’s Wonderlands. Turner’s definition of liminality was derived from a previous study of ceremonial rites by Belgian ethnographer Arnold Van Gennep (Turner, "Liminality and Communitas” 359). Victor Turner identifies the liminal as the interstitial space between the real and the meta real as an evolution of the three phases of ritualistic processes that Van Gennep had named "separation, margin, and aggregation" (Turner, “Liminality and Communitas" 359). Van Gennep based this categorisation on his investigations regarding rites of passage, which he defined as procedures that celebrate social conversions, changes of place, state and age (Pentikäinen 155). These rites are public celebrations common to all cultures and civilizations and are defined as “indicators and vehicles of transition from one sociocultural state and status to another (Turner, “Frame, Flow and Reflection” 466). The individual undergoing these rites is experiencing liminality since they are no longer in their previous state and neither in the next one; they are in-between, in transit to the new one, which is the state celebrated as the goal of 16 those encountered in dreams. The beginning of both Carroll’s novels alludes to Alice falling asleep out of boredom while sitting by the river with her sister, or snoozing off by the fireplace in a comfortable armchair. In either case, the subsequent events reinforce that idea that she is dreaming. In Burton’s film, the initial assumption is that Wonderland is a dream. Alice constantly insists that that is so and everyone is part of it: “wait, this is my dream” (00:22:08). Yet, both the audience’s awareness of the existence of various hypotexts about Alice, as well as the fact that everybody expects a heroic saviour by the name of Alice to return and save the day rather suggest that Burton’s Wonderland is more akin a memory than a dream, as confirmed in the ending: “it wasn’t a dream at all, it was a memory” (1:21:49). Whether a scene is a dream or a memory, Wonderland is manifestation of Alice’s psyche. This is particularly relevant to Burton’s film, where Alice remains the implied focaliser, even if she is not physically present in the scene. When the Red Queen is first introduced, Alice does not appear on screen. The Red Queen is presented through a medium shot, allowing the audience to appreciate not only her character but also the ostentatious surroundings. The Red Queen projects an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, which represents a part of Alice’s identity that she chooses to suppress. Among these unstable adult figures, the Mad Hatter is the one that attracts her attention the most. He is one of the first adult figures that Alice encounters, however, he does not meet Alice’s definition of adulthood nor does he fulfil her needs, for he does not exhibit the same behavioural patterns as the adult figures from her space of origin. These characters are often considered as adults because they embody some of what Alice considers as adult traits, but their senseless behaviour invalidates her preconceived notions of adulthood. The only way to make sense of their erratic behaviour is to read them as reflections of Alice’s internal conflicts and her struggle to detach from and deconstruct her preWonderland identity. She perceives them as figures of dominance over her— particularly, of course, the Queen of Hearts who is constantly commanding “off with their heads”—thus reflecting introjected notions of control and authority. Alice is introduced to many of the eccentric characters of Wonderland at the famous Mad Tea Party. The March Hare strikes a conversation with Alice by encouraging her to drink some wine, yet, there is no wine in sight. “It wasn’t very civil of you to offer it,” (Carroll 53) replied Alice upset. This interaction shows the childish nature of these older characters. These adult figures are loud and meddlesome— “Your hair needs cutting”, flatly states the Hatter addressing Alice for the first time (Carroll 53). Alice, who has been previously taught about etiquette, begins to perceive Wonderland in general as alien. These inconsistencies with what she has been raised with causes her to feel “dreadfully puzzled” (55). There is one thing in particular that troubles her: contrary to the 17 stereotype of busy adults, they are wasting their time—“I think you might do something better with the time” (56). The guests and host are not preoccupied with responsibilities and the pressure of time; they are more invested in exchanges unsolvable riddles: “why is a raven like a writing-desk?” (Carroll 54). Their erratic behaviour is part of the liminal experience since the characters that exist in this space are beyond the boundaries of normalcy (Pentikäinen 156). The original Alice is the product of what she has been taught by the adult figures of her upperclass Victorian world. Here, none of the characters, including Alice, fits the hegemonic definition of Oneness so that Wonderland becomes the space in which “normalcy” is questioned and challenged. The absurdity and illogicity so conspicuous in Wonderland are used to underscore the arbitrariness of socially accepted norms. One of the ways in which cultural norms are challenged is by highlighting the fact that they are discursively and ideologically presented as ‘reasonable’ and ‘logical’: as the ‘natural’ way of thinking and behaving. In Burton's film, illogicity stems from differing perceptions of fundamental concepts, such the notion of time. The Hatter refers to Time as a person—“It’s him”(Carroll 56)—rather than an abstract concept. “What a funny watch”, Alice remarks, “it tells the day of the month and it doesn't tell what o'clock it is!” (55). The Hatter replied by questioning whether her watch tells her the year, to which she logically replies “Of course not, but that's because it stays the same year for such a long time together”. The Hatter then responds, “Which is just the case with mine”, using his own logic to justify his thinking and confuse Alice even more. In various ways, Alice’s adventures in both of Carroll’s novels constitute different legs of a quest for a ‘guide book’, a set of rules that resemble to the ones she was raised with and which will provide her with some rationale to deal with the peculiarity of the inhabitants of Wonderland (Ede 79). Since the only way to cope with Wonderland is, in fact, to renounce the rules that governed her previous reality, the process of deconstruction is inevitable for, once Alice realises how incoherent the social norms are which with she has been raised, she detaches from what seems an arbitrarily imposed identity. If, as I contend, Wonderland mirrors Alice’s psychological dimension, it is a space Other than society: it is the space of and for the self, where the self is free to negotiate norms and standards, and by doing so, to redefine identity. 3.3 Wonderland as a space of self-identification Despite the apparent roller coaster of emotions, and rapidly changing landscapes, there is one thing that stays stable in Wonderland: Alice’s self-doubting and questioning of her 18 identity. Wonderland is not a land full of wonder because of its exceptionality, but because, in it, Alice never ceases to wonder who she is. The fact that it is liminal makes it exceptional; the fact that it is an exception from societal normality makes it a space for the individual to grow spurred by forces and motivations Other than those imposed by society. In the first of Carroll's novels, Alice is depicted as a naïve young child that is constantly in search of an identity and a sense of belonging. Indeed, the chapters that come after "Advice from a Caterpillar" in Adventures in Wonderland contain a thematic shift from physical to metaphysical changes in Alice (Ede 93). The Caterpillar is a crucial character in that process. Likewise, in Alice in Wonderland, the White Rabbit, the harbinger of the ‘wonders’ to come, directs Alice to meet Absolem so he can aid her in quest. He is the first character to challenge Alice regarding her identity. “Alice’s sense of selfhood is fundamentally different from that of the Caterpillar, [...] at least regarding such important concepts of identity, Alice can no more ‘explain’ herself that the Caterpillar can ‘see’ her meaning” (Ede 94). Caterpillars symbolise the process of identityconstruction by embodying their own. Their metamorphosis parallel Alice’s transition from one identity to another; two kinds of blossoming that redefine these characters. The characters become involved in a conversation in which the Caterpillar, employing the Socratic method, elicits the knowledge that she seeks from Alice herself. Since, as already established, Wonderland is but a projection of Alice’s mind, the injunction to “know thyself” is obeyed twice, as both the questioning Caterpillar and Alice the questionee are aspects of the same mind. The Caterpillar’s mode of questioning also implies that Alice already knows who she is; she just needs guidance to discover her true self under layers of imposed identity. The title of the chapter already discloses the reach of the character. “Advice” denotes guidance and confidence in the counsellor’s wisdom. Unlike Alice, the Caterpillar is aware of his state of transition. Alice, who is still unaware of her own liminal state, seeks his guidance. Alice’s journey starts with a clear yet complex inquiry: "who are you?" (Carroll 34), which, rather than a banal answer regarding her name, triggers a process of deep personal introspection. Alice shyly answers that she hardly knows due to the several changes that she has suffered since she arrived in Wonderland, emphasizing the fluid nature of the liminal space that grants her a space to question these matters. The caterpillar, in awe, urges her to explain herself, to what she admits her inability to do so. As she has been stripped from her identity, she lies symbolically naked and unable to articulate who she is. She can only define herself in negative terms as what she no longer is. Not only does language grant us the ability to communicate, but also to understand and to be understood, to be seen and acknowledged. These conversations and therefore, the language employed in them, “defines the boundaries of the 19 human imaginations, and hence, of the self” (Ede 84), stablishing this connection between language and the meaning of identity when Alice asks: “Who in the world am I?” (Carroll 10). Carroll’s and Burton’s linguistic distortions chip away at the logocentric configuration of western culture by taking away Alice’s ability to communicate her identity verbally. For instance, the Tea Party scene becomes the stage for many made-up words, such as “Frabjous Day”, “futterwacker”, and “upperlkuhen”. As the words morph and change meaning, she has trouble both understanding the other characters and explaining herself. Each time she has to reexplain herself or guess the meaning of a word, she loses a part of her past self, of the old version of herself, enabling the new version to bloom. It is through her conversations with the other characters that Alice is confronted with the issues that she has been avoiding in her previous reality, which is what Burton suggests when his version of the Cheshire Cat asks Alice how she got hurt—"It looks like you ran afoul of something with wicked claws [...] What did that to you?” (29:08-17). In Carroll’s first novel, her interaction with the Cheshire Cat shows Alice's inquisitive nature, as well as her desperate seek for guidance. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”, to which he responds: “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to” (Carroll 49). He reflects the peculiar logic of Wonderland, in which he implies that if Alice does not have a clear goal or destination, any direction is as good as the other. “I don't much care where—as long as I get somewhere” (49), encapsulating her desire to keep forward, to evolve, so that she arrives somewhere and becomes, indeed, someone. In Burton’s work, Absolem’s wise, authoritative figure is the one that tells Alice she is “not hardly” herself (1:26:48). Not yet, at least. A crane shot immerses the spectator into Wonderland’s underwood, steadily and slowly descending from the tops of the tress towards the mushrooms on the ground. The sequence ends with a master shot that includes Alice along with the White Rabbit, Tweedledum, Tweedledee and the Dormouse. They have entered Absolem’s domain amid the blue smoke that this enigmatic character puffs off. The ambiguity of Absolem’s statement underscores the complexity of Alice’s search for an identity. She knows she is Alice, but also that she is not the right Alice, as she has not yet unravelled her previous, socially imposed identity. She is still bound to the views, behaviours, and even the name that has been imposed upon her. Unaware of this, she cannot comprehend how she may not be the right person since it is her dream—“How can I be the wrong Alice when this is my dream?” (00:19:23). She is the protagonist and the focaliser, hence the right Alice, of course. In the film, the repression of Alice’s acknowledgement of an/Other identity of hers is conveyed through Absolem’s portrayal: he is a silhouette enshrouded in smoke and mysticism, under the 20 exotic plants and thick vegetation that shelters him from the light and from exposure to public view. Alice is escorted by other characters, who are also figments of her psychological dimension. As they approach him, Burton changes to a hand-held camera. The effect of this is that the footage becomes more precarious. When she encounters Absolem, a low angle shot is used every time the audience sees Alice’s point of view, highlighting who is invested with authority. During their conversation, Alice struggles with her identity because of a prophecy. Absolem reveals that on the Frabjous Day the ‘right Alice’ will fight the monster that has been terrorising Wonderland for years. Accepting her identity as the “right Alice” entails being the one destined to kill the Jabberwocky. Fear of confrontation makes her deny her true identity and feel content with being “the wrong Alice”. Fear is also what originally made her escape into Wonderland, hoping it would be a liminoid space as defined by Turner, a refuge from the responsibilities and duties of adult life. It turns out that there are obstacles and conflicts and confrontations in Wonderland too, which makes it the psychological reflection of real-life problems. Since Alice cannot escape Burton’s Wonderland without defeating the Jabberwocky, Wonderland is confirmed as a liminal space due to its transformative power: Alice must become “the right Alice”. In both the hypotext and the hypertext, the character of the Caterpillar/Absolem is annoying and annoyed, unbothered, at first, by the presence of Alice, and irritated by it in the end. This reaction mirrors the discomfort that is often the consequence of the process of self-discovery. Not only does Absolem embody a physical and mental transition, but also the upsetting experience that questioning one’s self is. In the ninth chapter of Through the Looking-Glass, “Queen Alice”, Alice reaches an important milestone in her quest for her identity. By completing her journey across the world on the other side of the looking-glass, Alice is crowned queen; she becomes an authoritative figure, equal in status to the adults previously mentioned. And yet, despite this progress, she is still subject to questioning. The Red Queen and the White Queen make her aware of their doubts regarding her legitimacy, questioning her knowledge about general notions—“Can you do Division?”—and not so general ones—“Take a bone from a dog: what remains?”(213). Alice’s identity as an independent, emancipated individual depends on her passing this test. Since both the Red and the White Queen embody parts of Alice’s psyche, Alice is putting her own maturity and identity to the test. Alice becoming a queen symbolises her sovereignty as a person. As a sovereign, she will have a right to self-determination. Therefore, unlike her younger self, she is no longer moulded by others. Despite her progression, her self-proclamation as a sovereign individual is not fully addressed in Carroll’s second novel on Alice’s adventures. Burton picks up the baton and 21 finishes the narrative in his cinematic sequel. At the end of Burton’s film, Alice emerges as an actual adult, an emancipated young woman, a new Alice that is not constrained by the social norms of Victorian society, but is ready to embark on a literal journey across the Atlantic towards a new world. Burton stages her moment of realisation on the silver screen by placing her before the character that first confronted her with her identity: Absolem. Her metaphysical journey across the liminal space of Wonderland comes full circle and she finally recalls her visits as a child to this land of wonder. Through this deliberate intertextual reference to Carroll’s hypotexts, Burton indicates that Wonderland is not a dream but rather a memory. This epiphany allows Alice to understand the extent of Wonderland’s significance. It is a part of her and it first emerged as a response to past traumas, as scattered bits of her fragmented self that had to be gathered individually to understand her identity as a whole. Alice manages to confront these repressed parts of herself, finally healing the split of her fragmented self. Thus, Alice concludes that Wonderland is real, embracing it not only as memory of her past reality, that is, as what provides her with ontological continuity, but also as the means to keep building herself beyond childhood, i.e. the means to stay a sovereign individual. 4. Conclusions Alice’s whole journey across Wonderland is a succession of events designed to other and subvert the order and logic of the Victorian space of origin. In order to emerge from the apparent chaos that is Wonderland, all three versions of Alice must have negotiated their identity against the old order and the present chaos, and succeeded in reconstructing themselves as a new self. The transitional and liminal nature of Wonderland mirrors Alice’s emotional, cognitive and social evolution. Carroll’s and Burton’s depictions of Alice show a reinterpretation of the fantastic, the surreal and the oneiric that challenges the traditional application of liminality to physical places and symbolic spaces. Both the literary and cinematic versions of Wonderland encapsulate her internal journey of alienation from and quest for identity. Alice is Wonderland. It follows that, in all three texts in question, Alice herself embodies the concept of liminality as defined by Turner. She tests her own identity with a 22 series of rites of passages devised by the self and for the self. She is a walking, talking, thinking space of endless potentiality in and of herself. By embracing Wonderland, she embraces herself. That her journey is articulated through a series of “adventures” in both the novels and the film also demonstrates that self-discovery does not depend on just one epiphany. And Burton’s ending of the metaphysical journey with the beginning of a literal one indicates that the pursuit of self-understanding is an ongoing, continuous, unending quest. Each text serves as a sequel to the previous one, furthering Alice's evolution. Burton's film does not merely reimagine Wonderland; it extends Alice's narrative beyond Carroll's closure, suggesting that her journey is far from over. Works Cited Alice in Wonderland. Directed by Tim Burton. Walt Disney Pictures, 2010. Cohan, Steven & M. Shires, Linda. Telling Stories: a Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction. Routledge, 1988: pp. 90-99. Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. 1865, 1871. Bantam Classics, 2006. Ede, Lisa Susan. The Nonsense Literature of Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll. 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