315
eISSN 0495-4548 – eISSN 2171-679X
T H E O R I A
Theo ia, 2024, 39(3), 315-331
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419
*
Co espondence o: Benoi Guilielmo. UZH, Philosophisches Semina , Zü ichbe gs asse 43, CH-8044 Zü ich (Swi ze land)–
[email p o ec ed] – h ps://o cid.o g/0000-0002-4224-1406
How o ci e: Guilielmo, Benoi (2024). «Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?»; Theo ia. An In e na ional Jou nal o Theo y, His o y and
Founda ions o Science,39(3), 315-331. (h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419).
Recei ed: 04 June, 2024; Final e sion: 12 No embe , 2024.
ISSN0495-4548 - eISSN2171-679X / © 2024 UPV/EHU P ess
This wo k is licensed unde a
C ea i e Commons A ibu ion-NonComme cial-NoDe i a i es 4.0 In e na ional License
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
(Duda y suspension: ¿Dos ac i udes o una?)
Benoi Guilielmo*
Uni e si y o Zü ich
ABSTRACT: A e doub and suspension o judgmen simila a i udes? In he bu geoning li e a u e on
suspension o judgmen , he no ion o doub is cu iously absen . This pape aims o a gue o he plau-
sibili y o an iden i y claim, which I e m he “No-Di e ence View.” This iew sugges s ha he e is no
subs an ial di e ence be ween being in doub and suspending judgmen . The a gumen will d aw on his-
o ical and sys ema ic conside a ions ha suppo he No-Di e ence View as a plausible iew wi hin he
logical space o posi ions.
KEYWORDS: doub , suspension o judgemen , belie , epis emology, men al s a es.
RESUMEN: ¿Son la duda y la suspensión del juicio ac i udes simila es? En la c ecien e li e a u a sob e la
suspensión del juicio, la noción de duda es á cu iosamen e ausen e. Es e a ículo a a de a gumen a a a o
de la plausibilidad de una esis de iden idad, que denomino la “Tesis de la No Di e encia”. Es a esis sugie e
que no hay di e encia sus ancial en e duda y suspende el juicio. El a gumen o se apoya en conside aciones
his ó icas y sis emá icas que espaldan la Tesis de la No Di e encia como una pos u a plausible den o del es-
pacio lógico de opciones.
PALABRAS CLAVE: duda, suspensión del juicio, c eencia, epis emología, es ados men ales.
Benoi Guilielmo
316 Theo ia, 2024, 39/3, 315-331
1. In oduc ion
A e doub and suspension o judgemen he same a i ude? Acco ding o Jane F ied-
man, “suspension o judgmen is no a amilia olk-psychological a i ude, bu i is a
doxas ic a i ude o en discussed by epis emologis s” (F iedman, o hcoming). In con-
as , doub akes a back sea in con empo a y epis emological discussions, despi e be-
ing a amilia olk-psychological a i ude and holding a cen al ole in epis emology,
pa icula ly since Desca es’s Medi a ions. While se e al con empo a y philosophe s
ecognize sha ed p ope ies be ween doub and suspension, none o hem seems o be
eady o endo se he s onge claim ha hese a i udes a e iden ical. Fo ins ance, ac-
co ding o F iedman:
[S]uspension sha es [wi h doub ] his push owa ds i s own demise: in suspending we
ask a ques ion and (a leas in some minimal sense) seek an answe . Al hough I don’ hink
ha doub and suspension a e iden ical, [..] i wouldn’ be su p ising i doub and suspen-
sion sha ed his p ope y [ iz. i p omp s us o inqui e un il i is ex inguished]. I is widely
hough ha we ind unce ain y and ambigui y and he like a e si e. (F iedman, 2017,
p.316, my emphasis)
Simila ly, in he seminal pape on suspended judgemen (F iedman, 2013a) whe e she
aises he “Reduc ion Ques ion” o whe he ha ing a suspensi e a i ude jus is “a ma -
e o ha ing some amilia indecision- ep esen ing a i udes”, F iedman ca e ully ex-
cludes belie and c edence, bu doub is men ioned wi hou being eally examined. I is
hus gene ally admi ed, mo e o less explici ly, ha doub and suspension a e wo di -
e en a i udes. Thei ela ionship emains unde explo ed.1 Rela edly, he ecei ed i-
adic axonomy o ou main doxas ic s ances, acco ding o which he e a e h ee and only
h ee doxas ic a i udes —namely, belie , disbelie , and suspension o judgmen — ails o
make oom o doub .2 This iadic ep esen a ion o ou doxas ic li e implici ly suppo s
he idea ha doub and suspension a e sepa a e beas s, whe e doub is ou o he pic u e
(wi hin he axonomy o ca ego ical a i udes). Conside o ins ance wo ecen s a e-
men s o his ep esen a ion:
1 Lee (2018) and Moon (2018) a e no able excep ions in con empo a y philosophy conce ning he ela-
ionship be ween suspension and doub . In hei espec i e pape s on doub , hey bo h discuss dis inc-
ions be ween di e en kinds o doub and a emp o ela e hem o suspension. Howe e , his ques-
ion is no he cen al issue o he men ioned pape s. Acco ding o Moon (2018, p.1830), e b o ms
o doub , like “F ed doub s ha Sally will a i e on ime,” indica e “a leas a s ong inclina ion o dis-
belie e,” while sen ences like “F ed is in doub abou whe he Sally will a i e on ime” sugges a mo e
“on- he- ence suspension o judgmen .” This idea is u he explo ed in Rosa ( o hcoming b.); see be-
low § 5.4. Lee (2018, p.55), con a y o Moon (2018), iden i ies suspension wi h in e media e le els
o doub (be ween sligh and s ong doub ). See also Hookway (2002) o in e es ing ema ks on Pei -
cian ‘ eal doub ’ and suspension, and Machuca (2021) conce ning Sex us Empi icus’ no ion o suspen-
sion and i s compa ibili y wi h doub .
2 The iadic pic u e is la gely assumed in con empo a y epis emology. See o ins ance, Comesaña & Klein
(2019), F iedman (2017, p.322, no e 3), Rosa ( o hcoming b), Sosa (2017, p.38), and Wedgwood
(2002, p.272). Doub is e y a ely designa ed as he hi d s ance in he iadic pic u e, hus aking he
place o suspension; see Ducasse (1940, p.701), Johnson (1921, p.4-5 ), and S ebbing (1930, p.33).
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419 317
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
[I] is o hodox o hink ha he e a e (a leas ) h ee coa se-g ained doxas ic eac ions ha
a e go e ned by epis emic a ionali y: belie , disbelie , and suspension o judgmen . (Lo d 2024,
p.419)
Whene e a pe son conside s any p oposi ion, ha pe son mus belie e he p oposi ion, o
disbelie e he p oposi ion, o suspend judgmen abou he p oposi ion. A pe son canno a any
ime ha e mo e han one o hese a i udes owa d one p oposi ion. (Feldman 2014, p.46)
I is qui e incon o e ible ha suspending on whe he some hing is he case adically di -
e s om doub ing ha some hing is he case: i you doub ha ghos s a e haun ing you
house, you a e no in a s a e o suspended judgemen abou he issue; i you doub ha p,
you a e aking a non-neu al s ance owa ds p —you disbelie e, o a e s ongly inclined o-
wa ds disbelie ing, ha p.3 So i you doub ha some ghos s a e haun ing you house, and I
ask you whe he i is indeed he case ha ghos s a e haun ing you house, you will likely e-
spond wi h a di ec “No” o be inclined o p o ide such a nega i e answe . Bu hings a e
much less clea when i comes o he a i ude o being in doub as o whe he p. Suppose
you o en hea wei d and unexplained noises a nigh . Suppose you s a being in doub
abou whe he ghos s a e haun ing you house, and canno ell whe he his is he case o
no , which you would like o be able o decide. I would be na u al he e o say wo hings:
(i) ha you a e in a s a e o suspended judgemen abou whe he ghos s a e haun ing you
house, and (ii) ha you a e in doub on his issue. In such case, in answe ing he ques ion
whe he ghos s a e haun ing you house, you will ce ainly u e ha you canno say “Yes”,
and ha you canno say “No”. In ou li le scena io, you ha e a neu al a i ude owa ds p:
you nei he belie e no disbelie e ha ghos s a e haun ing you house —which is su icien
o show ha being in doub as o whe he p di e s om doub ing ha p and ha ing doub s
abou p, which bo h do no imply such a neu al a i ude owa ds p.4
I we wan o cla i y he cen al oles hese no ions play, bo h in ou men al econ-
omy and in ou doxas ic li es, i is c ucial o cap u e hei ela ions and simila i ies o each
o he . My goal in his pape is o a gue ha he e is no subs an ial di e ence be ween he
wo a i udes o being in doub ( o which I shall simply e e in he es o his pape by he
e m “doub ”) and being in a s a e o suspended judgemen . I will hus examine conside a-
ions a o ing he plausible hesis, he NO-DIFFERENCE View (hence o h “ND”), as I
shall call i .
I shall i s cla i y wha suspension in ol es, a leas in i s minimal o m (§2), be o e
showing ha he NO-DIFFERENCE View inds s ong suppo in un o una ely ne-
glec ed discussions in he his o y o philosophy, whe he abou he desc ip i e o he no -
3 Rosa ( o hcoming a) e e s o such doub as a “nega i e a i ude”: he doub - ha exp ession co e-
sponds he e o an “a i ude o ou igh disbelie ,” o a leas “an a i ude ha leans owa d disbelie .”
Gaul ie ( o hcoming) obse es ha “one could a gue ha his alleged o m o doub [doub ha ] is
no in ac a o m o doub a all, bu jus a belie o judgemen : he belie o judgemen ha , gi en he
a ailable e idence, i is unlikely ha A is he igh answe o Q.”
4 See Howa d-Snyde (2013, p.359) on his dis inc ion. In d awing his dis inc ion be ween di e en
kinds o doub , Rosa ( o hcoming a.) acknowledges ha “ o ha e doub s abou p is nei he o doub
ha p no o be in doub as o whe he p (no necessa ily).” See Lee (2018, p.142), Moon (2018), and
Rosa ( o hcoming a.) on he di e ences be ween (a) he e bal o m o doub , (b) he p eposi ional
mass-locu ion “in doub ”, and (c) he coun -noun usage o doub . Fo he ine-g ained seman ic dis-
inc ion be ween doub - ha and doub -whe he , see Ashe (1987) and Uegaki (2023).
Benoi Guilielmo
318 Theo ia, 2024, 39/3, 315-331
ma i e aspec s o doub and suspension (§3). I shall hen ad ance addi ional a gumen s in
a o o ND, based on he simila i y o he a ional p o iles o doub and suspension (§4).
In he inal sec ion, I will b ie ly examine whe he ND is in ac compa ible wi h ce ain o
he iews o suspension de ended in he con empo a y li e a u e (§5). Ra he han o e ing
knockdown a gumen s, I will ad ance a a ie y o easons in a o o ND, my p ima y aim
being o a gue o he o e looked plausibili y o his iew.
2. A minimalis cha ac e iza ion o suspension o judgemen
In ad oca ing o he plausibili y o ND, I need o cha ac e ize he na u e o suspension
wi hou endo sing a speci ic analysis. My aim is o es ablish common g ound be ween he
di e ing concep ions in he deba e on suspension. As men ioned in he in oduc ion, his
pape examines he ela ionship be ween being in doub and being in a s a e o suspended
judgmen . I assume ha episodic “suspending” ma ks he beginning o wha is known in
he li e a u e as a “s a e o suspended judgmen ,” simila o how a judging episode ini i-
a es a belie s a e. Two ambigui ies in he li e a u e a e wo h no ing: (1) he di e ence be-
ween an ac i e no ion o suspension (as seen in agen ial iews; see McG a h, 2024) and a
s a i e iew, which has been he ocus since F iedman’s (2013a) seminal pape ; and (2) he
challenge o in e p e ing “suspension o judgmen ”, gi en some s ong assump ions in he
deba e (e.g., ha suspension is a doxas ic a i ude (F iedman, 2017), and in unde s anding
wha exac ly cha ac e izing suspension as an a i ude o “commi ed neu ali y” amoun s
o; see, on his las poin , F iedman, 2022). The e o e, I ollow he majo i y o con empo-
a y epis emologis s in assuming ha suspension is a men al s a e (F iedman, 2013a).
E en hough, as E ol Lo d (2023) ap ly no es, he cu en deba e abou suspension o
judgmen “is in some ways he Wild Wes because he e is la ge and la gely implici disa-
g eemen abou he basic ea u es o suspension,” I ind amids he ongoing discussions a
leas one disce nible common g ound: suspension is a so o neu al a i ude. One o he
main poin s o con en ion be ween he di e en accoun s conce ns how o cash ou his
neu al s ance:
NEUTRALITY When a subjec S suspends judgmen on p, S is in a neu al s a e o mind
abou whe he p is ue o alse.
The e is no hing mys e ious abou his neu ali y condi ion. We can unde s and i , e e -
ing o i s e ymology (ne+u e ), as meaning “nei he his no ha ”. The equi ed neu ali y
p esen ac oss all cases o suspension implies nei he belie ing p no disbelie ing p, o nei-
he a i ming no denying ha p. I ND holds, his essen ial ea u e o neu ali y mus also
be p esen in all ins ances o doub .
Fo mos con empo a y epis emologis s, he lack o belie /disbelie in ol ed by NEU-
TRALITY is necessa y, bu no su icien o suspension; u he condi ions need o be added
o adequa ely cap u e suspension (see McG a h, 2024, o a ecen o e iew o he deba e).5
5 Concep ions acco ding o which suspension is no a p ope doxas ic s ance, bu a he an agen i e in-
en ional omission, a b acke ing, a e aining om judging, o a pos poning o belie - o ma ion (see
McG a h, 2024 o an o e iew o di e en candida es) a e compa ible wi h NEUTRALITY. See
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419 319
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
In he ollowing sec ions, we will see ha some o hese u he condi ions ecen ly discussed
in he li e a u e on suspension —in e ms o p econdi ions o judging (e.g., “conside a ion
condi ion” o “cogni i e con ac ”; see Wagne , 2022), and in e ms o epis emic easons— a e
cons i u i e o his o ical accoun s o doub .
3. His o ical e idence o NO-DIFFERENCE
In his sec ion, I will p o ide his o ical da a om a ious philosophical adi ions and pe i-
ods. They con e ge in suppo ing he NO-DIFFERENCE iew:
ND The e is no subs an ial di e ence be ween being in doub abou whe he p and being in
a s a e o suspended judgemen abou whe he p.
Mo e p ecisely, he suppo ND ecei es om he his o y o philosophy akes h ee (pa ly
o e lapping) o ms: (i) he Simple iew, acco ding o which he s a e o doub is no hing
mo e han a s a e o suspension; (ii) he Scholas ic iew, acco ding o which wo di e en
species o a ional doub mus be dis inguished, and which cha ac e izes doub as an e i-
dence-sensi i e suspended s a e o mind; and (iii) he Belie iew, acco ding o which he
s a e o doub is a s a e o suspended judgmen ha consis s o ha ing a belie abou one’s
(de ec i e) epis emic si ua ion.
3.1. The Simple View
The Simple View is he idea ha doub is o be cha ac e ized in e ms o suspension o
judgmen . We can ead in Blackbu n (2005, p.104-105) ha doub is “[ ]he s a e o nei-
he belie ing no disbelie ing a p oposi ion; a suspension o judgemen .” Acco ding o
his minimal de ini ion, doub is a p i a i e o nega i e s a e: ha o nei he belie ing no
disbelie ing some hing. This echoes Ralph Wedgwood’s accoun o suspension, acco ding
o which “one ‘suspends judgmen ’ abou p when one consciously conside s p bu nei he
belie es no disbelie es p” (2002, p.272). I ’s wo h no ing ha Wedgwood in oduces a
c ucial conside a ion condi ion o suspension, which is absen om Blackbu n’s lexical
de ini ion (see Wagne , 2022, p.673 on his “cogni i e con ac ” equi emen ). Applied o
doub , his condi ion means ha a subjec canno be in doub abou a p oposi ion she has
no conside ed. As G.F. S ou w i es (1896, p.102), “[i]n doub ing we mus a leas p opose
a ques ion o ou sel es.” I canno be in doub abou whe he Ruby ac ed alone when killing
Oswald i I ha e ne e conside ed he ques ion, and he same goes o suspension. Ano he
minimal cha ac e iza ion o doub is p o ided by Be keley (1713):
Philonous: Does doub ing consis in accep ing he a i ma i e o he nega i e side o a ques ion?
Hylas: Nei he . Anyone who unde s ands English mus know ha doub ing signi ies a sus-
pense be ween he wo sides.
A che (2024) on he ac /a i ude ela ion in he suspension li e a u e, and pa icula ly McG a h’s
(2021) accoun . Wagne (2022) also a gues ha suspension is a men al ac o endo sing o commi ing
o one’s indecision. No e ha none o hese au ho s ejec NEUTRALITY.
Benoi Guilielmo
320 Theo ia, 2024, 39/3, 315-331
In his passage, Be keley de ines doub ( oughly) as suspension o belie (Ha 1980, p.32-
33). Acco ding o he Simple iew, NEUTRALITY is he speci ic and cen al common
ea u e o doub and suspense: when you a e in doub , you a e in suspense. Ano he cha ac-
e iza ion o being in doub is ound in Bolzano’s wo k (1973, p.65):
I one p oposi ion seems jus as p obable o us as i s opposi e, hen we can nei he judge i is
ue no judge ha i is alse, bu we a e in doub .
Bolzano does no use he e m “suspension,” bu his cha ac e iza ion o being in doub is
e y close o i . Mo eo e , we can assume he e ha no making a judgemen and alling
in o a s a e o doub is he same as nei he belie ing no disbelie ing ha p.
The upsho is ha , acco ding o he Simple iew, doub is cha ac e ized in e ms o sus-
pension. This explici ly o e a desc ip i e condi ion essen ial o being in doub and sus-
pense: nei he belie no disbelie ha p (o nei he accep ing no nega ing ha p) a e
conside ing a ques ion. The wo a i udes a e cha ac e ized as bo h epis emically neu al
owa ds hei con en . Being in doub is hus iden ical o a suspended/suspensi e s a e o
mind. These de ini ions emain minimal bu i seems legi ima e, a his poin , o conside
ND as a plausible posi ion.
3.2. The Scholas ic View
The Scholas ic iew builds on he Simple iew, which de ines doub as “a s a e in which
he mind is suspended be ween wo con adic o y p oposi ions and unable o assen o
ei he o hem” (Sha pe 1909, p.141). Howe e , he Scholas ic iew adds a c ucial no -
ma i e condi ion: a subjec doub s a p oposi ion p based on epis emic easons. This em-
phasis on eason- esponsi eness explains how doub can a y in epis emic a ionali y de-
pending on he a ailable e idence. Unlike he Simple iew, he Scholas ic iew highligh s
ha eason- esponsi eness is cons i u i e o doub , and in oduces a signi ican dis inc-
ion in he ypes o easons o doub . Ra ional doub is he eby di ided in o wo species,
nega i e doub and posi i e doub .6 To illus a e hese wo species o doub , he e a e wo
oy examples:
The C owd Es ima ion
Ka e is asked whe he some la ge assembly o ms an odd o an e en numbe based on a pho-
og aphic pic u e o some e en . She leans o nei he side, o lack o he means o deciding, e en
wi h p obabili y, one way a he han ano he .
6 Sha pe (1909, p.141) p o ides a concise and use ul explana ion o he dis inc ion: “Doub is ei he
posi i e o nega i e. In he o me case, he e idence o and agains is so equally balanced as o en-
de decision impossible; in he la e , he doub a ises om he absence o su icien e idence on ei-
he side.” This dis inc ion has been ecognized and endo sed by a long adi ion aking i s o igins in
S . Thomas Aquinas (Supe Sen ., lib. 3 d. 23 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 co.; Quaes iones dispu a ae de e i a e, q. 14
(“On ai h”), a . 1) and Suá ez (De iplici i u e heologica, in Suá ez 2015, p.950, p.953-954) be-
o e becoming a locus classicus in Neo-scholas ic ex books. Acco ding o his adi ion, doub is one
a i ude ha one can ha e owa ds some con en , and i di e s in kind om opinion, suspicion, o ce -
ain y (see o ins ance Coppens, 1891, and Rickaby, 1888).
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419 321
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
Wha is Ka e’s s a e o mind? A ques ion is p esen ed o he o conside a ion. She has no
alid eason o belie e ha he numbe o people in he pic u e is e en o odd. She emains
neu al, in a pe ec ly balanced s a e, unable o judge. She is in doub abou which is he
co ec answe , no ha ing he sligh es g ound o men ally a i ming any o hese con lic -
ing answe s. I is he lack o conclusi e e idence one way o ano he ha b ing abou his
s a e. This is a case o wha he scholas ics called nega i e doub (dubium nega i um): “I
may be de ined as he equipoise o he mind, due o he absence o any alid easons on ei-
he side” (Rickaby, 1888, p.45). The second example is he ollowing:
Edmund in Pa is
One au umn e ening, Edmund is s olling on he A enue des Champs-Élysées. He sees a igu e
s anding in a s o e window, which he ini ially akes o be a eal man, pe haps an employee wo king
he e. Then, howe e , Edmund becomes hesi an and asks himsel whe he i is no jus a me e dummy.
Simila o Ka e’s s a e o mind, Edmund also inds himsel suspended be ween wo al e na-
i es. His hesi a ion s ems om an equal balance o p os and cons ega ding he wo al e na-
i es, making he decision impossible —a leas un il he se les he ques ion by, o ins ance,
mo ing close o handwa ing he supposed man in he window s o e, wai ing o a eac ion.
As G.F. S ou pu s i , “ he e is a posi i e endency bo h o a i m and deny he mu ually ex-
clusi e al e na i es” (S ou 1896, p.102). Edmund’s dubi a i e a i ude consis s o a luc-
ua ion be ween con lic ing belie s: <The e is a man s anding he e> and <No, he e is no
man he e, i is a me e dummy>. Using he scholas ic e minology, we can classi y his doub
as posi i e. Posi i e doub (dubium posi i um), co esponds o “ he equipoise o he mind,
due o he ac ha he easons on ei he side a e equal and opposi e” (Rickaby, 1888, p.45).
This idea o equally balanced easons should be pu in pa allel wi h he de ini ion o suspen-
sion in Book I o he Py honian Hypo hesis (§ 96), whe e Sex us ema ks ha
Suspension o judgemen ge s i s name om he ac ha he in ellec is suspended so as nei-
he o accep no o ejec any hing because o he equipollence o he ma e s in es iga ed. (An-
nas & Ba nes 2000, p.49)7
To summa ize, acco ding o he Scholas ic View, doub mani es s in wo species, bo h un-
damen ally e lec ing a suspensi e s a e o mind. As a icula ed by Rickaby (1888, p.45),
“in one case, he balance is due o he absence o p oducible easons [nega i e doub ], in
he o he case o he p esence o exac ly coun e ailing easons [posi i e doub ].” As we
will see below (§4), his dis inc ion is mi o ing e iden ial no ms o suspension discussed
in con empo a y epis emology.8
7 To p ess his poin , le me no e ha Machuca (2021) has ecen ly examined he ques ion o whe he
he Py honis ’s suspension is incompa ible wi h doub , and hus concludes his pape : “I hink we can
sa ely say ha doub pe se is no a a iance wi h he Py honian s ance.” Machuca also accep s (as I
do in his pape ) he dis inc ion be ween doub - ha and being in doub , and explici ly cha ac e izes
doub as “ he men al s a e o indecision and puzzlemen desc ibed by such sen ences as ‘S is in doub
abou whe he p’ o ‘S doub s whe he (o no ) p’” (Machuca, 2021, p.51).
8 In e es ingly, A che (2024:110 sq.) and Zinke’s (2021) espec i e accoun s o nega i e/posi i e jus i-
ica ion and p i a i e/posi i e jus i ica ion o suspension align closely wi h he Scholas ic iew o he
nega i e/posi i e cha ac e is ics o a ional doub .
Benoi Guilielmo
322 Theo ia, 2024, 39/3, 315-331
3.3. The Belie View
Simila ly o he wo p e ious iews o doub , acco ding o he Belie View, doub is a sus-
pension o judgmen . Howe e , he e is an impo an componen in eg a ed in o he anal-
ysis o doub . Doub in ol es NEUTRALITY and ha ing a belie abou one’s (de ec i e)
epis emic si ua ion. To illus a e his concep ion, le ’s u n o Robe Flin , an unde a ed
ep esen a i e o he Belie iew (I di ide he quo a ion in o h ee pa s o cla i y):
[a] So a om implying an en i e absence o judgmen , doub is a suspension o judgmen
based on he judgmen ha nei he an a i ma i e no a nega i e judgmen would be wa an ed
in he ci cums ances. […] [b] Doub is an ac ual o posi i e condi ion o mind, and o en a mos
legi ima e and aluable one, bu i equi es jus i ica ion equally wi h belie and disbelie , and i
can only be jus i ied by showing ha , o a i ma ion and nega ion, he easons bo h o belie
and disbelie a e insu icien — ha hey coun e balance and coun e ac one ano he . […] [c] To
doub is o belie e ha he e is no wa an o a i m decision — ha he e is insu icien e idence
o a esol ed and se led belie . (Flin 1903, p.256-257)
In pa [a] we encoun e a i s o mula ion o he Belie iew. Flin indica es ha he
doub is based on a judgemen , bu no speci ically on a i s -o de judgmen ega ding
whe he p is ue o no . Ins ead, he con en o he judgemen conce ns ou capaci y o
make a a ional judgmen abou whe he p (“nei he an a i ma i e no a nega i e judg-
men would be wa an ed in he ci cums ances”). In pa [b], and in con as o he Scho-
las ic iew, Flin combines, in his desc ip ion, he wo adi ional ypes o easons o doub
(insu icien easons, and coun e balanced easons o and agains belie /disbelie ). Finally,
in pa [c], he e is a comple e o mula ion o he Belie iew, which can be eph ased mo e
con empo a ily: o doub whe he p is o belie e some hing abou one’s (de icien ) epis-
emic si ua ion ega ding p, speci ically ha one is no in a posi ion o be jus i ied in belie -
ing/disbelie ing p.Bo h he Scholas ic and he Belie iews claim ha doub is a suspension
o judgmen g ounded in epis emic easons, bu hey di e in how doub is analyzed. The
Belie iew concei es doub as a conjunc ion o a i s -o de doxas ic s ance conce ning
whe he p (co esponding o NEUTRALITY) and a highe -o de belie abou one’s epis-
emic si ua ion. In his pic u e, o doub is no me ely o ha e an absence o belie o disbe-
lie abou he a ge ed issue, bu also o ha e, as a necessa y condi ion, a belie abou one’s
pe spec i e conce ning he a ge ed issue, e.g., ha one lacks a ional g ounds o o m a a-
ional belie .
In summa y, in con as o he Simple and Scholas ic iews o doub , a u he speci ic
condi ion is necessa y: being in doub equi es ha ing a belie abou one’s epis emic (de ec-
i e) si ua ion conce ning p.Fo ins ance, acco ding o S ou , doub “p esupposes belie in
a disjunc i e judgmen . I consis s in acknowledging he eali y o one o o he o wo o
mo e al e na i es wi hou deciding be ween hem” (S ou 1896, p.101). The Belie iew
o doub inds a pa allel in he ecen li e a u e on suspension. Fo example, Sean C aw o d
a gues ha : “Suspension o judgemen necessa ily in ol es hough s abou one’s own epis-
emic pe spec i e on whe he o no p, namely, ha one’s epis emic pe spec i e alls sho
o es ablishing whe he p and hus ha one does no know whe he p” (C aw o d, 2004,
p.226). The belie -based iew o suspension is u he a icula ed by Raleigh (2021), and
Masny (2020, p.5024): “S suspends judgmen abou p i (i) S belie es ha she nei he be-
lie es no disbelie es ha p, (ii) S nei he belie es no disbelie es ha p, (iii) S in ends o
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419 323
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
judge ha p o no -p.” Wi hou del ing in o he de ails o hese accoun s, i ’s no ewo hy
ha ecen explana ions o suspension closely esemble olde accoun s o doub , p o iding
addi ional suppo o he plausibili y o he NO-DIFFERENCE iew.9
4. The Ra ional P o iles o Suspension and Doub
A his junc u e, he ocus is on he sha ed cha ac e is ics be ween doub and suspension,
pa icula ly hei a ionali y and con e gence in e ms o epis emic jus i ica ion/ a ion-
ali y. I is widely acknowledged ha a c ucial equi emen o a heo y o suspension is o
elucida e wha makes holding his a i ude epis emically jus i ied o a ional (see A che
2022; A kinson, 2021; Raleigh, 2021; Zinke 2021). I one emb aces he NO-DIFFER-
ENCE iew, i ollows ha being in doub and being suspended a e necessa ily go e ned by
he same epis emic no ms. Wha a e hese no ms? The ollowing wo ( he Absence o E i-
dence and he Coun e balanced E idence no ms) a e he less con o e sial ones in he li -
e a u e on suspension:
Absence o E idence No m
In he absence o [ ele an ]e idence o o agains an o dina y con ingen p oposi ion p, i is
epis emically pe missible o suspend judgmen abou p.
This no m should b ing o mind he concep o nega i e doub a icula ed by he Scholas ic
iew (c . § 3.2). To expound on his no m, F iedman (2013b) claims ha “i you a e going
o ha e some a i ude owa ds an o dina y con ingen p oposi ion ha you unde s and bu
abou which you ha e absolu ely no e idence ei he o o agains , you canno be going w ong
by suspending judgmen ” (F iedman, 2013b, p.60). In o he wo ds, i is a pe missibili y no m,
i.e., in such e iden ial si ua ion, suspending judgemen is pe missible om an epis emological
poin o iew. Fo ins ance, suppose ha you ha e no in o ma ion abou he dis ibu ion o
100balls in one u n. I could be 99 whi e balls and 1 ed, i could be 50/50, 49/51, o 75/25.
You simply do no possess he in o ma ion. Will he nex ball be ed o whi e? Acco ding o
he Absence o E idence No m, suspending judgemen abou whe he i will be a ed ball o a
whi e one is epis emically pe missible.10 The o he e iden ial no m is as ollows:
Coun e -balanced E idence No m
In case e idence is coun e balanced o o agains an o dina y con ingen p oposi ion p —i
equally suppo s belie ingpand disbelie ingp —i is epis emically a ional o suspend judgmen
abou p.
9 See A che (2024) o a c i ical discussion o he a ie y o belie -based accoun s o suspension, and
Wagne (2022, p.679) on he di e en con en s o he ele an highe -o de belie . See also Hook-
way’s (2002) discussion o belie iews o doub , acco ding o which “ o doub a p oposi ion is o ake
an e alua i e s ance owa ds i ” (Hookway, 2002, p.247). Howe e , in Hookway’s Pei ce-inspi ed ac-
coun o “ eal doub ,” an a ec i e componen is essen ial: being in a s a e o eal doub in ol es anx-
iously e alua ing one’s epis emic si ua ion as epis emically dange ous o unsa e, which in u n shapes
ou ac ions o elimina e he doub h ough inqui y (see Gaul ie , o hcoming).
10 I in en ionally a icula e he no m in e ms o epis emic pe missibili y (see Engels, 2010; F iedman 2019b;
Pollock, 1987), a he han equi emen s, o i ingness. This dis inc ion does no a ec he a gumen .
Benoi Guilielmo
330 Theo ia, 2024, 39/3, 315-331
Howa d-Snyde , D. (2013). P oposi ional ai h: Wha i is and wha i is no .Ame ican Philosophical Qua -
e ly, 50(4), 357-372.
Johnson, W. E. (1921). Logic, Pa 1. Camb idge: Camb idge Uni e si y P ess.
Lee, M. B. (2018). On doub . Philosophia, 46, 141-158. doi: h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s11406-017-9911-3
Lo d, E. (2020). Suspension o judgmen , a ionali y’s compe i ion, and he each o he epis emic. In S.
Schmid & G. E ns (Eds.), The e hics o belie and beyond: Unde s anding men al no ma i i y (pp.126-
145). Abingdon: Rou ledge.
Lo d, E. (2023). Book e iew: Epis emic explana ions: A heo y o elic no ma i i y, and wha i explains, by
E nes Sosa. Mind. doi:h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/mind/ zad012
Lo d, E. (2024). E idence and epis emic easons. In M. Lasonen-Aa nio & C. Li lejohn (Eds.), The Rou -
ledge handbook o he philosophy o e idence. New Yo k: Rou ledge.
Machuca, D. E. (2021). Is Py honian suspension incompa ible wi h doub ? Midwes S udies in Philosophy,
45, 27-55.
Masny, M. (2020). F iedman on suspended judgmen . Syn hese, 197(11), 5009-5026. doi: h ps://doi.
o g/10.1007/s11229-018-01957-1
McCain, K. (2023). E iden ialism, judgmen , and suspension: Mee ing Sosa’s challenges. Epis eme, 1-12.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1017/epi.2023.48
McG a h, M. (2021). Being neu al: Agnos icism, inqui y and he suspension o judgmen . Noûs, 55(2), 463-
484. doi:h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/nous.12323
McG a h, M. (2024). Is suspension o judgmen a ques ion-di ec ed a i ude? No, no eally. In M. S eup &
J. Tu i (Eds.), Con empo a y deba es in epis emology (3 d ed.). Chiches e : Blackwell.
Moon, A. (2018). The na u e o doub and a new puzzle abou belie , doub , and con idence.Syn hese, 195,
1827-1848.doi: h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s11229-016-1310-y
Newman, J. H. (1870). An essay in aid o a g amma o assen (C. F. Ha old, Ed.). Camb idge: Camb idge
Uni e si y P ess.
Pe in, C. (2018). Py honian scep icism and he agnos ic s a e o mind. In G. B uno & A. Ru he o d (Eds.),
Skep icism, his o ical and con empo a y inqui ies (pp.114-128). London: Rou ledge.
Pollock, J. L. (1987). Epis emic no ms. Syn hese, 71(1), 61-95.
P ice, H. H. (1969). Belie . London: Rou ledge.
Raleigh, T. (2021). Suspending is belie ing. Syn hese, 198, 2449-2474. doi:h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s11229-
019-02223-8
Rickaby, J. (1888). The i s p inciples o knowledge. London: Longmans, G een & Co.
Rosa, L. ( o hcoming a). Doub . In K. Syl an (Ed.), The Blackwell companion o epis emology (3 d ed.). Lon-
don: Blackwell.
Rosa, L. ( o hcoming b). How should we asc ibe he hi d s ance? In A. Zinke & V. Wagne (Eds.), Suspen-
sion in epis emology and beyond. London: Rou ledge.
Salmon, N. (1995). Being o wo minds: Belie wi h doub . Noûs, 29(1), 1-20. doi:h ps://doi.
o g/10.2307/2215724
Sienkiewicz, S. (2019). Fi e modes o scep icism: Sex us Empi icus and he Ag ippan modes. Ox o d: Ox o d
Uni e si y P ess.
Sha pe, A. (1909). Doub . In The Ca holic Encyclopedia (Volume 5). New Yo k: Robe Apple on Company.
Sch oede , M. (2012). The ubiqui y o s a e-gi en easons.E hics, 122(3), 457-488.
Sch oede , M. (2021). Reasons i s . Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
Sosa, E. (2017). Epis emology. P ince on: P ince on Uni e si y P ess.
S ebbing, S. (1930). A Mode n In oduc ion o Logic, London: Me huen.
S ou , G. F. (1896). Analy ic psychology. London: Allen & Unwin.
Suá ez, F. (2015). Selec ions om h ee wo ks. Indianapolis: Libe y Fund.
Uegaki, W. (2023). The doub -whe he puzzle. In Ł. Jed zejowski & C. Umbach (Eds.), Non-in e oga i e
subo dina e wh-clauses (pp.157-179). Ox o d: Ox o d Uni e si y P ess. doi: h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/
oso/9780192844620.003.0015
h ps://doi.o g/10.1387/ heo ia.26419 331
Doub and suspension: Two a i udes o one?
Vaza d, J. (2019). (Un) easonable doub as a ec i e expe ience: Obsessi e-compulsi e diso de , epis emic
anxie y and he eeling o unce ain y. Syn hese, 198(7), 6917-6934. doi: h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/
s11229-019-02497-y
Wagne , V. (2022). Agnos icism as se led indecision. Philosophical S udies, 179(2), 671-697. doi: h ps://
doi.o g/10.1007/s11098-021-01676-3
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim o belie . Philosophical Pe spec i es, 16, 267-297.
Zinke, A. (2021). Ra ional suspension. Theo ia, 87(5), 1050-1066. doi: h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/ heo.12320
beNoi guilielmo is cu en ly wo king on he na u e o a ious cogni i e and a ec i e s a es, as well as
he epis emology o inqui y. He is a membe o he Zu ich Epis emology G oup on Ra ionali y (ZEGRa)
and he G oupe de Reche che en Epis émologie du Collège de F ance (Pa is).
ADD ess: UZH, Philosophisches Semina , Zü ichbe gs asse 43, CH-8044 Zü ich (Swi ze land) – benoi .
[email p o ec ed] – h ps://o cid.o g/0000-0002-4224-1406
