Mediation, Meddling, and Micromanagement: India in Nepal's Peace Process and Political Transition
Abstract
This study examines India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition in the post-conflict era. The period of examination primarily focuses on, but is not strictly confined to, the years between 2005 and 2017. This timeframe marks a pivotal chapter in Nepal's history, characterised by transformative events such as the 2006 pro-democracy uprising (Jana Andolan II), the resolution of a decade-long Maoist insurgency that claimed over 17,000 lives, the abolition of the 240-year-old monarchy, the promulgation of a new constitution, and Nepal's transition from a unitary Hindu monarchy to a secular federal democratic republic. As the nascent republic navigated a series of political avalanches in the post-conflict transition, India was heavily involved in Nepal—often exhibiting a complex character, transmitting both assistance and assertion. Although India’s role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition is widely recognised, the specifics of its involvement, such as its facilitation of the 12-Point Understanding, remain unclear. This study addresses that gap by offering an in-depth analysis of India's role in Nepal’s political turmoil during the mid-2000s and its subsequent engagement in post-conflict Nepal. In doing so, it also provides a broader and critical re-evaluation of India–Nepal relations. While not the primary objective, the study also identifies and discusses key lessons from Nepal’s peace process and political transition. This study employs a three-layered theoretical framework, integrating concepts from peace and mediation research, critical international relations, and global development studies. The first layer examines peace mediation as a foreign policy tool, analysing mediators’ motives alongside the concepts of ‘power mediators’ and ‘pure mediators’. The second layer explores rising power behaviour, the paradoxes of South–South Cooperation, and the harsh realities of contemporary sub-imperialism. Lastly, world-systems theory and dependency concepts provide a broader historical and economic perspective, serving as effective reference points for conducting a thorough analysis of India–Nepal relations. Methodologically, the study is rooted in critical realism and employs a single case study design. Data were collected from multiple sources, including semi-structured key informant interviews (n=18, 982 minutes), media materials (n=105, 750 pages), and video interviews and speeches (n=12, 360 minutes). Using an inductive approach based on grounded theory, the data were analysed using the qualitative content analysis method. By analysing a series of political events in Nepal from as early as 2001, the study concludes that while India’s facilitative role in the 12-Point Understanding was indeed helpful, it was Nepal’s internal political dynamics, coupled with a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO), that ultimately initiated the peace process. However, India was successful in portraying itself as a peace broker and in leveraging that narrative to strengthen its influence in post-conflict Nepal. During the post-conflict political transition, Indian influence grew significantly, as did Nepal’s dependency on India, with India actively intervening and micromanaging Nepal’s political affairs. India consolidated its influence over Nepal's political, bureaucratic, and security institutions through a combination of soft and hard power strategies. This created a state of ‘peace dependency,’ where Nepali political actors became heavily reliant on India to resolve even mundane political stalemates and maintain post-conflict stability. However, in the later stages of the political transition, Nepal strongly challenged and resisted India’s hard power tactics, including coercive diplomacy and economic blockade, and demonstrated significant resistance to external domination. This study situates India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition within a sub-imperialist framework and as rooted in a historically complex relationship marked by both cooperation and conflict. Analysing India’s long-term engagement in Nepal reveals its intent to transform Nepal into a sub-imperialist domain. India seeks to gain control over Nepal's natural resources—particularly water—and promote a world system based on neoliberal capitalism and various forms of aggression. While India has gradually entrapped Nepal in a web of dependencies, its own relationship with global financial institutions and Western powers, particularly the United States, exhibits similar dependency traits. Furthermore, India’s preoccupation with regional sub-imperialism is intertwined with its inclination for internal colonialism at home and its fixation with the Hindu-nationalist Hindutva ideology. This study offers fresh insights into rising power behaviour by critically examining India’s engagement in post-conflict Nepal. It challenges the assumption that the economic and political ascendance of a select few countries from the Global South paves the way for a more equitable world order. Instead, it demonstrates how these so-called rising powers engage with their less powerful neighbours, often cloaking their actions in the rhetoric of collective emancipation or South–South Cooperation (SSC). However, in practice, they frequently adopt extractivist and oppressive policies that perpetuate and reinforce unequal power relations. This undermines the long-cherished aspirations of particularly smaller and less powerful developing countries for a fairer and more equitable global order. The study concludes with a critique of Nepal's peace and political transition process, acknowledging its notable achievements while highlighting critical shortcomings, such as the lack of an effective transitional justice framework and the failure to implement impactful socio-economic reforms. These findings provide valuable lessons for future peace processes in comparable contexts and contribute to the broader discourse on international mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, South–South relations, and the pressing issues of regional power rivalries and a shifting world order. Keywords: Nepal peace process, India–Nepal relations, South Asian geopolitics, sub-imperialism, South–South Cooperation, rising power behaviour, critical realism, case study
Full text
mediation, meddling, & Micromanagement manoj bhusal india in nepal’s peace process and political transition DISSERTATIONES UNIVERSITATIS HELSINGIENSIS 352 2025
Faculty of Social Sciences University of Helsinki Dissertationes Universitatis Helsingiensis 352/2025 Helsinki/2025 Mediation, Meddling, and Micromanagement India in Nepal’s Peace Process and Political Transition Manoj Bhusal ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the Karolina Eskelin Hall (U3032), University main building on 03 October 2025, at 13:15. Helsinki 2025
Pre-examiners Professor Ana Saggioro Garcia, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro Professor Miriam Prys-Hansen, the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Custos University Lecturer, Docent Tiina Seppälä, University of Helsinki Supervisors University Lecturer Docent Tiina Seppälä, University of Helsinki Dr. Lauri Siitonen, University of Helsinki Dr. Päivi Hasu, University of Helsinki Opponent Professor Francesco Strazzari, Sant'Anna Scuola Universitaria Superiore Pisa University of Helsinki Dissertationes Universitatis Helsingiensis 352/2025 Cover Design: Manoj Bhusal (author) ISBN 978-952-84-1430-8 (Paperback) ISBN 978-952-84-1429-2 (PDF) ISSN 2954-2898 (Print) ISSN 2954-2952 (PDF) Unigrafia / PunaMusta Joensuu 2025
iii Abstract This study examines India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition in the post-conflict era. The period of examination primarily focuses on, but is not strictly confined to, the years between 2005 and 2017. This timeframe marks a pivotal chapter in Nepal's history, characterised by transformative events such as the 2006 pro-democracy uprising (Jana Andolan II), the resolution of a decade-long Maoist insurgency that claimed over 17,000 lives, the abolition of the 240-year-old monarchy, the promulgation of a new constitution, and Nepal's transition from a unitary Hindu monarchy to a secular federal democratic republic. As the nascent republic navigated a series of political avalanches in the post-conflict transition, India was heavily involved in Nepal—often exhibiting a complex character, transmitting both assistance and assertion. Although India’s role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition is widely recognised, the specifics of its involvement, such as its facilitation of the 12-Point Understanding, remain unclear. This study addresses that gap by offering an indepth analysis of India's role in Nepal’s political turmoil during the mid-2000s and its subsequent engagement in post-conflict Nepal. In doing so, it also provides a broader and critical re-evaluation of India–Nepal relations. While not the primary objective, the study also identifies and discusses key lessons from Nepal’s peace process and political transition. This study employs a three-layered theoretical framework, integrating concepts from peace and mediation research, critical international relations, and global development studies. The first layer examines peace mediation as a foreign policy tool, analysing mediators’ motives alongside the concepts of ‘power mediators’ and ‘pure mediators’. The second layer explores rising power behaviour, the paradoxes of South–South Cooperation, and the harsh realities of contemporary subimperialism. Lastly, world-systems theory and dependency concepts provide a broader historical and economic perspective, serving as effective reference points for conducting a thorough analysis of India–Nepal relations. Methodologically, the study is rooted in critical realism and employs a single case study design. Data were collected from multiple sources, including semistructured key informant interviews (n=18, 982 minutes), media materials (n=105, 750 pages), and video interviews and speeches (n=12, 360 minutes). Using an inductive approach based on grounded theory, the data were analysed using the qualitative content analysis method. By analysing a series of political events in Nepal from as early as 2001, the study concludes that while India’s facilitative role in the 12-Point Understanding was indeed helpful, it was Nepal’s internal political dynamics, coupled with a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO), that ultimately initiated the peace process. However, India was successful in portraying itself as a peace broker and in leveraging that narrative to strengthen its influence in post-conflict Nepal. During the post-conflict political transition, Indian influence grew significantly, as did Nepal’s dependency on India, with India actively intervening and micromanaging Nepal’s political affairs. India consolidated its influence over Nepal's political, bureaucratic, and security institutions through a combination of soft and hard power strategies. This created a state of ‘peace dependency,’ where Nepali political actors became heavily reliant on India to resolve even mundane political stalemates and maintain post-conflict stability. However, in the later stages of the political transition, Nepal strongly
iv challenged and resisted India’s hard power tactics, including coercive diplomacy and economic blockade, and demonstrated significant resistance to external domination. This study situates India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition within a sub-imperialist framework and as rooted in a historically complex relationship marked by both cooperation and conflict. Analysing India’s long-term engagement in Nepal reveals its intent to transform Nepal into a subimperialist domain. India seeks to gain control over Nepal's natural resources— particularly water—and promote a world system based on neoliberal capitalism and various forms of aggression. While India has gradually entrapped Nepal in a web of dependencies, its own relationship with global financial institutions and Western powers, particularly the United States, exhibits similar dependency traits. Furthermore, India’s preoccupation with regional sub-imperialism is intertwined with its inclination for internal colonialism at home and its fixation with the Hindunationalist Hindutva ideology. This study offers fresh insights into rising power behaviour by critically examining India’s engagement in post-conflict Nepal. It challenges the assumption that the economic and political ascendance of a select few countries from the Global South paves the way for a more equitable world order. Instead, it demonstrates how these so-called rising powers engage with their less powerful neighbours, often cloaking their actions in the rhetoric of collective emancipation or South–South Cooperation (SSC). However, in practice, they frequently adopt extractivist and oppressive policies that perpetuate and reinforce unequal power relations. This undermines the long-cherished aspirations of particularly smaller and less powerful developing countries for a fairer and more equitable global order. The study concludes with a critique of Nepal's peace and political transition process, acknowledging its notable achievements while highlighting critical shortcomings, such as the lack of an effective transitional justice framework and the failure to implement impactful socio-economic reforms. These findings provide valuable lessons for future peace processes in comparable contexts and contribute to the broader discourse on international mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, South–South relations, and the pressing issues of regional power rivalries and a shifting world order. Keywords: Nepal peace process, India–Nepal relations, South Asian geopolitics, sub-imperialism, South–South Cooperation, rising power behaviour, critical realism, case study
v Tiivistelmä Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee Intian osallistumista Nepalin rauhanprosessiin ja poliittiseen siirtymään konfliktin jälkeen, keskittyen ensisijaisesti vuosiin 2005– 2017. Tätä käänteentekevää ajanjaksoa Nepalin historiassa leimasivat suuria muutoksia aikaansaaneet tapahtumat, kuten vuoden 2006 demokraattinen kansannousu (Jana Andolan II), yli 17 000 henkeä vaatineen kymmenvuotisen maolaississiliikkeen päättyminen, 240-vuotisen monarkian lakkauttaminen ja uuden perustuslain säätäminen, jonka myötä Nepal muuttui yhtenäisestä hindumonarkiasta sekulaariksi demokraattiseksi liittotasavallaksi. Nuoren tasavallan kamppaillessa poliittisten mullistusten kanssa Intia toimi Nepalissa aktiivisesti ja monitahoisesti, yhdistäen avunannon ja määrätietoisen vallankäytön. Vaikka Intian rooli Nepalin rauhanprosessissa ja poliittisessa siirtymässä on laajalti tunnustettu, sen osallistumisen yksityiskohdat, esimerkiksi 12-kohtaisen yhteisymmärryksen (12-Point Understanding) aikaansaamisessa, ovat edelleen epäselviä. Tämä tutkimus tuottaa aiheesta uutta tietoa ja tarjoaa syvällisen analyysin Intian roolista Nepalin poliittisessa myllerryksessä 2000-luvun puolivälissä sekä konfliktin päättymisen jälkeen. Samalla se arvioi uudelleen Intian ja Nepalin suhdetta laajemmasta, kriittisestä näkökulmasta. Lisäksi työ tarkastelee ja nostaa esiin Nepalin rauhanprosessin ja poliittisen siirtymän keskeisiä opetuksia. Tutkimuksessa käytetään kolmitasoista teoreettista viitekehystä, joka yhdistää rauhanja konfliktintutkimuksen, kriittisen kansainvälisen politiikan ja globaalin kehitystutkimuksen käsitteitä. Ensimmäinen taso tarkastelee rauhanvälitystä ulkopolitiikan välineenä, analysoiden rauhanvälittäjien motiiveja sekä rauhanvälitykseen liittyvää käsitteistöä (‘power mediators’ ja ‘pure mediators’). Toinen taso pureutuu nousevien valtojen käyttäytymiseen, globaalin etelän maiden yhteistyön haasteisiin ja nykyisen subimperialismin realiteetteihin. Lopuksi maailmanjärjestelmäteorian ja riippuvuusteorian käsitteet tarjoavat laajemman historiallis-taloudellisen perspektiivin ja viitekehyksen Intian ja Nepalin suhteen syvällisemmälle analyysille. Menetelmällisesti tutkimus pohjautuu kriittiseen realismiin ja noudattaa yksittäisen tapaustutkimuksen mallia. Aineisto koostuu avainhenkilöiden puolistrukturoiduista haastatteluista (n=18, 982 minuuttia), media-aineistosta (n=105, 750 sivua) sekä videohaastatteluista ja puheista (n=12, 360 minuuttia). Aineisto on analysoitu induktiivista, grounded theory-lähestymistapaan perustuvaa laadullista sisällönanalyysia hyödyntäen. Analysoidessaan Nepalin poliittisia tapahtumia vuodesta 2001 lähtien tutkimus päätyy johtopäätökseen, että Intian toiminta edesauttoi 12-kohtaisen yhteisymmärryksen aikaansaamisessa, mutta varsinaisen rauhanprosessin käynnisti Nepalin sisäinen poliittinen dynamiikka, joka tarjosi konfliktin osapuolille uusia mahdollisuuksia ja kannustimia. Intia onnistui kuitenkin esiintymään rauhanvälittäjänä ja hyödyntämään tätä narratiivia vahvistaakseen vaikutusvaltaansa konfliktin jälkeisessä Nepalissa. Poliittisen siirtymävaiheen aikana Intia puuttui aktiivisesti Nepalin poliittisiin asioihin, mikä lisäsi Intian vaikutusvaltaa maassa ja syvensi sen riippuvuutta Intiasta. Intia lujitti vaikutusvaltaansa Nepalin poliittisissa, hallinnollisissa ja turvallisuusinstituutioissa yhdistämällä pehmeän ja kovan vallan strategioita. Tämä loi ‘rauhanriippuvuuden’ tilan, jossa Nepalin poliittiset toimijat tukeutuivat vahvasti Intiaan ratkaistakseen jopa arkipäiväisiä poliittisia ongelmia ja ylläpitääkseen maan vakautta konfliktin jälkeen. Poliittisen siirtymän
vi myöhemmissä vaiheissa Nepal kuitenkin haastoi Intian vallankäyttöä vastustamalla esimerkiksi pakottavaa diplomatiaa ja taloussaartoa ja osoitti näin merkittävää vastarintaa siihen kohdistuneita ulkoisia valtapyrkimyksiä kohtaan. Tutkimus sijoittaa Intian osallistumisen Nepalin rauhanprosessiin ja poliittisessa siirtymään subimperialistiseen viitekehykseen ja osaksi historiallisesti monimutkaista suhdetta, jolle ovat ominaisia sekä yhteistyö että konfliktit. Analyysi paljastaa Intian tavoitteen muuttaa Nepal subimperialistiseksi vaikutusalueekseen. Intia pyrkimykset hallita Nepalin luonnonvaroja—erityisesti sen vesivaroja— tukevat samalla uusliberaaliin kapitalismiin ja erilaisiin voimankäytön muotoihin perustuvaa maailmanjärjestelmää. Vaikka Intia on vähitellen kietonut Nepalin riippuvuussuhteiden verkkoon, sen oma suhde globaaleihin rahoitusinstituutioihin ja länsivaltoihin, erityisesti Yhdysvaltoihin, ilmentää samankaltaisia riippuvuuden piirteitä. Intian subimperialistiset pyrkimykset kytkeytyvät myös sisäiseen kolonialismiin ja hindunationalistiseen Hindutva-ideologiaan. Tutkimus tarjoaa uusia näkökulmia nousevien valtojen käyttäytymisen tarkasteluun analysoimalla kriittisesti Intian toimintaa konfliktin jälkeisessä Nepalissa. Se kyseenalaistaa oletuksen, että muutamien globaalin etelän maiden taloudellisen ja poliittisen vaikutusvallan kasvu loisi pohjan oikeudenmukaisemmalle maailmanjärjestykselle. Sen sijaan se osoittaa, kuinka nousevat vallat toimivat vähemmän vaikutusvaltaisten naapureidensa kanssa. Vaikka ne korostavat retoriikassaan kollektiivista emansipaatiota ja globaalin etelän maiden yhteistyötä, käytännössä ne usein tukeutuvat sellaisiin vallankäytön muotoihin, jotka ylläpitävät ja vahvistavat epätasaisia valtasuhteita. Tämä heikentää erityisesti pienempien ja vähemmän vaikutusvaltaisten globaalin etelän maiden pitkään vaalimia toiveita oikeudenmukaisemmasta ja tasapuolisemmasta maailmanjärjestyksestä. Tutkielman loppupuolella arvioidaan myös Nepalin rauhanprosessia ja poliittista siirtymää kriittisestä näkökulmasta, tunnustaen sen merkittävät saavutukset mutta nostaen esiin myös keskeiset heikkoudet, kuten toimivan siirtymäkauden oikeudellisen viitekehyksen puuttumisen ja sosioekonomisten uudistusten toimeenpanon epäonnistumisen. Nämä havainnot tarjoavat arvokasta tietoa, jota voidaan hyödyntää rauhanprosesseissa samankaltaisissa konteksteissa. Lisäksi ne edistävät keskustelua kansainvälisestä rauhanvälityksestä, konfliktin jälkeisestä jälleenrakennuksesta, globaalin etelän maiden suhteista, alueellisista valtakamppailuista sekä muuttuvasta maailmanjärjestyksestä. Avainsanat: Nepalin rauhanprosessi, Intian ja Nepalin suhde, Etelä-Aasian geopolitiikka, subimperialismi, Etelä–Etelä-yhteistyö, nousevien valtojen käyttäytyminen, kriittinen realismi, tapaustutkimus
vii Acknowledgements This thesis is the end of a long, winding road, one that began in the dusty hills of rural Nepal, where I first witnessed my country stumble and bleed its way through history. As I grew from a boy into a young man, Nepal too was trying to grow, only it did so in the middle of an armed conflict, revolutions, and political storms that would humble even the hardiest traveller. Somewhere along the way, I decided to make sense of that chaos, and this thesis is my modest attempt. The journey here has been no smooth carriage ride. It has been a roller coaster— wild, rattling, and more than once, I thought the wheels might come off. But it has also been rewarding, even exhilarating, in the way that surviving a storm leaves you both exhausted and strangely grateful. Thus, I am deeply indebted to all who walked beside me on this journey, offering their support and steadying me in moments when the road grew rough. There are thanks I must offer to those whose support, generosity, and presence made these very words possible. First, to Professor Francesco Strazzari of the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy, who kindly agreed to serve as my opponent. To read through this hefty manuscript and then consider venturing to Helsinki in cold October is no small favour, and for that, I thank you. Equal gratitude goes to my pre-examiners, Professor Ana Saggioro Garcia from the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Professor Miriam PrysHansen from the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Germany. Your patient reading and sharp-eyed feedback polished this thesis into something presentable. My three supervisors deserve more thanks than words can give. Lauri Siitonen, with his steady hand, reminded me that scholarship is not a sprint but a slow, deliberate climb. He had already guided me in my Master’s, and the tenderness of his counsel and the thoughtfulness of our discussions are treasures I will carry with me long after this thesis is bound and shelved. Päivi Hasu, with eloquence and generosity, sharpened my methods and nudged me to think sideways when I was marching too straight. And then came Tiina Seppälä, arriving at a time when I was wobbling on the tightrope. She brought both comfort and momentum, read my drafts with utmost care, highlighted the strengths with generosity and the weaknesses with precision. Managing, somehow, to be both a friend and a fearless critic, Tiina, you gave me the rarest gift of all: confidence. If every doctoral student were lucky enough to have a supervisor like you, there would be so many successful PhDs—many of them walking a little taller, surer of their work, and braver in their worldviews. So, thank you for all that guidance and care, and also for agreeing to stand beside me as the custos in the public examination of this thesis, which will formally bring this journey to its close. The University of Helsinki offered me not only a place to pursue a doctoral degree but also mentors and companions who made this intellectual journey worth the miles. I am especially grateful to Professor Barry Gills, whose incisive comments in PhD seminars and beyond helped me refine the core of this research. He instilled in me a sense that being a little radical, both in thought and action, was not just acceptable but also desirable. I am also fortunate to have taken my MA thesis seminars with Professor Teivo Teivainen. Later, his guidance on issues directly relevant to this dissertation was invaluable, and despite his extremely busy schedule, he was always accessible. Professor Anja Nygren, Professor Markus Kröger, and Dr. Eija Ranta likewise offered invaluable practical advice—often
xiv SPA SSC TRC UK UNMIN UPF US USD ZoP Seven Party Alliance South–South Cooperation Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Kingdom United Nations Mission in Nepal United People's Front United States United States Dollar Zone of Peace
xv List of Tables Table 1: Distribution of Key Informants Table 2: Media Material Sources and Their Distribution List of Figures Figure 1: Data Sources Used in the Study Figure 2: Percentage of Mediated Conflict Dyad Years (1989–2013) Figure 3: Conflict Intervention by Decade Figure 4: Diplomatic Inventions in Conflicts and Frequent Interveners Figure 5: Depiction of Core–Periphery Relations List of Pictures Picture 1: Photo of the Maoist-UML Rolpa Meeting, Where the Six-Point Agreement Was Signed in October 2005 Picture 2: Street Protests During Jana Andolan II in Kathmandu, April 2006 Picture 3: Nepali Protesters Demonstrating Against the Indian Economic Blockade in Front of the Indian Embassy, Kathmandu, October 2015
1 1. Introduction ‘International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.’ ― Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1978: 29) ‘There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interest. This is a bitter Truth.’ ― Chanakya, 371 BC.1 This study examines India’s engagement in Nepal’s peace process and post-conflict political transition (2005–2017). While this serves as the primary focus, the study also explores broader themes, including the nature of contemporary India–Nepal relations, India’s emergence as a rising power, its internal contradictions, and the way it engages with its less powerful neighbours. Moreover, the study investigates how conflict and political mediation can be used as foreign policy tools to achieve certain foreign policy goals. Finally, it enlists and reflects on lessons from Nepal’s ostensibly completed yet fundamentally flawed peace process. At its core, this study is about a conflict, its resolution, and its disenchanted stakeholders. It is a narrative of contemporary South Asian geopolitics—a story of rising and declining powers, of dependencies and defiance, and of the enduring interplay between resilience and resistance. The study focuses on one of the most defining and crucial periods of modern Nepal, the period between 2005 and 2017. During this period, Nepal experienced both painful and rejuvenating political events, witnessing its own version of a political Renaissance. After a decade-long armed insurgency that claimed over 17,000 lives, the Maoist rebels laid down their arms in 2006 and entered mainstream politics. Following a brief but disastrous authoritarian interlude, Nepal’s 240-year-old monarchy was abolished in 2008, and Nepal was declared a federal democratic republic. The nascent republic then experienced a series of additional political avalanches—a protracted political transition, social and economic chaos created by two massive earthquakes, and a humanitarian catastrophe caused by India’s economic blockade. As Nepal navigated one of the most challenging episodes in its modern history, the presence of neighbouring India—marked by both assistance and assertion—was profound. While India’s role was considered critical and emphatic, the specifics of its engagement in post-2005 Nepal remain unclear. For instance, India’s role in facilitating the pivotal 12-Point Understanding between the Maoists and a group of seven Nepali political parties, known as the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), remains largely unclear. Other episodes of Indian engagement, for instance, its role in the 2006 people’s movement (Jana Andolan II)2, the subsequent peace deal, the constitution-making process (2008–2015), and more than a decade-long postconflict political transition also remain largely unexplored. This thesis revolves around these very issues. Simply stated, this is a (re)examination of India’s role in the Nepali peace process and the post-2005 political transition and an attempt to offer a fresh perspective on the Nepali peace process. While doing so, this study contributes to the broader scholarship on India– 1 Cited in Sharma (2023) 2 Jana Andolan I was a pro-democracy movement in Nepal during the 1990s.
2 Nepal relations. It prompts a critical re-evaluation of a long and complicated relationship marked by both cooperation and conflict, and a plethora of political, economic, and cultural interactions. Equally, it provides a new perspective on India’s evolution as a rising power and sheds light on how it engages with its less powerful South Asian neighbours. Theoretically, this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach, integrating concepts and perspectives from various theoretical strands. Theoretical concepts drawn from three domains—peace and mediation research, global development studies, and critical theories of international relations—constitute the theoretical framework of this study (Chapter 3). As conflict mediation and political transition processes are also often deeply linked to geopolitics and broader political and economic processes, the combination of different theoretical strands was not only helpful, but also necessary. Methodologically, this is a singular case study based on a critical realist approach (Chapter 2). Data were accumulated from four sources: 1. Semistructured key informant interviews (n=18), 2. Video materials, mostly consisting of talks and speeches of key informants unavailable for interview, 3. Opinion pieces and media interviews, mainly of key informants unavailable for interview, and 4. Articles collected from Nepali media archives. This way, in addition to 18 keyinformant interviews totalling 16.36 hours (982 minutes), this study draws on 12 videos (360 minutes) and 105 textual sources—including opinion pieces, interviews, news articles, and in-depth reports—amounting to 750 pages of data. For data analysis, the study adopted an inductive approach based on grounded theory and used the qualitative content analysis method (Chapter 2). Most key informants interviewed for this study were prominent political figures directly involved in Nepal’s peace process and political transition. These individuals, for instance, participated in official and behind-the-scenes negotiations and contributed to drafting the 12-Point Understanding, the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), the 2015 Constitution, and other significant political agreements. Their involvement spanned both domestic and international dimensions of the post-peace agreement era. The perspectives, insights, and experiences they shared hold substantial practical significance. Thus, the findings of this thesis will be particularly valuable to political negotiators, mediators, mediation organisations, policymakers, and most importantly, peace and international relations researchers. This study primarily contributes to peace and mediation research. However, its findings also enrich other theoretical domains, including various critical strands of international relations and global development studies. By exploring the genesis of the Nepali peace process (Chapter 5) and examining India’s extensive engagement in Nepal following the 2005 12-Point Understanding and the 2006 CPA, this study reveals how peace processes and political transitions can be moulded and influenced by external interests and geopolitical motives. Overall, this study enhances our understanding of the complexities of contemporary peace and post-conflict political transitions, which are increasingly shaped by geopolitical, security, economic, and resource interests, as well as the presence of multiple global and regional actors, rising powers such as the BRICS
3 (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)3, and expanding geopolitical interests, among others. This study also sheds light on a ‘rising India,’ its domestic dilemmas, and its foreign policy contradictions. By exploring India’s engagement in Nepal as a case of contemporary sub-imperialism, this study offers a fresh critical perspective on India–Nepal relations (Chapter 7). At the core of this investigation is an attempt to demystify how regional and global power dynamics can transform ostensibly benign instruments, such as conflict mediation, into handy tools for perpetuating dependency, advancing sub-imperialist pursuits, fulfilling resource interests, and achieving specific foreign policy goals. In other words, the later chapters of this thesis portray a picture of an unequal relationship between two distinctly different countries co-existing in a tumultuous relationship within the contemporary Global South—a regional giant with significant military and economic ambitions, and a smaller, less powerful neighbouring country, which constantly struggles for its sovereignty and survival. Moreover, this study enriches the mediation literature by investigating India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition in detail and proposing a new theoretical concept of ‘peace dependency’ (Chapter 9). Peace dependency illustrates how peace mediators/facilitators' prolonged engagement in post-conflict scenarios can sometimes undermine political stability in recipient countries and compromise their political agency and national sovereignty. Finally, although it is not the focus of this study, I have also made an attempt to compile and reflect on the lessons learnt from the Nepali peace process (Chapter 10). The purpose of this chapter is to offer practical insights and practitioners’ perspectives to enhance the practices of peacemaking and peacebuilding. After all, the fundamental goal of peace research is to help build lasting peace. 1.1 India in Nepal’s Peace Process and Political Transition In the autumn of 2015, Nepal faced one of the most challenging periods in its modern history: the aftermath of two devastating earthquakes and a humanitarian crisis caused by India’s economic blockade. In the spring of that year, two deadly earthquakes rocked the country, which took nearly 9000 lives, ravaged thousands of homes, destroyed numerous historical sites, and caused landslides and avalanches in the Himalayas. The earthquakes left Nepal’s relatively small and weak economy in shambles. The cost of damage was estimated to be about USD 7 billion, about 30% of Nepal’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the time (Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission 2015). As Nepal was still reeling from the shocks and aftershocks of the earthquakes, the country was forced to grapple with a massive man-made disaster. This time, the blow came from an economic blockade imposed by neighbouring India.4 India’s unofficial economic blockade—apparently imposed as a punishment for promulgating a new constitution without addressing India's concerns and 3 In 2024, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates became full members of the BRICS bloc, followed by Indonesia in early 2025. Since 2024, the terms BRICS+ and BRICS Plus have been informally used to denote the bloc’s expanded membership. In addition, 34 more countries have applied for BRICS membership (see Seli 2024). 4 India officially rejected allegations of an economic blockade and pointed fingers at a group of Nepali protestors of Madhesi origin who were unsatisfied with Nepal’s new constitution. However, India’s official claim was contested by Indian media, Indian civil society, and the government of Nepal. See Chapter 6 for more on this issue.
4 interests—took a heavy toll on Nepal. The economy further deteriorated, and the post-earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction work was severely affected as the blockade ‘choked imports of not only petroleum, but also medicines and earthquake relief material’ (Arora 2015b). Aid agencies began declaring Nepal a humanitarian crisis. The United Nations Children's Fund, for instance, warned that more than three million children under the age of five were at risk of death or disease due to a ‘severe shortage of fuel, food, medicines and vaccines’ (UNICEF 2015). As the blockade continued, the anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal also peaked. Demonstrations and protests outside the Indian embassy in Kathmandu became frequent. So did chants and placards depicting phrases such as ‘Back Off India’. In unison with the furious people in the streets, even senior political leaders in Nepal started becoming vocal against India’s ‘interferences’ in Nepal (Pattisson 2015, Ghimire 2015). This was rather an unusual development, for India had been credited with playing a crucial and positive role in ending the Maoist armed insurgency and facilitating Nepal's post-conflict political transition (see, for instance, Muni 2012, Jha 2012). India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition, which practically began with the signing of the 12-Point Understanding in New Delhi in November 2005, lasted till 2017. However, the nature of this involvement has been a subject of speculation and debate in both countries. While sensationalised media portrayals and conspiracy theories have proliferated, there is still a scarcity of objective academic research on this subject. Despite numerous books and articles addressing various aspects of this issue (see Chapter 4), India's precise role and influence during these critical years remain largely shrouded in mystery. The existing literature often presents conflicting accounts, highlighting the need for more rigorous academic analysis to demystify this crucial chapter in India–Nepal relations. The scholarship on external engagement in Nepal’s peace process and the political transition has indeed centred around India. However, while India's role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition is undeniable, the precise nature and extent of its decade-long, predominantly covert and assertive engagement remain poorly understood, and, thus, warrant further investigation. This investigation is both necessary and relevant, as much of India's influence during this period was both ‘unclear and questionable’ (Subedi & Bhattarai 2017: 95). What is well-known, however, is India’s inconsistent and contradictory role during the Maoist armed insurgency, in which it supported and supplied both sides of the war, perfecting the art of divide and rule (Shah 2004: 223). For instance, even though India declared the Nepali Maoists a terrorist organisation, it showed little interest in curbing their activities (Bhattarai 2005: 34, Upreti 2009: 223). The Maoists received training in India from various guerrilla groups (Bhattarai 2005: 32), and senior Maoist leaders lived and operated from India throughout the armed conflict (Mishra 2004: 638). India's contentious role during the decade-long insurgency is well-documented and extensively analysed (see, for instance, Shah 2004, Mishra 2004, Bhattarai 2005, Whelpton 2005, Whitfield 2008, Upreti 2009, Destradi 2010, Sharma 2013, Adhikari 2017, and Dhungel 2019). However, confusion persists regarding its precise role in the background negotiations leading to the 12-Point Understanding, and subsequent negotiations that took place during the peace process and political transition years. In other words, while its role in the conflict has been extensively analysed, its contribution to the resolution and its actions in the aftermath remain unclear. One of the focuses of this study is this specific area.
5 There is a consensus among scholars, civil society members, and politicians in both Nepal and India that India played a role in uniting the Maoist rebels with the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) to oppose the autocratic monarchy in Nepal. Scholarly works, especially those produced during the political transition years, provide numerous examples of India's involvement in shaping Nepal’s political landscape (see Upreti 2009, Sharma 2013, Adhikari 2014). However, accounts often vary and contradict regarding the nature and extent of India's role. Comprehensive academic studies that thoroughly address and explain India's involvement in Nepal during the early stages of the peace process and its aftermath are almost nonexistent. This study seeks to address this gap in the existing literature. Though with limitations, some scholars have attempted to broadly analyse India's engagement in Nepal's peace process and political transition. Initially, scholarly interest primarily focused on analysing the origins of the conflict and predicting its potential outcomes (see Karki & Seddon 2003, Thapa & Sijapati 2004, Hutt 2004). However, with the onset of the peace process, academic attention shifted to wider issues of peacebuilding, such as constitution-making, state restructuring, inclusivity, development, and the discourse of a 'new Nepal'. The role of international actors in the Nepali conflict has been studied both during the conflict and in the aftermath. Among others, India’s role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition has been described as aggressive (Adhikari 2017: 32), facilitative (Destradi 2010:17, Shrestha 2012: 211, Ghimire 2018a: 6), and one that provided tacit support (Whitfield 2008: 6). Some have also portrayed India as a coercive mediator (Poudel 2018: 7), preoccupied with its security-oriented concerns (Anderson 2014: 11) and self-interests (Bhattarai 2018). Others see India's role in Nepal as being driven by a commitment to promoting democracy in the region (Janjua 2007, H.B. Jha 2014), or simply as a means for becoming South Asia’s ‘benevolent hegemon’ (Destradi 2012: 289). However, as I discuss in Chapter 4, the previous literature on India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition has five notable limitations. First, much of the research conducted during and after the conflict focuses on narrow timeframes or isolated aspects of the issue. This lack of a holistic approach has led to an incomplete and fragmented understanding of the subject. Second, some lack the necessary critical perspective and simply portray India's actions as malevolent, benign, or even pro-democratic without providing detailed analysis or sufficient critical scrutiny. Third, the tendency to romanticise India's role—often presenting it as a supportive neighbour and suggesting its involvement was purely for peace, democracy, and stability—is also common. Fourth, some scholars have adopted an overtly Indo-centric view, attributing all political events in Nepal to Indian influence. This trend overlooks the stories of Nepali resistance and the agency that Nepali actors consistently exercise. Lastly, many scholars have confined themselves to narrow theoretical fields, such as international relations, overlooking valuable insights from other theoretical strands, such as peace and conflict studies, mediation studies, global development studies5, and South–South relations. Theoretical narrowness is not inherently problematic, but it does not necessarily capture or convey the full complexity of an issue as vast as India–Nepal relations. This research addresses these limitations by adopting a more comprehensive, critical, and interdisciplinary approach. 5 Some of the issues that I discuss in later chapters, such as natural resource expropriation, micromanagement, sub-imperialism, and peace dependency, can also be considered to be part of global development studies.
6 1.2 Mediators’ Might: Conflict Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool This study examines Nepal’s peace process and post-conflict political transition primarily from a peace and mediation research perspective. Studying mediation as a foreign policy tool provides valuable insights into how states tackle and make use of complex international conflicts and leverage them to advance their strategic interests. While traditional views of mediation often emphasise neutral third parties, examining it through a foreign policy lens reveals how states use mediation as a strategic tool to exert influence and advance specific foreign policy objectives (see Touval 1992, 2003; Bercovitch 2011, Butler 2018). This perspective is critical, given the uneven pattern of conflict mediation globally, because some conflicts receive excessive mediation attention while others are neglected and allowed to escalate (Greig & Diehl 2012; Svensson & Onken 2015: 69–70). This indicates how mediation efforts can be driven by foreign policy calculations rather than purely by an authentic concern for peace. As I discuss in Chapter 3, ‘power mediators' often use mediation as a foreign policy instrument (Harris & Reilly 1998, Svensson 2007: 230). Regional powers, such as India in this context, can employ ‘power mediation’ strategies and exercise various tactics, such as incentives and punishments, and pressure conflicting parties to accept a compromise (Harris & Reilly 1998). Power mediators leverage their power and resources to influence outcomes. They can use conflict management, mediation, and diplomacy as soft power strategies (Kurlantzick 2007, Nye 2009). Other soft-power strategies, such as rhetoric, persuasion, and agenda setting, can also be used (Rothman 2011: 50). When soft-power strategies fail to yield the desired outcomes, states often resort to more forceful approaches, such as coercive diplomacy (Keohane & Nye 1989, Jakobsen 2016). Mediation, when used as an extension of a state's broader foreign policy objectives, diverges from its idealised principles. Analysing mediation and conflict resolution in this foreign policy context, as this study has done, is essential for understanding contemporary mediation and peacemaking efforts and making sense of the complex interplay between conflict resolution and geopolitical manoeuvring. While the mediation literature forms the core of this study, the theoretical exploration goes beyond it. Given the complex research context and the multifaceted nature of the questions, I adopt a three-pillar theoretical framework (Chapter 3). As previously mentioned, this framework integrates insights from mediation literature and various other theoretical strands, including critical international relations and global development studies. The diversity of theoretical perspectives is essential, as no single theory fully captures the complexity of the research questions. This study thus serves as an example of theoretical experimentation, too. Instead of restricting the analysis to a narrow field of international relations or mediation studies, it ventures into different theoretical domains, exploring linkages and possibilities. For instance, South–South Cooperation as a theoretical lens has rarely been used to examine peace processes in the contemporary Global South, a task undertaken in this study. 1.3 Evaluating an Unpredictable Rise of Rising Powers The global power balance is undergoing a significant shift, primarily driven by the emergence of new economic powers from the Global South (see, for instance, Schwarzer 2017, Denisov et al. 2019, Grix et al. 2019). Initially, the rise of non-
7 Western powers, such as the BRICS bloc—originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa— inspired hope and was even referred to as the beginning of ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2013). Over time, however, the so-called rise of the emerging powers has become increasingly unpredictable, raising a sense of suspicion and uncertainty. Historically, the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) in 1964 had its roots in the aspirations of developing countries to challenge the prevailing Western-dominated global economic order6 and to establish a more equitable international system (Geldart & Lyon 1980). At its inception, G77 countries collectively envisioned a New International Economic Order. This was intended to address historical inequalities between the West and ‘the rest’, reform global trade and financial systems, and promote economic development in the Global South. The G77 was also expected to reform international institutions and challenge Western hegemony through various means, including advocating for fair trade practices, technology transfer, debt relief, and increased development assistance. Guided by principles of solidarity, collective self-reliance, and effective South–South Cooperation, the G77 was supposed to reshape global economic governance and ultimately create a multipolar world order. Although the G77 did not achieve the level of progress that was anticipated during its early years, the 21st century has nonetheless witnessed a profound shift in the global landscape. This shift has particularly involved the economic and political rise of a handful of non-Western countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Once firmly positioned within the developing world, these countries have now emerged as significant global economic and political powers. However, whether these countries have upheld the G77's collective cause and the spirit of South–South solidarity is questionable. Concerns that these countries have evolved into new forms of economic and political dominance, resembling the very systems they once sought to challenge, warrant careful examination. Principles, practices, and the increasing rhetorical use of South–South Cooperation (SSC) also require re-evaluation. Proponents who view SSC as an emancipatory agenda (see Mawdsley 2012, Carmody 2013, Cheru 2016, Muhr 2016, Bergamaschi et al. 2017) are increasingly overshadowed by critics who argue that the SSC rhetoric adopted by rising powers in the Global South is merely symbolic, aimed at securing a stronger position within the US-centred world order (see Vanaik 2013, Bond & Garcia 2015, Bond et al. 2021). Furthermore, rising powers’ sub-imperialist tendencies also demand serious scrutiny (see Çağlı 2009, Bond 2015, Valencia 2017, Bond et al. 2021). In recent years, the study of rising power behaviour has emerged as a distinct field of inquiry. This is mainly driven by the rapid political and economic rise of a few Global South countries. The focus of this study, India, for instance, is no longer the poor developing country it used to be. It is an economic powerhouse, an assertive regional force, and a leading member of the BRICS grouping. With its robust and consistent economic growth, expanding regional influence, and increasing global ambitions, contemporary India embodies many of the complexities and contradictions associated with rising powers. Analysing India's 6 While developing countries’ broader political agenda was primarily guided by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G77 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development drove their economic agenda (Alden et al. 2010).
14 organisation excessively controls or influences the internal affairs of another country or organisation. This could manifest in various ways, such as imposing strict conditions on foreign aid, closely monitoring and controlling the decisionmaking processes of another country's government, or intervening in the internal conflicts of another country. As I discuss in Chapter 6, when used in the context of foreign policy practice, micromanagement—as a form of interference in the internal affairs of another country—can undermine sovereignty and limit the ability of political actors to make their own decisions. In this thesis, I apply the term ‘micromanagement’ within the context of foreign policy. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Maoists and the Government of Nepal in 2006, ‘micromanagement’ emerged as a significant buzzword in Nepal. The term frequently appeared in the media stories and opinion pieces used as data in this study and was also widely referenced by the key informants during interviews. For this thesis, ‘micromanagement’ refers specifically to India's intricate and manipulative interventions in Nepal during the peace process and the subsequent political transition. While the lexicon of international relations frequently employs terms like power diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, and the combination of soft and hard power to characterise the involvement of stronger nations in the affairs of weaker ones, the act of micromanagement can be a deliberate tool used, often with other similar tactics, to achieve larger strategic goals. 1.6 Thesis Structure This thesis consists of eleven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the research questions, aims, and objectives, while also briefly introducing and defining key concepts used throughout the thesis. Additionally, this chapter highlights the research gap and outlines the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 connects methods to theory and data, and justifies the methodological approaches adopted in the study. It outlines the study’s ontological and epistemological foundations and lays out the research design. The methods used, the data accumulation process, and issues related to validity, reliability, research ethics, and researcher positionality are thoroughly discussed. The chapter explains the methodological choices and how they align with the research objectives and the theoretical framework of the study. Chapter 3 outlines a detailed theoretical framework for the study. It begins with an introduction to a triangular theoretical framework and includes a critique and evaluation of the three main theoretical strands used in the study. The theoretical domains covered in the chapter are: 1. Conflict mediation and thirdparty engagement, 2. South–South Cooperation (rising powers, sub-imperialism), and 3. Dependency and World-systems approaches. As previously stated, including a different set of theoretical perspectives is essential for a study of this type, because contemporary peace processes and political transitions are inherently complex. They should be studied not in isolation, but in relation to global and regional power relations, as well as the broader political, societal, and economic realities of our time. Chapter 4 reviews the existing literature and provides a detailed background of the research context. It begins with a section on the history of modern Nepal and discusses how India’s presence has always been felt in Nepal. It discusses the human and economic costs of the Maoist armed conflict, as well as the radical paradigm shift it prompted in the Nepali political landscape. Important details
15 concerning pre-2005 mediation and negotiation attempts, and the role of international involvement, are provided. Finally, a review of the previous literature gives insight into scholarly work on the Nepali peace process, the political transition, and India–Nepal relations during and after the Maoist armed insurgency. This section also identifies gaps in the existing literature and justifies the need for this study. Chapter 5 explores the genesis of the Nepali peace process by elaborating on the circumstances that led to the signing of the 12-Point Understanding between the Maoists and the SPA in New Delhi in November 2005. The pact between the two opposition factions was instrumental in ending both the armed conflict and King Gyanendra’s direct rule in Nepal. The 12-Point roadmap ultimately ended Nepal’s 240-year-old monarchy, and Nepal became a federal democratic republic. My focus in this chapter is to locate and analyse India’s role—as an unofficial mediator and facilitator—in forging the 12-Point Understanding and in orchestrating subsequent political events in Nepal. The chapter highlights the SixPoint Agreement, signed in October 2005 in Nepal’s Rolpa District, which laid the groundwork for a coalition between the Maoists and the SPA, ultimately leading to the 12-Point Understanding. Chapter 6 details India's extensive and prolonged engagement in Nepal during the post-conflict and political transition years. It shows that during Nepal's political transition, India intervened extensively, using both soft and hard power to control Nepal's political, bureaucratic, and security institutions. In the later years, India faced significant opposition from Nepal against its hard power tactics, such as coercive diplomacy and an economic blockade. India's efforts to mould Nepal’s 2015 constitution in its favour and to reinstate Nepal’s identity as a Hindu nation also failed. In Chapter 7, India’s motives behind its intensified engagement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition are thoroughly analysed. In this chapter, I argue that India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition was neither sudden nor an isolated event. Rather, it was an ‘inflamed’ episode in the long and complex relationship between the two countries. As a dominant player in this relationship—often marked by periods of cooperation and co-dependency as well as coercion and conflict—India’s undeclared Nepal policy since the 1950s has been to reduce it into a meek and pliable client state. After discussing India’s geopolitical, security, economic, and resource interests in Nepal, I argue that India’s actions in Nepal were mainly aimed at turning Nepal into one of its sub-imperialist destinations. This allowed India to gain control over its natural resources— especially water—and to perpetuate a world system based on neoliberal capitalism and various forms of aggression. In Chapter 8, I examine India's sub-imperialism in Nepal and the mindset inherent in the so-called ‘rising India’. The chapter explains how India has historically exerted control over Nepali politics, domestic markets, and natural resources, mainly to further its own interests. While India has entangled Nepal in a web of dependencies, its relationships with Western powers and global financial institutions also display similar dependency patterns, essentially reinforcing its sub-imperialist position. This chapter also explores how India’s sub-imperialism in South Asia is intertwined with its internal colonial practices at home—a strategy that has served well to the growth of Hindu-nationalist Hindutva political ideology and an unabated proliferation of extractivist corporate capitalism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the rising power dilemma. I argue that, contrary to initial hopes, the economic and political rise of some countries in the Global South
16 has not challenged Western hegemony. Instead, these rising powers, such as India, have increasingly adopted extractivist and oppressive foreign policies and have contributed to the maintenance of neoliberal regimes. This undermines the hopes for inclusive and empowering South–South relations and the goals of creating a New International Economic Order. However, grassroots movements focused on anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic resistance provide a glimmer of hope for smaller and less powerful developing countries like Nepal. In Chapter 9, the thesis revisits the peace and conflict research domain, in which the consequences of India’s post-conflict engagements in Nepal are analysed. By using several examples, I demonstrate that India’s influence and Nepal’s dependency on India significantly increased in the post-conflict context. By capitalising on the mediator narrative—that it had initiated the Nepali peace process by facilitating the 12-Point Understanding—India consolidated its influence in post-conflict Nepal. Gradually, the Indian embassy in Kathmandu and India’s intelligence operatives gained significant leverage in shaping Nepal's post-conflict political landscape. As a result, Nepal found itself in a state of 'peace dependency', with its political actors increasingly relying on India to resolve post-conflict crises and maintain internal stability. The concept of 'peace dependency' adds to mediation literature by providing a useful perspective for understanding and assessing the complexities of post-conflict environments. Chapter 10 critiques the Nepali peace process and outlines a few valuable lessons. Since most of the key informants interviewed for this study were directly involved in the peace process and post-conflict political transition, the practitioners' insights will be helpful for peace workers, mediators, and negotiators involved in resolving future conflicts in Nepal and elsewhere. The main takeaway of this chapter is that Nepal's peace process achieved significant technical and political milestones—including a cessation of hostilities agreement, a comprehensive peace agreement, completion of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, state restructuring, and a new constitution. However, even after nearly two decades after the CPA, the absence of a functioning transitional justice framework and unresolved socio-economic transformation issues continue to cripple the peace process, and leave Nepal vulnerable to further social unrest and future conflicts. Finally, in Chapter 11, I offer an executive summary of the main findings and make a few concluding remarks. The final section of this chapter offers recommendations for future research. These recommendations might be useful for researchers in peace and conflict studies, mediation studies, South–South relations, dependency, and international relations.
17 2. Research Methodology and Methods In this chapter, I discuss the methodological standpoints adopted in this study. I begin by describing the ontological and epistemological underpinnings I have chosen and then proceed to explain the methodical choices I have made. I also describe the data accumulation process and address validity, reliability, research ethics, and researcher positionality issues. Issues concerning translation and data accumulation from the Internet are also discussed. Any academic research demands that the research methods used are sound, relevant, and methodologically rigorous. At the same time, they need to correspond to the research questions being investigated. In that sense, selecting the right research methods is important for any research. However, for a study of this type, which deals with as complex an issue as India's engagement in Nepal, arming oneself with the right research methods is even more important. This study is qualitative, and its methodological foundation is built on qualitative tools. Epistemological and methodological foundations typically guide a researcher's choice of methods, and that is what I will do here. In addition, a researcher selects methods that help him or her find answers to research questions, and that very conviction guided my choice of particular research methods. Whether qualitative methods are suitable for this type of research is a point worth considering. Snape & Spencer (2003: 5) present qualitative research as a 'blend of empirical investigation and creative discovery' and argue that 'qualitative methods are used to address research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their contexts’. In addition, they argue that qualitative research is particularly suitable for ‘exploring issues that hold some complexity and to studying processes that occur over time’. This explanation is relevant in this study, as it explores an issue that does hold some complexity and focuses on events and processes that occur over time (i.e., mostly between 2005 and 2017). Similarly, Sofaer (1999: 1101) argues that qualitative research methods are best suited to providing ‘rich descriptions of complex phenomena’ and ‘illuminating the experience and interpretation of events by actors with widely differing stakes and roles.’ This, too, is the case with this study. From a methodological point of view, qualitative research 'involves an interpretive’ and ‘naturalistic approach to the world' (Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 3). In practice, this means that qualitative researchers 'study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them' (Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 3). Qualitative methods are particularly suited for capturing the complexity of social phenomena and providing in-depth insights into processes such as conflict resolution, diplomatic interactions, and relations between different actors. Though quantitative research methods are common in data-driven studies in peace and global development research, qualitative research methods are also equally robust and widely utilised. Qualitative research methods–such as interviews, observation, and case studies–
18 have been extensively used in both peace and international relations research,8 as well as in global development research.9 Before providing a detailed description of the research methods used in this study, it is helpful to examine the research paradigm adopted. A research paradigm consists of ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods. Ontology 'relates to being, to what is, to what exists’ (Hay 2002: 61), or it is a ‘vision of the world as it really is’ (Gerring 2007: 53). While ontology is about reality, epistemology is about the ways of knowing that reality (Guba 1990). In Hay’s (2002: 62) words, epistemology 'is the science or philosophy of knowledge'. Similarly, Schwandt (2001: 71) defines epistemology as 'the study of the nature of knowledge and justification'. Epistemology is instrumental in guiding methodological choices and is moulded by 'research objectives, questions, and study design' (Carter & Little 2007: 1). On the other hand, a methodology is 'a theory and analysis of how research should proceed' (Harding 1987: 2). In that sense, a methodology is a justification and explanation for methods, and not a method itself (Kaplan 1964: 18). Methods are tools and techniques for gathering data and evidence (Harding 1987: 2) as well as their analysis. This study adopts a critical realist approach as its philosophical and epistemological vantage point. Critical realism, initially developed by the Indo– British social scientist and philosopher Roy Bhaskar10 in the 1970s, provides a strong philosophical grounding for science, and offers a credible alternative to positivist and interpretive/constructionist approaches (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2017: 39–40). Understanding critical realism and its relevance in today’s complex social world is easier when it is compared to its alternatives: positivism and social constructionism. While positivism is more or less fixated on the empirical analysis of objective phenomena and demonstrating causal relations between different variables, constructionism focuses on the subjective interpretation of reality. Constructivist approaches emphasise that 'knowledge and reality do not have an objective or absolute value or, at the least, that we have no way of knowing this reality' (Murphy 1997: 5). Their focus, thereby, is on inventing or creating the properties of the world, rather than discovering them (Kukla 2000). While constructionism can be useful in revealing insights into how people interact with the world (Creswell 2009), some might consider its fixation on subjective human interpretation of the world as a limitation. Critical realism argues that ‘there is a real world out there’ (Joseph 2014: 1) and that ‘reality exists independently from researchers’ ideas and descriptions of it’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2017: 41) or from ‘people’s perceptions, language, or imagination’ (O’ Mahoney & Vincent 2014: 2–3). Like positivists, critical realists 8 See, for instance, Wiener (2009), Klotz & Prakash (2008) for qualitative research in IR, and Millar (2018), Höglund & Oberg (2011) for a broader understanding of the use of qualitative research methods in peace research. 9 See, for instance, Skovdal & Cornish (2015) for how qualitative research methods have practical implications for international development research and practice, and Morrow & Crivello (2015) for an elaborate understanding of how qualitative longitudinal research offers significant insight into issues related to international development. In addition, detailed country case studies by Colletta et al. (1996) in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda offer a comprehensive picture of the intricate nature of political, economic, and sociocultural issues in countries transitioning from war to peace. 10 Though initially proposed by Bhaskar, critical realism has evolved as a collective enterprise of various scholars, including Margaret Archer, Mervyn Hartwig, Alan Norrie, and Tony Lawson. While some argue that the Marxist notion of science heavily influences critical realism, others reject its alleged affinity with Marxism.
19 also attempt to seek causal explanations, but their emphasis is not necessarily on showing predictable patterns or establishing causal links. In critical realism, ‘relations are complex and causality can exist on different levels’ (O’ Mahoney & Vincent 2014: 42). Elaborating on the critical realist view of reality, Danermark et al. (2002: 26) argue that ‘reality exists and is what it is’. However, they emphasise that ‘the kind of knowledge that is produced depends on what problems we have and what questions we ask in relation to the world around us’. Bhaskar (1975: 56) advocated for a stratified ontology, in which reality consisted of complex, overlapping layers. He used three domains to clarify the notion of reality: the empirical, the actual, and the real. The empirical encompasses elements that can be observed or activities that take place in our immediate experience. The actual is rather broader, something that takes place independently of the observer, and the real encompasses mechanisms that are productive of different events and other 'surface phenomena' (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2017: 40). For critical realists, the aim of scientific or scholarly work is 'to investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world' (Danermark et al., 2002: 21). The realist notion thereby absolves researchers from what critical realists call the 'epistemological fallacy', a situation in which the real world is reduced to the knowledge we have of it, a notion dearly cherished in the positivist and constructivist traditions (Joseph 2014: 2). However, critical realists advocate for a broader understanding of the real, something that goes beyond mere objects and objectification, and encompasses other seemingly abstract elements, too. As Alvesson & Sköldberg (2017: 41) put it: The real is central to critical realism. There is a strong conviction regarding the real and the possibility of identifying it. Something is real if it has a causal effect, that is, if it affects behaviour and makes a difference. Reality does not just consist of material objects. Ideas and discourses are real and can have causal effects. Critical realists argue that causal processes are present not only in the natural world but also in the social world. Because of that, an attempt must be made to identify causal explanations in interactions and interplays in different social processes (Elder-Vass 2012: 10). Critical realism thereby embeds elements of positivism, such as the interest in the ‘objective world, patterns, generalization and finding causalities’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2017: 40). However, critical realists do not limit themselves to what is observable and measurable, but attempt to go deeper, to analyse complex and ‘invisible’ dimensions. In essence, critical realists argue against the practice of reducing a complex world to mere observable objects and facts. While accepting some tenets of objectivism/positivism, they strive to unearth underlying structures that engender various outcomes, including causal events. There is a growing need for social scientists to incorporate both realist and social constructionist approaches to analyse today's complex political and social processes. This can be done successfully within the domain of critical realism. If necessary, the combination of the two could also be termed ‘realist social constructionism’ (Elder-Vass 2013). Against this backdrop, this study takes a critical realist approach to explore India’s engagement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition, primarily between 2005 and 2017. The critical realist approach is particularly suitable in a case study such as this one because what I explore and analyse in this study expands beyond mere subjective interpretation. As documented in later chapters, the period
20 I covered marks the end of an armed insurgency in Nepal that claimed more than 17,000 lives. Although the pains from that time are fading, they can still be felt today. The country also experienced various other disruptive events, including a massive people’s movement, the end of a 240-year-old monarchy, the establishment of a new state structure, two devastating earthquakes, and an economic blockade by India, which led to a humanitarian crisis. Even though the expressions and interpretations of these fateful events might vary, the experiences of nuisance and loss, struggle and victory, and conflict and suffering are real. They each have their own ontological position, existence, and meaning. So do mass movements, treaties, agreements, ideologically motivated armed struggles, and the experiences of pain, joy, freedom, or exploitation that millions of people experience and feel. This is where critical realism serves as a philosophical approach to looking at these sophisticated, multilayered ontologies. The critical realist approach is commonly used in international relations as well as in peace and mediation research. Joseph (2014: 4), for instance, argues that since critical realism adopts a 'pluralistic approach to research methods', it can be an excellent choice for researchers investigating relations between countries. Critical realists argue that different research methods can be used to explore different aspects of ontological reality, thus challenging the primacy of method. As Patomäki (2019: 189) puts it, critical realism provides a 'plausible, rationally evolving framework for politics, political economy, and other social sciences'. In Kurki's (2008: 378) words, critical realism directs international relations (IR) theorists ‘towards more holistic, reflective and methodologically pluralistic causal theories'. Similarly, critical realism has been argued to be particularly suitable for researching transformative changes over time (Alderson 2019: 54), which is the case with this study. Finally, it is important to emphasise, in a critical realist fashion, that there can be multiple interpretations of ‘the truth’. The data I gathered and the arguments and analysis I offer in this study constitute only one perspective, which might have been affected by various elements, including my position as a Nepali researcher. If I were using a different methodological approach, relying on different theoretical domains, and collecting data using different methods and from sources other than the ones used here, then I would be offering a different perspective, but not necessarily a less important one. 2.1 Case Study Research and Its Components This study employed the case study method as the principal research approach. This study presents a focused case analysis of India’s role in Nepal throughout the latter’s peace process and political transition between 2005 and 2017. The case study is based on data collected from the following sources: semi-structured key informant interviews, media materials collected from media archives, opinion pieces and media interviews of key informants, and an analysis of video interviews and speeches of key informants retrieved from the Internet (see Appendix 1).11 The case study method is frequently employed as a research approach within the fields of peace and conflict studies, international relations, and global development studies. The case study method has been defined and characterised in various ways, both as a distinct research approach and as an intersection of multiple research methodologies. For instance, Yin (2018: 50) defines a case study as ‘an empirical 11 A detailed description of how these methods were selected and used is provided later in this chapter.
21 inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. He emphasises that adopting the case study method for an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon also demands multiple sources of evidence. Other scholars also emphasise the importance of multiple sources of evidence in case study research (see, for instance, Stake 1995, Gerring 2007, Woodside 2010). The justification for adopting the case study method, along with its suitability and applicability in research design, is closely tied to the research questions. In other words, not every study can be classified as a case study. The application of the case study method requires justification, must connect to the research questions and design, and should address key issues of validity and reliability. Many scholars have argued that the case study method is suitable, or rather preferable, in studies that are complex and demand a thorough investigation. In other words, it is particularly suitable for studies that demand answers to ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions (Rowley 2002: 16–17, Yin 2003). Gerring (2007: 49) argues that the depth that the case study method offers can be understood as ‘the detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or the degree of variance in an outcome that is accounted for by an explanation’. The topics case study research can cover vary widely. It can be employed to study ‘programs, events, persons, processes, institutions, social groups, and other contemporary phenomena’ (Hancock & Algozzine 2017: 15–16). The underlying idea behind case study research is conducting ‘an intensive study of a single case (or a small set of cases) with an aim to generalise across a larger number of cases of the same general type’ (Gerring 2007: 65). However, generalisation is not always the aim, nor is it a requirement. As already indicated above, case studies can be used to get an in-depth understanding of an issue, events, processes or an ongoing phenomenon. Case studies offer an empirical foundation for theoretical analysis, but they also ‘stand in their own right as historical explanations’ (George & Smoke 1974: 105). Even though it has been argued that case studies have to be suitable for both theory building and as theory testing (Woodside 2010: 11), some scholars argue that they are particularly useful in generating new hypotheses (Gerring 2007: 38). Eisenhardt (1989: 548–549), for instance, argues that case studies are particularly well suited for research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate. Eisenhardt's argument aligns with the objectives of this study. This study’s purpose is not theory testing, but to provide a nuanced interpretation and analysis of a complex topic. For instance, by adopting this analytical approach, I developed the concept of ‘peace dependency’, which I discuss in Chapter 9. When it comes to methodical practice, case study research often includes ‘collecting and interpreting stories individuals tell about their lives and events that they believe that they know about’ (Woodside 2010: 41). Often, case study research is ‘richly descriptive’, ‘grounded in deep and varied sources of information’ and employs data, such as, ‘quotes of key participants, anecdotes, prose composed from interviews, and other literary techniques to create mental images that bring to life the complexity of the many variables inherent in the phenomenon being studied’ (Hancock & Algozzine 2017: 16). Case studies have been divided into various subtypes and sub-categories, and
22 there are several variations of this method.12 One of the more notable and widely cited categorisations is that of Yin (2003). He divides the case study research design into three parts: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. According to him, exploratory case studies are often used to define questions and hypotheses, usually to carry out further research. Descriptive case studies are useful in describing a particular phenomenon within a context, whereas explanatory case studies focus on exploring causal relationships. However, I found it difficult and unnecessary to categorise this study into one of these subtypes. While it is a singular case study focused on a specific topic, it includes explorative, explanatory, and descriptive components at different stages. Since there is no intrinsic need to categorise this study into a particular category, I prefer to use simple nomenclature, referring to it simply as a ‘case study.’ Despite its widespread popularity, especially in various disciplines of the social sciences, case study research has been criticised on various grounds. One of the more common criticisms has been centred around the idea that case study research has no boundaries and that it can accommodate anything, and anything can be made to call a case study. Maoz (2002: 164–165), for instance, argues that case studies have been synonymous with ‘some sort of free-form research that can embed basically everything and anything, and the researcher does not necessarily feel compelled to justify why certain cases are selected, which data are used and which data are ignored, and how data processing and analysis is achieved’. In addition, as Idowu (2016: 184) argues, case study research has been ‘often charged with causal determinism, non-replicability, subjective conclusions, absence of generalizable conclusions, biased case selection and lack of empirical clout’. Idowu further argues that one of the most frequent criticisms of case study research is that case studies often depend on ‘single cases’; thus, they lack scientific or scholarly rigour and are unable to provide a generalising conclusion (p. 185). Case study research has been criticised for its potential verification bias, which means that case studies often confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions and ideas (Idowu 2016). Similarly, Feagin et al. (1991: 7) argue that ‘irrespective of the type, purpose, unit of analysis, or design, rigour is a central concern in case study research’. However, some of these criticisms are unfounded, or they do not accurately characterise the case study method. For instance, the lack of methodological rigour in specific research or by a particular researcher can stem from a flawed research design or negligence. It should not be seen as an inherent flaw in the research method itself. This is particularly relevant when there are plenty of case studies that are both rigorous and reliable. Criticisms, such as those of Maoz (2002), that everything goes with case studies and that case study researchers are exempt from justifying their case selection, also do not reflect the true picture of case study research, or how many researchers have used this method. Without a thorough justification of the choices made and a detailed explanation of all research procedures—including methods for sampling, data collection, data processing, and analysis—any study, regardless of whether it is a case study or not, cannot meet scientific and scholarly standards. However, the case study method does have its drawbacks. Like any other 12 Zainal (2007: 1–6), for instance, categorises case studies into two types: interpretive and evaluative. Stake (1995) proposed dividing them into three types: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. Whereas Dul & Hak (2008) argued that case studies could be simply of two types: the single case study and the comparative case study.
23 research method, it has limitations, potential pitfalls, and biases. Nevertheless, there are systematic strategies that researchers can employ to minimise these issues. This can enhance rigour and reliability during research design as well as in data collection, processing, and analysis. This is the approach I took in this study. An exhaustive analysis of the pros and cons of the case study method is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the bottom line is that, despite its limitations, the case study method remains widely used in contemporary social and political research. Case studies provide a valuable and in-depth understanding of a phenomenon and can also influence policy, practices, and future research (Merriam 2001). In response to critics who highlight methodological rigour as a concern in case study research, various techniques and approaches have been suggested by its proponents. These recommendations help ensure that case study research is thorough, reliable, and methodologically rigorous. Improving validity and reliability has been suggested as one of the strategies for ensuring methodical rigour in case study research, and that is the approach I have taken in this study. In practice, this means demonstrating a match between operational measures and the subjects being investigated and establishing a connection between the collected data and the research questions (Rowly 2002). The qualitative field is characterised by a diversity of paradigms and methodologies, making it challenging to establish universal criteria for validity. A simplistic approach that attempts to define global qualitative criteria would be inaccurate and risk oversimplifying the complex and nuanced nature of qualitative research. Moreover, methodologies within the qualitative field also emphasise other quality criteria such as credibility, transferability, trustworthiness, and authenticity. These criteria help ensure rigour and trustworthiness in qualitative research (see, for instance, Lincoln & Guba 1985, Miller 2008, Given 2008). The validity of all research can be improved by ‘ensuring that research procedures remain coherent and transparent, research results are evident, and research conclusions are convincing’ (Miller 2008: 910). I have used three methods to enhance the validity, reliability, and credibility of my research. These are: 1. Data triangulation, 2. Reflexivity, and 3. Ensuring transparency and maintaining a chain of evidence. Data triangulation involves the use of multiple data sources and is an excellent way to enhance validity (Yin 2003, Adolphus 2011). As part of this strategy, I used data from the key informant interviews, but also accumulated relevant articles, speeches, opinion pieces, and videos from Internet archives. My other strategy has been the implementation of reflexivity at every step of the research process. Applying reflexivity in the context of this research meant becoming more selfaware and critically examining my own biases, assumptions, and positionality as a native Nepali researcher with certain socio-political beliefs and inclinations. Reflexivity also helped me better understand the social, cultural, and historical context in which I was investigating this particular topic. As Davies (2012) points out, reflexivity helps researchers carry out more informed and introspective research, which also reflects my experience during this research process. Reflexivity was a continuous and deliberate practice throughout this research. For instance, after each interview, I engaged in personal reflections to critically assess how my positionality, assumptions, or emotions may have influenced the interaction and interpretation of the data. These reflections often formed the basis for subsequent discussions with my supervisors, where I openly examined the methodological and ethical choices I had made and invited their critique to identify potential blind spots. I also took proactive steps to recognise and address possible
30 2.2.3 The Data Collection Process The data collection process of this study began in mid-2017. I spent 2016 and the initial months of 2017 mostly reading about the research topic, making data collection plans, establishing contacts for interviews, and finalising fieldwork preparations. I spent the summer of 2017 (June, July, and August) in Nepal, during which the semi-structured key informant interviews (n=18) were conducted. As presented above in Figure 1, the study draws from a dual data collection approach, harnessing insights from two primary sources: key informants and media materials. Interviews were conducted with 18 key informants. Additional data were obtained from both interviewed and non-interviewed key informants, including opinion pieces, interviews given to other media outlets, and analyses of selected video interviews and speeches. Furthermore, in the second stage of the data accumulation process, media articles from Nepali media outlets were compiled and analysed. A targeted keyword search within media archives helped gather and examine relevant articles related to the study's focus. 2.2.4 Key Informant Distribution and Key Information Interviews As explained above, the key informants were chosen using a stratified purposive sampling method, and their distribution was as follows. Table 1: Distribution of Key Informants Sample category Number 1. Political actors and influencers High-profile political leaders, peace negotiators, and politicians who were in various influential positions during Nepal’s peace process and political transition (i.e. from 2005 to 2017). The list includes a former prime minister who oversaw the implementation of some crucial aspects of the peace process and led Nepal for 20 months as prime minister during the political transition. The list also includes one former deputy prime minister, one former deputy prime minister and foreign minister, members of parliament, former ministers, and a government negotiator officially representing the government of Nepal in the 2006 CPA process. A senior communist leader and former deputy prime minister interviewed had informally facilitated talks with the Maoists years before the 12-Point Understanding was signed in India. I also interviewed the only female member of the Central Committee of the Maoists when the party decided to launch the armed struggle in 1996. She was also the only female member of the ‘dialogue committee’, headed by the Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), and formed by the rebels to negotiate a peace deal with the government of Nepal. 8 2. Peace & security experts and civil society activists In this category, I interviewed two peace and security experts involved in Nepal’s peace process. The other key informants were civil society activists who played active roles in Nepal’s democratic 5
31 and peace movement. One of the interviewees served as an independent observer during the 2006 peace negotiations between the Maoists and the representatives of the government of Nepal in Kathmandu. 3. Investigative journalists, Peace & IR researchers In this category, I interviewed journalists and researchers who have extensively written and published on Nepal’s peace process, political transition, and India–Nepal relations. 5 I began to contact the key informants in spring 2017 as my trip to Nepal was already confirmed, and the interviews were scheduled for the summer. Initially, I used email and social media to contact the key informants. In emails and social media messages I sent, I introduced myself and explained the aims and scope of my research and my willingness to interview them. I received an encouraging response from journalists, researchers, and civil society activists. Political leaders, however, barely responded. Once in Nepal, I collected telephone numbers of the political leaders I wanted to interview. For this, I used a contact information booklet of Nepal’s parliament, which was available online. In addition, I used my political contacts in Nepal to be in touch with high-profile political leaders whose contact information was not publicly available. High-profile political leaders were mostly contacted through their personal secretaries and assistants. In general, sending text messages to political leaders or their assistants—detailing who I was and why I wanted to interview them—proved to be the most effective strategy to get a response from them. Trust building is a key strategy for getting quality data, particularly from elite interviews, and being transparent is a prerequisite for trust building (Ostrander 1993). I also experienced that being open and transparent about my own identity, the research I was conducting, and its aims, scopes, and objectives was an excellent way to build trust with the key informants. In addition, as Lilleker (2003: 214) suggests, being well-prepared, well-organised, tactful, professional, and exuding confidence also helped. Most interviews took place in the informants' homes or offices. One was held discreetly in a quiet café due to logistical constraints, but the setting felt less conducive. I recommend prioritising home or office environments for greater stability. The interviews were conducted one-on-one, fostering a direct and personal interaction between me and the key informants. However, occasional visits by personal secretaries of some leaders were not uncommon. Although not directly involved in the conversations, their presence added a layer of interruption to the interview process. Nonetheless, the essence of the interviews remained unaltered—the focus rested solely on the exchange between me and the key informants, ensuring a private and exclusive dialogue. One of the issues I repeatedly encountered while conducting the interviews was that the respondents struggled with remembering facts. The issue was mostly with dates, but, on occasion, confusion also occurred with names and places. However, this appears to be a common issue in key information interviews. I adopted the recommendations of Davies (2001) for dealing with possible data incongruity caused by the respondents’ memory issues. He recommends a triangulation strategy to minimise such errors. The recommendations include cross-referencing
32 interview data with published firsthand accounts or other documentary sources and verifying them with published secondary source material (p. 77–79). For important dates and facts, I cross-checked and verified the information provided by the key informants by consulting available official documents. When such verification sources were unavailable, I relied on reliable published sources and, on occasion, on media sources. The interview data collected from the 18 key informant interviews totalled 16.36 hours (i.e., 982 minutes). On average, each interview lasted 55 minutes and 55 seconds. The longest interview was 91 minutes, and the shortest lasted for 20 minutes.14 An interview guide was used to conduct the interviews, with questions customised for each candidate based on their previous experience and area of expertise. Even though each key informant received slightly modified questions, the interview theme was largely consistent across all participants. The interviews began with a question about the key informants' own experiences and involvement in the peace process before transitioning to the broader issues explored in this study. In the end, each key informant was asked to discuss briefly some key lessons from the Nepali peace process that could be useful in other post-conflict scenarios. Nearly all interviews ended with this question. Even though my key informant list included 40 key informants, meeting and interviewing everyone on the list was impossible. As 2017 was an election year in Nepal, some key informants who had promised to give an interview informed me at the last minute that they were too busy. Moreover, some key informants, especially those holding high-profile political positions, were reluctant to be interviewed. For instance, a senior government minister, who had played a visibly important role in the peace negotiation process, agreed to meet me at the ministry office. However, when I briefed him about my study and its themes, he politely declined the interview request. He mentioned he was too busy for an interview that day and that his assistants would contact me within a week. Despite my repeated follow-ups, my attempt to interview him was unsuccessful. He might have genuinely been busy as a senior government minister, but it is also possible he wanted to avoid my questions. Talking about India’s involvement in Nepal is often difficult for Nepali politicians, especially when they are in a position of power. 2.2.5 Media Materials from Internet Archives To supplement the data from my key informant interviews, I developed an additional data accumulation strategy. This time, I explored online archives of popular print and digital Nepali media outlets and looked for opinion pieces and interviews featuring my key informants. While doing so, my main priority was to cover the key informants I had been unable to interview. In addition, I also incorporated materials such as news, opinion pieces, and works of in-depth reporting that were not strictly linked to my key informants but were relevant to the research questions. I began this stage by identifying targeted keywords and relevant phrases. In this process, I ensured that the keywords and phrases selected captured the key concepts and themes under investigation. The keywords and key phrases I used 14 Even though each key informant received almost the same number of questions, a few key informants preferred answering only briefly, and as a result, some interviews were significantly shorter than the average length of the interviews, which was 55 minutes and 55 seconds.
33 were both general and specific.15 Predominantly, I used Nepali keywords and key phrases since most of the content relevant to this research was written in Nepali. I also included some English key phrases because some of the media portals I explored had content in English. Table 2: Media material sources and their distribution Media sources Number of texts/articles selected Kantipur Dainik 34 Onlinekhabar 20 Setopati 12 Ratopati 8 Annapurna Post 6 Lokaantar 6 Nepallive 4 Nepal Magazine 3 My Republica (English) 3 Nepali Times (English) 2 The Himalayan Times (English) 1 The Kathmandu Post (English) 1 Dristi Weekly 1 HimalKhabar 1 Nagarik Daily 1 Nepal Aaja 1 Hamrakura 1 Total 105 Of the 105 pieces selected, 98 were written in Nepali, while seven were in English. Data were gathered from 17 media sources (see Table 2) using two search engines (Google and Bing) and the internal archives of six media outlets: Kantipur Daily, Onlinekhabar, Setopati, Ratopati, Annapurna Post, and Lokaantar. One of the challenges I faced while accumulating data using the search engines was navigating through the massive amount of content. With the apparent explosion of online media in Nepal over the last two decades, the Nepali online media space has become crowded with a vast amount of content. Even for a relatively experienced media consumer like me, it is not always easy to distinguish between facts, distorted facts, and fake news. During online data accumulation, I encountered several low-quality news sites that thrived on false information, fake 15 For instance, I began with general key phrases such as “Nepali peace process,” “India’s involvement in Nepal’s post-conflict transition,” “India–Nepal relations,” and “2015 Nepal blockade.” I also used very specific phrases such as “participants of the 12-Point-Understanding,” “India in the Katawal case,” and “Jayshankar’s Nepal visit.”
34 news, and an exaggerated and sensational catering of conspiracy theories. To avoid collecting misleading information or ‘distorted’ facts, I took four steps. First, I ensured that all the online media sources I used were registered with the Department of Information, as mandated by Nepal's media law. For print and online media, I confirmed that they had received a top ranking from the Press Council Nepal, an autonomous media regulatory body established by the Government of Nepal. Second, I drew on my experience of consuming Nepali media for over two decades. Using purposive sampling, I selected materials that were deemed relatively more independent and widely trusted. Third, when I encountered highly controversial, partisan, and opinionated content, I examined it more closely and considered alternative perspectives. Fourth, whenever I came across facts (such as dates, names, or historical events), I cross-checked them with reliable sources and made a sincere effort to verify their accuracy. By following the procedures outlined above, I collected 105 pieces of text. The data included opinion pieces, interviews with key informants conducted by reporters and journalists, opinion and news pieces, and several in-depth reporting works. The materials gathered were then converted into PDF format, and digital copies were saved for analysis. Media materials were collected in two phases, in 2018 and 2020. In both cases, a separate document was used to record relevant metadata, including the title, publication date, author names, and URLs. The length of accumulated media text was 750 pages in total. The pieces collected ranged from 2009 to 2019, even though most of the texts were from 2015 to 2018.16 2.2.6 Speeches and Video Talks A small but important data component includes video speeches and video interviews of some of my key informants. These videos were gathered using the snowball sampling method. I found them referenced or referred to in the articles I read, or they were recommended during the key informant interviews I conducted earlier. In this category, I used 12 videos (five speeches, five media interviews, one conference presentation, and one video commentary/documentary). The length of the videos totalled 360.1 minutes (i.e. 6 hours). All twelve videos were accessed on the video-sharing site YouTube (see Appendix 1). This strategy was especially effective in capturing the viewpoints of important but hard-to-reach key informants. For instance, my attempt to meet Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, the founding chairman of the CPN (Maoists) and the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army, was unsuccessful. However, I found a lengthy speech in which he discussed the early days of the Maoist insurgency, detailing how the movement slowly gained both domestic and international attention. He explained how the party formed seemingly odd alliances, not always out of camaraderie, but also for tactical and strategic reasons to build strength and exert political power. In the same speech, he openly talked about India's role in Nepal's peace process and political transition. Undoubtedly, his speech became an important piece of data for this research. Similarly, G. P. Koirala, who had successfully led the 2006 people’s movement 16 There are several reasons for this. First, many Nepali media outlets only started to archive their media content in recent years. Second, the number of media outlets offering digital or online content was comparatively low during the initial years covered in this study. Third, many online news portals that offer vibrant discussion on the topic of this study were established only during the later years of the last decade. Fourth, after the 2015 economic blockade, discussions on India's influence in Nepal intensified at an unprecedented scale. Hence, pieces from the post-blockade years dominated the data.
35 (Jana Andolan II), was the most influential figure in the peace process and political transition saga. He would have unquestionably been an ideal key informant for this research. Mr Koirala, however, passed away in 2010, years before this study began. I interviewed his two close political aides, his daughter Sujata Koirala and nephew Shekhar Koirala, and their input was important in understanding Mr Koirala’s decisions and political choices. In addition, I also came across a 51-minute video interview conducted in 2007 by the BBC (Nepali) Sajha Sawal programme, in which Mr Koirala was asked several questions related to Nepal’s peace process and political transition. Even though I could not interview Mr Koirala myself, incorporating that video into this study helped me understand his perspectives and opinions and offered some important insights into the political processes he had led. In addition, I was unsuccessful in interviewing the former King, Gyanendra Shah, as I could not locate a communication channel through which to deliver my interview request to him. After being stripped of his royal status, he led a surprisingly private life, making only occasional and minimal media appearances. Although I was not able to interview him myself, I found and included a rare television interview he gave in July 2012 to Nepal’s News24 TV. In the interview, among other things, the former King claimed that the Seven Party Alliance had agreed to keep the constitutional monarchy intact as Jana Andolan II peaked in 2006. This piece of information was difficult, if not impossible, for me to get from elsewhere. Other speeches and interviews included in the study serve a similar purpose. Although I did not personally conduct these interviews or listen to the speeches firsthand, their inclusion in the study was crucial in addressing the research questions. They offer valuable insights and greatly enhance the overall depth of analysis. Utilising these externally sourced speeches and interview data contributes significantly to the robustness of this study and ensures a thorough exploration of the research objectives. 2.2.7 Media Sources as Research Data: Uses and Implications Using media sources as data in research comes with several caveats and considerations. Media outlets often have their own biases, which can influence the information they present. They can, deliberately or accidentally, mould the story they are presenting by injecting their views, perspectives, and prejudices. The Nepali media houses whose media materials I have used as data in this study have often been vocal about their guiding principles and political positions. For instance, nearly all major mainstream media outlets in Nepal openly criticised both King Gyanendra’s direct rule and the Maoist armed insurgency. They actively participated in Jana Andolan II, which ultimately ended King Gyanendra’s direct rule, and brought the Maoists to peaceful mainstream politics. In other words, during Nepal’s peace process and political transition, the media was not merely a collection of passive reporters; instead, it consisted of active participants who played a crucial role in guiding Nepal towards a new political direction. Nepali mainstream media backed and promoted what is often referred to as progressive agendas, including liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and nonviolence. As the agenda-setting theory has highlighted, media structures do indeed play an active role in crafting, moulding, and steering the public agenda (see, for instance, McCombs 2005, Towner & Muñoz 2020), which was indeed the case in Nepal.
36 Big media houses often have corporate interests that inherently influence how they report—or choose not to report—on specific issues and events. As Lazaridou & Krestel (2016) argue, media houses tend to intentionally promote some stories while giving little or no space to others. These values, choices, agendas, and interests are often reflected in their works and the issues they cover or fail to cover. While this limitation is also inherent in the data I have accumulated, the rise of independent and journalist-owned digital media platforms (such as Setopati, Ratopati, Nepallive, and Lokaantar in this context) is changing this dynamic. It is also crucial to address limitations concerning accuracy and reliability. For instance, not all media outlets prioritise fact-checking or accuracy. Journalists often rely on human sources for information and may not always have the tools to confirm the veracity of the information they receive. Time and resource constraints can also compel them to reduce investigative efforts or depend on PR (public relations) professionals and other parties as information sources (Gandy 1982, Hallin 2005). As Godler et al. (2020: 218) explain: Human sources pose knowledge-related problems for journalists: journalists can never enter an eyewitness’s head, they cannot always (and can never with certainty) gauge a whistle-blower’s intentions or sincerity, they cannot challenge a scientist’s claims like her peer, and they might not have the professional leeway to verify every single claim by a politician or a spokesperson. Similarly, media reports also tend to have temporal and spatial limitations. In this case, media coverage might vary temporally and spatially, focusing on certain events or regions while neglecting others. Even the most careful journalists may portray a partial and often biased representation of large, irregular, and important events (Woolley 2000: 171). This can ultimately create a skewed understanding of broader trends or realities. Media reports do not always provide the full context or depth essential for rigorous research. In addition, oversimplification of events or topics can be a problem, leading to an incomplete representation of subjects requiring in-depth portrayal. Strategies such as cross-verifying information from multiple sources, considering biases inherent in media content, and triangulating findings using diverse data sets are some of the strategies that researchers have used to mitigate the limitations associated with using media sources in research (see, for instance, Woolley 2000, Hill et al. 1997). As is evident in this chapter, I have also used crossverification, data triangulation, thorough acknowledgement of potential biases, and diligent attention to the quality of data sources as strategies for dealing with limitations inherent in media sources used in this study. Despite some of the limitations discussed, the media materials I used provided excellent insights and proved to be remarkable data sources to answer the research questions. Diplomatic tensions often unfold behind closed doors, but it was primarily the media that took on the task of unravelling these tensions and illustrating the strained and escalating India–Nepal relations in the years following the 2006 peace deal. In other words, media outlets frequently served as the main platforms on which discussions and debates about Indian micromanagement in the post-conflict context were openly discussed and debated from various perspectives. 2.2.8 The Internet as a Data Destination As is already clear, I used the Internet to accumulate some of the data used in this research. The use of the Internet as a source of information or as a platform for data
37 accumulation has several implications, both positive and negative. As other scholars have also pointed out, Internet-based research offers ample opportunities, particularly for a study of this type. Internet-based research is valuable for investigating interpretive frames within a limited time frame17 (Baumgarten & Grauel 2009: 116). It allows for research in a naturalistic setting without the interference of an intrusive researcher (Nosek et al. 2002: 174) and helps reach populations that are difficult to reach (Duffy 2002: 87, Hash & Spencer 2009). As far as this study is concerned, one of the remarkable benefits of the Internet was that it offered extremely valuable data from diverse sources. For instance, I used newspaper archives and video materials from several sources and from a period spanning many years. Had these materials not been on the Internet, data accumulation from such diverse sources would have been long, cumbersome, and expensive. This straightforward accessibility allowed me to explore various perspectives and gather data quickly and efficiently. By accumulating data from the Internet, I could include the perspectives of people who were unavailable or inaccessible for an interview. In addition, I also frequently used various sources available on the Internet to tally and verify the factual information that the key informants provided during the interviews. As Askitas & Zimmermann (2015) have argued, the Internet can be a great tool for researchers, particularly as a source of data advancement. This was the case in this study as well. While I did accumulate a significant portion of primary data from the key informant interviews, the data obtained from the Internet helped me broaden my perspectives. This also supported my analysis and argumentation. This was then ultimately instrumental in addressing the research questions. As others have also noted (see, for instance, Adair et al. 2006: 545, Alessi & Martin 2010: 128), data obtained from Internet sources, particularly first-person narratives, can provide rich and in-depth perspectives and are excellent qualitative data sources. I also had a similar experience conducting this study. Some personal narratives and pieces of investigative reporting that I incorporated as my data in this study provided in-depth insights that were immensely valuable in addressing the research questions. Internet-based data accumulation practice has a few shortcomings and limitations, some of which I also experienced. As Deacon (2007: 14) has argued, the use of computerised search engines in data collection is not only convenient but also helpful in locating and identifying deeply buried information, for instance, in an in-depth article. This was mostly true in my case, too. However, some keywords generated extensive data that were virtually impossible to process. In such cases, narrowing down and making the keywords more specific or using a restrictive search was helpful. Similarly, only keyword matching sometimes did not produce any useful content. In other words, there were several cases of false positives. On occasions, locating the context of searched content also posed a challenge. News articles and opinion pieces are produced in a particular context and to respond to certain socio-political developments. Understanding those contexts and complexities was in itself a challenging task. Karlsson & Sjøvaag (2016) argue that since Internet-based research is a relatively new practice, old and established methods might not be sufficient for studying and analysing digital media content. There is a need to develop new 17 As is typical with interpretive framing, my analysis of the complex and multifaceted India–Nepal relations revolves around political aspects, whereas other aspects of India–Nepal relations, such as cultural and linguistic, have not been highlighted.
38 common standards and protocols to address inherent limitations. These limitations, however, do not mean that ‘web researchers should be allowed to have lax standards’ (Herring 2010: 246). In fact, they ‘need to hold themselves to high standards of conceptual clarity, systematicity of sampling and data analysis, and awareness of limitations in interpreting their results’ (p. 246). According to Nosek et al. (2002: 175): The challenges of the Internet should not deter investigators from taking advantage of this powerful medium for discovery and education. Yet the responsibility for conducting research that meets the highest standards for ethical treatment and advances science is first and foremost the responsibility of scientists themselves. Deacon (2007: 23) recommends a wide range of measures for improving the reliability of an analysis centred around digital searches, and I also took some of those measures. For instance, I checked the accumulated data for duplicated items and false positives and carefully scanned the titles and the time span selected. In addition, as I have already explained, data triangulation is one of the strategies researchers commonly use to compensate for shortcomings in a particular data collection method. I also adopted that strategy in this research. As a result, the Internet-sourced data is used in tandem with firsthand key informant interviews, and this strategy not only ensured data variance, but also helped bolster data analysis and the study’s reliability. 2.3 Data Analysis Researchers use various analytical approaches and methods to analyse qualitative data. In case study research, an analytical strategy aims to link case study data to ‘some concepts of interest’ and then use those concepts to achieve a sense of direction in the process of data analysis (Yin 2003). For dealing with qualitative data and constructing an analytical framework, Yin (2003: 109–139) presents four strategies: 1. Relying on theoretical propositions (i.e., constructing an analytical framework based on theoretical vantage points used in the study), 2. The inductive strategy (i.e., taking the ‘ground up’ approach of analysis), 3. Developing case descriptions (especially when concepts and categories cannot be developed from the data), and 4. Examining rival (plausible) explanations. As an analytical strategy, this study adopts the inductive approach based on grounded theory.18 The analytical framework also draws inspiration from McCracken's (1988) recommendations for analysing long qualitative interviews.19 Yin (2018: 278) argues that a researcher can develop their own analytical strategy based on the research questions and the nature of the data. Nonetheless, Yin recommends starting with research questions and not with data. The aim, he argues, is to ‘play with the data’ and look for patterns, insights, or concepts that seem promising. Schmidt (2004: 253) also encourages researchers to develop their own appropriate modes of analysis and argues that ‘the analytical techniques that are selected for semi-structured interviews within the framework of an 18 Grounded theory is a methodology developed by Glaser & Strauss (1967) and is primarily used for building theoretical constructs from data. 19 McCracken (1988) proposed five stages of analysis for analysing long qualitative interviews: 1) treat each data item independent of other items, 2) develop observations by themselves then align with other findings and then per literature review, 3) examine connections between second-level observation, considering literature and culture review, 4) scrutinise this collective form to determine inter-theme consistency and contradiction, and 5) use patterns and theme displayed across findings into a final form of analysis.
39 investigation will depend on the goals, the questions and the methodological approach’. Particularly in qualitative studies, the timing of data analysis is also important. There is no consensus among scholars on when data analysis should begin. Some argue that data analysis should begin only after all data is collected, ensuring the researcher can assess the amount and quality of the data. Others believe that data analysis and data collection can occur simultaneously (see, for instance, Hartley 1994). Against this backdrop, I adopted a middle-way approach. While the final, comprehensive data analysis began many months after the data collection, a 'preliminary analysis' took place already during the data collection stage. When collecting data from the key informant interviews and later from the Internet, I wrote field notes and reflexive remarks, which aided the final analysis. In the grounded theory tradition, the use of notes and memos has long been advocated (Corbin & Strauss 2007) as they can provide clues, ideas, hints, and suggestions that are useful for conceptualising data in the analysis stage (Lempert 2011). Analytic aids, such as memos and field notes, not only enhance analysis, but also contribute to ensuring that the final coded product is both valid and reliable, or, in other words, credible and confirmable (Guba & Lincoln 1989). 2.3.1 Content Analysis As Dey (1993: 31) puts it, the researcher’s aim in qualitative data analysis should be to describe different phenomena, classify them, and observe how concepts interconnect. While the analytical fabric of this study is based on grounded theory, the data were analysed using the qualitative content analysis method. Content analysis offers tools and techniques for systematic text analysis and is a widely popular method of data analysis that has been in practice since the 18th century.20 Krippendorff (1969: 103) defines content analysis as the ‘use of replicable and valid method for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source’. In the words of Mayring (2000), content analysis is an approach of empirical, methodological, controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following step-by-step models and analytical rules and without relying on reckless quantification. Content analysis is ‘the longest established method of text analysis among the set of empirical methods of social investigation’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 55). Qualitative content analysis involves searching for underlying themes in the data being analysed and is presumably the most prevalent approach to the qualitative analysis of documents (Bryman 2017). Broadly speaking, content analysis is of two types: Quantitative content analysis and qualitative content analysis. Quantitative content analysis relies on methods such as frequency counts and objective analysis of coded frequencies (Cracauer 1952), whereas in qualitative content analysis, patterns are prioritised. Qualitative content analysis is generally inductive and begins with open research questions. Thus, it is not so much about testing a hypothesis (White & Marsh 2006). While some have raised concerns about the qualitative content analysis method, noting its potential for impressionism and the need for greater systematic rigour (Krippendorff 2018), it remains a valuable and insightful approach to data analysis. This method enables rich and nuanced interpretations of complex data, enhances 20 In the beginning, the content analysis method was mainly used to analyse quantitative data, but since the 1950s, it has been used to analyse both quantitative and qualitative data.
46 how I apply this knowledge in academic and professional settings, will hold significance. My dedication to embracing ethical practices will guide me towards making responsible choices now and in the future. 2.5 Researcher Positionality Particularly in this type of research, it is essential to recognise how my own background and biography influenced my work. Similarly, it is important to be open and honest about how my background has shaped and influenced my choices and actions, the questions I asked and possibly avoided, and the interpretations I have presented in this thesis. My positionality also influenced the level of access I had to my key informants and the responses I received from them. To help the reader understand my perspective and the stance I have taken in this study, it is important to cover the following elements: my background, the reasons behind my pursuit of a doctoral research project, my insights as a researcher from Nepal, and the opportunities and challenges I encountered during my fieldwork in Nepal. I was born and raised in Nepal, shaped by the Nepali culture and identity, but also exposed to certain political narratives. My parents were members of a leftist political party, and I have clear memories of politics being a regular topic of discussion at home. I remember my father discussing India’s economic blockade on Nepal in the early 1990s. That was how, at the tender age of five, I was first introduced to the subject of India’s influence in Nepal. I later realised that India was part of the picture whenever there was a politically significant event of a massive scale in Nepal—a royal massacre, an armed insurgency, a people’s movement, or a peace deal. As the Maoist insurgency was at its peak in Nepal, I graduated from high school and moved to the capital city to study further. As the conflict became increasingly violent, my entire family was displaced from our ancestral village. Even though my parents were left-leaning, they did not subscribe to the Maoists’ radical ideology, and as a result, the rebels often targeted them. When I was studying in the capital city, Nepal’s political landscape went through a drastic makeover. A massive people's movement in 2006, in which I also participated, overthrew King Gyanendra’s direct rule. This opened avenues for the Maoists to end the armed insurgency through a negotiated settlement and join peaceful mainstream politics. This was the time my political consciousness began to mould and evolve, and I started to cherish the ideals of democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. I also began to see the Maoists not as a terrorist organisation—as the Nepali state had often portrayed them under the King’s direct rule—but as a political force fighting to bring about positive change in Nepal. My view of the Maoists as agents of change, despite their flaws, limitations and wartime atrocities, is amply reflected in the analysis and interpretations presented in this thesis. I left Nepal in late 2007 to study for a degree programme in social services at a university of applied sciences in Finland. I then completed a master’s degree in social sciences from the University of Helsinki in 2014. Throughout these years, I have actively followed political developments in Nepal. For my master’s thesis, I analysed South Sudan’s post-conflict peace policies, which triggered my interest in the post-conflict issues of my own country. For my PhD, my initial idea was to study India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process as a case study of South–South Cooperation. However, as I was preparing my PhD research plan in 2015, India
47 openly intervened in Nepal’s constitution-making process, which was strongly resisted by Nepali political actors (see Chapter 6). An enraged India then imposed an economic blockade on Nepal, creating a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. In particular, this incident motivated me to revise my research plan and take a more critical look at India–Nepal relations. When I started reading more about the subject, I gained a better understanding of the tumultuous relationship between the two countries. In the late 2000s, as a young man, I had understood that India played a positive role in ending the Maoist armed insurgency in Nepal. However, I was unaware of the inherent complexities, geopolitical and economic interests, and other subtle nuances involved in India’s engagement in Nepal. As I explored India–Nepal relations more critically, themes such as historical dependency, micromanagement, resource interests, and economic and political subjugation began to emerge. This exploration and understanding have significantly shaped my thinking and the analysis presented in this thesis. Though I have lived outside Nepal for over seventeen years, I remain a Nepali citizen and consider Nepal my home. There are both advantages and disadvantages to researching the country of your origin or one you know well (see, for instance, Ite 1997: 83, Mandiyanike 2009: 70, Mckenzie 2019). In my case, as a researcher, one of the biggest advantages was my ability to speak the local language, i.e., Nepali. As a native of the country I was researching, I possessed a deeper understanding of critical institutional and contextual factors, as well as the networks that facilitated access to key informants. In addition, my proficiency in Nepali and Hindi granted me access to a vast body of existing literature on India–Nepal relations written in these languages. Being a native Nepali also came with some disadvantages. Mandiyanike (2009: 70) discusses suspicions regarding the purity of the researcher’s intentions, a sentiment I also encountered. For instance, two influential key informants on my interview list agreed to meet with me and inquired about the purpose of my research and the research questions. After hearing my brief description, they declined to participate in the interview. They said they did not have enough time for the interview, even though their secretaries had informed me there would be enough time for an interview. Since both key informants were prominent political leaders, one being a senior government minister at the time, they may have declined the interview due to the politically sensitive nature of the topic or because they were suspicious of me as a researcher based in the West and conducting research at a Western university. Some key informants, however, openly praised this study and thanked me for my efforts. They often mentioned that there had been many misunderstandings, especially regarding the 12-Point Understanding, and it was commendable that a Nepali researcher had decided to explore the topic more thoroughly. Some even commended me, saying that I was disseminating the success story of the Nepali peace process to a global audience through this study. It is incontestable that my own identity and biography, at least to some extent, affect my analysis in this thesis. I am also aware that the questions I posed to the respondents were of my construction, and to a certain degree, they reflect my interests and predilections. As Harding (1986, 1987, 1991) points out, as researchers, we should be aware that our social and political positions, affiliations, and predilections affect how we conduct research. Our interests, the questions we ask and refrain from asking, the type of research design and methodology we adopt, the theoretical framework we use, the participants we choose or fail to choose, the
48 way we interpret or analyse data, all of this is subtly linked to who we are and what is our social and political location (Guillemin & Gillam 2004: 274). I have utilised reflexivity to address these issues and as a method of critical reflection. This is the case in both contexts: the type of knowledge produced and the way how that knowledge is generated. In reflexive research, ‘the researcher should constantly take stock of their actions and their role in the research process and subject these to the same critical scrutiny as the rest of their data’ (Mason 1996: 6). In other words, a reflexive researcher goes beyond just reporting the ‘facts’, and engages in constructing interpretations (‘What do I know?’), and questions how those interpretations were formulated (‘How do I know what I know?’) (Hertz 1997: 8). In the domain of research ethics, practising reflexivity involves placing oneself and one's practices under constant scrutiny, and acknowledging ethical dilemmas and the entire process of knowledge creation (McGraw et al. 2000: 68). In this context, reflexivity is an active and ongoing process that influences all aspects of research. As a researcher, I am not only aware of this, but have also applied reflexivity at every stage of this study. 2.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study This study has a definite scope and some limitations, which must be acknowledged and addressed. First, as the title of this thesis clearly indicates, the main scope of this study is the investigation of India's engagement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition, primarily between 2005 and 2017. This was the timeframe when Nepal’s peace process culminated, and the country got out of a protracted political transition. My investigation and analysis primarily focus on the years mentioned above. However, whenever relevant and necessary, I also refer to events that occurred before or after the selected timeframe. Second, in this study, I adopted a particular theoretical approach, and that naturally shaped its scope. There are numerous ways to study peace processes, third-party engagements and influences, or the complexities of modern international relations. This is also true while studying the relationship between two neighbouring countries that share much more than just a common border. Researchers can select from various theoretical frameworks and methodological perspectives to study these phenomena. Among many options and combinations, I used a triangular theoretical approach (Chapter 3), which forms the theoretical foundation of this study. The point of departure of my theoretical framework has been theoretical issues surrounding mediation and third-party engagement, followed by rising power models (South–South Cooperation and sub-imperialism), and concepts drawn from world-systems approaches and dependency theories. Third, even though theoretical inputs have been taken from a diverse range of fields, this study, at its core, remains within the domain of global development studies. Peace and international relations research are distinct fields on their own, but can also be incorporated under the interdisciplinary umbrella of global development studies. Most of the theoretical concepts I use throughout this thesis, such as dependency and sub-imperialism, have been extensively used in the global development scholarship. Mediation, along with post-conflict peace and political issues, has also been examined through the lens of global development studies. Moreover, this study has a few limitations that need thorough acknowledgement. First, the subject of this study—India’s influence in Nepal during the peace process and political transition years—is undoubtedly complex. India, a military and economic giant and a shrewd regional player in South Asia, has always
49 been influential in Nepal. India’s influence has been felt in Nepal in major political developments and upheavals, especially since the early 1950s.28 Similarly, Nepal and India share a complex relationship that has developed over many generations and covers many areas. No set of theories or data can fully capture the intricacies and depth of the vast connection between these two countries. That fact is undeniably one of this study's major limitations. So, this study is not an exhaustive and all-encompassing examination of India–Nepal relations, but rather a small step towards understanding India’s influence and actions in Nepal primarily during the peace process and political transition years (i.e., between 2005 and 2017). Second, the period I chose to examine spans from 2005 to 2017, covering the most significant events of the peace process and the post-conflict political transition that took place during these years. However, my focus on this rather narrow timeframe leaves out some other significant incidents and developments that occurred before this period. For instance, India's role during the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1996–2005) deserves a thorough re-evaluation, as does its nearly threedecade-long silent support of the Panchayat authoritarian regime in Nepal. Whenever applicable, I do refer to historically relevant cases and incidents; however, such references do not compensate for an exhaustive analysis. Hence, that becomes yet another limitation of this study. Third, the key informants interviewed for this study were all Nepali citizens. My initial plan to include the ‘Indian side of the story’ by interviewing Indian leaders and diplomats was later discontinued primarily due to logistical constraints and my intention to avoid a cumbersome research design. Therefore, this study lacks a thorough representation of the Indian perspective. Similarly, the secondary data that I have used—newspaper articles and videos—were mostly written or produced by Nepali nationals. I have used works of Indian scholars, too, but their representation overall is marginal. Fourth, most of the key informants I interviewed were public figures, many of them political elites holding prominent political posts. Despite some pitfalls, elite interviewing is widely used in political and peace research. In short, interviewing elites can pose challenges for two main reasons. On one hand, elites are ‘less accessible’ and, on the other hand, ‘more conscious of their own importance’ (Richards 1996: 200). In my elite interviews, it is possible that the narratives they provided may have been inaccurate and influenced by their prejudices or vested interests. Their statements might have been shaped by their desire to present themselves as ‘patriotic’ leaders who oppose any form of foreign meddling and interference in Nepal. While I took steps to address any potential impact from this, mainly by verifying their statements against facts from other reliable sources, it was impossible to confirm the authenticity of all their claims. Before conducting the fieldwork, I was aware of the shortcomings inherent in elite interviewing. I understood that it is important for politicians to safeguard their public image and to refrain from divulging sensitive or controversial information that might put them in trouble. I attempted to address these issues by using tips and techniques recommended by other scholars engaged in elite interviewing (see, for instance, Richards 1996, Berry 2002, Harvey 2011). I included such techniques 28 For instance, in February 1950, King Tribhuvan, enraged by his powerless position under the Ranas, left Nepal and sought refuge in India. A compromise was reached between the King, the Rana rulers, and representatives of the Nepali Congress, a political party fighting for democracy in Nepal. The Delhi Agreement was brokered by the then-Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Since then, India has been steadily present in almost all major political events and processes in Nepal.
50 in the Interview Guide (see Appendix 3), which I consistently used while conducting the interviews. One such technique was to offer the respondents complete or partial anonymity, and yet another was to use data triangulation to improve consistency and reliability. Fifth, as is typical with elite interviewing (see, for instance, Richards 1996), my interview sample of 18 key informants is relatively small. My initial list of respondents included over 40 key informants. However, it was impossible to interview everyone on the list for several reasons. Some key informants ignored my request for an interview, while others agreed to meet, but then found excuses to avoid being interviewed. They often claimed to be too busy or unavailable for a lengthy discussion. I conducted most of these interviews in the summer of 2017, which was an election period in Nepal, and some key informants on my list were extremely busy with election campaigns. There are also limitations concerning the use of secondary data. Since the secondary data I used were collected online from media sources, in terms of editorial policy and practice, their editorial bias is potentially reflected in the data I used. Owners of media outlets, journalists, editors, and even bloggers can, either intentionally or unintentionally, inject their personal views, prejudices, and perspectives into the stories they present. They also have the power to decide which stories receive space or airtime and which do not. They may choose to promote certain stories while omitting others (Lazaridou & Krestel 2016). Moreover, some articles and videos that could have been included as data in this study are missing because not all of them were available online, especially from the earlier years of the peace process. Finally, since this study primarily focuses on Nepal’s peace process and political transition from 2005 to 2017, any generalisations I make in later chapters are based solely on this case study. As all peace processes and political transitions are unique, my analytical and theoretical arguments in this thesis may not apply or necessarily extrapolate to other scenarios. This is also the case because India's role as a peace mediator/facilitator in Nepal is quite distinct and does not conform to traditional notions of mediation. Moreover, India’s influence in Nepal has been long and extensive, which may have shaped how India positioned itself as a ‘power mediator’ (see Chapter 3) to help resolve the Maoist armed insurgency in Nepal. In this context, India’s role may have diverged from the established norms typically observed in mediation cases. As a result, India's role in Nepal as a 'conflict mediator' may differ from typical mediation efforts involving professional mediators, mediation organisations, and relatively independent countries that have little or no vested interests in the countries receiving mediation. 2.7 Chapter Summary: Connecting Methods to Theory and Data This chapter provided a detailed overview of the methodological approaches adopted in this thesis. It began by outlining the ontological and epistemological foundations that underpin the research, thus crafting a clear philosophical framework for the study. The chapter then detailed the rationale behind the methodological choices made and explained how these align with the research objectives and theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3. After that, the data collection process was described in detail, encompassing key informant interviews and media materials. Critical research considerations, including validity, reliability, ethical concerns, and the researcher's positionality, were also thoroughly discussed. Issues related to elite interviewing, the use of media
51 content in research, translation, and data accumulation from Internet sources were addressed. It also discussed the use of qualitative content analysis as the primary analytical method applied to both interview transcripts and media materials. This choice was driven by the nature of the collected data and the research design. Overall, this chapter provided a thorough and transparent account of the research methodology, methods, data accumulation strategies, and ethical considerations made in the research process.
52 3. Theoretical Framework ‘The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.’ -Thucydides, Melian Dialogue, 5th century B.C. This chapter outlines the theoretical framework employed in this study. The framework integrates multiple theoretical perspectives that serve as a theoretical reference point for investigating India's engagement in Nepal's peace process and political transition from 2005 to 2017 and navigating the complex and historically tumultuous relations between the two countries. By integrating conflict mediation theories, rising power behaviour models, and world-systems approaches, I aim to create a critical and comprehensive foundation for understanding India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition, as well as the tumultuous coexistence between the two countries. My central premise in selecting these diverse theoretical strands is based on the belief that phenomena like mediation, peace processes, and political transitions should not be studied in isolation but rather within the context of global and regional power relations and broader political, geopolitical, and economic processes. Conflict Mediation Theories: One of the focal points of this study is India's role in the Maoist-SPA 12-Point Understanding signed in New Delhi on 22 November 2005. The 12-Point Understanding was equivalent to a de facto peace agreement that essentially sketched a roadmap for a negotiated settlement of the Maoist armed insurgency and political restructuring of post-conflict Nepal. Given the ambiguity surrounding India's role in the 12-Point Understanding and the opaque nature of its involvement, this study examines India’s role first through the lens of conflict mediation. Thus, the investigation begins with India's meditative or facilitative role in the Maoist-SPA 12-Point Understanding. The first theoretical pillar, therefore, revolves around conflict mediation issues. To this end, I draw upon conflict mediation theories, focusing on four key aspects: the initiation of mediation (Why are some conflicts mediated while others are not?), the timing of mediation (What point in a conflict does mediation occur?), mediator motivation (What drives actors to take on mediating roles?), and power mediation (How does the involvement of regional powers as mediators influence the dynamics and resolution of conflicts?). This also includes examining why some conflicts receive extensive mediation while others are almost ignored. Moreover, it also involves investigating the timing and motives behind mediators' involvement. There is a particular emphasis on how regional powers, acting as power mediators, influence the progression and resolution of conflicts. In this study, this approach is crucial for understanding India's strategic motivations and actions in the Nepali peace process and political transition. Thus, I begin the first section of this chapter by introducing theoretical concepts surrounding peace mediation literature, emphasising ripeness theory, which sheds light on ‘ripe’ moments for conflict resolution. In the same section, I introduce mediation as a conflict resolution tool and offer a brief overview of the global mediation scenario. In addition, I bring in theoretical concepts surrounding ‘power mediation’ and ‘pure mediation’, and borrowing from works of scholars such as Saadia Touval (Touval 1975, 1987, 1992), I support the argument that mediation can be used as a foreign policy tool to serve specific foreign policy interests. I
53 conclude the first section by arguing that even though ‘power mediators’ might successfully forge peace agreements, their possible vested interests and long-term post-peace deal activities need critical scrutiny. Rising Powers, South–South Cooperation, and Sub-imperialism: This study initially aimed to analyse India’s involvement in Nepal primarily through the lens of South–South Cooperation (SSC). While this plan was not abandoned altogether, the research expands to consider India not just as a country in the Global South, but also as a rising power with significant economic and political ambitions. Theoretically, this involves examining how the so-called rise of such powers, such as India, may simultaneously challenge Western hegemony in some instances and accelerate the expansion of their hegemonic aspirations. Therefore, throughout this thesis, India is examined not only as Nepal's powerful neighbour, but also as a rising power with a multitude of foreign policy motives and global political and economic agendas. After discussing the origins of South–South Cooperation (SSC) and connecting them to the developing world's long-standing hope for creating a New International Economic Order, I critically examine how the contradictory behaviour of rising powers has threatened the prospects and promises of an emancipatory SSC. To portray a clearer picture of contemporary SSC, I evaluate both sides of the argument, looking at the viewpoints for and against it. As will be apparent in my discussion, while some continue to see a tremendous ‘emancipatory’ potential in SSC, others view it merely as a way of perpetuating and creating new forms of inequality and dependency. There is growing concern that SSC is becoming increasingly crippled and overshadowed by the sub-imperialist tendencies of the so-called rising powers in the Global South. Despite its prospects and pitfalls, my central argument, however, is that SSC should not be regarded as an isolated theoretical construct or as a novel mechanism that will 'liberate' the developing world. Rather, it should be evaluated critically on a case-by-case basis within the broader context of the current volatile international order and the neoliberal political and economic environment. Additionally, the focus should be not only on South–South Cooperation, but also on South–South conflict. World-Systems and Dependency Theories: In the final section of this chapter, I examine world-system and dependency approaches. In analysing India– Nepal relations, I have chosen to emphasise world-systems theories over traditional international relations paradigms such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism. While traditional international relations theories do offer valuable insights into interstate relations, world-systems and dependency theories are better suited for a long-term historical view. World-systems and dependency theories offer several advantages for my analysis. First, they provide a long-term historical perspective crucial for understanding the long and tumultuous India–Nepal relations. Second, they emphasise economic relationships and global divisions of labour, which is particularly relevant given India's extensive economic interest and influence in Nepal (see Chapter 8). Third, core, semi-periphery, and periphery concepts effectively frame the India–Nepal relationship, with India occupying a semiperipheral position, exerting influence over Nepal as a peripheral state. I conclude the chapter by arguing that dependency and world-systems approaches, while less prominent in contemporary academic discourse, still hold relevance. They are useful for analysing power asymmetries between countries and for situating regional dynamics within a global context. In the context of this study, this framing enables a more comprehensive understanding of how India's actions in Nepal connect to broader global economic and political structures. Similarly,
54 their emphasis on (under)development and dependency helps explain Nepal's chronic economic reliance on India and its implications, among others, for Nepal’s sovereignty and self-determination. Finally, the interdisciplinary framework that world systems and dependency theories provide is useful for a more comprehensive analysis of complex situations, such as peace processes and post-conflict political transitions. 3.1 Analytical Advantages of an Integrated Approach Before moving on to the actual discussion of the theoretical vantage points adopted, it is useful to briefly discuss the analytical advantages of an integrated approach and why such an approach was essential in the first place. As already argued above, the complex, multifaceted nature of India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition cannot be adequately captured by any single theoretical lens. Therefore, a theoretical integration was essential. The core analytical contribution of this thesis lies not in the simple layering of these fields, but in their active integration. • Peace/mediation Research provides the foundational context. It offers the vocabulary and analytical tools to understand the mechanics of mediation, political negotiation, post-conflict political transitions, and transitional justice issues. • Critical IR introduces the crucial dimension of power asymmetry, specifically through the lens of sub-imperialism. In other words, it allows the analysis to move beyond a simplistic view of India as a neutral mediator to an actor with its own geopolitical interests. • Global Development Studies, particularly dependency and worldsystems theories, offer a macro perspective, illuminating the structural and economic underpinnings of this power relationship. They expose and help elaborate the mechanisms of unequal exchange and resource control that solidify Nepal's subordinate position. These ‘layers’ are not meant to remain as separate, parallel tracks of analysis. Instead, they are woven together to create a more robust, intricate, and holistic explanatory model. The true analytical power emerges at the intersection where these theories meet and inform one another. This integration allows me to explain, for example, that India’s ‘micromanagement’ is not merely a diplomatic strategy (an IR concept) nor simply a form of third-party mediation (a peace research concept). Rather, it is a specific mode of intervention where geopolitical ambitions, characteristic of subimperialism (Critical IR), are operationalised through the direct manipulation of post-conflict mechanisms (Peace Research), and are sustained by deep-seated structures of economic dependency (Global Development Studies). I argue that these concepts are not just layered; they are causally interlinked. Ultimately, this theoretical integration culminates in the development of the thesis's central novel concept: ‘peace dependency.’ This term is a direct product of the synthesis of the layered frameworks. It describes a state where the very architecture of a nation's peace process becomes contingent upon the interests and influence of a sub-imperial regional power. ‘Peace dependency’ would be an incomplete concept if viewed only through the lens of peace research or dependency theory alone; it derives its explanatory force precisely from the above-mentioned
55 integration. Therefore, while the thesis introduces its theoretical tools in a layered fashion for the sake of clarity, its central arguments and conclusions are the product of their synthesis. This integrated approach is what makes it possible to offer a comprehensive critique of South–South relations that accounts for power, politics, and economics simultaneously. Then it provides a richer understanding of the case study than any single discipline could offer alone. 3.2 Peace Mediation and Third-Party Involvement In peace and conflict studies, mediation has often be defined as ‘a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law’ (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 8). When categorised according to objectives, there are primarily two types of mediation. One focuses on short-term ceasefire agreements, which are initiated with the obvious aim of easing hostilities and preventing the loss of lives, and the second type focuses on the long-term goals of a peace deal and broader peace processes (DeRouen & Bercovitch 2012: 67). Mediation has been used for centuries to facilitate peace negotiations and find peaceful solutions to conflicts. For instance, in modern times, the United Nations has been active in various mediation processes and continues to consolidate its presence in the international conflict mediation scene.29 Among others, the UN has established a separate unit for mediation, the Mediation Support Unit. Other multilateral organisations, such as the EU and the African Union, also have conflict mediation programmes that facilitate dialogue, mediation, negotiation, and postnegotiation peacebuilding work. Some non-governmental organisations, such as the CMIMartti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation based in Finland or the Swiss Peace Foundation in Switzerland, dedicate most activities to peace mediation, facilitation, and negotiation work. States also practise mediation as part of foreign policy. For decades, countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, and South Africa have been influential players in international mediation (see Figure 4). Apart from economic, diplomatic, and military means, mediation has also been used as a tool for foreign intervention. There is a growing consensus among scholars that mediation has, overall, a positive impact on conflict mitigation and resolution. Even in cases in which peace accords are not signed, mediation opens avenues for ceasefires, and as a result, cases of hostilities and casualties decline and opportunities for peace agreements increase, which ultimately pave the way for a successful conflict settlement. Reflecting on the importance of mediation, Bercovitch (2007: 291) argues that: Success may be achieved if the parties in conflict feel empowered or feel that their concerns were addressed respectfully. There may be no successful outcome (in any sense of the word), but the parties still feel they have achieved success in the process. In the same way, there may be a process of mediation marred by many procedural disagreements and dissatisfactions, but it may lead to a cessation of violence and even a formal agreement. The availability of mediators can also help transform intractable conflicts and reach peace agreements (Bercovitch 2004). Mediators bring unique skills and 29 For more on UN mediation, peacekeeping, and preventive diplomacy initiatives, see Doyle & Sambanis (2006).
62 mediation attempts, whereas ‘representatives of international, regional, or nongovernmental organisations, individuals, and small and distant states, are classified as pure mediators’ (Svensson 2007: 230). Pure mediators often lack the power to influence situations outside the negotiation situation and limit themselves to strategies such as ‘reasoning, unforced persuasion, the control of information and the generation of alternatives’ (Harris & Reilly 1998: 109). Power mediators, however, can exercise a range of other strategies and options, such as ‘incentives and punishments’ to ‘persuade the parties to obey’, to adopt flexibility, and accept a compromise (Harris & Reilly 1998: 109). Saadia Touval (1992, 2003) is a key advocate of the idea that mediation serves as a foreign policy tool, particularly when used by major powers. By situating mediation within a realist structure of international relations, he argues that powerful actors in the international system might use mediation as a foreign policy instrument to promote their self-interest or further their goals. In his view, big powers can use mediation as a tool to serve their defensive as well as expansionist interests (Touval 1992: 232–33). He further argues: Because of their extensive global involvements, many conflicts in various parts of the globe are perceived by the superpowers as affecting their interests. Thus, they will often be motivated to intervene, and may choose mediation as a suitable instrument for intervention. Their political influence, and their vast material capabilities, enable them to apply sticks and carrots, and provide them with important resources for engaging in mediation (p. 233). This discrepancy in the interests of big powers and their rivalries leads to a situation whereby conflicts in regions in which superpowers do not compete are neglected. However, intervention and peacekeeping attempts become increasingly common in areas where superpower influence and rivalry persist (Touval 1992: 247). This notion helps explain the ‘over-mediation’ and ‘under-mediation’ patterns in international conflict mediation (see Greig & Diehl 2012, Svensson & Onken 2015, Lundgren & Svensson 2020). Based on the theoretical observations made above, it is argued that the involvement of third parties, especially regional powers and superpowers, in mediation, negotiation and broader peacebuilding processes might be unavoidable, inevitable or even desirable in some cases. However, mediators' motives and possible vested interests demand careful and critical scrutiny. Particularly, when ‘mediation serves as a means toward achieving certain primary foreign policy goals’ (Touval 2003: 93), mediation’s aftershocks are likely to extend beyond a successful peace deal. A key takeaway from this section is that mediation has been employed as a foreign policy tool by major powers, and they continue to do so. While mediation per se is beneficial for conflict resolution, it has other implications when used, particularly as a foreign policy tool. India, the focus of this study, is a significant power with global ambitions, and it has both officially and unofficially engaged itself in diplomatic interventions and mediated conflicts, particularly in the South Asian region, for many years (see Figure 4, Banerji 2023). Analysing India's involvement in Nepal through the lens of mediation research sheds light on how major powers, particularly rising powers from the Global South, leverage mediation within broader global and regional political and economic contexts.
63 Figure 4 Diplomatic interventions in conflicts and frequent interveners. It covers 438 diplomatic interventions in 68 conflicts, from 1945 to 1999. (Source: Regan et al. 2009:140) Mediation does not take place in isolation; it is deeply shaped by its surrounding contexts. This highlights the need for a broader approach to examining the interconnections between mediation and other influencing factors. For instance, to fully grasp India's role in Nepal's conflict resolution, it is essential to look beyond traditional mediation research. In the following sections, I will do just that—move beyond mediation and introduce other theoretical perspectives that help situate India’s role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition. Given their shared status as Global South countries, I first examine South–South Cooperation as a framework for understanding the relations between India and Nepal. I then introduce other critical theoretical perspectives, such as sub-imperialism and dependency theories, as more suitable frameworks for analysing the complex and often turbulent relationship between the two countries. This approach will help clarify India’s role in Nepal’s peace and political transition and beyond.
64 3.4 South–South Cooperation: An Emancipatory Agenda and an Avenue for Exploitation? The initial aim of this study was to analyse India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition by using the theoretical framework of South–South Cooperation (SSC). In other words, India’s involvement would be examined mainly as an example of contemporary South–South Cooperation. As the research progressed, the theoretical framework was expanded to incorporate more critical theoretical perspectives. Nevertheless, the SSC perspective was also retained due to its relevance and pervasive use in contemporary academic discourses, particularly in global development studies, which I am a student of. In addition, its increasing strategic use by the so-called rising powers of the Global South also necessitates the critical investigation and thorough re-evaluation of SSC. Traditionally envisioned as a practice aimed at consolidating solidarity among countries of the Global South and empowering them through mutual support, SSC has often been heralded for its potential to foster cooperation and development for developing countries like Nepal. However, the critical question regarding South– South Cooperation today revolves around its practical application. In particular, two issues are at the crux of contemporary SSC. First, how powerful states in the Global South use SSC to advance their political and economic agendas, and second, whether countries with vastly different characteristics—such as size, power, population, economy, and military capacity—like Nepal and India—can genuinely engage in cooperation under the SSC framework. The potential of SSC to foster South–South solidarity and promote equitable development stands in contrast to the risk of perpetuating existing hierarchies and inequalities. Therefore, a critical examination of both its opportunities and challenges is essential, which I attempt to do in this section. I start by examining the various arguments for and against SSC. I argue that SSC cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider global political and economic context, which includes power imbalances, conflicts, and existing economic disparities. In other words, SSC should not be regarded as an autonomous or idealised framework detached from external contexts. Therefore, its success or failure is deeply intertwined with the broader global political and economic realities in which it is embedded and conditioned to operate. It is evident that SSC does not seek to radically transform existing global economic and political paradigms. Rather than dismantling the current system and constructing a new one, it aims to find solutions within the prevailing framework. This orientation, however, inherently places significant limitations on its scope. 3.4.1 Historical Aspirations and Contemporary Challenges South–South Cooperation, particularly in the arena of international development, and South–South Relations, usually in the domain of International Relations, broadly indicate the cooperation or relations between countries in the Global South. Such cooperation includes partnerships, collaboration, and coordination in economic, political, social, cultural, and technical sectors. In recent years, SSC has gained significant attention at international development forums, and global development agencies have integrated the concept into their policy frameworks. For instance, the United Nations has established a separate body—the United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation—to promote and facilitate South–South and triangular (North–South–South) cooperation. Since 2004, the UN has also
65 celebrated 16 December as the International Day for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC 2017). Instances of SSC have been seen particularly in the areas of trade and foreign direct investments (FDIs). For instance, South–South trade increased from USD 600 billion in 1995 to USD 5.3 trillion in 2021, and its volume is higher than that of North–South trade (UNCTAD 2023). South–South trade in recent years has not only outperformed both global and North–South trade, but it is also believed to have contributed to reviving the world economy after the 2008 financial crisis (Priyadarshi 2015). SSC has typically flourished in areas of economic cooperation, technology flow, and sharing technical knowledge for capacity-building projects in the developing world. Policy recommendations have been made to broaden the scope of SSC and extend it into areas of peace and security, too (see, for instance, Mathur 2014). The origins of SSC can be traced back to the Bandung Conference of 1955, at which newly independent Asian and African nations convened to discuss cooperative potentials among developing countries. This initiative led to the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, resulting in the creation of the Group of 77 to foster solidarity among the Global South countries. In 1974, the UN General Assembly, in its resolution 3251 (XXIX), approved the establishment of a special unit to ‘promote technical cooperation’ among developing countries (UNOSSC 2017). In the same year, developing countries presented their demand for a New International Economic Order at the United Nations. This period marked the height of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as many developing countries were increasingly fed up with the bipolar global division and their unequal representation in the international system. Despite gaining political independence, they had realised that structures of subjugation persisted, albeit in new forms. The prevailing mindset among developing countries was that the path to overcoming their challenges lay in uniting and acting in solidarity. Thus, the concept of SSC somehow emanated from the NAM’s foundations and the collective aspiration of the developing countries to reshape the global order. The Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, adopted in 1978, further institutionalised SSC. In 1980, the United Nations ultimately established a High-level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, which was renamed in 2004 as the High-level Committee on South–South Cooperation (see Prashad 2007, Besada et al. 2019). Although historically based on mobilising developing country solidarity, SSC has been revitalised by emerging economies primarily to advance their economic and strategic interests. With the political and economic rise of a handful of countries from the Global South, such as China, India, Brazil, and others, crossand subregional cooperation in the Global South began to increase rapidly, particularly since the 1990s (Ekoko & Benn 2002). Though SSC was traditionally centred around anti-colonial political solidarity, technical cooperation, or the advocacy for a New International Economic Order, in later years, the focus shifted to trade and foreign direct investments, infrastructure financing, and development cooperation and aid programmes (Mawdsley 2012). For instance, China adopted the SSC discourse in the early 2000s to differentiate itself from the traditional North–South cooperation model represented by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (Gülseven 2023). In 2015, it also established a separate fund, the Global Development and South– South Cooperation Fund, to finance its SSC projects. Similarly, India has also
66 adopted and leveraged SSC rhetoric extensively. For instance, it hosts annual Voice of Global South summits and has established the India–UN Development Partnership Fund. Through this fund, it has implemented projects in more than 50 developing countries, including in Nepal (UNOSSC 2024). Both China and India heavily frame their foreign aid programmes under South–South Cooperation (SSC) and actively use SSC rhetoric in their foreign policy communication. The ultimate aim of these initiatives, however, appears to be the enhancement of their regional and global influence. Unsurprisingly, South–South Cooperation, both as a theoretical concept and a practical approach, has garnered widespread admiration as well as harsh criticism. The divided arguments often come from two camps. Some view SSC as a noble idea, a new source of hope, and a potential means of fostering self-reliance and independence for the Global South (see, for instance, Mawdsley 2012, Carmody 2013, Cheru 2016, Muhr 2016). Those in the opposing camp see SSC as a set of sugar-coated rhetoric that resembles a new scramble for Africa or thrives on the exploitation of poorer and weaker countries in the Global South (see Southall & Melber 2009, Moyo 2012). For some, SCC amounts to a form of neo-dependency (Aniche 2015), or even sub-imperialism (Bond 2015). There seems to be a clear tendency among those romanticising SSC to view it as a single, homogeneous entity. However, as countries in the Global South vary greatly in size, power, and capabilities, SSC exhibits significant variation. For instance, Nepal’s collaboration with a similarly positioned country, such as Bangladesh or Bhutan, will differ greatly from its relationship with India—a regional power actively involved in the global superpower race. These variations mean that not all forms of SSC are created equal. Scholars who have glorified SSC often overlook these discrepancies and fail to address the vast asymmetries between countries in the Global South. There is a clear need to consider these power dynamics along with the political and economic realities when analysing South– South Cooperation, particularly within regional contexts. South-South Cooperation has its roots in the aspirations of developing countries for a New International Economic Order, their desire to construct and participate in a non-aligned foreign policy movement, and their frustrations with underdevelopment and a persistent state of dependence, even after years of political independence from colonial powers. Today’s SSC, as a phrase, might still carry some connotation of solidarity, development, and progressive cooperation in the Global South. However, it has not certainly evolved into what was once expected. Nearly seven decades since the Bandung Conference, it is evident that South–South Cooperation has fallen short of its initial promises and aspirations. While certain sectors, particularly trade, have thrived under SSC, its original emancipatory vision has eroded significantly. Similarly, the non-alignment agenda that once defined it has largely been abandoned. As Jouili (2021) has argued, contemporary South–South Cooperation has abandoned the emancipatory, sovereignty-driven vision of the Bandung project in favour of a neoliberal paradigm that renders the state apolitical and development challenges merely technical. At the same time, emerging powers, despite their growing institutional roles, primarily seek further integration into global capitalism and perpetuate traditional centre–periphery polarisation (Jouili 2021). Indeed, South–South Cooperation has suffered from a mix of internal disparities (in capacity and institutional frameworks) and external shifts in the global economic and political landscape (particularly the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of neoliberal economic policies). The resulting environment has
67 often favoured more immediate, bilateral, or regionally confined partnerships over the broader, multilateral solidarity that was once envisioned for the Global South. As a result, while some countries in the Global South have ascended the global political and economic ladder by leaps and bounds, for other developing countries, widespread poverty, various forms of inequality, conflict, underdevelopment, and a form of frustration and hopelessness, which were present at the onset of the SSC, are still a stark reality. Rising powers of the Global South, such as India, China, and Brazil, are significant contributors to the disappointing progress of the SSC solidarity agenda. While they continue to use SSC rhetoric more than ever, they have effectively sidelined South–South solidarity and the principles of the NAM. Instead, they appear to be actively engaging in hegemonic competition and mirroring the practices of traditional global powers. As a result, the developing countries that once saw an emancipatory potential in SSC have ended up in a situation in which the South–South rhetoric is increasingly used by powerful countries in the Global South, mainly to advance their own strategic political and economic interests. In this context, two things are clear. First, it is crucial to distinguish between rhetoric and reality. Do countries such as China and India genuinely represent the interests of the developing world, despite their firm assertions to do so? Second, accusations that rising powers in the Global South are increasingly behaving as sub-imperialist actors must be taken seriously and investigated thoroughly. 3.4.2 A Framework for Solidarity or Sub-Imperialism? As argued above, there is a need for a thorough re-evaluation of South–South Cooperation, particularly in relation to its use by the so-called rising powers of the Global South. The accusation that these powers are employing SSC merely as a rhetorical tool to strengthen their own positions in the global power hierarchy is a serious and highly relevant question for this study (see Bond & Garcia 2015, Bond et al. 2021). An equally pertinent question is whether the economic and political ascent of a select few countries in the Global South holds significance for the emancipatory South–South project that many passionately advocate and continue to place their faith in (see, for instance, Mawdsley 2012, Carmody 2013, Cheru 2016, Muhr 2016, Bergamaschi et al. 2017). The extent to which the rising powers of the Global South challenge the dominant political and economic governance systems remains a contentious issue. While some continue to see an emancipatory element in the so-called rise of the rising powers from the Global South, for others, they are strongly positioned or are simply part of the West-centred neoliberal world order (see, for instance, Gray & Murphy 2013, Vanaik 2013, Bond & Garcia 2015, Bond et al. 2021). To begin with, events such as China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 indicated that ‘rather than proposing an alternative to the US-centred Washington Consensus, China may conversely be in the process of internalising the rules of the West’ (Beeson 2013: 188). At the fundamental levels, there appears to be no substantive ideological or intellectual rivalry among major global powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. As Peters (2023) has argued, they all operate within the broader paradigm of capitalism's political-economic structure and the intellectual foundations of secular liberalism. However, each country interprets these concepts differently and seeks to align them with its specific geopolitical interests. Similar arguments can be made about ‘middle power’ countries such as India,
68 Brazil, and South Africa. They all seem very unpredictable in their dealings with the West. Bond & Garcia (2015), for instance, explore the contrarian positions of the BRICS within the world system. They argue that the rise of the ‘Global South (and East)’ has been uncertain, as it is sometimes cooperative with and sometimes antagonistic to the traditional powers. Providing numerous examples to support their claims, they challenge the notion that the BRICS bloc is an anti-imperialist force seeking to, what they call, ‘overturn tables at the proverbial temple’ (p. 1). Furthermore, they demonstrate how the BRICS have cooperated to maintain the neoliberal status quo. Examples include BRICS funding the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and establishing their own New Development Bank, with an IMF-style Contingent Reserve Arrangement. In addition, they also point out the neoliberal collaboration between Washington and the BRICS countries in global climate negotiations. Similarly, in 2016, China initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the world’s second-largest multilateral development bank and international financial institution, whose co-founders included the wealthiest European countries and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Bond & Garcia 2015). Other scholars have made similar observations and have argued that the socalled rise of the Global South, often associated with the BRICS bloc, or IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) is ‘located within the Western global hegemony’ and that their actions are aimed at securing a position at the ‘table of global neoliberal economic governance’ (Gray & Murphy 2013: 185). Vanaik (2013: 195–212) similarly argues that the firm discourse of South–South Cooperation adopted by rising powers in the Global South, like India and China, is merely rhetoric. Their aim, he emphasises, is not to challenge but to secure a stronger position within the US-centred world order. One key characteristic of these rising powers is their unpredictability in dealing with established global powers. Their behaviour is marked by an interplay of cooperation as well as confrontation. While sometimes aligning with global powers on certain issues, when it suits their ambitions, at times, they also assert their independence and challenge the status quo. As Bond & Garcia (2015) have pointed out, there are several examples, for instance, of the BRICS bloc occasionally adopting ‘inter-imperial’ stances against Western powers. Among others, BRICS members have denied demands by Western countries to impose stricter intellectual property controls, especially in patents on medicines. Similarly, some BRICS leaders boldly challenged Washington in the Edward Snowden case. They also implicitly and collectively supported Russia in the conflict over Crimea (Bond & Garcia 2015). Moreover, China and India’s deviation from the Western stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is another recent example (Menon & Rumer 2022). Furthermore, BRICS' efforts to establish their own currency can be seen as a move to create an alternative, non-dollar-based global financial system. To some extent, this reflects their desire to reduce dependency on the USD and reshape the existing international financial order (Liu & Papa 2022). The most important question from this study’s perspective, however, is how these rising powers engage with weaker, less powerful countries in their regions. In other words, how do countries like India and Brazil treat countries like Nepal and Venezuela? The economic and political domination of BRICS’ less-developed neighbours is a growing and legitimate concern. Since the so-called rise of most of these rising powers is largely based on an extractive, high-carbon economic model, their less powerful neighbours are prone to economic and resource exploitation. In addition, increasing evidence shows that minorities and marginalised populations within their own borders also suffer at the hands of their rulers. One example being that
69 the criminalisation of social movements and the oppression of dissidents in the BRICS countries are worse than in the G7 (Bond & Garcia 2015). China, for instance, continue to face international condemnation for its repression of the Uyghur ethnic minorities and those associated with the Free Tibet Movement. India faces equally serious accusations of ‘internal colonialism’ (see Roy 2011, Dey 2019) and has been lashed for its poor treatment of minorities, and for committing serious human rights violations in states like Kashmir and Manipur (see Chapter 8). Some scholars have explored how the geopolitical interests of rising powers are reflected in their foreign policy practices. With a case study of Brazil, Christensen (2013) concludes that Brazil has sought to strengthen its geopolitical strategy in the Southern American region by creating a sphere of influence. Stuenkel (2013) argues that despite being two large democracies, neither India nor Brazil has promoted democracy in their neighbouring countries. Though India prides itself on being the world’s largest democracy, some accuse it of being primarily focused on economic and geopolitical power struggles, which raises serious concerns about its democratic motives and credentials (see Destradi 2010, Roy 2011, Anderson 2014, H.B. Jha 2014, Bhattarai 2018). Though SSC had elements of solidarity, shared identity, and a joint aspiration for emancipation, it has long been influenced by powerful countries like India and China, whose economic and strategic interests significantly shaped its direction. The initial ideals have further eroded over time. This has led to the emergence of more interest-driven engagements and the reinforcement of existing hierarchies rather than challenging them. In other words, the rising powers of the Global South have abandoned South–South solidarity and have instead prioritised their own political and economic ascent. This is evident in two main ways: first, they seem to prefer creating and strengthening spheres of influence in their regions; and second, they act as sub-imperialist agents when necessary or when it benefits their interests. In other words, they act as intermediaries for global powers until they can pursue their own hegemonic ambitions fully. All of this leads to one clear conclusion: the rising powers’ sub-imperial tendencies, their changing posturing and positioning within the global order, and their contradictory actions demand thorough scrutiny. The fate of smaller, weaker nations within their spheres of influence—such as Nepal in this case—also deserves careful consideration. The experiences and challenges of these countries must not be overlooked when analysing rising power behaviour. The concept of sub-imperialism associated with rising powers today is not a new idea. It was introduced in the 1960s and can be found in Brazilian economist and dependency scholar Ruy Mauro Marini’s work on Brazil. Marini developed the concept of sub-imperialism within the context of Marxist dependency scholarship. He used it to explain what he called the Brazilian expansionist policy in Latin America and Africa, which aimed to gain control over resources and raw materials from weaker countries on both continents (see Marini 1965, 1972). Sub-imperialism scholarship has somehow experienced a resurgence again, particularly in light of the actions, questions, and uncertainties surrounding the so-called rising powers. This resurgence is facilitated by growing scholarly interest in how regional powers mediate and extend hegemonic influence within an evolving multipolar world order, particularly amid the reconfiguration of global capitalism (economic nationalism, protectionism, trade wars, data and platform capitalism) and the decline of unipolar US dominance. Scholars such as Elif Çağlı, Adrián Sotelo Valencia, Claudio Katz, Patrick Bond, and Ana Garcia have contributed to the contemporary literature on sub-imperialism. Marini proposed sub-imperialism not as a generic term for any powerful
70 regional state but as a specific concept derived from his Marxist analysis of dependency. He defined sub-imperialism as the form which dependent capitalism assumes upon reaching the stage of monopolies and finance capital (Marini 1972). The concept is built on a core internal contradiction. In a dependent economy, value is constantly transferred to the imperialist centre through mechanisms like unequal exchange. To counteract this drain and maintain profit rates, the peripheral bourgeoisie is compelled to resort to the super-exploitation of its domestic labour force. However, this very super-exploitation—by depressing wages below the cost of reproduction—restricts the size and purchasing power of the internal market, especially for durable goods produced by the monopoly sector. This creates a realisation crisis: capital cannot find sufficient profitable outlets at home. This internal contradiction causes an expansionist drive. The sub-imperialist state and its monopoly capital are forced to seek external markets for their goods and capital, as well as cheaper access to raw materials and labour. This expansion is typically directed at the sub-imperial power's immediate geographic region, its ‘hinterland’. This expansion is not a break from imperialism but a new form of articulation with it. Marini described Brazil's relationship with the United States not as one of simple submission, but as a loyal ‘bargain’ or ‘antagonistic cooperation’ (Marini 1972). The sub-imperial power carves out a sphere of regional hegemony, acting as a junior partner or regional manager for the global imperialist system. It helps maintain order and facilitate accumulation in its region, serving both its own expansionist needs and the broader interests of global capital. In its simplest form, sub-imperialism characterises a scenario in which a nation or a group of nations, though not imperialist powers themselves, serve as intermediaries for imperialist powers within their regions. They tend to leverage their influence to extract resources, control markets, and sway political dynamics in other countries, often working alongside major global powers. In that sense, subimperialism can be understood as a parallel and secondary form of contemporary imperialism (Katz 2021). Katz, who emphasises the military component of imperialism, argues that the entire imperial system, which guarantees the transfer of value from periphery to core, is ultimately undergirded by a ‘coercive pillar’, the use or threat of military force. While the US and its NATO allies form the primary axis of this military power, sub-imperial powers participate in this system at a regional level. Katz's contribution updates the concept of sub-imperialism by adding an explicit geopolitical-military dimension. A sub-imperial power is not just an economic expander; it is also a regional gendarme. As is clear in India’s sub-imperialism in Nepal, explained in the latter chapters, it uses its military and security apparatus—through arms sales, training, joint exercises, and direct intervention—to project power, secure its economic interests, and maintain order within its sphere of influence. In other words, subempires engage in economic and political exploitation of their regions, much like traditional imperialists, but their influence is geographically limited (see, for instance, Väyrynen & Herrera 1975, Çağlı 2009, Bond 2015, Valencia 2017, Bond et al. 2021, Katz 2021). There is growing evidence that the emerging powers from the Global South, especially the BRICS nations, have demonstrated sub-imperialist behaviours and contributed to the maintenance of global hegemony and neoliberal regimes. They are engaged in capital accumulation, resource extraction, and market expansion in ways that reinforce existing power structures rather than challenge them. While they may assist, accommodate, and cooperate with existing global hegemons, their
71 ultimate ambition, however, seems to be to ascend the global power hierarchy and establish their own hegemony. Arguing that the BRICS follow colonial and neo-colonial tracks, Bond (2015) elaborates on different facets of modern-day sub-imperialism. According to him, contemporary sub-imperialism includes semi-peripheral accumulation, hinterland exploitation, internal modes of super-exploitation, and the reproduction of a world system based on neoliberalism and military aggression. He identifies three additional roles of sub-imperialist regimes. The first additional role, he argues, is ensuring regional geopolitical stability in volatile areas. That is, playing the role of a regional ‘deputy sheriff’ and engaging in surplus transfers from the hinterland to the sub-imperialist capital city, and often from there to the imperialist headquarters. These are primarily located in advanced capitalist states, particularly the United States and other Global North economies, where major financial institutions, multinational corporations, and international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank are headquartered. Second, a sub-imperialist regime also advances the broader agenda of globalised neoliberalism. This includes launching institutions that may rhetorically oppose neoliberalism but, in practice, aim to do the opposite. Third, sub-imperialist regimes engage in super-exploitative practices within their hinterlands, following colonial and neo-colonial tracks. Proposing South Africa as an example, Bond (2015) argues that the core imperatives of sub-imperialism remain the maintenance of a liberal regime that permits the free flow of labour and capital and the maintenance of a superior security capability able to project into its region. According to him, South Africa acts as a regional facilitator of global capitalism. Its role is to keep African economies open to Western investment while suppressing alternative economic models. It enforces neoliberal policies from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, integrating Africa into the global system in ways that benefit Western interests, including financial flows, trade routes, and structural adjustments. Its predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system, a policy of spheres of interest, and war (Bond 2015). Marini and Bond both use the concept of sub-imperialism to critique how certain semi-peripheral states assert dominance within their regions while remaining subordinate to core capitalist powers. Marini developed the concept in the 1970s within the framework of Marxist dependency theory, using Brazil as an example of a country that, while dependent on US imperialism, also played a regional imperialist role by exporting capital and dominating weaker neighbouring economies. His analysis emphasised the structural contradictions of peripheral capitalism and the reproduction of imperialist dynamics within the Global South. Patrick Bond, writing in the post-apartheid and neoliberal era, builds on and extends Marini’s framework to analyse South Africa’s role in southern Africa. Bond’s approach is grounded in critical political economy and social justice activism, and often emphasises how South Africa, under the banner of South–South Cooperation, advances the interests of Western capital through regional dominance, military interventions, and neoliberal policy export. While both theorists agree that sub-imperial powers act as intermediaries in global capitalism, Bond focuses more on neoliberal governance and global financial structures, whereas Marini centres on structural dependency and class contradictions within capitalist development. Katz’s work also aligns with Bond’s critique of neoliberal South–South relations, particularly in how states like South Africa operate sub-imperially within their regions. However, Katz is less focused on activist frameworks and more on
78 The core-periphery relations proposed by the world-systems approach expand beyond national boundaries and exceed the already-proposed North–South dichotomy. Similarly, it is entirely possible to have all three capitalist zones—core, semi-periphery, and periphery—within a single country or region. This also applies to the core-periphery relations among countries in the Global South. This starting point is especially relevant and useful for this study, as I aim to examine and analyse the dependency patterns that characterise India–Nepal relations—two countries in the Global South with some significant similarities, but also vast differences. Dependency and world-systems approaches have also faced substantial criticism. Over the years, the unprecedented upheavals in the global political landscape have significantly influenced dependency theory and world-systems approaches. As Sanchéz (2003: 39) puts it, once influential across multiple disciplines and valued beyond academia, dependency ideas have fallen out of fashion and have been reduced to footnote status. However, the so-called ‘demise of dependency’ was not sudden. Dependency thoughts suffered severe theoretical critiques from the developmentalist, structuralist, and mainstream economic fronts. Additionally, the lack of ‘verifiability’ in dependency ideas—being vague and difficult to test—raised questions about their real-life usefulness. As Stallings (1992: 48) sums up, ‘the combination of intellectual critiques and reinforcing international trends had a devastating effect on dependency analysis’. One of the main factors that made dependency theories nearly obsolete was their insistence that development and progress within the global capitalist system were impossible. However, these claims appeared to be contradicted by the reality on the ground. For instance, as Sanchéz (2003: 39) elaborates: The evolution of at least four economies—South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong— showed two things radically at odds with dependency tenets: first, that attaining economic progress is very much possible; and second, that it is feasible via enhanced integration with the world economy. In addition to these challenges, the fall of socialist/communist regimes worldwide served as ‘the nail in the coffin for the dependency movement’ (Sanchéz 2003: 39). Similarly, dependency ideas were attacked for their preoccupation with the ills of capitalism while neglecting domestic forces of development—local actors, their agency, and their sphere of choices, and influence. Arguably, dependency theory’s portrayal of local actors reduced them to look like nothing more than pawns of external forces (Smith 1979: 257–58). Some critics have pointed out that countries like India appeared to have even benefitted from colonialism, particularly in terms of the expansion of their transportation and communication systems (see Manning 1974, Goldthorpe 1975). In contrast, other countries, such as Nepal or Ethiopia, which were never colonised and had remained somewhat disconnected from global capitalism, remained poorer and less developed38. As neoliberalism ascended to become the new theory of choice among mainstream economics scholars, underdevelopment in developing countries was 38 The absence of formal colonisation did not mean that these countries were free from colonial influence. For instance, Nepal was never formally colonised, but it was not immune to colonial influence, particularly from the British Empire. Nepal was obliged to provide Gurkha soldiers for British military service, and its economy and external relations were largely shaped by British interests. Nepal's foreign policy was also aligned with British objectives. This lack of formal colonisation allowed Britain to reap many of the benefits typically associated with colonial rule—such as access to resources and manpower—without the administrative burdens of direct control (see Mulmi 2017).
79 seen not so much as a centre–periphery problem. Instead, it was associated with a range of other issues, such as corruption in governments in the Global South, ethnic conflict, civil wars, landlocked geographical location, lack of inclusive institutions, cultural issues, and so forth (see, for instance, Collier 2008, Robinson & Acemoglu 2012).39 The connection between development aid and the dependency discourse was also weakened, as influential neoliberal economists such as Jeffrey Sachs began to argue that many developing countries had benefited from aid programmes run by international aid agencies or Western governments. Unlike dependency scholars, neoliberal economists suggested that development aid could be an effective mechanism for eliminating poverty and underdevelopment from the developing world (see, for instance, Sachs 2005). Against this backdrop, the relevance of dependency theory and world-systems approaches has been widely debated. On one hand, it seems that they are undoubtedly facing a crisis, challenged by shifts in academic focus and their dismal performance in predicting plausible outcomes. Yet, on the other hand, they are also experiencing a resurgence, facilitated by recent changes and uncertainties in the global landscape. The expansion of global capitalism, along with the rise of powerful multinational corporations and the increasing economic dominance of a few key players, has renewed interest in dependency perspectives. For instance, modern global supply chains, finance, and technology illustrate contemporary dependencies: developing countries typically provide low-value labour or raw inputs while core countries control innovation, finance, and market systems. Even with globalisation and the rise of emerging economies (such as the BRICS), dependency theory’s lens exposes how dominant countries maintain power— sometimes shifting the dynamics but not the fundamental structures of dependency. While some have seemed to enjoy the limited respite offered by postcolonial thoughts,40 many dependency scholars and others, nonetheless, continue to believe that dependency theory and world-system approaches are just as relevant today, especially when examining power relations in the 21st century and analysing the pressing issues crippling modern corporate capitalism.41 3.5.1 A Contemporary Defence of Dependency Ideas Some criticisms of dependency theory stem from the confusion surrounding its understanding and the various forms and scope it encompasses. Sanchéz (2003), for instance, argues that the name itself is deceiving as dependency theory is not a 39 Collier (2008), for instance, argues that poverty and underdevelopment cannot be reduced to a history of exploitation but can be linked to civil wars, ethnic tensions, and unfavourable geography. Similarly, Robinson & Acemoglu (2012) argue that the lack of inclusive institutions also hinders prosperity and development. 40 Writings of scholars such as Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi K. Bhabha offer some classic readings on postcolonial theory. See, for instance, O’Hanlon & Washbrook (1992), Dirlik (1994), Ahmad (1997), and Chibber (2014) for an extensive and critical review of postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory has been criticised primarily for its shallow focus, if at all, on the role of capitalism and its insufficient attention to socioeconomic inequality and inconsistencies created by capitalist modernity. In short, postcolonial theory ‘approaches capitalism epistemologically,’ whereas, for dependency theory, ‘capital is foundational or ontological’ (Kapoor 2002: 658). In addition, scholars such as Chibber (2014) criticise postcolonial theory for its portrayal of cultures as fixed and static, its assumptions that the gap between the East and the West is unbridgeable—thereby denying people’s ‘universal aspirations—and for labelling all Enlightenment values as Eurocentric. 41 In a 2017 edition of Ideas for Development (eds. Kvangraven, Styve, Kufakurinani, & Santanta), dependency scholars such as Samir Amin, Adebayo O. Olukoshi, Miguel Angel Centeno, and Matías Vernengo renew their faith in dependency ideas and their relevance in the 21st century.
80 theory per se, but an approach to the study of underdevelopment. Understanding dependency as an approach instead of a theory omits the need to test and verify it for empirical validity. Sanchéz further argues that the emergence of ‘flawed, prejudiced, or incomplete interpretations’ of dependency ideas might have been aggravated by the fact that scholars in the ‘centre’ predominately read only the dependency literature translated into English, leaving behind a lot of countryspecific cases on the ‘domestic structure of dependence’ (p. 33). Critics of dependency and world-systems approaches often cite examples of East Asian economies, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, to claim that rapid economic growth and development were possible while still being connected to the core. However, other scholars have questioned the accuracy of these claims. Samir Amin, a renowned dependency scholar, for instance, argues that the East Asian countries in question were, in fact, ‘allowed’ to move from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core’ due to geostrategic reasons, mainly to avert the threat of China and North Korea (in Kvangraven 2017: 16). Similarly, the works of scholars like Petras & Hui (1991) and Medeiros (2004) illustrate how the United States practised 'development by invitation' by opening markets for certain East Asian countries while restricting access to other developing countries. Even when US concessions were not offered, such as in China, the road to development was reached with a combination of ‘central planning’ and ‘selective opening’ (Olukoshi, in Styve 2017: 24). Before concluding whether dependency analysis is relevant in the 21st century, it is crucial to consider contemporary global political and economic contexts. Despite progress made in a handful of countries in the Global South, it is no secret that old lines of inequality and unequal power relations persist and prevail in various forms. Equally, ‘the fact that some countries seem to be breaking out of the dependency trap does not mean that a trap never existed’ (Glennie & Hassanaien 2012). It is also important to emphasise that the dependency relationships of the 21st century may look quite different from those of the past. Referring to the proliferation of multinational corporations and the pervasive corporate capitalism, Strange (1994: 215), for instance, argues that ‘opting out of the world market economy is no longer an option’ and ‘that is what dependency means today’. Contrary to the arguments made by proponents of globalisation, the benefits of globalisation have not been distributed equally, and it has not been suitable for all. As Samir Amin argues, globalisation has been polarising, and the centres have shaped it in their favour (in Kvangraven 2017: 14). Farny (2016) makes similar remarks, arguing that global disparity along the North–South divide continues, and today’s dependency relations persist through trade deals, foreign direct investment, and development aid. Apart from the clear differences in income levels and living standards between developed and developing countries, capital flows from the periphery to the semi-periphery and ultimately to the core countries, facilitated by multinational corporations. Similarly, poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia is still pervasive. Rich countries at the ‘core’ continue to hold more power in international financial institutions, and mechanisms such as the Doha round of negotiations, which would have benefitted developing countries had it been successful, continue to falter. The developed world, in fact, ‘has used much political muscle in making sure the door to their agricultural markets remains shut’ (Sanchéz 2003: 45–46). What is even more concerning is the replication of dependency relations at multiple levels. As already mentioned, Western powers continue to maintain
81 renewed forms of dependency globally. At the same time, the rising powers of the Global South—or those acting as sub-empires—have recreated and reinforced the same patterns within their spheres of influence. It is also no secret that the world is not progressing towards greater equality; instead, the gap between the richest and the poorest continues to widen. The rise of tech giants as new agents of cross-border capital accumulation further exacerbates these disparities. This shows that dependency and world-systems approaches are becoming increasingly important for understanding contemporary global issues and how global corporate capitalism operates. As already mentioned, the so-called rise42 of a few countries in the Global South, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, arguably from the semi-periphery towards the ‘core’, has not eliminated, but created new and more aggressive forms of dependency relations within the Global South. As analysed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this thesis, the dependency patterns between two unequal countries in the contemporary Global South—examined here through the case of India and Nepal— are shaped by geopolitical, economic, and resource interests. Often collectively expressed in the form of sub-imperialism, capital accumulation and surplus transfers are central to these unequal co-existences. Other researchers have identified similar patterns elsewhere. Taylor (2016: 8), for instance, notes that the widespread hype claiming the rise of Africa is a myth, as the so-called rise is ‘based on an intensification of resource extraction whilst dependency deepens, inequality increases, and de-industrialisation continues apace’. In an analysis of Sino–Latin America trade relations, Skira (2007: 18) points out that while Latin America exported mainly raw materials and primary products to China, its imports from China were primarily manufactured goods. Noting that around 76% of Latin American countries’ exports to China constituted primary commodities, she concludes that ‘Sino–Latin American trade relations resemble in some ways the centre–periphery relationships outlined by Prebisch’ (p. 18). This is a clear indication that dependency thoughts are still relevant today and can be used for ‘making sense of global inequalities in today’s globalised world’ (Farny 2016). Dependency thoughts are also helpful in recognising ‘structural imbalances and causes of underdevelopment’ in the contemporary world (Radovanovic 2012: 9). This is even more relevant, particularly when dependency deniers ‘offer no tangible exit from underdevelopment...other than a commitment to a policy and politics of mimicry’ (Olukoshi in Styve 2017). However, understanding the diversity of dependency as an approach is essential. When understood as an approach—despite any shortcomings inherent in the theory—it remains useful as a conceptual tool for analysing the past and the present. As a concluding remark to this section, it is worth highlighting that dependency ideas can certainly be useful not only in analysing underdevelopment—as had been the case traditionally—but also to make sense of contemporary international relations, patterns of international trade, investment, development aid, and, more recently, the behaviour of the so-called rising powers of the Global South. No matter how they are presented or redefined, core–periphery relations continue to exist in various forms and have expanded from North–South to South–South levels. This has resulted in new patterns of dependency and exploitation that were once unimaginable, especially when a large group of developing countries had collectively envisioned creating a new international economic order and leading 42 The ‘rise’ of the Global South has been a contested issue in itself, as countries like India and China have held global power not only today but also centuries ago (see, for instance, Tellis & Mirski 2013).
82 their collective political and economic emancipation. In short, today’s global realities necessitate a fresh theoretical inquiry, and dependency theories offer an excellent starting point. As evident in subsequent chapters, I use the dependency framework, with a particular emphasis on sub-imperialism, to analyse India’s actions in Nepal and carry out a broader evaluation of India–Nepal relations. In other words, dependency theories are not obsolete, and their theoretical relevance continues to endure. They can help us comprehend core–periphery relations of the past but also of today. 3.6 Chapter Summary: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives This chapter outlines the theoretical framework used in this study. The framework synthesises various theoretical perspectives later used to analyse India's involvement in Nepal's peace process and political transition. By incorporating theories of conflict mediation, models of rising power behaviour, and worldsystems and dependency analysis, this chapter constructed a theoretical framework suitable for analysing India’s engagement in Nepal and re-evaluating contemporary India–Nepal relations. The first section introduced theoretical concepts related to peace mediation, particularly ripeness theory, which identifies optimal moments for conflict resolution. Mediation is presented as a tool for resolving conflicts, and an overview of the current global mediation landscape is offered. Drawing on works of scholars like Saadia Touval, concepts of ‘power mediation’ and ‘pure mediation’ are explored. Mediation as a foreign policy tool is thoroughly discussed, acknowledging that while ‘power mediators’ may broker peace agreements, their vested interests and post-agreement actions warrant critical examination. The chapter then moved on to the discussion of South–South Cooperation, highlighting differing scholarly views. Some see SSC as an emancipatory concept, while for others, it is a form of exploitation, neocolonialism, or even sub-imperialism. After discussing the sub-imperialist tendencies of the so-called rising powers of the Global South, I argue that SSC should be evaluated within the broader context of global political and economic processes rather than as a standalone innovation or a benevolent panacea. The final section elaborated on dependency and worldsystems theories. Despite their current academic unpopularity, it is argued that dependency and world-systems theories are experiencing a resurgence for a reason and appear to be incredibly useful for analysing increasingly complex global political and economic relations of our time.
83 4. The Tumultuous Path to Peace in Nepal: A Literature Review The Nepali peace process, which culminated in 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), had a complicated past. Previous attempts for peace bore no fruit, as the talks repeatedly stalled and failed. The attempts to find a military solution to the conflict ultimately backfired for King Gyanendra, who lost his throne and became the last king of the 240-year-old Shah dynasty. The 2006 peace deal promised a new and better Nepal for its citizens; however, amid postconflict political wrangling, it took another nine years merely to promulgate a new constitution. As the political transition deepened, India's involvement in Nepal's post-conflict peace and transitional political processes became a pressing issue. Since this study focuses on the same topic, this chapter provides insight into the research context and reviews the relevant literature. In the first section, I briefly examine Nepal’s modern history, even though a thorough analysis of the historical past is beyond the scope of this thesis. I offer this brief voyage into history to demonstrate how Nepal has historically undergone a painful transformation. Nepal’s evolution towards what one might now call a participatory and inclusive democracy has not been easy. Apart from its own domestic hurdles, India’s presence and influence in Nepal throughout its modern history has been consistent, assertive, and sometimes even ruthless. Whenever one attempts to investigate, analyse, or critically assess India–Nepal relations, a brief review of the historical context is both necessary and helpful. That is what I aim to do in the first part of this chapter. In the second part of this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the Maoist armed insurgency (1996–2006) and its impact on Nepali society. I discuss the origins and progress of the insurgency and assess the causes and consequences of the conflict. Again, the aim is not to offer an exhaustive analysis of the conflict—other scholars have already done that43—but to offer some historical and geopolitical context of the armed conflict. In terms of its size and the damage it caused, the Maoist armed insurgency will be remembered as one of the most violent episodes in Nepal's modern history. The insurgency claimed more than 17,000 lives, left many wounded and traumatised, and severely impacted Nepal’s economy. At the same time, it shook the foundations of Nepali state structures, transformed the political psyche of ordinary Nepalis, and triggered a radical paradigm shift in Nepal’s modern political landscape. In the third section, I provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature, focusing specifically on India's role in Nepal’s peace process and political transition. I conclude the chapter by highlighting five significant issues that earlier studies have overlooked, thus justifying the need for this research. 43 For a detailed understanding of the Maoist insurgency, its origin, ideological bases, development, and impacts on Nepali society, see, for instance, Karki & Seddon (2003), Thapa & Sijapati (2004), Hutt (2004), Onesto (2005), Lawoti & Pahari (2009), and Adhikari (2014).
84 4.1 A Brief History of Modern Nepal and the India Factor The formation of modern Nepal dates back to the 18th century. Before the 18th century, a significant part of current Nepal comprised negligible states and territories—known as Baise and Chaubise states—each controlled by its own king (Sharma 2004: 10). In 1743, Prithvi Narayan Shah (hereafter P. N. Shah), a young king from a tiny principality known as Gorkha, began to expand his kingdom by attacking and annexing other tiny states.44 Shah’s first attack was on Nuwakot, where his father, Nara Bhupal Shah,45 had been defeated in 1736 (Northey & Morris 1928: 30–31). In 1768, the Gorkha soldiers invaded the Kathmandu valley (Waller 2004: 171), and by 1775, the passing year of P. N. Shah, the annexation process had reached up to eastern Nepal and Sikkim (Whelpton 1997). P. N. Shah played a significant role in the formation of the modern Nepali state. He is also remembered for his contribution to shaping Nepal's foreign policy. Before his death, he reportedly summoned notable noblemen, priests and his close aides known as bhardars to his side and offered a range of advice which was later documented and published as the Divyopadesh.46 As evident in his teachings, Shah believed that Nepal’s foreign policy should be based on non-alignment and neutrality, which many scholars argue still guide Nepal’s foreign policy (see, for instance, Baral 2018, Khanal 2019). Shah’s concerns about the presence of the East India Company and its dominance in India and the possibility of its eventual trespassing into Nepal are reflected in his teachings. In the Divyopadesh, he says: This state (Nepal) is like a yam (gourd) between two stones. Keep a strong friendship with the Emperor of China; one has to maintain a friendship with the Emperor of the Sea (English Emperor) in the south. But he is very clever. He is occupying Hindustan. He is eyeing the plane area (of Nepal also). When Hindustani (Indian) people will wake up (not tolerate them), he may find it difficult to stay there. He might have been searching for a safe fort and there is every possibility that he may come here at any day (P.N. Shah, 1774, Divyopadesh, translation Nepal Law Commission 2018: 9). Nonetheless, P.N. Shah’s guidance to his successors was that Nepal should refrain from carrying out offensive acts against the ‘English Emperor’ and that any fighting against the British should be defensive (Shaha 1978: 104). His legacy guided Nepal’s foreign policy for a long time. For many years, Nepal followed a policy of physical 44 There is no consensus on whether P.N. Shah’s policy of military conquest and annexation of other principalities was merely an expansionist project or an attempt to reunify Nepal, which was fragmented into small principalities. Some scholars have argued that Nepal was already as big as present-day Nepal during the Licchavi period and that P.N. Shah’s motive was to reunify the old Nepal (see, for instance, Acharya 2005). Others argue that P.N. Shah was motivated by an expansionist urge and the desire to become a king of a big state, and reunifying the old Nepal was not his primary interest. Some also suggest that the formation of modern Nepal was driven by P.N. Shah’s realisation that unless there was a relatively bigger and stronger state, the British India/East India Company would gobble up small principalities in the south and China in the north. 45 Historical accounts show that Nara Bhupal wanted to expand his kingdom by annexing Nuwakot and other principalities in the vicinity. However, after being faced with a humiliating defeat in Nuwakot, he abandoned his expansionist ambition and instead decided to live the life of a religious devotee. After Nara Bhupal died in 1742, Prithvi Narayan ascended to the throne at age 20 and immediately started making plans for continuing his father’s dream, i.e., to expand the Kingdom of Gorkha. See, for instance, Whelpton (2005) for a detailed overview of Nepal’s pre-modern and modern history. 46 The English translation of the word Divyopadesh, provided by The Nepal Law Commission, is ‘celestial teaching.’ Some authors have also translated it into English as ‘divine teaching’ or ‘divine counsel’. P.N. Shah delivered these teachings as pravachana (discourses) reportedly during the last week of December 1774. Teachings in Diyvopadesh include a wide range of subjects, including foreign policy, religion, economic practices, and defence policies. For more information, see, for instance, Acharya & Yogi (2013), and for the English translation of the document, see Nepal Law Commission (2018).
85 isolation as a survival strategy (Hasrat 1970). This meant the exclusion of foreigners and foreign powers (Atique 1983: 97). To compensate for the losses of this ‘isolationist’ strategy, self-determination and self-reliance were promoted, which, according to Kafle (2008: 139), can be considered a postcolonial response of Nepal. At least in principle, ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-alignment’ have been important pillars of Nepal’s foreign policy, and they continue to remain so.47 Among other reasons, the geo-strategic location of Nepal—the fact that it is sandwiched between two giant Asian powers, India and China—and continuous political instability in the country have led Nepal to adopt such policies (Baral 2018: 25). Nepal's official texts on foreign policy have consistently emphasised ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-alignment’ as key principles. However, in practice, Nepal's proximity to India and India’s influence in Nepal have always been significant. I will briefly explore this issue in this chapter and discuss it in detail in later chapters. After P. N. Shah’s death, his successors continued the expansion project under the leadership of his younger son, Bahadur Shah. By 1815, the Kingdom of Nepal extended to the North Indian territories of Kumaon and Garwal in the west and Sikkim in the east (Landon 1928: 67–69, Rose & Scholz 1980, Pradhan 2009). Nepal’s relations with Tibet escalated over trade routes and the quality of copper coins supplied from Nepal. As a result, in 1788, Nepal invaded Tibet (Upadhya 2012: 22–23). A series of skirmishes continued between the two countries, and Tibet sought help from China48 to quell Nepali aggression. China came to Tibet’s rescue and provided massive military support. In 1792, the Treaty of Betrawati was signed, and Nepali forces retreated from Tibet (Landon 1928, Upadhya 2012: 26). In the south, Nepal was at odds with the East India Company as the dispute over controlling states that bordered Nepal mounted. The tussle between the two led to the Anglo–Nepali War (1815–16), in which both parties bore heavy losses. The war ended with the Sugauli Treaty, due to which Nepal lost more than one-third of its territories to the British East India Company (see Rose 1971). The formation of a unified Nepali state and its expansion did not bring about positive changes in the lives of the Nepali people. The Shah kings preferred Kathmandu over Gorkha as Nepal's capital; thus, Kathmandu became the new power centre of Nepal. The new and 'unified' Nepal did not move towards inclusivity, social progress, or development, but was characterised by widespread corruption, nepotism, and the power struggles of a handful of Kathmandu-based elites that captured the entire state mechanism for their personal benefit. Basnett (2009: 14) notes that the post-unification period marked ‘the beginning of unequal power imbalance in the country whereby control over land and political power was monopolised by a fragmented elite, centralised by the state’. 47 As of September 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal states that the following principles guide Nepal's foreign policy: 1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2. Noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, 3. Respect for mutual equality, 4. Non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes, 5. Cooperation for mutual benefit, 6. Abiding faith in the Charter of the United Nations, 7. Value of world peace (MOFAN 2024). 48 Tibet was annexed by China in 1951, and until then, it functioned as an independent state. However, whether Tibet was independent is debated, as the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in exile had their own versions of its independent status before 1951. For more on this, see, for instance, Goldstein & Rimpoche (1989).
86 4.1.1 The Rana Rule (1846–1951) After the unification of Nepal in 1768, the beginning of the Rana oligarchy in 1846 is perhaps the most significant turning point in Nepal's history. In 1846, Jung Bahadur Kunwar49, a royal bodyguard, and his brothers massacred around 29 statesmen in the notorious Kot Massacre50 and got themselves high-ranking administrative and military posts. In the aftermath of the Kot Massacre, Jung Bahadur became Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the army. All other high-ranking and influential posts went to his brothers and cousins (Joshi & Rose 1966: 29–31). Jung Bahadur orchestrated yet another massacre, the Bhandarkhal Massacre51, and further consolidated his power. The position of Prime Minister became hereditary and was passed on to his descendants. The Shah kings became powerless figureheads, with their movements and daily activities closely monitored and controlled by the Ranas. Jung Bahadur’s decisions prevailed in both domestic and international affairs. By 1872, he had successfully gained recognition for his regime from Nepal's two major neighbouring powers, India and China (Pandey 1973: 61). The Rana oligarchy lasted for 104 years and is considered the darkest period in Nepal’s history. The entire state apparatus was exploited for the benefit of the Ranas for over a century. The grievances of ordinary Nepalis went unheard and neglected. It is estimated that the Rana Prime Ministers used anywhere between 25% to 50% of total state revenue for personal benefits (Kumar 1967). The Rana oligarchy ruled by suppressing and systematically subjugating ordinary Nepalis, treating the country as if it were their private enterprise. Unsurprisingly, many of Nepal’s resources were used for their private use. For instance, by 1950, merely three prominent Rana families had accumulated 227,105 acres of land—approximately 42.5% of the total cultivated Birta land in the plains of Nepal (Regmi 1971). Jung Bahadur and his successors exploited the rifts and divisions among the monarchical factions to consolidate power for themselves. In addition, Jung Bahadur consolidated his grip on power and promoted his image as an absolute authority by waging war on Tibet52 in 1855 (Pandey 1973: 57–58) and successfully interpreting its outcome in his favour. In addition, he sought affinity with the British rulers in India while neglecting China, a declining power at that time (Lohani 2011: 3). In 1857, as uprisings against the rule of the British East India Company in India broke out, Jung Bahadur and his brother, General Dhir Shamsher, led Nepali troops and went to India to help the British rulers in 49 Jung Bahadur Kunwar, who later secured the title of Rana, came from a prominent family in Gorkha. Historical accounts show that he was an ambitious, shrewd and ruthless man who did not hesitate to murder even his relatives for power. For an elaborate analysis of how Jung Bahadur rose to prominence, see, for instance, Pandey (1973) and Adhikari (1984). 50 The Kot Massacre occurred in 1856 and is considered to be one of the bloodiest massacres in Nepal’s history. After Queen Rajya Laxmi’s close confidant and rumoured lover, Gagan Singh, was mysteriously killed, a high-profile meeting of royal counsels was organised at the Kot to hunt for his killer. As chaos escalated, Jung Bahadur and his brothers ran a killing spree. That day, more than 30 high-ranking personalities were killed, including Prime Minister Fateh Jung Shah, several ministers, and some top army personnel. For more on the Kot massacre, see, for instance, Vaidya (2000). 51 The Bhandarkhal massacre took place in 1806, in which more than 93 high-profile people were killed at the Hanuman Dhoka palace’s Bhandarkhal garden. For more, see, for instance, Pandey (1973) or Karmacharya (2005). 52 The war concluded with the Treaty of Thapathali (1856), under which Nepal would be responsible if there had been any external attack on Tibet (Sahu 2015: 198). The war apparently ended due to mutual exhaustion, but Jung Bahadur was successful in projecting the end of the war as Nepal's victory, thus further consolidating his political image in Nepal.
87 suppressing the rebellion (Hibbert 1978: 358, Tyagi 1974: 80–81). They successfully sabotaged the uprisings in India, and the jubilant British East India Company rewarded Jung Bahadur by returning a part of the land53 that Nepal had ceded to British India after the Anglo–Nepalese War. This success further solidified Jung Bahadur's absolute authority in Nepal. There was no one to challenge his power, and peace reigned in the country. However, ‘that was the peace of the grave’ (Pandey 1973: 59–60). The Rana rulers focused on pleasing the rulers of India and kept Nepal in complete darkness for over a century. They crippled and stagnated Nepal's economy and kept the institution of monarchy within the four walls of the royal palace. Even though the British East India Company did not attempt to colonise Nepal after the Anglo–Nepalese War, it considered Nepal a buffer state against China and the USSR and integrated Nepal into its security parameters (Adhikari et al. 2013: 4). As a legacy from their colonial rulers, post-colonial Indian rulers continued this practice. Nepal’s dependence on British India grew substantially during the Rana rule. Nepali youths started to be recruited as Gurkha soldiers in the British–India army. Nepal relied heavily on British India, among others, for foreign trade and international travel (Bhattarai 2005: 20). All these factors, along with the eventual fall of the British Raj in India in 1947, inspired a democratic movement in Nepal. This also led to India’s increased engagement in Nepal, which I will briefly discuss in the next section. 4.1.2 Dawn of Democracy (1950–1960) In 1936, a small group of Nepali activists formed a political group named Praja Parishad54 with the aim of plotting a revolution and overthrowing the Ranas. However, in 1943, a plan to assassinate leading members of the Rana regime was exposed. As a result, members of the Parishad were arrested and executed, with their bodies displayed publicly to deter dissent. This act backfired on the regime, and dissatisfaction against the Ranas grew (Brown 2002: 16). Nepalis who were living in exile in India participated in the Indian struggle for independence, while aspiring to liberate Nepal from the Ranas. For many Nepali political activists, Indian leaders fighting against the Raj were role models. The British Raj had been crucial for the sustenance of the Rana regime in Nepal (Basnett 2009: 15), and the fall of the Raj was detrimental to the survival of the Ranas in Nepal. Nepali intellectuals in exile in India and a group of disgruntled Ranas—who had been sidelined within the Rana hierarchy—were actively involved in waging an anti-Rana movement. The anti-Rana movement gained momentum in 1947 when the Nepali National Congress (NNC) party was established in India under the leadership of B.P. Koirala55 (Rose 1971: 183). Two years later, in 1949, the Communist Party of Nepal was formed in Calcutta, India, under the leadership of Pushpa Lal Shrestha (Gurung 1977: 1850). Both parties sought to end the oppressive Rana oligarchy in Nepal and were inspired by and received support from anti-Raj movements in India. Nepali political activists living in exile in India not only campaigned for democracy in Nepal but also actively participated in the Indian independence 53 Four districts of today's Nepal—Banke, Bardiya, Kailali and Kanchanpur—were returned to Nepal as a reward for supporting the British in suppressing the Indian rebellion of 1857. 54 Praja Parishad can be loosely translated into English as the People's Foundation or People’s Federation. 55 Tanka Prasad Acharya was appointed as the President of the party. However, the Ranas imprisoned Acharya in Kathmandu, which made B.P. Koirala the de facto leader of the party.
94 suffered unprecedented setbacks, what made it possible for Nepal’s Maoists to rise as a strong political force, command an insurgency, and ultimately—though through a peace process—rise as Nepal’s new rulers? There are no easy answers to these questions, and an exhaustive analysis of the Maoist armed conflict is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is useful to review a few major works that shed light on potential causes of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency and the reasons behind the success it enjoyed in Nepal. In addition, India’s contradictory engagement with Nepal’s political forces during the insurgency has been the subject of much debate and speculation. Therefore, addressing this issue, even briefly, is essential and relevant to this study. Writing in 1998, two years after the insurgency began, Baburam Bhattarai,69 one of the senior-most Maoist ideologues, blamed India for Nepal's underdevelopment and argued that India kept Nepal in semi-colonial bondage (see Bhattarai 1998). He argued that India prevented the development of national capital in Nepal, eyed its natural resources, and imposed exploitative and oppressive behaviour through unequal treaties and agreements. To break the chains of this semi-colonial status, he concluded, the Maoists’ People's War was launched. While blaming India for everything that happens in Nepal has its pitfalls, Bhattarai’s arguments are not entirely baseless. Writing years before Bhattarai did, Blaikie et al. (1980) made a case of a semi-colonial Nepal that bore the burden of exploitation and dependence in its relationship with India. They also warned of an impending, large-scale political crisis in the country, which indeed later took place as they had predicted. Various studies, conducted particularly during the later years of the armed insurgency, have looked at domestic causes of the Maoist movement in Nepal. Such studies can be broadly categorised into two types: those that use techniques such as cross-sectional regression to analyse how inequality, poverty, geography, and ethnic or linguistic differences contributed to the insurgency. In contrast, studies of the second type often emphasise the failures of post-1990 governments in Nepal and raise issues related to conflict incentives. For instance, Murshed & Gates (2005) found that grievances, expressed in ethnic and caste discrimination, landlessness, and other inequalities, were the main catalysts for the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Other scholars, such as Thapa & Sijapati (2004), Deraniyagala (2005), Bohara et al. (2006), Parwez (2006), Macours (2006), Tiwari (2009), Basnett (2009), Do & Iyer (2010), and Piya & Maharjan (2009) came up with similar findings. Deraniyagala (2005: 61), for instance, argued that ‘a long history of agricultural stagnation, inequalities in land ownership, inadequate investment in human development and social and physical infrastructure and an extractive and predatory state’ were responsible not only for uneven development and poverty, but also for the armed conflict. In addition, she noted that the Maoist armed insurgency began during a period of economic liberalisation in Nepal, which not only aggravated already existing inequalities, but also created new ones. Using detailed casualty datasets, Do & Iyer (2010) found that conflict-related deaths were significantly higher in poorer districts and mountains, i.e. in areas favourable for running a guerrilla movement. They indicated that poverty made recruiting fighters cheaper for the insurgents, but a higher level of poverty also 69 Mr Bhattarai was the second-most senior party leader, headed the rebels’ 'people's government' and drafted the party's ideological documents. In 2015, when Nepal declared a new constitution through a constituent assembly, Mr Bhattarai declared renouncing the communist ideology, resigned from the Maoist party, and began forming a new ‘non-communist’ political group under his leadership.
95 meant 'a greater level of grievances against the government', and 'more support for insurgent groups' (p. 745). Indeed, the Maoists' strategy was to use both the mountainous geography and people's grievances. As Hachhethu (2005: 138) states: The Maoists’ internal party document prepared before the launch of the armed struggle demonstrates that the rebels planned to capitalise on Nepal's mountainous geography as well as on perceived grievances of ethnic groups, peasants, Nepalis in rural areas and in the Indian diaspora, who had often been forgotten by the state. As in many other civil wars, the Maoist armed insurgency has also been viewed from the ‘greed versus grievance’ perspective. Proponents of the greed model70, who mostly seem to come from the mainstream economic tradition, argue that civil wars are primarily fought not because of persisting inequalities or grievances, but because of potential financial incentives for rebel groups. These models portray insurgencies as economic activities rather than actions oriented towards pursuing ideological or political goals. In an attempt to analyse Nepal’s armed conflict from this perspective, Acharya (2009: 17), for instance, argues that the rebel leaders and their subordinate soldiers engaged in a contractual relationship (akin to that of employers and employees) and the insurgency survived as long as the 'operating costs' remained low. He concluded that the Maoist armed insurgency in Nepal did not 'appear to be linked in any causal way to grievances, social factors or even ideology. It was incentives that mattered most’ (p. 18). However, many of the arguments presented by scholars who support the greed model do not appear to apply to the situation in Nepal. First, the argument that the rebels joined the insurgency merely for economic reasons is implausible. As far as their personal safety was concerned, being part of a guerrilla movement was a risky decision for the insurgents. The remuneration they received as a rebel soldier would be much less than what they could have earned by joining the government security forces or, in a desperate situation, selling their manual labour in India. In addition, these economic models fail to recognise that an insurgency is much more than recruiting militants and fighting one successful battle after another. As evident in Nepal’s case, many people who joined the Maoist movement—be it party cadres engaged in non-combative work, women groups, students, peasants, and many others—received no remuneration. It is also worth highlighting that combatants are part of an insurgency, and though their role might be important, it is not always the most crucial one. Another shortcoming of the greed model, which does not make sense in Nepal’s case, is that they see armed insurgencies targeted at controlling lootable resources. They often argue that insurgencies do not progress when a lucrative natural resource is absent. To support this claim, they often cite examples of the so-called blood minerals from Africa, Afghanistan’s opium, and the widespread drug production and smuggling in conflict-ridden Latin American countries. However, this was not the case in Nepal. There was no ‘lootable resource’ in Nepal that the rebels could have controlled and benefited from. Instead, the Maoist movement relied heavily on voluntary donations and finances from various extortion. In other words, the insurgency per se was not aimed at controlling or benefitting from a lucrative natural resource. Finding the root causes of a conflict is difficult, as conflicts begin for a range of reasons. In Nepal's case, too, it can be argued that the Maoist armed conflict was a 70 See, for instance, Collier & Hoeffler (1998) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004) for an in-depth understanding of the ‘greed’ model.
96 result of several causes, including poverty and underdevelopment (Thapa & Sijapati 2004), social exclusion of certain minorities and ethnic groups (Gurung 2007, Lawoti 2005), government suppression of the leftist political activities in the Midwestern region (Acharya 2009: 7), inequalities in land ownership, and social chasms created by post-1990 economic liberalisation (Deraniyagala 2005). Finally, an unequal relationship and deep dependency on its southern neighbour, India, also catalysed the conflict (Bhattarai 1998). Overall, the Maoist armed insurgency expressed the widespread frustration of people in the post-1990s. After a long and difficult struggle, democracy was reestablished in Nepal in 1990, and ordinary Nepalis had high hopes in the new system. However, these expectations were shattered as mainstream political parties that rose to power following the democratic movement became entangled in ongoing power struggles. They failed to focus on solving the problems of the people. The grievances of historically marginalised and oppressed communities were never adequately addressed. Some scholars have raised the issue of frustration and unmet expectations as potential triggers for the conflict. For instance, Parwez (2006) and Fujikura (2003) argued that a higher level of education in a democratic environment raised people's expectations. However, the lack of economic opportunities engendered public frustration and ultimately led to revolt and violence. Similarly, Tiwari (2009: 24) proposed that the insurgency was caused by a ‘mismatch’ between political and economic empowerment, because an equal level of economic empowerment did not accompany increased political empowerment in the post-1990 era. In a similar spirit, Shneiderman et al. (2016: 2042) argue that the Maoist conflict should be considered merely a single element in a much broader process of transformation that Nepal was going through. These transformative elements, they highlight, included democratisation, identity politics, migration, state restructuring, and the emergence of a remittance economy. These explanations appear more plausible than those trying to squeeze the conflict within the oddly crafted greed-versus-grievances continuum. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Maoist armed insurgency was a disruptive political event that emerged when Nepal was going through a significant socio-political transformation. It is also worth noting that the insurgency's inception happened in a particular political context. However, as the insurgency progressed, some elements71—such as the political instability, corruption, and the royal massacre of 2001—helped it become what it later became: a full-fledged civil war-like conflict. The later years of the insurgency were particularly marked by daily instances of violence, numerous casualties, and the government's gradual loss of territorial and administrative control. 4.2.2 Cost of the Conflict The decade-long Maoist armed insurgency was the bloodiest and most violent 71 Political empowerment and the shift in people's consciousness in the post-1990 democratic era was certainly one element that made the Maoist armed insurgency possible. However, other political events also facilitated its growth and its ultimate spread. These events include the 2001 royal massacre (when Nepal's King, Queen, and other prominent members of the royal family were shot and killed), a confused government that lacked the political will and skills to deal with the insurgency when it was nascent, widespread rift and divisions within the mainstream political parties, and India’s nonchalant approach towards the Maoist rebels taking shelter in its land. In later years, the insurgency intensified mainly due to the repressive approach taken by King Gyanendra, who refused to recognise the armed insurgency as a political issue and tagged the rebels as terrorists who had lost their way. He also sought international support to repress and defeat the rebels by force.
97 episode in Nepal's modern history. In terms of human lives that were lost and the physical damage and destruction it caused, the conflict was of immense scale. The armed conflict also left a deep scar in Nepal’s social fabric that will take decades to heal. According to the figures released by Nepal’s Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (2013), in total, the insurgency took at least 17,886 lives.72 More than 3,000 people were abducted, and nearly 1,600 people disappeared during the violent decade (1996–2006). In addition, nearly 9,000 people were left maimed and disabled, and the number of displaced people stood at around 80,000.73 In terms of physical damage, the conflict was equally destructive. It is estimated that nearly 17,500 individual properties were destroyed during the conflict (Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, Nepal 2013). In addition, in an attempt to weaken the state, the Maoist rebels adopted an undeclared policy of destroying public property. As a result, more than 2,000 schools and nearly 4,000 public offices were demolished during the conflict (Ghimire 2013). The insurgents also destroyed bridges, burned down electricity plants, and demolished government infrastructure. The conflict negatively affected economic activities, hampered economic growth, and was undoubtedly a severe blow to Nepal's fledgling post-1990 economy. For instance, the GDP growth rate during the early 1990s stood at around 5%. However, as the conflict progressed and peaked during the early 2000s, the GDP growth shrank sharply, averaging barely 2.5% per annum (National Planning Commission of Nepal 2003, Deraniyagala 2005: 57). The conflict had multisectoral impacts and badly affected vital sectors of Nepal's economy, such as tourism, agriculture, industry and commerce. The armed conflict also altered Nepal’s social and demographic structure. In search of safety, people started moving from villages to cities, some of them chased off by the rebels and tagged as ‘class enemies’. Hit hard by the uncertainty and unemployment the armed conflict brought, many Nepali youths started migrating abroad—mainly to Middle Eastern and East Asian countries—to sell menial labour. As years passed, the migration trend intensified, ultimately changing the Nepali economy's entire outlook. Nepal’s economy gradually shifted from being primarily an agricultural economy to a remittance economy.74 Post-conflict Nepal has a new economic face, and so does its demography. The rapid international migration of Nepali youths has caused tremendous demographic and social changes, whose long-term impacts are yet to be seen. As reported in various studies,75 the conflict also left a huge psychological impact on ordinary Nepalis. Killing, abduction, torture, arbitrary arrests, rape, and the use of child soldiers were common war strategies adopted both by the rebels and government security forces.76 As the conflict intensified, especially in the later years, children's rights, women’s rights, and ordinary people’s economic, social, and 72 This figure is disputed, as some other estimations show the casualties to be higher or lower than this one. 73 While most people were internally displaced, some managed to leave Nepal for employment in India or Gulf countries. Some also sought asylum in various Western countries. 74 In 1996, the year the conflict began, the proportion of remittances in Nepal’s GDP was merely 0.97%. As the armed conflict intensified, there was a sharp increase in the number of Nepali youths travelling abroad for foreign employment. By 2006, the year the conflict ended, the proportion of remittances in the GDP was 16.06%, which further rose to 31.20% in 2016 (World Bank 2019). 75 See, for instance, Thapa & Hauff (2005), Tol et al. (2010), and Kohrt et al. (2012) to get a detailed overview of the psychological and emotional impact borne by ordinary Nepalis because of the Maoist armed insurgency. 76 For an elaborate analysis of conflict-related violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law between February 1996 and 21 November 2006, see, for instance, OHCHR (2012).
98 cultural rights were severely compromised (Khanal 2017). In addition, since transitional justice issues and reconciliation processes were largely overlooked in the years following the CPA, a culture of impunity thrived in post-conflict Nepal (Jeffery 2017, Adhikari et al. 2014). Having been inspired by the Maoist insurgency and the political gains and spotlight it had received, Nepal also witnessed a rise and proliferation of other small armed groups, which perpetuated the culture of violence also in the post-insurgency years.77 4.3 Locating India’s Role in Nepal’s Peace Process and Political Transition (2005–2017): A Review of Previous Research As the Maoist armed insurgency emerged as a formidable force in Nepal in the early 2000s, academic interest in it also grew. Initially, scholarly interest was mainly limited to analysing the origins of the conflict and estimating its potential outcomes (see, for instance, Karki & Seddon 2003, Thapa & Sijapati 2004, Hutt 2004). However, in later years, with the onset of the peace process, academic focus also began to shift. More attention was given to broader peacebuilding issues, including constitution-making, state restructuring, inclusivity, development, and the rhetoric of building a 'new Nepal'. The role of international actors in the Nepali conflict was analysed during the conflict and also in the aftermath. When it comes to Nepal's peace process, India has always been the elephant in the room. Other international actors, such as the US, the UK, China, the EU, and several other international organisations, were present, on and off, in the scene. However, as Jha (2012: 332) argues, they were mostly responsible for paying the bills of the peace process. In contrast, India had the strongest presence and ultimately received most of the credit for the relatively successful peace process (see Chapter 5). Even though studies on international engagement in Nepal's peace process and political transition have centred around India, India's role in Nepal's peace process and political transition remains a poorly understood topic. For instance, Subedi & Bhattarai (2017: 95) argue that India’s engagement in Nepal’s peace process also needs further study because India’s role has been both ‘unclear and questionable’. Previous literature that deals with India's engagement in Nepal's peace process and political transition can be broadly categorised into three. Works that assess India’s involvement during the armed insurgency—before the 12-Point Understanding and the CPA—provide crucial historical insights into how India became a major player in Nepal’s conflict resolution scene. Second, studies focusing on India's involvement during the crucial years of the peace process (i.e., between 2005 and 2008) are important because they provide insight into India's actual involvement in activities leading up to the peace deal and its immediate aftermath. Third, studies that emerged after the initial years of the peace process are also relevant because they investigate India’s long-term engagement in the later years of political transition. Scholars who have examined India’s approach to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal generally agree that India's role during the insurgency was inconsistent and contradictory (see, for instance, Shah 2004, Mishra 2004, Bhattarai 2005, Whelpton 2005, Whitfield 2008, Upreti 2009, Destradi 2010, Sharma 2013, Adhikari 2017, and Dhungel 2019: 24). While Nepal's northern neighbour, China, 77 See, for instance, Thapa (2017) and Rawski (2009) for an overview of the armed groups that were active in the wake of the Maoist armed insurgency.
99 saw the use of the term ‘Maoist’ as an insult to their leader Mao Zedong, labelled the Nepali Maoists as an 'anti-government outfit', and extended no concrete support to them (Upadhya 2012: 136), Nepal's southern neighbour, India took a different approach. Despite declaring the Maoists a terrorist group, India showed little or no interest in curbing their activities in India (Bhattarai 2005: 34, Upreti 2009: 223). The Maoist rebels not only received training from various guerrilla groups in India (Bhattarai 2005: 32), but the top rebel leaders mostly lived in various parts of India78 and were able to operate from there with little or no restriction (Mishra 2004: 638). In the later years of the conflict, India continued its paradoxical approach as internal polarisation intensified among major political forces in Nepal. On one hand, it denounced King Gyanendra's direct rule and advocated for a ‘twin-pillar’ political system in Nepal (i.e., constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy). On the other hand, it also provided military assistance to Nepali security forces fighting the Maoists under the King’s direct command. Similarly, it showed little interest in Maoist activities that took place in various parts of India. Instead of suppressing their activities, India kept in touch with the rebel leaders for a potential coalition-building between the Maoists and Nepal's mainstream political parties agitating against King Gyanendra's rule (Destradi 2010: 18, Adhikari 2017: 32, Sharma 2013). This way, 'by supporting and supplying both sides of the civil war in Nepal,’ Shah (2004: 223) argued, India ‘perfected the imperial art of divide and rule’. India's indifference towards the Maoists, however, was not unilateral. The Maoists reciprocated by carefully avoiding activities that interfered with India’s interests.79 While the Maoists’ political documents were riddled with anti-Indian rhetoric, in practice, nothing remarkably anti-Indian took place during the insurgency. This discrepancy between the words and actions of both India and the Maoists has been used by some scholars (such as Shah 2004, Mishra 2004) to advance the narrative that the Maoist movement was potentially a ploy employed by India to weaken the Nepali state and, as a result, to keep a more pliable regime in Kathmandu. In addition, Shah (2004: 202) went on to argue that uprisings and insurgencies that had no external backing did not survive and thrive in Nepal, which was not the case with the Maoist armed insurgency.80 Arguments like these are undoubtedly useful for vilifying both India and the Maoists simultaneously. Such statements have been favourites of royalists and conspiracy theorists, both inside and outside Nepal. However, most of these arguments, such as the notion that the Maoist insurgency was potentially a foreign ploy, lack evidence. In the absence of credible evidence, such arguments serve no purpose and reduce a large-scale armed insurgency to a petty ploy of a nagging 78 While many top Maoist leaders did live in India throughout the conflict, they have denied any support from the Indian establishment. They have often argued that since India is a vast 'ocean' of people, it was not hard for them to hide in Indian cities. This is both plausible as well as contradictory. India, indeed, is a densely populated country, and hiding in India would not be difficult. However, given that India has professional and wellestablished intelligence agencies, tracking down foreign rebels would not be that difficult, either. When willing to do so, India did, for instance, run a crackdown on Bhutanese dissidents hiding in and operating from India. 79 For instance, in 1998, when the Kalapani border dispute between Nepal and India was at its peak, many political parties in Nepal used that as political capital and portrayed themselves as patriots who did not give in to Indian aggression. The Maoists, however, chose to neglect the issue and were absent from the scene altogether (Mishra 2004: 635). 80 For this, he used the examples of Dr K. I. Singh's failed revolt in the wake of the 1950 Delhi Agreement, as well as the short-lived and failed armed campaign launched by a communist faction in eastern Nepal in the 1970s.
100 neighbour. In addition, they bluntly neglect and undermine the social and political psyche of post-1990 Nepal. As already discussed, India acted in a contradictory manner when it provided an undeclared ‘shelter’ to the Maoists and supplied arms and ammunition to Nepali security forces loyal to the King. However, that does not mean that the entire insurgency was a plot designed and implemented by New Delhi. As Nepali Maoist leaders often tend to argue, they were simply using India to serve their political and tactical goals. India was likely doing the same, using the rebels to maintain its traditional grip on Nepal or to keep the country mildly unstable, as it has often been accused of doing in the past. For New Delhi, the Maoists indeed served as a bargaining tool that it could tactfully use in its dealings with Kathmandu. Using opposing political forces as leverage in Nepal is an old habit of India, and a quick look at Nepal's history shows this clearly. Throughout various junctures in history, India has utilised nearly all political forces in Nepal, including the traditional democratic parties, regional political groups, the Maoists, and the monarchy, whenever necessary. The tendency to label the Maoists as India’s pawns or to argue that New Delhi planted and cultivated the Maoist armed struggle undermines the Maoist movement's role in steering Nepal towards a progressive path. Democracy, the rule of law, secularism, and inclusivity are widely cherished ideals of contemporary Nepal. While one can be critical of or loathe the Maoists’ violent politics, one cannot be oblivious to their contribution to shaping today's Nepal, which is significantly more progressive, more democratic, and more prosperous than it has ever been. The Maoist movement made not only a political contribution, but also a social one. As Adhikari (2014: 275) puts it, the rebels ‘taught large sections of the population to organize and agitate in the face of injustice, instead of quietly accepting their position in the social hierarchy’. The dubious role that India played during the Maoist insurgency is well-known and has been discussed in detail by several scholars. However, when it comes to India's involvement in the background negotiations that led to the 12-Point Understanding, confusion persists. This is also the case with India’s involvement in the aftermath of the 2006 peace deal. Interestingly, India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process was predicted even before the process was conceived, long before the signing of the 12-Point Understanding in New Delhi. Writing at the peak of the armed conflict, Mishra (2004: 646), for instance, noted that ‘any solution to the Maoist problem must involve winning the hearts and minds of the Indian authorities, perhaps more so than winning the hearts and minds of the Maoists themselves’. While Mishra’s (2004) arguments certainly appear to have been exaggerated and more provocative than realistic, nonetheless, it was evident that some form of Indian involvement would be unavoidable if a successful peace process was to be implemented in Nepal. Some scholars, such as Bhattarai (2005: 35), also noted that India was unhappy when it was not consulted during the 2003 peace talks and that India was unwilling to see a third-party involvement, except its own, in an eventual peace process that would take place in Nepal. Similarly, at the dawn of the peace process, Upreti (2006: 207) wrote: India does not want to see any outsider being active in [the] Nepalese armed conflict. Considering itself as a regional power, it wants to handle all the issues arising in South Asia itself.
101 Similar predictions were made concerning India’s eventual involvement in postconflict Nepal. A year after the signing of the CPA, Janjua (2007: 86), for instance, warned that India’s involvement in post-conflict Nepal would be an active one and that India could even put pressure on Nepali political parties to appoint ministers of its choice and implement pro-Indian policies. As I explore in subsequent chapters, these predictions, more or less, came true, and India's presence in Nepal rapidly grew in the peace process and political transition years. Amid these predictions and various unverified anecdotes circulating in the media, confusion remains over India’s involvement in Nepal’s peace process and political transition. This confusion is continuously reflected in works that have emerged after the 2006 peace deal. Some scholars, such as Adhikari (2017: 32), term India's role as an aggressive one, while others have used somewhat softer tones. Some of the common references, however, include terming India’s involvement as a ‘facilitative one’ (Destradi 2010:17, Shrestha 2012: 211, Ghimire 2018a: 6), the one that provided ‘tacit support’ (Whitfield 2008: 6), or a mediator that took on the job intending to coerce the rebels to shun arms and to steer them towards mainstream politics (Poudel 2018: 7). It has also been argued that the 12Point-Understanding, which sketched Nepal’s post-conflict roadmap for peace and democracy, would not have been possible in the absence of India’s support (Whitfield 2008: 6). Having reflected on India’s engagement from the early years of the conflict, Upreti (2009: 234) argued that among international actors, India’s presence was the most extensive, so much so that, especially during the later years, Nepal became ‘entirely dependent on India’ for managing its peace process. As I will discuss in subsequent chapters, this state of dependency was not limited merely to conflict resolution. It had stretched to other domains, and some of the most critical Nepali state institutions had become victims of India’s minute manipulation and massive micromanagement (see Chapters 6 and 7). Often furthered by Indian scholars, there are also less critical, widely romanticised, and overtly optimistic versions of India’s engagement in post-conflict Nepal. Mehta (2011), for instance, argued that against the backdrop of the conflict and democratic movement, India had been ‘very actively’ promoting democracy in Nepal. Similarly, Janjua (2007: 101) claimed that, though carried out with the consent of the UK and the US, India's engagement in post-conflict Nepal aimed to establish a 'full-fledged' democracy. H.B. Jha (2014: 57) argued that India had been acting out of its passion for safeguarding democracy and that, at times, its passion for democracy had been proved costly. However, the narrative of India as a democracy promoter has been entirely rejected by other scholars. For instance, Destradi (2010: 3) argued that India’s engagement in Nepal was guided by ‘short-term stability concerns’ and could not be considered to be an act of democracy promotion. In Bhattarai’s (2018: 13) words, India’s actions were aimed at ‘taking control over decision-making processes in Nepal, and securing its own self-interests’. Similarly, Anderson (2014: 11) argued that India was motivated by security-oriented concerns rather than a desire to ensure a smooth democratic process in Nepal. India's use of the 'democracy card', however, is not surprising as it has also done so in the past to promote its interests in Nepal (H.B. Jha 2014: 57). The issue of motive has also received some scholarly attention, and at the crux of it is the question: What motive does India have for its extensive engagement in Nepal? This is a difficult question, and the topic of India–Nepal relations is as vast as the history of the two countries. However, one thing is clear: India’s interests in
102 Nepal are numerous and often complex. Whenever necessary, India has employed various forms of rhetoric, including democracy promotion, peacebuilding, development assistance, and its much-touted neighbourhood first policy. Reflecting on India’s previous engagements in Nepal, Shah (2004: 201), for instance, argued that India harboured the habit of using its democratic credentials merely to ‘give a moral colouring to its acts of economic and political manipulation in Nepal’. Arguments put forward during the later years of the political transition echoed similar undertones. Referring to India’s engagement in post-conflict Nepal, Musachhio (2018: 40), for instance, argues that, by ‘presenting democracy through a discourse entailing development, New Delhi managed to corroborate its hegemony over Nepal by means of soft power’. He further argues that India portrayed its image as a democracy-promoter in an attempt to achieve its foreign policy interests, which included fostering its bilateral ties with the United States81, preventing a potential spread of Maoist insurgency in India, and securing a conducive environment for implementing projects with the economic interests of India. While arguments suggesting India's hegemonic tendencies may be plausible, there is a lack of detailed analysis on how these tendencies are executed on the ground. In addition, as I show in the next two chapters, India’s self-portrayal was not limited to exhibiting itself as a democracy promoter. It was enamoured with its emerging reputation as a formidable actor in international mediation and peacebuilding—an identity it sought to cultivate as part of its global profile to advance its broader ambitions on the world stage. Although limited, there have been some attempts to explore India’s involvement during the peace negotiation phase, its aftermath, and the later years of the peace process and political transition. Over the last two decades, India has become a lucrative genre in Nepal's non-fiction publishing scene. Its actions in Nepal, both actual and perceived, have become popular subjects that simultaneously evoke fear, anxiety, and speculation. Unsurprisingly, books about India’s presence in Nepal achieved tremendous commercial success in the growing book market of postconflict Nepal. However, this has also led to some drawbacks. Enticed by the potential for profit, some authors have produced works that rely heavily on unsubstantiated anecdotes and conspiracy theories. A few authors, especially Nepali investigative journalists such as Sharma (2013), Adhikari (2012), and P. Jha (2014), appear to have made a sincere attempt to investigate and analyse India’s engagement in post-conflict Nepal. Their work, to a certain degree, demonstrates India’s extensive engagement in post-conflict Nepal, which was not only affecting Nepal’s everyday politics, but also gradually weakening Nepal’s sovereignty. These works come across as overly journalistic and depend heavily on detailed descriptions of everyday political events. In short, they lack critical perspectives and an academic tone, often missing connections to relevant theoretical concepts. This study aims to bridge that gap by linking theory with practice through an inductive process while also making a theoretical contribution. Though successful only in part, a few scholars attempted to investigate the issue more rigorously and with a critical academic tone. Adhikari (2014), for instance, offered instances of Indian micromanagement in post-conflict Nepal. His account includes how Indian embassy officials in Kathmandu were engaged in negotiating post-conflict political deals and 'containing’ the Maoists. Similarly, Jha (2012) attempts to provide what he calls a 'Nepali perspective' on international 81 Among others, through an anti-terrorism coalition-building.
103 involvement in Nepal between 2005 and 2010 by covering crucial political events that occurred in that period. His assessment helps us understand how different international actors were involved in Nepal's peace process during its crucial phase. Though his focus is not exclusively on India, he successfully portrays the uneasiness and confusion among Nepali stakeholders regarding India's involvement. The way India's involvement was received and interpreted in Nepal is another vital issue he raises. He states: Monarchists, sections of the military, and established parliamentary parties claim that Delhi provided the Maoists with a safe haven during the war, got them to Kathmandu, destroyed the monarchy, and effected regime change. Others praise India for helping end the war (Jha 2012: 333). Similarly, Whitfield (2008) covered various political events between 2000 and 2008, a time span that covers early dialogue promotion to the first constituent assembly elections. Like Jha (2012), she attempts to analyse the roles of different international actors in Nepal's peace process and touches upon India's role. Even though her brief analysis of India's engagement is insufficient to offer an elaborate picture of India's extensive engagement in Nepal, she successfully demonstrates how other international actors suffered and were ultimately sidelined because of India. She, for instance, found that some international actors, especially the small ones, such as the Switzerland-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the USbased Carter Centre, had to put up, often by using policies of ‘tolerance’ and ‘avoidance’, with India’s emphatic presence in Nepal (Whitfield 2008: 35). Whitfield's (2008) work offers a valuable insight into the roles of various international actors in Nepal's peace process. However, its main limitation is the timespan it covers. Many of India's interventions that had a tremendous impact in Nepal occurred mainly after 2008, something that is missing from her work. A handful of studies have also examined India’s engagement in the later years of the peace process and political transition. Bhattarai (2018), for instance, looks at India’s role in Nepal’s constitution-making process and identifies four strategies India employed to influence the content of Nepal's new constitution and the decision-making processes. According to him, India's four strategies were highlevel dialogue, economic blockade, international coalition building, and targeted support for domestic oppositional forces in Nepal. He also touches upon India’s uneasiness, impatience, and concern over China and Western countries’ growing presence in Nepal. He notes how India was ‘looking for avenues through which it could send a message of it being the most influential power in Nepal’ (p. 5). Similarly, Ghimire (2018a) investigated security sector governance in post-war Nepal and found that India used elite-level interactions to advance its security interests. Ghimire’s (2018a) findings help us understand India’s influence on Nepal’s security sector in the peace process years. However, his exclusive focus on the security sector is insufficient to tell a holistic story of India’s influence in Nepal, which extends well beyond the security sector. As I explain in subsequent chapters, India's influence included political meddling and micromanagement that affected Nepal's day-to-day politics, bureaucracy, as well as state apparatuses and decisionmaking mechanisms. Scholars such as Shah (2004) and Ghimire (2018b) have incorporated a broader theoretical dimension in their works to analyse the tumultuous India–Nepal relations of the 21st century, among other things. They view the relationship between the two countries as the reproduction of patron-client relationships that
110 I will begin the next section by discussing India’s claims and its self-projection as an éminence grise in the Nepali peace process. As already mentioned, India was never officially involved as a mediator or arbitrator in Nepal's peace process. However, as the peace process moved in a positive direction and the armed conflict finally ended in 2006 with the CPA, India did not shy away from taking credit for the actions it claims to have taken. This desire for credit and a constant stakeseeking mentality has created confusion and dismay in Nepal. It has also raised serious concerns about India’s intentions and actions in the country. 5.2 Taking Undue Credit? The Indian 'Ownership' of the Nepali Peace Process In September 2015, Nepal's Constituent Assembly (CA) was all set to promulgate a new constitution and put an end to years of political stalemate, stagnation, and indecisiveness that had paralysed the nation. A constitution from a people-elected Constituent Assembly was a dream of the Nepali people, a hope they held dear for over seven decades. It was also a key demand of the Maoists and symbolically represented the culmination of the peace process. Three days before the scheduled constitutional promulgation date, on 17 September 2015, Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar landed in Kathmandu as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's special envoy. As events unfolding in the aftermath showed, Jaishankar came to Nepal with a single mandate: to prevent the new Nepali constitution from being promulgated on the scheduled date. Jaishankar, flanked by the Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Ranjit Rae, met with senior political leaders in Nepal, including the Prime Minister, Sushil Koirala, and top Maoist leaders, such as Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' and Baburam Bhattarai. It has been clear from various first-hand accounts (see, for instance, N.K. Shrestha 2017a) that when meeting Nepali leaders, Jaishankar crossed diplomatic boundaries. He warned Nepali leaders not to promulgate the constitution unless a green signal was received from New Delhi or until the demands raised by India and the Madhesi parties were duly addressed. Narayan Kaji Shrestha, Nepal's former foreign minister, who met with Jaishankar along with Maoist leaders Dahal and Bhattarai, described the meeting during a media interview as follows: From the very beginning, the way he presented himself was not good. He said at the beginning, ‘You are ready to declare the constitution overnight, aren't you? You are violating the entire process and declaring the constitution?’ As a diplomat and an envoy of a head of government, he should not have talked like that. He not only violated diplomatic norms, but also dared to undermine the sovereignty of Nepal and the Nepali people. Going further, he said, ‘I have come to Nepal as a special envoy of the Prime Minister and with a special mission and message. That is, you have to postpone the promulgation of the constitution for now...Otherwise, you will have to kill many people on the day the constitution is promulgated…He also said, 'What happens even when you declare the constitution? What happens even with the support of many countries in the world? Does your constitution work if India does not support it? Yes, you can declare the constitution, but don't you want development? And don't you need India's help for development? Has India's support been enough already?' Indirectly, he threatened to retaliate if India's advice to stop the constitution's promulgation was not heeded. He also said, 'If we hadn't helped, you would still be in the jungle, and the monarchy would still be here. And that is now forgotten?' In short, it appeared that his
111 mission was to stop the promulgation of the constitution at all costs. This was not just a general request; it was a threatening order (N.K. Shrestha 2017a). Jaishankar's short stint in Kathmandu was not as successful as he had probably hoped to be. Despite India's serious reservations, Nepal's Constituent Assembly promulgated the new constitution, with more than 90% of the CA members voting in its favour. While the regional Madhesh-based parties took to the streets opposing the new constitution, Jaishankar's prophecy of an eventual 'bloodshed in the streets' proved false. Many countries worldwide, including the US, China, and the EU, welcomed Nepal's new constitution. However, India merely issued a statement saying that it had 'noted' that a new constitution had been promulgated in Nepal and that it extended best wishes to the people of Nepal (MEA India 2015). Three days after India had extended its best wishes to the people of Nepal, perhaps intending to give Nepalis a 'lesson', India imposed an undeclared economic blockade on Nepal. The blockade lasted for five months. It strained the already fragile India–Nepal relations and created a humanitarian crisis in Nepal. Jaishankar's visit during the final hours of the constitution promulgation process and the message he delivered clearly indicated that India viewed itself as a 'party' and a 'stakeholder' in Nepal's peace and political transition process. Jaishankar’s message was clear: bypassing India's wishes was not an option that Nepali political actors should consider. Similarly, the economic blockade that followed his visit also clearly indicated that the Indian establishment was angered by the Nepali political actors’ exercise of sovereign power. By intervening in the constitution promulgation process, India wanted to maintain its grip on Nepal and firmly hold the helm of political engineering. Jaishankar was not the only high-profile Indian official who highlighted India's role in Nepal's peace process, seeking credit for it. Years earlier, in 2009, Pranab Mukherjee—India's Minister for External Affairs, who later became India's President—claimed in an interview with Al Jazeera that India had persuaded the Maoists to give up violence and participate in mainstream, peaceful politics. The Maoists, Mukherjee argued, had accepted India's admonition and ended up leading the government in Nepal (see Al Jazeera 2009). In the interview, Mukherjee projected India as a regional peacebuilder. Apart from Nepal, he also cited examples of other South Asian countries where India had been involved in building peace and stability. In 2012, SD Muni, a professor at India's Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), who had mentored the Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai during his doctoral studies at JNU, revealed in a book that the 12-Point Understanding had 'emerged from the continuous parlays between the SPA and the Maoists, along the way informally consulting trusted interlocutors and officials in India' (Muni 2012: 328). According to him, New Delhi used informal channels to influence the content of the 12-Point Understanding.90 The SPA and the Maoist negotiation team members showed him the draft of the document several times. Muni, however, rejected the allegations that New Delhi was the mastermind behind the 12-Point Understanding and that the Maoists and the SPA were presented with a final document draft merely to sign. 90 He argued that India influenced the content of the 12-Point Understanding in three critical aspects. First, it was called an 'understanding' and not an 'agreement' to make sure that it was not a binding commitment for either side. Second, even though the Understanding was reached in New Delhi, it was not made public or signed jointly by the SPA and the Maoists. This was done to bar Maoists from the legitimacy they were seeking. Third, it was also made sure that the word 'republic' did not appear in the document and was replaced with phrases such as 'full democracy' or 'end of the autocratic monarchy' (Muni 2012: 317).
112 The Nepali peace process has served as a useful example or a marketing tool that Indian politicians, diplomats, and the Indian corporate media, obsessed with India’s international image, have been using to portray India’s image as a regional democracy-promoter and peacebuilder. Even Indian academics have done so. While India’s ‘marketing’ of its involvement in the Nepali peace process appears to be working quite effectively, a careful analysis of the internal political events in Nepal does not quite add up to the story that India is telling the world. Before questioning the Indian version of events, in the next section, I analyse a series of political events in Nepal from as early as 2001. An analysis of these events offers a broader view of the evolution of the Nepali peace process. It demonstrates that internal political dynamics were much more crucial in initiating, steering, and accomplishing the 12-Point Understanding and a relatively successful peace process in Nepal. 5.3 The Conflict Conundrum and the Story of Two Failed Peace Processes In July 2001, Sher Bahadur Deuba, a leader of the Nepali Congress party, who happened to be Nepal's Prime Minister when the Maoist insurgency began in 1996, rose to power again as Prime Minister. Deuba had completely ignored the Maoists' 40-point demands in 1996. However, within six years, the Maoist movement had proliferated to such an extent that this time, Deuba's survival as Prime Minister mostly depended on his ability to persuade the Maoists to participate in peace talks and to end the armed conflict with a negotiated settlement. Two days after Deuba’s appointment as Prime Minister, on 25 July 2001, a ceasefire was declared. After a little more than a month, on 30 August 2001, the first round of peace talks between the government and Maoist negotiation teams was held at a private resort in Lalitpur. Two weeks after the first talks, the second round took place in Bardiya, western Nepal (Upreti 2006: 120). At the negotiating table, the Maoists demanded, among other things, that a republican system be established in Nepal and that the 1990 constitution should be replaced by a new one. They demanded a people-elected constituent assembly to draft and declare a new constitution. The Maoists later dropped their demand for a republican state. However, the peace talks failed as the government was not ready to fulfil any of the Maoists’ major demands, including elections for a constituent assembly. Mumaram Khanal, a senior Maoist leader at that time who had participated in several secret and informal talks that led to the 2001 peace talks, recalled why the talks had failed in 2001: The first round of formal talks in 2001 stalled and failed over the issue of the constituent assembly (CA) election. There was disagreement over whether to organise CA elections with a condition or without any condition. The king wanted to ensure that his position was safeguarded even if elections for a CA were held. The condition was not a ceremonial monarchy, but a constitutional monarchy. The CPN (Maoists) did not accept that, and the talks failed.91 By mid-November 2001, the Maoists withdrew from the formal negotiation process, declared the ceasefire over, and announced that the armed struggle would resume. Within days, they attacked and captured an army barracks in Dang in the western Tarai (Whelpton 2005: 218). This was their first attack on an army base. In an 91 Interview with Mumaram Khanal (24.07.2017).
113 attempt to run a parallel government, the Maoists also declared a new body called the United Revolutionary People's Council of Nepal. Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai led the People’s Council (Thapa & Sijapati 2004: 122). The Deuba government responded to the Maoist offensives by declaring a state of emergency, curtailing civil liberties, and tagging the CPN (Maoists) and its sister organisations as terrorists. Some of the most brutal clashes between the Maoists and state security forces, including attacks and counterattacks, took place during the emergency period (see, for instance, Thapa 2002, Kräämer 2003). The first peace talks were initiated and held in Nepal, and there is no credible evidence of any international involvement in these talks. However, a quick look at Nepal’s political situation at that time is sufficient to understand why the 2001 talks failed. In essence, the 2001 talks were organised merely for tactical purposes. At that time, neither the Maoists nor the government seemed genuinely interested in resolving the conflict through a negotiated settlement. The 2001 talks had begun in the context of major political upheavals in Nepal. On 1 June 2001, two months before the first ceasefire, ten prominent members of Nepal's royal family, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, were killed in a mass shooting at their official residence in Kathmandu. In the aftermath of the shocking royal massacre, King Birendra's brother, Prince Gyanendra, was crowned the new king. Not long after his ascent to the throne, King Gyanendra, known for his hardliner image in contrast to his relatively liberal deceased brother, declared that he would not be a ‘passive onlooker’ like his elder brother had been. The Maoists tried to use the royal massacre as an opportunity to garner support for their 'republic' agenda. Baburam Bhattarai, through an op-ed in a national broadsheet, argued that the legitimate monarchy had been obliterated in the royal massacre and that it was time to institutionalise republicanism in Nepal. Mr Bhattarai also portrayed the erstwhile king, King Birendra, as a patriotic figure with whom the Maoists had an 'undeclared strategic cooperation' over various issues (see Bhattarai 2001). Bhattarai’s argument raised concerns because King Birendra’s approach towards the Maoists had indeed been ambiguous. When the G.P. Koirala government had requested mobilising the army against the Maoists, King Birendra dismissed the idea.92 When King Birendra was Nepal's head of state and the army's Commander-in-Chief, the Royal Nepal Army never left its barracks to suppress the insurgency. G.P. Koirala, who was Prime Minister at the time of the palace massacre, again attempted to mobilise the army. By default, the army was loyal to the new King. As per the constitution, army mobilisation required the King's approval. When the new King also declined his request to mobilise the army, G.P. Koirala resigned as Prime Minister. Sher Bahadur Deuba, who replaced Koirala, ascended to power, promising that he could resolve the armed conflict through dialogue and negotiation and that, in his view, the insurgency was a political issue and demanded a political solution. In contrast to G.P. Koirala's suppression line, Deuba's promise of a peaceful resolution resonated well in the conflict-stricken Nepali society. The Deuba government's survival depended on its ability to solve the armed conflict through a negotiated settlement. To justify his relevance, Mr Deuba had to declare a ceasefire and invite the Maoists to the negotiating table. The Maoists, too, saw this as an opportunity to bolster their image as a political entity. This was a perfect opportunity for them to show that they were a revolutionary political force 92 Interview with Beduram Bhusal (14.07.2017).
114 adept not only in violence and vandalism, but also ready to join peaceful politics if their concerns were seriously addressed. The public image of the Maoists had begun to suffer because of the reckless acts of violence and destruction they had been carrying out since the insurgency was launched in 1996. In the wake of the shocking royal massacre and six years of Maoist violence, pressure for peace also came from the traumatised Nepali society. Civil society organisations represented that voice in various forms by lobbying and campaigning for peace. The Maoists and the Deuba government probably knew very well that the ambitious and hardliner King would hardly budge from his position and that the peace talks would ultimately falter and fail. Still, the talks were held anyway because even the failed talks offered both parties temporary strategic benefits and some amount of political capital, which they could shrewdly use. The Deuba government justified its relevance by claiming it had stuck to its initial promise and brought the rebels to the negotiating table—an act that previous governments had failed to achieve. Similarly, the Maoists took advantage of the ceasefire to connect with and campaign among the urban population, a group that had been challenging to reach while operating from underground. In addition, as a precondition for creating a conducive environment for peace talks, the Maoists were able to negotiate the release of a significant number of their cadres from police custody and detention centres throughout the country. Moreover, since the Maoists appeared to know in advance that the talks were going to fail, they used the time that the ceasefire and the peace talks bought to reorganise themselves and to prepare for a major guerrilla attack as soon as the ceasefire was over. A derailed peace process also served the ambitious King. Since ascending to the throne, he had clearly signalled that he wanted a more active role and appeared to be looking for the right moment for a major crackdown on political parties. The talks had failed primarily because the King refused the idea of unconditional CA elections.93 However, the failed talks were used by the King and the royalists to weave the narrative that the elected representatives had been unsuccessful in tackling the insurgency and that the King had to step in to restore peace and order in the country. On 4 October 2002, through a royal proclamation, King Gyanendra sacked Prime Minister Deuba, dissolved the Cabinet, and seized total executive power. In a televised address, the King accused the Prime Minister of being ‘incompetent’.94 Within a week, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, a staunch royalist, was handpicked by the King as Nepal’s new Prime Minister. Nearly four months after Chand was appointed Nepal’s new Prime Minister, on 29 January 2003, a new ceasefire agreement with the Maoists was announced. The Chand government had persuaded the Maoists to rejoin the negotiating table. The Maoists, who had been on the offensive as they left the 2001 peace talks, had now ended up in a defensive abyss. They had borne heavy losses during the state of emergency. In the wake of the 11 September attacks in the US, the changing global political climate, especially the US's global 'war on terror', also affected them significantly. For instance, after 2001, the US military assistance to Nepal increased dramatically, reaching over 29 million USD between October 2001 and October 93 Even though his designation was that of a constitutional monarch, since he enjoyed the loyalty of the army, the ultimate authority in Nepal at the time rested on him. 94 Showing security reasons, Prime Minister Deuba had sought postponement of parliamentary elections scheduled for November. Instead of considering his request, the King dismissed him and his Cabinet.
115 2004 (HRW 2004: 84). In 2003, the United States also signed an anti-terror aid agreement with Nepal, enlisted the Maoists as a terrorist group in its 'watchlist', and provided 'counterterrorism' training to the Nepali army (TKP 2003a, TKP 2003b). Military assistance also came from other countries, including China, India, and the UK.95 A series of peace talks was held in April, May and August 2003, but there was little progress regarding a negotiated settlement. The negotiation teams were reshuffled as the King replaced the Chand Cabinet with the one led by Surya Bahadur Thapa, yet another staunch royalist. The Maoists sat at the talks with three major demands, not very different from the ones they previously had: 1. A round table conference (of all Nepali political stakeholders), 2. Formation of an interim government, 3. Elections for a constituent assembly (Upreti 2006: 125). Once again, negotiations stalled over the issue of the constituent assembly. The talks did not progress as the Maoists had hoped, even though they had been more flexible than before, and the demand for an end to the monarchical rule had been dropped to 'facilitate the peace process' (Pokharel 2003). It became increasingly clear that the government negotiation team, made up of long-time monarchists, was not authorised to address the major demands put forward by the Maoists. Without the King's direct participation, there was little progress in the peace talks. The Maoists demanded that, since the King choreographed everything from behind the curtain, there was no point in holding useless talks with the negotiation team, and that they wanted to hold a decisive talk with the King himself. Their demand, however, was neglected by the palace. As political developments later revealed, amidst growing international support for the 'war on terror' and a gradual military defeat of the Maoists on the ground, the King was not in the mood for a compromise. The peace talks, it appeared, were barely a tactical orchestration performed while the King set the stage and tested the waters for an authoritarian adventure. On 17 August 2003, while the ceasefire was still in effect, the state security forces killed 15 Maoist cadres and two civilians while they were asleep in central Nepal's Doramba district (Tamang 2004). This was a clear sign that the peace talks were organised for the sake of organising. Particularly, the government team was neither interested nor committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. A week after the Doramba incident, the Maoists gave an ultimatum of 48 hours to address the issue of the constituent assembly, to which the government did not respond. On 27 August 2003, the ceasefire and the peace talks were over as the Maoists withdrew from the process and declared the resumption of the 'people's war' (Lawoti & Pahari 2009: 336). The 2003 peace talks occurred in a significantly different domestic and international political context. However, as with the 2001 talks, a genuine commitment to finding a negotiated settlement was absent again. The US-led 'war on terror' and increasing international support appeared to have convinced the King that the rebels could be crushed and defeated through aggressive military suppression—an act that had already been rehearsed during the state of emergency period. This time, the Maoists were in a defensive mood and appeared much more resilient than they had been in the 2001 talks. Their resilience had a limit, and in the name of compromise, abandoning agendas that had defined and shaped their 95 For an overview of military assistance that Nepal received during the early 2000s, see, for instance, HRW (2004).
116 political identity—such as their demand for constituent assembly elections—would have been equivalent to committing political suicide. To sum up, both the 2001 and the 2003 talks failed because they were essentially destined and designed to fail. The 2001 talks were conducted because the Maoists wanted to buy time and strengthen their political and military prowess, whereas the Deuba government wanted to justify its political utility by keeping up with the promise it had made earlier. In addition, both actors had to respond to the pressure for peace that came in the wake of the 2001 royal massacre. Similarly, the 2003 talks stalled because King Gyanendra—who was gradually rehearsing his authoritarian moves—appeared convinced that in the changed global scenario, and with an aggressive mobilisation of the Royal Nepal Army, the rebels could be defeated. Therefore, he saw no point in compromising with them. In contrast, the Maoists were in a defensive state. However, dropping their most important demands and surrendering to the state was not an option they could choose. As a result, the peace talks failed, and new episodes of violent conflict resumed in Nepal. 5.4 King Gyanendra’s Authoritarian Adventure After experimenting with two handpicked governments in two years, in May 2004, King Gyanendra made an unusual public call for the Prime Minister's post. Anyone interested in the job could 'apply' for it by sending a request letter to the King. Out of several candidates, Sher Bahadur Deuba, whom the King had sacked in 2002 for being 'incompetent', was now reappointed as Prime Minister through the application process. Even though Deuba represented a political party, the Nepali Congress (Democratic), he was still a handpicked candidate, and there was no national political consensus for his appointment.96 This way, the King continued undermining the relevance of mainstream political parties and showed no interest in restoring the democratic process, which had been derailed since his 2002 proclamation. As far as the issue of the armed conflict and the protracted political impasse was concerned, there was little the Dauba government could do. The government's manoeuvring space was severely limited, since the government itself was just another 'experiment' of the King. Prime Minister Deuba, who had been a proponent of dialogue and peaceful resolution of the conflict before and during the 2001 talks, was now adamant about suppressing the Maoists by force. The Maoists, who had walked out of the peace talks feeling humiliated, were now aggressively engaged in lethal armed attacks, extortion, and abductions. Due to increased hostility and the security forces' aggressive suppression strategy, the rebels suffered some significant losses, but, at the same time, their outreach appeared to have significantly grown in the wake of the 2003 talks (Upreti 2006, Lawoti & Pahari 2009). On 1 February 2005, the King finally revealed what he had been ‘hatching’ behind the walls. In a carefully planned coup d'état, with the support of the national army, the King dismissed the constitution, deposed the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and consolidated absolute power for himself. In a lengthy televised address, he labelled the Maoists as individuals engaged in criminal activities who had lost their way. He urged them to surrender their weapons and join peaceful politics. In addition, he made it clear that he would chair the Council of Ministers 96 The Communist Party of Nepal (UML) joined the Deuba government, arguing that the King’s regressive move, which began in 2002 when he sacked Deuba, had been partially corrected with Deuba’s reappointment. The Nepali Congress, a major political party led by Girija Prasad Koirala, however, rejected the King’s move and continued its street protests.
117 as its Chairman, signalling the end of handpicked prime ministers and his desire to rule as an authoritarian ruler.97 Under the King's direct rule, most senior politicians in the country were either arrested and placed in police custody or kept under house arrest. Human rights activists, journalists, and prominent civil society members were subjected to similar measures. For months, telephone lines were cut off, and the Internet was suspended from public use. Freedom of expression and civil liberties were severely curtailed. Media censorship was so extreme that military officers occupied the editorial desks of major newspapers and dictated what went to the press. One of the King’s first decrees was to ‘ban the reporting of news over the radio and to give the authorities the power to close down any media outlet’ (Christou 2006: 98). King Gyanendra’s authoritarian anarchy was modelled on his father’s autocratic Panchayat rule, which lasted for thirty years (1960–1990). Among others, the King appointed two hardliner Panchayatis, Tulsi Giri and Kirti Nidhi Bista, as ViceChairmen of his administration.98 He filled most of the government ministries with illiberal figures with controversial histories, who had little political relevance in post-1990 Nepal. In his February 1 coup d'état speech, King Gyanendra appeared very clear about his roadmap. He was going to use the anti-terrorism card to suppress the Maoists by force and sideline mainstream political parties by imprisoning their senior leaders on corruption charges. With that mindset, the King, however, failed to realise that 21st-century Nepal was significantly different from that of the 1960s. The democratic political changes achieved in the 1990s had significantly altered Nepal's social and political landscape. Though there was some level of frustration over how governments in the democratic era had (under)performed, ordinary Nepalis seemed to cherish the democracy and political freedom that the 1990s brought. The democratic change had also facilitated a rapid growth of a free press and a sprawling community of pro-democracy and pro-change Nepali diaspora, which contributed as strong antidotes to the King's authoritarian rule. Similarly, unlike in the 1960s, Nepal in the 2000s had a vibrant civil society, as well as thousands of community organisations and non-governmental organisations working on various socio-political issues. A significant portion of the population that was not only educated, but also capable of independent thinking. With the rapid growth of globalisation and modern means of mass communication, Nepal was no longer an isolated mystical Shangri-La in the Himalayas. It had evolved into an active member of the global community that regularly interacted with the outside world. In such a scenario, it was clear from the beginning that King Gyanendra's rule would not last long. However, the King appeared adamant in his pursuits and seemed confident in defeating the Maoists and mainstream political parties to consolidate his authoritarian regime. Ironically, King Gyanendra's autocratic ambitions and his blatant disregard for opposing political forces created the foundation for resolving the Maoist armed insurgency and ultimately led to the creation of a republican Nepal, which I will discuss in the next section. 97 An unofficial English translation of King Gyanendra’s proclamation is available at: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/05emergencyking.htm 98 Both Giri and Bista were senior figures during the one-party Panchayat rule, which lasted for three decades.
118 5.5 New Meeting Point for the Maoists and the SPA: Ending the King’s Direct Rule After King Gyanendra began his ultimate autocratic show through the February 2005 coup, the tectonic plates of Nepali politics began to shift. The parliamentary political parties that had happily accepted a constitutional monarchy in a political compromise in 1990 were appalled by the King's latest actions and his abject and repeated breach of the 1990 constitution. As the bond between the monarchy and the parliamentary political parties began to loosen, the possibility of an affinity between the parliamentary parties and the Maoists substantially grew. Before the King's February 2005 move, the relationship between the Maoists and the parliamentary parties had been historically tense. The Maoists saw the parliamentary parties and their cadres as primary rivals on the ground. As a result, since the beginning of the armed conflict, party members of parliamentary parties became prime targets of the Maoists. They were killed, abducted, and forced to leave their homes. Similarly, the Maoists were a threat and political rivals that the parliamentary parties wanted to eliminate. Even though the King's regressive move had started in 2002, the parliamentary parties were largely in a ‘wait and see’ mood until the King’s 2005 takeover. Occasional street protests against the King’s move were common, but their commitment to a constitutional monarchy was unabated, even though the King had clearly crossed the limits set by the 1990 constitution. There was a reason for this tolerance. The parliamentary parties were convinced that compromising with the King would be a better option than joining hands with a radical communist force, tagged by many countries as terrorists. After all, the Maoists sought to eradicate all their political competitors and establish a one-party communist dictatorship. Ironically, the Maoists also attempted to reach a power-sharing deal with the King. After the 2003 peace talks had failed, the Maoist leadership was able to establish contact with the royal palace and requested a one-on-one meeting between the King and the Maoist chairman, Prachanda. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a senior Maoist leader who was facilitating communication with the palace, accepted that they had, indeed, sought to hold a decisive dialogue with the King: We had given the King two options to choose from: power or the throne. If he desired power, we told him, he would have to relinquish the throne and declare [Nepal] a republic state…and then he could become an executive head or president for five years. And we would support him. But if he needed the throne, we told him, he would have to give up all his power and accept the role of a titular monarch (Cited in Adhikari 2011). The Maoists found themselves in an increasingly desperate situation and were looking for a way out. Reaching out to the King was one of their exit plans. In the new political scenario, both regional and global, it had become increasingly challenging for the Maoist leadership to operate from India. Both the United States and India had tagged the Maoists as ‘terrorists’. In addition, worried about the spillover effects of the Maoist movement into its northern states, India had started to detain and extradite Maoist leaders to Nepal (J. Nepal 2020). As a result, senior Maoist leaders, such as Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, returned from India and lived in the Loshebang mountain in western Nepal (BC 2014). Initially, the King, too, had been responsive to the Maoists' proposal and reportedly communicated with them via private messengers. Probably aware of the Maoist desperation, he ultimately neglected their request for a direct and decisive dialogue. The unrealised proposal of a monarchist-Maoist alliance, however,
119 created a deep division within the CPN (Maoists) party. While the faction led by Chairman Prachanda was in favour of cooperating with the King and sidelining the parliamentary parties, the second leader in the rank, Baburam Bhattarai, advocated for a partnership with the parliamentary parties and the abolition of the monarchy.99 In advocating a coalition with the King, a flawed character of the Maoist leadership was apparent. In public, the Maoists maintained a minutely crafted image of a radical progressive force that was aiming to abolish the monarchy and establish a people’s republic. That is how they persuaded and motivated thousands of Nepali youths to join the insurgency and sacrifice their lives. However, for potential political gains, they also secretly worked to build an ‘unholy’ alliance with the King. However, the Maoists, who had been hoping to hear from the King, were shocked when the King, through the February 2005 declaration, not only called them strayed criminals, but also warned that he would take action against them. Against this backdrop, in September 2005, the Maoists’ central committee conclave organised in Chunbang, a village in the Rukum district of western Nepal, took a Uturn in their position on the monarchy. The party approved Baburam Bhattarai’s political line that they would coordinate with the parliamentary parties to abolish the autocratic monarchy. In addition, they also decided to drop, at least temporarily, the agenda of ‘communist one-party rule’ or the so-called ‘people’s republic’ and replaced that with a new ‘people’s democratic republic’, where democracy and periodic elections would be irreplaceable rules of the game (Adhikari 2014: 233, Shrestha 2016, J. Nepal 2020). Behind this dramatic policy shift, there was, however, something more than the King's fledgling autocracy. The Maoists had realised that after nine years of guerrilla warfare, the movement was losing momentum, and the dream of capturing and controlling the entire Nepali state was becoming virtually impossible. Pampha Bhusal, a senior Maoist leader and an attendee of the Chunbang meeting, recalled why her party had taken that decision: At that time, the national army was not in a position to go outside its barracks. The balance of power was such that we could not come to the cities, and they could not go to the villages. Even though 80% of the country was under our control, it was impossible for us to capture Kathmandu… Since we couldn't do that, we also needed a policy shift and an agreement… If we could not do that at that time, our movement would have ended like the communist movements of Peru, Malaysia, or the Philippines.100 By adopting a policy of suppression, the King was gradually closing all potential avenues for dialogue and negotiation. The Maoists' decision to accept a 'democratic republic' and to engage with the parliamentary parties for a decisive fight against the autocratic monarchy totally changed Nepal's political course. Ultimately, the alliance between the Maoists and the parliamentary parties was announced via the 12-Point Understanding. Its foundations, however, were laid approximately a month earlier, not in a durbar in New Delhi, but in a tiny village of the Rolpa district in western Nepal. 99 To advocate this line of thought, a Maoist politburo meeting held in January 2005 in Rukum took disciplinary action against Bhattarai. The meeting declared him a 'pro-Indian betrayer', expelled him from all party positions (except the party's ordinary membership), and was detained along with Hisila Yami, his wife, and Dinanath Sharma, a senior Maoist leader who had supported Bhattarai's line of thought. For more on this, see, for instance, J. Nepal (2020). 100 Interview with Pampha Bhusal (03.08.2017).
126 in the wake of King Gyanendra's February 2005 coup. The first major milestone in that process was the Six-Point Agreement signed between the Maoists and the CPN (UML) in Rolpa. However, the 12-Point Understanding reached in New Delhi is the most significant and visible cornerstone of the Nepali peace process. As Bishnu Poudel put it, the 12-Point Understanding was an outcome or an achievement that contained the collective consciousness, organisation, and values of Nepali political actors. However, since that outcome happened to be achieved in a foreign land, a wide variety of suspicions and interpretations have emerged.116 No matter how small India's contribution may have been, it must be properly acknowledged, and India deserves the credit that is due. However, India's role does not seem to be as significant and decisive as claimed by Pranab Mukherjee or S. Jaishankar. Moreover, the affinity between the Maoists and the SPA had been so close that, sooner or later, an alliance would have been formed, even if they had not been able to gather in New Delhi. Therefore, arguments—such as that of S Jaishankar—that the Maoists would still be in the jungle if India had not helped appear implausible and largely baseless. As Pradeep Gyawali put it: If India's role had not been positive, it would have been a little difficult, but the process would have gone ahead. The Maoists had realised that they should come to a peace process, and the SPA had also realised that it was time to take the Maoists along and fight against the autocratic monarchy. The common midpoint was that the Maoists should be ready to shun arms, come to a peace process, and accept democracy, while other political parties should be ready to accept Constituent Assembly elections and make Nepal a republic. So, if India's role had not been positive, it would have been a little complicated, but it was not impossible.117 Altogether, the 12-Point Understanding came into fruition not because India used a whip of coercive diplomacy or because it performed the magic of a skilled mediator, but at that particular juncture in history, political developments in Nepal necessitated such a solution. In other words, the balance of power in Nepal’s politics had moved from a trilateral into a bilateral one, and alliance-building between the Maoists and the SPA was quite obvious, given that both were suffering from the King’s suppression. The SPA recognised that its collaboration with the Maoists was crucial in the struggle against King Gyanendra's direct rule, and that this partnership would ultimately help to end the armed conflict. Similarly, the Maoists were also facing a crisis and a critical juncture. In a way, the insurgency was not in a position to move forward. Gradually, they had realised that even if they captured the state, they would not be able to sustain it/run it all by themselves. They were, indeed, searching for a way out.118 I will explore the theoretical linkages of these occurrences in detail in later chapters. However, in brief, from a theoretical standpoint, I argue that during the 2001 and 2003 peace talks, the Maoist armed conflict was not yet 'ripe'119 for resolution. By late 2005, when the 12-Point Understanding had been signed, a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS)120 was developing between the Maoists and the 116 Interview with Bishnu Poudel (13.07.2017). 117 Interview with Pradeep Gyawali (10.07.2017). 118 Interview with Beduram Bhusal (14.07.2017). 119 For an in-depth understanding of conflict ripeness, see Chapter 3, or, for instance, Zartman & Touval (1985), Zartman (1989, 2000, 2001). 120 See, for instance, Zartman (2002).
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