Complexities of Representation: Chinese Outbound Tourists as De Facto Ambassadors in Southern Africa

Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 108 Complexities of Representation: Chinese Outbound Tourists as De Facto Ambassadors in Southern Africa Obert Hodzi1 Yu-Wen Chen2 Abstract Exploring the representational effect of tourism, this study examines factors that influence perceptions that Chinese outbound tourists are representatives or de facto ambassadors of the Chinese government advancing its national objectives abroad. The paper finds that the Chinese government is ambivalent, and at times inconsistent about endowing individual tourists with the responsibility to serve as its de facto ambassadors. In addition, the paper argues that the role of tourism in China’s bilateral relations with South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe influence general perceptions among bureaucrats and elites in the three countries that Chinese outbound tourists are representatives of the Chinese government. Keywords: Outbound Tourism, Tourists, Representation, China, Bilateral Relations Introduction For political elites in select Southern African countries, what does Chinese tourism represent? Do they regard Chinese tourists as representatives of the Chinese government, advancing its national objectives abroad?3 What is the representational power of Chinese tourists to the making of Sino-African people-to-people engagement and foreign policy relations? In general, the study of interlink between tourism (and tourists) and a country’s national interests is crucial to understanding the ‘instrumentalisation’ of tourism, which increasingly, beyond the revenue and tourism statistics, has ‘representational meaning’ in state-to-state relations. This is essential because as put by Linda Richter, tourism is generally seen “largely in economic terms, with little awareness of its potential political impact” (1989:3). Important to note is that, the representational meaning is not universal but contextual and relatable to a country’s national interests and foreign policy objectives. It is therefore an idea that is given localized geospatial meanings. For instance, in basic terms and based on findings of our empirical research in China and Southern Africa, for Beijing, burgeoning outbound tourism represent national rejuvenation and realisation of the ‘China Dream’, evoking nationalism and legitimation of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The fact that in 2018, Chinese travelers made a total of 149.72 million outbound trips, spending over US$120 billion, solidifies the image of a prosperous and confident China on path to becoming a ‘moderately prosperous society’. For Zimbabwe, an 1 Obert Hodzi is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Liverpool. Email: [email protected] 2 Yu-Wen Chen is Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Helsinki. Email: julie.ch[email protected]i 3 In this paper, we use the term [unofficial] representatives, agents, and [unofficial or citizen] ambassadors interchangeably mostly for our analytical framing, although sometimes Chinese literature also refers to these terms. Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 109 Approved Destination Status (ADS) and subsequent hosting of Chinese tourists represent its burgeoning bilateral relations with Beijing, and its regional competitiveness - proving to the West that it has political legitimacy. On the other hand, in Namibia, Chinese tourists represent its independence from a historical dominance by South Africa over its tourism industry and economy - suggesting its ability to compete with Pretoria for Chinese tourists as an equal-status sovereign nation. In sum, the three examples, which are discussed in detail in this paper, imply that the same group of Chinese tourists can represent and have different meanings attributed to them in relation to a country’s national interests and foreign policy objectives. The representations are, however, the consequences of actors and processes often situated outside the contours of the state and its foreign policy making processes. They depend on flows of tourists, and their individual and collective behaviour abroad. In addition, perceptions of national tourism agencies and other stakeholders in the hospitality industry regarding tourists from abroad matter, and feed into production of the representations. Suggesting the critical role played by tourism in advancing national objectives and shaping of states’ foreign policies. Existing scholarship in International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis eschews this political and representational role of tourists and tourism, particularly outbound tourism. This is because tourism, whether inbound or outbound, has generally been considered too private and ad hoc to systematically influence foreign policy or national objectives; or in cases where a link is made between tourism and foreign policy, it is regarded as a soft power instrument (Kwek, Wang & Weaver, 2013; Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016; Xu, Wang & Song, 2018). However, the rise of China’s state-driven outbound tourism is demanding a relook on the role of tourism in foreign policy. This paper contributes to this critical and emerging debate on the instrumentalisation of tourists by states to advance foreign policy objectives. Specifically, it explores how and why Chinese outbound tourists have come to be seen in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia as representatives or de facto ambassadors of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Notably, there is no lack of impressionistic observations framing Chinese tourists as instruments of China’s soft power. For instance, Kwek, Wang and Weaver, by using “analytical auto-ethnography to explore the package tour experience of overseas Chinese,” argue that China’s “international tourism policies highlight the interdependency between inbound tourism growth, economic development and soft power projections” (2013:37). Similarly, Xu, Wang and Song maintain that through its ADS scheme, promotion of tourism culture activities abroad, use of tourism as a form of foreign aid and strengthening of bilateral tourism cooperation, the Chinese government is increasing “China’s soft power through outbound tourism” (2018:6). Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 110 However, there is a dearth of empirically grounded scholarship on the role of tourism, in particular, Chinese outbound tourism in Beijing’s foreign policy. In arguing that the Chinese state instrumentalises outbound tourism to achieve its national objectives, this paper goes beyond the tourism-as-soft-power argument and contributes to the development of empiricallybased research by focusing on Chinese tourism in three Southern African countries; South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The three countries were selected for two reasons. Among the 16 countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - a regional organization of countries in the Southern Africa region, the three are among Southern Africa’s biggest tourist destinations with the most significant tourist attractions; Kruger National Park (South Africa), Victoria Falls (Zimbabwe) and the Namib Desert (Namibia). Between 2009 and 2017, according to the World Bank, Zimbabwe and South Africa were Southern Africa’s top two receivers of international tourists (see table 1 below). Second, although Mozambique and Botswana received more international tourists than Namibia, their national tourism boards do not focus on Chinese tourists. Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have the ADS, enabling them to market their tourist destinations in China and, among the 16 SADC countries, they have had the most significant tourist marketing campaigns and have tourism marketing offices in China (Chen & Duggan, 2016). Their interaction with Beijing and contact with Chinese tourists make them useful in investigating factors influencing perceptions, in the three countries, that Chinese tourists are representatives of the Chinese government. Table 1: International Tourism - Number of Arrivals (in thousands) Rank (200917) Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 1 South Africa 7 012 8 074 8 339 9 188 9 537 9 549 8 904 10 044 10 285 80 932 2 Zimbabwe 2 017 2 239 2 423 1 794 1 833 1 880 2 057 2 168 2 423 18 834 3 Mozambique 1 461 1 718 1 902 2 113 1 886 1 661 1 552 1 639 1 447 15 379 4 Botswana 1 721 1 973 .. 1 614 1 544 1 966 1 528 1 574 .. 11 920 Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 111 Table 1: International Tourism - Number of Arrivals (in thousands) Rank (200917) Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 5 Namibia 980 984 1 027 1,079 1 176 1 320 1 388 1 469 1 499 10 922 6 Mauritius 871 935 965 965 993 1 038 1 151 1 275 1 342 9 535 7 Tanzania 695 754 843 1,043 1 063 1 113 1 104 1 233 1 275 9 123 8 Eswatini 908 868 879 888 968 939 873 947 921 8 191 9 Zambia 710 815 920 859 915 947 932 956 1 083 8 137 10 Malawi 755 746 767 770 795 819 805 849 837 7 143 11 Lesotho 344 426 398 423 433 1 079 1 082 1 196 1 137 6 518 12 Angola 366 425 481 528 650 595 592 397 261 4 295 13 Seychelles 158 175 194 208 230 233 276 303 350 2 127 14 Madagascar 163 196 225 256 196 222 244 293 255 2 050 15 Congo, Dem. Rep. 53 81 186 167 191 334 354 351 .. 1 717 16 Comoros 11.3 15.3 18.8 22.8 21.9 22.8 23.6 26.8 28 191.3 Source: World Bank Considering that the three countries have the most elaborate campaigns to attract Chinese tourists (Kromberg, 2014; Chen & Duggan, 2016), we selected them to examine whether they regarded Chinese tourists to be representatives of the Chinese government , able to advance its foreign policy objectives in the countries. Furthermore, we explore whether the Chinese government regard Chinese tourists as its representatives abroad. In investigating these issues, we argue that the representation of tourism in China’s bilateral relations with the three Southern African countries influence perceptions that Chinese outbound tourists are agents of Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 112 the Chinese government. This argument is based on findings deduced from expert interviews we conducted in China and the three countries. Details of the interviews and the sensitivity of conducting research on China in the three countries is discussed in the next section. The sections that follow analyse the incorporation of Chinese tourists into Beijing’s foreign policy processes; the instrumentalisation of Chinese outbound tourists and factors influencing perceptions that Chinese tourists are representatives of Beijing. The conclusion sums up the main implications. Researching Chinese tourism in Southern Africa: the tourists, elites and the sensitivities Research on China related matters in Africa is often problematic due to the secretive nature of some African governments’ engagement with China (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013:12). From our experience, even the seemingly ‘politically unencumbered’ subject of Chinese outbound tourism is considered sensitive by some government officials in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia making access to information on the subject a challenge for researchers. At the same time, Chinese tourists in group tours, such as the ones we encountered in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe simply have too strict and heavy-laden itineraries to spare a moment for an interview. For instance, the two groups that we managed to informally engage with were seemingly uncomfortable discussing in public whether they represented the Chinese government’s national interests in their touristic activities. The sensitivity and discomfort of both the government officials and Chinese tourists suggest, in some respects, the political and diplomatic signification of Chinese outbound tourism to Africa. Regardless, in examining why the three Southern African countries regard Chinese tourists as representatives of China, it seemed prudent to focus on experts and policyimplementers. This is because our focus was to examine perceptions of national tourism agencies, who have a mandate to market their countries as tourist destinations in China; and actors in the hospitality industry, who host Chinese tourists. Yet, accessing these experts in Zimbabwe, China, South Africa and Namibia proved to be challenging, but surmountable because of gatekeepers who required convincing about the academic objectives of the research. Inevitably, there were several last-minute cancellations because some high-level government officials withdrew their consent to being interviewed. For example, an official in a local governmental tourist agency in Cape Town, South Africa cancelled a confirmed interview appointment without explanation and stopped responding to emails. Accordingly, negotiating for an audience with the experts and/or their gatekeepers constituted an integral part of our research preparation. Regardless, our research was guided by qualitative approaches, and data collected Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 113 between June and October 2017 in Windhoek, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Victoria Falls, Harare and Beijing. The main sources of data were key informant interviewees selected for their expertise in Chinese tourism as well as their strategic and professional positions in government, national tourism agencies, the hospitality industry and tour agencies. In sum, respondents to our face-to-face, semi-structured qualitative interviews can be categorised into four distinct but interdependent tourism stakeholders. (1) Policymakers and implementers; directors in ministries responsible for tourism and directors at national tourism boards. (2) Tourism service providers; tourism agencies bringing Chinese tourists to the three African countries, hoteliers and hospitality associations. That is, umbrella bodies representing the interests of private hotels and actors in the hospitality industry. (3) Chinese tourists in tour groups in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. (4) Academic experts on tourism and China’s foreign policy. To get an understanding of the PRC’s foreign policy objectives regarding Chinese outbound tourists, we interviewed academics specialising in tourism and the foreign policy of China at the Renmin University of China, Peking University, Tsinghua University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, interviewing directors at the Namibia Tourism Board (NTB), the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) and the Department of Tourism in South Africa enabled us to expand our access in the field. The officials we interviewed pointed us to potential interviewees. As noted by Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz, when targeted experts who hold key positions in their organisations are willing to participate, they present: “opportunities for expanding the researcher’s access to the field […] and indicate additional potential interviewees with expertise in a particular field during the interview itself ” (2009: 2). For instance, in Zimbabwe, a highlevel official at the ZTA instructed a junior manager to give us access to statistical data that the junior manager had previously refused to give us access to. In Namibia, an official at the Hospitality Association of Namibia drove us to places where we could meet tour groups of Chinese tourists and referred us to other potential interviewees. However, to reduce the homogeneity of informants’ views and voices in snowball sampling, multiple initial contact points representing a maximum variation were accessed. Nonetheless, considering the sensitivity of China-related issues in the three countries, expert interviews proved to be a difficult but effective means of obtaining critical data that would have been impossible to get without the support of the experts we interviewed. In our case, the expert interviews shortened ‘time-consuming data gathering processes [because we regarded] the experts as ‘crystallization points for practical insider knowledge” and we Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 114 interviewed them “as surrogates for a wider circle of players” (Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009: 2). Accordingly, we gained extensive access to reports and statements on outbound Chinese tourism issued by the governments of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe that were not easily accessible to the public. For example, we were given access to a Memorandum of Understanding signed by China and one of the three countries on the promotion of tourism between the two countries. In sum, we interviewed more than ten expert informants in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and China. Three respondents were heads of national tourism agencies in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. One was a director of tourism in South Africa’s Department of Tourism. Two Chinese tour companies in Windhoek and Cape Town were interviewed. Three other informants work in the tourism industry as hotel front-of-house staff and in hospitality associations in the three countries. In Johannesburg, we interviewed a hotel staff member who participated in a public-private partnership initiative to instruct hotel staff in Mandarin and Chinese culture. In Windhoek, we interviewed, the head of the Hospitality Association of Namibia and in Victoria Falls we interviewed a hotel porter at the Kingdom Hotel. One of the informants is a traditional chief in Victoria Falls. In Beijing, we interviewed academics working on Chinese foreign policy and soft power strategies at the Renmin University of China, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking University. To ensure a holistic view of how China and the Chinese in general are perceived in African countries, brief interviews with locals and Confucius Institute staff at the University of Zimbabwe were also conducted, lasting between 10 and 30 minutes. They offered supplementary information for our analysis. The following sections discuss main factors contributing to general perceptions that the Chinese state regards its outbound tourists as its representatives. Historical analysis of the development of tourism in China China’s historical and political development since 1949 has led to the state playing a dominant role in tourism, controlling both domestic and international travel by Chinese nationals. Thus, tourism was regarded as both a political and strategic foreign policy matter such that, until 1978 the Bureau of Travel and Tourism (BTT), which managed travel agencies in the country was directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the State Council. Yet, even with the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA), the agency in charge of tourism now squarely under the State Council, the government continues to play a leading role in directing China’s tourism policy, developing the tourism industry and instituting domestic and foreign policies Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 115 that subtly influence travel patterns of Chinese tourists. Wooyeal Paik (2019) concurs that the Chinese government maintained, and still maintains a stringent control over these tourists and the tourism industry. Prior to China’s opening up, people-to-people exchange through tourism had a strong emphasis on fostering relationships with then allied countries, such as the Soviet Union and regions like Eastern Europe. The policy was favoured because of “both its long-run economic prospects and the immediate political goodwill and publicity the new hospitality may garner” (Richter, 1989:5). The trend was however, broken by dramatic domestic ruptures like the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident leading to a decline in inbound and outbound tourism (Uysal, Wei & Reid, 1986). At that time, outbound tourism was only limited to state-sanctioned tours, state visits and business travels. There was no self-paying ordinary Chinese. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform era was also a turning point because tourism began to be presented as a tool for economic development and source of foreign currency. From then on, tourism assumed a dual economic and politico-diplomatic role leading some scholars to describe it as “tourism with Chinese characteristics” (Zhang, King and Ap, 1999). Despite the domestic and international implications of the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen, China did not stop developing its inbound tourism industry through the use of various financial incentives and gradually opening up to outbound tourism. Linking inbound tourism to its diplomatic objectives, Beijing invited foreign dignitaries, students, and elites to visit China. The underlying logic was that these visits would increase foreign guests’ acceptance of China, both culturally and politically, fostering mutual understanding and friendship. Despite warnings to the Chinese government by both Western and Chinese scholars that “to know us” does not mean “to love us” (Rawnsley, 2015), the government continues to invite and sponsor foreigners to visit China in an attempt to use tourism as a soft power tool to advance its national interest. Thus, as tourism’s role in economic development grows, its political and foreign policy functions are being consolidated, making Chinese outbound tourism a diplomatic tool for Beijing (Tse, 2013; Chen & Duggan, 2016). One of the elaborate ways that Beijing influences the traveling patterns of Chinese outbound tourists is by imposing tourist bans as a sanctioning tool against countries that happen to offend the PRC. For example, in 2018, China barred its citizens from visiting the Pacific island nation of Palau as a sanction for its diplomatic links with Taiwan. The ban significantly affected Palau’s tourism-dependent economy because China is the country’s largest tourism market. “Chinese tourists accounted for 47 per cent of international visitors to Palau in 2016, Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 116 with Taiwan making up 10 per cent” (South China Morning Post, 2018). In 2017, South Korean government said that “it had learned that Chinese authorities summoned representatives of travel agencies in Beijing […] and instructed them to stop selling South Korean tours” (Mullen, 2017). The ‘tourism sanction’ was in retaliation to South Korea’s decision to host the THAAD missile defense system. In the month after the THAAD launch, South Korea saw a sudden 40 percent plunge in Chinese tourists – who, previously, accounted for nearly 50 percent of all arrivals into the country (Coca, 2018). This imposition of a ‘tourism sanction’ and the historical development of Chinese outbound tourism aid perceptions of interlink between tourism and China’s national objectives as espoused by the Communist Party of China. Another approach that Beijing has used is to support tourism to certain strategically important countries or areas. Tse’s study (2013) gives ample examples such as encouragement of Mainland Chinese to visit the Special Administrative Regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and Macau to help boost their economies as a sign of the motherland’s good will towards the two regions. It is also not a coincidence that China heavily encouraged Chinese tourists to Southeast Asian countries after they were devastated by the tsunami in 2004 as a way of adding credibility to China’s diplomatic discourse that it is benevolent to its neighboring countries (Tse, 2013). The tradition of seeing tourism as a key component of people-to-people exchange that has been in existence even before the Cultural Revolution remains, suggesting that tourism continues to be “an important part of the country’s diplomatic strategy [and] plays an active part in international relations and cooperation with other countries” (Zhang, 2016: 33-34). As further put by Wooyeal Paik, “the political dimension to Chinese outbound tourism expands and results in more political relations in a host country’s local, national, and international contexts” (2019:2). What is missing, however in the discussion of Chinese tourism as a tool for achieving economic, political and foreign policy objectives, is the role of Chinese outbound tourists. To date, there has been no significant inquiry on whether Chinese outbound tourists are indeed acting as unofficial representatives of the PRC in the countries that they travel to. Unless there is a nuanced understanding of the role that Chinese tourists play in advancing ‘perceived’ Beijing’s foreign policy objectives, assertions that China is using tourism as a diplomatic tool and soft power strategy remain abstract and unsubstantiated. Demand for tourists to advance China’s national objectives Socio-economic transformations in China increased the financial capacity of previously disadvantaged Chinese to travel abroad. McKinsey reported in 2018 that from 2010 to 2015, Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 123 leaders of tourism in the region. Accordingly, Chinese tourists represented not just revenue, but state-to-state relations, compelling governments in the three African countries to regard them as ‘unofficial’ representatives of the Chinese government. Perceived preferential treatment of Chinese tourists In Zimbabwe and South Africa perceptions that Chinese tourists are representatives of the Chinese government are not just based on their individual or collective behaviour but on the preferential treatment they allegedly get from the Zimbabwean and South African government. Although none of our interviewees in both countries could specify the forms that the preferential treatment took, they were adamant that the police and immigration officers treated the Chinese better although China is not even their biggest market at all.11 Part of the reason as put by an official at the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority is that there was an impression that Chinese tourists had to be treated better because the Zimbabwean government did not want anything to happen to them that could jeopardise its bilateral relations with China.12 In South Africa and Namibia, government officials made the same assertions, arguing that their focus on the Chinese tourism market was state-driven rather than market-driven. The effect is that Chinese tourists were regarded as representing the broader interests of both China and each of the three Southern African countries hence they were ‘representatives’ of the PRC. In addition, the intervention by government officials in criminal matters involving Chinese tourists contributed to perceptions that the tourists represented China. In all three countries, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, some Chinese on tourist visas were arrested for attempting to smuggle ivory or rhino horns. The cases were reported in local media in a manner that suggested the accused Chinese persons were representative of all the Chinese nationals. While in Namibia the Chinese ambassador issued a statement arguing that the arrested Chinese were not representative of the Chinese government or the Chinese people. In Zimbabwe, some government officials attempted to assist the arrested Chinese to evade justice. This fueled notions that the arrested Chinese were officials or representatives of the Chinese government. Accordingly, based on their association with government officials in Zimbabwe, 11In 2016, 117 144 Chinese tourists visited South Africa making the 6th largest source of tourists. The highest number of tourists to South Africa came from the United Kingdom (447 840), the United States (345 013), Germany (311 832), France (154 226) and the Netherlands (147 973). In comparison, only 9 164 Chinese tourists visited Zimbabwe, making them Zimbabwe’s tenth largest source of tourists, way behind other countries from Asia, such as Japan (22 566) and South Korea (12 956). In Namibia, Chinese tourists (9 722) were not even in the country’s top ten tourists market. 12Interview in Harare, Zimbabwe, 30 June 2017. Obert Hodzi JCIR: Vol. 7, No, 1 (2019) Yu-Wen Chen 124 some Chinese on tourist visas are regarded by locals as representatives of China. In sum, there is a strong perception even among officials in government that the Chinese tourists were representative of the Chinese government in that any harm on them would result in a break-up of diplomatic relations with China hence, in their view, they ought to be treated well to avoid complicating their countries’ diplomatic relations with China. Conclusion As states scramble for a share of China’s outbound tourism, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia are leveraging on their diplomatic, economic and political relations with Beijing. In the process, they are imputing representative responsibilities on Chinese tourists. What is also emerging from our research is that Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are also using Chinese outbound tourism to achieve their foreign policy objectives, particularly enhancing their bilateral relations with China. The distinctive importance of Chinese outbound tourism to bilateral relations between China and Africa was confirmed by interviewees at the NTB, ZTA and the South African Department of Tourism. The officials at the three institutions suggested that the push to attract more Chinese tourists was an executive decision taken by the respective countries’ political leadership. Both the Chinese government and governments of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe are pushing for Chinese tourists as a tool for enhancing bilateral relations, making Chinese tourists a function of international relations and politics. As part of the people-to-people exchange, Chinese tourism to the three countries complements traditional and formal diplomacy. It has significant impact on relations between nations. Accordingly, the Chinese government and Chinese outbound tourists in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia have an implied principal-agent relationship. The Chinese government recognise the implications of badly behaved outbound tourists on its international image, hence it expects Chinese outbound tourists to represent China well. On the other hand, through a combination of patriotism, government sanction on bad behaviour, naming and shaming by fellow Chinese citizens, and perceptions of their representativeness in host countries, Chinese tourists in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia assume the role of de facto representatives of China. Beyond the conduct of Chinese outbound tourists, the use of tourism by the Chinese government to expand bilateral and diplomatic ties with African countries and the exclusion of other countries from the ADS scheme create impressions that Chinese outbound tourists are China’s soft power agents. 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