Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine

RUSSIANS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE Félix Krawatzek, Isabelle DeSisto and George Soroka ZOiS REPORT No.2 / 2023 · May 2023 H RUSSIANS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE Félix Krawatzek, Isabelle DeSisto and George Soroka ZOiS REPORT No.2 / 2023 · May 2023 ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 2 Content 02 ___ Summary 04 ___ Introduction 05 ___ Russians in Georgia and Armenia: Insights into the sample 05 ______ Comparing the profiles of respondents 08 ______ Timing and reasons for migration 10 ______ Shared challenges while abroad 11 ______ Surveying Russians abroad: Methodological note 12 ___ Armenia: A destination for politically active young Russians 12 ______ Progressive young urbanites with liberal social values 13 ______ Political engagement in Russia and Armenia 17 ______ Highly critical about Russian politics 18 ______ Waning interest in Russia’s war in Ukraine 19 ______ International political actors: Uncertainty amidst positive ratings 20 ___ Georgia: Families and more qualified opposition to the Russian regime 20 ______ Social values in line with the average young Russian 21 ______ Periodic political engagement in Russia and Georgia 24 ______ Generally critical of Russian politics 25 ______ Persistently high level of interest in Russia’s war in Ukraine 26 ______ Overall approval for international political actors 27 ___ Conclusion 28 ___ Imprint Summary Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous Russians decided to leave their country. Georgia and Armenia were among the most popular destinations for Russian migrants, either as a temporary stopover or for more permanent relocation. Young urbanites with higher education are disproportionately represented in this wave of migration, which has significant implications for the Russian labour market. The political consequences of the associated demographic changes remain uncertain — on the one hand, the Russian regime has exiled some of its most vocal critics; on the other, the comparatively liberal environments in their host countries might allow exiles to connect with one other and mount a challenge to the Putin regime. Both Armenia and Georgia are readily accessible for migrants, who can remain there de facto indefinitely. Nonetheless, conditions for newly arrived Russians differ significantly between these countries. Armenia remains socially and politically closer to Russia, whereas public criticism of the Russian government and Russian society is more tangible in Georgia. We conducted a face-to-face survey in both countries in late 2022 among a total of more than 1,600 respondents. Although our sample is not random and therefore does not represent the experiences and attitudes of all recent Russian migrants in Armenia and Georgia, our findings illuminate important patterns both within and across countries. The key findings are as follows: ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 3 – Young respondents from cities dominate the samples, with individuals from Moscow and St. Petersburg especially overrepresented. – Half of our samples in both countries have not yet decided for how long they have left Russia. This points to the profound uncertainty this population faces. However, the share of those who see a long-term future for themselves outside of Russia is considerably higher in Armenia than in Georgia: 20 % of Russians interviewed in Armenia say they have left Russia forever, while only 12 % of those interviewed in Georgia say the same. In line with their sense of a more permanent departure from Russia, respondents in Armenia are more likely to state that they no longer feel responsible for Russia’s political future (27 %), while only 19 % of those in Georgia feel the same way. – Adjusting to the host country can be extremely challenging. Respondents frequently say they have experienced difficulties that are both psychological and material — such as trouble finding a place to live or a job. – Russians interviewed in Armenia were more politically active prior to their emigration, both in terms of news consumption and participation in political or civic activities, such as volunteering, donating to NGOs or organising cultural events. Respondents in Armenia were also more likely to report that they had participated in protest events against the war in Ukraine while still living in Russia (26 % in Armenia versus 11 % in Georgia). – Levels of political activism in the host country are significantly higher among our sample in Armenia. The Russians we interviewed in Armenia discuss politics with friends and family members more frequently and are also more likely to consume news online and engage in political discussions on social media than their counterparts in Georgia. They have also forged stronger connections with other migrants from Russia. However, respondents in both countries seldom engage in volunteer activities or participate in protests unrelated to the war in Ukraine. – Migrants’ views on Russian institutions are overwhelmingly negative, particularly among those interviewed in Armenia. By contrast, around 66 % of respondents in Armenia gave a positive rating to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyi but only 46% in Georgia. Attitudes to NATO, the EU, and Western media are also largely positive. – Respondents clearly attribute responsibility for the war to Russian authorities. In Armenia, three-quarters of respondents blame Russian authorities; in Georgia, the figure is nearly two-thirds. Respondents in Georgia continue to monitor the progress of the war more closely: over half said they followed the war ‘very closely’, compared to just over 40 % in Armenia. – Russian migrants in Georgia and Armenia have substantially more liberal social attitudes compared to the general Russian population. This difference is particularly pronounced with regard to tolerance of same-sex relations. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 4 Introduction Emigration from Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 occurred on a scale unprecedented since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.1 Even if precise numbers are hard to come by, at least two ‘peaks’ of migration are evident: one in the initial weeks after the invasion, which lasted through the summer, and another following President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of a ‘partial mobilisation’ on 21 September 2022. The total number of migrants is well over 500,000, with some media reports claiming that it may be closer to one million.2 Earlier migrants were predominantly young urbanites — both men and women — who were on average better educated and more affluent than the Russian population as a whole. The post-mobilisation migrants, meanwhile, were disproportionately military-age men trying to escape conscription. Post-Soviet countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia became popular destinations for those fleeing Russia, alongside countries like Turkey, Brazil, and Thailand. The motives underlying individual decisions to emigrate varied, and individuals often left for a combination of reasons. For some, political repression and the Kremlin’s escalation of the war in Ukraine were the primary motivating factors; others wanted to avoid military service or worried about their economic prospects. This report focuses on the situation of Russians in Armenia and Georgia. Both countries were particularly attractive to those living in the Western part of Russia, as they are geographically proximate and can be entered without a visa. Armenia does not even require an international passport for entry, and regular flights from Russia make the country accessible. Georgia shares a land border with Russia, allowing migrants to bring their vehicles and at least some of their belongings with them. For those intent on leaving Russia, these countries served as ready and relatively inexpensive destinations and, at least for a sub-set of migrants, convenient transit points from which to move to third countries. Moreover, Russians can stay in both countries de facto indefinitely — in Armenia after official registration of their place of residence, and in Georgia provided they exit and re-enter the country at least once a year.3 1 WegratefullyacknowledgethefinancialsupportforthisprojectreceivedfromtheFriedrich EbertFoundation,theHarvardUkrainianResearchInstitute(HURI),theDavisCentreforRussianandEurasianStudiesatHarvard,andHarvard’sMindadeGunzburgCentreforEuropean Studies.ManythanksgotoVarvaraIlyinaandDmitryRudenkinforresearchassistance.We wouldalsoliketoacknowledgeTravisFrederick’sinputindesigninganearlierversionofthe survey. 2 TheBellarrivesathalfamillionmigrantsbytheendof2022‘Skol’korossiyanv2022godu uyekhaloizstranyinevernulos’’,30December2022,https://thebell.io/skolko-rossiyan-v2022-godu-uekhalo-iz-strany-i-ne-vernulos,whereastheWashingtonPostclaimsthatthenumberislikelytobeonemillionattheupperendofthescale:‘RussiansabandonwartimeRussia inhistoricexodus’,13February2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/13/ russia-diaspora-war-ukraine/. ForbesRussiahasreportedthatsome700,000fledRussiaafter Putin’sannouncementof‘partialmobilisation’alone,thoughtheKremlinhasdisputedthis figure‘Rossiyuposle21sentyabryapokinuliokolo700000grazhdan’,4October2022,https:// www.forbes.ru/society/478827-rossiu-posle-21-sentabra-pokinuli-okolo-700-000-grazdan. 3 Fortheentryrequirements,see‘Visarequirementsforforeigners’,https://www.mfa.am/en/visa [lastaccessed11April2023]aswellas‘Georgianvisainformation’,https://www.geoconsul.gov. ge/HtmlPage/Html/View?id=956&lang=Eng[lastaccessed11April2023]. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine  5 Socio-political contexts, however, differ markedly between Armenia and Georgia. Armenians use the Russian language far more often than Georgians and the atmosphere for Russians tends to be more welcoming. Yerevan maintains better relations with Moscow than Tbilisi, making it a less hospitable destination for the most politically active dissidents. At the same time, it has been widely reported that Georgians have been less welcoming of the Russian newcomers, whom some see as failing to assimilate into society and driving up real estate prices. The mass emigration after February 2022 will have major demographic, economic, and political consequences for Russia. On the economic front, these consequences are already perceptible. In late December 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media reported that ‘10 % of the country’s IT workers had left in 2022 and not returned’.4 However, given that a share of these workers can continue to do their jobs remotely, at least for the time being, their departure may have caused less economic disruption than would be the case for other types of workers. The political repercussions are less clear. On the one hand, the Putin regime has effectively exiled some of its most vocal critics; on the other hand, political activists operating from outside Russia now have more freedom to connect with each other and criticise the Russian government. Thus, while the consequences of this migration are already being felt in Russia, it is impossible to predict its full impact. Russians in Georgia and Armenia: Insights into the sample Comparing the profiles of respondents We designed and fielded face-to-face surveys of Russian citizens living in Georgia (Tbilisi and Batumi) and Armenia (Yerevan). These three cities are known to be the most popular destinations in these countries for those who have recently left Russia. Interviews took place between late November 2022 and early January 2023. Eligibility was based on Russian citizenship, rather than language, to avoid sampling Russian-speaking respondents from Ukraine, Belarus, or elsewhere. At the end of the survey, interviewers were asked to assess the demeanour of each respondent; most indicated that subjects felt either absolutely at ease or mostly comfortable. The length of the interviews is indicative of a generally high level of comfort. The average interview in Armenia lasted 16 minutes, with the shortest being six minutes and the longest over 90 minutes. In Georgia, meanwhile, the average interview lasted 12 minutes, while the longest ran for nearly two hours. We surveyed 853 respondents in Georgia (60 % in Tbilisi and 40 % in Batumi) and 801 in Armenia’s capital Yerevan. The two samples differ substantially from the overall Russian population in their demographic composition. The 4 ‘RussiansabandonwartimeRussiainhistoricexodus’,13February2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/13/russia-diaspora-war-ukraine/. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 6 average age of respondents in our sample is significantly lower and men are overrepresented compared to the Russian population at large ( TABLE1). We also observe a noticeable difference in marital status between the samples: in Georgia, around 58 % of respondents stated that they were either married or in a civil partnership, whereas in Armenia this figure was only 45 %. This difference is reflected in family composition: while one-third of respondents in Georgia stated that they have children, less than 15 % of those in Armenia have children. The sociodemographic differences suggest that Georgia is a more attractive destination for older respondents with families, as many Russians perceive the quality of life there as higher. Armenia, by contrast, is more popular among younger Russians with more limited resources ( FIGURE1).5 Nevertheless, the actual costs of living in the two countries are fairly similar if we look at indicators such as rental prices or groceries, and the two countries’ GDP per capita is comparable. Both have also experienced high economic growth in the last year, aided by the inflow of economically active young Russians.6 5 MariaKuznetsova,aspokeswomanfortheRussianhumanrightsgroupOVD-Info,whoisbased inTbilisi,Georgia.Inreality,thepre-warcostoflivingdoesnotappeartodiffersubstantially acrossthetwocountries:‘Kudapoyekhat’—vGruziyuiliArmeniyu’,13March2020,https:// www.skyscanner.ru/news/kuda-luchshe-poekhat-gruzia-ili-armenia-sravnenie. 6 IMF,‘PressReleaseNo.22/374’,7November2022,https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/11/06/pr22374-Georgia-IMF-Reaches-Staff-Level-Agreement-First-Review-GeorgiaStand-By-ArrangementandIMF,‘PressReleaseNo.22/77’,17March2022,https://www.imf. org/en/News/Articles/2022/03/16/pr2277-armenia-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-sixthreview-stand-by-arrangement. Armenia Georgia Russia (2010Censusdata) Gender Female 34.80 % 39.70 % 53.80 % Male 65.20 % 60.30 % 46.20 % Age Averageage 30.1 32.6 39 Settlement size Citywithpopulation>1million 86.30 % 81.40 % 19.75 % Cityof500kto1millioninhabitants 4.50 % 9.80 % 11.03 % Cityof250kto500kinhabitants 4.70 % 4.90 % 8.50 % Cityof100kto250kinhabitants 1.10 % 1.60 % 9.87 % Settlementwithapopulation<100k 2.50 % 1.40 % 50.84 % Place of residence Moscow 54.10 % 31.10 % 8.01 % St.Petersburg 19.40 % 16.90 % 3.42 % Source: ‘Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2010 goda’, No. 491 – 492, 19 – 31 December 2011, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2011/0491/perep01.php as well as ‘Vserossiyskaya perepis’ naseleniya 2010’, https://gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm [last accessed 11 April 2023]. TABLE 1 Demographic composition SamplesofthesurveycomparedtotheoverallRussianpopulation ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine  7 The level of education among respondents is higher than that of the Russian population overall. In both Georgia and Armenia, the share of respondents who have completed higher education (including specialist training or degrees at the bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral level) is over 70 %. According to OECD data from 2019, the share of Russians between 25 and 34 years old with tertiary education was 63 %.7 If we restrict our sample to that age range, we find that 79 % of respondents have higher education credentials. The vast majority of respondents in both countries (over two-thirds) worked full-time before leaving Russia. Smaller shares were working part-time, studying, or caring for a family member. Only around 3 % of respondents in Armenia and 7 % in Georgia were unemployed prior to their departure. Consistent with numerous media reports about the disproportionate outflow of workers in the information technology sector, a sizeable share of respondents in both countries were employed in IT: 27 % in Georgia and 37 % in Armenia. While only individuals with Russian citizenship were eligible to participate in our survey, we do observe variation in respondents’ ethnicities. Those who self-identify as ethnic Russians make up around 89 % of the sample in Georgia, whereas this share is substantially lower in Armenia (69 %). In the latter sample, around 8 % of respondents are Russian citizens but have now returned to Armenia and see themselves first and foremost as Armenians. Respondents also identify with other national groups found in Russia, such as Tatars, Ingrians, Ossetians, and Komi. 7 ‘EducationataGlance:OECDIndicators’,2019,https://www.oecd.org/education/education-ata-glance/EAG2019_CN_RUS.pdf. 21.5% 58.6% 18.0% 2.0% 20.9% 47.2% 23.4% 8.4% 18–24 25–34 35–49 50+ Armenia Georgia Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of Russians in Georgia (853) and Armenia (801), 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE1 How old are you? СколькоВамлет? Armenia Georgia The share of respondents who have completed higher education is over 70 %. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 14 sample. While reliable numbers concerning how many Russians have actually taken part in a protest event are unavailable, a 2021 Levada Center poll found that only 17 % of respondents would entertain the idea of participating in a mass political protest; we can assume that a far lower percentage has actually done so. These data indicate that the population we surveyed is far more mobilised than most Russians.15 Among respondents in Armenia, higher education, being a woman, and having left Russia before the declaration of the partial mobilisation are all associated with more frequent participation in political and civic activities. Similarly, those without children participated in political and civic activities back in Russia more often than those who have children. More educated respondents were more likely to have engaged in political discussions with friends and family, and men tended to discuss politics more frequently than women. When asked about their participation in demonstrations related to Russia’s war in Ukraine, 26 % of respondents in Armenia said they had joined a proUkraine demonstration while living in Russia ( FIGURE7). As documented by the human rights organisation OVD-Info, Russian authorities have responded harshly to such protests, with nearly 15,000 people arrested across the country during the first weeks of the war alone.16 The level of participation 15 ‘Protestnyyenastroyeniya’,10December2021,https://www.levada.ru/2021/12/10/protestnyenastroeniya-3/ 16 ‘Netvoyne’,14March2022,https://reports.ovdinfo.org/no-to-war. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) 17.5% 82.5% 0.1% 25.7% 74.2% Yes, in support of Russia Yes, in support of Ukrainе No, I have not taken part in such actions While in Georgia/Armenia While in Russia 17.5% 82.5% 0.1% 25.7% 74.2% Yes, in support of Russia Yes, in support of Ukrainе No, I have not taken part in such actions While in Georgia/Armenia While in Russia FIGURE7 Armenia: Have you taken part in demonstrations in support of or against the war (Russia’s ‘special military operation’)? ПринималилиВыучастиевакцияхвподдержкуилипротиввойны (специальнойвоеннойоперацииРоссии)? WhileinArmenia WhileinRussia 26 % of respondents in Armenia said they had joined a pro-Ukraine demonstration while living in Russia. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine  15 in pro-Ukraine demonstrations in Armenia is lower — still, its very existence suggests that Russians in Armenia are well connected with one another, particularly those we interviewed in Yerevan. Those most likely to say that they participated in a pro-Ukraine demonstration in Russia or Armenia were younger, female, well-educated and lived in Moscow or St. Petersburg. They were also more likely to have left before September 2022. Indeed, those who left between January and September 2022 were nearly three times as likely to have participated in war-related protests in Armenia as those who left afterwards, and women were twice as likely as men to have done so. While this points to the more political nature of the first wave of emigration, it also suggests that time in the host country enables migrants to network with one another, forming a basis for their political activism. We also asked a set of questions about the future of politics in Russia. A plurality (38 %) of respondents in Armenia said they do feel personal responsibility for Russia’s political future. A remarkably large share of the Armenian sample (27 %) stated that they used to feel responsible but no longer do ( FIGURE8). Given that the Armenian sample is composed of many young and politically active Russians, this figure indicates a strong sense of disillusionment with Russian politics. It also suggests that the longer migrants live abroad, the more estranged they feel from their country of origin. A further 28 % said that they never felt responsible for Russia’s political future. Underscoring the importance of time spent in migration, Russians who left between January and September 2022 (rather than after the partial mobilisation) were more likely to state that they no longer have a sense of responsibility for Russian politics — 31 % as opposed to 21 % of those who left since September 2022. Respondents who left before mobilisation were Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE8 Armenia: Do you feel personally responsible for Russia’s political future? ЧувствуетелиВыличнуюответственностьзаполитическоебудущее России? 38.1% 27.3% 28.2% 6.4% Yes, I do I used to, but now I don't No, never Don't know / Refused The responses in Armenia indicate a strong sense of disillu sionment with Russian politics. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 16 significantly more likely to express a sense of personal responsibility, while those who left afterwards were more likely to say that they have never felt responsible for Russian politics. To get a better sense of the behaviours that might follow from beliefs about personal responsibility for Russia’s political future, we asked whether the respondents think that Russians living abroad are obliged to take action to influence the political situation in Russia. Slightly more than 50 % of respondents in Armenia believe that Russian migrants have such an obligation, despite the growing sense of estrangement from Russian politics in that group ( FIGURE9). This high share relates to the strong level of politicisation within the Armenian sample, but even in this group, 16 % stated they did not know how to respond to the question. The youngest respondents, aged 18 to 24, were the most convinced that Russians abroad should take political action. Based on their responses to this question, we then asked why they did or did not think that Russians abroad should take such action. Respondents who said Russians are obliged to act were given a set of reasons to choose from: ‘Their actions can change the political situation in Russia’; ‘Their actions send a signal to other countries about what Russian citizens are thinking’; and ‘Their actions send a symbolic message to Russians who remain in Russia’. Roughly equal numbers selected each of these options, with around 22 % of respondents in Armenia claiming that exiled Russians can influence the political situation back home. Those who chose to provide their own answer frequently made emotional statements, reasoning, for instance, that ‘one cannot just leave and forget’ or that it was necessary ‘to show that Russian society is not homogeneous’. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE9 Armenia: Do you think that Russians living abroad are obliged to take action to influence the political situation in Russia? СчитаетелиВы,чтороссияне,проживающиезарубежом,обязаны участвоватьвдеятельности,чтобыповлиятьнаполитическуюситуацию вРоссии? 33.2% 50.4% 16.4% No Yes Don't know / Refused No Yes Don't know / Refused ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine  17 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% President Putin Russian media Russian army Very negatively Negatively Generally positively Very positively Don't know / Refused Generally positively Respondents who said that Russians are not obliged to take action to influence the political situation in Russia were given a parallel set of reasons to choose from: ‘Their actions cannot change the political situation in Russia’; ‘Their actions cannot influence how other countries treat Russia’; and ‘Russians living in Russia do not want to hear the opinions of Russians who live abroad’. Around 28 % of this group then chose the first reason. Those who expressed a view that was not in our set of reasons spoke of a feeling of being overwhelmed by the situation and said that they no longer identify with Russia and that ‘politics is for politicians’. Highly critical about Russian politics We also asked respondents to give their evaluations of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian army, and the Russian media. Unsurprisingly, their ratings of Russian institutions were very low ( FIGURE10). As in Russia itself, the Russian army still receives the least negative ratings, relatively speaking, with the worst ratings reserved for the Russian media. Eighty-four per cent express very negative views of the media, a similar share gives very poor ratings of the president, and 70% are equally critical of the army. The share of respondents who avoided giving any rating was also highest in the case of the army. Looking at individual institutions, it is noteworthy that male respondents are less hostile to President Putin and give a much lower rating to the army. Those with lower levels of education also tended to express higher trust in all of these institutions, along with those aged 25 to 49. Still, very few respondents in any category expressed positive attitudes towards any Russian institutions. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE10 Armenia: How do you rate the activities of the following individuals and / or institutions? КакВыоцениваетедеятельностьследующихлици/илиинститутов? Very negatively Negatively Very positively Don’tknow/ Refused ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 18 Waning interest in Russia’s war in Ukraine Interest in the war is flagging among Russians in Armenia ( FIGURE11). Even if a clear majority follows the situation ‘very closely’ or ‘quite closely’, nearly a quarter stated at the end of 2022 that they ‘used to follow [the war] closely, but don’t any longer’. This is consistent with our finding that many respondents in Armenia say they used to feel personally responsible for Russia’s political future but now do not, and reflects the fact that a high share of respondents in Armenia left Russia in early 2022. Forty-seven per cent of those who left before September 2022 continued to follow the war very or quite closely, as opposed to 41 % of those who left after September 2022. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) 43.9% 25.3% 23.0% 3.0% 3.9% 0.9% Very closely Quite closely I used to follow closely, but now I don't I didn't used to, but now I follow closely Without much attention I don't follow it at all 74.7% 1.3% 0.5% 2.5% 13.9% 7.0% Russian authorities Russian citizens Ukrainian authorities Western states / NATO Other Don't know / Refused FIGURE11 Armenia: How closely have you been following the situation in Ukraine since the conflict started in February 2022? НаскольковнимательноВыследилизаситуациейвУкраинесмомента началаконфликтавфеврале2022? FIGURE12 Armenia: In your opinion, who is primarily responsible for the conflict in Ukraine? НаВашвзгляд,ктонесетглавнуюответственностьзаконфликтвУкраине? ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine  19 Three-quarters of respondents in Armenia believe that the Russian authorities are primarily responsible for the war in Ukraine ( FIGURE12). However, the share of those who selected ‘other’ as the responsible party or avoided the question altogether was fairly high. The open-ended responses convey a sense of shared responsibility; people frequently added comments like ‘everyone’ and ‘both parties, but Russia more’, or attributed guilt to the United States alongside Russia and Ukraine. Female respondents were most likely to state that the Russian authorities alone were to blame. International political actors: Uncertainty amidst positive ratings Ratings of both Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyi and Western institutions like NATO were generally high. Respondents in Armenia were particularly well-disposed towards Zelenskyi: 20 % rated him ‘very positively’ and 46 % ‘generally positively’ ( FIGURE13). However, nearly one in five respondents expressed uncertainty about Zelenskyi and gave ‘don’t know’ or ‘prefer not to answer’ responses to this question. Zelenskyi’s ratings were especially positive among respondents who left before the partial mobilisation and among those aged between 35 and 49. A high proportion of respondents (around 30 % in both cases) were unable or unwilling to provide an answer to the question of how they evaluated NATO or Western media. Overall, the EU received generally positive assessments, with 57 % of respondents in Armenia being ‘very’ or ‘generally’ positive about the EU. Approval of Western media and NATO was significantly lower. This may reflect both a general mistrust in the media and a belief that NATO is at least partially responsible for escalating the war in Ukraine Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 801 Russians in Armenia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% European Union NATO Western media President Zelenskyi Very negatively Negatively Generally positively Very positively Don't know / Refused FIGURE13 Armenia: How do you rate the activities of the following individuals and / or institutions? КакВыоцениваетедеятельностьследующихлици/илиинститутов? Generally positively Very negatively Negatively Very positively Don’tknow/ Refused ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 20 Georgia: Families and more qualified opposition to the Russian regime Social values in line with the average young Russian Attitudes towards same-sex relations among our Russian respondents in Georgia correspond broadly to those held by Russians of a similar age in Russia.17 In Georgia, 63 % of respondents stated that consenting adults should ‘definitely’ or ‘generally’ have the right to engage in same-sex relations, while 37 % said they should not ( FIGURE14). This is by and large in line with the attitudes of Russians aged 18 to 24 in Russia (53 % approve, 39 % disapprove), who are far more accepting of homosexuality than older Russians. In the Georgian sample, approval of same-sex relations tends to be higher among single people and those with higher education. The aforementioned Levada survey also finds an important gender difference, with women being more likely to approve of same-sex relations (28 % versus 20 % for men). We did not, however, detect any significant gender differences in our results in Georgia. Russians in Georgia are considerably more tolerant of homosexuality than the overall Georgian population. According to a 2017 Pew survey, 93 % of Georgians believe that homosexuality should not be accepted by society, although young Georgians are more tolerant than those aged 35 and older.18 17 ‘OtnosheniyerossiyankLGBTlyudyam’,15October2021,https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/15/ otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-lgbt-lyudyam/. 18 ‘Socialviewsandmorality’,10May2017,https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/05/10/ social-views-and-morality/. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 853 Russians in Georgia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) 35.6% 27.7% 13.7% 23.1% Definitely yes Generally yes Generally no Definitely no Ergebnis FIGURE14 Georgia: Do you think that consenting adults have the right to enter into a relationship with people of the same sex? КакВысчитаете,имеютлиправовзрослыелюдиповзаимномусогласию вступитьвотношенияслюдьмитогожепола? ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 21 Periodic political engagement in Russia and Georgia We also asked Russian respondents in Georgia about their levels of political and civic engagement in the six months before leaving Russia. Only 36 % indicated that they had been involved in at least one of the following activities: participating in a protest unrelated to Ukraine; volunteering; donating to an NGO or helping Ukrainian refugees ( FIGURE15). Nevertheless, at 14 %, the share of respondents who said they had participated in a protest unrelated to events in Ukraine reflects a far higher level of protest participation than is typical in Russia. Individuals with higher education and those without children were more likely to report engaging in political or civic activities. This was also the case among those who left Russia before the partial mobilisation was declared. Respondents in a long-term partnership, as well as those between 18 and 24 years of age, were more likely to watch political news online, discuss politics with friends, or post political comments on social media. Overall, 92 % of the sample reported engaging in at least one of these activities. Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 853 Russians in Georgia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE15 Georgia: Were you involved in the following activities during the 6 months before you left Russia? ПринималилиВыучастиевследующихдействияхвтечение6месяцевдо ВашегоотъездаизРоссии? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Watch political broadcasts / videos Discuss politics on social media Discuss politics with friends / family Volunteer in my area Donate to NGOs Help Ukrainian refugees Protests unrelated to events in Ukraine Organise cultural events No Yes No Yes ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 22 When asked about their participation in demonstrations against Russia’s war in Ukraine, 11 % of respondents in Georgia said they had participated in such events back in Russia, while 7 % had taken part in anti-war protests since arriving in Georgia ( FIGURE16). Several factors increased the likelihood of an individual participating in a pro-Ukraine demonstration while still living in Russia. Younger respondents, individuals from Moscow and St. Petersburg, and those who left before the declaration of the partial mobilisation were more likely to have protested in Russia. Among respondents aged 18 to 24, 14 % declared that they had participated in anti-war protests compared to 7 % of those aged 35 to 49. The level of protest participation was quite high among those who left between January and September 2022 (15 %) and much lower among those who left Russia after September 2022 (8 %). 0.1% 7.0% 92.8% 1.0% 11.0% 88.0% Yes, in support of Russia Yes, in support of Ukrainе No, I have not taken part in such actions While in Georgia/Armenia While in Russia Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 853 Russians in Georgia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE16 Georgia: Have you taken part in demonstrations in support of or against the war (Russia’s ‘special military operation’)? ПринималилиВыучастиевакцияхвподдержкуилипротиввойны (специальнойвоеннойоперацииРоссии)? WhileinGeorgia WhileinRussia Regarding participation in pro-Ukraine demonstrations while in Georgia, we observe similar trends in age and time of departure. Individuals who left before the partial mobilisation were more likely to have protested abroad: 12 % compared to just 4 % of those who left afterwards. Similarly, those aged 18 to 24 were twice as likely to have participated in protests in Georgia than respondents in the 35–49 age group (10 % vs 5 %). The share of respondents in Georgia who reported feeling responsible for Russia’s political future is well below 40 % ( FIGURE17). The share of those who have never felt such a sense of responsibility is almost 30 %, while a considerable fraction did not know how to react to the question. Women and respondents interviewed in Tbilisi more frequently reported feeling a sense of personal responsibility than men and those who were interviewed in Batumi. 11 % said they had participated in demonstrations against the war back in Russia. ZOiS Report 2 / 2023 Russians in the South Caucasus: Political Attitudes and the War in Ukraine 23 In Georgia, respondents were evenly split on the question of whether Russians abroad are obliged to take action to influence the political situation in Russia: nearly 40 % said they are, while another 40 % said they are not. The remaining respondents were undecided ( FIGURE18). Forty per cent of respondents who said Russians are obliged to act believe that their actions would ‘Send a signal to other countries about what Russian citizens are thinking’. Another 27 % indicated that ‘Their actions can change the political situation in Russia’, and a further 20 % said that they would ‘Send a symbolic message to Russians who remain in Russia’. Respondents who felt that Russians are not obliged to act most often expressed a sense of disillusionment, with 40 % agreeing that ‘Their actions Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 853 Russians in Georgia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI) FIGURE18 Georgia: Do you think that Russians living abroad are obliged to take action to influence the political situation inRussia? СчитаетелиВы,чтороссияне,проживающиезарубежом,обязаны участвоватьвдеятельности,чтобыповлиятьнаполитическуюситуацию вРоссии? 38.6% 39.6% 21.8% No Yes Don't know / Refused 36.9% 18.5% 29.4% 15.1% Yes, I do I used to, but now I don't No, never Don't know / Refused Diagrammtitel FIGURE17 Georgia: Do you feel personally responsible for Russia’s political future? ЧувствуетелиВыличнуюответственностьзаполитическоебудущее России? Source: Data from ZOiS / Harvard / FES survey of 853 Russians in Georgia, 18+, conducted in December 2022 (CAPI)