Outer space and the Arctic: Connections, opportunities, challenges

Byers, Michael Working Paper Outer space and the Arctic: Connections, opportunities, challenges CIGI Papers, No. 303 Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario Suggested Citation: Byers, Michael (2024) : Outer space and the Arctic: Connections, opportunities, challenges, CIGI Papers, No. 303, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo (Ontario) This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303171 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 Outer Space and the Arctic: Connections, Opportunities, Challenges Michael Byers CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 Outer Space and the Arctic: Connections, Opportunities, Challenges Michael Byers About CIGI The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is an independent, non-partisan think tank whose peer-reviewed research and trusted analysis influence policy makers to innovate. Our global network of multidisciplinary researchers and strategic partnerships provide policy solutions for the digital era with one goal: to improve people’s lives everywhere. Headquartered in Waterloo, Canada, CIGI has received support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario and founder Jim Balsillie. À propos du CIGI Le Centre pour l’innovation dans la gouvernance internationale (CIGI) est un groupe de réflexion indépendant et non partisan dont les recherches évaluées par des pairs et les analyses fiables incitent les décideurs à innover. Grâce à son réseau mondial de chercheurs pluridisciplinaires et de partenariats stratégiques, le CIGI offre des solutions politiques adaptées à l’ère numérique dans le seul but d’améliorer la vie des gens du monde entier. Le CIGI, dont le siège se trouve à Waterloo, au Canada, bénéficie du soutien du gouvernement du Canada, du gouvernement de l’Ontario et de son fondateur, Jim Balsillie. Credits Managing Director and General Counsel Aaron Shull Director, Program Management Dianna English Program Manager Jenny Thiel Senior Publications Editor Jennifer Goyder Publications Editor Christine Robertson Graphic Designer Sami Chouhdary Copyright © 2024 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. For publications enquiries, please contact [email protected]. The text of this work is licensed under CC BY 4.0. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. For reuse or distribution, please include this copyright notice. This work may contain content (including but not limited to graphics, charts and photographs) used or reproduced under licence or with permission from third parties. Permission to reproduce this content must be obtained from third parties directly. Centre for International Governance Innovation and CIGI are registered trademarks. 67 Erb Street West Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2 www.cigionline.org Table of Contents vi About the Author 1 Executive Summary 1 Introduction 1 Space and the Arctic 5 Space and Arctic Security 11 Conclusion 12 Works Cited vi CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 • Michael Byers About the Author Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. Michael has been a fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University; professor of law at Duke University; visiting professor at the universities of Cape Town, Tel Aviv, Nord (Norway) and Novosibirsk (Russia); and senior global fellow at the University of St Andrews. He is the author of International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge University Press, 2013) and the co-author of Who Owns Outer Space? (Cambridge University Press, 2023). Both volumes were awarded the Donner Prize for the best book on public policy by a Canadian. 1Outer Space and the Arctic: Connections, Opportunities, Challenges Executive Summary Satellites support communications, navigation, security, search and rescue and scientific research across the Arctic. The number of satellites is growing quickly, creating opportunities for growth and development. However, the increased use of space also carries risks for national and regional governments, local communities, Indigenous organizations and companies. Satellites are vulnerable to system failures, deliberate attacks and natural forces such as solar storms. Redundancies of all kinds are needed to protect against these risks. For instance, ground-based navigational aids to aviation should be maintained, notwithstanding the cost-saving attractions of GPS. At the same time, satellites contribute to Arctic security through an enhanced understanding of what potential adversaries are doing — or not doing. One of the great geopolitical risks in the Arctic involves security dilemmas, where states feel compelled to build up their military capabilities in an escalating series of responses to suspected increases by others. Satellites help to prevent unnecessary escalations, accidents and arms races. Introduction Humanity is expanding quickly into outer space (“space”) as a result of new technologies and a dramatic increase in the capabilities of private space companies. These developments create opportunities for growth and development in the Arctic, where satellites already support communications, navigation, surveillance, security, search and rescue, disaster relief, forest firefighting, weather forecasting, fishing, prospecting, education, health care and environmental research. Moreover, most Earth observation satellites, used for everything from intelligence gathering to seaice monitoring, are placed in polar orbits. These orbits are roughly perpendicular to the equator and therefore converge over the Arctic. For this reason, the world’s largest satellite ground station is located in the region, on the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard (Filipova and Fountain 2021), while two smaller ground stations are located at Inuvik, Northwest Territories (Kongsberg Satellite Services [KSAT] 2019).1 Ground-based infrastructure is another way that developments in space can spur growth and development in the Arctic. At the same time, a growing reliance on space also carries risks, including system failures, deliberate attacks and natural forces such as solar storms. National and regional governments, local communities, Indigenous organizations and companies should embrace the opportunities presented by developments in space, while planning for risks and maintaining terrestrial systems as backups. Space and the Arctic both play a role in global security, although there is little evidence of an arms race in space, and no reason to believe that Russia or China pose major threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Satellites are an important tool for maintaining peace and stability in the region. Space and the Arctic Space and the Arctic are closely connected in multiple ways, from astrophysics to culture, communications, navigation, search and rescue and environmental science. The Arctic Only Exists Because of Space The Arctic environment only exists because of space, since the extreme seasons that define the region are a consequence of Earth’s orbital mechanics, most notably the tilt of the planet as it orbits the sun.2 This leads to the absence of sunlight in winter and to 24-hour sunlight in summer in the Earth’s polar regions. The Arctic’s connections with space are also visible in the aurora borealis, created when charged particles from the sun slam into Earth’s magnetic field and are redirected northward, interacting with the upper atmosphere to create a dynamic luminescence.3 Another 1 See https://natural-resources.canada.ca/research-centres-and-labs/ satellite-receiving-stations/satellite-facilities/inuvik-satellite-stationfacility/10953. 2 See https://nsidc.org/learn/parts-cryosphere/arctic-weather-and-climate/ science-arctic-weather-and-climate. 3 See www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/astronomy/northern-lights/what-arenorthern-lights.asp. 2CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 • Michael Byers connection with space is visible in the extreme tides of eastern Nunavut and northern Quebec (Oceans North 2018, 33), which result from the Earth’s interaction with the moon’s gravity. The Inuit, who live in harmony with the seasons, are fully aware of their relationship with space. Kenojuak Ashevak’s Nunavut (Our Land) celebrates the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, which led to a new majority-Inuit territory in Canada in 1999. The 4 m wide lithograph chronicles the annual cycle of Inuit life in a circle revolving around the sun, the moon and the stars.4 Arctic Communications Depend on Satellites In 1962, Canada became the third country with a satellite in orbit.5 Alouette-I was designed to study a layer of the upper atmosphere, called the ionosphere, to understand why Arctic radio communications were disrupted by solar storms. It was named after the folksong voyageurs sang as they paddled the trade routes of northern Canada. Although the satellite was turned off after a decade of scientific service, it remains in orbit today, a piece of Canadian history in the sky (Canadian Space Agency 2023). In 1972, Anik A1 was launched into geosynchronous orbit, about 36,000 km above the equator.6 The world’s first domestic communications satellite, it enabled the CBC to broadcast from coast to coast to coast. “Anik” means “little brother” in Inuktitut. Even today, Nunavut, the largest of Canada’s three northern territories, is entirely dependent on satellites for communications. These have facilitated health care, education, economic development and governance, but there been limitations, because connectivity with the rest of the territory, country and world has been expensive, unreliable and slow (Rabouam 2023). Although satellites like Anik A1 were game changers for the Canadian Arctic, connectivity from geosynchronous orbit suffers from latency, i.e., small delays in reception and transmission, due to the distance that the radio signals have to travel (Seal and Ritchie 2023). Satellite signals 4 See www.historymuseum.ca/blog/nunavut/. 5 See www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/alouette.asp. 6 See www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/multimedia/search/image/156. from geosynchronous orbit also encounter line-of-sight challenges above about 70° north, and generally cannot reach above 75° north. This poses a problem for some communities in Nunavut, notably Pond Inlet (72°), Resolute Bay (74°) and Grise Fiord (76°), while Canadian Forces Station Alert is located at 82° north. Connectivity from geosynchronous orbit has improved somewhat over the decades, due to improved technologies, but an explosion in internet usage has still left operators struggling to meet demand. In 2018, Ottawa-based Telesat launched Telstar 19 VANTAGE (Rogers 2018). This single satellite provided a five-fold increase in broadband connectivity to the Canadian Arctic. Then, in 2021, SSi Canada signed a deal with Luxembourgbased SES to redirect an existing satellite toward northern Canada, providing competition and additional capacity (McKay 2021). However, these improvements have been offset by problems. In 2022, Anik F2, an 18-year-old satellite operated by Telesat, began to fail. The company announced that it would purchase another existing satellite, from an unnamed operator, and redirect it toward the Arctic to maintain capacity (Rainbow 2022). Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit are now being supplemented, and may soon be supplanted, by “mega-constellations” of satellites in low-Earth orbit (Boley and Byers 2021). Located at much lower altitudes, these systems offer lower latency. They also provide greater coverage of the Arctic, because some of the satellites are placed on polar orbits, which brings them within line of sight at all locations. However, because the satellites are at low altitudes and move relative to the Earth’s surface, hundreds, even thousands of them are needed to provide continuous coverage. SpaceX’s Starlink is the current market leader and its terminals, each about the size of a pizza box, are appearing outside homes and businesses across the North (Charron-Leclerc 2023). SpaceX’s ability to compete is augmented by its reusable Falcon 9 rockets and the flat packing of up to 60satellites, each more than 350 kg, into a single payload fairing — the cargo hold on the top of a rocket. SpaceX, which currently has more than 5,500 Starlink satellites in orbit (Pultarova and Howell 2024), is the new game changer for the Canadian Arctic. Heath care, education and commerce will all be advanced. Inuit and First Nations youth can now work for global tech companies or create start-ups of their own. 9Outer Space and the Arctic: Connections, Opportunities, Challenges horrible for the world…the one limiting factor is no debris. Whatever you do, don’t create debris” (quoted in Billings 2015). Widespread awareness and concern about debris help to explain why no state has ever used a kinetic ASAT weapon against a satellite from another state. Satellites Help Prevent “Security Dilemmas” With space-based technologies, it is relatively easy to gather information about military activities, especially in the Arctic where there are relatively few human activities or trees, buildings and other objects that might offer concealment. One example concerns synthetic aperture radar satellites, which — as discussed above — can identify and track ships, even at night and through clouds.20 Another example involves thermal imaging satellites, which are most effective in detecting human activity when temperatures are cold.21 This ability to gather information from space helps to prevent a “security dilemma,” where one state, uncertain about the actions and motives of another, feels compelled to increase its military capabilities. This can lead to an escalating and destabilizing series of responses, even if the initial response was based on incorrect information or assumptions (Herz 1950; Booth and Wheeler 2007). For instance, the re-opening and expansion of Cold War-era military bases in the Russian Arctic has prompted concern, mostly in the Western media (Williams and Novak 2023). Yet it is relatively easy, including with publicly available Google Earth or low-cost Planet imagery, to observe that the changes are modest in scale and appear defensive in character (Walsh and Dean 2022). The tracking of submarines is a more complex matter (Byers 2013, 245), although satellites can be used to detect departures and arrivals in port. Sometimes, synthetic aperture radar satellites might be able to identify changes in wave patterns caused by submerged submarines. However, nuclear missile submarines are the core of the US and Russian nuclear deterrents, as the assets most likely to survive a surprise “first strike.” In other contexts, satellite surveillance can bring greater stability to international relations by helping to prevent security dilemmas, but nuclear missile submarines are different — not 20 See www.earthdata.nasa.gov/learn/backgrounders/what-is-sar. 21 See https://crisp.nus.edu.sg/~research/tutorial/infrared.htm. being able to track them continuously from space is probably a good rather than a bad thing. Russia and Western States Still Cooperate in Space Russia has long cooperated with Western states in the Arctic. This cooperation began during the Cold War, as exemplified by the 1973 Polar Bear Treaty among Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United States.22 By prohibiting the use of helicopters and icebreakers for hunting polar bears, the treaty arrested a sharp decline in bear populations around the region. In 1982, the Soviet Union and the United States led the negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a “constitution for the oceans” containing provisions of direct relevance to the Arctic, such as article 234 on pollution prevention in ice-covered waters and article 76 on coastal state rights over continental shelves extending more than 200 nautical miles from shore).23 In 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev prompted a process of institution building that, after additional Finnish and Canadian leadership, led to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 199124 and the Arctic Council in 1996.25 Although the Arctic Council does not deal with security matters, during the 2010s it grew into the central governance mechanism for the region, initiating the negotiation of the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement26 and other new treaties on oil spill preparedness and response27 and scientific 22 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, 15 November 1973, 30 ILM 13. 23 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 24 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, 4 June 1991, 30 ILM 1624. 25 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation and the United States, 19 September 1996, 35 ILM 1387. 26 Arctic Council, Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States, 12 May 2011, online: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531>. 27 Arctic Council, Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States, 15 May 2013, online: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/ ee4c9907-7270-41f6-b681-f797fc81659f>. 10 CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 • Michael Byers cooperation.28 In 2017, the five Arctic Ocean states along with China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland and the European Union signed a treaty prohibiting commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean until scientific evidence supports its opening.29 A similar history of cooperation exists in space. During the early Cold War, while the Soviet Union and the United States were building intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to fly through space, they were also negotiating four multilateral treaties setting out rights and duties for spacefaring states: the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 2017). In 1975, the Soviet Union and the United States cooperated in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which saw a docking between two spacecraft and a famous handshake in orbit.30 Another marker of cooperation came in 1978 after Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear-powered reconnaissance satellite, malfunctioned and re-entered the atmosphere with more than 50 kg of Uranium-235 on board (Volynskaya 2013). The debris was scattered across the Northwest Territories and, after an expensive recovery effort, Canada requested $6 million in compensation. The Soviet Union denied legal responsibility but paid half of the requested amount.31 Later, in the 1990s, Russia was invited to be a full partner in the International Space Station (ISS), as part of the United States’ more general policy of proactively cooperating with its former adversary during the early post-Cold War period (Sheehan 2007). Russia and Western states have continued to cooperate in space after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The ISS has been functioning normally, with some Western astronauts travelling there in Soyuz spacecraft, and some Russian cosmonauts travelling in SpaceX Crew Dragons. The Cospas28 Arctic Council, Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States, 17 May 2017, online: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/9d1ecc0c-e82a-43b5-9a2f28225bf183b9>. 29 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, Canada, China, Denmark, European Union, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea and the United States, 2018, online: <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/agreement-accord-eng.htm.> 30 See www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/apollo-soyuz/astp_mission.html. 31 Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954,” Canada and Union of Soviet Social Republics, 2 April 1981, 20 ILM 689. Sarsat Programme of satellite-supported search and rescue is also functioning normally. One explanation for this continued cooperation concerns the “cold, dark, and dangerous” character of both the Arctic and space (Byers 2019). In every region, natural factors such as geography, climate and the presence or absence of resources play a role in national interests and policy preferences. In the Arctic and space, a combination of remoteness and extreme conditions makes almost any activity risky and extremely expensive, and this creates an incentive for cooperation and burden sharing. Natural Risks Forest fires, which can damage fibre-optic cables, are not the only natural threats to space-based services in the Arctic. A more serious threat comes from space itself, in the form of solar storms. Solar storms occur with some frequency, and most cause little interference. But a “coronal mass ejection” can be an entirely different matter. Composed of electrons, protons and other particles, these powerful storms are unpredictable in severity, timing, speed and direction. At some point — perhaps next year, perhaps decades from now — the path of a severe coronal mass ejection will coincide with Earth’s orbital position. When that happens, the deluge of high-energy particles will produce an exceptionally strong aurora. In 1859, in what was called the Carrington Event, people in Hawaii could see the Northern Lights (May and Dobrijevic 2022). At the same time, powerful currents will be produced in long conductors. Power grids, telephones and the internet could be rendered inoperable for weeks, months, perhaps even years. Northern countries such as Canada, and especially their Arctic regions, are particularly vulnerable to these effects because Earth’s magnetic field bends inward near the poles. The scale of the damage is directly proportional to a society’s reliance on technology: the more electronics we use, the greater the risk. In 1859, telegraph operators received shocks through their equipment. In 1921, a coronal mass ejection disrupted train services in the United States, while telephone switchboards in Sweden caught fire. In 1989, a much smaller storm, just one-tenth the strength of the 1921 event, overloaded the HydroQuébec grid and left the entire province in darkness for nine hours (Morton 2022). In May 2024, another relatively small storm disrupted GPS signals to 11Outer Space and the Arctic: Connections, Opportunities, Challenges farm tractors across North America, delaying the all-important spring planting (Albeck-Ripka 2024). Satellites themselves are at risk. When the magnetic field becomes energized, it raises the atmosphere, which increases the drag in low orbits. If a satellite’s on-board thrusters are not powerful enough to counter this effect, it can be dragged down, back to Earth. In 2022, a relatively small solar storm caused the loss of 49 SpaceX satellites that had just been deployed to their initial altitude of about 216 km (Andrews 2022). The deluge of high-energy particles from a coronal mass ejection could also damage the electronics on satellites, rendering them defunct. Satellites at all altitudes, including GPS satellites, are exposed to this risk. The odds of a coronal mass ejection striking Earth are about 12 percent per decade (Riley 2012), with the likelihood increasing near the peak of the approximately 11-year solar cycle. During the 2012 peak, a coronal mass ejection narrowly missed Earth. In May 2024, a relatively small coronal mass ejection created large auroras and had some disruptive effects. This could almost be expected: the current solar cycle is predicted to peak in 2025.32 There is good news. It is possible to build resilience into power grids and, in some places, this has already been done. After the 1989 solar storm, Hydro-Québec installed converters that provide some protection against sudden influxes of “direct current” on its transformers. Resilience can also be built into satellites, for instance, with better propulsion systems and shielding against influxes of high-energy particles. All these measures raise costs, which governments and publicly owned companies such as Hydro-Québec can absorb, but which private companies might not incur unless required to do so by regulators. Most crucially, governments and companies can plan for the deliberate turning-off of power grids, fibre-optic networks and satellites — effectively putting them into “safe mode” — before a severe solar storm arrives (Byers 2022). Such a shutdown would have to be initiated as soon as a warning is received: while robotic spacecraft stationed near the sun would provide one, it would arrive only a few hours before the storm itself. For this reason, Canada needs a robust, well-tested national protocol for taking drastic32 See www.swpc.noaa.gov/products/solar-cycle-progression. but-necessary action as soon as a severe solar storm is detected on a path toward Earth. Satellite companies need similar protocols, including foreign companies such as SpaceX that increasingly provide essential service to remote communities. Without such protocols, communities across Canada, and especially in the Arctic, could lose communications for weeks, months or even years. Conclusion New space technologies and a dramatic increase in commercial space capabilities create exciting opportunities for Arctic governments, communities and companies. Northern residents can now access the internet at a bandwidth, latency and cost comparable to the residents of large cities in the South, enabling them to access telehealth and online education and to participate fully in the national and global economies. The Arctic, once isolated, is now part of the digital world. At the same time, synthetic aperture radar satellites have made it safer for ships and snowmobiles to navigate sea ice, the Cospas-Sarsat Programme has removed the “search” from search and rescue, and satellites of all kinds are supporting communications, aviation, surveillance, security, disaster relief, forest firefighting, weather forecasting, fishing, prospecting, education, health care and environmental research. Militaries also benefit greatly from satellites for positioning, navigation, surveillance and situational awareness, as well as for the allimportant search and rescue mission. Satellites are necessary to operate fifth-generation fighter jets and long-range drones. But perhaps the most important contribution of satellites to militaries is an enhanced understanding of what potential adversaries are doing — or not doing. One of the great geopolitical risks in the Arctic involves security dilemmas, where states feel compelled to build up their military capabilities in an escalating series of responses to suspected increases by others. Satellites help to prevent unnecessary escalations, accidents and arms races. They are thus an important tool for maintaining peace and stability — the best form of security. 12 CIGI Papers No. 303 — September 2024 • Michael Byers The Arctic is more connected to space than any other region. Yet connectivity can create dependency and therefore exposure to new risks, which in the case of satellites include system failures, deliberate attacks and natural forces such as solar storms. Redundancies of all kinds are needed to protect against these risks. For instance, it is safer to have multiple satellite companies providing Arctic communications, rather than a potential monopoly provider such as SpaceX. 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