Rui, Xu ao; Lianyong, Feng; Feng, Jingxuan
A icle
A gas-on-gas compe i ion ading mechanism based on
coope a i e game models in China's gas ma ke
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Sugges ed Ci a ion: Rui, Xu ao; Lianyong, Feng; Feng, Jingxuan (2020) : A gas-on-gas compe i ion
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Resea ch pape
A gas-on-gas compe i ion ading mechanism based on coope a i e
game models in China’s gas ma ke
Xu ao Rui a,b, Lianyong Feng a,∗, Jingxuan Feng b
aSchool o Economics and Managemen , China Uni e si y o Pe oleum, Beijing 102249, China
bPe oChina Planning and Enginee ing Ins i u e, Beijing 100083, China
a icle in o
A icle his o y:
Recei ed 25 July 2019
Recei ed in e ised o m 21 Decembe 2019
Accep ed 30 Janua y 2020
A ailable online xxxx
Keywo ds:
China
Na u al gas ma ke
Gas-on-gas compe i ion
Coope a i e games
Shapley alue
abs ac
A g owing numbe o majo na u al gas ma ke s in he wo ld ha e adop ed he gas-on-gas compe i ion,
o a e in he phase o ansi ion o his p ice o ma ion mechanism. In his si ua ion, China has
also s a ed o e o m he p icing mechanism by es ablishing gas ading cen e s in Shanghai and
Chongqing, p o iding pla o ms o selle s and buye s o comple e he compe i ion-based ansac ions,
ma king a ansi ion om oil index p icing o gas-on-gas compe i ion p icing. In o de o ca y ou
esea ch on China’s gas ma ke based on gas-on-gas compe i ion ading mechanism, his pape builds
a na u al gas ading model based on coope a i e game heo y, discusses he key pa ame e in he
models, aking in o accoun o he ep esen a i e issues o China’s gas ma ke in ans o ma ion. Also,
his pape designs scena ios based on Jiangsu P o ince, a ela i ely well-es ablished gas ading ma ke
in China, and explo es he impac o each issue on he ma ke by using he compa a i e analysis
and sensi i i y analysis. This s udy concludes ha es ablishing he gas-on-gas compe i ion model
co esponds o he cu en gas ma ke de elopmen in China. In addi ion, he ma ke pa icipan s
need o op imize he con ac modes o gas supply, educe gas supply cos and imp o e he p ice
a o dabili y, in o de o maximize he coope a ion bene i s in gas ma ke , inc ease he ading olume,
p omo es he de elopmen and ma u a ion o China’s gas ma ke .
©2020 The Au ho s. Published by Else ie L d. This is an open access a icle unde he CC BY license
(h p://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. In oduc ion
Two main compe ing p ice mechanisms — oil indexa ion
and gas-on-gas compe i ion (GOG, spo o hub-based p icing)
a e con ibu o s shaping he global gas ma ke (Zhang e al.,
2018a,b), which can be di ided in o h ee majo egional ma ke s:
he No h Ame ican, he Eu opean and he Eas Asian ma ke ,
wi h each using di e en p ice o ma ion mechanism (IEA,2013).
No h Ame ica is home o he mos ma u e na u al gas ma -
ke , whe e gas p ices a e de e mined by he in e play o supply
and demand — gas-on-gas compe i ion (G andi,2014). The gas
ma ke he e has become a single highly in eg a ed one (Pa k
e al.,2008) and is decoupled om he oil ma ke (Pe i anis and
Dagoumas,2018) as he impac o oil p ice on na u al gas p ice
has educed a e he 2008 global inancial c isis (Ji e al.,2018).
I is ound ha he economic condi ions, o al ene gy demand,
US dolla exchange a e and gas consump ion a e he majo
ac o s a ec ing gas p ice o ma ion in he ma ke (Li e al.,2017).
The Eu opean ma ke uses bo h gas-on-gas compe i ion and oil
∗Co esponding au ho .
E-mail add esses: [email p o ec ed] (X. Rui),
[email p o ec ed] (L. Feng).
indexa ion, and is now ansi ing om oil indexa ion o gas-
on-gas compe i ion (Shi,2016). Du ing he ansi ion, Na ional
Balance Poin (NBP), Ti le T ans e Facili y (TTF) and Ne Connec
Ge many (NCG) ha e played he i al oles in he e o m o
Eu opean gas ma ke s (Hea he ,2012;Hulsho e al.,2016), and
GOG e o ms ha e been p o ed o be e ec i e (Mi iello and Polo,
2015). The Eas Asian ma ke is essen ially linked o oil p icing
(G andi,2014), and he e ha e been ising calls o es ablishing
a p ice o ma ion mechanism based on gas-on-gas compe i ion.
Majo coun ies in Asia, including China, Japan and Singapo e,
a e making igo ous e o s o se up hei own gas hubs (Shi
e al.,2019;Shi and Va iam,2016,2017,2018;S e n,2014;Zhang
e al.,2018a,b). As a key gas ma ke in Eas Asia, hough he
gas p ices in China ha e been egula ed by he go e nmen o
a long ime, i has g adually linked o al e na i e ene gy o c ude
oil, LPG and uel oil only in ecen yea s. The coun y has also
s a ed p icing mechanism e o m based on gas-on-gas compe i-
ion by es ablishing gas hubs in Shanghai and Chongqing. Hu e al.
(2011) and Hu (2014) en isioned a gas hub based on gas-on-gas
compe i ion aking in o accoun ac ual and de elopmen end o
China’s na u al gas ma ke . Tong e al. (2014) sys ema ically ex-
plo ed he necessi y, easibili y and phased s a egic app oaches
o building a gas hub in China, and p o ides decision suppo
o p omo ing he es ablishmen o China’s gas hubs. Shi (2017)
h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.egy .2020.01.015
2352-4847/©2020 The Au ho s. Published by Else ie L d. This is an open access a icle unde he CC BY license (h p://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/).
366 X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377
made sugges ions wi h ega ds o he o ma ion o benchma k
p ices o China’s na u al gas by analyzing he undamen al con-
di ions necessa y o se up gas-on-gas compe i ion mechanism
and e iewing cu en si ua ion con ibu ing o benchma k p ice
o ma ion. Though assump ions and sugges ions on how o build
gas-on-gas compe i ion-based gas ma ke in China p oposed by
schola s a e no uncommon, he e ha e been ew discussions
on ading beha io s in China’s gas ma ke based on gas-on-gas
compe i ion.
A g owing numbe o majo na u al gas ma ke s in he wo ld
ha e adop ed gas-on-gas compe i ion, o ha e been mig a ing
o his mechanism. As a pa o i s g owing e o s in his e-
ga d, China has es ablished gas hubs in Shanghai and Chongqing.
Though hei ading olume accoun s o only a small po ion o
he coun y’s o al olume igh now due o he ela i ely sho
his o y o such hubs, ma ke p ices o na u al gas o med h ough
gas-on-gas compe i ion will be a eliable guide as an inc easing
numbe o en i ies ade h ough hubs.
The e is a game be ween playe s in ma ke -based gas ans-
ac ions. Such a game can be ei he a coope a i e game o a non-
coope a i e game depending on whe he a binding ag eemen
can be eached in ansac ions. Though bo h games emphasize
a ional decision making, a coope a i e game highligh s collec i e
a ionali y, pays a en ion o equal dis ibu ion o bene i s in
decision-making, ocuses on cha ac e is ics o collec i e beha io ,
while a non-coope a i e game emphasizes indi idual a ional-
i y, gi es p io i y o indi idual in e es s in decision-making, and
ocuses on indi idual beha io al cha ac e is ics. Compa ed wi h
o he gas ma ke s, China’s gas ma ke has i s own cha ac e is ics,
as go e nmen pays mo e a en ion o p ope ly handling he
ela ionship be ween he en e p ises, ma ke s and go e nmen
in supe ision, in o de o achie e he uni ica ion o na ional
in e es s, co po a e in e es s and social in e es s (The S a e Coun-
cil,2017). The heo e ical basis o coope a i e game heo y is o
inc ease in e es s o all pa ies wi hou ha ming any pa icipan s,
i no , inc ease in e es s o a leas one pa y. In he case o China’s
gas ma ke , hough playe s compe e wi h each o he , mu ual
coope a ion also lies in each pa icipan s. Fo ins ance, China’s gas
supply is domina ed by a ew s a e-owned oil companies, which
a e essen ially ex ensions o he go e nmen and esponsible o
mul i- ask objec i es, as a consequence o powe ul go e nmen
supe ision (Xin e al.,2019). While pu suing p o i abili y, hose
s a ed-owned oil companies also need o conside he na ional
demand o ensu e ene gy secu i y, as well as he o e all ai ness
and o de liness o he ma ke . The e o e, hey need o coope a e
wi h o he playe s o maximize he o e all bene i s o he gas
ma ke . No mally, o bo h g oups o gas supplie s and buye s,
one playe ’s gain is ano he one’s loss unde a non-coope a i e
game. Howe e , China’s na u al gas ma ke ends o keep he
bene i s o bo h pa ies o e en o inc ease, hus he o ma ion
o a s a egic coali ion be ween supplie s and buye s will be
acili a ed and a coope a i e game will be o med (Jiang e al.,
2016). When acing he s ong supplie s, disad an aged gas buy-
e s can p o ide a join o e while compe ing wi h hem (Paola
and Ma co,2005). The e is bo h coope a ion and compe i ion
be ween playe s, c ea ing a uni ied g and coali ion. In his case,
coope a i e game heo y is mo e sui able o China’s gas ma ke .
This pape in ends o ca y ou he esea ch on he hub-
based Chinese gas ma ke based on gas-on-gas compe i ion, by
explo ing ou ep esen a i e issues in he ans o ma ion o he
ma ke , i.e., con ac model selec ion on supply side, he e o m
on pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism, gas p ice a o dabil-
i y change on demand side and he e o m o he gas p icing
mechanism. In addi ion, he pape examines coope a i e bene i s
alloca ion op ions o di e en playe s in each scena io wi h an
objec i e o maximizing coope a i e bene i s in he gas ma ke ,
s udies he impac o each issue on he Chinese gas ma ke by
compa ing ma ke equilib ium p ices, coope a i e bene i s allo-
ca ion and o al ma ke ansac ion olumes o playe s in each
scena io.
The pape is o ganized as ollows: Sec ion 2builds na u al
gas ading model based on coope a i e games, and discusses
key pa ame e s in he models h ough aking ou ep esen a i e
issues in he ans o ma ion o he China’s gas ma ke in o ac-
coun . Sec ion 3p esen s scena ios based on a a ge ma ke in
Jiangsu P o ince, home o China’s mos well-es ablished na u al
gas ma ke . Sec ion 4compu es coope a i e bene i s alloca ion
among playe s in each case wi h he model and pe o ms sensi i -
i y analysis. Resul s a e also e iewed. Finally, Sec ion 5p o ides
a summa y and concluding ema ks.
2. Modeling and analysis
2.1. Modeling
Coope a i e game is a ma hema ical model e ec i ely ad-
d essing coo dina ion p oblems o mul iple s akeholde s. As
Lozano e al. (2013) indica ed ha he essence o coope a i e
game is o ind a bene icial dis ibu ion me hod p omo ing coop-
e a ion among p ima y pa icipan s, and o each a ai and jus
ag eemen by collec i e a ionali y, hus he o e all e iciency will
be imp o ed. By in oducing coope a i e game heo y in o he
Chinese gas ading ma ke based on gas-on-gas compe i ion, we
could explo e how playe s on supply and demand side alloca e
bene i s upon coope a ion, and gain insigh on ma ke ading
beha io s.
The e o e, he pape builds na u al gas ading model based
on coope a i e game heo y. Gi en i is easible o maximize he
join payo s h ough he model, he pape alloca es he join
payo s among playe s, igu es ou ma ke equilib ium p ices and
explo es ma ke -based ading mechanisms. In iew ha his
p ocess is implemen ed in h ee s eps, he model is di ided in o
h ee sub models, and each s ep is pe o med by a sub model.
Model I — Bene i op imiza ion model, a o al bene i s unc ion o
a gas ma ke , which is c ea ed h ough mu ual dealings by playe s
in he ma ke . Wi h he goal o gaining he maximum coope a i e
bene i s by a g and coali ion, he unc ion calcula es ansac ion
olume o each playe in mu ual ansac ions subjec o ele an
cons ain s, and hen igu e ou bene i s o each ansac ion.
Model II — Shapley alue alloca ion model, alloca es coope a-
i e bene i s using Shapely alue me hod among playe s in each
coali ion in he gas ma ke . Coope a i e bene i s mean collec i e
payo s gene a ed h ough ma ke ansac ions be ween playe s
in he ma ke . Model III — T ading p ice model iden i ies ading
p ices and ma ke equilib ium p ices be ween playe s based on
de ini e coope a i e bene i s dis ibu ion plans o he maximum
coope a i e bene i s o he g and coali ion.
2.1.1. Bene i op imiza ion model
Assume he e a e a o al o zplaye s in a gas ma ke , including
mgas supplie s and ngas buye s (z=m+n), o ming a g and
coali ion Z={A1,A2,...,Am,B1,B2,...,Bn}wi h ans e able
u ili y. I any subse So Zco esponds o a eal- alued unc ion
(S), sa is ying (∅)=0, (S1∪S2)≥ (S1)+ (S2)and
∀S1,S2⊆Z,S1∩S2= ∅, we say ha [Z, ]is a coope a i e game
consis ing o a se o playe s z, and a cha ac e is ic unc ion .
When Gas supplie Ai(i∈m) deals wi h Gas buye Bj(j∈
n), he supplie ’s quo a ion is PAi, while he buye ’s quo a ion is
PBj, he ading olume is Qij, and he payo s gene a ed h ough
he ansac ion is πij, which is calcula ed by he equa ion πij =
(PBj −PAi)Qij. In he equa ion, PBj should be less han a o dable
p ice WBj, i.e., he buye ’s willingness o pay, while he supplie ’s
X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377 367
quo a ion PAi should be highe han i s supply cos CAi, and he
ading olume Qij should be less han supplie ’s maximum sup-
ply a ailable QAi and he buye ’s maximum demand QBj, as in
Eq. (2.1):
πij =(PBj −PAi)Qij
s. .PAi ≥CAi,PBj ≤WBj,QAi ≥Qij,QBj ≥Qij
(2.1)
Fu he , when he e a e lgas supplie s and kbuye s in he
ma ke o ming a coali ion S, he payo s gene a ed h ough he
coope a ion be ween playe s wi hin he coali ion is deno ed by
cha ac e is ic unc ion (S), hen:
(S)=
l
∑
i=1
k
∑
j=1(PBj −PAi)Qij,∀l∈m,k∈n
s. .PAi ≥CAi,PBj ≤WBj,QAi ≥
k
∑
j=1
Qij,QBj ≥
l
∑
i=1
Qij
(2.2)
Bene i op imiza ion model aims a maximizing o al payo s
o a g and coali ion in a gas ma ke , i.e.:
max (Z)=
m
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1(PBj −PAi)Qij
s. .PAi ≥CAi,PBj ≤WBj,QAi ≥
n
∑
j=1
Qij,QBj ≥
m
∑
i=1
Qij
(2.3)
2.1.2. Shapley alue alloca ion model
Many coope a i e game calcula ion me hods a e a ailable and
he mos ep esen a i e one is he Shapley alue me hod (Shap-
ley,1953). The Shapley alue is de e mined by cha ac e is ic
unc ion , and deno ed by X=(X1,X2,...,Xz), o any ∈z,
X is de ined as:
X ( )=∑
S⊆Z
(|S|−1)!(z−|S|)!
z![ (S)− (S−{ })]∀ ∈Z
(2.4)
whe e, X ( ) ep esen s payo s alloca ion o Playe ,|S|is he
numbe o playe s in a coali ion S, (S)deno es he collec i e
payo s o playe s including Playe , (S−{ })is he collec i e
payo s o playe s excluding Playe .
Wi h he p emise o maximizing coope a i e bene i s in he
gas ma ke , we alloca e he o al bene i s among playe s wi h he
Shapley alue me hod, and playe s who quo e in big di e ence o
ha e la ge ading olume will enjoy la ge alloca ion.
2.1.3. Equilib ium p ices model
When add essing he p oblem o coope a i e payo s dis ibu-
ion among playe s in a gas ma ke , i is impo an o compu e
ading p ices, ading olumes and ma ke equilib ium p ices
be ween playe s, in o de o s udy ading beha io s in he gas
ma ke unde coope a i e game condi ions.
The ading p ice Pij o Gas supplie Aiand Gas buye Bjcan
be de i ed om he ollowing equa ion:
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
Xi( )=
n
∑
j=1(Pij −PAi)Qij
Xj( )=
m
∑
i=1(PBj −Pij)Qij
(2.5)
whe e, Xi( )and Xj( )a e payo s alloca ions o Gas supplie
Aiand Gas buye Bj espec i ely (calcula ed o m Eq. (2.4)). As
he supply p ice PAi o Gas supplie Ai, he pu chase p ice PBj o
Gas buye Bjand o al olume Qij a e known, he ading p ice
Pij o bo h supplie and buye can be calcula ed wi h equa ions
and applied o he ollowing equa ion:
P=⎛
⎝
m
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
PijQij⎞
⎠/⎛
⎝
m
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
Qij⎞
⎠(2.6)
Eq. (2.6) is designed o de e mine ma ke equilib ium p ices
P o a g and coali ion by calcula ing a weigh ed a e age o
ading p ices Pij o all pa icipa ing gas supplie s and buye s a
he ime o he ansac ion. I is no he ac ual ading p ices in he
coali ion, bu i ual p ice indexes e lec ing o al ading p ice
le el o he g and coali ion.
2.2. Discussion o ela ed issues
In o de o gain a be e insigh in o ading beha io s o
China’s gas ma ke based on gas-on-gas compe i ion, he pape
e iews he cha ac e is ics o China’s gas ma ke and he key
a eas o e o m in he coun y’s gas indus y chain, and explo es
issues in he ma ke using he na u al gas ading model.
2.2.1. Selec ion o ading con ac modes
When making a ansac ion in China, a gas supplie will sign
wi h a buye a gas supply con ac , which will s ipula e he gas
sou ce. In China, whe e gas p ices a e con olled by he go e n-
men , i is common no o de ine ce ain gas sou ce in gas supply
con ac and se lemen owing o a ious ac o s, enabling some
cos ly gas sou ces o pa icipa e in ela ed ansac ions, making
majo supplie s su e om huge cos p essu e. Howe e , wi h
he in oduc ion o mo e ma ke -o ien ed p icing mechanism,
whe he a gas sou ce is de ined becomes a key ac o di ec ly
a ec ing supply cos (by a ec ing alues o he cons ain CAi in
Model I) and bene i s dis ibu ion among playe s in a coali ion.
Rega ding CAi in Eq. (2.3), a gas supplie may p o ide a buye
wi h gas om di e en sou ces i he sou ce is no de ined in he
ela ed con ac . Assuming he e a e hgas sou ces o Supplie Ai,
we can compu e he gas supply cos CAi as ollows:
CAi =(h
∑
α=1
CAiαQAiα)/h
∑
α=1
QAiα∀α∈h(2.7)
I he gas sou ce is clea ly labeled, and de ined as α(∀α∈h),
he supplie p o ides he buye wi h he gas αa a supply cos
CAiα.
2.2.2. Re o m o pipeline p icing mechanism
In Oc obe , 2016, he Na ional De elopmen and Re o m Com-
mission (NDRC) announced new adminis a i e measu es on
pipeline ansmission p icing (NDRC,2016), ma king he s a
o subs an ial e o m on na u al gas ansmission p ice o ming
in China. The measu es ha e s eng hened egula ion on he
p ice o he na u al gas pipeline ansmission, p e en ing pipeline
en e p ises om gaining excessi e bene i s om excess supply
o monopoly. Soon a e wa d, The NDRC published he pipeline
ansmission p ices based on he new mechanism o 13 in e -
p o incial pipeline en e p ises a ound he coun y (NDRC,2017a),
which we e 15% less on a e age compa ed wi h p ices be o e
he adjus men (NDRC,2017b). The e o m on he gas pipeline
p icing mechanism no only has made majo impac on he gas
pipeline ansmission, bu also will a ec he collec i e payo s
dis ibu ion in he gas ma ke .
In Eq. (2.3), assume ha he uni gas supply cos o Supplie
Aiunde he cu en pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism is
CAi, known ha he o iginal supply cos unde p eceding p icing
mechanism C∗
Ai, and he p ice change caused by he e o m on
he pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism is ∆CAi, hen CAi =
C∗
Ai +∆CAi.
368 X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377
2.2.3. Gas p ice a o dabili y change
Gas p ice a o dabili y e lec s a gas use ’s abili y o wi hs and
he gas p ice, and i s p ice o m can be exp essed as a o dable gas
p ice, which is a ec ed by policies, economic and en i onmen
condi ions, e c. I ends o change in esponse o ex e nal ac o s
(Wang e al.,2014), esul ing in changes in he cons ain WBj
in Model I, which in u n a ec s he payo s dis ibu ion among
playe s in a coali ion. Fo example, in 2017, China ook s ong
measu es o eplace coal wi h na u al gas, imp o ing p ice a -
o dabili y o esiden ial and indus ial use s, which s imula ed
he apid g ow h o gas demand as well as he de elopmen o
gas ma ke (Yang,2018).
In o de o in es iga e he impac o he change in he a o d-
able gas p ice on he dis ibu ion o payo s, i is assumed ha
he a o dable gas p ice o Buye Bjis WBj, and changes o W∗
Bj
a e a ec ed by ex e nal ac o s, he di e ence is ∆WBj, hen
W∗
Bj =WBj +∆WBj.
2.2.4. Gas p ices egula ed by he go e nmen
China’s gas ma ke is mo ing om he con olled p icing
mechanism owa d a ma ke -o ien ed one. Since he gas p ices
ha e been con olled by he go e nmen o e decades, and he
ma ke -o ien ed mechanism is s ill no sophis ica ed, gas suppli-
e s ha e been condi ioned o managing p oduc ion and ope a ion
cos s, de eloping gas supply plans and sales p icing p og ams,
and buye s a e also used o haggling o e p ices wi h supplie s
and de ining gas pu chasing p og ams, in acco dance wi h p ices
guided by he go e nmen . In he mean ime, gi en he small scale
and insu iciency o compe i i e p ice ansac ions in he gas hubs
in China, mo e wo k needs o be done o o mula e ma ke p ices
e lec ing he in e ac ion o supply and demand h ough he hubs.
Many ansac ions a e made based on p o incial ga e benchma k
p ices se by he go e nmen s o di e en p o inces.
The ading p ice Pij o Gas supplie Aiand Gas buye Bjis
no o med h ough a coope a i e game, bu a p ice con olled
by he go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗, based on which payo s
is dis ibu ed while he equilib ium ading p ice P o he g and
coali ion is go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗.
3. Case s udy
In 2017, China’s gas consump ion o aled 237.3 bcm, o which
23 bcm o 9.69% wen o Jiangsu P o ince, making he p o ince
he bigges , mos dynamic and ep esen a i e gas consume in
he coun y. The e o e, he pape selec s he p o ince o he case
s udy.
Jiangsu’s gas ma ke is domina ed by CNPC and Sinopec, wi h
gas esou ces consis ing o domes ic gas, gas impo ed om Cen-
al Asian coun ies and impo ed LNG. The domes ic gas and Cen-
al Asia-impo ed gas a e ansmi ed h ough in e -p o incial
pipelines ( he Fi s and Second Wes –Eas Gas Pipelines, he
Sichuan o Eas China Na u al Gas Pipeline) and he impo ed LNG
is also sold di ec ly o use s h ough p o incial pipeline ne wo ks
a e gasi ica ion. The ma ke enjoys a huge use base which is
geog aphically dispe sed, and gas is mainly used in ou a eas:
gas powe gene a ion, indus ial uel, chemical gas, and u ban gas,
and each o hem can be subdi ided depending on uses.
Conside ing he ac ual gas indus y landscape in Jiangsu
P o ince and i s huge bu geog aphically dispe sed use s, we
selec a ce ain coun y ins ead o he whole p o ince as he a ge
ma ke o he case s udy. Assume he ma ke adop s gas- o-
gas compe i ion mechanism, whe eby bo h supplie s and buye s
ade on he Shanghai Gas Exchange, dis ibu e payo s among
playe s wi h he aim o maximizing o al payo s o a g and coali-
ion and o ming a ma ke equilib ium p ice h ough he game.
In addi ion, we assume ha he e a e wo la ge gas supplie s, A1
and A2, and h ee buye s, i.e., a pe ochemical company B1, a gas
powe plan B2and a chemical company B3in he a ge ma ke ,
and he e a e h ee pipeline companies, i.e., D1,D2and D3.
The da a o he model is de i ed acco ding o he ollowing
p inciples: (1) he p o incial ga e p ice and pipeline ansmission
p ice a e se based on he ac ual p ices published by NDRC;
(2) he in e -p o incial pipeline ansmission dis ance, pu chase
p ices o gas impo ed om Cen al Asia and impo ed LNG
( aking in o accoun VAT c edi ) a e de ined wi h e e ence o
ac ual da a o each company; (3) a o dable gas p ices o use s a e
calcula ed wi h he co esponding e alua ion me hod (Li e al.,
2012,2011); (4) gas supply olume o each gas supplie in he
a ge ma ke is easonably assumed wi h e e ence o hei ma -
ke sha e, and demand o each buye is easonably assumed
acco ding o he esea ch da a.
3.1. Da a sou ces
Assume he e a e wo gas sou ces a ailable o Gas sup-
plie A1. Gas sou ce ais domes ic gas om Xinjiang P o ince
wi h a supply amoun o 1.66 ×108m3, he ga e benchma k
p ice in Xinjiang is he pu chase p ice, i.e. RMB 1.03/m3(NDRC,
2019a). The in e -p o incial pipeline ansmission cos o als
a RMB 0.568/m3and includes h ee pa s — he uni ans-
mission p ice is RMB 0.1416/103m3km cha ged by he in e -
p o incial pipeline company D1(NDRC,2019b), co e ing a ans-
po a ion dis ance o 2177 km, he uni ansmission p ice is
RMB 0.1202/103m3km cha ged by he in e -p o incial pipeline
company D2(NDRC,2019b), co e ing a anspo a ion dis ance
o 2163 km, and he Jiangsu p o incial pipeline ne wo k ans-
mission ee is RMB 0.205/m3, o which RMB 4.463/103m3km is
cha ged by he p o incial pipeline ne wo k company D3as he
p o incial pipeline ansmission ee (Rui e al.,2018), co e ing a
ansmission dis ance o 46 km. Gas sou ce bis he impo ed LNG
wi h a supply amoun o 0.34 ×108m3. The pu chase p ice is
se by e e ence o CIF No heas Asia p ices (du y paid), i.e. RMB
2.87/m3in his case, and he gasi ica ion ee e e s o he ac ual
p ice a a LNG e minal in Jiangsu P o ince, i.e., RMB 0.345/m3
in his case, and he p o incial pipeline ansmission ee is RMB
0.205/m3. Gas supplie A2supplies gas om a single sou ce,
i.e. domes ic gas om Sichuan P o ince, wi h a supply amoun
o 1.50 ×108m3, he ga e benchma k p ice in Sichuan P o ince
as he pu chase p ice, i.e. RMB 1.53/m3(NDRC,2019a). The in e -
p o incial pipeline ansmission ee o als a RMB 0.650/m3, o
which RMB 0.3824/103m3km is cha ged by in e -p o incial
pipeline company D3as he in e -p o incial pipeline ansmission
ee (NDRC,2019b), co e ing a ansmission dis ance o 1700 km.
The supplie p o ides na u al gas di ec ly o use s wi hou using
pipeline ansmission se ice om p o incial pipeline companies.
As no ed ea lie , a o dable p ice e lec s gas p ice bea ing
abili y o buye s, and is he highes p ice buye s a e willing
o pay. Li e al. (2012) and Li e al. (2011) p oposed a se o
e alua ion me hods, including ‘‘Ne back me hod’’, ‘‘Al e na i e
alue me hod’’ and ‘‘S a is ical analyze me hod’’, o assess he
p ice a o dabili y o gas buye s. Assume ha Gas buye B1is
a pe ochemical en e p ise, wi h a gas demand o 1.20 ×108
m3, Gas buye B2is a gas plan , wi h a gas demand o 1.50 ×
108m3, and Gas buye B3is a chemical company, wi h a gas
demand o 0.50 ×108m3. Acco ding o he abo e me hods, he
a o dable p ices o h ee buye s a e RMB 3.55/m3, RMB 2.25/m3
and RMB 0.85/m3 espec i ely. The ele an pa ame e s used a e
summa ized in Table 1.

X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377 369
Table 1
Rele an pa ame e s in he a ge ma ke .
S/N I em Uni Gas supplie
A1A2
Gas sou ce a Gas sou ce b Gas sou ce c
1 Gas supply amoun 108m31.660 0.340 1.500
2 Supply cos RMB/m31.803 3.077 2.180
2.1 Pu chase p ice RMB/m31.030 2.870 1.530
2.2 In e -p o incial pipeline ansmission ee RMB/m30.568 / 0.650
2.3 Gasi ica ion ee RMB/m3/ 0.345 /
2.4 P o incial pipeline ansmission ee RMB/m30.205 /
S/N I em Uni Gas buye
B1B2B3
1 Gas demand 108m31.200 1.500 0.500
2 A o dable p ice RMB/m33.550 2.250 0.850
3.2. Scena io design
Fi e scena ios a e designed based on he case.
Scena io 1: Gas supplie A1does no speci y he gas sou ce in
con ac s wi h he buye s, and supplies gas a he comp ehen-
si e gas supply cos CA1, which is calcula ed as RMB 2.020/m3
wi h Eq. (2.7).
Scena io 2: Gas supplie A1speci ies he gas sou ce in con-
ac s wi h he buye s, and supplies hem wi h he gas a a cos
based on he designa ed gas sou ce. The supply cos o gas sou ce
ais RMB 1.803/m3 e e ed as CA1a, and ha o gas sou ce bis RMB
3.077/m3 e e ed as CA1b.
Scena io 3: Based on Scena io 1, each pipeline company
cha ges based on p eceding ansmission p icing mechanism,
which has inc eased by 15% compa ed wi h cu en pipeline
p ice. As he pipeline anspo a ion cos changes, he gas supply
cos C∗
A1is RMB 2.139/m3,C∗
A2RMB 2.295/m3, and he pipeline
ansmission ee change ∆CA1ais RMB 0.136/m3,∆CA1bRMB
0.036/m3,∆CA2cRMB 0.012/m3.
Scena io 4: Based on Scena io 1, assume gas buye B3uses gas
as a eplacemen o coal and i s a o dable p ice ises om RMB
0.850/m 3 o RMB 2.770/m3, an inc ease o RMB 1.920/m3, a e
conside ing he en i onmen bene i s (Wang e al.,2014).
Scena io 5: Based on Scena io 1, assume he gas p ice is
egula ed by he go e nmen . Bo h pa ies make a deal based
on he benchma k p ice o he ime being in o ce in Jiangsu
P o ince issued by he NDRC in 2019, i.e., P∗is RMB 2.030/m3.
In o de o u he analyze issues in Sec ion 2.2, we com-
pa e esul s om Scena ios 2–5 wi h Scena io 1 as a benchma k
scena io, and each compa ison esul co esponds o de ailed
analysis o he issues men ioned abo e, espec i ely, as shown
in Fig. 1.
4. Resul s and discussion
4.1. Resul s
Applying he scena io speci ic pa ame e s o Na u al gas ad-
ing model, we go he esul s o Scena io 1 o 5, as shown in he
Table 2.
In Scena io 1, Gas supplie A1enjoys he same supply cos
a a weigh ed a e age supply cos o RMB 2.02/m3in e e y
ansac ion by cos sha ing, lowe han ha o Gas supplie A2,
i.e. RMB 2.18/m3. Gas supplie A1gains he compe i i e p icing
ad an age, enabling buye s o ecei e mo e p o i alloca ions
h ough coope a ion. As a a ional pa icipan in he ma ke , all
buye s would gi e p io i y o wo king wi h Gas supplie A1, hus,
all 200 million m3gas would be sold and gas supplie A would
eap a p o i o 101 million RMB. Then he buye s con inue o
ade wi h Gas supplie A2 o co e he emaining achie able
ansac ion, and Gas supplie A2gains a p o i o 2 million RMB.
Gas buye B1can buy gas a an a o dable p ice o RMB 3.550/m3,
he highes among all supplie s, which could make supplie s
gain mo e p o i alloca ion h ough coope a ion. Being a ional
playe s, all supplie s would gi e p io i y o wo king wi h Gas
buye B1, he demand o buye B1could be me a 120 million
m3gas, and ge s a p o i alloca ion o 92 million RMB. Then, he
supplie s con inue o ade wi h Gas buye B2 o he emaining
achie able ansac ions, and sell he buye 150 million m3gas,
and he buye gains a p o i alloca ion o 12 million RMB. In his
case, he achie able ades in he ma ke eaches 270 million m3
gas, c ea ing he o al bene i s o 207 million RMB. The ma ke
equilib ium p ice is RMB 2.44/m3.
In Scena io 2, Gas supplie A1enjoys he lowes supply cos
(RMB 1.803/m3) wi h gas sou ce a. I p e e en ially pa icipa es
in ma ke ansac ions and sells all 166 million m3gas i can
supply, gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o 115 million RMB. A e
he ade is made, gas supplie A2wi h he second lowes supply
cos (RMB 2.18/m3) unde sou ce ccomes o pa icipa e in he
ma ke . A e Gas supplie A2sells 104 million m3gas, all he
achie able ansac ions a e comple ed and ansac ions s op. I
ge s a p o i alloca ion o 4 million RMB. Since Gas supplie A1’s
gas sou ce bis he mos expensi e (RMB 3.08/m3), i is unable
o pa icipa e in ading e en when he achie able ansac ions
a e all ealized in he ma ke . Each buye pa icipa es in ma ke
ansac ions in he o de o highes o lowes a o dable p ice,
un il all achie able ansac ions ha e been comple ed. Gas buye
B1pu chases 120 million m3o na u al gas, gene a ing a p o i
alloca ion o 105 million RMB, and Gas buye B2150 million
m3, o als a 14 million RMB. The a ailable ades in he ma ke
eaches 270 million m3gas, c ea ing o al bene i s o 237 million
RMB. The ma ke equilib ium p ice is RMB 2.39/m3.
In Scena io 3, he pipeline ansmission p ice de e mined by
he p eceding p icing mechanism is 15% highe han he cu en
one, which inc eases supply cos o each gas supplie . Gas sup-
plie A1enjoys he lowes supply cos (RMB 2.14/m3), and akes
p io i y o selling all 200 million m3gas i can supply wi h a p o i
alloca ion o 89 million RMB. Wi h he supply cos inc easing o
RMB 2.295/m3, highe han a o dable p ice o buye s in he e-
maining achie able ansac ions, Gas supplie A2canno comple e
he ansac ions and ansac ions hal . Gas buye B1o e s he
highes a o dable p ice and p e e en ially pa icipa es in ma ke
ansac ions, i s demand o 120 million m3o na u al gas is
ully sa is ied, gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o 85 million RMB.
Cons ained by he supply capaci y o a single gas supplie A1in
he ma ke , Gas buye B2can only buy 80 million m3gas, which
is a sho ha wha i demands, i.e. 150 million m3, gene a ing
a p o i alloca ion o 4 million RMB. The a ailable ades in he
ma ke eaches 200 million m3gas, c ea ing o al bene i s o 178
million RMB. The ma ke equilib ium p ice is RMB 2.58/m3.
370 X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377
Fig. 1. Schema ic diag am o esea ch me hod.
Table 2
Resul s in di e en scena ios.
Scena io 1 Scena io 2 Scena io 3 Scena io 4 Scena io 5
X( )Qij Pij X( )Qij Pij X( )Qij Pij X( )Qij Pij X( )Qij Pij
Gas supplie
A1
Gas sou ce a 1.01 2.00 2.52 1.15 1.66 2.50 0.89 2.00 2.58 1.14 2.00 2.59 0.02 2.00 2.03
Gas sou ce b – – –
A2Gas sou ce c 0.02 0.70 2.22 0.04 1.04 2.22 – – – 0.04 1.20 2.22 – – –
To al 1.03 2.70 – 1.19 2.70 – 0.89 2.00 – 1.18 3.20 – 0.02 2.00 –
Gas buye
B10.92 1.20 2.78 1.05 1.20 2.68 0.85 1.20 2.84 0.92 1.20 2.78 1.82 1.20 2.03
B20.12 1.50 2.17 0.14 1.50 2.16 0.04 0.80 2.19 0.08 1.50 2.20 0.18 0.80 2.03
B3– – – – – – – – – 0.19 0.50 2.39 – – –
To al 1.03 2.70 – 1.19 2.70 – 0.89 2.00 – 1.18 3.20 – 2.00 2.00 –
P2.44 2.39 2.58 2.45 2.03
(Z)2.07 2.37 1.78 2.36 2.02
In Scena io 4, Gas supplie A1enjoys he lowes supply cos
(RMB 2.02/m3). I p e e en ially pa icipa es in ma ke ansac-
ions and sells all 200 million m3gas, gene a ing a p o i alloca-
ion o 114 million RMB. To comple e he emaining achie able
ansac ions, buye s con inue o deal wi h Gas supplie A2, which
sells 120 million m3na u al gas, gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o 4
million RMB. Gas buye B1o e s he highes a o dable p ice and
p e e en ially pa icipa es in ma ke ansac ions. I s demand o
120 million m3o na u al gas is ully sa is ied, gene a ing a p o i
alloca ion o 92 million RMB. Conside ing he en i onmen ben-
e i s, he a o dable p ice Gas buye B3can accep inc eases om
RMB 0.85/m3 o RMB 2.77/m3, and will p e e en ially pa icipa es
in he ma ke . I s demand o 50 million m3o na u al gas is ully
sa is ied, gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o 19 million RMB. Since
Gas buye B2’s a o dable p ice is highe han he supply cos o
he emaining gas supplie s, i can p oceed he ansac ion and
sa is y i s o al demand o 150 million m3na u al gas, gene a ing
a p o i alloca ion o 8 million RMB. The a ailable ades in he
ma ke eaches 320 million m3gas, c ea ing o al bene i s o 236
million RMB. The ma ke equilib ium p ice is RMB 2.45/m3.
In Scena io 5, he gas p ices a e egula ed by he go e nmen .
Bo h supplie s and buye s ha e o apply he p ice (RMB 2.03/m3)
guided by he go e nmen as he ading p ice. Only Gas supplie
A1enjoys supply cos lowe han he ading p ice, enabling i
o sell all 200 million m3gas, gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o
2 million RMB. Gas supplie A2canno pa icipa e in he ma ke
ansac ions, which will dec ease he o al supply amoun in he
ma ke , esul ing in sho supply o na u al gas. Gas buye B1
o e s he highes a o dable p ice and p e e en ially pa icipa es
in ma ke ansac ions. I s demand o 120 million m3o na u al
gas is ully sa is ied, c ea ing a p o i alloca ion o 182 million
RMB. Cons ained by he supply capaci y o a single gas supplie
A1in he ma ke , Gas buye B2can only buy 80 million m3na u al
gas, which is much less han wha i demands, i.e. 150 million m3,
gene a ing a p o i alloca ion o 18 million RMB. The a ailable
ades in he ma ke eaches 200 million m3gas, c ea ing o al
bene i s o 202 million RMB. The ma ke equilib ium p ice is RMB
2.03/m3.
4.2. Sensi i i y analysis
Se ing scena io 1 as he benchma k, he esea ch made he
compa ison among ma ke equilib ium p ices P, collec i e pay-
o s , ansac ion olume Q in Scena io 2–5. To ensu e he
e ec i eness and s abili y o he esul , he pape pe o ms sen-
si i i y analyses o key a iables a ec ing he compa ison esul s
o each issue, as shown in Fig. 1.
4.2.1. T ading con ac modes
The di e ence be ween Scena io 1 and Scena io 2 is whe he
gas sou ce is speci ied by Gas supplie A1. In Scena io 1, Supplie
A1does no speci y he gas sou ce, bu use he uni ied weigh ed
gas supply cos , while in Scena io 2, Supplie A1speci ies he
gas sou ce, o e s a p ice based on he cos o each gas sou ce.
X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377 371
The e o e, a iables a ec ing he esul s a e gas supply cos CA1a
and gas supply olume QA1ao gas sou ce a, and gas supply cos
CA1band gas supply olume QA1bo gas sou ce b.
Single ac o sensi i i y analyses a e pe o med o each a i-
able. Va ia ion anges om −50% o +50%, and we ake 10% as
he inal a ia ion. Ma ke equilib ium p ices P, collec i e payo s
, and ansac ion olume Q o each single ac o change in wo
scena ios a e shown in Figs. 2–5.
The sensi i i y analysis shows ha wi hin he ange o −50%
o +50% o each a iable, he equilib ium p ice in he a ge
ma ke unde Scena io 2 is no highe han Scena io 1, while he
collec i e payo s a e no lowe han Scena io 1, indica ing ha
gas supplie s can lowe he equilib ium p ice in he na u al gas
ma ke and inc ease he collec i e payo s when ansac ions a e
made h ough he gas supply mode in Scena io 2.
4.2.2. Re o m o pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism
The di e ence be ween Scena io 1 and Scena io 3 is ha
in Scena io 1, in e -p o incial pipeline ansmission ee is se
by he new mechanism, while i is de e mined by he o iginal
mechanism in Scena io 3. The e o e, he a iable a ec ing he
esul s is he di e ence ∆CAi be ween he ansmission p ices
caused by he e o m o he p icing mechanism.
Single ac o sensi i i y analyses a e pe o med on ∆CA1a,
∆CA1b, and ∆CA2c. Conside ing ha he goal o p icing mechanism
e o m is o educe pipeline ansmission ee, he ac ual new
pipeline ansmission ee is lowe han he o iginal pipeline p ice,
ha is, ∆CAi ≥0. Va ia ion o each ac o anges om 0% o +50%,
and we ake 10% as he inal a ia ion.
As shown in Figs. 6–8, wi hin he ange o 0%–50% o each
a iable, he equilib ium p ice in he a ge ma ke unde Sce-
na io 3 is highe han Scena io 1, while he collec i e payo s and
o al ading olume a e no highe han Scena io 1, indica ing
ha he e o m o he pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism
(Scena io 1) e ec i ely lowe s he ma ke ading p ice, while
helping imp o e he collec i e payo s and ma ke ading.
4.2.3. Gas p ice a o dabili y change
The di e ence be ween Scena io 1 and Scena io 4 is ha he
en i onmen al bene i s o Gas buye B3in Scena io 1 who uses
gas as a eplacemen o coal is no included, whe eas in Scena io
4, he a o dable p ice o Gas buye B3comp ises o he en i on-
men al bene i s and i is much highe . The e o e, he a iable ha
a ec s he esul is he a o dable p ice change ∆WB3.
Conside ing ha na u al gas is cleane and mo e en i onmen-
ally iendly han coal, eplacing coal wi h na u al gas can c ea e
en i onmen al bene i s, ∆WB3≥0, he ange o p ice change is
RMB 0/m3 o RMB 3.84/m3, and we ake RMB 0.38/m3as he inal
change.
As shown in Fig. 9, wi h he inc ease in he a o dable p ice
change ∆WB3, Gas buye B3in Scena io 4 is able o pa icipa e
in ma ke ansac ions g adually, he ma ke equilib ium p ice is
a ec ed by new playe s, he collec i e payo s and ading olume
inc ease, illus a ing ha enhancing gas p ice a o dabili y will
help imp o e collec i e payo s and gas ma ke ansac ions.
4.2.4. Gas p ices a e egula ed by he go e nmen
Scena io 1 di e s om Scena io 5 in ha he equilib ium
p ice in Scena io 1 is de e mined by he ma ke , whe eas i is
go e nmen -con olled in Scena io 5. The a iable a ec ing he
esul s is he go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗.
The cu en go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗is RMB 2.03/m3.
Wi h e e ence o his o ical gas benchma k p ices in Jiangsu
P o ince, he ange o change is om −20% o 20%, and we ake
5% as he inal change.
As shown in Fig. 10, when he go e nmen -con olled p ice
P∗is RMB 2.03/m3, he equilib ium p ice in Scena io 5Pis lowe
compa ed wi h Scena io 1, while he collec i e payo s and ad-
ing olume in Scena io 5 a e also lowe han in Scena io 1.
When he go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗is lowe han supply
cos o each playe , he collec i e payo s and ading olume in
Scena io 5 educe o 0, and he supplie s e use o pa icipa e in
he ma ke . When he go e nmen -con olled p ice P∗ ises, he
collec i e payo s and ading olume in Scena io 5 will inc ease
and each i s maximum when he go e nmen -con olled p ice is
a a ce ain alue (op imal go e nmen -con olled p ice, e.g. RMB
2.23/m3), and hen i will g adually d op as he go e nmen -
con olled p ice P∗con inues o ise. I can be ound ha wi hin
he ange o go e nmen -con olled p ice change, he collec i e
payo s and ading olume in Scena io 5 a e consis en ly no
g ea e han hose in Scena io 1, sugges ing ha go e nmen
p ice con ols a e no conduci e o imp o ing collec i e payo s
and gas ma ke de elopmen .
4.3. Discussions
Compa ing scena io 1 wi h scena io 2, he esul sugges s ha
he supplie s wi h comp ehensi e cos ad an age will bene i
om he con ac which does no speci y he gas sou ces. They
a e able o inc ease sales olume o gas, expand he ma ke
sha e, and domina e he ma ke h ough cos ad an age, bu
he bene i s will no imp o e along wi h he inc easing sales,
which means i is no conduci e o maximizing bene i s. When
a con ac speci ies ce ain gas sou ce, pa o cos ly gas sou ces
will no be able o pa icipa e in ma ke , he ma ke equilib ium
p ices will be pushed down and he coope a i e payo s o he
o e all coali ion will inc ease. Also, he p o i alloca ions o all
pa icipan s will inc ease. Appa en ly, when g and coali ion se
he maximum p o i s as he goal, speci ying he ce ain gas sou ce
in he con ac mee s all pa icipan s’ in e es s in he gas-on-gas
compe i ion-based ma ke .
Compa ing Scena io 1 and Scena io 3, he esul sugges s
ha he bene i s gene a ed om he p ice cu in ansmission
will be ans e ed o he downs eam ading ma ke s, a e he
e o m on pipeline ansmission p icing mechanism. The bene-
i s o all pa icipan s will be e-dis ibu ed by he coope a i e
game be ween supplie s and buye s, and he p o i alloca ions
o all pa ies will inc ease, same o he ading olume and
o al p oceeds, while he ma ke equilib ium p ice will dec ease.
Ob iously, i Chinese go e nmen s eng hens he supe ision
on pipelines cha ac e ized by na u al monopoly and educes he
pipeline ansmission ees, in o de o p e en he pipeline en-
e p ises ob aining excess e u ns and lowe he downs eam gas
cos , he gas-on-gas compe i ion-based gas ma ke will g ow and
he ading ma ke will be p omo ed.
Compa ing Scena io 1 wi h Scena io 4, he bene i s gene a ed
o educed by ex e nal ac o s will be passed o ela ed buye s,
hen en i e ma ke , esul ing in changes in ma ke ansac ion
olume and o al bene i s which will be e-dis ibu ed among
all pa icipan s. Thus he gas ading ma ke will be e ec ed.
Recen yea s, in o de o p omo e he de elopmen o gas ma -
ke , Chinese go e nmen has p oposed a numbe o policies,
in ended o encou age he use s o abandon al e na i e ene gy
and swi ch o na u al gas ins ead. Fo ins ance, local go e n-
men o e allowance o amilies using cen alized hea ing se ice
(Shijiazhuang Municipal People’s Go e nmen ,2017), ensu e he
pu chase p ice o elec ici y gene a ed by na u al gas does no
exceed RMB 0.35/kWh benchma k p ice o coal-de i ed powe
plan s (NDRC,2014). The subsidy policies ha e signi ican ly en-
hanced p ice a o dabili y o use s consuming na u al gas, which
is undoub edly conduci e o inc easing o al p oceeds o he
372 X. Rui, L. Feng and J. Feng / Ene gy Repo s 6 (2020) 365–377
Fig. 2. Sensi i i y analysis o gas supply cos CA1a.
Fig. 3. Sensi i i y analysis o gas supply olume QA1a.
gas ma ke , p omo ing gas ading and expanding China’s gas
consump ion ma ke .
Compa ing scena io 1 wi h scena io 5, he esea ch shows
ha he gas supplie s sha e a less po ion o p o i han he gas
buye s, which has se e ely supp essed he supplie s’ en husiasm
o p oduc ion, while s imula es he demand o buye s, esul ing
a sho en-supplied gas ma ke . In addi ion, he coope a ion pay-
o s and o al ansac ion olume in he p ice-con olled ma ke