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Are constitutional characteristics a proxy for institutional quality? Evidence from 109 countries

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Are constitutional characteristics a proxy for institutional quality? Evidence from 109 countries

Author: Evrensel, Ayðse Y.
Publisher: Abingdon: Taylor & Francis
Year: 2021
DOI: 10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
Source: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/270067/1/10.1080_23322039.2021.1911909.pdf
E ensel, Ayðse Y.
A icle
A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a p oxy o ins i u ional
quali y? E idence om 109 coun ies
Cogen Economics & Finance
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Taylo & F ancis G oup
Sugges ed Ci a ion: E ensel, Ayðse Y. (2021) : A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a p oxy o
ins i u ional quali y? E idence om 109 coun ies, Cogen Economics & Finance, ISSN 2332-2039,
Taylo & F ancis, Abingdon, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, pp. 1-33,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
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A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a p oxy o
ins i u ional quali y? E idence om 109 coun ies
Ayse Y. E ensel |
To ci e his a icle: Ayse Y. E ensel | (2021) A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a p oxy o
ins i u ional quali y? E idence om 109 coun ies, Cogen Economics & Finance, 9:1, 1911909,
DOI: 10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
To link o his a icle: h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
© 2021 The Au ho (s). This open access
a icle is dis ibu ed unde a C ea i e
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Published online: 09 May 2021.
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GENERAL & APPLIED ECONOMICS | RESEARCH ARTICLE
A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a p oxy o
ins i u ional quali y? E idence om 109 coun ies
Ayse Y. E ensel
1
*
Abs ac : The pape in es iga es he ques ion whe he cons i u ions a e a p oxy o
ins i u ional quali y. I p o ides a discussion o ins i u ions and s a es ha cons i u-
ions a e an example o a o mal ins i u ion. As any o he o mal ins i u ion, cons i u-
ions a e also in luenced by coun ies’ in o mal ins i u ions, including cus oms and
belie sys ems. The no el con en analysis goes beyond he o en-used cons i u ional
cha ac e is ics o go e nmen sys ems and elec o al ules. In addi ion o he men-
ioned cha ac e is ics, he leng h, he numbe o e isions, and o e 30 addi ional
cha ac e is ics a e coded o 109 cons i u ions, such as s a e eligion and eligious
eedom as well as e e ing o s a e as mo he , a he o holy. Based on he con en
analysis, al e na i e cons i u ional sco es a e calcula ed. S a is ically signi ican co -
ela ions a e obse ed be ween measu es o ins i u ional quali y such as co up ion
con ol and some o he cons i u ional sco es. Based on he wo widely-used economic
de elopmen models, he OLS and wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions a e conduc ed
wi h and wi hou he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables, whe e in he la e case he
ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables a e eplaced by cons i u ional sco es. Especially
in wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions, cons i u ional sco es ha emphasize he
leng h, men ion s a e eligion, and e e o s a e as mo he , a he o holy s a is ically
signi ican ly and nega i ely a ec income pe capi a. These indings poin ou o
possible limi a ions o change ha is aimed by cons i u ional e isions.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ayse Y. E ensel is an Associa e P o esso o
Economics in he Depa men o Economics
and Finance a Sou he n Illinois Uni e si y
Edwa ds ille. He eaching is ocused on
In e na ional Economics and Mac oeconomics
a he unde g adua e and g adua e le el. He
ea lie publica ions examined exchange a e
egimes, e ec i eness o IMF p og ams, FDI,
p e e en ial ade ag eemen s, and he co up-
ion-g ow h ela ionship. Recen ly, he esea ch
ocus has been di ec ed owa d cul u e and
ins i u ions. She has published empi ical mul i-
coun y s udies on he his o ical and cul u al
o igins o ins i u ional quali y.
PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
Ins i u ions can be o mal, such as w i en laws
and cons i u ions, o in o mal, such as cul u e and
he sha ed belie sys em ha implici ly desc ibes
accep able beha io in a gi en social g oup. The e
a e impo an easons as o why we examine
a ious ypes o ins i u ions and ins i u ional
quali y, he mos impo an o which is ha he
cha ac e is ics o ins i u ions in a coun y ha e an
e ec on he coun y’s economic de elopmen .
Some ins i u ional cha ac e is ics such as p o-
mo ing he ule o law, co up ion con ol, limi s
o he powe o he coun y’s execu i e ( ha o
he p esiden o p ime minis e ) a e belie ed o
suppo economic de elopmen . Only a ew s u-
dies examine cons i u ions in a mul i-coun y
se ing and hese s udies usually ocus on wo
cha ac e is ics o cons i u ions: go e nmen ype
and elec o al ules. This s udy conduc s a mo e
comp ehensi e con en analysis o a la ge num-
be o cons i u ions o ind ou whe he cons i u-
ional and ins i u ional cha ac e is ics a e ela ed.
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
Page 1 o 33
Recei ed: 31 Janua y 2021
Accep ed: 30 Ma ch 2021
*Co esponding au ho : Ayse
Y. E ensel, Depa men o
Economics and Finance,Sou he n
Illinois Uni e si y Edwa ds ille,
Edwa ds ille, IL 62026-1102
E-mail: [email p o ec ed]
Re iewing edi o :
Wai Ching Poon, Economics, Monash
Uni e si y – Malaysia Campus,
MALAYSIA
Addi ional in o ma ion is a ailable a
he end o he a icle
© 2021 The Au ho (s). This open access a icle is dis ibu ed unde a C ea i e Commons
A ibu ion (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
Subjec s: Socio-Legal S udies; Cul u e & De elopmen ; Economics and De elopmen
Keywo ds: Cons i u ions; ins i u ions; colonialism; cul u e; income
Subjec s: K39; O43; Z10
1. In oduc ion
Economis s’ ini ial in e es in cons i u ions ocused on cons i u ions’ abili y o gene a e he mos
basic laye o ules o socie ies, which was expec ed o a ec economic ou comes (Buchanan &
Tullock, 1962). No h and Weingas (1989) p o ide he applica ion o his iew o he cons i u ions
o Wes e n Eu opean coun ies o iden i y di e en economic ou comes associa ed wi h di e en
se s o basic ules in hese coun ies. Subsequen empi ical s udies on cons i u ions analyze he
ela ionship be ween he mos ob ious cons i u ional cha ac e is ics and economic ou comes.
Some s udies examine he e ec s o go e nmen ypes (p esiden ial s. pa liamen a y) on iscal
policy ou comes (Ande sen & Aslaksen, 2008; Eiche e al., 2018; Milesi-Fe e i e al., 2002; Pe sson
& Tabellini, 2002; Rockey, 2012; Su e , 1998). The o he s ocus on he e ec s o elec o al ules
(majo i a ian s. p opo ional) on co up ion and in as uc u e in es men (Eiche e al., 2018;
Pe sson e al., 2003; Pe sson and Tabellini 2004a , 2004b).
The mo i a ion o his pape came om he au ho ’s eading o he 1982 Tu kish Cons i u ion mo e
han h ee decades ago. The i s page o he Tu kish Cons i u ion con ains he ph ase Holy Tu kish
S a e as opposed o We he People in he U.S. cons i u ion. Addi ionally, he Tu kish Cons i u ion is
a ai ly long book ha basically alks abou e e y hing unde he sun compa ed o he U.S. cons i u ion
ha looks like a sho empla e. Clea ly, coun ies ha e di e en app oaches o hei cons i u ions.
Some o hem ele a e s a e o a high s a us and ado n i wi h ph ases such as mo he , a he , o
sac ed. As No h (1990) sugges s, o mal ins i u ions a e in luenced by in o mal ins i u ions whe e
in o mal ins i u ions a e de ined as he cul u al and his o ical collec i e expe ience o a socie y. This
iew enables us o go beyond he o en-used cons i u ional cha ac e is ics such as go e nmen
sys ems and elec o al ules and add o he cons i u ional cha ac e is ics o he lis .
The pape aims o demons a e ha cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a e ela ed o coun ies’ ins i u-
ional cha ac e is ics. I his is he case, cons i u ional cha ac e is ics can be used as a p oxy o
ins i u ional cha ac e is ics, o example, in economic de elopmen and g ow h eg essions. Howe e ,
his objec i e necessi a es a mul idimensional con en analysis o a la ge numbe o cons i u ions. The
no el da ase includes 109 coun ies whose cons i u ions a e coded o o e 30 cha ac e is ics. Among
hese cha ac e is ics, he e is he leng h o cons i u ions as well as men ioning s a e eligion and
e e ing o s a e as mo he , a he o holy. Based on he con en analysis, six al e na i e cons i u ional
indices a e calcula ed, which a e no malized as cons i u ional sco es be ween 0 and 1. The no mal-
iza ion o sco es is done in a way so ha highe sco es would indica e highe ins i u ional quali y.
Assuming ha cons i u ions a e an example o o mal ins i u ions, s a is ically signi ican co ela ions
a e obse ed be ween co up ion con ol, bu eauc a ic quali y, and he a e age ins i u ional quali y,
which a e conside ed in o mal ins i u ions, and some o he cons i u ional sco es.
The cons i u ional sco es a e pu o he es by eplica ing wo widely-used economic de elop-
men models. The benchma k OLS and he wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions a e i s conduc ed
wi h ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables. Then, hese a iables a e eplaced by cons i u ional
sco es. The esul s sugges ha he explana o y powe o cons i u ional sco es o eal GDP pe
capi a depends upon he empi ical model. Especially in wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions,
cons i u ional sco es ha emphasize he leng h, men ion s a e eligion, and e e o s a e as
mo he , a he o holy a e s a is ically signi ican .
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
Page 2 o 33
While no el, his s udy ep esen s a c ude con en analysis o a la ge numbe o cons i u ions.
The ac ha only some o he cons i u ional sco es co ela e wi h (in o mal) ins i u ional quali y
implies he p esence o noise in he measu emen o cons i u ional cha ac e is ics, which s ems
om a ious issues. Fi s , a common challenge in ins i u ional quali y- ela ed s udies is ha
complemen a i y o o mal and in o mal ins i u ions (o he lack he eo ) can a y among coun-
ies (Helmke & Le i sky, 2004; Poppo & Zenge , 2002). Fo example, e en hough p esiden ial
go e nmen sys ems a e assumed o be associa ed wi h smalle and mo e e icien go e nmen s,
a coun y’s poli ical cul u e would make his sys em less e icien . Second, blun ly pu , he con en
o cons i u ions may e lec wish ul hinking in ha he coun y’s cons i u ion is unable o imp o e
he condi ions ha a e aimed o be imp o ed. In o he wo ds, he con en o he cons i u ion is no
e ec i ely implemen ed. Thi d, addi ional dimensions o cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a e needed
o c ea e a highe deg ee o a ia ion in cons i u ional quali y.
Viewing cons i u ions as a o mal ins i u ion and assuming ha cons i u ions should be ela ed
o coun ies’ in o mal ins i u ional cha ac e is ics such as co up ion o bu eauc a ic quali y is an
impo an line o inqui y. This iew ells us ha cons i u ions o hei e isions should no be
examined in a acuum. A coun y’s in o mal ins i u ional cha ac e is ics a e expec ed o be isible
in i s cons i u ions and cons i u ional e isions. The implica ion o his line o inqui y is ha new
cons i u ions o cons i u ional e isions may no b ing he expec ed change, as long as in o mal
ins i u ions ha a ec cons i u ions do no change.
The pape is o ganized as ollows. Sec ion 2 p o ides a discussion on ins i u ions and cons i u-
ions as well as hei connec ion o economic ou comes. Sec ion 3 desc ibes he con en analysis
o 109 cons i u ions, c ea es cons i u ional sco es, and examines he ela ionship be ween con-
s i u ional sco es and some o he well-known measu es o ins i u ional quali y. Sec ion 4 p esen s
he esul s o he OLS and wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions and e lec s on he empi ical
esul s by ela ing hem o he concep s ha a e discussed in Sec ion 2. Finally, Sec ion 5
concludes.
2. Ins i u ions and cons i u ions
This sec ion’s aim is o p o ide a succinc discussion ega ding he ela ionship be ween ins i u-
ions and cons i u ions as well as hei possible in luence on economic ou comes, no ably on
economic de elopmen . This discussion is necessa y so ha he empi ical analysis in Sec ions 3
and 4 a e based on a concep ual amewo k.
Acco ding o No h (1990), ins i u ions e e o he ules o he game by p o iding bo h he
con en and he limi s o indi iduals’ choices, which in u n de ines he incen i e s uc u e in an
economy. Based on his unde s anding o ins i u ions, economic ou comes depend on wha
ins i u ions ewa d o penalize. Fo example, p omo ing independen judicia y, p ope y igh s
en o cemen , equal access o educa ion, and ci il libe ies a e expec ed o encou age in es men
and g ow h. Cu en ly, he e is no classi ica ion o ins i u ions, which sa is ies Acemoglu and
Johnson’s (2005) sugges ion o unbundling ins i u ions. Thei ision is ha he cu en black-box
na u e o ins i u ions is eplaced wi h a sys em ha ecognizes he in luence a eas o ins i u ions,
such as con ac ing s. p ope y igh s ins i u ions, economic s. poli ical ins i u ions, e c.
Cu en ly, we ha e a coa se bu in o ma i e classi ica ion o ins i u ions as o mal and in o mal
ins i u ions. Fo mal ins i u ions imply w i en ins uc ions o bluep in s ha de ine he codes o
conduc , he decision-making mechanisms, e c. W i en laws ha de ine he poli ical, judicial, and
social sys em as well as egula ions cons i u e o mal ins i u ions, which includes cou s, legisla-
u es, bu eauc acies, cons i u ions, laws, and egula ions. The ules and p ocedu es associa ed
wi h o mal ins i u ions a e c ea ed, communica ed, and en o ced h ough o icial channels.
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
Page 3 o 33

In o mal ins i u ions, on he o he hand, imply lea ned, expec ed, and alued pa e ns o beha io ,
which may no be explici ly w i en. No h (1990) desc ibes in o mal ins i u ions as men al con-
s uc s, such as ideas and ideologies ha e lec s he collec i e belie sys em o a socie y, in sho ,
cul u e. To p o ide an example, no cons i u ion no es ha he coun y shall be highly co up . The
coun y ends up being highly co up due o he cha ac e is ics o i s in o mal ins i u ions such as
sha ed alues, belie sys em, o cul u e.
Social sciences de ine cul u e as he collec ion o accep able no ms and p ac ices ha a e
sha ed by membe s o a socie y and lea ned h ough successi e gene a ions. The con en o
sha ed alues e lec s he sense o mo ali y o a g oup o people ega ding accep able and
punishable beha io (G ei , 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; No h e al., 2009). Cul u e mo i a es and
jus i ies ac ions consis en wi h i s alues h ough i s impac on policies (Schwa z & Boehnke,
2004). A common cul u al he i age p o ides a means o educing he di e gence in he men al
models in a socie y. I also ensu es in e gene a ional ans e o cul u e and he e o e he con-
inua ion o uni ying pe cep ions. In ecen decades, cul u e has been inc easingly ecognized o
i s in luence on o mal ins i u ions as well as on economic ou comes (Guiso e al., 2003, 2006; Lich
e al., 2007; Moky , 2017; Roland, 2004; Williamson, 2000). Fo example, Moky (2014) s a es ha
belie s suppo ins i u ions and wi hou unde s anding belie s o cul u e, we canno eally unde -
s and why socie ies ha e he ins i u ions hey do.
In his pa hb eaking s udy, Schwa z (1994, 1999) has p o ided a se o cul u al alue dimen-
sions, he combina ions o which can be help ul o unde s and in o mal ins i u ions o a socie y.
The embeddedness/au onomy dimension implies he desi able ela ionship be ween he indi idual
and he g oup. Embeddedness e e s o a cul u al emphasis on he pe son as embedded in he
g oup and commi ed o main aining he s a us quo wi hou dis up ing g oup solida i y o he
adi ional o de . Au onomy, on he o he hand, desc ibes cul u es in which he pe son is iewed as
an au onomous membe o he socie y. In his case, cul u e emphasizes he desi abili y o
indi iduals independen ly pu suing hei own ideas and li e di ec ions. The hie a chy/egali a ianism
dimension is conce ned wi h he ideal way o elici coope a i e beha io in socie y. Hie a chy e e s
o a cul u al emphasis on obeying ole obliga ions despi e unequal dis ibu ion o powe and
esou ces. Egali a ianism implies he willingness o olun a ily su ende ing sel ish in e es s in
a o o p omo ing he wel a e o o he s. The mas e y/ha mony dimension conce ns he ela ion
o humankind o he na u al and social wo ld. Mas e y e e s o a cul u al emphasis on ge ing
ahead h ough ac i e sel -asse ion in o de o mas e , change, and exploi he na u al and social
en i onmen . Ha mony e e s o an emphasis on accep ing he social and physical wo ld as i is,
ying o comp ehend i , and i ing in a he han o change i .
Religion is sugges ed as one o he mos impo an componen s o cul u e based on which he
men ioned cul u al alue dimensions a e u he es ablished and ein o ced. Webe (Webe , 2001)
s a ed ha he Re o ma ion p o ided he mo al jus i ica ion o wo ldly ac i i ies such as wo k,
p o i , and weal h accumula ion by making ou ine p oduc i e ac i i ies consis en wi h eligious
belie s. Simila ly, No h and Thomas (1973) explained he Eu opean economic ans o ma ion in
he 16
h
cen u y especially in England and he Ne he lands based on he P o es an Re o ma ion
and a gued ha he habi s and no ms in oduced by he Re o ma ion we e a signi ican sou ce o
capi al accumula ion. The change in he cul u al ab ic o England and he Ne he lands p omo ed
wo k e hics and h i , which laid he ounda ion o capi al accumula ion and indus ializa ion. The
cul u al o igins o cu en economic and ins i u ional sys ems ha e been u he examined in o he
s udies (Acemoglu e al., 2001; G ei , 1994; No h, 1981).
The empi ical e idence sugges s ha a highe sha e o P o es an s in a coun y is associa ed
wi h ins i u ions o highe quali y wi h less co up ion, mo e emphasis on he ule o law, and
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23322039.2021.1911909
Page 4 o 33
s onge democ acy (Ingleha , 1999; Landes, 1998; Lich e al., 2007; La Po e al., 1997; Pu nam
R, 1993). O he s udies examine he e ec s o eligious denomina ions on us , which conside ed
o be impo an o ins i u ional quali y and economic pe o mance (Tabellini, 2008, 2010).
P edominan ly Ca holic, Muslim, and Hindu coun ies exhibi lowe us owa d o he s han he
p edominan ly P o es an coun ies (Ba o and McClea y, 2003; La Po e al., 1997). While mos o
he men ioned empi ical s udies use c oss-sec ion da a, mo e ecen s udies make use o mic o
da a ha con ain indi iduals’ a i udes on a a ie y o subjec s in many coun ies, which mos ly
con i m he o e all c oss-coun y esul s. Fo example, Guiso e al. (2003) ound ha eligious
upb inging among P o es an s is posi i ely ela ed o us , while i is nega i ely ela ed o us
among Ca holics, Muslims, and Hindus in inc easing o de o dis us . In o he wo ds, he nega i e
e ec o eligious upb inging on us is he weakes among Ca holics and s onges among
Hindus.
Howe e , cul u e is no assumed o be he only sou ce o a ia ion in ins i u ional quali y.
Acemoglu e al. (2001) emphasize ha he e is a need o isola e he exogenous sou ces o
a ia ion in ins i u ions. They ace he sou ces o cu en ins i u ions o he pas ins i u ions,
whe e he la e is a ec ed whe he he colonial pas was cha ac e ized by ex ac i e economic
ac i i ies, as measu ed by se le mo ali y. In colonies whe e se le s died in la ge numbe s,
colonial adminis a ions ocused on ex ac ing ag icul u al o mining esou ces wi hou impo ing
hei Eu opean ins i u ions. In mo e empe a e places such as No h Ame ica, New Zealand, and
Aus alia, Eu opeans se led in la ge numbe s and colonial adminis a ions c ea ed homeland-like
ins i u ions.
In he adi ion o Douglass No h, he e exis s an unb eakable ela ionship be ween o mal and
in o mal ins i u ions. The di ec ion o causali y is assumed o be going om in o mal o o mal
ins i u ions. The dis inc ion be ween o mal and in o mal ins i u ions has led o s udies ha
examine he in e ac ion be ween hem. One o he impo an ques ions in his espec is whe he
o mal and in o mal ins i u ions o social con ac s a e complemen s o subs i u es (Poppo &
Zenge , 2002). Helmke and Le i sky (2004) p oposes a ypology o ou pa e ns o o mal and
in o mal ins i u ional in e ac ion. In a complemen a y ela ionship, in o mal ins i u ions p o ide
he mo i a ion o o mal ins i u ions, he eby making he o mal ins i u ions e ec i e. The accom-
moda ing ela ionship implies ha in o mal ins i u ions c ea e incen i es o beha e in ways ha
al e he subs an i e e ec s o o mal ules wi hou di ec ly iola ing hem. In a compe ing
ela ionship, o mal ules and p ocedu es a e no sys ema ically en o ced, which enables ac o s
o igno e o iola e hem. A subs i u i e ela ionship implies ha in o mal ins i u ions ha e made
he o mal ones ine ec i e. Fo example, i is no enough o ha e w i en laws allowing women o
pa icipa e in he labo o ce, i he socie y’s expec a ions ega ding he ole o women p e en i .
In his case, he ela ionship be ween o mal and in o mal ins i u ions becomes compe ing o e en
subs i u i e a he han complemen a y o accommoda ing.
Now, I u n o cons i u ions. Acco ding o No h (1990), cons i u ions ep esen one o he
dimensions o o mal ins i u ions. The ques ion is as o wha o look o in a cons i u ion. Some
o he economic s udies on cons i u ions ollow Fulle (1964) ha has he pe spec i e o legal
philosophy. Had ield and Weingas (2014), o example, sugges s ha e ec i e cons i u ions
should ha e ce ain legal a ibu es such as gene ali y (subjec s human conduc o he ules),
s abili y (p omo es compliance h ough es ablished coo dina ion pa e ns, because ins abili y low-
e s he alue o he ule and he e o e cu en and u u e compliance), cla i y ( educes ambigui y
abou he law and he line be ween cons i u ional and uncons i u ional beha io ), and consis ency
(p omo es uni o m implemen a ion o he announced ules). Addi ionally, some schola s obse e
ha a cen al ole o cons i u ions is o help people coo dina e. Nonau ho i a ian cons i u ions a e
belie ed o ha e he abili y o achie e he coo dina ion equilib ium (Mi al & Weingas , 2013;
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Weingas , 1997). Cons i u ional cha ac e is ics such as go e nmen sys ems and elec o al ules
a e also examined because o hei possible e ec s on iscal policy ou comes (Ande sen &
Aslaksen, 2008; Eiche e al., 2018). The men ioned s udies abou cons i u ions imply as o which
concep ual objec i es cons i u ions should ul ill.
In eali y, a imes policy make s ace he necessi y o a e o m, a widely suppo ed undamen al
change, whose legi imacy will s em om a new cons i u ion. In his sense, some cons i u ions a e
aspi a ional such as ha o Sou h A ica ollowing he end o apa heid.
1
E en an aspi a ional cons i u-
ion may ail o each i s goal. His o ically speaking, i s O oman cons i u ions a e an example o quasi-
aspi a ional cons i u ions ha ailed. The edic s o Tanzima and Islaha we e in oduced in 1839 and
1853, espec i ely, o mode nize he Empi e by in oducing human and p ope y igh s. La e in esponse
o he Eu opean p essu e o limi Sul an Abdulhamid II’s absolu e powe , he i s Cons i u ion was
in oduced in 1876, which c ea ed a legisla i e assembly. Howe e , he Sul an suspended he Gene al
Assembly in 1878 and uled he Empi e wi h absolu e powe o ano he 30 yea s (Ka a eli, 2011;
Özbudun, 2011). O he imes cons i u ional e isions may be ini ia ed by a speci ic poli ical g oup wi h
s onge o weake suppo om ci izens. The 1982 cons i u ional e isions ha clea ly e lec ed he
Tu kish mili a y’s iew on he p e-1980 iolence in he coun y was app o ed by o e 91% o o es in
a e e endum. Howe e , he 2010 e ision aimed a educing he mili a y’s in luence on poli ics as well as
imp o ing Tu key’s human igh s eco d o make he coun y mo e a ac i e o he Eu opean Union.
These e isions we e app o ed by 58% o he o es in a e e endum.
The abo e discussion indica es ha cons i u ions a e w i en o e ised o a a ie y o easons.
While hese easons can be in es iga ed in a coun y s udy, in an empi ical s udy wi h many
coun ies i is di icul o dis inguish he easons o e e y ini ial cons i u ion and subsequen
e isions. One solu ion is o adop he adi ion o Douglass No h and iew cons i u ions as
a p oduc o he belie sys em o a socie y. Cons i u ions as o mal ins i u ions a e expec ed o
be ela ed o in o mal ins i u ions in coun ies (No h, 1990). This is an impo an poin , when i
comes o conduc ing a con en analysis o cons i u ions. The assump ion is ha a socie y in which
an indi idual is iewed as embedded in a g oup and he coope a ion wi h he es o he socie y is
secu ed h ough hie a chy and ha mony will p oduce a di e en cons i u ion han he socie y ha
p esc ibes indi idualism and egali a ianism. Fo example, e e ing o s a e as sac ed may indica e
a hie a chical socie y.
Ou in e es in cons i u ions (and gene ally speaking in ins i u ions) is no jus in ellec ual cu iosi y. The
e ec o ins i u ional quali y on coun ies’ income is well es ablished in empi ical s udies (Acemoglu
e al., 2003; Ba o, 1991; Eas e ly & Le ine, 2003; Hall & Jones, 1999; Knack & Kee e , 1995; Mau o, 1995;
La Po a e al., 1999; Rod ik, 1999). This pape in es iga es whe he cons i u ional cha ac e is ics, as an
example o a o mal ins i u ion, a e in e changeable wi h cha ac e is ics o in o mal ins i u ions as well
as whe he cons i u ional cha ac e is ics ha e an e ec on economic de elopmen . The empi ical
analysis aims o answe he ollowing ques ions. 1) A e in o mal ins i u ional cha ac e is ics and con-
s i u ional cha ac e is ics ela ed in he sample coun ies, i we assume ha cons i u ions ep esen he
o mal aspec o coun ies’ ins i u ions? 2) I hey a e ela ed, is i possible o subs i u e ins i u ional
cha ac e is ics wi h cons i u ional cha ac e is ics in income eg essions and e i y he e ec s o con-
s i u ions on economic de elopmen ?
3. Con en analysis o cons i u ions, cons i u ional sco es, and he ela ionship be ween
cons i u ional indices and ins i u ional quali y
The da ase has 109 coun ies’ cons i u ions.
2
Table 1 p o ides he lis o he sample coun ies wi h
w i en cons i u ions.
3
Table 2 in oduces he a iables ha e lec he cons i u ional cha ac e -
is ics in he sample coun ies. Some o he a iables ha e al eady been used in p e ious s udies on
cons i u ions, such as go e nmen ype and elec o al ules. The e o e, his da a come om
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a a ie y o s udies and he CIA Wo ld Fac Book. All o he a iables a e compiled by he au ho
du ing he con en analysis o he sample coun ies’ cons i u ions. In he ollowing, as a a iable is
in oduced, he ele ance o his a iable as well as wha i measu es will be discussed.
In Table 2, he a iable s a e implies ha he cons i u ion e e s o s a e as mo he , a he , holy,
e c., which e ec i ely pu s s a e as an elusi e au ho i y igu e on a pedes al. As men ioned in he
p e ious sec ions, Schwa z’s (Schwa z, 1994, 1999) wo k ocuses on classi ying socie ies based on
hei emphasis on embeddedness o indi iduali y. Deep- oo ed belie s in a socie y may lead o he
posi ion ha he con inua ion o s a e is mo e impo an han indi iduals’ eedom. Measu es o
eedom in coun ies a e posi i ely ela ed o income le els (De Haan & S u m, 2000). S a e akes
on he alue o 1, i he cons i u ion men ions s a e as mo he , a he , holy, e c. and 0 o he wise.
The e a e wo eligion- ela ed a iables ha s ess embeddedness and indi iduali y, espec-
i ely: s a e el (s a e eligion) and el ee ( eedom o eligion). I a coun y decla es a s a e eligion
in i s cons i u ion, i may be an indica ion ha in o mal ins i u ions and decisions in his coun y
will e lec he o icial eligion’s poin o iew. The inclusion o eedom o eligion in a cons i u ion,
Table 1. Sample coun ies
Albania Finland Libya Slo enia
Alge ia F ance Luxembou g Somalia
Angola Gabon Madagasca Sou h A ica
A gen ina Gambia Malaysia Spain
Aus alia Ge many Maldi es S i Lanka
Aus ia Ghana Mali Sudan
Bahamas G eece Mal a Su iname
Bah ain Gua emala Mexico Sweden
Bangladesh Guyana Mongolia Swi ze land
Belgium Hai i Mo occo Sy ia
Bo swana Hondu as Mozambique Taiwan
B azil Hong Kong Namibia Tanzania
Bulga ia Hunga y Ne he lands Thailand
Bu kina Faso Iceland Nige ia Togo
Came oon India No way Tunisia
Canada Indonesia Oman Tu key
Chile I an Pakis an UK
China I aq Pa aguay USA
Colombia I eland Pe u Uganda
Congo, Republic o Is ael Philippines U uguay
Cos a Rica I aly Poland Venezuela
Co e d’I oi e Jamaica Po ugal Vie nam
Cuba Japan Qa a Yemen
Cyp us Jo dan Romania Zambia
Denma k Kenya Saudi A abia Zimbabwe
Ecuado Kuwai Senegal
Egyp Lebanon Sie a Leone
E hiopia Libe ia Singapo e
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ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables used in his pape . Co up ion is one o he mos equen ly used
a iables on ins i u ional quali y and is de ined as he use o public o ice o powe o p i a e gain
(Ba dhan, 1997; Rose-Acke man, 1999). Widesp ead co up ion is belie ed o ende law en o cemen
agencies and he judicia y dys unc ional, which has nega i e consequences on economic de elop-
men (He z eld & Weiss, 2003). While he e is no consensus ega ding he sou ces o co up ion
Table 5. Desc ip i e s a is ics o cons i u ional indices
All coun ies
Obs. Mean S anda d
de ia ion
Minimum Maximum
ci1 108 33.38 28.08 2.25 115
ci2 108 17.43 14.15 1.5 58.25
ci3 108 20.87 16.99 1.6 69.9
ci4 109 0.32 0.22 0 0.75
ci5 109 1.37 1.56 0.01 8.79
ci6 109 1.48 1.94 0 10.75
ci s ands o cons i u ional indices as desc ibed in Table 4.
Table 6. Desc ip i e s a is ics o cons i u ional sco es
Obs. Mean S d de . Minimum Maximum
All coun ies
ci1sco e 108 0.73 0.25 0 1
ci2sco e 108 0.72 0.25 0 1
ci3sco e 108 0.72 0.25 0 1
ci4sco e 109 0.58 0.30 0 1
ci5sco e 109 0.85 0.18 0 1
ci6sco e 109 0.86 0.18 0 1
Ad anced coun ies
ci1sco e 29 0.79 0.16 0.35 0.96
ci2sco e 29 0.79 0.16 0.37 0.97
ci3sco e 29 0.79 0.16 0.36 0.96
ci4sco e 30 0.47 0.26 0 1
ci5sco e 30 0.89 0.16 0.32 1
ci6sco e 30 0.90 0.16 0.30 1
O he coun ies
ci1sco e 79 0.70 0.27 0 1
ci2sco e 79 0.69 0.27 0 1
ci3sco e 79 0.69 0.27 0 1
ci4sco e 79 0.62 0.30 0 1
ci5sco e 79 0.83 0.18 0 1
ci6sco e 79 0.85 0.19 0 1
ci#sco e is calcula ed by using al e na i e ci indices and he minimum
and maximum alues o hese indices as shown in Table 5, acco ding o Equa ion 1 in he ex .
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(Eh lich & Lui, 1999; Shlei e & Vishny, 1993), some sugges ha colonial he i age may accoun o
some in e na ional a ia ion in he incidence o co up ion (T eisman, 2000). Addi ionally, cul u e and
eligion as one o he mos impo an dimensions o cul u e a e iewed as ano he possible sou ce o
co up ion (Ge ing & Thacke , 2004; La Po e al., 1997; Rose-Acke man, 1999). Table 7 includes wo
o he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables: bu eauc a ic quali y and a e age ins i u ional quali y,
whe e he la e is he a i hme ic a e age o co up ion con ol, bu eauc a ic quali y, openness in
execu i e ec ui men , and cons ain s on he execu i e.
Table 8 p o ides desc ip i e s a is ics o he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables in he sample
coun ies. The able shows ha co up ion con ol, bu eauc a ic quali y, and a e age ins i u ional
quali y a e highe in ad anced coun ies. Co ela ions be ween ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a i-
ables and cons i u ional sco es a e shown in Table 9. In he ollowing, only he s a is ically
signi ican co ela ions a he 5% le el a e men ioned. Fi s , ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables
(co up ion con ol, bu eauc a ic quali y, and a e age ins i u ional quali y) a e highly and posi i ely
co ela ed (be ween 0.81 and 0.89) wi h each o he . Second, linea associa ions be ween ins i u-
ional quali y- ela ed a iables and cons i u ional sco es a e limi ed o cons i u ional sco es 4, 5,
and 6. As expec ed, hey a e posi i e (be ween 0.24 and 0.36). Su p isingly, he co ela ion
Table 7. De ini ion o he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables
Va iables De ini ion
Co up ion con ol Co up ion in go e nmen as aced by business, such
as special paymen s, b ibes, nepo ism, job
ese a ions, e c.; alues ange be ween 1 and 10
whe e highe numbe s indica e highe co up ion
con ol; 2003–2015 a e age
Bu eauc a ic quali y Cha ac e is ics and e iciency o public adminis a ion;
alues ange be ween 1 and 10 whe e highe
numbe s indica e highe bu eauc a ic quali y;
2003–2015 a e age
A e age ins i u ional quali y A i hme ic a e age o co up ion con ol (0–10),
bu eauc a ic quali y (1–10), openness o execu i e
ec ui men (1–4), and execu i e cons ain s (1–7);
highe numbe s indica e highe ins i u ional quali y;
2003-2015 a e age
Co up ion con ol is p o ided by he WDI (Wo ld De elopmen Indica o s) o he Wo ld Bank (h p://da abank.
wo ldbank.o g/da a/home.aspx.) Bu eauc a ic quali y, execu i e openness, and execu i e cons ain s a e p o ided
by he Poli y IV P ojec , which is a ailable a h p://www.sys emicpeace.o g/poli y/poli y4.h m. A e age ins i u ional
quali y is calcula ed by he au ho .
Table 8. Desc ip i e s a is ics associa ed wi h ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables
All coun ies Ad anced coun ies O he coun ies
Obs. Mean S d
de .
Obs. Mean S d
de .
Obs. Mean S d
de .
Co up ion con ol 109 5.74 2.29 30 8.39 1.73 79 4.73 1.57
Bu eauc a ic
quali y
109 5.52 2.52 30 8.59 1.67 79 4.35 1.66
A e age
ins i u ional
quali y
103 3.78 1.57 27 5.84 0.96 76 3.05 0.98
See Table 7 o a iable de ini ion.
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coe icien s be ween he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables and cons i u ional sco e 4 a e
nega i e. As Table 4 indica es, go e nmen sys em and elec o al ule ha e a 50% weigh in
cons i u ional index and he e o e in cons i u ional sco e 4. Addi ionally, Table 3 shows ha 83
and 67% o ad anced economies ha e a pa liamen a y go e nmen sys em and a p opo ional
elec o al ule, espec i ely. As expec ed, he co ela ions be ween he ins i u ional quali y- ela ed
a iables and cons i u ional sco es 5 and 6 a e posi i e.
The ul ima e es o whe he cons i u ional sco es a e subs i u es o ins i u ional quali y- ela ed
a iables is o use hem in eg ession analysis. The nex sec ion in oduces some o he well-known
income eg essions, in which ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables as well as cons i u ional sco es
a e used.
4. OLS and wo-s age leas squa es es ima ions
The e is a la ge numbe o empi ical s udies ha use ins i u ional quali y as an explana o y
a iable in income eg essions ( o example, Ba o, 1991; Le ine & Renel , 1992; Mau o, 1995;
Sachs & Wa ne , 1997; Sala-i-ma in, 1997; Acemoglu e al., 2001, 2003; Eas e ly & Le ine, 2003).
I ollow hese s udies’ empi ical es ima ion s a egy o ini ial OLS es ima ions as a benchma k
ollowed by wo-s age leas squa es (2SLS) es ima ions. In e ms o he explana o y a iables, wo
eg ession models a e used. The i s eg ession model is simila o hose in Ba o (1991), Le ine
and Renel (1992),Mau o (1995), Sachs and Wa ne (1997), and Sala-i-ma in (1997), which ha e
many common a iables such as ini ial GDP pe capi a, ixed capi al in es men , human capi al-
ela ed a iables such as li e acy a e as well as p ima y, seconda y o e ia y school en olmen ,
egional dummies such as o Sub-Saha an A ica and La in Ame ica, openness, expo s uc u e,
eligious belie s, and legal o igins. The second eg ession model is simila o hose used in
Acemoglu e al. (2003) and especially Eas e ly and Le ine (2003) wi h limi ed a iables such as
legal o igins, eligious belie s, e hic ac ionaliza ion, la i ude, and se le mo ali y a es.
Table 10 p o ides he de ini ion o he a iables used in he OLS and 2SLS es ima ions. In bo h
es ima ions, eal GDP pe capi a is he dependen a iable. In e ms o he explana o y a iables,
many empi ical income models such as Ba o (1991), Acemoglu e al. (2003), and Eas e ly and
Le ine (2003) include an ini ial measu e o eal GDP pe capi a. As he men ioned empi ical s udies,
Table 9. Co ela ion coe icien s be ween ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables and cons i u-
ional sco es
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bu eauc a ic
quali y (2)
0.81*
A e age
ins i u ional
quali y (3)
0.89* 0.87*
ci1sco e (4) 0.12 0.04 −0.11
ci2sco e (5) 0.13 0.06 −0.09 0.99*
ci3sco e (6) 0.13 0.06 −0.10 0.99* 0.99*
ci4sco e (7) −0.26* −0.24* −0.24* −0.12 −0.11 −0.11
ci5sco e (8) 0.24* 0.36* 0.29* 0.19 0.26* 0.26* 0.02
ci6sco e (9) 0.24* 0.35* 0.29* 0.16 0.22* 0.22* 0.03 0.99*
Column (1) indica es co up ion con ol. (*) indica es 5 pe cen le el o signi icance. The co ela ion ma ix incudes 102
obse a ions. ci#sco e indica es cons i u ional sco es, which a e based on cons i u ional indices. See Table 4 o
de ini ion o al e na i e cons i u ional indices. See Table 7 o de ini ion o co up ion con ol, bu eauc a ic quali y,
and a e age ins i u ional quali y.
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his pape also uses eal GDP pe capi a 1960 as ini ial income. Fixed capi al in es men as
a pe cen o GDP and he human capi al index ep esen s he physical and human capi al equi e-
men o economic de elopmen . In e ms o he ade s uc u e, I use openness, which is de ined
as expo s plus impo s di ided by he GDP. E en hough ade es ic ions a e no di ec ly
measu ed, an inc ease in his a io is gene ally conside ed inc eased openness o o eign ade.
The ele ance o legal o igins is well es ablished in Glaese and Shlei e (2002), La Po a e al.
(1999), and La Po a e al. (2008). Gene ally speaking, he B i ish and F ench legal adi ions a e
ecognized as his o ically being a he opposi e end o he legal spec um. The di e ence be ween
hese wo legal adi ions is said o be endogenous o he his o ical powe o kings in espec i e
coun ies. While weake F ench kings led he way o a cen alis ic, s a e-con olled judicial sys em
ep esen ed by judges, powe ul ule s o England mo i a ed p ope y owne s o p o ec hem-
sel es om kings. The opposi e emphasis on s a e and he indi idual is hough o ha e conse-
quences on he e iciency o he judicial sys em in he p o ec ion o p ope y igh s. Howe e ,
ecen ly he idea o legal o igins has been ques ioned especially in coun ies ha ecei ed hei
legal s uc u e exogenously du ing he colonial e a (Gue ie o, 2016a, 2016b). The e may be
he e ogenei y in gi en legal adi ions in o me colonies depending upon whe he Eu opeans
Table 10. Va iables used in income eg essions
Va iable De ini ion
Real GDP pe capi a Real income pe capi a in US dolla s, base yea 2000;
Wo ld Bank (2010)
Real GDP pe capi a in 1960 Real income pe capi a in 1960 in US dolla s,
base yea 2000; Wo ld Bank (2010)
Fixed capi al in es men Fixed capi al in es men , pe cen o GDP; Wo ld Bank
(2010)
Human capi al index Weigh ed index o p obabili y o su i al o age 5,
expec ed yea s o school as well as es sco es, and
he ac ion o he 15 yea s old g oup who su i e o
Age 60; Wo ld Bank (2018)
Openness Expo s plus impo s, pe cen o GDP; Wo ld Bank
(2010)
Legal o igins Dummy a iables ha ake on he alue o 1 o
F ench o B i ish legal o igin and 0 o he wise; La Po a
e al. (1999)
E hnic ac ionaliza ion P obabili y ha wo indi iduals d awn andomly in
a coun y a e om di e en e hnic g oups; Alesina
e al. (2003)
Religious belie s Pe cen Ch is ians, P o es an s, and Muslims in
popula ion; CIA (2007)
Sub-Saha an A ica Dummy a iable ha akes on he alue o 1 o
a Sub-Saha an A ican coun y and 0 o he wise
La in Ame ica Dummy a iable ha akes on he alue o 1 o
a La in Ame ican coun y and 0 o he wise
La i ude No malized be ween 0 and 1 by di iding he coun y’s
sou he n/no he n mos la i ude (in no he n and
sou he n hemisphe e, espec i ely) by 90; CIA (2007)
Se le mo ali y a e Mo ali y a es pe 1000 o Eu opean soldie s, cle gy,
adminis a o s, se le s, e c.; Acemoglu e al. (2001)
P onoun–d op ule Dummy a iable ha akes on he alue o 1 i he
language allows p onoun d op and 0 o he wise;
Kashima and Kashima (1998)
Mos a iables imply he 2000-2015 a e age, unless indica ed o he wise.
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se led in la ge numbe s and impo ed hei ins i u ional s uc u e o he colony, including hei
judicial se up, o used he colony o esou ce ex ac ion pu poses, which may ha e no necessi-
a ed elabo a e ins i u ions.
Since Hall and Jones (1999), many empi ical s udies use la i ude as a p oxy o colonial pas .
Lowe la i udes close o he equa o in bo h hemisphe es a e assumed o e lec ex ac ion-based
economies. A numbe o s udies, among hem Eas e ly and Le ine (2003), ind ha he e is
a s ong posi i e associa ion be ween la i ude and economic de elopmen as measu ed in eal
pe capi a GDP. E hnic ac ionaliza ion is ano he widely used eg esso ha measu es he p ob-
abili y o wo andomly selec ed indi iduals in a coun y being om di e en e hnic g oups. The e
is an e hnolinguis ic a ia ion o his a iable as well. The ele ance o his a iable is ha highe
e hnic and e hnolinguis ic di e si y is associa ed wi h poli ical and economic powe s uggle
among g oups, especially in endowmen - ich coun ies. The g oup in powe is inclined o make
poli ical and economic decisions ha would exclude and he e o e weaken he economic and
poli ical posi ion o he o he g oup (Alesina e al., 2003; Eas e ly & Le ine, 1997; Mau o, 1995).
Religious a ilia ion as pe cen o P o es an s, Ca holics, Muslims, e c. in a coun y is used in
many s udies. E en hough God is pe cei ed o be mo al in many eligions, punishing hose who
engage in oppo unis ic beha io (Moky , 2014), s udies e eal di e ences in he implemen a ion o
belie s in di e en eligions. Webe (2001) ce ainly se he s age wi h he P o es an e hics ha is
hough o ha e shaped economic policies ega ding eedom, p ope y igh s, and compe i ion.
Pu nam (1993) and Landes (1998) a gue ha Ca holic and Muslim coun ies a ach less alue o
indi idualism and a o a powe ul s a e-chu ch combina ion. This pape uses he pe cen sha e o
Muslims in he es ima ions.
6
Table 11 shows he desc ip i e s a is ics associa ed wi h he eg ession a iables. As expec ed,
bo h he cu en and ini ial eal GDP pe capi a is highe in ad anced coun ies. Simila ly, ixed
capi al in es men , human capi al index, and openness is highe in ad anced coun ies. While 33%
o ad anced coun ies ha e he B i ish legal o igin, i is only 9% in o he coun ies. When i comes
o he F ench legal o igin, he ou come is he opposi e. While only 23% o ad anced coun ies ha e
he F ench legal o igin, i inc eases o 57% in o he coun ies. E hic ac ionaliza ion is much highe
in non-ad anced coun ies as well. The sha e o Ch is ians and P o es an s is much highe in
ad anced coun ies, while ha o Muslims is lowe . The mean la i ude o ad anced coun ies is
also much highe han he mean la i ude o o he coun ies.
Table 12 summa izes he co ela ion coe icien s be ween he eg ession a iables. In he
ollowing, only he s a is ically signi ican co ela ion coe icien s a he 5% le el a e men ioned,
unless indica ed o he wise. Because he i s column is eal GDP pe capi a, i s , linea ela ions
be ween he o me and he o he a iables a e discussed. Posi i e ela ionships a e obse ed
be ween ini ial eal GDP pe capi a, human capi al index, B i ish legal o igin, he sha e o Ch is ians,
and la i ude. Co ela ions coe icien s be ween eal GDP pe capi a and e hnic ac ionaliza ion and
he sha e o Muslims a e nega i e. Second, he e a e in e es ing linea ela ionships on he
diagonal. Fo example, he e is a nega i e ela ionship be ween se le mo ali y a e and la i ude
(−0.56).
In he ollowing, he esul s o he OLS and 2SLS es ima ions a e p esen ed. In hese es ima ions,
all a iables excep o he egional dummies, legal o igins, and p onoun-d op ule a e exp essed in
na u al loga i hm.
The OLS es ima ions a e based on he ollowing model:
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Table 11. Desc ip i e s a is ics on he eg ession a iables
All coun ies Ad anced coun ies O he coun ies
Obs. Mean S d de . Obs. Mean S d de . Obs. Mean S d de .
Real GDP pe
capi a
102 19,082 20,022 29 37,688 12,843 73 11,690 17,417
Real GDP pe
capi a 1960
105 14,801 17,318 29 29,271 9,528 76 9,279 16,435
Fixed capi al
In es men
104 22.26 6.00 30 23.16 4.02 74 21.89 6.63
Human capi al
index
100 0.58 0.16 29 0.78 0.04 71 0.50 0.11
Openness 101 82.19 50.44 27 98.18 65.96 74 76.36 42.51
B i ish legal o igin 109 0.16 0.37 30 0.33 0.48 79 0.09 0.29
F ench legal o igin 109 0.48 0.50 30 0.23 0.43 79 0.57 0.49
E hnic
ac ionaliza ion
101 0.46 0.28 26 0.25 0.19 75 0.53 0.26
Ch is ians 107 48.47 36.21 30 67.13 27.29 77 41.19 36.79
P o es an s 98 16.49 22.53 28 24.95 30.10 70 13.1 17.84
Muslims 100 30.09 38.66 29 3.26 4.26 71 41.05 41.06
La i ude 109 0.29 0.19 30 0.49 0.16 79 0.21 0.13
Se le mo ali y
a e
54 257.72 510.58 6 26.21 28.97 48 286.66 534.96
P onoun-d op ule 109 0.78 0.42 30 0.30 0.47 79 0.96 0.19
See Table 10 o a iable desc ip ion.
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Table 12. Co ela ion coe icien s among he eg ession a iables
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Real GDP pe
capi a 1960 (2)
0.97*
Fixed capi al
in es men (3)
0.21 0.17
Human capi al
index (4)
0.75* 0.67* 0.16
Openness (5) −0.02 −0.01 0.19 −0.11
B i ish legal o igin
(7)
0.34* 0.33* 0.08 0.27 −0.07
F ench legal o igin
(8)
0.08 0.11 −0.11 0.07 0.13 −0.59*
E hnic
ac ionaliza ion
(9)
−0.47* −0.40* −0.06 −0.63* −0.01 −0.20 −0.02
Ch is ians (10) 0.33* 0.37* −0.27 0.27 −0.14 0.15 −0.03 0.01
P o es an s (11) 0.16 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.35* −0.28 0.21 0.61*
Muslims (12) −0.48* −0.48* 0.17 −0.48* 0.04 −0.01 −0.17 0.26 −0.79* −0.50
La i ude (13) 0.57* 0.53* −0.03 0.51 −0.26 0.36* 0.01 −0.66* −0.09 −0.23 −0.17
Se le mo ali y
a e (14)
−0.58* −0.50* −0.27 −0.65* 0.33 0.09 −0.40 0.48 −0.06 −0.06 0.37* −0.56*
P onoun-d op ule
(15)
−0.39* −0.37* −0.06 −0.30 0.02 0.38* −0.72* −0.06 0.03 −0.32 0.02 −0.23 0.30
(*) indica es 5 pe cen le el o signi icance. Column (1) is eal GDP pe capi a.
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
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yi¼μþX0
iγþβIiþi(2)
whe e y
i
is eal GDP pe capi a o he i h coun y, X is a ec o o con ol a iables, I deno es ei he an
ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iable o cons i u ional sco es, and e
i
is he e o e m wi h usual p ope -
ies. The coe icien β measu es he co ela ion be ween ins i u ional quali y (o cons i u ional sco e) and
income pe capi a in he p esence o o he con ol a iables. I is expec ed ha his coe icien is
s a is ically signi ican ly posi i e, which e lec s he expec ed posi i e ela ionship be ween income pe
capi a and ins i u ional quali y. The OLS eg essions use he he e oskedas ici y consis en s anda d
e o s. The e o e, he es ima ed coe icien s can be in e p e ed as obus co ela ions be ween he
dependen a iable and he explana o y a iables.
Table 13 summa izes he esul s o he OLS eg essions. Models 1 h ough 5 a e simila o hose
used in Ba o (1991), Le ine and Renel (1992), Mau o (1995), Sachs and Wa ne (1997), and Sala-
i-ma in (1997). Models 6 h ough 10 a e simila o hose used in Acemoglu e al. (2001) and
Eas e ly and Le ine (2003). In he i s i e models and in e ms o he con ol a iables, he esul s
a e simila o hose in he p e ious s udies. The men ioned a iables a e s a is ically signi ican ,
unless indica ed o he wise. S a ing wi h Model 1, he ini ial eal GDP pe capi a has he la ges
coe icien and is posi i e. While ixed capi al in es men is posi i e in mos speci ica ion, in some
models i becomes ma ginally signi ican . Excep o Models 2 and 3, human capi al index is also
posi i e. While he La in Ame ica dummy is no s a is ically signi ican , he Sub-Saha an A ica
dummy is consis en ly signi ican a be e han 1% le el o signi icance and nega i e. S a ing
wi h Model 2, ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables and cons i u ional sco es a e added o he
basic model (Model 1). Co up ion con ol and a e age ins i u ional quali y a e posi i ely ela ed o
eal GDP pe capi a. A 1% inc ease in co up ion con ol and a e age ins i u ional quali y is
associa ed wi h 0.12 and 0.15% inc ease in eal GDP pe capi a, espec i ely. When he ins i u-
ional quali y- ela ed a iables a e subs i u ed by cons i u ional sco es, he only s a is ically sig-
ni ican ly posi i e cons i u ional sco es a e, 5 and 6, albei ma ginally. Addi ionally, he size o he
coe icien s associa ed wi h cons i u ional sco es 5 and 6 a e abou he hal o he coe icien s
associa ed wi h co up ion con ol and a e age ins i u ional quali y. As shown in Table 4, hese
wo cons i u ional sco es ha e a highe weigh o he numbe o cons i u ional e isions. In Models
1 h ough 5, 98% o he a ia ion in eal GDP pe capi a is explained by he eg esso s. Addi ionally,
he p alue associa ed wi h F s a is ic indica es ha he null hypo hesis o all coe icien s being
ze o is ejec ed a be e han 1% le el o signi icance.
In Table 13, Model 6 h ough 10 use a limi ed numbe o eg esso s. Model 6 shows he basic
es ima ion, whe e only la i ude and e hnic ac ionaliza ion a e s a is ically signi ican in some o
he es ima ions. La i ude has a posi i e ela ionship wi h eal GDP pe capi a. E hnic ac ionaliza-
ion is nega i e; howe e , i is ma ginally signi ican in mos es ima ions. When co up ion con ol
and a e age ins i u ional quali y a e added in Models 7 and 8, espec i ely, he coe icien s
associa ed wi h hese a iables become highly s a is ically signi ican , la ge, and posi i e. Fo
example, a 1% inc ease in co up ion con ol is associa ed wi h 1.17% inc ease in eal GDP pe
capi a. Models 9 and 10 eplace co up ion con ol and a e age ins i u ional quali y wi h cons i u-
ional sco es. Excep o cons i u ional sco es 4 and 5, none o he emaining sco es a e s a is i-
cally signi ican . Model 9 shows ha cons i u ional sco e 4 has a nega i e ela ionship wi h eal
GDP pe capi a. In ac , a 1% inc ease in eal GDP pe capi a is associa ed wi h a 0.53 dec ease in
eal GDP pe capi a. As shown in Table 4, he cons i u ional sco e 4 is based on he cons i u ional
index 4, which includes go e nmen sys em and elec o al ule. Because o he p e ious s udies
ci ed in p e ious sec ions, whe e he pa liamen a y go e nmen sys em and he p opo ional
elec o al ules a e belie ed o be associa ed wi h lowe ins i u ional quali y, he cons i u ional
sco e 4 assigns 1 o pa liamen a y sys em and p opo ional elec o al ule and 0 o he wise.
Howe e , Table 3 shows ha in his pape ’s da ase he majo i y o he ad anced coun ies ha e
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
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pa liamen a y sys ems and p opo ional elec o al ules. In Model 9, cons i u ional sco e 5 is
posi i ely associa ed wi h eal GDP pe capi a a be e han 1% le el o signi icance. The size o
he coe icien is wice as la ge as ha in Model 4. In Models 6 h ough 10, be ween 29 and 47% o
he a ia ion in eal GDP pe capi a is explained by he eg esso s. Addi ionally, he p alue
associa ed wi h F s a is ic indica es ha he null hypo hesis o all coe icien s being ze o is ejec ed
a be e han 1% le el o signi icance.
The OLS es ima ions a e associa ed wi h well-known p oblems. One o hem is he ac ha
ins i u ional quali y (o cons i u ional sco es) may no be exogenous. I is possible ha income pe
Table 13. OLS es ima ions (Dependen a iable: na u al log o eal GDP pe capi a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RGDP PC
1960
0.82
(.00)
0.81
(.00)
0.81
(.00)
0.81
(.00)
0.81
(.00)
Fixed capi al
in es men
0.19
(.08)
0.20
(.07)
0.23
(.05)
0.19
(.08)
0.20
0.08)
Human capi al
index
0.39
(.04)
0.21
(.31)
0.19
(.40)
0.40
(.04)
0.41
(.04)
Openness 0.02
(.55)
0.02
(.50)
0.01
(.84)
0.02
(.53)
0.02
(.53)
La in Ame ica
dummy
−0.07
(.23)
−0.06
(.29)
−0.07
(.23)
−0.06
(.31)
−0.06
(.30)
Sub-Saha an A ica
dummy
−0.29
(.00)
−0.37
(.00)
−0.36
(.00)
−0.29
(.00)
−0.29
(.00)
B i ish legal
o igin
0.32
(.38)
0.06
(.83)
−0.19
(.44)
0.38
(.29)
0.26
(.46)
Muslims −0.003
(.25)
−0.001
(.85)
0.003
(.39)
−0.004
(.33)
−0.004
(.180)
La i ude 0.45
(.02)
0.25
(.13)
0.23
(.17)
0.36
(.08)
0.43
(.02)
E hnic
ac ionaliza ion
−0.25
(.09)
−0.20
(.09)
−0.19
(.09)
−0.23
(.15)
−0.29
(.04)
Co up ion
con ol
0.12
(.04)
1.17
(.01)
A g. ins i u ional
quali y
0.15
(.06)
2.04
(.00)
Cons i u ion
sco e #4
−0.53
(.09)
Cons i u ion
sco e #5
0.06
(.10)
0.13
(.00)
Cons i u ion
sco e #6
0.06
(.10)
Cons an 1.55
(.00)
1.30
(.01)
1.25
(.03)
1.59
(.00)
1.58
(.00)
9.66
(.00)
7.44
(.00)
6.25
(.00)
9.23
(.00)
9.66
(.00)
# o obs.
R
2
P ob > F
90
0.98
0.00
90
0.98
0.00
88
0.98
0.00
90
0.98
0.00
90
0.98
0.00
87
0.29
0.00
87
0.45
0.00
87
0.47
0.00
79
0.31
0.00
87
0.33
0.00
Numbe in pa en heses a e p alues associa ed wi h es ima ed coe icien s. All es ima ions use he he e oskedas i-
ci y-consis en s anda d e o s. All a iables a e in na u al logs excep o he egional dummies, legal o igin, and
sha e o Muslims in a coun y. See Table 10 o a iable desc ip ions. The model shown in 1 h ough 5 is simila o
hose used in Ba o (1991), Le ine and Renel (1992), Mau o (1995), Sachs and Wa ne (1997), and Sala-i-ma in
(1997). The model shown in 6 h ough 10 is simila o hose used in Acemoglu e al. (2001) and Eas e ly and Le ine
(2003).
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
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Page 22 o 33
capi a a ec s ins i u ional quali y (simply pu , iche economies can a o d be e ins i u ions) and
his e e se causa ion would ende he es ima ed OLS coe icien associa ed wi h ins i u ional
quali y as biased. Ano he possibili y is ha he e is an omi ed a iable ha is in ac co ela es
wi h income pe capi a and ha should ha e been used ins ead o ins i u ional quali y. Finally,
ins i u ional quali y- ela ed a iables may well be associa ed wi h measu emen e o s, because
hei de ini ion usually implies ha hey a e mul i-dimensional concep s (Acemoglu e al., 2003;
Eas e ly & Le ine, 2003). The e o e, based on e e se causa ion, omi ed a iables, and measu e-
men e o s associa ed wi h he OLS es ima ions, we a e able o alk abou he co ela ions
be ween he dependen and explana o y a iables and no abou causali y.
The 2SLS es ima ions necessi a e he use o ins umen s o he endogenous a iable, which is
ins i u ional quali y. While hese ins umen s should be co ela ed wi h he endogenous a iable,
hey should be o hogonal o he e o e m. A numbe o es s a e conduc ed o make su e ha
he ins umen s o he endogenous a iable a e alid. Tables 14 and 15 summa ize he esul s o
he 2SLS es ima ions, whe e he ins i u ional quali y and cons i u ional sco es a e used as he
endogenous a iables, espec i ely. A he bo om o hese ables, h ee es esul s a e epo ed.
Fi s , he endogenei y es has he null hypo hesis o he ele an a iable being exogenous.
Because he 2SLS es ima ions use he he e oskedas ici y-consis en s anda d e o s, he p alue
shown in ables is associa ed wi h Woold idge’s χ
2
sco e es . A p alue o 5% o less leads o he
ejec ion o he null hypo hesis and he conclusion ha he ele an a iable is endogenous.
Second, a alid ins umen should be co ela ed wi h he endogenous eg esso , bu no wi h he
e o e m. The p alue associa ed wi h i s -s age F- es shows whe he he ins umen has some
explana o y powe o he endogenous a iable. Because he null hypo hesis o he i s -s age
F- es s a es ha he ins umen s do no explain he c oss-coun y a ia ion in ins i u ional quali y,
a p alue o 5% o less may indica e he alidi y o he ins umen . Thi d, because he ins umen
mus be unco ela ed wi h he e o e m, when he numbe o ins umen s exceeds he numbe o
endogenous eg esso s ( he model is o e iden i ied), one can es whe he he ins umen s a e
unco ela ed wi h he e o e m. I he model is jus iden i ied ( he numbe o ins umen s equals
he numbe o endogenous a iables), a es o o e iden i ying es ic ions (OIR) canno be
pe o med. Because o he use o he he e oskedas ici y-consis en s anda d e o s, he p alue
associa ed wi h OIR is based on Woold idge’s obus sco e es o OIR. In his es , he null
hypo hesis implies ha he ins umen s do no explain pe capi a income beyond he abili y o
ins umen s o explain ins i u ional quali y. In o he wo ds, a p alue o 5% o less may indica e an
in alid ins umen .
Tables 14 and 15 also epo he ins umen al a iables used o each es ima ion. I ce ainly is
no easy o come up wi h alid ins umen s. Se le mo ali y is an impo an con ibu ion o
Acemoglu e al. (2001) o a sho lis o ins umen s o ins i u ional quali y. They a gue ha
di e ences in colonial expe ience could be a sou ce o exogenous a ia ion in ins i u ions.
Eu opeans did no see he easibili y o se lemen s in ce ain colonies wi h highe mo ali y
a es and we e he e o e mo i a ed o c ea e ex ac i e ins i u ions. In con as , in colonies wi h
lowe se le mo ali y a es, Eu opeans es ablished Eu opean-like ins i u ions, no ably in No h
Ame ica, Aus alia, and New Zealand. Acemoglu e al. (2001) and (2003) as well as Eas e ly and
Le ine (2003) ind ha he se le mo ali y a e is a alid ins umen o ins i u ional quali y, when
es ima ing he e ec o he la e on cu en pe capi a income. While his pape uses se le
mo ali y as an ins umen , un o una ely his ins umen is a ailable only o 54 ou o 109 sample
coun ies, which conside ably dec eases he numbe o obse a ions.
La i ude is also used as an al e na i e ins umen o ins i u ional quali y. Eas e ly and Le ine
(2003) show ha he e is a s ong posi i e associa ion be ween la i ude and economic
E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance (2021), 9: 1911909
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Page 23 o 33
Viewing cons i u ions as a o mal ins i u ion and assuming ha cons i u ions should be ela ed
o coun ies’ in o mal ins i u ional cha ac e is ics such as co up ion o bu eauc a ic quali y is an
impo an line o inqui y. This iew ells us ha cons i u ions o hei e isions should no be
examined in a acuum. A coun y’s in o mal ins i u ional cha ac e is ics a e expec ed o be
embedded in i s cons i u ion and cons i u ional e isions. The implica ion o his line o inqui y is
ha new cons i u ions o cons i u ional e isions may no b ing he expec ed change, as long as
in o mal ins i u ions ha a ec cons i u ions do no change.
Acknowledgemen s
I hank wo anonymous e iewe s o hei insigh ul com-
men s and sugges ions du ing he e iew p ocess.
Funding
The au ho ecei ed no di ec unding o his esea ch.
Au ho de ails
Ayse Y. E ensel
1
E-mail: [email p o ec ed]
1
Depa men o Economics and Finance, Sou he n Illinois
Uni e si y Edwa ds ille, Edwa ds ille, IL, 62026-1102,
USA.
Ci a ion in o ma ion
Ci e his a icle as: A e cons i u ional cha ac e is ics a
p oxy o ins i u ional quali y? E idence om 109 coun-
ies, Ayse Y. E ensel, Cogen Economics & Finance
(2021), 9: 1911909.
No es
1. I hank o one o he anonymous e e ees o aising
his poin .
2. The da ase is a ailable a : h ps://da a e se.ha a d.
edu/da ase .xh ml?pe sis en Id=doi:10.7910/DVN/
VMERCI
3. While he UK is gene ally known as no ha ing
a w i en cons i u ion bu a collec ion o laws, a ious
s udies including he Compa a i e Cons i u ions
P ojec s assumes Magna Ca a o 1215 as he UK
cons i u ion. See: h ps://compa a i econs i u ionsp o
jec .o g/ccp- ankings/
4. Ben-Bassa and Dahan (2008) p esen s in e es ing
esul s on he implemen a ion o cons i u ional com-
mi men s. They cons uc quan i a i e indices o social
igh s o 68 coun ies. Thei esul s sugges ha
coun ies wi h he adi ion o F ench ci il law gene -
ally ha e a highe commi men o social igh s han
coun ies adhe ing o he English common law adi-
ion. Howe e , in e ms o whe he he cons i u ional
commi men is ansla ed in o ac ual public policy,
hey could no ind a obus e ec o social igh s on
public policy excep o he cons i u ional igh o
social secu i y.
5. Ad anced coun ies a e iden i ied based on he IMF’s
classi ica ion. O he coun ies include low-income
de eloping, eme ging, and ansi ion coun ies. The
IMF’s coun y classi ica ions a e a ailable a h ps://
www.im .o g/ex e nal/pubs/ /weo/2015/02/weoda a/
g oups.h m#cc.
6. Se le mo ali y a e and he p onoun-d op ule a e
discussed la e in ela ion o 2SLS es ima ions.
7. When he model ha is simila o Ba o (1991), Le ine
and Renel (1992), Mau o (1995), Sachs and Wa ne
(1997), and Sala-i-ma in (1997) is used, none o he
cons i u ional sco es we e s a is ically signi ican .
The e o e, he esul s o hese es ima ions a e no
shown.
Re e ences
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling
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