The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022

Kühling, Christoph; Springer, Frederik; Klein, Markus Article — Published Version The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—ALongitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 Politische Vierteljahresschrift Provided in Cooperation with: Springer Nature Suggested Citation: Kühling, Christoph; Springer, Frederik; Klein, Markus (2025) : The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—ALongitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, ISSN 1862-2860, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden, Vol. 66, Iss. 4, pp. 829-845, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-025-00612-y This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330889 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de RESEARCH NOTE https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-025-00612-y Politische Vierteljahresschrift (2025) 66:829–845 The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 Christoph Kühling · Frederik Springer · Markus Klein Received: 11 April 2024 / Revised: 9 March 2025 / Accepted: 17 March 2025 / Published online: 28 April 2025 © The Author(s) 2025 Abstract The more than ten-year history of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is marked by continuous programmatic and personnel development. Starting out as an economically liberal, Eurosceptic party, the AfD quickly developed into a radical right party, which in recent years has increasingly moved in the direction of right-wing extremism. Previous analyses of the AfD’s changing electorate have only captured the party’s transformation from a Eurosceptic to a radical right party. In this research note, we argue that the looming transformation from a radical right to an extreme right party, like the transformation from a Eurosceptic to a radical right party, should lead to a gradual shift in the electorate. Assuming that extremism is considered taboo by many voters, we expect the AfD electorate to be increasingly dominated by far-right voters. Moreover, some sociodemographic groups are expected to be particularly repelled by the party’s extremist tendencies (the highly educated, western Germans, and civil servants), as they are more likely to reject extreme-right ideas. Our empirical analysis based on Politbarometer data from 2013 to 2022 largely confirms our expectations: First, we find that the effects of well-known predictors of AfD voting (general ideology, education, east–west) have increased further. Second, our analysis shows that an immunising effect of civil servant status has developed in parallel with the party shift towards extremism. Keywords Alternative for Germany (AfD) · Radical right · Extreme right · Politbarometer Christoph Kühling · Frederik Springer · Markus Klein Department of Political Science, Leibniz University Hannover, Hannover, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] K 830 C. Kühling et al. Das sich wandelnde Gesicht der AfD-Wählerschaft – Eine Längsschnittanalyse von 2013 bis 2022 Zusammenfassung Die mehr als zehnjährige Geschichte der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) ist durch eine kontinuierliche programmatische und personelle Entwicklung gekennzeichnet. Als wirtschaftsliberale Partei gestartet, wandelte sich die AfD schnell zu einer rechtsradikalen Partei, die sich in den letzten Jahren immer weiter in Richtung Rechtsextremismus bewegt. Bisherige Analysen zum Wandel der AfD-Wählerschaft erfassen nur den Wandel der Partei von einer euroskeptischen zu einer rechtsradikalen Partei. In dieser Forschungsnotiz argumentieren wir, dass der Wandel von einer rechtsradikalen zu einer zunehmend rechtsextremen Partei ebenso wie der Wandel von einer euroskeptischen zu einer rechtsradikalen Partei zu einer allmählichen Verschiebung in der Wählerschaft führen sollte. Basierend auf der Annahme, dass Rechtsextremismus von vielen Wählerinnen und Wählern als Tabu angesehen wird, erwarten wir, dass die Wählerschaft der AfD zunehmend von extrem rechts positionierten Wählerinnen und Wählern dominiert wird. Außerdem gehen wir davon aus, dass einige soziodemografische Gruppen von den extremistischen Tendenzen in der Partei besonders abgestoßen werden (Hochgebildete, Westdeutsche und Beamte), da sie rechtsextreme Ansichten eher ablehnen. Unsere empirische Analyse auf Basis der Politbarometer-Daten von 2013 bis 2022 kann unsere Erwartungen weitgehend bestätigen: Erstens finden wir, dass die Effekte der bekannten Prädiktoren der AfD-Wahl (allgemeine Links-Rechts-Ideologie, Bildung und Ost-West) weiter zugenommen haben. Zweitens zeigt unsere Analyse, dass sich parallel zur programmatischen Radikalisierung zunehmend eine immunisierende Wirkung des Beamtenstatus herausbildet. Keywords Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) · Radikale Rechte · Extreme Rechte · Politbarometer 1 Introduction The electoral breakthrough of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is closely linked to the party’s transformation from a market-liberal, Eurosceptic party to a right-wing populist party in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. Unsurprisingly, there has been a great deal of research devoted to the question of whether the theoretical explanations used in the international literature on the radical right can also be applied to the AfD. Empirical research on the AfD electorate shows that so-called losers of modernisation are indeed more inclined to vote for the AfD (e.g. Lux 2018), supporting economic explanations. However, research highlights that theoretical accounts based on cultural grievances have a higher explanatory power (e.g. Rippl and Seipel 2018). Longitudinal studies that directly address the question of whether the party change was accompanied by a change in the electorate (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bieber et al. 2018; Klein et al. 2022) corroborate that it was only in the course of the party’s transformation into a radical right party that its electorate came closer to the typical profile of radical right voters. K The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 831 However, no study has yet examined how the party’s recent developments towards right-wing extremism (defined as opposition to the liberal democratic order) have affected the party’s electorate. In this paper, we aim to fill this research gap and argue that the looming transformation from a radical right to an extreme right party, like the transformation from a Eurosceptic to a radical right party, should lead to a gradual shift in the electorate, with the old electoral profile gradually being replaced by the new one. Assuming that right-wing extremism is considered taboo by many voters, we expect the AfD electorate to be increasingly dominated by far-right voters. Moreover, some sociodemographic groups (e.g. the highly educated) are expected to be particularly repelled by the party’s extremist tendencies, as they are more likely to reject extreme-right ideas. Our research question is not only of theoretical relevance. From a societal point of view, it is important to know which social groups support a party that is increasingly moving towards right-wing extremism because preventing extremism requires identifying its social base. The paper is structured as follows: First, we discuss existing research on the development of the AfD electorate in the course of the party’s transformation into a radical right party (Sect. 2). In the subsequent section, we derive theoretical expectations for the change in the AfD electorate, based on the party’s recent move towards right-wing extremism (Sect. 3). After describing the data used and the chosen analytical strategy (Sect. 4), we present the results of our analysis in Sect. 5. The paper concludes with a summary of the results and a discussion of their implications (Sect. 6). 2 Previous Research on the (Changing) AfD Electorate The AfD was founded in 2013 in response to the European debt crisis. In this initial phase, the party could be described as an economically liberal, Eurosceptic party but not yet as a right-wing populist party (Arzheimer 2015). However, a conflict soon emerged within the party between the economically liberal leadership and more radical forces, culminating in the departure of party spokesman Lucke and other moderates in the summer of 2015. The eastern German regional branches played a central role in this radicalisation process (Weisskircher 2022, p. 319). From this point on, researchers have categorised the AfD as a right-wing populist party (Arzheimer and Berning 2019, p. 3). Under the new leadership of spokespersons Petry and Meuthen, and against the backdrop of the refugee crisis, the AfD subsequently focused its programme primarily on the issue of migration. This programmatic shift laid the groundwork for the party’s entry into the Bundestag in 2017. With the programmatic transformation into a radical right party, the party’s electorate should have moved closer to the voter profile of these parties. International comparative research has identified two main theoretical approaches to explain who votes for a radical right party and why: The modernisation losers theory,themost prominent economic explanation, attributes the electoral success of radical right parties to economic modernisation processes such as globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2008). The increase in cross-border trade and migration turns certain social groups, such as K 832 C. Kühling et al. workers, the unemployed, the poorly educated, and the petty bourgeoisie, who are less able to adapt to these socioeconomic changes, into “modernisation losers”. Cultural explanations, such as Norris and Inglehart’s (2019)cultural backlash theory, interpret the rise of radical right parties as a reaction to sociocultural modernisation. According to this theory, processes of social change, such as the spread of postmaterialist values and multiculturalism, lead to insecurity in some segments of the society (e.g. men and the poorly educated). Given that immigration features prominently in these theories (and in the parties’ programmes), it is not surprising that international research has shown a consistent and strong effect of anti-immigrant attitudes (Arzheimer 2018; Rooduijn 2018; Stockemer et al. 2018). In addition, general left–right ideology turns out to be a relevant explanatory variable in many studies (e.g. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). International research has also been able to draw a relatively clear voter profile of radical right parties from a sociostructural perspective. The so-called radical right gender gap, i.e. the fact that men support these parties to a greater extent than women do (Stockemer et al. 2018), is the most well established. Research has also demonstrated that highly educated voters are less likely to vote for radical right parties (e.g. Bornschier et al. 2021). In terms of occupational and employment status, research indicates that blue-collar workers are more likely to vote for these parties (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Above-average support has also been found among the unemployed (e.g. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020)andthe (small) self-employed (Gidron and Hall 2017; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Finally, deprivation and decline in social status have been identified as relevant predictors of radical right voting (Gidron and Hall 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). Existing longitudinal and cross-sectional research on the AfD has shown that since its programmatic transformation, the AfD’s electorate resembles the typical voter profile of right-wing populist parties as outlined above. With regard to political predispositions, research highlights the crucial role of anti-immigrant attitudes for explaining electoral support for the AfD (e.g. Baron and Görtz 2023; Hambauer and Mays 2018; Rippl and Seipel 2018). Longitudinal evidence suggests that attitudes towards migration had no effect in the early days but became more important over time (particularly during the refugee crisis; Arzheimer and Berning 2019;Bieber et al. 2018; but see Schmitt-Beck’s 2017 analysis of the 2013 election). The effect of the general left–right ideology has also increased over time (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bieber et al. 2018). However, there is disagreement as to whether there was already an effect in the early phase of the AfD (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Klein et al. 2022; Schmitt-Beck 2017) or only somewhat later (Bieber et al. 2018). With respect to the sociodemographic profile of the AfD electorate, there is a substantial strand of literature that addresses the question of whether the AfD receives above-average support from people with lower socioeconomic status. Although the results are not entirely consistent (see, for example, Bergmann et al. 2017 for contradictory findings), most studies indicate that individuals from lower social strata, i.e. people with lower education or income, blue-collar workers, and the unemployed or people at risk of unemployment, are more likely to vote for the AfD (Cohen 2021; Lux 2018,2022;Tuti ´ c and von Hermanni 2018). Longitudinal evidence suggests that this profile evolved only in the course of the party’s transformation into a rightK The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 833 wing populist party: The above-average support among voters with a low or medium level of education developed only in 2014, while the disproportionately high support from blue-collar workers also appeared only in 2016 (Klein et al. 2022). In contrast, the AfD already enjoyed above-average support from the self-employed in its early phase as a market-liberal, Eurosceptic party, although the self-employed supported the party less over time (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bieber et al. 2018). The welldocumented gender gap in AfD support (Hudde 2023) was also present from the start. Another feature of the German case is the above-average support for the AfD in eastern Germany, which can be attributed to attitudinal differences (e.g. in antiimmigrant attitudes) and differences in the translation of these attitudes into votes (Arzheimer 2024b; Pesthy et al. 2021). There is also evidence that this east–west gap has widened over time (Arzheimer and Berning 2019). To sum up, research on the AfD electorate has largely revolved around the question of whether its electorate resembles that of other radical right parties. More recent studies on the AfD have analysed the effect of COVID-19 orientations in the context of the 2021 election (Bayerlein and Metten 2022; Hansen and Olsen 2024) or the political geography of right-wing populism (Arzheimer and Bernemann 2024; Manow and Flügel 2023). To date, however, no study has systematically examined whether the party’s ongoing shift towards extremism has been accompanied by a further change in the composition of the AfD’s electorate.1 3 Theoretical Expectations for the Change of the AfD Electorate in the Course of the Party’s Move Towards Extremism The evolution from a market-liberal, Eurosceptic party to a typical party of the radical right, as described in the previous section, was not the end of the party’s programmatic and personnel development. Further changes in the party leadership followed, with party spokespersons being replaced by more radical successors, thereby cementing the radicalisation of the party in terms of personnel. Regarding the party’s ideology, the AfD has increasingly been moving in the direction of right-wing extremism since 2017 (Arzheimer 2024a, p. 6). This became clear in January 2019, when the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) classified the party’s extreme faction, “der Flügel” (the wing), as a suspected extremist organisation. After being officially declared right-wing extremist in March 2020, it formally disbanded. Since then, several regional branches of the party have come under scrutiny, with some being confirmed as extremist. Since March 2021, the federal AfD has also been classified as a suspected right-wing extremist organisation. In January 2022, former party spokesman Meuthen announced his resignation from the party on the grounds that parts of the party no longer adhered to the liberal democratic basic order. Schroeder and Weßels (2023, p. 37) see Meuthen’s with1A study by Steiner (2024) that examines the effect of COVID-19 attitudes on vote switching towards and away from the AfD in the 2021 federal election also provides some insights into changes in the electorate that go beyond COVID-19. However, the study is based on a different research design and focuses on COVID-19 attitudes rather than general changes in the electorate. K 834 C. Kühling et al. drawal as another turning point in the party’s development, as the radical forces in the party have now prevailed after a long internal struggle for power. Since then, there has no longer been a clear demarcation from right-wing extremism. Before we look at what expectations for the AfD’s electorate can be derived from the party’s extreme-right tendencies, we would like to address the question of whether this shift is also reflected in estimates of the party’s position. According to data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al. 2024; Jolly et al. 2022; Polk et al. 2017), the AfD moved to the right on the sociocultural (GAL-TAN) dimension between 2014 and 2017 (from 8.7 to 9.5). However, there was no further movement to the right at the following survey points (which may be the result of a ceiling effect).2In contrast, Debus’ (2022) quantitative analysis of the AfD’s party manifestos shows that the AfD has moved further to the right on the GALTAN (green–alternative–libertarian and traditional–authoritarian–nationalist) dimension between 2017 and 2021. Despite this mixed evidence, the party’s surveillance and the assessments by political observers (e.g. Schroeder and Weßels 2023) clearly suggest that extremists have a considerable influence in the party. Similar to the transformation from a market-liberal, Eurosceptic party to a radical right party, the looming transition to an extreme right party is likely to change the profile of the AfD electorate.3However, we assume that the party’s development should not be immediately reflected in the electorate. In particular, supporters from the previous stage of the party’s development may initially continue to shape its image; it is only when these supporters clearly perceive the changes in position and consider them to be permanent that they will turn their backs on the party.4This will result in a gradual change of the electorate’s composition, with voters from the previous stage of development gradually becoming less important. Consequently, the party’s image will become increasingly characterised by the new voter profile. With regard to the voter profile of extreme right-wing parties, it can be argued that it should be similar to that of radical right parties (Arzheimer 2024a, p. 4). By and large, the predictors of a vote for the radical right, as discussed above, should also apply to extreme-right parties. However, the electorates of both party types should also differ in important respects. It can be argued that there is a strong social norm against right-wing extremism, resulting in a social stigma against extreme-right parties (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Mendes and Dennison 2021). This should be particularly true in the German case. Since voting for a right-wing extremist party is thus likely to be seen as taboo by many voters, voters who had previously supported the AfD but were now put off by its extremist tendencies should have gradually turned their backs on the party. 2The often-assumed leftward shift of other parties is only weakly supported by the CHES time series (1999–2024). According to the data, the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union have moved only slightly towards the centre. 3It is important to note that we derive our theoretical expectations solely from the development of the party. Changes on the demand side (triggered by economic crises or migration), which may reinforce or counteract this development, are not taken into account. However, they are discussed in the empirical section. 4This is all the more true for the move towards the extreme right, which is much more gradual than the transition to the radical right that took place in 2015. K The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 835 While the AfD still managed to mobilise voters from the political centre during the refugee crisis (Klein et al. 2018), the electorate should increasingly be dominated by far-right voters who support, or at least tolerate, the party’s extreme positions. Similarly, supporters from the early days who might have gone along with the party’s right-wing populist character are likely to turn away from the party. Thus, we assume that the effect of the general left–right placement on the AfD vote should have increased further: H1 The positive effect of being ideologically far right on the intention to vote for the AfD increases over time as the AfD moves towards the extreme right. The sociodemographic composition of the AfD electorate should also become clearer. To begin with, the move towards right-wing extremism should widen the education gap in AfD support. On the one hand, this can be explained by the wellknown positive relationship between education and democracy: Education enhances the ability to understand complex political processes and promotes the development of democratic values and norms (e.g. Österman and Robinson 2023, p. 1300f.). In addition, education is closely related to the reduction of prejudice. In essence, the underlying mechanisms are similar to those linking education and support for democracy. One argument is that schools teach values such as tolerance and equality. Moreover, education provides individuals with the skills to reject oversimplified views such as prejudice (e.g. Weber 2022, p. 230). From these theoretical arguments, we derive the expectation that the immunising effect of education has increased over time, as there are signs that the AfD is violating central pillars of the liberal democratic order, for example by cultivating an ethnic conception of “the people” and agitating against parliamentary democracy (see, e.g., Verfassungsschutz SachsenAnhalt 2024). Thus, we hypothesise the following: H2 The negative effect of education on the intention to vote for the AfD increases over time as the AfD moves towards the extreme right. Another theoretical expectation can be formulated with regard to the occupational group of civil servants. Since the prerequisite for appointment to such a professional position is a commitment to the liberal democratic basic order, this group should have internalised democratic values and thus be particularly deterred by right-wing extremist tendencies. For some time now, the party itself has been concerned about the consequences of the surveillance by the Verfassungsschutz of the party for its members who are civil servants, as they could face consequences under public services law (e.g. Tagesspiegel 2020). Even though civil servants do not face any consequences for supporting the AfD at the ballots, the cognitive dissonance that would result from voting for a party that opposes the liberal democratic order they have sworn to uphold should have a deterrent effect. In sum, we hypothesise the following: H3 The negative effect of being a civil servant on the intention to vote for the AfD increases over time as the AfD moves towards the extreme right. K 836 C. Kühling et al. Finally, regarding the well-documented east–west discrepancy in AfD support, we expect this gap to widen over time for two reasons. Empirical evidence on rightwing extremist attitudes in Germany shows that there are differences between east and west on some subdimensions of right-wing extremism. In particular, there are significant differences on the subdimension that most strongly distinguishes rightwing extremism from right-wing populism, namely support for authoritarian rule. According to the so-called Mitte Study 2018/19 (published by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation), 7.5% of the population in the east, compared to 2.6% in the west, endorse authoritarian rule (Küpper et al. 2018, p. 254). Another argument for a growing east–west divide is that the AfD is much more established in the east, and voting for this party may therefore be less of a taboo. In eastern Germany, it is much more likely that a family member, a friend, or a colleague has sympathies for the AfD, and this may result in the belief that voting for the AfD is something normal and legitimate. Therefore, we expect the following: H4 The positive effect of living in eastern Germany on the intention to vote for the AfD increases over time as the AfD moves towards the extreme right. 4 Data and Analytical Strategy Our empirical analysis is based on the Politbarometer, a representative telephone survey conducted by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. Every 2 to 3 weeks, this opinion research institute surveys 1500 respondents to gauge the German voting population’s attitudes towards current political issues and actors.5The advantage of these data compared to the online surveys of the German National Election Study used by Bieber et al. (2018) and Arzheimer and Berning (2019) is the higher sample quality and the more frequent data collection. A further strength of the Politbarometer data is that the survey instruments used are highly stable and thus enable a consistent analysis of changes over time. The published cumulative dataset currently covers the survey period from 1977 to 2022.6In line with the emergence of the AfD, our analysis starts in March 2013. For this period, the dataset contains a total of 244,393 voters. To describe the development of the AfD electorate, we estimated binary logistic regressions with the dependent variable indicating whether a respondent intended to vote for the AfD or for another party. These were run separately for each quarter of a given year.7We report the observed effects in terms of relative risks. To do this, we determined the predicted probabilities of voting for the AfD when an independent dummy variable took the value 1 and when it took the value 0; dividing the former 5Accounting for the oversampling of eastern Germans, we weight all our analyses. 6The ID of the dataset is “ZA2391_v15-0-0”, and it is available at https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ ZA2391 7Particularly in the early days of the AfD, monthly estimates would be subject to too much uncertainty due to the small number of AfD voters. An annual analysis, on the other hand, would make it difficult to link trends to specific events in the political landscape or within the party itself. K The Changing Face of the AfD Electorate—A Longitudinal Analysis from 2013 to 2022 843 Baron, Daniel, and Antonia Görtz. 2023. Sozioökonomische und einstellungsbezogene Ursachen für Wanderungen von CDU/CSUund SPD-Wähler*innen zur AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017. 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