Qin, Bo ao
Wo king Pape
Does a p omise sc ip wo k o educe he hypo he ical
bias? E idence om an induced alue expe imen
Economics Discussion Pape s, No. 2019-38
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E idence om an induced alue expe imen , Economics Discussion Pape s, No. 2019-38, Kiel
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Discussion Pape
No. 2019-38 | June 17, 2019 | h p://www.economics-ejou nal.o g/economics/discussionpape s/2019-38
Does a p omise sc ip wo k o educe he hypo he ical
bias? E idence om an induced alue expe imen
Bo ao Qin
Abs ac
This pape explo es whe he a u h- elling p omise can wo k o educe he hypo he ical bias
in p e e ence elici a ion. Using an induced alue expe imen in China wi h a andom n h-
p ice auc ion, he au ho inds: 1) Hypo he ical bias exis s in a andom n h-p ice auc ion
wi h induced alues and making a u h- elling p omise can educe he hypo he ical bias. 2)
All ea men s a e demand- e ealing excep o he hypo he ical baseline.
JEL C90 D44 Q51
Keywo ds Hypo he ical bias, oa h, andom n h-p ice auc ion, induced alue expe imen
Au ho s
Bo ao Qin, Jinhe Cen e o Economic Resea ch, Xi'an Jiao ong Uni e si y China,
[email protected] u.edu.cn
Ci a ion Bo ao Qin (2019). Does a p omise sc ip wo k o educe he hypo he ical bias?
E idence om an induced alue expe imen . Economics Discussion Pape s, No 2019-38,
Kiel Ins i u e o he Wo ld Economy.
h p://www.economics-jou nal.o g/economics/discussionpape s/2019-38
Recei ed May 27, 2019 Accep ed as Economics Discussion Pape June 11, 2019 Published June 17, 2019
© Au ho (s) 2019. Licensed unde he C ea i e Commons License - A ibu ion 4.0 In e na ional (CC BY 4.0)
1 In oduc ion
Cos and bene i analysis is impo an in policy decision making. Howe e ,
he e is no di ec ma ke o en i onmen al goods. Economis s ely on he
con ingen alua ion me hods (CVM) o measu e he en i onmen al bene i s
o he public.Howe e , many li e a u e ind he e is a hypo he ical bias – he
gap be ween subjec s’ s a ed willingness o pay and hei eal willingness o
pay (Bohm [1972];Lis and Galle [2001];Mu phy e al. [2005];Ehmke e al.
[2008]).The gap leads o c i ics abou he eliabili y o he CVM me hod
(Hausman [2012]). To elimina e he hypo hesis bias, many me hods such as
CVM-X, cheap alk, and consequen iali y a e p oposed wi h mixed success
(Fox e al. [1998];Cummings and Taylo [1999];Ca son and G o es [2007])1.
Con empo a y guidance o CVM s udies is compiled by enowned en i on-
men al economis s o p omo e he bes p ac ice o CVM and o inc ease i s
eliabili y (Johns on e al. [2017]). A ecen a emp o elimina e he hypo-
he ical bias is p oposed by Jacqueme e al. [2013]. They use a solemn oa h
sc ip and ind i leads o u h- elling in an induced alue expe imen . In
he homeg own alua ion expe imen , he oa h also educes he hypo he ical
1Cummings and Taylo [1999] in oduce a cheap alk sc ip by in o ming subjec s he e
is a endency o hem o o e es ima e he willingness o pay. They ind ha cheap alk
can educe he hypo he ical bias and pe o m equally as well as eal mone a y incen i es in
e e endums o public goods. They also ind ha he e ec o a cheap alk sc ip depends
on i s leng h. Leng hy sc ip s wo k be e han sho sc ip s. They ind ha cheap alk can
elimina e hypo he ical bias o non-deale s bu no o deale s who ha e mo e expe ience
dealing wi h spo s ca ds. The e o e, he e ec o cheap alk depends on he leng h o he
sc ip and he ype o esponden . Aadland and Caplan [2006] use a sho and neu al
cheap alk sc ip in a 4,000-household phone con ingen alua ion su ey and ind ha he
cheap alk sc ip exace ba es he hypo he ical bias. They sugges cau ion in using cheap
alk o con ol he hypo he ical bias ex-an e.
2
bias. The e ec o he oa h is es ed by la e s udies which a e summa ized
in able 1 wi h success.
Al hough oa hs wo k well in educing he hypo he ical bias, i migh be
oo s ong a mechanism. Oa hs a e a e and ypically used only in se ious
si ua ions such as he cou , ma iage, o joining a poli ical pa y. O e use
o he oa h may weaken i s powe . I s ep back and use a weake e sion o
he oa h: a p omise. Asking subjec s o p omise o ell he u h is a mo e
na u al way o commi in he Chinese con ex . Chinese a e usually asked
o ead ou a p omise sc ip in which hey p omise o ca y ou hei jobs
du i ully. The p omise sc ip is no un amilia o Chinese. Fo example,
Ca lsson e al. [2013] used a s a e p e e ence su ey wi h a p omise sc ip
in bo h China and Sweden. They ound ha he p omise a ec ed people’s
willingness o pay di e en ly in he wo coun ies. In China, a p omise o ell
he u h signi ican ly educes he subjec s’ willingness o pay. In Sweden,
howe e , a p omise inc eases subjec s’ willingness o pay.
He ein I s ep back and explo e whe he a mo e common p omise wo ks
as well as he a e oa h o c ea e a commi men o u h- elling in a andom
n h-p ice auc ion (see Shog en e al. [2001b]). I ind ha hypo he ical bias
exis s and making a p omise did imp o e subjec s’ since e bidding.
To he bes o my knowledge, my pape is he i s di ec ly es he e ec
o a p omise sc ip in educing he hypo he ical bias in an induced alue (IV)
expe imen . The IV expe imen allows me o know he eal p i a e alues
and o calcula e he hypo he ical bias. My pape di e s om Ca lsson e al.
[2013], which use a p omise sc ip in he ield wi h a con ingen alua ion
s udy in bo h China and Sweden. My pape also di e s om Jacqueme e al.
[2013] which es s he e ec o an oa h in F ance wi h a Vick ey auc ion. I
use a andom n h-p ice auc ion and un i in China. The andom n h-p ice
3
auc ion has some imp o emen s o e he Vick ey auc ion as i is incen i e-
compa ible and can engage bo h on-ma gin bidde s and o -ma gin bidde s
(Shog en e al. [2001b]).
2 Expe imen al Design
The goal o commi men heo y is o c ea e a nonma ke mechanism o co -
ec he hypo he ical bias ex-an e. This expe imen ollows Jacqueme e al.
[2013], bu I s a by using he weake p omise as a commi men de ice o
see whe he subjec s bid since ely in a andom n h-p ice auc ion. This is
an ex-an e app oach o co ec bo h he hypo he ical bias in a hypo he ical
su ey and he downwa d bias in a eal economic commi men auc ion. The
expe imen uses an induced alue auc ion and has ou ea men s: (i) base-
line hypo he ical, (ii) hypo he ical + p omise, (iii) mone a y incen i e, and
(i ) mone a y + p omise. I un expe imen s in China. The expe imen al
design and he main ea u es o he expe imen a e summa ized in able 2.
Design o he IV expe imen . I use a andom n h-p ice auc ion as
he elici a ion mechanism. In a andom n h-p ice auc ion, he ma ke p ice
will be de e mined by a andom d aw om he bids. I a andom d aw is
he n h highes bid, he n−1 highes bidde s will win he auc ion and pay
he n h highes bid (Shog en e al. [2001b]). The andom n h-p ice auc ion
mechanism wo ks simila ly o he classic second-p ice auc ion excep o he
ma ke -clea ing p ice2. A e all he bids a e anked, a andom numbe will
2Vick ey [1961] second-p ice auc ion has been a popula ool in he lab o elici subjec s’
p e e ences o p i a e goods. The Vick ey second-p ice auc ion wo ks as ollows: each
subjec submi s hei bid o a p i a e good, and he bids a e anked om highes o lowes .
The highes bidde wins he good and pays he second-highes p ice. This mechanism is
incen i e compa ible in heo y as i sepa a es wha you pay om wha you say. I a subjec
4
be d awn om 2 −N( he numbe o o al pa icipan s). Assuming ha nis
he andomly d awn numbe , he n−1 highes bidde s will win he auc ion
and pay he n h highes p ice. The me i s o his mechanism a e ha i
sepa a es wha you pay om wha you say like he Vick ey auc ion and i
also has mo e han one winne like he BDM. This mechanism is incen i e
compa ible and also has an endogenously de e mined ma ke -clea ing p ice.
Shog en e al. [2001b] show ha his mechanism is demand e ealing in
agg ega e like he Vick ey auc ion and ha i can engage bo h he on-ma gin
bidde s and he o -ma gin bidde s. P e ious s udies employing he andom
n h-p ice auc ion include Fox e al. [1998], Shog en e al. [2001a];Shog en
e al. [2001b], Lis and Shog en [1998], Pa khu s e al. [2004], and Lusk
and Rousu [2006]. These s udies p o e ha he andom n h-p ice auc ion
can e eal he subjec s’ ue p e e ences in agg ega e and engage o -ma gin
bidde s.
I un he expe imen in China. Chinese a e mo e expe ienced wi h
p omises han wi h oa h aking (Ca lsson e al. [2013]). Subjec s a e e-
c ui ed om Xi’an Jiao ong Uni e si y, Xi’an. I place a no ice on a campus
bulle in boa d o ec ui pa icipan s. Subjec s a e s uden s om di e en
majo s. The expe imen s a e ca ied ou in a class oom. My ins uc ions
and ques ionnai es a e ansla ed in o Chinese om Jacqueme e al. [2013].
bids mo e han his alue o he good, he will isk winning and paying mo e han his ue
alue. I a subjec bids less han his ue alue, he will isk losing he chance o win he
good. The weakly dominan s a egy o a subjec in his mechanism is o bid u h ully.
Ano he me i o his mechanism is ha he ma ke p ice is endogenously de e mined
(Shog en e al. [2001b]). Se e al s udies ind ha Vick ey’s second-p ice auc ion can only
engage on-ma gin bidde s, bu no o -ma gin bidde s (see e.g.,Kagel [1995];Shog en e al.
[2001a]). The bidde s who ha e highe alues (on-ma gin bidde s) bid u h ully as hey
ha e a highe chance o win. Bidde s wi h lowe alues (o -ma gin bidde s) will no bid
u h ully as hei chances o winning a e low.
5
I make some changes o i he andom n h-p ice auc ion. Subjec s a e no
in o med ha hei dominan s a egy is o bid hei esale alues.
Each ound has 9 s eps.
S ep 1. The expe imen e assigns each bidde a esale alue on his o he
eco d shee . The esale alue is he p ice a which he bidde can sell he
good back o he moni o a e he expe imen . Each bidde knows no hing
abou he o he bidde s’ esale alue. The esale alue is d awn om a
uni o m dis ibu ion. The demand cu e is 84; 76; 71; 68; 65; 63; 53; 38; 24
(I is simila o Jacqueme e al. [2013]). Each bidde is endowed wi h each
alue once du ing he expe imen .
S ep 2. Each bidde hen submi s a bid o buy one uni o he good.
S ep 3. The expe imen e anks he bids om highes o lowes . In he
e en o ies, he anking is d awn andomly.
S ep 4. A andom numbe will be d awn o de e mine how many pa ic-
ipan s will win he good. The andom numbe will be somewhe e be ween 2
and he o al numbe o pa icipan s. Call his andom numbe N.
S ep 5. The N−1 highes bidde s will win he auc ion, and all winning
bidde s will pay he amoun o he N h highes bid o he exchange. Fo
example, i he andom numbe 5 is selec ed and he 5 h highes bid is 40,
he 4 highes bidde s will win he auc ion and pay 40 o he good.
S ep 6. The winning bidde s hen sell he uni back o he moni o . The
p ice o his ansac ion is he esale alue gi en o he subjec on his/he
eco d shee in s ep 1. The p o i ha winning bidde s ea n o ha ound is
he di e ence be ween he esale alue and he ma ke p ice: p o i = esale
alue - ma ke p ice ( he N h highes ) Subjec s a e in o med ha hey can
ha e a nega i e p o i i he ma ke p ice is highe han hei esale alues.
S ep 7. All bidde s a o below he ma ke p ice buy no hing; hey make
6
ze o p o i o ha ound.
S ep 8. End o he ound. The p o i in ha ound appea s on he
subjec s’ eco d shee s.
S ep 9. Go o he nex ound by going back o s ep 1. A new esale alue
o his new ound will show up on he subjec s’ eco d shee s.
Each ea men is composed o wo sessions. Each session has 9 bidde s
pa icipa ing in 9 ounds. In all sessions, subjec s a e old ha hey will
ge a pa icipa ion paymen o RMB 30 yuan. In bo h he hypo he ical and
he p omise ea men s, subjec s a e clea ly old ha hey will ge a ixed
paymen o RMB 30 yuan. In he mone a y incen i e ea men , subjec s
a e old ha hei paymen s depend on hei decisions. All paymen s will be
made a e he expe imen . Be o e he ac ual auc ion phase, a nonnume ical
example is de eloped co e ing all he ins uc ions. Howe e , subjec s a e no
old ha bidding one’s esale alue is he dominan s a egy. Subjec s a e
also asked o comple e a sho ques ionnai e abou he impo an ea u es o
he game be o e he expe imen s a s. Subjec s’ sociodemog aphic da a a e
collec ed a e he auc ion. O e all, 72 subjec s pa icipa ed in he expe -
imen . 44 a e male and 28 a e emale. Subjec s ha e di e en majo s and
include bo h unde g adua e and g adua e s uden s. The expe imen las s
a ound an hou and a hal , and he ake-home ea nings a e 30 yuan in he
baseline and p omise ea men s and 48.1 yuan in he eal mone a y incen-
i e ea men . The high expe imen al ea nings encou age subjec s o ake
he expe imen se iously, especially in he mone a y incen i es ea men s3.
The p omise sc ip . Figu e 1 shows he p omise sc ip . The p omise
3Fischbache e al. [2001] a gue a high s ake le el can make subjec s ake expe imen s
mo e se iously. S udies such as Slonim and Ro h [1998] ind ha s akes ma e in ul ima-
um games.
7
ea men is iden ical o he baseline ea men excep o he p omise sc ip .
In he p omise ea men , each subjec is asked o eely make a p omise
be o e en e ing he lab. Subjec s a e no in o med abou he na u e o he
expe imen .
3 Resul s
Table 3 p o ides aw da a on obse ed bids by ea men and ound. We see
ha he subjec s in he baseline ea men signi ican ly in la ed hei bids.
The a e age demand e ela ion is 137%. In he p omise, mone a y incen i es,
and p omise + mone a y incen i e ea men s, subjec s in la e hei bids and
he a e age demand e ela ions a e 118%, 110%, and 110%. I do no ind ha
any ea men is pe ec ly demand- e ealing jus by inspec ing he summa y
da a.
A he indi idual bid le el, expe imen al e idence shows ha a andom
n h-p ice auc ion can engage bo h on-ma gin bidde s and o -ma gin bidde s
(Shog en e al. [2001b]). This is con a y o he second-p ice auc ion, which
ypically only engages on-ma gin bidde s, ha is, hose whose p i a e alue
is a he highe end o he dis ibu ion (Pa khu s e al. [2004]; Jacqueme
e al. [2013]). Table 3 shows ha a andom n h-p ice auc ion can engage
o -ma gin bidde s (e.g., IV=24, 38, 53). On-ma gin bidde s usually in la e
hei bids (e.g., IV=76, 84). In all ou ea men s, demand e ela ions a e
la ge han 100% o bo h he lowes esale alue and he highes esale alue
(excep o he p omise + mone a y incen i e ea men ).
Table 5 shows he equency o ac ual bids ela i e o p i a e alues. I
ind ha in all ou ea men s, mos subjec s in la e hei bids. In he
baseline, p omise, mone a y incen i es, and mone a y + p omise ea men s,
8
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17
Figu e 1: P omise sc ip
18
Table 1: Oa h and en i onmen al alua ion
Findings
Jacqueme e al. [2013] Oa h ea men pe o ms be e han o he ea men s such as
money, hypo he ical, and money+oa h, in an induced alue ex-
pe imen
In a homeg own alue expe imen , oa h educes hypo he ical bias
and inc eases bids ela i e o he eal ea men
elici ing mechanism: second p ice auc ion
S e ens e al. [2013] Oa h elimina es hypo he ical bias in a homeg own public good ex-
pe imen
elici ing mechanism: e e endum BDM
de Magis is and Pascucci [2014] Oa h educes WTP
elici ing mechanism: hypo he ical choice expe imen o a p i a e
good
Ca lsson e al. [2013] Oa h educes ex eme WTP alues and esul s in small a iance.
Oa h educes WTP in China, and inc eases WTP in Sweden
elici ing mechanism: con ingen alua ion
Jacqueme e al. [2017] They ejec he null hypo hesis ha a hypo he ical bias does no
exis
Oa h inc eases u h ulness in o es and people who sign an oa h
a e signi ican ly less likely o o e o a public good.
Elici ing mechanism: o ing e e enda
19
Table 2: Expe imen al Design
Commi men Induced alue
Baseline-hypo he ical X
P omise X X
Mone a y incen i e X
Mone a y incen i e + P omise X X
Numbe o epe i ion 1 9
G oup size 1 9 (2 g oups o each ea men )
Paymen - sum o ea nings in each ound
Table 3: Agg ega e bidding beha io by ea men and ound
Agg eg.
Demand
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 To al
IV-Baseline 1084 2115 1221 1256 1519 1550 1474 1517 1385 1323 13360
195 113 116 140 143 136 140 128 122 137
IV-P omise 1084 1274 1175 1540 1240 1338 1267 1111 1267 1279 11491
118 108 142 114 123 117 103 117 118 118
IV-Mone a y incen i e 1084 1177 1189 1197 1219 1169 1215 1189 1208 1135 10698
109 110 110 112 108 112 110 111 105 110
IV-P omise + 1084 1300 1281 1090 1172 1126 1207 1223 1171.5 1119 10689.5
Mone a y incen i es 120 118 101 108 104 111 113 108 103 110
No e: he second column epo s he agg ega e demand, which is de ined as he sum o he esale alue a ibu ed o
he subjec s. Fo each ea men in ow, he uppe numbe ep esen s he sum o obse ed bids, he lowe numbe
ep esen s he pe cen age o he sum o he bids ela i e o he agg ega e demand in %.
20
Table 4: Agg ega e bidding beha io by ea men and induced alue (IV)
IV 24 38 53 63 65 68 71 76 84
AD 432 684 954 1134 1170 1224 1278 1368 1512
IV-Baseline RAD 618 699 1310 2341 1523 1566 1667 1857 1779
RAD/AD 143 102 137 206 130 128 130 136 118
IV-P omise RAD 723 756 1082 1308 1343 1363 1466 1674 1776
RAD/AD 167 111 113 115 115 111 115 122 117
IV-Mone a y incen i e RAD 513 743 1045 1256 1253 1338 1363 1522 1665
RAD/AD 119 109 110 111 107 109 107 111 110
IV-P omise+ RAD 517 768 1054 1257 1297 1374 1429 1514 1481
Mone a y incen i e RAD/AD 120 112 110 111 111 112 112 111 98
No e: he i s ow epo s he induced alues a ibu ed o buye s. The second ow epo s
he co esponding agg ega e demand (AD) in each ea men . Fo each ea men in ow,
he uppe numbe ep esen s he e ealed agg ega e demand (RAD). The lowe numbe
ep esen s he pe cen age o he e ealed demand ela i e o he agg ega e demand in %.
Table 5: F equency o ac ual bids ela i e o p i a e alue
Bids Bids±10%b
no a iona numbe pe cen age no a iona numbe pe cen age
Baseline = 27 16.67 = 51 31.48
>100 61.73 >87 53.7
<35 21.6 <24 14.81
P omise = 48 29.63 = 93 57.41
>84 51.85 >58 35.8
<30 18.52 <11 6.79
Mone a y incen i es = 30 18.52 = 90 55.56
>91 56.17 >58 35.8
<41 25.31 <14 8.64
Mone a y+P omise = 46 28.4 = 95 58.64
>86 53.09 >45 27.78
<30 18.52 <22 13.58
a. No a ion: =, bid equals esale alue; >, bid is la ge han esale alue, <, bid is less han esale alue
b. ±10%: an indi idual’s bid is wi hin 10% o his o he esale alue
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Table 6: Hypo he ical bias and induced alue expe imen s
Findings
Taylo e al. (2001) no hypo he ical bias.
elici ing mechanism: closed e e endum o a public good
demand cu e: 1, 2, 3, 4, 4.5, 4.75,4.9, 4.95, 5.05, 5.10, 5.25, 5.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 in dolla
he hypo he ical and eal induced alue e e enda pe o m equally well in elici ing demand
The hypo he ical bias in homeg own alue s udies is a alue o ma ion p oblem;
Vossle and Mckee (2006) no hypo he ical bias
elici ing mechanism: dicho omous choice, dicho omous choice wi h ollow-up ce -
ain y ques ion, paymen ca d, and mul iple-bounded disc e e choice.
demand cu e: uni o mly dis ibu ed om $1.5 o $9.5, inc emen in 1 dolla
Mi ani and Flo es (2009) no hypo he ical bias
elici ing mechanism: a h eshold p o ision public good expe imen
demand cu e: (3, 5, 7, 9, o 11 okens), 5 ounds
Mu phy e al. (2010) no hypo he ical bias in he induced alue expe imen ; hypo he ical bias in he
homeg own alue expe imen
elici ing mechanism: BDM o he p i a e good, and e e endum o public good
and public p o ided p i a e good
induced alue: $4.5, $11.5, and homeg own alue
5 ounds
Che y e al. (2004) hypo he ical bias
elici ing mechanism: second p ice auc ion
demand cu e: $8.4, $7.6, $7.1, $6.8, $6.5, $5.3, $3.8, $2.4, $1.8, $0.9
10 ounds
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Table 7: IV bidding beha io - Indi idual andom e ec model es ima ion
Va iable IV Baseline IV Baseline
+P omise
IV-Mone a y
incen i es
IV-Mone a y incen i es
+ P omise
n=162 n=162 n=162 n=162
i 1.314 1.047 1.071 0.992
(0.30) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08)
Cons an 38.32 7.7 0.863 12.435
(24.88) (8.76) (4.63) (7.01)
Round Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
σµ28.36 19.27 8.43 14.24
σ67.64 21.15 11.8 17.35
Wald chi2(1) 26.4 141.03 428.83 177.24
S anda d e o s a e in pa en heses
A Appendix
The ins uc ions and ques ionnai es a e based on Jacqueme e al. [2013].
We make some changes o i he andom n h p ice auc ion. The andom n h
p ice auc ion ins uc ion is based on Lusk and Shog en [2007].
A.1 Ins uc ions
Pa 1 Thank you o ag eeing o pa icipa e in oday’s session. As you
en e ed he oom, you should ha e been assigned an ID numbe , which is
loca ed on he uppe igh hand co ne o he ins uc ion. You will use his
ID numbe o iden i y you sel du ing his esea ch session. We use andom
numbe s in o de o ensu e con iden iali y.
Be o e we begin, I wan o emphasize ha you pa icipa ion in his
session is comple ely olun a y. I you do no wish o pa icipa e in he
expe imen , please say so a any ime. Non-pa icipan s will no be penalized
23
in any way. I wan o assu e you ha he in o ma ion you p o ide will be
kep s ic ly con iden ial and used only o he pu poses o his esea ch.
Fo ob ious scien i ic easons, i is manda o y no o speak du ing he
expe imen . Un o una ely, we will ha e o ask any pa icipan no complying
wi h his ule o lea e he oom wi hou any oppo uni y o ake po en ial
ea nings.
I is e y impo an you unde s and he p ocedu e o he expe imen .
I you ha e any ques ions, please aise you hand, someone will come and
answe you. Thank you o ollowing hese ules.
PAYMENT OF YOUR EARNINGS
You ea ning du ing he expe imen will be exp essed in ECU (Expe i-
men al Cu ency Uni ). These ea nings a e con e ed in o RMB acco ding
o he a e: 3 ECU=1RMB. A ixed ee equal o 30 yuan is added o his
payo . You will be paid p i a ely he co esponding mone a y payo in cash
a he end o he expe imen .
Ins uc ions
A he beginning o his pa , he e a e () pa icipan s.
O e iew. You will be pa icipa ing in an auc ion in which you a e a
buye . You ha e o o e , a each ound, a p ice in ECU o buy a good.
The expe imen moni o will e-acqui e his good om you. The e will be
se e al ounds o bidding. The ou come o each auc ion in each ound has
no in luence on how much you will ge paid a he end o he expe imen (
Mone a y incen i es: The ou come o each auc ion in each ound has di ec ly
in luence on how much you will ge paid a he end o he expe imen ).
PROCEDURE FOR EACH ROUND
Each ound has 8 s eps.
S ep 1. Each bidde looks a his o he esale alue on his o he eco ding
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