Fa án-Pé ez, Liane ; Mo eno, Jo ge O.; de las Me cedes Adamuz, Ma ía
A icle
Going long, going sho , issue o liquida e? Co po a e deb
ma u i y o Mexican public i ms
Jou nal o Economics, Finance and Adminis a i e Science
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Uni e sidad ESAN, Lima
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Fa án-Pé ez, Liane ; Mo eno, Jo ge O.; de las Me cedes Adamuz, Ma ía (2025) :
Going long, going sho , issue o liquida e? Co po a e deb ma u i y o Mexican public i ms,
Jou nal o Economics, Finance and Adminis a i e Science, ISSN 2218-0648, Eme ald Publishing
Limi ed, Leeds, Vol. 30, Iss. 59, pp. 150-168,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/JEFAS-03-2024-0082
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Going long, going sho , issue o
liquida e? Co po a e deb ma u i y
o Mexican public i ms
Liane Fa �
an-P�
e ez
Facul ad de Econom�
ıa, Uni e sidad Au �
onoma de Nue o Le�
on,
Mon e ey, M�
exico and
Cen o de In es igaciones Econ�
omicas, Uni e sidad Au �
onoma de Nue o Le�
on,
Mon e ey, M�
exico
Jo ge O. Mo eno
Facul ad de Econom�
ıa, Uni e sidad Au �
onoma de Nue o Le�
on,
Mon e ey, M�
exico, and
Ma �
ıa de las Me cedes Adamuz
Depa amen o Acad�
emico de Adminis aci�
on,
Ins i u o Tecnol�
ogico Au �
onomo de M�
exico, �
Al a o Ob eg�
on, M�
exico
Abs ac
Pu pose –This pape s udies he de e minan s o he deb ma u i y o Mexican-lis ed companies by analysing
he e ec s on he ex ensi e (issuing o liquida ing deb ) and he in ensi e (deb ma u i y enego ia ion) ma gins.
Design/me hodology/app oach –This s udy, using a Tobi model o panel da a and measu ing ma u i y as a
ime a iable, shows ha size, liquidi y and le e age, among o he i m cha ac e is ics, as well as he ma ke
in e es a e, explain deb ma u i y. Addi ionally, he s udy employs he McDonald and Mo i decomposi ion o
de e mine whe he he explana o y a iables o ma u i y ha e a mo e signi ican e ec on he decision o issue o
liquida e deb o on deb ma u i y enego ia ions.
Findings –The esul s ob ained highligh ha he ma ke in e es a e nega i ely a ec s deb ma u i y. On he
o he hand, a iables like size, liquidi y, colla e al and le e age demons a e a posi i e ela ionship wi h he
dependen a iable. In addi ion, he ex ensi e ma gin has a highe impac on co po a e deb han he in ensi e
ma gin, sugges ing ha i ms p e e o liquida e o issue new deb a he han enego ia e p eexis ing con ac s.
Resea ch limi a ions/implica ions –The main limi a ion o his s udy is he use o an unbalanced panel. The
lack o da a limi s he applica ion o speci ic me hodologies sugges ed by he li e a u e as a way o es he
obus ness o he es ima es.
O iginali y/ alue –Fi s o all, his s udy adds empi ical e idence o deb ma u i y decisions by publicly aded
i ms in a middle-income coun y such as Mexico o he exis ing li e a u e on ma u i y choice. Second, he s udy
ea s deb ma u i y as a ime-censo ed, limi ed a iable. Finally, he au ho s ha e used he McDonald and Mo i
(1980) me hodology o decompose he e ec o each independen a iable in o ex ensi e and in ensi e ma gins.
Keywo ds Deb ma u i y, Tobi , Mexican i ms, McDonald and Mo i decomposi ion
Pape ype Resea ch pape
1. In oduc ion
The li e a u e on co po a e deb issuance has g own signi ican ly in he pas ew yea s.
In addi ion o o he deb cha ac e is ics, ma u i y is an essen ial aspec o his analysis.
Ma u i y de e mines he liquidi y and paymen capaci y ha companies may ha e, bo h in he
sho e m and long e m, a ec ing hei alue c ea ion.
JEFAS
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© Liane Fa �
an-P�
e ez, Jo ge O. Mo eno and Ma �
ıa de las Me cedes Adamuz. Published in Jou nal o
Economics, Finance and Adminis a i e Science. Published by Eme ald Publishing Limi ed. This a icle
is published unde he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may ep oduce,
dis ibu e, ansla e and c ea e de i a i e wo ks o his a icle ( o bo h comme cial and non-comme cial
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maybe seen a h p://c ea i ecommons.o g/licences/by/4.0/legalcode
Ma �
ıa de las Me cedes Adamuz aknowledges he inancial suppo o he Asociaci�
on Mexicana de
Cul u a, A.C. o his esea ch.
The cu en issue and ull ex a chi e o his jou nal is a ailable on Eme ald Insigh a :
h ps://www.eme ald.com/insigh /2077-1886.h m
Recei ed 5 Ma ch 2024
Re ised 7 Sep embe 2024
27 No embe 2024
Accep ed 28 No embe 2024
Jou nal o Economics, Finance and
Adminis a i e Science
Vol. 30 No. 59, 2025
pp. 150-168
Eme ald Publishing Limi ed
e-ISSN: 2218-0648
p-ISSN: 2077-1886
DOI 10.1108/JEFAS-03-2024-0082
A b oad ange o heo e ical and empi ical li e a u e on co po a e deb ma u i y choice,
wi h bo h c oss-sec ional and ime-se ies implica ions, is al eady a ailable. Ea ly heo ies
ega ding his opic highligh he impo ance o in o ma ion asymme y and agency cos s as
de e minan s o deb ma u i y (Flanne y, 1986,1994;Diamond, 1991,1993). Asymme ic
in o ma ion heo ies sugges ha bo owe s wi h a ou able p i a e da a on hei quali y issue
sho - e m deb and oll i o e because e inancing a es will impound in o ma ion abou i m
quali y. In addi ion, he posi i e in o ma ion e ec ou weighs he liquidi y isk. Bad-quali y
bo owe s ins ead eso o long- e m deb o a oid he cos s associa ed wi h he deb ollo e .
Some heo e ical models also add ess he impo ance o axes in choosing deb ma u i y. Fi ms
will issue long- e m deb o educe expec ed ax liabili y in en i onmen s cha ac e ised by high
ma ke in e es a es and low e ec i e ax a es (B ick and Ra id, 1985;Kane e al., 1985). The
lis o a iables ha play an essen ial ole in deb ma u i y has inc eased by adding he
ins i u ional and inancial en i onmen o coun ies, such as he legal and poli ical sys em and
capi al ma ke s de elopmen (Demi g€
uç-Kun and Maksimo ic, 1999;Fan e al., 2012;Ki ch
and Te a, 2012;Zheng e al., 2012;Gonz�
alez, 2017;Da a e al., 2019). The empi ical
li e a u e on ma u i y choice is ex ensi e. I sys ema ically shows ha a iables such as
liquidi y, le e age, size, cash low isk and ma ke in e es a es, among o he i m- ela ed
a iables, a e s a is ically and economically signi ican (Ba clay and Smi h, 1995;S ohs and
Maue , 1996;Guedes and Ople , 1996;Axelson e al., 2013;Cus �
odio e al., 2013;
Chen e al., 2021).
This pape in es iga es he deb ma u i y de e minan s o a i m by analysing wo
dimensions: he ex ensi e ma gin ( he p obabili y o issuing o liquida ing deb ) and he
in ensi e ma gin ( he enego ia ion o cu en deb expi a ion). Mos pape s use he sho - e m
o long- e m deb a io ga he ed om i m-le el balance shee in o ma ion as a p oxy o deb
ma u i y. This esea ch, howe e , de ines ma u i y as a weigh ed a e age o he co po a e deb
ma u i y and ea s i as a censo ed limi ed a iable. Following McDonald and Mo i (1980)
[1], o p o ide s ong e idence o he hypo heses, his s udy uses a censo ed Tobi model and
he decomposi ion o i s ma ginal e ec s o sepa a e he e ec on he p obabili y o being
abo e ze o (in ensi e e ec ) om he e ec condi ioned o being abo e o below ze o
(ex ensi e e ec ). This app oach allows us o analyse whe he he impac o he cha ac e is ics
o a company and ma ke ac o s is mo e signi ican on he p obabili y o liquida ing o
eissuing deb (limi obse a ions) o on changes in he magni ude o ma u i y, gi en ha i ms
ha e al eady issued deb (as a posi i e pa o he dis ibu ion).
The aim o his pape is wo old. Fi s , i adds empi ical e idence o deb ma u i y decisions
made by publicly aded i ms in a middle-income coun y such as Mexico o he exis ing
li e a u e on ma u i y choice. The Wo ld Bank desc ibes he Mexican inancial sys em as
s able bu ela i ely ine icien , shallow and wi h low inancial inclusion. As a gued by O man
and Koksal (2017), hese ea u es could lead o con lic s o in e es , in o ma ion asymme y
p oblems, expec ed cos s o liquida ion o po en ial ax e asion. Se e al s udies ha e ound
ha he a io o long- e m deb (wi h a ma u i y longe han one yea ) o o al liabili ies is
ypically lowe in de eloping coun ies han in de eloped coun ies (Maye , 1990;Cap io and
Demi g€
uç-Kun , 1998;Demi g€
uç-Kun and Maksimo ic, 1999;Gianne i, 2003;Fan e al.,
2012;Demi g€
uç-Kun e al., 2015). The e o e, s udying he case o a middle-income economy
is in e es ing, as p e ious esea ch has shown ha un a ou able deb ma u i y s uc u es in
i ms may a ec he mac o- inancial s abili y in de eloping economies (Schmukle and
Vespe oni, 2006;Basel Commi ee on Banking Supe ision, 2011).
Second, he hypo hesis ha i ms manage hei deb ma u i y p o iles in di e en ways,
depending on how close hei ma u i y p o iles a e o ze o, is es ed. Choi e al. (2018) p esen a
ma u i y choice model in which i ms adeo be ween he issuance cos s, he seconda y
ma ke illiquidi y and he ollo e isk. On he one hand, i cos s and illiquidi y a e essen ial,
i ms will choose a mo e concen a ed deb s uc u e. On he o he hand, concen a ed ma u i y
p o iles a e isky i ma ke condi ions a e unce ain. They also show ha he choice o deb
ma u i y depends on he p eexis ing ma u i y p o ile o he i m. The e idence p esen ed by
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Rauh and Su i (2010) and Colla e al. (2013) es ablishes ha small, low- a ed i ms ha e
dispe sed o mul i- ie ed deb p io i y s uc u es.
This s udy ound ha he a iables signi ican ly and posi i ely ela ed o he ma u i y o
co po a e deb a e size, liquidi y, colla e al asse s and le e age. In con as , he e ec o he
equilib ium in e bank in e es a e is bo h nega i e and signi ican . The Tobi model
decomposi ion shows ha he ex ensi e e ec exceeds he in ensi e e ec . In o he wo ds, he
de e minan s o deb ma u i y ha we e ele an o signi ican ha e a g ea e impac on he
liquida ion o eissuance o deb han on he ac ha companies ha ha e al eady issued deb
inc ease o dec ease hei ma u i y.
This s udy is s uc u ed as ollows: Sec ion 2 p esen s he li e a u e e iew and he hypo heses;
Sec ion 3 analyses he me hodology and desc ibes he a iables used o de elop he es ima es;
Sec ion 4 explains he esul s ob ained om applying he co esponding models o he p e ious
sec ion; Sec ion 5 discusses some c i ical issues and Sec ion 6 concludes he in es iga ion.
2. Li e a u e e iew
This sec ion p oposes se e al hypo heses and e iews he suppo ing exis ing empi ical
e idence.
2.1 Hypo heses de elopmen
2.1.1 Agency cos s and i m size. In an ea lie pape , Smi h and Wa ne (1979) a gue ha i m
size is closely ela ed o deb ma u i y. Con lic s o in e es be ween c edi o s and sha eholde s
de elop as e in small i ms, since hey do no ha e a su icien numbe o secu ed asse s o
mee hei claims (An oniou e al., 2006). The e o e, he expec ed ela ionship be ween
ma u i y and size is posi i e.
Mye s (1977) indica es ha i g ow h i ms issue sho - e m deb be o e exe cising hei
g ow h op ions, hey can educe he agency cos s associa ed wi h he downside isk a ising
om unde in es men . I necessa y, lende s and bo owe s can enego ia e. Ti man (1992)
also suppo s his a gumen , as g owing i ms ha e a highe p obabili y o bank up cy and can
bene i om sho - e m bo owing. These a gumen s show ha g ow h op ions and ma u i y
a e in e sely ela ed.
Asse colla e aliza ion is also ela ed o agency cos s. A company wi h a high p opo ion o
asse s ha can be pledged, educing he con lic o in e es since his ac a ou s he
company’s lende s (K€
o ne , 2007).
H1. Fi m size is posi i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
H2. Colla e al asse s a e posi i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
H3. G ow h oppo uni ies a e nega i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
2.1.2 Asymme ic in o ma ion, signalling and liquidi y isk. Flanne y (1986) s a es ha when
issuing cos s a e su icien ly high, good-quali y companies can signal hei alue o he ma ke
by assuming hese cos s, dis inguishing such i ms om poo -quali y companies. The e o e,
high-quali y i ms issue a g ea e olume o sho - e m deb , which means ha he ela ionship
be ween company quali y and ma u i y should be nega i e.
Te a (2011) a gues ha a combina ion o asymme ic in o ma ion and signalling migh
explain why he ma u i y o liabili ies should ma ch he ma u i y o asse s. Ma u i y ma ching
would signal he commi men o en ep eneu s o hei in en ions ega ding he company.
Fi ms would also ma ch he ma u i y o hei liabili ies o he ma u i y o hei claims o a oid a
liquidi y p oblem ha would igge ine icien liquida ion o he i m. Excess liquidi y,
howe e , is ine icien , gi en he high oppo uni y o hese esou ces. Addi ionally, Mo is
(1992) sugges ed ha mo e liquid companies can pos pone he ma u i y o hei deb o a oid
ce ain es ic ions ha lende s impose on bo owe s seeking longe - e m deb .
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Al e na i ely, Diamond (1993) explains he ela ionship be ween le e age and whe he
i ms issue sho - e m o long- e m deb . He s a es ha le e aged companies educe liquidi y
isk by issuing long- e m deb . S ohs and Maue (1996) ein o ce his idea and sugges ha
when companies ha e a high le el o long- e m deb , his di ec ly leads o a highe p opo ion
o deb , es ablishing an au oma ic posi i e co ela ion be ween le e age and ma u i y.
H4. Fi m quali y is nega i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
H5. Liquidi y is posi i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
H6. Le e age is posi i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
2.1.3 Taxes. Kane e al. (1985) explain he ela ionship be ween axes and co po a e ma u i y.
They de elop a model implying ha a i m leng hens deb ma u i y as he ax ad an age o deb
dec eases o ensu e ha he emaining ax ad an age o deb is no less han he expec ed lo a ion
and bank up cy cos s. Thus, a i m’s deb ma u i y should dec ease wi h i s e ec i e ax a e.
H7. E ec i e ax a e is nega i ely ela ed o deb ma u i y.
2.1.4 Ma ke in e es a es. T adi ional inancial heo y s a es ha he longe he deb e m, he
highe he yield demanded by an in es o o compensa e o he oppo uni y cos o he in es ed
money. Howe e , con a y o he expec a ion hypo hesis, some mac oeconomic condi ions a ou
a nega i e ela ionship be ween ime and in e es a es (Campbell and Shille , 1991;Campbell,
1995). The e o e, one o hese ac o s can ha e inc eased, dec eased o nulli ied he yield cu es,
sugges ing ha he ela ionship o he in e es a e o e ime wi h he e m up o ma u i y can be
ei he posi i e o nega i e (McCown, 1999;Wang and Yang, 2012;Quinn e al., 2022).
H8. The equilib ium in e bank in e es a e is posi i e o nega i e ela ed o deb ma u i y.
2.1.5 Empi ical e idence om de eloped economies. Bille e al. (2007) employ a
simul aneous equa ion model o examine le e age, ma u i y and co enan p o ec ion as join
de e minan s. Wi h a da abase o 15,504 deb issues om 1960 o 2003, hey ound ha co enan
p o ec ion is inc easing in le e age, deb ma u i y and he ma ke - o-book a io. This e idence is
consis en wi h he no ion ha i ms use co enan s o con ol sha eholde –bondholde con lic s
o e he exe cise o g ow h op ions and ha deb ma u i y and co enan s a e subs i u es o
managing such con lic s.
Taking ad an age o he long- ime-se ies dimension analysis, Cus �
odio e al. (2013)
e ealed a dec easing end in he use by Ame ican i ms o long- e m deb om 1976 o 2008.
Fi ms wi h g ea e g ow h oppo uni ies and sho e -ma u i y asse s ely mo e on sho - e m
deb , aligning wi h he agency cos s hypo hesis and he ma u i y-ma ching p inciple. The
ela ionship be ween deb ma u i y and i m size is nonmono onic: small and la ge i ms
bo ow in he sho e m, whe eas medium-sized i ms leng hen hei deb ma u i y. These
au ho s u he demons a e ha asymme ic in o ma ion cons i u es an essen ial d i e o deb
ma u i y: esea ch and de elopmen (R&D)-in ensi e i ms and i ms wi h mo e ola ile
asse s ely mo e on sho - e m deb .
O he s udies on deb ma u i y associa ed wi h Ame ican companies explo e no el lines o
esea ch associa ed wi h co po a e cul u e, du a ion o execu i e compensa ion, poli ical
co up ion and in es men o e he business cycles. In his s udy, he au ho s employ s anda d
con ol a iables associa ed wi h i m cha ac e is ics like le e age, asse ma u i y, i m size
and he ma ke - o-book a io. In his sense, Da a e al. (2024) link co po a e cul u e and deb
ma u i y choice. These au ho s demons a e ha a supe io co po a e cul u e is associa ed wi h
he choice o sho - e m deb , which educes manage ial agency p oblems and makes
manage s mo e esponsi e o ex e nal moni o ing h ough he choice o sho - e m deb .
Fu he mo e, he ela ionship be ween cul u e and deb ma u i y is mo e p onounced in i ms
wi h highe manage ial equi y owne ship and in hose wi h inancial cons ain s bu weakens
in i ms wi h highe CEO sensi i i y o s ock p ices. Addi ionally, Fu e al. (2022) analyse he
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ela ionship be ween he du a ion o execu i e compensa ion and co po a e inancing
decisions, inding ha i ms wi h longe CEO pay du a ion ha e sho e deb ma u i y, which is
consis en wi h he no ion ha i ms sho en deb ma u i y o mi iga e in o ma ion asymme y.
This e ec is s onge o i ms wi h la ge bid-ask sp ead, less analys co e age, mo e g ow h
op ions, mo e ola ile e u ns and lowe de aul isk and o i ms in R&D-in ensi e indus ies.
Besides, Hassan e al. (2022) examine he impac o local co up ion on i ms’ deb ma u i y
s uc u e while explo ing bo h demand-side and supply-side explana ions. Thei esul s
suppo he demand-side s o y and demons a e ha i ms in high-co up ion a eas employ less
sho - e m deb o mi iga e liquidi y and e inancing isks. In his sense, hey also ind ha he
e ec is mo e p onounced among i ms wi h smalle size, lowe asse edeployabili y and
highe ola ili y. Finally, Poeschl (2023) explo es he de e minan s o i msʼdeb ma u i y and
he impo ance o i msʼdeb ma u i y o hei in es men and le e age dynamics. The esul s
sugges ha i ms sho en deb ma u i y du ing imes when de aul isk p emiums a e high and
hei in e nal unds a e sca ce. This beha iou is consis en wi h bo h he li e cycle and
business cycle dynamics o i ms’ deb ma u i y. Endogenous deb ma u i y helps i ms o
dele e age as e in esponse o nega i e shocks.
In Casino e al. (2019), he de eloped ma ke co e ed is Eu ope. Based on wo g oups o
lis ed and unlis ed Eu opean companies, hey measu e how agency cos s in luence he
ma u i y s uc u e o he companies in he sample. Using he panel me hodology o es ima e he
co esponding models, he s udy inds ha asse ma u i y, size, le e age and liquidi y a e
essen ial in de e mining deb ma u i y o he wo g oups o Eu opean i ms. Howe e , ee
cash low and g ow h oppo uni ies a e no impo an in de e mining he deb ma u i y o lis ed
companies. In gene al, he e ec o hese de e minan s on he dependen a iable is consis en
wi h he es o he li e a u e.
Allaya e al. (2022) analyse he ela ionship be ween olun a y disclosu e and co po a e
deb ma u i y o 404 F ench-lis ed companies. Addi ionally, hey include con ol a iables
such as le e age, asse ma u i y, i m size and he ma ke - o-book a io. They ound ha
companies wi h highe olun a y disclosu e ha e mo e long- e m deb , sugges ing ha
companies bene i om b oad disclosu e h ough g ea e access o long- e m deb .
Besides es ing he deb ma u i y heo ies, mo e ecen pape s ha e in es iga ed he
ma u i y choice o i ms om a no el pe spec i e. Fo ins ance, Choi e al. (2018) ocus on
sp eading (o concen a ing) ma u i y da es o e ime. Using an exogenous shock o bond
ollo e isks such as he GM and Fo d downg ade in May 2005, hey show ha i ms wi h
mo e ma u ing deb o oll o e immedia ely a e he shock inc ease he dispe sion o hei
ma u i y p o ile mo e han a con ol g oup o o he wise simila i ms. Likewise, Pa ise (2018)
es s whe he he h ea o en y by low-cos compe i o s a ec s inancing decisions, using da a
on he Ame ican domes ic ai line indus y. Pa ise inds ha incumben s signi ican ly inc ease
deb ma u i y be o e en y occu s. This ype o beha iou sugges s ha i ms ac i ely manage
deb ma u i y o educe he ollo e isk associa ed wi h sho - e m deb e inancing unde
ad e se ma ke condi ions.
2.1.6 Empi ical e idence om eme ging ma ke s. Empi ical es s and e idence o he deb
ma u i y heo ies in eme ging ma ke s a e also ex ensi e and ela i ely ecen . Many s udies
analyse co po a e deb s uc u e, using deb ma u i y as he dependen a iable. Coun ies and
economic a eas co e ed and used as examples include Chile (Cas a~
neda and Con e as, 2017),
Mexico (Fa �
ane al., 2022), A ican coun ies (E udaiye-Mu ha e al., 2017), India (Kalsie
and Nagpal, 2018), Vie nam (Phan, 2020), Se bia (Ku�
cand Kali�
canin, 2021) and Eas e n and
Cen al Eu ope (Toade e al., 2022). Based on adi ional panel da a and o he dynamic
models, hese au ho s use independen a iables such as size, g ow h oppo uni ies,
colla e alised asse s, liquidi y and le e age o explain he phenomenon. Thei esul s a e
gene ally consis en wi h he ex ensi e li e a u e al eady a ailable on his subjec , as hey also
ind ha i m ac o s explain he ma u i y o co po a e deb o a la ge ex en .
Some esea che s empi ically explo e he ela ionship be ween he choice o deb ma u i y
and i m agency cos s. These au ho s use simila con ol a iables such as company size,
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le e age, p o i abili y and angibili y, among o he s. Fa hangdous e al. (2020) ind no
adeo be ween manage ial owne ship and deb conce ning he educ ion o agency cos s.
Addi ionally, Faysal e al. (2020a) suppo he ole o inside owne ship in enhancing ixed
pe o mance by educing he cos o equi y, which means ha manage ial owne ship can be a
subs i u e o all sha eholde s. Mo eo e , Salehi e al. (2021a) p o e ha amily companies
and s a e sha eholde s ha e no signi ican impac on he agency cos s. Howe e , inancial
le e age causes a decline in agency cos s, and la ge companies also ace highe agency cos s.
Likewise, Salehi e al. (2021b) de ec ha he audi commi ee posi i ely impac s company
pe o mance, sugges ing ha e ec i e co po a e go e nance can minimise con lic s o in e es
and enhance o e all pe o mance. Finally, Faysal e al. (2020b) ind ha in he I anian con ex ,
boa d size, CEO enu e and audi quali y educe he cos o equi y.
Lemma e al. (2020) in es iga e he impac o clima e change on co po a e inance. They
use a panel da a model and con ol a iables ela ed o i m cha ac e is ics like size,
p o i abili y, angibili y and ax shield o p o e he ela ionship be ween deb ma u i y and
co po a e ca bon isk. The esul s show ha he deb ma u i y is signi ican ly highe , bo h
s a is ically and economically, o companies wi h lowe ca bon in ensi y ( isk). In addi ion,
high-quali y ca bon disclosu e accen ua es he posi i e associa ion be ween deb ma u i y and
he in e se o ca bon in ensi y.
Ano he a ea o cu en li e a u e ela ed o deb ma u i y is add essed by Su and Chauhan
(2021). Using da a om all lis ed Indian companies, hey ound ha g oup a ilia ion is
posi i ely associa ed wi h co po a e deb ma u i y, i.e. g oup i ms use mo e long- e m deb
han simila s andalone i ms. Howe e , in o ma ion asymme y and mo al haza d p oblems
weaken he impac o g oup a ilia ion on deb ma u i y s uc u e. In addi ion, Chena i e al.
(2023) e alua e he e ec o bank up cy isk on s ock p ice isk, emphasising he ole o deb
ma u i y in companies lis ed on he Teh an S ock Exchange. They ind ha his e ec is no
s a is ically signi ican and he e o e ejec hei esea ch hypo heses. Finally, Zhang e al.
(2024) analysed he in luence o supplie concen a ion on deb ma u i y s uc u e. The esul s
sugges an in e ed U-shaped ela ionship be ween supplie concen a ion and deb ma u i y
s uc u e. In he case o igh mone a y policy, ewe colla e al asse s and highe o al deb , he
in e se U-shaped ela ionship is mo e signi ican .
S ephan e al. (2011) published a s udy ela ed o he wo k desc ibed abo e. They analysed
he de e minan s o deb ma u i y choice in Uk aine. Using a Tobi model o censo he
dependen a iable be ween ze o and one, hey con i m he impo ance o companies
ope a ing in an economy in ansi ion. This s udy p o es ha es ic ed and un es ic ed
companies eac di e en ly o liquidi y isk and ollow di e en deb ma u i y s a egies.
Ano he in e es ing line o esea ch ha is being widely add essed hese days is ha
associa ed wi h en i onmen al, social and go e nance (ESG) issues. Zhou e al. (2024)
s udy he in ica e associa ion be ween ESG in ol emen and co po a e deb ma u i y. They
employ da a om he lis ed Chinese i ms and obse e a posi i e co ela ion be ween ESG
pe o mance and he long- e m deb a io o en e p ises. Impo an ly, he ma ginal e ec
o ESG on deb ma u i y is ob ious o en e p ises exhibi ing highe le els o ESG
pe o mance.
3. Me hod
3.1 Da a and a iables
The da ase consis s o 93 companies lis ed on he Mexican S ock Exchange (BMV, by i s
ac onym in Spanish) o 18 yea s (2002–2019). The sample is ob ained om he o icial BMV
websi e, conside ing he non- inancially lis ed companies. Financial da a we e sou ced om
he Capi al IQ da abase and annual epo s. The ma ke a iable, such as he in e es a e, is
ob ained om he o icial websi e o he Cen al Bank o Mexico (Banxico). Since da a o
ce ain companies ha e been una ailable o se e al yea s o bo h he dependen a iable and
i s de e minan s, he only op ion was o use an unbalanced panel.
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The dependen a iable “deb ma u i y” is de ined as a weigh ed a e age o he ma u i y
employed, which weigh he con ac alue o each deb i em o e he o al deb egis e ed o
each yea , mul iplied by he emaining ime o he con ac o end. This me hodology p o ides
a be e ep esen a ion o ma u i y by including ime as pa o he measu emen :
mi; ¼X
J
j¼1
sj;i; *mj;i; (1)
whe e sj;i; ∈½0;1�is unde s ood as he p opo ion o each deb i em “j” o he company “i” in
pe iod “ ” in he o al deb :
sj;i; ¼Dj;i;
P
J
j¼1
Dj;i;
(1a)
and mj;i; is he cu en ma u i y o each i em “j” o he company “i” in pe iod “ ”:
mj;i; ¼V j;i; �Acj;i; (1b)
whe e V is he o al ma u i y o he con ac and Ac is he closing yea unde analysis. Figu e 1
shows he beha iou o his a iable.
The explana o y a iables o co po a e deb ma u i y a e closely ela ed o he i m
cha ac e is ics. Size is de ined as he na u al loga i hm o he book alue o o al asse s. This
s udy uses he a io be ween ne sales and he book alue o o al asse s as a p oxy o he
quali y o a i m. Liquidi y o a i m is measu ed as he a io be ween cu en asse s and cu en
liabili ies, while angibili y is de ined as he a io be ween ne angible asse s and he book
alue o he o al asse s. The a io be ween o al deb and o al asse s is he le e age. Taxes a e
compu ed as he p opo ion be ween he ax expenses and i s axable base (income be o e
axes). Acco ding o he li e a u e, de ining he g ow h op ion o a i m is i al in explaining
deb ma u i y. The a io o ma ke o book alue o equi y is a p oxy o his a iable.
The s udy also includes a Mexican ma ke in e es a e, as an explana o y mac oeconomic
a iable. The in e bank equilib ium in e es a e (TIIE) is he e e ence a e used in mos
Sou ce(s): Au ho s’ own elabo a ion using he annual da a om he Capi al IQ pla o m
3
4
5
6
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
A e age Ma u i y
Time in yea s
Figu e 1. Annual weigh ed a e age ma u i y o co po a e deb
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156
comme cial deb con ac s signed in Mexican pesos. The annual a e age as a unc ion o i s
daily alue e lec s he ollowing ac o :
TIIE ¼P
T
¼1
TIIE 28 days
T(2)
Sec o s a e he usual con ol a iables. Table 1 shows he de ini ion and compu a ion o he
a iables unde s udy, along wi h e e ences o au ho s who suppo hese a iables, which a e
conside ed s anda ds in he li e a u e.
3.2 Desc ip i e s a is ics
Table 2 epo s he desc ip i e s a is ics, excep o he sec o a iable, o be e unde s and he
ac o s in ol ed in his s udy.
The a e age deb ma u i y o he companies lis ed on he BMVis 4.7 yea s, conside ing his
alue in he medium o long e m. The minimum alue is ze o, sugges ing a deb paymen and a
maximum o app oxima ely 28 yea s. The a e age liquidi y is 2.48, implying ha , on a e age,
companies can co e hei o al obliga ions wi h hei esou ces mo e han wice. Howe e , a
minimum o 0.05 exis s, which means ha o a pa icula yea , a speci ic company had i s
obliga ions p ac ically unco e ed. Rega ding colla e al asse s, he le e age and co po a e ax
a es e e o ze o minimums. In he i s case, a speci ic company a a pa icula momen
dep ecia ed all o i s angible asse s. In he second case, a company has no eco ded deb o
one speci ic yea . In he hi d case, a company did no pay axes o a yea because i epo ed
inancial losses. Finally, he minimum nega i e alue eco ded by he ma ke - o-book a io
explains ha , o a pa icula yea , a speci ic company closed he pe iod wi h nega i e equi y,
condi ioned by a loss in e ained ea nings.
Table 1. Va iable desc ip ion
Va iable Desc ip ion Expec ed sign Re e ences
Deb Ma u i yi; Annual weigh ed a e age o deb
con ac s
N/A Fa �
ane al. (2022)
Sizei; Na u al loga i hm o o al asse s
o i m iin yea þAn oniou e al. (2006)
and Toade e al. (2022)
Quali y o he i mi; Ne sales di ided by o al asse s
o i m iin yea �S ephan e al. (2011)
Liquidi yi; Cu en asse s di ided by cu en
liabili ies o i m iin yea þS ephan e al. (2011)
Colla e alized Asse si; Ne angible asse s di ided by
o al asse s o i m iin yea þTe a (2011) and
K€
o ne (2007)
Le e agei; To al deb di ided by o al asse s
o i m iin yea þDiamond (1993) and
S ohs and Maue
(1996)
E ec i e Co po a eTax Ra ei; Tax expenses di ided by Income
be o e axes o i m iin yea �Kane e al. (1985) and
Te a (2011)
Ma ke o Booki; Ma ke alue o equi y di ided
by book alue o equi y o i m i
in yea
�Mye s (1977) and
Ti man (1992)
The A e age 28 days Annual a e age 28 days o he
equilib ium in e bank in e es
a e
±Fa �
ane al. (2022) and
Campbell (1995)
Sec o i; Dummy 0 and 1 Unde e mined Fa �
ane al. (2022)
Sou ce(s): Au ho s’ own elabo a ion using bibliog aphic e e ences
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me hodology o s udy he e ec s o e ma u i y using a Tobi model and he McDonald and
Mo i decomposi ion, iden i ying he e ec s o e he ex ensi e ma gin ( he p obabili y o
issuing o liquida ing) and he in ensi e ma gin ( he enego ia ion o cu en deb con ac s).
The obse a ions a he lowe limi o he sample, hough hey a e a small numbe in ela ion o
he whole, ha e a g ea scope o explain he phenomenon o liquida ion and deb issuance
agains changes in he magni ude o he ma u i y.
This new app oach o analysing ma u i y allows o a be e unde s anding o wha is
behind deb issuance and deb ma u i y. Rele an a iables, excep company size, ha e a o al
elas ici y be ween 0 and 1 in absolu e alue. In his sense, he e ec s o hese independen
a iables a e conside ed inelas ic, as co po a e deb ma u i y unde goes less han p opo ional
changes o small a ia ions in each ac o . The decomposi ion o he elas ici y shows ha he
ex ensi e e ec ou weighs he in ensi e e ec in all o he a iables. This esul means ha he
explana o y a iables ha e a mo e signi ican impac on he p obabili y ha i ms liquida e and
eissue deb han on changes in ma u i y magni ude, gi en ha hey ha e al eady issued deb .
The esul s a e obus , showing ha Mexican companies p e e ea ly deb liquida ion a he
han holding and e inancing by adjus ing he magni ude o hei ma u i y. This holds ue only
when he i m’s liquidi y pe mi s.
No es
1. F om his poin o wa d, we will e e o McDonald and Mo i as au ho s in e changeably, using
ei he hei ull su names o hei ini ials, MM.
2. I is essen ial o cla i y ha using a Tobi model wi h ixed e ec s is no empi ically sound. The e is no
su icien s a is ic ha allows he ixed e ec s o be condi ioned ou o he likelihood, due o he
inciden al pa ame e p oblem (G eene, 2004).
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Fu he eading
G eene, W.H. (2012), Econome ic Analysis, Pea son, The Uni ed S a es o Ame ica.
Co esponding au ho
Jo ge O. Mo eno can be con ac ed a : [email p o ec ed]
Fo ins uc ions on how o o de ep in s o his a icle, please isi ou websi e:
www.eme aldg ouppublishing.com/licensing/ ep in s.h m
O con ac us o u he de ails: [email p o ec ed]
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