How women's movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion
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Khan, Ayesha; Sharp, Samuel Research Report How women's movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion ODI Report Provided in Cooperation with: ODI Global, London Suggested Citation: Khan, Ayesha; Sharp, Samuel (2025) : How women's movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion, ODI Report, ODI Global, London, https://odi.org/en/publications/womens-movements-demands-democracy-in-backlash/ This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314359 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Report How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion AYESHA KHAN AND SAMUEL SHARP February 2025
How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion AYESHA KHAN AND SAMUEL SHARP
ODI Global 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ United Kingdom © ODI Global 2025 Online ISSN: 2052-7209 This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. ODI Global requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI Global website. Views and opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author(s) and should in no way be attributed to the institutions to which they are affiliated or to ODI Global. Khan, A. and Sharp, S. (2025) How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion. ODI report. London: ODI Global (odi.org/en/publications/womens-movements-demands-democracy-inbacklash). Front cover image: Women from diverse backgrounds and grassroots communities protest at an event organised by SIHA calling for democracy and women’s human rights, Khartoum, Sudan, 2019 Credit: Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA)/Ula Osman.
Acknowledgements The authors benefited from insights to the initial research design during a workshop with scholars Pilar Domingo, Caroline Harper, Naila Kabeer, Deniz Kandiyoti, Maxine Molyneux, Pragna Patel and Shirin Rai, held in October 2023 at ODI in London. We are also grateful for further feedback from Naila Kabeer, Maxine Molyneux, Jane Jaquette, Pilar Domingo, Ján Michalko and Khawar Mumtaz. We especially thank our key informants who shared with us their time and insights. We gratefully acknowledge the support of our Communications Team, Emilie Tant, Emily Subden and Prerna Dhote, research assistance with Spanish language materials from Ruth Rodas-Kamminga and Diana Jiménez Thomas Rodriguez, editorial guidance from Terese Jonsson, typesetting by Garth Stewart and proof-reading by Hannah Caddick. The authors take full responsibility for any weaknesses or omissions in this final version. About the authors Ayesha Khan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Gender Equality and Social Inclusion team at ODI Global. Her research focuses on feminist movements, backlash to gender equality, and democracy. Sam Sharp is a Research Fellow in the Politics and Governance programme at ODI Global. His research focuses on contemporary challenges to democracy and civic space and particularly how these manifest in emerging democracies.
Contents Acknowledgements / V Display items / VII Acronyms and abbreviations / VIII Glossary / IX 1 Introduction / 1 2 Methods / 4 3 Global trends: democracy, civic space and politicised religion / 5 3.1 Democracy and civic space / 5 3.2 Religion in public life and institutions / 5 3.3 Country cases / 6 4 Women’s movements, civic space and demands for democracy / 9 4.1 Iran / 10 4.2 Sudan / 12 4.3 Pakistan / 15 4.4 Summary / 16 5 Religious politics and backlash / 17 5.1 Political Islam: Sudan, Malaysia and Bangladesh / 18 5.2 Hindu nationalism: India / 21 5.3 Evangelical Christianity: Argentina and Mexico / 22 5.4 Transnational implications / 24 5.5 Summary / 25 6 Movement strategies / 26 6.1 Collective action / 26 6.2 Women’s rights activists build new alliances / 27 6.3 Using secular institutions to counter politicised religious authority / 33 6.4 Summary / 35 7 Conclusion / 36 7.1 Recommendations for further research / 37 References / 39 Appendix 1 List of interview participants / 50
Display items Boxes Box 1 Ni Una Menos: a broad-based coalition against gender-based violence / 28 Box 2 Women’s movement alliances with new grassroots mobilisations: Indian response to Hindu nationalism / 29 Box 3 The transnational campaign for recognition of the crime of gender apartheid / 32 Tables Table 1 Summary of country cases / 7
Acronyms and abbreviations BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women FFC Forces for Freedom and Change LGBT/LGBTQI+ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex (the plus sign represents people with diverse sexual and/or gender who identify using other terms) MANSAM Sudanese Women in Civic and Political Groups Morena National Regeneration Movement (Spanish: Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional), Mexico NGO non-governmental organisation SIHA Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa SIS Sisters in Islam UCC uniform civil code UK United Kingdom US United States WLF Woman, Life, Freedom WLUML Women Living Under Muslim Laws
Glossary Anti-rights Well-resourced movements that undermine human rights by promoting patriarchal power through hyper-nationalist and exclusionary ideologies. They target civil society and the rights of women, LGBTQI+ people, migrants and minorities, with their rhetoric increasingly amplified by political leaders globally (McEwen and Narayanaswamy, 2023). Aurat March A feminist movement in Pakistan that started in 2018 and calls for gender equality and challenging societal norms, with annual marches held on International Women’s Day (Kamal, 2022). Hadith Collections of the sayings or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, used by Muslims as a key source of Islamic religious law and moral guidance (Sayeed, 2024). Protestant Christianity A branch of Protestant Christianity also called Evangelicalism or Evangelical Protestantism, that believes in the necessity of personal conversion and spreading of the Christian faith. Increasingly connected with ultra-conservative and anti-rights groups. Fatwa An edict or a ruling issued by a recognised religious authority on a point of Islamic law (Shehabuddin, 1999). Hindu nationalism A political belief that a nation’s policies should be based on religious Hindu and cultural norms. Hindutva A right-wing ideology that advocates Hindu supremacy and seeks to transform India from a secular state into a Hindu nation (Sahgal, 2020). Madrassa Schools or any educational institution, particularly focused on religious Islamic instruction or Quranic teaching. Ni Una Menos A feminist movement that originated in Argentina in 2015 and has since spread across Latin America. Initially focused on femicide (it is literally translated ‘not one [woman] less’), the movement expanded to advocate on the legalisation of abortion (Daby and Moseley 2022). Political Islam Movements, institutions and ideas that bring Islamic beliefs and actors into the political sphere. Salafi movement A revivalist movement within Sunni Islam that seeks to return to the original teachings of pious predecessors (Hasan, 2010). Secularism A worldview or political principle that separates religion from the political realm. It asserts that a secular state’s policies should be governed by nonreligious considerations and remain separate from religious institutions. Shariah law A legal system devised from the Quran. Shariah courts dispense justice on crimes covered by Shariah laws.
7 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Table 1 Summary of country cases Country Political regime (V-Dem Institute, 2024)3 Civic space (CIVICUS, 2022)4 Percentage of population with no religious affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2012) Argentina Electoral democracy Narrowed 12.2% Bangladesh Electoral autocracy Closed <0.1% India Electoral autocracy Repressed <0.1% Iran Closed autocracy Closed 0.1% Malaysia Electoral democracy Obstructed 0.7% Mexico Electoral democracy Repressed 4.7% Pakistan Electoral autocracy Repressed <0.1% Sudan Closed autocracy Repressed 1% 3 V-Dem’s ‘Regimes in the world’ dataset categorises regimes as closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies or liberal democracies. Electoral autocracies hold some elections, but they are not meaningful, free and fair. Electoral democracies have meaningful, free and fair elections, but lack the individual and minority rights protections that characterise liberal democracies. 4 CIVICUS classes civic spaces on a scale (from most to least open) of: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed or closed. Some of the cases are established democracies, either featuring marginal backsliding (Argentina and Mexico) or substantial backsliding, arguably into autocratic regimes (India). Others are regimes that hold elections but have struggled to see progress deepening the quality of democracy (Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia). Finally, others are regimes that remain closed autocracies, having resisted democratisation pressures (Iran and Sudan). Malaysia is the only case that has seen some improvement in the quality of liberal democracy over the last decade (V-Dem Institute, 2024). None of the cases are classed by CIVICUS as having fully open civic spaces, with Bangladesh and Iran categorised as ‘closed’ civic spaces – the least open. In Iran this severe closure of civic space has severely repressed the women’s movement, with key senior figures in jail and student protesters killed during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom (WLF) protests which brought tens of thousands onto the streets in protest across the country, as many arrested, and hundreds killed (Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2024). The Indian Government has also targeted civic activism, silencing media and advocacy organisations seeking to protect minority Muslim rights. International nongovernmental organisations and foreign-funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have restricted ability to operate (with CIVICUS classing its civic space as declining from ‘obstructed’ to ‘repressed’), impacting support for women’s rights advocacy (ICJ, 2020). Argentina has also seen recent restrictions, with President Javier Milei displaying a willing disregard for civil liberties in pursuit of ‘economic shock therapy’, including legislation targeting protesters (Sharp and Milesi, 2024).
8How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion In all the country case studies, a large majority of citizens hold religious beliefs. In most of the countries, religious affiliation is near universal. Mexico and Argentina are the only countries with notable populations with no religious affiliation and even there they remain a substantial minority. The cases also demonstrate a range of institutionalised religious bodies (such as the Shariah courts in Pakistan, Sudan, Iran and Malaysia and the Fatwa Council in Malaysia). For some, religious organisations and parties have substantial impact on the wider political culture. This includes India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) ideology of Hindutva, influenced by the nationalist organisation the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Islamist political parties and organisations such as the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the growing Evangelical Christian organisations in Argentina and Mexico. The growing politicisation of religion can also influence declines in civic space. For example, in South Asia, avowedly secular activists have been threatened and killed by extremists for holding ‘atheist’ views (Chaudhury, 2020; Kakar, 2021). Women Life Freedom activist group gathered outside the UN headquarters to remember the one year anniversary of the death of Mahsa Amani, New York City, USA, 2023. Credit: Steve Sanchez Photos/Shutterstock.com
9 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion 4 Women’s movements, civic space and demands for democracy Feminist movements have often been at the forefront of democratic movements in many contexts. In other contexts, the demand for democratic reforms is often, but not always, at the forefront of women’s claims. This chapter outlines how women’s movements push for democratisation in closed autocracies (Iran and Sudan; see Sections 4.1 and 4.2) and electoral democracies with weak legitimacy (Pakistan; see Section 4.3). In all three countries, civic space is closed or repressed, and religious authority is integrated in governance structures. Iranian women have been at the frontlines of multiple waves of civil society protests against a theocratic state in which the legal system is based on religious law and the clergy holds political power, demanding more rights for women, civil liberties and inclusive democracy. Their movement survives despite repressed civic space and with laws, policies and institutions in place that are shaped by Islamic doctrine. This context has weakened the policy impact of those voices calling for democratic reform. At the same time, it has pushed some feminists to create their own parallel deliberative spaces in anticipation of a democratic future and has clarified their calls for a secular democracy. In Sudan, a broad-based coalition of women’s civil society groups successfully mobilised to bring down a repressive and Islamist regime to initiate a democratic transition. Activists identify the failures of the democratic transition, linked to the new government’s inability to deliver on reforms and bring stability to the country. These include no change in the political settlement, the persistent exclusion of women from meaningful political participation, and the political co-optation of women’s groups. The Sudanese case illustrates how feminists understand their activism as a political project to undo both gender inequality and the discrimination brought by religious laws. Backlash in the form of stalled gender reforms and growing sexual violence, exclusion from meaningful political participation and renewed violent political conflict was the price of the failed democratic project. Pakistan is not an official theocracy nor is it in a state of widespread conflict. However, the absence of meaningful democracy has limited progress towards the goals set by its women’s movement in the 1980s, which resisted gender discrimination from state-led Islamisation policies during a military regime (1977–1988) and demanded a return to democracy. Like women’s rights activists in Iran and Sudan, they challenged politicised religious authority and pursued broader social justice goals based on equality of citizenry. But democratic institutions remain weak and political support for the legacy of Islamisation continues along with a rise in public religiosity. Safe deliberative spaces, free from the threat of the religious right and state surveillance, are severely curtailed, limiting women’s collective action and public debate about inclusive democratic reforms. The remainder of this chapter discusses these cases in more detail.
10 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion 4.1 Iran Iran has been a theocratic state with an elected civilian government, overseen by a council of clerics, since the 1979 revolution. The clerics hold unaccountable political power, rejecting both democratic principles and equality between citizens – men and women, and Muslims and non-Muslims. This structure led to a pluralistic women’s movement across the ‘secular-religious divide’, and resistance from women and other social groups who seek democratisation (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010: 886). Women’s deep engagement with public and political life, including many who challenged the state’s narrow interpretation of women’s rights in Islam, along with those who were secular advocates for gender equality, has been credited with starting the movement for democratic and social reform in Iran (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). The women’s movement has been distinctly focused on rights-based advocacy against discriminatory Shariah laws. Their focus onlegal reforms and civil and political rights in fact positions these activists as radical with respect to the theocratic regime (Tohidi, 2016). Post-1979, women’s groups developed distinct ways to align themselves and/or confront powerful elites to advocate for reforms in personal laws, greater personal freedoms (e.g. against forced veiling), and challenge the Islamic Republic. Contemporary secular feminism derives from the state’s Islamic structure and has been the focus for a wide coalition of women across the ideological spectrum (Tajali, interview). The struggle for democratic and institutional reform achieved only intermittent political openings. A reformist government was elected (1997–2005), during which civic space opened up and debates over secularism and social reforms began to gain currency. In 2008, under President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (2005 -2013), women organised one of the largest public protests since 1979, demanding constitutional reforms to end discrimination against women. Upon this, the government shut down women’s NGOs, arresting and harassing activists, and closing media outlets (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). In the name of national security, it harshly suppressed civic space and collective action, such as the One Million Signatures campaign, a grassroots effort to push the government to eliminate discriminatory laws (Human Rights Watch, 2008), and the Green Movement protests, which involved women, students and youth who challenged the re-election of Ahmadinejad (Akbar, 2021). US-based Iranian scholar and academic Mona Tajali explains how the politicised nature of the women’s movement over decades led to its ‘securitisation’, which enhanced the risks for secular feminists in particular. It pushed many underground or abroad, allowing for the advancement of more moderate women who were willing to work within the framework of the state (Tajali, interview). The securitisation led to ‘a clear disconnect between these religious groups and those who have been facing crackdowns for the past decades’, says Tajali. Collaboration between secular feminists and religious women to advance reforms on specific issues, such as blocking a 2006 bill to make polygamy easier (Hoodfar, 2022), gave way ‘to clear divisions’ with pro-theocracy women with access to power who benefit ‘from the social capital and status’ it confers (Tajali, interview). The women’s movement supported the new ‘Hope Government’ of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021), who promised to establish a ministry for women’s affairs and permit women greater role in public and political life (Parsa, 2021).
11 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion The human rights lawyer Shahindokht Molaverdi was appointed to his cabinet. An advocate for Iran to join the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), she was adept at engaging with the state (Tajali, interview). She strategically used the discourse of ‘gender justice’, an approach ‘to women’s right to dignity, safety, and full participation in society’ while recognising social and cultural norms, rather than the discourse of gender equality deployed by secular feminists (Tajali, 2023: 142). Soon, hard-line conservatives forced her resignation ‘just because she had a feminist bone in her’ (Tajali, interview). She went to prison for anti-regime propaganda, undermining national security and promoting prostitution and sexual deviancy (Mehrabi, 2020). Clarifying the demand for secular democracy The Woman, Life, Freedom protests against the forced veiling of women, which began in September 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini in custody, ‘was a watershed moment’ which ‘completely clarified that working from within the theocratic state will not lead to any radical change’, explains Tajali. Hoodfar and Tajali (2023) argue the protests are the result of widespread public disaffection with earlier attempts at reform in Iran, bringing together wide public support to demand ‘substantial political and social change that is markedly secular’. Thus, the ‘closure of the state’ to women’s voices is directly linked with a deepened secularism in the movement today, as well as in large sections of the public (Tajali, interview). A wide coalition of civil society groups called for a secular state, without religion informing laws and policies, and the end of discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities (Hoodfar and Tajali, 2023). The government only hardened its stance in response to the threat posed by the women’s movement to their grip on power. The recent declaration that mandatory veiling (hijab) laws will be enforced even more strictly, with greater presence of morality police, indicates that the state knows ‘that, in the eyes of many, it’s a lost battle’ (Tajali, interview). More women are refusing to veil, while the government has not accounted for its clear violations of human rights in its repression of the protests (Human Rights Council, 2024). Many feminists were disabused of the idea that new elections may bring back more women into political office to effect gradual reforms. It became clear that the state was unwilling to negotiate and that women need to focus on a transition to democracy instead. ‘They decided to ensure that the women’s rights protests yielded tangible results in practice because it was such a progressive, liberatory protest’ (Tajali, interview). The same group that made a 2009 charter for women’s rights crafted the Iran Women’s Bill of Rights, with its first draft published in 2023, together with activists from the diaspora who had been forced to flee the country after the 2009 crackdown. Although it was organised largely from the diaspora, the authors obtained input of women inside Iran, including some in prison. Its demands include a representative assembly to draft a new constitution, a secular democratic state and a comprehensive list of women’s human rights. The Bill of Rights is conceived as part of a new constitution based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related conventions, and calls for women’s equal representation at all decisionmaking levels, and social and environmental justice to build a pluralist secular democracy (Feminist Collective, 2023).
12 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Feminists understand democratic reforms will take time because democratic institutions have deliberately been weakened. Thus, many are working on ‘building parallel systems’ in politics, academic spaces and women’s groups, using virtual space to have important discussions and debates. ‘They’re doing the homework for that eventual democratic transition’, explains Tajali. As Iranian feminist scholars have argued before, without ‘democratic and accountable statesociety structures’, a religious state will rely on the repression of dissent using religious ideology and gender reforms will remain impossible (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010: 901). 4.2 Sudan The Sudanese 2019 uprising saw Omar al-Bashir removed from power and the end of the Islamist regime in power for over 30 years. Global media published iconic photographs of young women leading demonstration on the streets, symbolic of the groundswell of popular protest (SIHA Network, 2021). The 2019 revolution was an outcome of the ‘repression and alienation’ women experienced under political Islam, ‘which put enormous pressure on the women’s movements to resist … and their attempt to find their place and capacity to influence society’, according to Hala Alkarib, Sudanese feminist activist and regional director of Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA). The revolution signified women’s implicit understanding that democratic reforms were imperative to achieving their rights. It mobilised a broad coalition of women, from urban to grassroots activists (SIHA Network, 2021). Alkarib notes it was grassroots women’s groups, such as street vendor associations and others from conflict-affected areas, that maintained a coherent vision of their demands for political, economic and social protection. ‘They were the ones most exposed to the brutality of the legal system’ under the previous regime (Alkarib, interview). Grassroots groups were joined by young women from urban areas who had been exposed to militant Islam and related violence (SIHA Network, 2021). Feminist mobilisation was instrumental to coordinating the protests and pushing for gender equality reforms, as a new generation of activists had come of age who were independent from ‘patriarchal political parties’ (Alkarib, interview), in contrast to the historical women’s movement whose leading organisations had strong political affiliations (Ezeldeen, 2022; Thompson and Kostiainen, 2023). Excluding women from meaningful political participation Sudan’s political elite became one driver of the backlash against the opening offered by the 2019 revolution. Transition government leadership soon attempted to co-opt the women’s movement and restore the historical pattern of ensuring it was not autonomous from political parties. The Sudanese Women in Civic and Political Groups (MANSAM), an independent coalition of activists formed in 2018, played a key role in mobilising support for the revolution and ensuring women’s voices were heard during the transition. It has been described as a ‘last attempt’ to bring together activists from a wide range of backgrounds to counter the exploitation of women members of political parties (Abbas, 2023a). The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of different political organisations, worked with MANSAM to bring together all the women’s groups that mobilised during the revolution. MANSAM signed onto the FFC declaration to support the democratic transition. It became a civil society component in this broader coalition
13 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion but without the political influence, explains Reem Abbas, who was a former member of the coordination committee. This prevented the movement from growing independently from political actors (Alkarib, interview). Women’s groups that were members of MANSAM but politically affiliated began to leave, amid growing concerns that individual women were using it to advance their personal political goals (Abbas, 2023a). A form of backlash ‘before women had the opportunity to claim rights as a social group’ came from among political elites who participated in the revolution yet still expressed patriarchal attitudes and sidelined women’s participation in politics (Tønnessen and Al-Nagar, 2024: 495). The pattern of excluding women from meaningful participation in the transition was inevitable because there was no fundamental change in what Abbas terms ‘the militarised political marketplace’, which ensures that traditional leaders or armed men would always retain control. Leaders of the transition did not use the opportunity to change the political settlement, failing to push back against military encroachment into all sectors or challenge the authority of tribal leaders (Abbas, interview). Women pressed on with their demands, such as that Sudan should sign CEDAW (SIHA Network, 2021). The transition government passed some reforms to limit extreme religious interpretations and discriminatory laws against women, which were not well implemented. The government was unable to resist the return of the military and it lacked sufficient international support. It could not control violence against women, nor their persecution for minor crimes (Alkarib, interview). Civic space during the transition remained constrained and activists began to worry about surveillance and getting arrested. The grassroots women’s groups who were on the frontline of advocating for democracy and their rights were targeted by the FFC because they refused to align themselves with any political organisations (Alkarib, interview). The political coalitions used the civil society movement, and the women’s groups within it, ‘to add into their political capital’ (Alkarib, interview). MANSAM was unable to represent the diverse interests of Sudanese women (SIHA Network, 2021). FFC viewed MANSAM as ‘the women’s side of the house’ and discouraged its members from engaging in protests and other actions to demand accountability from the new government on its stated commitments to women’s rights. The new government failed to ratify CEDAW and other international instruments, stop the persecution of women for selling alcohol and end punishments such as stoning to death, which were introduced by the previous Islamist regime. The government’s failures began with its inaction on women’s issues but indicated that ‘the writing was on the wall’ in terms of the violence that was to come (Alkarib, interview). MANSAM brought together women who were affiliated with political parties (wings or women’s groups within parties), women-led civil society organisations and civic groups, such as professional organisations, in the largest women’s coalition in Sudan. It focused on overall legal reform, achieving success with the removal of the law on dress code, and working on peace talks as a priority (Abbas, interview). However, the influence of political parties undermined agreement on a minimum common platform (Abbas, 2023a). MANSAM was criticised for being used ‘as a mobilising machinery for the FFC in preparations for the next stage’ of political transition (Alkarib, interview). Younger feminists and grassroots women who had come out for the revolution grew dissatisfied (Abbas, 2023a). They organised the Sudan Women Protest Platform to maintain focus on an
14 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion agenda of family law reform, access to resources and employment, sexual and gender-based violence, and legal and political system reform. FFC indicated these protests were an unnecessary disruption (Alkarib, interview). A new military regime took power in a 2021 coup and targeted women protesters who participated in the revolution. The backlash against women gained pace and cases of sexual violence increased dramatically (ISHR, 2022). The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered into conflict with the Sudanese army in 2023, recalling the earlier statement of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo that ‘anyone that doesn’t fight doesn’t have an opinion’ (Abbas, 2023b). As Alkarib says, ‘I think the backlash has been so horrific, the country’s failure to attain democracy has impacted everything’. Alaa Saleh, clad in white, leads chants during a protest in resistance against authoritarianism and the fight for democracy in Khartoum, Sudan, 2019. The image was heavily shared on social media. Credit: Lana Haroun | X.
15 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion 4.3 Pakistan Pakistan has become increasingly Islamised since its creation as a homeland for Muslims in 1947, with negative consequences for the rights and freedoms of religious minorities and women (Saeed, 2007; Khan, 2018; Nelson, 2021). Islam is the state religion and the constitution requires all laws to be in consonance with Shariah. A Council of Islamic Ideology advises the government to ensure law and policy conforms to Islam. Parallel Shariah courts exist to dispense justice on crimes pertaining to adultery, theft and intoxication covered by Shariah laws. The women’s movement gained momentum against state-run Islamisation measures implemented under military rule (1977–1988). Its leading voice at the national level, the Women’s Action Forum, called for a secular democratic state in its 1991 charter (Khan, 2018). The struggle for democracy, spearheaded by political parties with mass membership, is a stark contrast to the top-down politics of Islamisation in Pakistan (Khan, 2018; Mufti et al., 2020). Democratic institutions are weak, while the strongest political stakeholder remains the military, meaning the country is characterised as a hybrid democracy (Adeney, 2017). Pakistani society has become more demonstratively religious after Islamisation. The public role of religion is now more broadly accepted as a norm, with militant religious organisations often enforcing their interpretation of doctrine outside of established law (Basit, 2020; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2023). Progressive political parties no longer use the term ‘secular’ in policy documents or public statements, for fear of being accused of the crime of blasphemy. The most popular political party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, promised to build a devout society while deploying a binary framing of feminists as western, atheist and immoral and increasing curbs on civic space and media freedoms (Talbot, 2022). Pakistan has a long history of cultivating forces of the religious right, including the Taliban, other militant groups and more mainstream religious political parties (Khan, 2018). The legacy of Islamisation means that elected legislators have been reluctant to challenge discriminatory religious laws and policies (Nelson, 2021). The women’s movement, led by a group called Women’s Action Forum, spearheaded opposition to Islamisation throughout the 1980s and demanded both gender equality and democratic reforms (Khan, 2018). Working together with elected representatives, they achieved the first legislative gender quota in 2002, bringing a wave of legal reforms to address sexual violence, domestic violence, honour killings and other crimes, but they were unable to remove existing Shariah laws nor those against blasphemy (Khan and Naqvi, 2018). The new feminist mobilisation, known as Aurat March, brings together a wide group of women representing cross-class and religious denominations, and inclusive of diverse gender identities. Partly inspired by the global #MeToo movement, its annual events since 2018 are celebrated in a widening number of urban centres on International Women’s Day. The Aurat Marchers now confront growing numbers of hostile counter-marchers, requiring police protection from religious political party activists who hurl stones at them and allege they are uttering blasphemous slogans (Kamal, 2022). Unlike the generation of activists represented by Women’s Action Forum, the Aurat March is reluctant to directly challenge discriminatory religious laws, even those affecting the Christian community, for fear of offending the sentiments
16 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion of a vulnerable religious minority. Sara Malkani helped organise the first Aurat March and collaborates frequently with its Karachi-based collective.She is concerned that side-stepping some of the wider issues in Pakistani law and society allows the politicised religious lobby to wield a strong influence on entrenched doctrinal laws that remains highly exclusionary of religious minorities and resistant to progressive interpretation (Khan, 2018; Nelson, 2021). Malkani believes that Aurat March activists may not question bodies such as the Federal Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic Ideology because ‘a lot of people view it as a wall’, and an unwinnable battle. Instead, activists search for ‘creative ways, interesting ways’ to advance their claims within existing institutions and non-secular legal frameworks, in effect to ‘by-pass’ the wall. Still, the distinct dangers of querying the stateled interpretation of religion include vigilante killings by mobs, militant organisations, arrests by law-enforcement agencies and more (Ispahani, 2017; Ul Mustafa, 2016). Treading carefully without directly challenging doctrine still does little to lower the risk for activists in civic space in the contemporary environment of antifeminist backlash and religious fervour, extremist organisations, and religio-political parties. Even as young feminists continue to make rightsbased claims, Malkani wonders at what point their demands will become more political and confront the fact that Pakistan does not have a secular constitution and ‘that we have a religious lobby and a conservative lobby that has claimed the entire space to interpret what Islam requires’. As she put it, ‘there’s no meaningful confrontation with that problem’. The critical challenge is the closure of public debate around these questions, which has affected how feminists conceptualise the way forward. There are no longer safe deliberative spaces in which to hold meaningful conversations about Islamisation. Malkani believes that only ‘if we were to have democracy in a more meaningful sense’ would it be possible to find out where the people of Pakistan stand – whether they are supportive of ‘secular framings’ or religion ‘trumps our demands for sexual equality, sexual freedom and so on’. This discussion will only be possible without fear of repercussion and in a climate of informed debate. 4.4 Summary This chapter has shown how feminist mobilisations significantly contribute to democratisation processes in three contexts where civic space is constrained and democratic institutions are weak or not inclusive of women. In Iran, women have started to create parallel deliberative spaces and plan for a democratic transition with support from diaspora activists. In Sudan, despite women’s leadership role in pushing for a democratic transition in 2019, women’s voices were largely sidelined and the new civil war has derailed progress. Pakistan’s weak democracy and constrained civic space has also weakened feminists’ unified call for democratic reforms, despite the women’s movement’s previous history of challenging military rule. In all three countries, politicised religious influence has constrained women’s voices in civic space and not aligned with democratic reforms.
23 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion The feminist activists interviewed suspect that much of the growing influence of Evangelical groups comes through their political connections and financing, with many reportedly financing politicians’ electoral campaigns and ‘smear campaigns’ against those in favour of legal abortion (anonymous activist, interview). Datta (2021: 13) has analysed this phenomenon in Europe, where he identifies ‘dark money from the US Christian Right’ as providing the financial backing for much anti-gender activism. An activist interviewed described her perceptions in Argentina: What Evangelical groups have is a lot of money … and a lot of power through money. So, they finance legislators’ campaigns, finance communication campaigns and finance attacks. In Mexico, too, socially conservative Evangelicals provided an important part of the base that brought President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to power, with the Evangelical Solidarity Encounter Party part of the ruling alliance alongside López Obrador’s National Regeneration Movement (‘Morena’) (Rojas, 2022). Despite Morena being a left-wing movement, President López Obrador’s populist ruling approach often speaks to more conservative ideologies, including through an emphasis on ‘moral renewal’ of society, perhaps partly influenced by this Evangelical base of support (Olson, 2020). The interviewees in both Mexico and Argentina expressed a sense that Evangelical advocacy groups cross lines that Catholic groups do not with regards to anti-gender activism, with Evangelicals and linked conservative groups pursuing more aggressive counter advocacy and often digital harassment (anonymous activist, Pérez-Pazos, interviews). An Argentine activist interviewed also describes a campaign from Evangelical groups to encourage people not to watch a fictional Netflix series about an Evangelical pastor, co-written by Claudia Piñeiro, a renowned Argentine author prominent in abortion rights campaigns. The interviewee suggests that this kind of campaign is not something you would imagine from the contemporary Catholic Church in Argentina (at least not in a concerted, public manner). While feminist activists in both countries (anonymous activist, Pérez-Pazos, interviews) describe collaboration with elements of the Catholic Church (see Section 6.2), Evangelicals remain stern opponents of gender equality. 5.4 Transnational implications The transnational movement of political Islam has had intricate and long-lasting impact on women’s rights since the 1970s. The spread of Wahhabi Islam across the Muslim world is well documented. The Salafist movement, too, has transformed the politics of Muslim-majority countries (N. Hasan, 2010; Arat, 2016; Khan, 2018). The rise of Hindutva politics is already evidencing cross-border implications. In Bangladesh, a new Hindu extremist group, the Hindu Mahajot, or Bangladesh National Hindu Grand Alliance, claims to be the victim of Islamic fundamentalism and demands financial resources and greater political representation (Singha, 2021). Hossain says it is suspected of receiving funding and political support from India. Ironically, groups associated with it are lobbying against equal rights in the Hindu personal laws, when a UCC already exists in neighbouring India. Hindu women activists working for personal law reform have been intimidated by the Hindutva-affiliated gatekeepers to their community, along with the recent Awami League government, into backing off from their advocacy (Hossain, interview).
24 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion After the government’s recent overthrow, a leading feminist scholar and activist joined an appeal with others from the region, asking the Indian government to refrain from interfering in Bangladesh’s democratisation process by promoting false information about anti-Hindu activities (Azim et al., 2024). Evangelical churches and associated ‘religious right’ advocacy groups influential in anti-gender activism in Mexico and Argentina also have transnational links, in particular with the US Evangelical movement (Zilla, 2018). Datta (2021) documents how US ‘Christian right’ organisations both train and advise anti-gender advocacy groups abroad, with a set of ‘mega donors’ from the US also providing funding to anti-rights groups internationally. The rise of religious fundamentalism in politics has transformed the landscape of activism for women’s rights globally – and not just within these organisations’ countries, where they exercise direct political power. The connections among diaspora communities are strong, and migrant communities in western countries often gain strength from religious influences as they contend with xenophobia and racisms in their adopted homes. As Pragna Patel argues, the rise of religious identity among Muslim communities in the UK was a response to the impact of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia from the 1980s onwards. Today in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (UK), many women among the large Bangladeshi migrant community have adopted the Saudi-style veil, as indeed in other Muslim contexts (Riaz, 2013). Religious organisations form coalition groups and provide services to women. Patel trained as a lawyer and was a founding member of the Southall Black Sisters and the global network Women Against Fundamentalism (Katz, 1995). She believes these religious groups aim to control their local constituencies, contain women, and promote a homogenous Muslim, Hindu or Sikh identity, defined in illiberal, fundamentalist terms, yet they have gained state recognition for their efforts as the UK adopted ‘multi-faithism’ as official policy (Patel, 2008). Muslim fundamentalists in the UK who call for more faith-based schools and laws to accommodate their religious values frame this as an issue of freedom of religion, while feminist critics see it as the imposition of a rigid and conservative faith upon individuals, particularly girls (Cowden et al., 2024). ‘These demands were anti-rights and anti-democracy, with women being the first casualties’, says Patel. Today we see Asian women’s shelters and organisations with names that represent their religion, rather than secular identity, she says, and the political left in Britain is unable to respond effectively to the challenge posed by religious fundamentalism. Critically, and even outside the UK and across South Asia, ‘secularism and the idea of secular feminism have become dirty words’ (Patel, interview). 5.5 Summary This chapter shows the transnational impact of politicised religion, extending globally, even into contexts like the UK, where the impact on women’s activism in some communities reveals the de-secularisation of their claims and discourse. Feminist mobilisations are contending with the long legacy of political Islam, the rise of Hindu nationalism and Evangelical Christianity, which is challenging secular principles and undermining commitments to women’s equal rights and inclusive democracy.
25 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion 6 Movement strategies The interviewed activists identified a number of useful strategies to protect, and resist further erosion of, their rights as they contend with challenges to democracy and a backlash to gender equality that is often fuelled by politicised religion. This chapter shows how important collective action remains to advance women’s gender equality goals. Contemporary challenges to democracy and civic space are providing opportunities for new alliances with other social justice movements, and even with progressive religious organisations on certain issues. Women’s mobilisations are most able to confront politicised religious authority and its detrimental effects on gender rights when the state is committed to secularism and the provision of civil courts and justice systems. 6.1 Collective action Collective action remains a key strategy for women to advance gender equality claims and push for civic spaces themselves to remain open and inclusive. Large public mobilisations are an integral feature of the feminist movement in Mexico and have been able to influence and push for progress, even on doctrinal issues such as the decriminalisation of abortion. Mexico City set a precedent as the first jurisdiction to legalise abortion in 2007, with, after a gap of 12 years, some other states following. The breakthrough moment came in 2021, with the Supreme Court ruling that to criminalise abortion was unconstitutional (Taylor, 2023). Feminist collective action has been key at all stages, with large-scale public mobilisations often a demonstration of solidarity across different feminist groups and part of a broader Marea Verde (Green Tide) movement for abortion rights, with demands for legalisation starting in Argentina and spreading across Latin America (Tamés, 2023). The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court credited these activists, and their ‘legitimate demands’, as influential in the landmark 2021 ruling (Kitroeff, 2022). As state-level legalisation has been slow, feminist movements have deployed legal strategies and continued to march (Tamés, 2023; Ramos, 2024). Feminist movements thus rely on a civic space that is sufficiently open to allow for such mobilisations, although this also allows for counter-mobilisations (Ruibal, 2014). Pérez-Pazos, a Mexican feminist and urban planner researcher, describes an abortion rights march and counter advocacy: We had pro-life contingents next to us … and while we sang, we jumped, we hugged each other, what they did around us was kneeling, they were praying, because they believe in something different than us. For feminists like Pérez-Pazos, such confrontations with opposing views illustrate the significance of an open and inclusive secular public sphere. Historically in Argentina, as across much of Latin America, women played a central role in pro-democracy struggles. In response to military abuses, organisations which initially focused on women’s rights became key elements of larger movements to defend human rights (Jelin, 1994; Waylen, 2000). At times, this included collaboration with elements of the Catholic Church, which, under the influence of
26 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion liberation theology, became explicitly involved in politics, advocating for the rights of the poor and protection of human rights (Hale, 2018; Philpott, 2007). The election of President Milei in 2023 has brought new threats to civic space and economic security. Today, influential movements such as Ni Una Menos (not one [woman] less) similarly aim for broad coalitions, using a pluralist approach and framing feminist struggles as social justice struggles to mobilise broad segments of the public. In countries where civic space does not encourage public debate and dissent, it has been more challenging for women to advance their claims and build public support through collective action. In Malaysia, SIS advocate for the recognition of gender equality within Islam, and contend this requires a neutral secular state and democratic dispensation, ‘to guarantee a dialogic public civil space defined above all by tolerance’ (Reilly, 2017: 489). A rights-based critique against religiously enforced gender discrimination, for example argues that forced hijab denies Muslim women the right of choice, moral autonomy and personal independence (Othman, 2006). However, the promotion of women’s rights as related to Islam opens women to charges of sedition because the Sultan of Malaysia is both head of state and its religion, thus effectively curbing the safe deliberative practice so essential to a healthy civic space (Isa, interview). Where states have mixed commitments to secularism, women’s movements have demonstrated mixed success in countering challenges to the separation of religion from politics. In Bangladesh, when a succession of military rulers introduced reforms to increase religious authority by, for example, removing secularism as a constitutional principle, lifting the ban on religious political parties, and declaring Islam to be the state religion (Malik, 1995; Chowdhury, 2010), women’s groups led public protests in 1988 claiming that religion should remain in the private, not public, sphere (Nazneen, 2018). They won a Supreme Court ruling to restore the principle of secularism, but religious groups accused women’s rights activists of being agents of western imperialists and undermining Islam (Nazneen, 2018). With the 2009 elections, a more progressive government allowed feminists to advance some progressive legislation, but under pressure from the extremist religious organisation Hifazat-ul-Islam, it refused to support the Supreme Court’s ruling to remove Islam as the state religion (Nazneen and Masud, 2017). 6.2 Women’s rights activists build new alliances Women’s rights activists are building new alliances amid backlash and constraints on civic space, thus ensuring they still engage in collective action for gender equality. These alliances may be at the local, national or transnational level, and sometimes even include some progressive religious groups. Social justice mobilisations Women join grassroots social justice mobilisations in shared resistance to the erosion of democracy and rise of religion in politics. The election of President Milei in October 2023 significantly altered the landscape for women’s movements in Argentina and brought them into allyship with additional civic movements and interest groups. These groups in turn have been able to benefit from the mobilisation capacity of Ni Una Menos (see Box 1).
27 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Box 1 Ni Una Menos: a broad-based coalition against gender-based violence The Ni Una Menos movement began from public outrage in Argentina at the femicide of a teenage girl. A tweet from journalist Marcela Ojeda acted as a spark, roughly translated as: ‘Businesswomen, athletes, actresses, they are killing us, are we not going to do anything?’. Social media was used to coordinate a mass protest against persistent gender-based violence within a few weeks. Organisers of the first march say the aim was to build a broad movement which brought together diverse groups to combat gender-based violence, with the goal ‘to try and reach all ages, all sectors and the entire country’ (anonymous activist, interview). The initial march mobilised more than 200,000 in Buenos Aires alone. The Ni Una Menos movement grew to integrate advocacy and mobilisation for more controversial rights issues beyond gender-based violence. It is a key part of the Green Tide movement for reproductive justice, popularising the use of green scarves as a symbol for the right to legalised abortion. This inspired other regional spin-offs across Latin America, including in Mexico. In Argentina, Ni Una Menos protests led to the creation of a Ministry for Women, Gender and Diversity and became a catalyst for the legalisation of abortion in 2020 (Daby and Moseley, 2022). The influence of Ni Una Menos illustrates the value of feminist mobilisations building broad coalitions. From the outset, the movement aimed to use explicitly pluralist discourses and strategies and collaborated with other movements. An activist interviewed explained the intention that ‘anyone could use Ni Una Menos’, including feminists along with those who had never been activists. Its decentralised structure has allowed the movement to integrate different interest groups. The interviewee described how, when the movement shifted to focus on the legalisation of abortion, its decentralised structured allowed it to integrate different interest groups, include actors, journalists and lawyers (anonymous activist, interview). This enables distinct groups to maintain space under the banner of Ni Una Menos. The severity of President Milei’s economic reforms, cuts to public services and increasing poverty rates have brought social and economic justice issues to the forefront of feminist advocacy (anonymous activist, interview). Milei has also threatened civic space and an independent media, introducing measures to allow for easier prosecution of protestors and closing Latin America’s leading Spanishlanguage news agency (Sharp and Milesi, 2024). Feminist movements have played an important role in opposing Milei’s reforms, including with the Confederation of Workers and in defense of the public university, as well as through a women-led counter-mobilisation (Lambertucci and Centenera, 2023). The activist interviewed explained that when the government is pursuing a ‘transversal’ attack on ‘everything that has to do with human rights and the rights to survival’ it is necessary for feminists to be allies to broader movements. As the response to Milei demonstrates, it is the most pressing issues of the time, along with the related political constellations, that configure the allies for
28 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion feminist movements. Where these pressing issues are broader questions of social and economic justice, this may include atypical allies from religious groups (a topic returned to in Section 6.2.2). In India, the ascent of Hindu nationalism since the 1980s seeks to undo the accommodations to religious plurality offered by the constitutionally secular state. Hindu nationalism seeks to provide, in effect, an ‘anti-secular alternative’ (Hasan, 2010: 943). Public support for the BJP and the ideology of Hindutva is transforming the national imaginary into an exclusionary new majoritarian national identity (Needham et al., 2007; Anand and Lall, 2022; Jayal, 2022). Muslim women in Delhi became the public face of protest to the 2019 Citizenship (Amendment) Act and a new national register of citizens. They built coalitions with other poor communities to respond to the Hindu nationalist attack on rights, as discussed in Box 2. Box 2 Women’s movement alliances with new grassroots mobilisations: Indian response to Hindu nationalism The 2019 Citizenship (Amendment) Act provides access to Indian citizenship for victims of religious persecution who arrived in the country before 2015, but excludes Muslims. The new National Register of Citizens requires documentary evidence of ancestry to permit registration as an Indian citizen, disproportionately disenfranchising women and poor and marginalised communities (Choudhury Lahiri, 2021). Muslim women in Delhi gathered in Shaheen Bagh and became the public face of protest to both these laws. Most were involved in contentious politics for the first time. They asserted their rights to engage in the public sphere, assert their Muslim identity and also claim their citizenship of India at the same time (Rai, 2020; Choudhury Lahiri, 2021). Lasting over 100 days, their protests became the longest intergenerational sit-in demonstrations in India since independence (Chopra, 2021). Their ‘popular constitutionalism’ featured mass recitations of the constitution’s preamble, affirming the secular and democratic nature of the Republic of India. Women were attempting to ‘reshape citizenship’ by defending the secular constitution and rejecting ‘Islamophobic and exclusionary populist nationalism’ (Rai, 2020: 271). Soon after, in 2020–2021, the Farmers’ Movement (Kisan Andolan), emerged in protest triggered by the government’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impose restrictive laws favouring corporate rights over agrarian workers (Singh, 2022). Its roots lay in the agrarian crisis in rural India caused by landlessness, rising costs, farm debt, unemployment, environmental degradation and a wave of farmers’ suicides (Singh, interview). The protests mobilised thousands of women, who joined the men in their communities in a protest of two million people in the capital, Delhi, where their peaceful encampment lasted one year (Singh, 2022).
29 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Box 2 Women’s movement alliances with new grassroots mobilisations: Indian response to Hindu nationalism (continued) Singh believes that the women’s protests and Kisan Andolan gave the predominately urban-based Indian women’s movement a key lesson in how to build alliances. Protesting farmers, university students, the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan and the National Women’s Association all came to show their support for the protestors of Shaheen Bagh (Chopra, 2021). Understanding that the current government is systematically disenfranchising the poor ‘section by section’ – Adivasi (indigenous tribes), Dalit (scheduled castes), farmers or Muslim, Singh explains: The dots were joined between how the agenda of Hindutva, of lynching, of banning cow slaughter, how these various laws and policies were, in fact, disenfranchising citizens, Muslim citizens, and how the citizenship law actually disenfranchised more powerfully the women. (Singh, interview) In Iran, women’s groups are building new alliances of solidarity in the face of severe state repression, now that opposition groups are ‘doing the homework for that eventual democratic transition’ themselves, says Tajali. New shared interests have emerged, for example with Kurdish women and the LGBTQI+ community, both of whom experience ongoing oppression in the country. Kurdish women in Iran have had a more hostile engagement with the Iranian state, which denies them, as Sunni Muslims, the protection offered to religious minorities, and discriminates against them based on ethnicity and their political organisations demanding greater autonomy (Yildiz and Taysi, 2007). The slogan jin, jiyan, azadi (woman, life, freedom) was originally a Kurdish protest slogan (Gupta, 2023), evocatively rendered into Persian, zan, zindagi, azadi, in the wake of the custodial killing of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, in Iran, and the ensuing WLF protests across the country. A group of activists from inside and outside Iran published a manifesto in 2023 to complement the ‘Rainbow Wave’ of LGBTQI+ protestors who participated in the WLF movement. They, too, demand an end to the ‘apartheid regime of sex and gender’ as part of the struggle against patriarchy, expressing solidarity with ongoing resistance against the ‘tyranny and autocracy’ of the regime, exhibited through student protests and union and labour strikes, while demanding an end to all forms of discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexuality (Bidarzani, 2023). Allyship with religious authorities Feminists may be able to develop allyship with religious authorities on specific goals depending on country contexts. On nondoctrinal issues, religious groups in Mexico are often not opponents (and sometimes allies) of feminists. Marcela Oropa (interview), the founder of Defensoras Digitales and part of the Ley Olimpia movement, contrasts abortion rights activism with activism against digital harassment. Frente Nacional para la Sororidad (National Front for Sisterhood) advocated for an ‘Olimpia Law’ against digital harassment, inspired by the experiences of Olimpia Coral Melo, who had been a victim of dissemination of non-consensual sexual images (Carrillo, 2022;
30 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Oropa et al., 2024; Pearson, 2020). The main opposition to the law came from ‘freedom of expression’ advocacy groups (Suarez Estrada, 2022). In contrast to abortion issues, the lack of engagement of religious authorities (either collaborative or oppositional) was notable. Pérez-Pazos (interview) also describes devout Catholics who, while offering strong opposition on abortion rights, support feminist advocacy against gender-based violence. The mostly secular political settlement allows for relations between feminists and religious groups today to be largely issue-dependent, without invoking fundamental disputes over the role of religion in policy processes. In Argentina, feminists built coalitions with religious groups based on specific issues, for example with progressive elements of religious groups supportive on women’s rights demands. The influence of many feminist movements, both in terms of progress with regards to women’s rights and in resisting anti-rights backlash, has come from their ability to build broad coalitions to advance particular causes (Anderson, 2022). The activists interviewed in both Mexico and Argentina have been able to work on advancing reproductive rights with Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir (Catholics for the Right to Decide), a pro-abortion group active since the 1990s and inspired by ‘Catholics for Choice’ in the US (Ngo, 2021; Hernández, 2023). Collaborations can also result from particular political constellations allying religious groups with feminists resisting attacks on democracy and civic space, or on broader social justice issues. For example, as described in Section 6.2.1, feminists in Argentina have found themselves allying with the Catholic Church, which ‘comes out to question poverty in the country’ (anonymous activist, interview) in resistance against President Milei’s drastic economic reforms, even though it holds opposing views on reproductive rights. As an Argentine activist interviewed summarised: Today we find ourselves in a very particular moment in Argentina because everything is turned upside down, so we the feminists find ourselves retweeting what the Catholic Church says. As the Ni Una Menos movement demonstrates, ‘there is something very positive about secular feminism having the capacity to build with religions, including the Catholic religion’ (anonymous activist, interview). How feminists frame their activism in order to build such coalitions is often strategic, based on recognising the need to garner sufficient public support. Similarly, religious actors deploy ‘strategic secularism’ in arenas where religious arguments carry less weight (Morán Faúndes, 2018; Vaggione, 2018; Reuterswärd, 2021). However, this collaboration is only possible with certain religious groups and on certain issues where there is accordance. In Argentina, the close association between the Evangelical Church and far-right conservative groups has made it a key opponent to progress in women’s rights, such that the interviewee suggested that feminist collaboration with progressive Catholic groups becomes even more important in resisting Evangelical-linked feminist backlash. Transnational activism The constraints to civic space in the country cases have ensured that transnational and diaspora networks are vital to advancing gender equality as a human right.Women’s voices from the diaspora ensure that the struggles of their fellow citizens are not forgotten by the international community. Thus, a virtual civic space creates a sense of community providing knowledge and resources for feminists.
31 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion The civil war in Sudan (2023–) has forced many leading feminist activists to flee their country. Reem Abbas is now in exile in Egypt, where she continues with research and writing, speaking in webinars and meetings, mentoring feminists and conducting trainings, ‘doing anything that I can do’ (Abbas, interview). Iranian feminists continue their advocacy from the diaspora to craft the Bill of Rights discussed in Section 4.1. Perhaps one of the most powerful outcomes of the WLF protests was the birth of a ‘global Iran’, as millions of diaspora Iranians supported and followed the uprising in real time, achieving a closeness on both sides that was unprecedented (Bayat, n.d.). Transnational feminist groups are critical platforms to advance women’s rights claims at the international level whilst also providing support to feminists within their own countries. This report has referred to some of these organisations, such as SIHA in the Horn of Africa. SIS in Malaysia benefit from the resources and global advocacy work of Musawah, a Muslim transnational feminist organisation. Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML; see Box 3), where Mona Tajali plays a leadership role, has a global reputation for providing research resources and training to support feminists in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Asia since its inception in the 1980s. Box 3 The transnational campaign for recognition of the crime of gender apartheid Women Living Under Muslim Laws members are scholars and activists drawn from all contexts where Muslims reside. It was among the first to campaign for the recognition of gender apartheid in Iran in the 1980s, a campaign which now includes Afghanistan as the second country (WLUML, 2023). It has taken many years for Iranian feminists within the country to recognise the system of gender apartheid. In 2023, the human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Narges Mohammadi wrote a letter from prison outlining the 19 laws and policies in her country that constitute gender apartheid (Mohammadi, 2024). Iranian activists work together with international actors and agencies, such as UN Women, and Afghanistan’s feminists to push the international community to recognise gender apartheid (UN Women, 2023). As Mona Tajali (interview) says: They’re thinking of it as yet another tool to address Iran’s backlash, and also recognising that the pressures from international community has been very limited when it comes to gender persecution ... And they’re saying that if it helps for Iranians and Afghans to come together, then let’s do so. Legal scholar Karima Bennoune, who crafted the argument for gender apartheid’s legal recognition, is a former council member of WLUML. Tajali is currently director at the WLUML Feminist Transnational Leadership Institute, which brings young women across the region together, beginning with virtual meetings and moving on to in-person gatherings, to build solidarity and collective action ‘considering the interconnectedness of issues across borders’ (Tajali, interview).
32 How women’s movements lead demands for democracy in the face of backlash and politicised religion Transnational solidarities are necessary to counter the influence of extremist nationalist and religious political ideologies because they, too, have transnational reach. Pragna Patel believes international recognition of Afghanistan and Iran as gender apartheid regimes would also support women in minority communities within the UK to resist ‘fundamentalist pressures’. She has observed how the South Asian diaspora in the UK has been impacted by Hindutva politics, Sikh nationalism, the spread of Salafist religious movement, and political Islam influenced by the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan (Patel, interview). Minority women have to grapple with religious fundamentalism as well as gatekeepers who represent their faith communities with a ‘conservative and even misogynist and homophobic religious agenda’ (Patel, 2008: 18). Transnational solidarities would support women to recognise the political imperatives behind identity-based politics and the dangers of religious fundamentalism, and share resistance strategies (Patel, interview). 6.3 Using secular institutions to counter politicised religious authority ODI Global research and interviews underscore the enduring value of secular state structures and civil courts for women’s rights activists who have to contend with politicised religious authorities. Where states are sufficiently secular, feminists can advocate for women’s rights without always challenging the political power of religious authorities.Mexico has a long history of the separation of church and state, and greater scepticism regarding the use of religious arguments in public policy – which has contributed to more progressive policy outcomes (Amuchástegui et al., 2010; Blancarte, 2023). Feminist movements rely on a relatively open civic space (for women’s rights advocacy) and civic institutions to advance their claims – and have made progress even on doctrinal issues disputed by religious groups. The sustained secular political settlement allows for relations between feminists and religious groups today to be largely issue-dependent, without invoking fundamental disputes over the role of religion in policy processes. For example, in debates about emergency contraception, feminist groups grounded their advocacy in public support for secular politics, arguing that their opponents were improperly ‘[allowing] religious notions to inform public policymaking’ (Amuchástegui et al., 2010: 997). Nonetheless, contestations between feminists and religious groups remain on doctrinal issues (e.g. abortion and divorce) that challenge deeply held religious beliefs and where the Catholic Church is more forceful in defending its space in the public sphere (Htun and Weldon, 2018). Reuterswärd (2021) explains how restrictive abortion reform failed in one state while in another it succeeded because anti-abortion movements had better access to political and economic elites through the church. Activists describe the value of developing new feminist narratives, a broader framing for advocacy goals and more pluralist discourse to meet the challenges of the current moment. In Argentina and Mexico, activists employ pluralist approaches and strategically frame their activism to garner broader public support and build coalitions. This can involve avoiding foregrounding secular language which may provoke the Catholic Church or Evangelical groups. Ni Una Menos in Argentina framed its advocacy around abortion rights as a social justice issue (e.g. emphasising the health risks of unregulated abortions). This successfully allowed activists to limit more contentious debates with
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