UN arms embargoes under scrutiny: Obstacles and options for an effective contribution to conflict resolution

Vorrath, Judith Research Report UN arms embargoes under scrutiny: Obstacles and options for an effective contribution to conflict resolution SWP Research Paper, No. 12/2024 Provided in Cooperation with: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin Suggested Citation: Vorrath, Judith (2024) : UN arms embargoes under scrutiny: Obstacles and options for an effective contribution to conflict resolution, SWP Research Paper, No. 12/2024, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, https://doi.org/10.18449/2024RP12 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/302545 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Judith Vorrath UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny Obstacles and Options for an Effective Contribution to Conflict Resolution SWP Research Paper 12 September 2024, Berlin Abstract ∎ There are still a number of UN arms embargoes in place to prevent the flow of arms and military material into conflict zones. Although the UN Security Council is not generally deadlocked on this issue, it has only taken relevant decisions to re-design the embargoes in a few cases over the last ten years. ∎ Recent amending decisions have essentially created or extended exceptions or exemptions for the security forces of the respective national government. This is intended to strengthen them against non-state armed groups. ∎ Accompanying control mechanisms are increasingly controversial – both with the countries concerned and among the members of the Security Council. At the same time, meaningful political guidance on the embargoes and their adaptation to the respective conflict situation have proven to be difficult. ∎ This study focuses primarily on the relatively active UN arms embargoes on Somalia, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. For those, it reveals overarching challenges in implementation and enforcement: a) smuggling and irregular supplies, which also reflect the increasing internationalization of conflicts, b) exceptions and exemptions for government forces where there is a high risk of weapons being diverted from official stocks, and c) increased use of technologies such as drones and improvised explosive devices, whose components would have to be controlled as dual use goods. ∎ This suggests a need for further reforms of arms embargoes. Above all, however, they need to be better linked to political processes, especially those in the affected region. Arms embargoes can also be useful to obtain access to more or better information or as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the internationally recognized government. SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Judith Vorrath UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny Obstacles and Options for an Effective Contribution to Conflict Resolution SWP Research Paper 12 September 2024, Berlin This work is licensed under CC BY 4.0 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the executive board of the Institute. They are also subject to copy-editing. For further information on our quality control procedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp-berlin.org/ en/about-swp/qualitymanagement-for-swppublications/. SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN (Print) 2747-5123 ISSN (Online) 1863-1053 DOI: 10.18449/2024RP12 (Updated English version of SWP-Studie 6/2024) Table of Contents 5 Issues and Recommendations 7 Introduction: UN Arms Embargoes in the Context of Armed Conflicts 10 UN Arms Embargoes since the Sanctions Decade 10 Reforms after the Bonn-Berlin process 14 Improved impact in the 2000s 16 Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges 16 Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes 33 Monitoring implementation: challenges and weaknesses 40 Towards a Smarter Use of UN Arms Embargoes: Starting Points and Conditions 42 Abbreviations Dr Judith Vorrath is a Senior Associate in the International Security Division at SWP. SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 5 Issues and Recommendations UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny: Obstacles and Options for an Effective Contribution to Conflict Resolution No other type of UN sanctions has been imposed as frequently as the arms embargo. Virtually all current United Nations sanctions regimes aimed at resolving armed conflicts and supporting peace processes include such an embargo. It thus remains an important part of the toolbox under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, there is little recent evidence of its impact and effectiveness. Many of the embargoes still in force are aimed at armed conflicts that have been going on for a long time and seem deadlocked. The fact that arms embargoes have been unable to change this overall situation is often seen as proof of their ineffectiveness. Findings show that various reforms in the 2000s have certainly improved compliance with and implementation of arms embargoes. However, it is not only UN sanctions that have been transformed significantly in the last ten years; the (security) political environment has also changed. This may have created new or higher hurdles that stand in the way of embargoes making an effective contribution to conflict resolution. This study therefore concentrates on how UN arms embargoes as an instrument have developed, how they are used by the Security Council, and what the challenges are in their implementation. The key question is what obstacles exist to such embargoes making an effective contribution to conflict resolution, and what leverage the instrument still offers under changing conditions. For eight of the current UN arms embargoes in conflict contexts, this study traces how they have been designed, implemented and used politically over time. In principle, UN member states are responsible for implementing them. However, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposes and designs arms embargoes and the sanctions committees as its subsidiary organs monitor their implementation. The committees also have certain decision-making powers; for example, they can place persons or entities on sanctions lists or approve supplies in accordance with exemptions to arms embargoes. The UNSC has been relatively active in four cases – including in the last ten years: the arms embargoes Issues and Recommendations SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 6 on Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR). They will be the main focus of this analysis. In these cases, the embargoes were imposed under very different circumstances, but all followed a similar pattern later. They were adapted to support an internationally recognized government in consolidating and expanding its authority in the face of only partial or unsustainable peace agreements. Their key objective is to cut the flow of weapons to non-state actors that hinder conflict resolution, while exceptions or exemptions for government security forces allow them to receive external support. This type of adaptation is based on certain expectations as to how the respective political process will develop. Where these did not materialize in the cases examined, it was difficult to respond with further changes, partly because the governments of the countries concerned are increasingly calling for the UN arms embargoes to be lifted altogether. Divergences are also growing among Security Council members as to whether and under what conditions embargoes could be lifted. A further difficulty is that the UNSC’s attention to individual armed conflicts tends to fluctuate. Depending on national interests among elected and permanent members of the body, objectives other than settling and resolving the conflict gain relevance, such as the fight against international terrorism or the expansion of spheres of influence. This may collide with the provisions of the arms embargo, especially as there are important manufacturers and suppliers of weapons and military equipment among UNSC members. Such aspects complicate the political steering of arms embargoes as a means of conflict resolution – even more reason to focus on how their implementation and enforcement can be improved. There are various starting points for this in the UN architecture, in particular through the now common monitoring by expert groups that work with the respective sanctions committee. Their reports – those which are publicly available – reveal a number of overarching challenges in the four “active” core cases being addressed in this study. First, smuggling and irregular supplies of arms and military equipment reflect how regionally and internationally intertwined the armed conflicts are. In addition, the exceptions and exemptions from the embargoes that exist for the respective government’s security forces not only make monitoring more difficult, but they can also undermine the goal of strengthening state authority, as there is a high risk in conflict areas that weapons and ammunition will be diverted from official stocks. In the conflict contexts examined, technologies such as armed or unarmed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are also increasingly being used. This makes the already difficult question of the extent to which dualuse goods are covered by UN arms embargoes even more powerful. Further need for reform can be derived from these challenges. For example, existing ambiguities in arms embargo regulations should be clarified, particularly regarding their exact scope and the exemptions provided for. Overall, however, the real obstacles to an effective contribution to conflict resolution lie elsewhere. As this analysis shows, decisions on embargoes are less about permanent blockades in the UNSC than about a lack of linkage between political goals and the respective conflict dynamics and changing conditions for peace efforts. Preventing the uncontrolled flow of weapons and other military equipment into conflict areas is still an obvious approach. However, the design of arms embargoes has to be continuously adapted to the conflict and to changes in access to military material. This is the only way in which embargoes can also be used as an effective bargaining chip. Where this option does not exist, information from UN monitoring can at least be used in other ways – for example, if the EU is considering imposing its own arms embargo or tightening an existing one in case a UN embargo is terminated or eased. Reforms after the Bonn-Berlin process SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 13 on an annual basis. 26 These limits are intended to encourage the Security Council to consider possible changes in the situation on the ground and to decide whether the embargo should be extended, suspended or adjusted. It will end if no new decision is reached. Exemptions have also become an integral part of many arms embargoes, allowing UN peacekeeping missions or other international missions to be equipped and non-lethal military equipment to be supplied for exclusively humanitarian purposes. 27 This is to prevent sanctions from restricting international support efforts, in particular peace operations by the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) or the EU as well as training missions or other international arrangements to improve the security situation. The Bonn-Berlin process identified a whole range of starting points for improving the legal and admin26 In addition, the partial lifting of the general embargo against Somalia is time-limited. 27 This was part of the recommendations of the BonnBerlin process, see Brzoska, ed., Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions (see note 12), 31. istrative basis for implementation at national level. These included, for example, making violations of UN arms embargoes a punishable offense or enacting provisions in the member states to freeze and confiscate assets from the proceeds of illegal arms supplies. 28 The extent to which these and other proposals have changed the structures and practices in the individual states is difficult to ascertain, due to a lack of systematic overviews. The majority of sanctions regimes include a call on all UN members to report on their implementation. In fact, however, only a minority of countries do so – and not at regular intervals or according to uniform standards. As a result, meaningful information on the implementation of arms embargoes is not available across the board. This is one reason why the monitoring of implementation has been gradually expanded in the UN system. At the heart of the governance structure outlined in Figure 2 that has emerged is the respective sanctions committee, which reports to the Security Council as a subsidiary body. The 15 member states of the Security Council are represented on each committee. However, decisions are made by consensus, meaning 28 Ibid., 100. Figure 2 Reforms after the Bonn-Berlin process UN Arms Embargoes since the Sanctions Decade SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 14 that non-permanent members can also prevent decisions from being made. As a rule, the committee is chaired by an elected member state. The chair can initiate consultations if there is no consensus on an issue and refer the matter to the Security Council if no decision materializes. The main purpose of the committees is to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions by the member states and to take appropriate measures if information is available about suspected cases of non-compliance or violations of measures. The committees are supported by the UN Secretariat. UN Panels of Experts (PoEs) were also introduced in the 2000s to better monitor sanctions. Essentially, they collect, review and analyse information on the implementation of sanctions and on individuals and entities that could be listed under a specific regime. The PoEs report regularly to the committee and can also make recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. The creation of these expert panels was a key reform, as their investigations and recommendations provide the sanctions committee with valuable information and hold member states more accountable, particularly through naming and shaming. 29 The PoEs also helped to improve the UN sanctions system and the understanding of sanctions, especially in states with low capacities. Current UN regimes aimed at conflict resolution include such expert groups or monitoring teams – which also include specific arms expertise if an arms embargo has been imposed. 30 To enforce embargoes, the Security Council frequently authorizes member states to inspect on their territory suspicious cargo towards the target area and to confiscate and dispose of prohibited weapons, ammunition or other military equipment seized in the process – instead of simply sending the shipment back, for example. In certain cases, such as Somalia and Libya, the UNSC has also authorized other member states or regional organizations to inspect suspicious ships off the coasts of these states. Some UN peacekeeping missions also have a mandate to monitor the implementation of arms embargoes in cooperation with the PoEs. This can include – 29 In principle, secondary sanctions can also be imposed on states in case of persistent violations, although this has only happened twice so far in the UN context: against Eritrea and Liberia. 30 Amongst these, only the Iraq embargo is not monitored by an expert panel. as, for example, in the DRC and CAR – the confiscation and collection of weapons and other goods that were imported in violation of the embargo. The involvement of peacekeeping missions in the implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes was also an important concern of the Bonn-Berlin process. 31 Although the adjustments and changes outlined above did not always go as far as the original reform recommendations, UN arms embargoes have developed substantially since the 1990s. But have they also become more effective as a result? Improved impact in the 2000s Overall, the effectiveness of arms embargoes and other sanctions remains controversial. 32 This is partly because different assessment criteria are used. Even if sanctions fail to achieve the central goal of changing the behaviour of targeted actors, they can still lead to other desired results. If implemented consistently, arms embargoes can at least limit a conflict – just as economic sanctions can limit the ability of certain actors or countries to wage war. 33 In fact, various studies suggest that the effect of arms embargoes has been improved by the reforms. UN and other multilateral embargoes have in some cases significantly reduced the arms imports of affected states and groups. 34 The success rate – measured by significant changes in arms import behaviour – was also significantly higher when the embargoes were 31 Brzoska, ed., Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions (see note 12), 116f. 32 Parts of the following section were published in Judith Vorrath, “The Evolution of UN Arms Embargoes in Conflict Settings: Stumbling Blocks to Effective Implementation”, in Multilateral Sanctions Revisited: Lessons Learned from Margaret Doxey, ed. Andrea Charron and Clara Portela (Montreal & Kingston, London, and Chicago: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2022), 133–47. 33 Margaret Doxey, “Sanctions through the Looking Glass: The Spectrum of Goals and Achievements”, International Journal 2, no. 55 (2000): 207–23 (220). 34 Michael Brzoska and George A. Lopez, “Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Policy Conclusions for Effective Arms Embargoes”, in Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes, ed. idem, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, vol. 10 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2009), 243–54 (243). Improved impact in the 2000s SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 15 part of a package of sanctions. 35 This underlines that it was an important step to move away from standalone UN arms embargoes. However, as expected, the success rate proved to be much lower when target behaviour rather than actual arms imports was used as a criterion. 36 Of course, reducing imports does not mean stopping the flow of weapons, ammunition and military aid to conflict zones. If official arms deals are banned, non-state actors can step in to compensate for the ban with supplies via the black market. Certain UN member states may also prefer to ignore embargoes for political or economic reasons and (continue to) supply arms and military material. In other cases, they may simply not prevent deliveries and transfers. This can be due to a lack of capacity, as many countries do not have effective systems to control the export and transit of goods. However, there can of course also be political reasons for directly or indirectly undermining an embargo. Such interests have to be weighed against the costs of violations of arms embargoes or non-compliance with them. Whether the measure is effectively monitored and enforced continues to depend heavily on influential states that produce and trade in weapons themselves. 37 The five permanent members of the UNSC are also the states in which the companies with the highest arms revenues are based. 38 A study on the export behaviour of states showed that their transfers were indeed restricted by arms embargoes. In the case of multilateral embargoes, external enforcement mechanisms did not even appear to be necessary for the supplying states to comply with the ban. 39 This indicates a political 35 Michael Brzoska, Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes, Paper Originally Presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association 2007, Chicago, 28 February – 3 March 2007, 14. 36 Fruchart et al., United Nations Arms Embargoes (see note 5), 40. 37 David Cortright, George A. Lopez and Linda Gerber, Sanctions Sans Commitment: An Assessment of UN Arms Embargoes (Waterloo, ON: Project Ploughshares, 2002), 11. 38 SIPRI, The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2022, SIPRI Fact Sheet (Solna, December 2023), 5, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-11/fs_2312_top_ 100_2022.pdf (accessed 5 December 2023). 39 Jennifer L. Erickson, “Stopping the Legal Flow of Weapons: Compliance with Arms Embargoes, 1981–2004”, Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 2 (2013): 159–74 (168). binding effect, although that effect appears to have weakened in the final years of the period under review. This points to a central problem that arises when trying to assess the impact and effectiveness of arms embargoes – many of the available findings date back to the 2000s. At that time, there were indications that the embargoes were becoming more effective, even if their ultimate objectives remained unachieved. 40 However, the situation has changed in many respects since then. To assess the current challenges in the design and implementation of arms embargoes – and thus their effects – it is necessary to analyse how decision-making and practice within the UN framework have evolved more recently. 40 Brzoska, “Gezielte Sanktionen als Mittel der Konflikteinhegung in Afrika” (see note 15), 214. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 16 The UNSC is not only responsible for imposing arms embargoes but also for changing or lifting them. As has been shown, their design has evolved significantly. However, each individual case differs from others – if only in whether and how the UNSC adapts the embargo over time. The first part of this chapter deals with such adjustments in the context of the respective objective – i.e. the question of what the arms embargo is intended to achieve in the relevant conflict context and which overarching political goals it is intended to support. Another key point is the monitoring of the embargo by the PoEs supporting the respective sanctions committee. Their reports, as well as the use that is made of them, point to very specific obstacles to implementation and enforcement. The second part of this chapter therefore analyses key findings on arms embargoes that have emerged from expert panel reports since 2015. 41 The ongoing UN arms embargoes in conflict contexts, which are listed in Figure 3, form the basis for the following analysis. The South Sudan embargo is excluded because it has only existed for a relatively short time. As the list shows, the arms embargoes actually differ significantly in their design and relevant provisions. 41 The database for these analyses and the associated figures is freely accessible at GESIS under DOI 10.7802/2673. I would like to thank Maria Dellasega and Laura Marcela Zuñiga for their active and competent support in collecting and evaluating various data sources, including the PoE reports. I would also like to thank Michael Brzoska and Sascha Lohmann for their very helpful and constructive comments on earlier drafts. As the author, I am of course responsible for all content. Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes This study assumes that the concrete implementation of sanctions and their use as a political instrument are closely linked. It is true that sanctions can also have an impact without being effectively implemented, for example if targeted persons or groups perceive their mere imposition as stigmatizing. But even then, at certain critical points in a conflict, the question will arise whether the UNSC must adapt or (partially) lift the sanctions. Many of the existing conflict-related regimes with arms embargoes have been in place for a long time. When regimes were ended – such as those for Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire in 2016 – this followed conflict settlements and political transition phases that were considered relatively successful. The current UN regimes relate primarily to protracted violent conflicts that have so far eluded a lasting solution, which is often seen as evidence of the failure of the measures adopted. As only relatively few new sanctions regimes have been adopted (six in the last ten years), 42 the particularly complicated cases may be those remaining. However, it is also conceivable that the UNSC is less and less willing or able to use this instrument effectively and adapt it to changing conditions. This would result in “gesture sanctions”, 43 which continue to exist primarily for symbolic purposes, without compliance necessarily being expected. The first step is therefore to determine how the Security Council has actually used arms embargoes as an instrument over the last ten years. The changes to 42 I.e. from 2013 to the end of 2022. 43 Doxey, “Sanctions through the Looking Glass” (see note 33), 213. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 17 the embargoes (see Figure 4, p. 13) 44 will serve as a guide and will subsequently be placed in the political context and the responses to the respective violent conflicts. Symbolic arms embargoes? When the UNSC is largely inactive Iraq In the case of some arms embargoes, the UNSC has been largely inactive, as Figure 4 shows. Under the Iraq regime, there has been no change since an exception was granted in 2004, allowing supplies to the government and multinational forces. This regime, which followed the UN comprehensive trade restrictions against Iraq in the wake of the Gulf crisis of 1990–91, represents the shift towards more targeted sanctions in the UN system. However, it has been 44 A distinction is made between “exemptions”, which require notification of or approval by the respective sanctions committee and “exceptions”, which do not require submission to the committee. largely irrelevant for years. There have been virtually no meetings of the committee since 2007; the main decisions taken were mainly to remove individuals and entities from the sanctions list after written submission by the Focal Point for Delisting. 45 Together with the recovery of Iraqi funds abroad, the possibilities and ways of delisting also were the central concern of an Iraqi delegation that met with the committee in 2019. 46 The arms embargo, on the other hand, did not really play a role, most likely because the government has been excepted from it – without specific control requirements. 45 See annual reports of the UN sanctions committee, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1518/annualreports (accessed 5 December 2023). 46 UNSC, “Members of 1518 Sanctions committee Meet with Iraqi Delegation”, SC/13670, press release, 18 January 2019, https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13670.doc.htm (accessed 10 January 2023). Figure 3 Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 18 Sudan There has also been little activity on the UN arms embargo on Sudan in the last ten years. This is mainly due to diverging positions among the P5. From the outset, the embargo applied exclusively to the Darfur region. Efforts to extend it to the entire territory of Sudan were unsuccessful, mainly due to the split in the Security Council. This was already evident in the voting process that led to the imposition of the arms embargo in 2004. 47 China and Russia also abstained when the embargo was extended to all warring parties in Darfur and the Sudanese government was obliged to obtain prior authorization for arms transfers to the region. Representatives of both states subsequently emphasized that arms supplies to Sudan were still possible without violating the embargo, as the government there was responsible for approvals. 48 This points to a glaring loophole in the embargo. The 2022 PoE report simply states that violations of the arms embargo continued unhindered and that the committee had not received any corresponding applications or notifications from the government regarding arms supplies. 49 According to a former member of the expert panel, the division between the members of the Security Council in the case of Sudan means that the sanctions were primarily intended to maintain the illusion that the UN was acting decisively in Darfur. 50 Recently, there have been increasingly controversial debates in the UNSC about the conditions under which the sanctions could be lifted. The criteria for their review, which were outlined in a report by the UN Secretary-General, have been rejected by the country’s military government, which was installed following the coup in 2021, as impossible to fulfil. Its ambassador blamed the embargo for encouraging “rogue armed transboundary bands to disrupt peace and order in Darfur”. 51 In the UNSC, China and 47 Thomas Dörfler, Security Council Sanctions Governance: The Power and Limits of Rules (New York, 2019), 151. 48 Ibid., 155. 49 UNSC, S/2022/48, 3 (access to reports of the PoEs in the United Nations Electronic Document Archive at https:// documents.un.org). 50 Jérôme Tubiana, “The Diary of a Former Sanctions Buster”, openDemocracy, 2 October2012, https://www. opendemocracy.net/en/diary-of-former-sanctions-buster/ (accessed 11 January 2023). 51 “Sudan Demands United Nations Immediately Lift Arms Embargo”, AP News, 4 February 2023, https://apnews.com/ article/politics-sudan-government-united-nations-793ec Russia, as well as the three elected members of the African Group of States (A3) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), spoke out in favour of considering an unconditional lifting of the embargo, as demanded by the Sudanese government. 52 Overall, the discussions remained deadlocked, and the arms embargo ultimately had mainly symbolic significance in the tug-of-war over the future of the sanctions in a deteriorating political and security environment. Targeted arms embargoes: Taliban/Afghanistan and Yemen Two other arms embargoes that appear largely inactive in Figure 4 are those on the Taliban and Yemen. This is unsurprising as they are targeted embargoes, applying to persons and entities that are on the respective sanctions list. In the first case, these are persons and entities designated as Taliban or persons and groups associated with them; in Yemen, the leadership of the Houthi rebels and associated persons and, since February 2022, also the Houthi as a group. The scope of the respective arms embargo therefore changes as a result of listings or delistings made by the sanctions committee or Security Council. Accordingly, there are no exceptions or exemptions decided by the UNSC, which are common in other cases. Potentially, the Taliban embargo (with 135 individuals and five entities) has a much greater reach than the one against the Houthi (with twelve individuals and one entity, both as of January 2023). The key point, however, is that both embargoes are aimed at a specific party to the conflict. This is not only in line with the approach of using UN sanctions in a more targeted manner, but de facto means taking sides. Leaving underlying political objectives aside, this move is also based on the assumption that asymmetric arms embargoes are more likely to lead to the desired result. Sanctioned groups usually fall behind militarily in the conflict if the other side 3544dd486c96bc28fe3f0014fe2 (accessed February 7, 2023). Also see: Letter dated 27 January 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2023/67, 30 January 2023: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7 B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S202367.pdf (accessed 12 August 2024). 52 In March 2023, the UNSC instated a time-limit on the sanctions, including the arms embargo, for the first time as part of a compromise. Security Council Report (SCR), What’s in Blue, Sudan Sanctions: Vote on Draft Resolution, 8 March 2023, https://tinyurl.com/27zvae9w (accessed 7 September 2023). Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 19 can continue to receive weapons and military material. External military interventions are also more promising under these conditions. 53 In fact, the relevance of the arms embargo differs in the two cases. The sanctions regime against the Taliban was created because they supported transnational terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it was expanded to include targeted sanctions against Osama bin Laden and members and offshoots of Al-Qaida (and later ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). The focus was therefore initially on counter-terrorism before the Taliban sanctions list was separated in 2011 to support the Afghan peace process. 54 During negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar, led by the USA, the sanctions repeatedly played a role. Their lifting remained one of the Taliban’s recurring demands, as they saw the measures as a stigma and an obstacle to their political activities. As their willingness to engage in real negotiations and reconciliation remained extremely questionable 55 and the violence in Afghanistan continued to increase, 56 new listings were indeed issued – in addition to some delistings. These also applied to the targeted arms embargo, but ultimately they were primarily relevant to the travel ban and the assets freeze, which were also the focus of the Monitoring Team’s 57 recommendations during this phase. 58 The arms embargo in its targeted form was particularly difficult to control, meaning that the new designations did not matter much. There were also increasing rifts between the P5 in the UNSC when it came to categorizing the key threats in Afghanistan. 59 When the Taliban took power in August 2021, the overarching objectives of the sanctions became obsolete, but 53 Brzoska and Lopez, “Putting Teeth in the Tiger” (see note 34), 245. 54 Dörfler, Security Council Sanctions Governance (see note 47), 93. 55 See, among others, SCR, June 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/202106/afghanistan-12.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 56 This included attacks by the Taliban and also by Al-Qaida and Islamic State. 57 In the case of the Taliban regime an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team was set up, which also supports the sanctions committee on ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida. 58 See inter alia recommendations in this report: UNSC, S/2012/971, 3. 59 SCR, March 2017 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-03/afghanistan_20. php (accessed 25 January 2024). not the sanctions themselves. In the first weeks and months, the Taliban appointed numerous people to the cabinet and other high-ranking positions who were on the UN sanctions list. 60 How to deal with this and with the exceptions from the travel ban for the Taliban was the subject of controversial debate. 61 Under the given circumstances, the targeted arms embargo had little concrete significance; at most, it could probably come into play again as a bargaining chip when it comes to future relations with the Taliban government. In the case of non-state actors, the lifting of an embargo cannot be used as an incentive to negotiate. In Yemen, the aim of the arms embargo is similar, but the situation regarding implementation and enforcement is different. The focus on the Houthi rebels is intended to support the government recognized as legitimate. This is particularly in the interests of the Security Council members USA, Great Britain and France (P3), to push back the influence of the Houthis as well as their main ally, Iran. A regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia, with logistical support from the US and the UK, has also been backing the Yemeni government militarily, including with airstrikes. Observers have thus been calling this a proxy war. 62 The USA and Saudi Arabia were keen to maintain strict control of the air and sea routes. A blockade was imposed on Houthi-ruled areas in 2015, justified in particular with the need to enforce the arms embargo. 60 UNSC, S/2022/419, 3; SCR, November 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthlyforecast/2021-11/afghanistan-14.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 61 SCR, September 2022 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-09/ afghanistan-18.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 62 Kali Robinson, “Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering” (New York and Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 21 October 2022), https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/yemen-crisis (accessed 16 January 2023). Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 20 Figure 4 Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 21 In fact, large quantities of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment have repeatedly been seized, for example in January 2023, when the US Navy intercepted a fishing boat in the Gulf of Oman en route to Yemen that was carrying more than 2,000 assault rifles. 63 However, the competent PoE pointed out that the coalition and the government it supported also contributed to the spread of weapons in Yemen, which then ended up or could end up in the hands of the Houthis. 64 In 2016, the panel had already proposed that the Security Council make the delivery of weapons and military material for security forces under the control of the Yemeni government conditional on the sanctions committee being given advance information. 65 However, no such adjustment was made. For years, Resolution 2216 of 2015 remained the basis for action, a fact which was increasingly seen as an obstacle to peace efforts, not just concerning the arms embargo. 66 More recent listings also referred exclusively to the Houthi. This did not change when the parties to the conflict became fragmented – including on the government side. There was recurring dissent in the UNSC; Moscow repeatedly criticized a biased position towards the Houthi. As a rule, however, Russia abstained as a permanent member when new listings were put to the vote – and even voted in favour when the Houthi were added to the list as a “terrorist group”. In contrast to Afghanistan, there was a neighbouring country that had a vital interest in enforcing the UN arms embargo – namely Saudi Arabia, which borders directly on the areas that have been controlled by the Houthi over a longer period of time. The targeted embargo therefore was actually relevant, even if the Houthi still have access to weapons and other material. In a negotiation process, however, it can only be used to a limited extent as a means of working towards conflict resolution. This is because lifting the embargo (or delisting actors) specifically as an incentive is not an option for non-state groups. It 63 “US Naval Forces Seize Vessel with AK-47 Assault Rifles for Houthis in Yemen”, Naval News, 11 January 2023, https:// navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-newsarchive/2023/january/12694-us-naval-forces-seize-vessel-withak-47-assault-rifles-for-houthis-in-yemen.html (accessed 19 January 2023). 64 See UNSC, S/2018/192, 26 January 2016. 65 Ibid., 49f. 66 SCR, September 2019 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-09/yemen10.php (accessed 25 January 2024). is possible to extend a targeted to a general arms embargo, but this has not occurred – in the case of this or other existing targeted arms embargoes. 67 Embargoes as a means of conflict resolution? When the UNSC makes adjustments The changes to the UN arms embargoes shown in Figure 4 suggest that the Security Council has been quite active in some cases over the last ten years. In the following section, these adjustments for Somalia, DRC, Libya and CAR are placed in their respective contexts, particularly with regard to decision-making and positions in the Security Council as well as the link with other measures. Somalia The arms embargo on Somalia is not only the longest existing among the current ones, but it was also the only UN sanction in this context until 2008. Its ineffectiveness was attributed inter alia to the fact that it “became a substitute for an active policy on Somalia following the failure of peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s.” 68 It was also only with the authorization of AMISOM, an AU peace operation, that the UNSC made a significant change to the arms embargo in 2007. It was lifted for weapons and equipment intended for use by AMISOM or for the development of the Somali security sector; in the latter case the supplying states had to inform the sanctions committee. 69 This was intended to support the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had been in place since 2004, particularly with regard to combating the Al-Shabaab militia, which was seen as the main threat to peace and security. This line had in fact been pursued earlier already. At the end of 2006, for example, the UNSC failed to 67 In the case of Somalia, in addition to the general and partially lifted arms embargo, there is also a targeted one which was adopted later. The extension to a general arms embargo in the case of Haiti did not take place until 2023, see note 4. 68 SCR, Anatomy of a Sanctions Regime: A Case Study of Sixteen Years of Failed Efforts to Effectively Implement Sanctions in Somalia, Special Research Report, 2008, no. 4 (16 September 2008), 2. 69 UNSC, “Security Council Authorizes Six-month African Union Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1744 (2007)”, SC/8960, press release, 20 February 2007, https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc8960.doc.htm (accessed 25 January 2024). Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 22 formally condemn a military intervention by Ethiopia alongside the TFG, even though it had to be considered as a violation of the arms embargo. 70 During this phase, the UNSC became more active, in particular by imposing targeted sanctions (travel ban, assets freeze, targeted arms embargo) by unanimous decision in 2008. In 2009, the regime was also extended to Eritrea to punish the country for supporting armed groups in Somalia, particularly Al-Shabaab. 71 This secondary sanction and the treatment of Eritrea were highly controversial and subsequently a recurring bone of contention in the Security Council. Over the last ten years, there have been a whole series of changes to the arms embargo. After AlShabaab had been pushed back, there was still a basic consensus in the UNSC to strengthen the central government in Somalia. However, positions on specific measures diverged, especially when it came to the arms embargo. This was evident when it was partially lifted in 2013, partly in reaction to criticism from the Somali government that, despite existing exemptions, the embargo was hindering the fight against Al-Shabaab, which was now associated with Al-Qaida. The USA strongly supported the partial lifting, while a majority of Security Council members including European states, were far more sceptical in view of the lack of control exercised by the Somali government. 72 Ultimately, certain conditions that applied to supplies and military support were not only retained, but partly extended. 73 In particular, the lifting was limited to twelve months and the Somali government was obliged to report regularly on the structure of the national security forces and on the registration, storage and distribution of weapons. 74 Shortly after this adjustment, the Obama administration decided that Somalia could receive military support from the 70 Pieter D. Wezeman, Arms Flows and the Conflict in Somalia, SIPRI Background Paper (Solna: SIPRI, October 2010), 5ff. 71 Another reason for the sanctions was Eritrea’s armed confrontation with Djibouti. UNSC, “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Eritrea over Its Role in Somalia, Refusal to Withdraw Troops Following Conflict with Djibouti”, SC/9833, press release, 23 December 2009, https://press.un. org/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm (accessed 25 January 2024). 72 SCR, March 2013 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-03/somalia_5.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 73 SIPRI, SIPRI Databases/Arms Embargoes, UN Arms Embargo on Somalia, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_ arms_embargoes/somalia (accessed 11 August 2023). 74 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2093 (2013), 6 March 2013. USA. 75 When Al-Shabaab subsequently committed massive attacks, the focus on fighting it intensified, including through AMISOM, which carried out operations together with the Somali army. In addition, Kenya and the USA launched air strikes against Al-Shabaab. 76 Washington later admitted that it had maintained a limited military presence of up to 120 soldiers in Somalia since 2007. 77 Against this backdrop, the partial lift was extended after one year, although the monitoring team found that the Somali government was clearly violating the requirements. 78 However, further reporting obligations were introduced for the government at the beginning of 2014, for example on the distribution of imported weapons. 79 In addition, the UNSC authorized a Maritime Interdiction Force the same year, which has been renewed annually since then. The Force is also meant to monitor the ban on charcoal exports, which was primarily aimed at depriving Al-Shabaab of revenue. 80 Although the installed Combined Maritime Forces have found weapons and ammunition, their operations are considered less effective than those used to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. 81 In addition, findings or reports of violations rarely had meaningful consequences. The number of listings under the Somalia regime remained at a low level with a total of 20 (as at the end of 2022); 82 only three of these were based on a violation of the arms embargo. 83 75 SCR, May 2013 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-05/somalia_7.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 76 SCR, March 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www.secu ritycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-03/somalia_13. php (accessed 25 January 2024). 77 SCR, October 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-10/ somalia_15.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 78 See comments in chapter “Monitoring embargo implementation: challenges and weaknesses”, p. 41. 79 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2142 (2014), 5 March 2014. 80 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2182 (2014), 24 October 2014. 81 Magne Frostad, “United Nations Authorized Embargoes and Maritime Interdiction: A Special Focus on Somalia”, in The Future of the Law of the Sea Bridging Gaps between National, Individual and Common Interests, ed. Gemma Andreone (Cham, 2017), 2013–37. 82 This includes Al-Shabaab as a group. 83 See “Sanctions List Materials” on Somalia, https://www. un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials (as at the end of 2022). Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 29 Central African Republic (CAR) Unlike in the case of Libya, the UNSC’s approach in the Central African Republic (CAR) was initially rather passive after conflicts broke out. The primary focus was on supporting regional mediation efforts. In March 2013, Séléka rebels – an alliance of several armed groups – seized the capital Bangui after an agreement with the government collapsed, and the incumbent President François Bozizé fled into exile. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) then initiated a transition process, which included the formation of a transitional council. 158 The imposition of the UN arms embargo marked the beginning of a phase of greater Security Council activity. Further targeted sanctions were also threatened. 159 In this phase, there were increasing warnings of a complete erosion of the situation to the point of genocide. Christian-oriented “anti-Balaka” militias formed against the Muslim-oriented Séléka forces, which had officially been dissolved but remained active (referred to below as the ex-Séléka). 160 In view of these circumstances, calls for a UN peacekeeping mission became more insistent. However, as there was no consensus in the Security Council, France was initially authorized to deploy additional troops to support the existing AU mission beyond the 400 forces already stationed in the country. 161 In January 2014, the EU decided on an additional military mission of up to 1,000 soldiers, primarily to relieve the French troops. In the same Resolution that authorized the EU mission, the Security Council expanded the sanctions regime, so that individuals and entities could be targeted by the committee. 162 In April, it was finally decided to transform the AU operation into a UN mission (MINUSCA). Shortly afterwards, the sanctions committee designated the first persons – in addition to former President Bozizé, one leader of the Séléka and one leader of the anti158 SCR, July 2013 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-07/expected_ council_action_in_july.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 159 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2127 (2013), 5 December 2013, para. 56. 160 SCR, December 2013 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-12/central_ african_republic_3.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 161 SCR, January 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-01/central_ african_republic_4.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 162 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2134(2014)*, 28 January 2014. Balaka. 163 During this phase, the UNSC faced the dilemma of how to hold actors accountable for their behaviour while at the same time finding channels of communication with the armed groups. 164 In addition to a ceasefire – which was to remain very fragile – the Brazzaville Agreement concluded in July 2014 agreed, amongst other things, on a government of national unity and the planning of parliamentary and presidential elections. 165 From the outset, the arms embargo allowed for the supply of weapons and lethal equipment to the CAR security forces as part of a security sector reform (SSR) and following prior approval by the committee. 166 This corresponded with the goal of strengthening state authority, which MINUSCA was also mandated to support. In addition, the EU established a military advisory mission in CAR as a successor to its expiring mission. 167 Apparently, most of the armed groups’ equipment at this time came from state arsenals, so the committee sent a letter to the CAR government demanding for better management of official weapons stocks. 168 The government had already called for the embargo to be lifted in August 2015. However, given the gaps in securing weapons, there was no consensus in the UNSC to relax the requirements. 169 Despite an agreement that provided for their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, members of some groups were still carrying out violence against the civilian population and engaging in criminal activities. 170 The committee subsequently decided on further listings – initiated by France, the UK and the USA, among 163 SCR, June 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-06/central_african_ republic_5.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 164 SCR, July 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-07/central_african_ republic_6.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 165 SCR, September 2014 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-09/ central_african_republic_8.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 166 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2127 (2013), 5 December 2013. 167 SCR, April 2015 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-04/central_ african_republic_11.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 168 SCR, What’s in Blue, Central African Republic Sanctions Committee Activities, 26 August 2015, https://www.security councilreport.org/whatsinblue/2015/08/central-africanrepublic-sanctions.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 169 Ibid. 170 SCR, August 2015 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-08/central_ african_republic_13.php (accessed 25 January 2024). Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 30 others – in response to a renewed escalation of violence in Bangui ahead of a referendum and the elections, which were later postponed. 171 According to the expert panel, the arms embargo was also used as a pretext for blaming the UN for the ongoing violence in the CAR. The conduct of the elections was controversial, including in the UNSC. However, former Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was ultimately confirmed as the new president by the Constitutional Court in March 2016, and the National Assembly was constituted in May after renewed parliamentary elections. 172 Yet, hopes for a positive development remained unfulfilled, and the Security Council’s attention to the CAR waned. 173 While efforts to establish a peace process at regional level continued, it was still primarily up to MINUSCA to ensure security. However, the mission increasingly became the target not only of attacks by armed groups, but also of protests accompanied by demands for an end to the arms embargo. 174 The new CAR government repeatedly declared that the embargo had to be lifted to compensate for disadvantages vis-à-vis armed groups. In fact, the PoE noted at the time that the ex-Séléka, for example, were benefiting from arms smuggling from Sudan and the DRC. 175 However, the panel emphasized that the existing exemption made it possible to equip the national security forces, suspecting that the arms embargo also served as a pretext for blaming the UN 171 SCR, January 2016 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-01/central_ african_republic_14.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 172 SCR, April 2016 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-04/central_ african_republic_15.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 173 SCR, June 2017 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-06/central_ african_republic_21.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 174 SCR, January 2017 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/central_ african_republic_19.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 175 SCR, October 2016 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-10/central_ african_republic_17.php (accessed 25 January 2024). for the ongoing violence. 176 At this point, the Security Council was still unwilling to allow the embargo to expire. 177 But its continued existence became increasingly controversial – as did the role of MINUSCA and other external security actors that were gaining in importance. Based on a bilateral agreement on security cooperation, Russia deployed military trainers to the CAR from 2018 onwards and notified the UN sanctions committee. However, fighters and weapons from the Russian mercenary group Wagner also entered the country. 178 Moscow strongly supported the lifting or at least easing of the embargo, while the P3 in particular insisted that the state of the security sector in the CAR did not allow either. During the extension of sanctions, it was agreed that clear benchmarks should be established, according to which the UNSC could review the embargo. In addition, the UN Secretary-General should assess progress according to them. 179 A peace agreement brokered by the AU was concluded in early 2019. However, several armed groups soon withdrew from the newly formed government, forcing the president to reshuffle the cabinet so that all groups would be represented; subsequently, violence repeatedly broke out at the hands of various signatory parties. 180 However, there were no further targeted sanctions while the arms embargo was eased. The progress report had stated that there was an arms imbalance between the government and the rebels, 176 SCR, October 2017 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-10/central_ african_republic_22.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 177 SCR, July 2016 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-07/central_african_ republic_16.php (accessed 25 January 2024); SCR, January 2017 Monthly Forecast, https://www.securitycouncilreport. org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/central_african_republic_19. php (accessed 25 January 2024). 178 Dirk Druet, Wagner Group Poses Fundamental Challenges for the Protection of Civilians by UN Peacekeeping Operations, IPI Global Observatory (New York: International Peace Institute, 20 March 2023), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/03/ wagner-group-protection-of-civilians-un-peacekeepingoperations/ (accessed 25 January 2024). 179 SCR, What’s in Blue, Central African Republic Sanctions Regime Mandate Renewal, 30 January 2019, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/01/centralafrican-republic-sanctions-committee-mandate-renewal.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 180 SCR, June 2019 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-06/central-africanrepublic-2.php (accessed 25 January 2024). Political framework: Decisions of the Security Council on current embargoes SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 31 which created the impression that the embargo put the government at a disadvantage. The exemption was adjusted to the effect that only notifications to the committee and no prior approvals were required to supply weapons of certain types to the national security forces. 181 However, further dissent emerged in the positions of some permanent UNSC members, particularly between France and Russia. This dynamic continued with upcoming extensions. After mostly protracted negotiations, the embargo was gradually eased by granting exemptions for additional types of weapons, ammunition and equipment. 182 The security situation in the CAR remained precarious, and the implementation of the 2019 peace agreement stalled time and again. In April 2020, seven of the 14 armed groups among the signatories suspended their participation in the government, and violence escalated in some parts of the country. The UNSC responded by listing two leaders of armed groups in April and August 2020. 183 A new dynamic emerged when the “Coalition of Patriots for Change” (CPC) was founded – an alliance of partly rival rebel groups whose aim was to disrupt the elections due at the end of 2020. The vote was finally prevented by violence in around 40 percent of constituencies. Despite the restrictions and opposition protests, the Constitutional Court ultimately confirmed the victory of incumbent Touadéra. However, the violence continued, including attacks on various towns, some of which were repelled by MINUSCA together with the national armed forces (FACA). 184 181 SCR, October 2019 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-10/centralafrican-republic-3.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 182 In July 2023, the notification requirements for supplies to government forces were lifted completely, see UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2693 (2023), 27 July 2023, paras. 1 and 2. Russia and China abstained because they demanded a complete lifting of the embargo, see UNSC, “Security Council Extends Arms Embargo on Central African Republic, Mandate of Expert Panel, Adopting Resolution 2693 (2023) by 13 Votes in Favor, 2 Abstentions”, SC/15369, press release, 27 July 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15369.doc.htm (accessed 7 September 2023). 183 UNSC, The List Established and Maintained Pursuant to Security Council Res. 2127 (2013), https://scsanctions.un.org/ wq7bk-en-car.html (accessed 8 September 2023). 184 SCR, February 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-02/centralafrican-republic-10.php (accessed 25 January 2024). Both the government and the UN mission suspected ex-President Bozizé, who had returned from exile and was not eligible for the elections, of making common cause with the armed groups in order to take power. 185 In any case, CPC forces surrounded the capital Bangui in January 2021; they were pushed back mainly with the help of Russian and Rwandan troops. 186 From the national government’s perspective, the arms embargo was primarily a misguided effort by the UN, as weapons and fighters continued to enter the CAR via the borders with neighbouring countries. The P3 and some elected Security Council members placed conditions on the support for the government, which included a reform of the security sector. They also insisted on monitoring whether security actors were respecting human rights. The extensions of MINUSCA’s mandate and of the arms embargo regularly led to controversy on these points. In addition, the African members of the UNSC at the time also increasingly spoke out in favour of lifting the embargo. 187 What was particularly relevant, however, was that Russia expanded its political and economic involvement in the CAR. 188 After the attack on Bangui, Russian forces had become a kind of guarantee of survival for the country’s government; they increasingly influenced the operations of the national security forces or were active independently of them. 189 This had far-reaching consequences. According to reports by the UN Secretary-General, there were targeted threats and hostilities against MINUSCA by national security forces and bilaterally deployed security per185 “Central African Republic: A Disputed Election and a Strange Rebel Alliance”, BBC News, 7 January 2021, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55558642 (accessed 8 September 2023). 186 SCR, February 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-02/centralafrican-republic-10.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 187 SCR, What’s in Blue, Central African Republic: Vote on a Draft Resolution Extending the Sanctions Regime, 29 July 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/07/ central-african-republic-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-extendingthe-sanctions-regime.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 188 Julia Stanyard, Thierry Vircoulon and Julian Rademeyer, The Grey Zone: Russia’s Military, Mercenary and Criminal Engagement in Africa (Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, February 2023), 58. 189 Ibid., 50. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 32 sonnel 190 (the latter commonly a synonym for Wagner forces), and the USA also expressed strong criticism. Russia, however, rejected the accusations. 191 France, in turn, suspended military cooperation with the CAR and budget support for the country in 2021 – citing an obvious disinformation campaign by the CAR government. 192 In addition, evidence of human rights violations by the FACA and “bilateral forces” accumulated in the course of various investigations. 193 The EU imposed sanctions against the Wagner Group in December 2021 and suspended its training mission in the CAR shortly afterwards. 194 The UNSC meetings were correspondingly tense, and the arms embargo remained a central point of conflict, while insecurity increased, especially in the border areas of the country. 195 Conclusion In the four cases discussed – Somalia, DRC, Libya and the CAR – the respective arms embargoes were imposed under very different circumstances, but they have followed a similar pattern over the last ten years. Their emphasis is on cutting off non-state actors that hinder conflict resolution from the flow of arms and military material. At the same time, the internationally recognized government is supported in consolidating and expanding its authority in the face of only partial or unsustainable peace agreements. Therefore exemptions for governments have 190 See e.g. UNSC, Report by the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, S/2021/867, 12 October 2021, 12+16: https:// www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_867_E.pdf (accessed 27 August 2024). 191 SCR, July 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2021-07/central-africanrepublic-12.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 192 Ibid. 193 SCR, What’s in Blue, Central African Republic: Vote on Renewing the Sanctions Regime, 28 July 2021, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/07/centralafrican-republic-vote-on-renewing-the-sanctions-regime.php (accessed 25 January 2024); SCR, November 2021 Monthly Forecast, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthlyforecast/2021-11/central-african-republic-14.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 194 SCR, February 2022 Monthly Forecast, https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-02/centralafrican-republic-15.php (accessed 25 January 2024). 195 SCR, July 2023 Monthly Forecast, https://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-07/central-africanrepublic-21.php (accessed 25 January 2024). been introduced to enable them to strengthen their security forces while at the same time controlling the inflow of military goods – under the supervision of the sanctions committee. The prospect of lifting an arms embargo can be used to pressure a government into reforms in the security sector. Attempts to support peace through the arms embargoes encountered various obstacles. First, the adjustments to the embargoes were linked to certain assumptions or expectations as to how the political process would develop. If these did not materialize, it was difficult to respond again with changes. In general, it is a challenge to effectively combine UN sanctions with mediation efforts. 196 The special feature of arms embargoes is that they primarily offer potential leverage over the respective recognized authorities, as certain incentives can be created through (partial) liftings or exemptions. This option does not exist for non-state armed groups that are subject to the embargo, since the aim during a conflict settlement and peace process is precisely to disarm and demobilize them. At the same time, if the embargo was to be tightened (again) for the respective government, this could be interpreted as a withdrawal of trust or as calling the respective peace process into question. This has therefore only occurred once in the last ten years in the cases examined: in 2014, with the arms embargo on Libya. The prospect of a lifting can be used to push for concrete reforms by the government in the security sector. However, there are increasingly divergent views among the P5 on whether and how conditions should be imposed. In addition, the respective national governments sometimes vehemently criticize the conditions set under embargo exemptions. Under these circumstances, the tendency to further ease or lift arms embargoes for government forces continues, as the most recent decision on the CAR arms embargo shows. 197 196 In detail: Thomas Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker and David Lanz, UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice (New York: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 18 February 2019). 197 UN News, “Security Council Lifts Arms Embargo on Central African Republic Forces”, 30 July 2024, https://news. un.org/en/story/2024/07/1152656 (accessed 27 August 2024). Monitoring implementation: challenges and weaknesses SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 33 The second obstacle is the fluctuation of attention that exists in the UNSC for specific armed conflicts. An often-overlooked aspect of this is that regionally influential countries are frequently elected to the Security Council, which have strong positions on the respective conflict in their neighbourhood. If there are serious interests by elected or permanent members goals other than the settlement and resolution of the conflict often become relevant, such as the fight against international terrorism or the expansion of spheres of influence. This can collide with the provisions of the UN arms embargo. Yet it is crucial for its credibility that it is supported by the P5, as they are themselves important arms producers. If embargoes have a time limit, this actually seems to lead to more activity in the cases discussed. More recently, negotiations around regular extensions have become increasingly controversial, which at least reveals the different positions, while in the case of indefinite embargoes such as the one on Libya, there has in fact no longer been a consensus for some time. However, discussions often reflect the different points of view on sanctions among the UNSC members rather than the situation on the ground. This can be seen from the fact that the debates and decisions on various embargoes in recent years – regarding the DRC, CAR, but also South Sudan and Sudan – follow a very similar logic, although the situation in the countries themselves is very different. All these aspects make it difficult to politically direct arms embargoes as a means of conflict resolution. Yet, for as long as such embargoes are in place, the other pressing question is how to improve their implementation and enforcement. Monitoring implementation: challenges and weaknesses Besides the Security Council, the sanctions committees and panels of experts (PoEs) are key players within the UN governance structure on sanctions. The PoEs primarily provide the information basis for monitoring the implementation of measures and adjusting them if necessary. A number of overarching challenges can be identified from the monitoring of the four cases of UN arms embargoes analysed in more detail here. The findings of the panels inevitably reflect the mandates and guidelines issued by the respective committees, as well as the composition of the panels themselves. Their work is also influenced by restrictions of a financial, logistical or political nature – not necessarily in an identical manner across the four cases. The Covid-19 pandemic has been a problem for all PoEs, as it has restricted travelling in particular, which has had an impact on the content of the reports in the last two years covered. And last but not least, some of the information that flows to the committee is confidential, so the publicly available reports may not contain all findings. In principle, the panels can only provide parts of the picture on the compliance with an embargo. Their information is based on seizures by national or international forces, on the examination of weapons used or captured in combat, on information from member states or other actors and on their own reconnaissance, for example via satellite images, documents and local sources. Naturally, this can result in certain biases. Nevertheless, the reports on CAR, DRC, Libya and Somalia from 2016 to 2022 198 provide important insights into when and how UN arms embargoes were (possibly) breached or circumvented and what weaknesses they have. Irregular supplies and smuggling into conflict zones In principle, in all four cases, the parties to the conflict have continued to have access to weapons, ammunition and military equipment in recent years despite the embargo – sometimes to a considerable extent. The central questions in monitoring the embargoes are where this material comes from and by which route or through which channels it has reached the target area. This relates to providing supplies or military assistance and to a lack of adequate controls in UN member states to prevent such support. First of all, the PoEs identify (possible) violations of the embargo on the basis of the sources mentioned. Some panels also try to create baselines by compiling overviews of the types of weapons and ammunition that are available in the target area at a certain point in time – this makes it possible to identify newly emerging makes later. In many areas where armed conflicts have been ongoing for a long time, as in the 198 Here the final reports of the expert panels at the end of their (usually one-year) mandate were taken into account. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 34 cases discussed here, large numbers of weapons are already in circulation. 199 Weapons also enter the target areas irregularly via various routes. First, in all four cases there are regional links between different conflict areas via arms smuggling – for example between the DRC and the CAR, the CAR and Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, and Libya and the Sahel states. In particular, the large number of weapons that entered the country during the Libyan revolution not only filled the stocks of Libya’s own militias, but subsequently spread throughout the region 200 – despite the “two-way” embargo, which also prohibits the export of weapons and military equipment from Libya. 201 In the case of Somalia, the PoE primarily reports on weapons and ammunition being smuggled into the country by sea from or through Yemen. The ships mainly landed on the coast of Puntland in northeastern Somalia, 202 where the local security authorities and international naval forces of the Combined Maritime Forces repeatedly confiscated such shipments; 203 others could at least be confirmed by the Monitoring Group. These are mainly small arms and ammunition that enter the country, primarily by boat from Yemen; according to the UN experts, they are intended for militias, Al-Shabaab or ISIL, but may also only be passing through Somalia as a transit country. 204 These include weapons and other supplies that appear to come from Iran. 205 In the CAR reports, smuggling by land is particularly emphasized. Hunting rifles and ammunition often come from the DRC, sometimes in exchange for gold and diamonds. 206 This access was relevant for a whole spectrum of armed groups (anti-Balaka, exSéléka and self-defence groups). 207 Some members of 199 Libya: UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 107; DRC: UNSC, S/2022/479, para. 128; UNSC, S/2016/466, para. 219; CAR: UNSC, S/2017/1023, para. 102. 200 UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 107. 201 UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 187; UNSC, S/2018/812, para. 123; UNSC, S/2022/427, para. 78. 202 UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 122. 203 Ibid., para. 121, 124. 204 UNSC, S/2017/924*, para. 104; UNSC, S/2019/858* para. 130; UNSC, S/2020/949, para. 113; UNSC, S/2022/754*, para. 83, 105. 205 UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 115f; UNSC, S/2017/924*, para. 104. 206 UNSC, S/2016/1032 para. 145; UNSC, S/2019/930, Annex 4.5. 207 UNSC, S/2017/1023, Summary, 3. the CAR military are also said to be involved in arms smuggling from the DRC. 208 In addition, weapons and fighters entered the CAR from Sudan, 209 as well as across the western borders 210 or from Chad to the north of the country, especially in 2020–21, when the newly founded CPC was in particular need of material. 211 For arms smuggling into the DRC the links to neighbouring countries to the east mentioned in the last section are particularly relevant. During the reporting period, a smuggling network consisting of members of the Burundian army, various intermediaries and Congolese armed groups was investigated in detail. 212 The Burundian, Ugandan and Rwandan armies also frequently operate directly on the territory of the DRC – to support or combat armed groups with contacts in their respective countries. 213 Overall, smuggling often reflects regional links between violent conflicts. Arms flows can be an indicator of shifts in conflict dynamics but can also be the subject of armed conflicts themselves in some cases – for example, when it comes to controlling smuggling routes and areas close to borders. Irregular arms shipments naturally also reach government forces, often via longer-range transports. In Somalia, the blatant cases in the reporting period mainly concerned security forces that are not assigned to the central government but are allowed to receive support and material if the sanctions committee has been informed and has not objected. These were mainly regional forces in Somaliland and Puntland. 214 For example, the UAE established a military base in the port city of Berbera in Somaliland, 215 and a stateowned company from Ethiopia supplied weapons and ammunition to various Somali regional administrations for at least a decade. 216 208 Ibid., para. 22, 248. 209 UNSC, S/2017/639, Annex 5.9; UNSC, S/2017/1023, para. 173; UNSC, S/2018/1119, para. 69. 210 UNSC, S/2017/1023, para. 247. 211 UNSC, S/2021/569, paras. 30f. 212 UNSC, S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 152; UNSC, S/2018/531, paras. 198f. 213 UNSC, S/2019/469, para. 66; UNSC, S/2022/479, para. 162; UNSC, S/2022/479, para. 21; UNSC, S/2022/479, para. 71. 214 UNSC, S/2016/919, Annex, 8.3. 215 UNSC, S/2018/1002, paras. 40f.; UNSC, S/2019/858*, para. 128f. 216 UNSC, S/2019/858*, para. 120. Monitoring implementation: challenges and weaknesses SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 35 In both CAR and DRC, the national armed forces also received supplies without the necessary notifications or approvals. Related flights to the CAR were apparently carried out by the Sudanese air force and Congolese airlines, amongst others, whose aircraft landed at Bangui International Airport. 217 For the DRC, the experts report that more than 2,000 tons of material for the military, including weapons and ammunition, were delivered irregularly from January 2018 to the time of the 2020 report. 218 The Congolese security forces also received training assistance and civilian air support from abroad. 219 Irregular deliveries to Libya were particularly extensive. Not surprisingly, both sides competing for power benefited from this. External support has increased, particularly in the course of the fighting since 2014 and the rise of ISIL. 220 According to the PoE, the majority of transfers in favour of the forces affiliated with General Haftar came from the UAE and Jordan during the reporting period. 221 The military material which the GNA in turn received from Turkey, arrived by air with military aircraft, and in some cases also by sea. 222 The main air routes were between the UAE and eastern Libya or western Egypt respectively, from Russia via Syria to eastern Libya as well as from Turkey to the west of the country. 223 A particularly extensive operation was organized for Haftar’s forces by companies based in the UAE; according to the report, Erik Dean Prince, founder and long-time CEO of the private security company Blackwater, was also involved. 224 In addition to the supply of military goods, the deployment of foreign fighters and mercenaries was also a relevant factor in Libya. The PoE describes in detail the activities of the Russian Wagner Group there since 2018 – from maintenance assistance to operational support in combat and the performance of specialized military tasks. Effectively it acted as a “force multiplier” for the forces on the Haftar side in 2019 and early 2020. Wagner was active in Libya with 217 UNSC, S/2021/569, para. 73, 76. 218 UNSC, S/2020/482*, para. 156. 219 Ibid., para. 148. 220 UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 108. 221 UNSC, S/2017/466, para. 132; UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 61. 222 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 62; UNSC, S/2021/229, para. 73. 223 UNSC, S/2021/229, para. 81; UNSC, S/2022/427, para. 79. 224 UNSC, S/2021/229, para. 86ff. up to 2,000 people and also deployed combat aircraft. 225 The SADAT International Defence Consultancy from Turkey apparently trained forces close to the government and was also responsible for supervising and paying the approximately 5,000 Syrian fighters on the GNA side. 226 In earlier reports, the panel also provided information about foreign pilots recruited by armed groups in Misrata. They had been enlisted by an intermediary company that had previously been involved in illegal arms deals. 227 However, this phenomenon is not limited to Libya. As already mentioned, Russia sent military trainers to the CAR, where the boundary to Wagner operations was fluid. The instructors participated directly in combat operations and provided armed personal protection for CAR officials, although they were supposed to be unarmed and only in the country for training. According to various sources, their number was between 800 and 2,100, which was significantly higher than officially stated. 228 In the case of the DRC, the panel cited evidence that at least 80 people from Georgia and Belarus had worked as pilots, trainers and technicians for the Congolese air force over a period of almost ten years. Apparently, Georgians who had previously served in the Georgian Air Force were recruited by the Congolese authorities. 229 At least some of the business models behind the irregular deliveries are becoming apparent. In addition to governments, their security forces and nonstate armed groups in the target area, various private actors are involved – beyond the manufacturers of weapons and military equipment. Exemptions for government forces and risks of “diversion” Supplies such as those described not only violate the provisions of the exemptions, they can also undermine their objective, namely to strengthen the authority of the respective internationally recognized government to improve the security situation. In almost all conflict contexts, there is a high risk that weapons and ammunition will be diverted from official stocks (“diversion”). The problem of equipping national 225 Ibid., para. 93f, 97. 226 Ibid., para. 99. 227 UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 170. 228 UNSC, S/2021/569, paras. 66, 68. 229 UNSC, S/2020/482*, paras. 188f. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 36 security forces has been a recurring theme in cases such as Afghanistan. However, with the targeted arms embargo, the situation there was different from the exceptions and exemptions to the embargoes discussed in more detail here. Although the exemptions allow supplies to security forces, they are also intended to ensure that their type, scope and whereabouts are monitored more closely and to help improve weapons management on the ground, including registration, secure storage and end-user control. In almost all conflict contexts, the risk of weapons and ammunition being diverted from official stocks is high. However, the reports on CAR, DRC, Libya and Somalia up to 2022 paint a picture of recurring violations of reporting or authorization requirements. It is not always possible to distinguish between a lack of knowledge or of due diligence and deliberate disregard. In some cases, deliveries such as those discussed in the last section were clearly deliberately made without following the intended procedures. Until at least 2019, for example, payments to foreign companies for military equipment and training were recorded in official DRC documents under the purchase of agricultural goods. 230 Exemptions can also serve as loopholes, for example if a notification is made but only part of the delivery or support is reported – as in the case of Russia’s bilateral military support for the CAR. Military equipment authorized for import can also be upgraded later, as the panel on Libya found for patrol vessels that had been regularly delivered to the GNA by UN member states under the current exception for nonlethal equipment. 231 In some cases, there were regular deliveries without the sanctions committee being informed accordingly. This was the case when the Chinese armed forces, a state-owned arms and ammunition company in the People’s Republic and private companies transferred military equipment to the DRC eight times between January 2015 and January 2019. 232 Sometimes reports are simply consistently incorrect or delayed – as in the case of deliveries from China, the USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti to Soma230 UNSC, S/2022/479, paras. 16f. 231 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 78. 232 UNSC, S/2020/482*, para. 158. lia, as reported in the 2018 Monitoring Team report. 233 Member states sometimes point to ambiguities in the exemptions as a reason for this; in the relevant Resolutions, it is essentially left to the individual states to define the exact scope of application. 234 Some PoEs also note that there is confusion regarding the specific responsibilities for notifications or a lack of coordination between the supplier state and the supplied government 235 or among the authorities of the recipient country. 236 However, the ambiguities go beyond mere procedure. One difficulty lies in defining which units or actors are state-controlled and therefore allowed to receive military material under exceptions or exemptions. In Libya, the problem already existed between 2011 and 2014 as there were competing procurement channels within the internationally recognized government and at the same time there was a lack of oversight and clarity regarding end users. 237 The panel also criticized the GNA for not providing any information on the structure of the security forces under its control. 238 The government subsequently failed to provide more detailed reports. 239 Similar difficulties can be found in the case of Somalia. Even after a national security architecture was adopted for the country in 2017, the government’s mandatory reports contained no information on the status of regional forces or militias. 240 In 2022, the PoE called for a list to be drawn up of Somali security sector institutions that do not belong to the central government. At the same time, it recommended the creation of mechanisms with which the government could oversee the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment to these institutions. 241 In fact, material and military support flow largely unchecked to the regional forces in question. 242 The reports on Somalia and Libya hint at another ambiguity. Here, provisions of the arms embargo collide with other Resolutions, especially those on combating terrorism. In addition to the air strikes 233 UNSC, S/2018/1002, para. 10. 234 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 79. 235 Somalia: UNSC, S/2017/924*, para. 126. 236 CAR: UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 111. 237 UNSC, S/2016/209, para. 115. 238 UNSC, S/2017/466, para. 107. 239 See recommendations under UNSC, S/2018/812, para. 243; UNSC, S/2022/427, para. 132. 240 UNSC, S/2018/1002, para. 38. 241 UNSC, S/2022/754*, para. 140(g). 242 UNSC, S/2020/949, paras. 111f. Monitoring implementation: challenges and weaknesses SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 37 that the USA claims to have carried out in 2017–18 in support of the GNA against ISIL and Al-Qaida, 243 the panel on Libya also reports operational and technical support from Italian, British and American special forces 244 as well as French operations 245 and indications of French anti-tank missiles on the side of the Haftar troops. 246 At the PoE’s request, France specifically invoked paragraph 3 of Resolution 2214 (2015), in which member states are urged by the Security Council to use all means to combat threats to peace and security posed by acts of terrorism. 247 When assessing the associated military activities carried out in agreement with the GNA, it is unclear whether the provisions of the arms embargo are trumped by those on counter-terrorism. 248 In Somalia, Puntland’s security forces are being supported by the UAE and the USA in the fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIL, although the committee’s approval has not been obtained. 249 The panel also reported on indications of a delivery of armed drones by Turkey in 2021. When questioned on this point, Turkey claimed that it would use the systems itself in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. However, there was no corresponding exception, and the panel expressed doubts about the actual use by Turkey. 250 These cases show that member states prioritize the fight against terrorism over compliance with the arms embargo. Even if exemption provisions are observed, the often-inadequate post-delivery management remains problematic. The panels on Libya, Somalia and the DRC point out that significant quantities of arms, ammunition and other material entered the countries through exemptions. In Somalia alone, more than 20,000 weapons and 13 million rounds of ammunition reached the central government’s armed forces between 2013 and September 2016, after the embargo was partially lifted. 251 However, the PoEs repeatedly state that they are unable to determine whether weapons and ammunition have reached the intended 243 UNSC, S/2018/812, para. 108. 244 UNSC, S/2017/466, para. 147. 245 Ibid., para. 133. 246 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 93. 247 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2214 (2015), March 27, 2015. 248 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 229; UNSC, S/2021/229, para. 59. 249 UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 119. 250 UNSC, S/2022/754*, para. 96. 251 UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 115; for more detailed figures on imports to Libya, see UNSC, S/2018/812, para. 129. end users due to various deficiencies in documentation and processes. 252 In Somalia, the PoE report revealed a significant discrepancy between the number of weapons officially received by the government since the partial suspension and those actually distributed to the country’s national army. 253 In general, the PoEs frequently identify weapons and ammunition from government forces that have either been resold by military personnel, passed on to allied armed groups or stolen by armed groups. 254 Overall, the willingness of some UN member states to respond to the panels’ inquiries about possible deliveries is limited. As a result, tracing attempts often come to nothing. In contrast, the PoEs do report efforts in arms management and selective improvements – partly thanks to the support of the UN and international partners – although many gaps remain. While the embargoes are often criticized by the respective governments as an obstacle, many of the PoE reports suggest that the conditions for supplying arms and ammunition are insufficiently fulfilled. “New” technologies and dual use goods As mentioned above, the term “arms and related materiel” includes not only all types of weapons and ammunition, but usually also components, spare parts and weapon accessories. 255 Given the lack of standard lists, a further challenge is therefore to determine the scope of the arms embargoes in relation to dual-use goods. Annexes that specify the requirements for exemptions – such as in the case of Somalia, where lists of goods for approval and notification were drawn up – can indirectly indicate what is definitely covered by the embargo. However, they are not comprehensive and are not available for all regimes. It is therefore always up to the PoEs to point out ambiguities and the resulting dangers 252 Somalia: UNSC, S/2017/924*, para. 138; CAR: UNSC, S/2018/1119, paras. 191f; DRC: UNSC, S/2018/531, para. 204; Libya: UNSC, S/2016/209, Annexes 31, 38; UNSC, S/2018/812. 253 UNSC, S/2018/1002, para. 22. 254 For various examples, see, inter alia, in the case of CAR: UNSC, S/2021/569, para. 98; on DRC: UNSC, S/2021/560, paras. 143f.; UNSC, S/2019/469, paras. 197ff.; on Somalia: UNSC, S/2020/949, para. 98; UNSC, S/2022/754*, para. 78; UNSC, S/2018/1002, para. 24; UNSC, S/2019/858*, para. 114. 255 Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs/ Compliance and Capacity Skills International, High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (see note 25), 60f. Design and Implementation of UN Arms Embargoes: Current Challenges SWP Berlin UN Arms Embargoes under Scrutiny September 2024 38 of circumventing embargoes. In the case of Libya, the experts called for clarification as to whether certain technologies (such as patrol boats) can be used for military purposes in the country and therefore fall under the arms embargo. 256 The same report also raises this question for electronic interdiction and jamming systems designed to disable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or commercial UAVs. 257 This points to an important aspect that further exacerbates the dual use problem: the emergence of “new” types of weapons that are sometimes only assembled in the conflict zones. UAVs and UCAVs play a particular role in the reports on Libya, but also appear in those on the DRC, where the expert group points out that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) use surveillance drones. 258 On Libya, the PoE found that Haftar forces used UAVs supplied by the United Arab Emirates, 259 while GNA forces used Turkish-made UCAVs (major deliveries of components of these drones were also mentioned). 260 Both sides also used small UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. 261 The underlying issue, according to the PoE, is that “[t]he ever-evolving technology and relatively low cost of smart electronic fast-moving consumer goods, such as optics and unmanned aerial vehicles, […] and the ease of modification of civilian vehicles to convert them into combat-capable vehicles […] make such dual-use items […] ideal for military use in low-level conflicts.” 262 The experts believe thatthe arms embargo is violated in cases where the corresponding upstream technology is primarily imported by parties to the conflict and used for military purposes. 263 However, exporters as well as countries of origin and transit would have to verify this accordingly, which is difficult in many cases. The use of such technologies is, in fact, not new but plays a growing role in almost all protracted armed conflicts. The same applies to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These are often built in 256 UNSC, S/2019/914*, para. 80. 257 Ibid., paras. 99, 229. 258 UNSC, S/2021/560, para. 23. 259 UNSC, S/2019/914*, paras. 108, 110. 260 Ibid., paras. 112–116, 121. 261 Ibid., para. 122. 262 UNSC, S/2022/427, para. 61. The PoE points out here that its definition of “dual use” does not correspond to that used under the Wassenaar Arrangement or the EU export control regime (ibid., note 90). 263 UNSC, S/2022/427, para. 61. the conflict zone itself from explosive material and other components, for example in the DRC, where the ADF are using them more and more frequently. 264 Between November 2020 and March 2021 alone, for example, 36 incidents involving 64 IEDs were registered that were suspected or confirmed as being linked to the group. 265 These included material from Tanzania, which is often used in mining, 266 as well as explosives, batteries and detonators from Uganda. 267 The Security Council thus added a listing criterion in 2022 for being involved in the production or use of IEDs as well as for any planning, ordering or assistance of attacks in the DRC with IEDs. 268 In the case of CAR, the use of IEDs has also increased significantly since mid-2020, especially in the west and north-west of the country. In 2021 alone, 44 such attacks were recorded, in which 30 people died, mostly civilians. However, the PoE does not go into detail about the design of the explosive devices and the possible origin of the components used. 269 IEDs play a particularly important role in the reports on Somalia. 270 In 2016 the PoE had already found that Al-Shabaab was using increasingly sophisticated technology against high-value targets, including AMISOM, a use facilitated by foreign trainers and the transfer of knowledge from other conflict zones. 271 This affected the arms embargo because the PoE found clear evidence that Al-Shabaab had been manufacturing its own explosives since at least July 2017, having previously used mainly military explosives derived from war remnants or captured by AMISOM. 272 The PoE repeatedly called for better information from UN member states regarding exports to Somalia of chemicals suitable for the construction of improvised explosive devices. 273 When examining a specific case, the sanctions committee found that although explosives for commercial purposes are not 264 UNSC, S/2020/1283, paras 12ff. 265 UNSC, S/2021/560, para. 19. 266 UNSC, S/2016/466, para. 222. 267 UNSC, S/2021/560, para. 24. 268 UNSC, Res. 2641 (2022), para. 3. 269 UNSC, S/2022/527, para. 28. 270 The PoE on Libya mentions IEDs only in relation to boxes of detonating cords in Benghazi that originated from a Turkish-based explosives manufacturer and were seized from a vessel coming from Misrata. UNSC, S/2018/812, para. 119. 271 UNSC, S/2016/919, para. 123. 272 UNSC, S/2019/858*, para. 20. 273 UNSC, S/2017/924*, para. 224; UNSC, S/2019/858*, para. 24.