T an, Ngoc Thanh e al.
A icle
The link be ween i m isk- aking and CEO powe o lis ed
i ms on he Vie namese s ock ma ke : he ole o s a e
owne ship
Cogen Business & Managemen
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
Taylo & F ancis G oup
Sugges ed Ci a ion: T an, Ngoc Thanh e al. (2024) : The link be ween i m isk- aking and CEO powe
o lis ed i ms on he Vie namese s ock ma ke : he ole o s a e owne ship, Cogen Business &
Managemen , ISSN 2331-1975, Taylo & F ancis, Abingdon, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, pp. 1-16,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23311975.2024.2302193
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/325993
S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen
Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den.
Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle
Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich
machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen.
So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen
(insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en,
gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do
genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e.
Te ms o use:
Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal
and schola ly pu poses.
You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o
exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he
in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public.
I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en
Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise
u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence.
h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/
Cogen Business & Managemen
ISSN: 2331-1975 (Online) Jou nal homepage: www. and online.com/jou nals/oabm20
The link be ween fi m isk- aking and CEO powe
o lis ed fi ms on he Vie namese s ock ma ke :
he ole o s a e owne ship
Ngoc Thanh T an, Thi Ngoc Dung Pham, Dien Duan Nguyen, T ung Kien T an,
Gia Quyen Phan & T an Thai Ha Nguyen
To ci e his a icle: Ngoc Thanh T an, Thi Ngoc Dung Pham, Dien Duan Nguyen, T ung Kien
T an, Gia Quyen Phan & T an Thai Ha Nguyen (2024) The link be ween fi m isk- aking and CEO
powe o lis ed fi ms on he Vie namese s ock ma ke : he ole o s a e owne ship, Cogen
Business & Managemen , 11:1, 2302193, DOI: 10.1080/23311975.2024.2302193
To link o his a icle: h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23311975.2024.2302193
© 2024 The Au ho (s). Published by In o ma
UK Limi ed, ading as Taylo & F ancis
G oup
View supplemen a y ma e ial
Published online: 22 Ma 2024. Submi you a icle o his jou nal
A icle iews: 1800 View ela ed a icles
View C ossma k da a Ci ing a icles: 2 View ci ing a icles
Full Te ms & Condi ions o access and use can be ound a
h ps://www. and online.com/ac ion/jou nalIn o ma ion?jou nalCode=oabm20
Banking & Finance | ReseaRch aR icle
Cogen Business & ManageMen
2024, VoL. 11, no. 1, 2302193
The link be ween i m isk- aking and CEO powe o lis ed i ms on
he Vie namese s ock ma ke : he ole o s a e owne ship
ngoc hanh ana , hi ngoc Dung Phamb , Dien Duan nguyenb , ung kien anc ,
gia Quyen Phand and an hai ha nguyene
aFacul y o Finance and accoun ing, Ho Chi Minh Ci y uni e si y o economics and Finance, Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Vie nam;
buni e si y o Finance-Ma ke ing, Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Vie nam; cschool o Public Finance, College o economics, Law, and
go e nmen , uni e si y o economics Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Vie nam; dDepa men o Balance shee
Managemen , sacombank, Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Vie nam; eFacul y o Finance and Banking, Van Lang uni e si y,
Ho Chi Minh Ci y, Vie nam
ABSTRACT
he chie execu i e O ice (ceO) is pi o al in i m go e nance and is asked wi h policy
implemen a ion and maximizing sha eholde bene i . howe e , p edic ing ceO
beha iou emains challenging, especially when conside ing ceO powe (ceOP). hence,
his s udy explo es he link be ween ceOP and i m isk- aking (FR ) in selec ed i ms
on he s ock ma ke in Vie nam om 2010 o 2020. U ilizing he en opy weigh
me hodology, a ceOP index combines s uc u al, owne ship, and expe powe
indica o s. he sYs-gMM app oach mi iga es po en ial endogenei y issues, e ealing a
posi i e co ela ion be ween ceOP and FR . in e es ingly, ceO isk a e sion inc eases in
s a e-owned i ms’ pa icipan s, sugges ing heigh ened supe ision. Mo eo e , each
cha ac e is ic o he ceOP index uniquely in luences FR . he indings o e heo e ical
and p ac ical insigh s o enhancing go e nance and supe ision mechanisms o
op imize s akeholde bene i s.
IMPACT STATEMENT
in business, a oiding all isks is imp ac ical, and isk- aking endea ou s can p esen
g ow h oppo uni ies. howe e , unce ain ies om isks can impac inancial
pe o mance, equi ing co po a ions o demons a e e ec i e isk managemen .
Decision-making and o e sigh o o ganiza ional ac i i ies a e decided by he chie
execu i e O ice (ceO). hence, his s udy explo es he in e ac ion be ween ceO powe
and i m isk- aking in he con ex o Vie nam. Powe ul ceOs end o g a i a e owa ds
isks, bu e ec i e go e nance mechanisms and boa d independence can balance his
endency. he s udy ecognizes he in luen ial ole o ceO powe in shaping isk- aking
beha iou s and emphasizes he posi i e impac o s a e owne ship. Balancing ceO
empowe men wi h o ganiza ional supe ision is c ucial, and solu ions include
comp ehensi e isk assessmen s and clea ope a ing amewo ks. howe e , he s udy
acknowledges limi a ions and ecommends guidelines o a mo e comp ehensi e
analysis in u u e esea ch.
1. In oduc ion
in i m con ex s, hie a chical dis inc ions a e widely ecognized, whe ein indi iduals a e s a i ied based
on hei con ol o e esou ces and capaci y o dispense ewa ds o punishmen s (kel ne e al., 2003;
ing e al., 2017). Decision-making and o e sigh o o ganiza ional ac i i ies a e unde aken by he chie
execu i e O ice (ceO) (adams e al., 2005). howe e , decision-making p ocesses wi hin i ms exhibi
a ia ions, wi h some ceOs assuming sole au ho i y o e c i ical decisions, while o he s ely on he col-
lec i e judgmen o he boa d o di ec o s (haide & Fang, 2018). When conside ing ceOs’ signi ican
powe , hei decisions a e pi o al in s a egic esou ce alloca ion abou in es men s, le e age,
© 2024 he au ho (s). Published by in o ma uK Limi ed, ading as aylo & F ancis g oup
CONTACT an hai Ha nguyen ha.nguyen an@ lu.edu. n Facul y o Finance and Banking, Van Lang uni e si y, Ho Chi Minh Ci y,
Vie nam.
addi ional a ilia ion o gia Quyen Phan: Facul y o accoun ing and Finance, nha ang uni e si y, Khanh Hoa P o ince, Vie nam.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23311975.2024.2302193
his is an open access a icle dis ibu ed unde he e ms o he C ea i e Commons a ibu ion License (h p://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/), which
pe mi s un es ic ed use, dis ibu ion, and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is p ope ly ci ed. he e ms on which his a icle has been
published allow he pos ing o he accep ed Manusc ip in a eposi o y by he au ho (s) o wi h hei consen .
ARTICLE HISTORY
Recei ed 11 Ma ch 2023
Re ised 28 Decembe
2023
accep ed 2 Janua y 2024
KEYWORDS
ceO; owne ship powe ,
s uc u al powe ; expe
powe ; isk- aking; s a e
owne ship; Vie nam
JEL CLASSIFICATION
M00; g30; g32
REVIEWING EDITOR
Da id McMillan,
Uni e si y o s i ling,
Uni ed kingdom
SUBJECTS
asian s udies; Risk
assessmen ; Business,
Managemen and
accoun ing
2n. . Ran e al.
pe o mance, and isk managemen (c ossland e al., 2014). i is conside ed o be he abili y o indi id-
uals o asse hei will and exe in luence o e o he s (Finkels ein, 1992); powe can con ibu e o e ec-
i e go e nance and diminish ope a ional unce ain y wi hin co po a ions when wielded by ceOs (haide
& Fang, 2018). none heless, his powe can also be suscep ible o exploi a ion o pe sonal gains, po en-
ially comp omising ope a ional e iciency and o e sigh h ough bo h o mal and in o mal means (adams
e al., 2005; ing e al., 2017). his duali y e okes conce ns ega ding he po en ial in luence o ceO
powe (ceOP) on i m in e es s, as indica ed by he li e a u e, which sugges s he exis ence o ade-o s
in e ms o he ad an ages and disad an ages associa ed wi h g an ing he ceO g ea e decision-making
au ho i y (han e al., 2016).
concu en ly, isk- aking plays a pi o al ole in a i m’s pe o mance and compe i i e edge wi hin he
indus y (cheng e al., 2020; nguyen e al., 2020). Va ia ion is exhibi ed in he deba es su ounding he
app op ia e le el o isk- aking and i s impac on i m pe o mance ( hi Pham & hi Dao, 2022); ne e he-
less, isk- aking en ails unce ain ies ha can emana e om a ious in e nal o ex e nal ac o s, exe ing
an in luence on i m p o i abili y and gi ing ise o luc ua ions in inancial pe o mance (Jo & na, 2012).
no ably, p io in es iga ions ha e unde sco ed he pi o al ole o obus i m go e nance wi h he cen al
ole o ceOs in enhancing i ms’ pe o mance and managing hei le el o isk (B aga-al es & shas i, 2011;
Faccio e al., 2016). ceOs assume esponsibili y o i m go e nance mechanisms as hey adminis e c ucial
i m policies (adams e al., 2005). When ceOs pe cei e powe as a c ucial aspec o hei , hey engage
mo e isk- aking in con empla ing he signi icance o he o ganiza ional change, gaining aluable insigh s
in o ex e nal oppo uni ies, and decisi ely d i ing he de elopmen o business s a egies, enabling hem
o make long- e m decisions ha align wi h he business in e es s and he ad ancemen o he o ganiza-
ion ole (ande son & galinsky, 2006; sassenbe g e al., 2012). hus, an ele a ed le el o ceOP equen ly
co ela es wi h inc eased po en ial o managing ola ili y and ex ao dina y i m pe o mance (han e al.,
2016; ing e al., 2017), heigh ened se e i y in ea nings managemen (le e al., 2022; shiah-hou, 2021),
and a g ea e inclina ion owa ds isk- aking (Foong e al., 2021; haide & Fang, 2018; li, 2019).
indeed, he ole o powe e ol es a ound he powe access-inhibi ion heo y, which holds ha powe
has dual e ec s: access and inhibi ion (cho & kel ne , 2020; kel ne e al., 2003). he concep o access
e ec in ol es indi iduals exhibi ing beha iou s di ec ed owa ds achie ing goals when d i en by posi-
i e s imuli, o en in ol ing aking mo e isks. con e sely, he inhibi ion e ec pe ains o indi iduals
unde aking ac ions aimed a isk a oidance when mo i a ed by nega i e incen i es. conside able powe
es ed in a ceO may in luence an inc eased willingness o ake isks (lewellyn & Mulle -kahle, 2012; li
& ang, 2010). his heigh ened isk p opensi y can acili a e he ceO in making s a egic, long- e m deci-
sions ha align wi h business in e es s and o ganiza ional de elopmen , as ande son and galinsky (2006)
discussed. howe e , he powe eaches an excessi e le el, i also leads powe holde s o become mind-
lessly op imis ic (ande son & galinsky, 2006; Fas e al., 2012), ac ing on hei desi es in une hical ways
(hi sh e al., 2011; kennedy & ande son, 2017), and being mo e disinhibi ed in beha iou (Pa ick e al.,
2009; Zhou e al., 2021). he ecogni ion ha a di ec o ’s inclina ion o ake isks and pu sue luc a i e
oppo uni ies is a esul o in luence p edominan ly a ising om hei abili y o con ol aluable esou ces
and dispense ewa ds and punishmen s (Finkels ein, 1992). he impo an ques ion is, a e in luen ial
ceOs mo e likely o isk ini ia ing i m s a egic change due o hei access o and alloca ion o abundan
esou ces? O , gi en he g owing esis ance o change wi hin he o ganiza ion, do ceOs b ing abou less
i m isk- aking (FR ) as hei powe inc eases? Despi e ex ensi e schola ly inqui y, he impac o ceOP
on i m isk- aking has la gely escaped sc u iny in academic esea ch.
in p e ious s udies, ano he ac o in luencing FR is he co ela ion be ween isk- aking and o gani-
za ional s uc u e and go e nance (Faccio e al., 2011). as Vo (2018) sugges ed, his connec ion o igina es
om in es men ho izons and he di e se isk p e e ences o dis inc sha eholde s. Uddin (2016) adds a
laye o his unde s anding by asse ing ha go e nmen owne ship in a co po a ion di ec ly shapes i s
isk- aking beha iou s in bo h in es men and ading, ul ima ely in luencing i s pe o mance and su -
i al in a compe i i e ma ke . P e ious s udies also unde sco e he impac o dispa i ies be ween public
and non-public sec o s on i m ac i i ies, especially in assuming ce ain isks o compe i i e ad an age
and inno a ion (song e al., 2020; Zhou e al., 2016). By le e aging hei poli ical connec ions, s a e-owned
en e p ises ypically ecei e inancial incen i es and policies ha bols e hei e ec i eness and compe -
i i eness (Ben-nas e al., 2015). consequen ly, s a e-owned en e p ise manage s o en pe cei e poli ical
cOgen BUsiness & ManageMen 3
ela ionships as a means o mi iga e ex e nal unce ain ies (schweize e al., 2019). howe e , i is c ucial
o acknowledge ha hese poli ical connec ions can in oduce complexi ies in o i m s a egy. sOes e-
quen ly g apple wi h excessi e in e e ence and a lack o independence o ope a ing ac i i ies (Bha i &
sa we , 2011). Mo eo e , hey may de ia e om con en ional go e nance p inciples, al e ing he goals
and ac i i ies o co po a ions (ab amo e al., 2017). sOe manage s migh p io i ize social objec i es and
sho - e m poli ical goals o e maximizing pe o mance (kang & kim, 2012).
in ligh o hese conside a ions, al hough ex ensi e esea ch has been conduc ed, he impac o ceOP
and s a e owne ship (sO) in luences on FR ha e no been examined in academic esea ch. Fi s , agency
heo y-based p edic ions a e weak and inconsis en (Finkels ein e al., 2008). some schola s ha e p o-
posed ha he absence o clea -cu ela ionships could s em om he p esump ion in agency heo y
ha manage s possess consis en isk p e e ences, ei he leaning owa ds isk a e sion o isk neu ali y
(sande s & hamb ick, 2007). indeed, he measu emen s o he ceO conside ed do no ully e lec he
powe o he ceO, and he e o e, he p e ious esul s a e s ill highly inconclusi e. P io s udies on ceOP
measu ed "powe " om bo h inside o duali y pe spec i e and dis ega ding o he dimensions o powe ,
o ins ance, he ceO’s gende (Faccio e al., 2016; hang, 2022; ing e al., 2017) o he ceO’s owne ship
pe cen age (Pham & Pham, 2020; Vu e al., 2019). his assump ion ails o conside ha manage s may
be isk-seeke s in speci ic con ex s. hey could be obse ed in Mubeen e al. (2021), who examined he
concu en ceO in a i m o he numbe o yea s in he ceO posi ion. second, a di e gence o opinion
exis s among schola s ega ding he ole o ceOP on isk p e e ence in decision-making. some s udies
sugges ha excessi e powe may lead o isky ac i i ies (kel ne e al., 2003; ang e al., 2011), while
o he s p o ide e idence o conse a i e decision-making unde inc eased powe (ande son & Be dahl,
2002; Mane e al., 2007). hi dly, his in es iga ion unde sco es he pi o al ole played by sO in shaping
FR beha iou . While p e ious s udies ha e made asse ions ega ding he impac s o sO (nguyen e al.,
2020; Vo, 2018), he absence o a clea connec ion be ween sO and ceOP p esen s a no able esea ch
gap ha equi es a en ion. gi en ha go e nmen objec i es mi o i s in e es s, and he ceO migh
unc ion as a ep esen a i e o ei he he go e nmen o o he sha eholde s, po en ial con lic s could
a ise in decision-making ela ed o isk- aking ac i i ies. his po en ial disco d be ween he ceO and
o he s akeholde s o be ween he ceO and he go e nmen necessi a es a close examina ion o he
in e play be ween sO and ceOP wi hin he scope o his s udy.
his s udy explo es he ela ionship among ceOP, sO and FR by cons uc ing he indica o s o he
powe componen s. Mo eo e , we conside he powe connec ion be ween sO and ceOP ha de e mines
whose in e es s a e likely o be pu sued (Finkels ein e al., 2008). Ou s udy con ends ha a heigh ened
inclina ion o in ol emen in isky endea ou s co ela es wi h ele a ed le els o ceOP; ne e heless, his
inclina ion also d aws esis ance and sc u iny om o he s akeholde s, in luencing he change in isk- aking
mindse (Zhou e al., 2021). hus, Vie nam se es as a compelling esea ch case o explo e he impac o
sO and ceOP, owing o i s pas s a us as an eme ging ansi ional coun y and i s his o ical backd op o
a cen ally-planned economy cha ac e ized by he p e alence o s a e-owned en e p ises (Vo, 2018). a
he same ime, his s udy p o ides p ac ical implica ions o Vie nam’s cu en i m go e nance egime.
Vie nam’s i m go e nance egula ions a e p ima ily based on he law on secu i ies 2019, he law on
en e p ises 2020, and o he ele an egula ions which equi e u he scien i ic e idence o p ac ice sub-
o dina e egula ions e ec i ely. howe e , Vie nam lacks key sou ces o i m go e nance e e ences ound
in mo e de eloped economies, such as i m go e nance p ac ices and e ec i eness.
his pape is o ganized in a 5-pa s s uc u e. in addi ion o he in oduc ion, sec ion 2 is a li e -
a u e e iew. sec ion 3 desc ibes he da a, models, measu emen s, and ela ed o mulas. sec ion 4
discusses he main indings. sec ion 5 p esen s he conclusions, p ac ical sugges ions, and
limi a ions.
2. Li e a u e e iew
2.1. Theo ies o i m isk- aking and CEO powe
he concep o powe in go e nance is de ined by P e e and salancik (1978) as he capaci y o exe
con ol o e indi iduals o objec s. hus, ceOP is cha ac e ized by haleblian and Finikels ein (1993) as
4n. . Ran e al.
consis en ly in luencing c ucial co po a e decisions. in a b oade con ex , he capabili y o na iga e in e -
nal and ex e nal esou ces o add ess challenges can be seen as powe o ceOs (Finkels ein, 1992). i is
also posi ed by Baldenius e al. (2014) ha g ea e con ol and in luence o e o he manage s a e o en
exe cised by a powe ul ceO. Recen esea ch on ceOP ocuses on h ee key heo ies: he heo y o
powe in ol ing app oach and inhibi ion e ec s, agency heo y, and p ospec and social psychology
heo ies.
Rega ding he aspec o isk- aking beha iou , he agency heo y sugges s ha ceOs wi h mo e
powe end o a oid isks o p o ec hei pe sonal gains in co po a ions. his heo y cen es on he
sepa a ion o owne ship and con ol and add esses con lic s o in e es be ween sha eholde s and
manage s and di e ences in isk a i udes (Band, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). i assumes manage s
ha e dis inc goals and a e isk-a e se, pa icula ly in he absence o p ope go e nance mechanisms.
Wi hou he abili y o di e si y employmen isk, ceOs may exhibi heigh ened isk a e sion, aking
ewe isks o p o ec hei pe sonal in e es s (Be and & Mullaina han, 2003). howe e , kel ne e al.
(2003) p esen ed a comp ehensi e heo y o powe ha explo es bo h he app oach and inhibi ion
e ec s, shedding ligh on he dual consequences associa ed wi h powe . When indi iduals possess
highe le els o powe , i ac i a es hei beha iou al app oach sys em (Bas) o wo p ima y easons:
access o esou ces and au onomy in pu suing hei goals. acco ding o his heo y, powe ul ceOs
exhibi g ea e sel -assu ance ega ding po en ial ewa ds, esul ing in educed isk a e sion (Zhou
e al., 2021). P e ious s udies ha e shown ha inc eased ceOP leads o heigh ened con idence in
ob aining ewa ds, ul ima ely leading o dec eased isk a e sion (kel ne e al., 2003). Meanwhile, he
Beha io al agency Model (BaM) posi s ha loss-a e se manage s ha e hei isk- aking beha iou in lu-
enced by compensa ion s a egies (Wiseman & gomez-Mejia, 1998). execu i es may p io i ize sa e-
gua ding cu en weal h o e pu suing new gains, po en ially dampening hei inclina ion o manage ial
isk- aking. he nega i e ela ionship be ween ceOP and FR implies ha highly in luen ial ceOs may
lean owa ds isk a e sion in decision-making.
he e o e, ceO isk- aking a i udes a e u he in luenced by decision amewo ks and e e ence
poin s ied o hei powe and co po a e pe o mance (kel ne e al., 2003). he heo ies o powe unde -
sco e he dual e ec s o powe : inc eased powe ac i a es he app oach sys em, encou aging isk- aking
(sheikh, 2019), while diminished powe ac i a es he inhibi ion sys em, leading o isk a e sion (Zhou
e al., 2021).
2.2. P e ious s udies and hypo hesis de elopmen
Rega ding empi ical indings, mos s udies indica e a ela ionship be ween ceOP and FR . i is wo h
no ing ha a ious measu es and egions ha e been used o assess ceOP, as ou lined in he li e a u e
(loukil & Yous i, 2022; shabi e al., 2023). hese measu es o en conside duali y, independence, owne -
ship, and enu e o gauge he ex en o a ceO’s esou ce con ol and in luence (Finkels ein, 1992; ang
e al., 2011). Fo ins ance, a s udy by cheikh (2014) highligh ed ha a highe ceOP index could indica e
ha he ceO held he posi ion o he sole inside di ec o o e en se ed as he chai pe son, he eby
exe ing a subs an ial in luence on he boa d. in such cases, he ceO migh be mo e inclined o pu sue
isky in es men s a egies o secu e p i a e bene i s. Fu he mo e, a s udy by Fa ag and Mallin (2016)
examined he in luence o duali y and he numbe o di ec o s on he isk- aking o lis ed i ms in spain
be ween 1995 and 2000, and a posi i e ela ionship be ween he duali y o ceO and i m isk- aking was
e ealed. When he oles o chai man and ceO we e combined in o one indi idual, he abili y o e ec-
i ely o e see and con ol decision-making was diminished, esul ing in a g ea e p opensi y o iskie
choices. simila ly, sheikh (2019) pe cei ed ha ceOP had a link wi h i m isk. Using a panel o
non- inancial Us co po a ions om 1992 o 2015, posi i e ela ionships be ween ceOP and FR ( o al isk
and idiosync a ic isk) we e iden i ied only in high-compe i ion ma ke s o wi h good i m go e nance,
acco ding o he s udy, bu a signi ican e ec o ceOP on i m isk was no ound in low-compe i ion
ma ke s o wi h weak i m go e nance. hen, his s udy sugges ed ha a ceO’s isk a i ude was shaped
by decision-making amewo ks and e e ence poin s, wi h mo e powe ul ceOs ela ing highe isk ol-
e ance le els, acco ding o he p ospec heo y posi ed by kahneman and e sky (1979). hus, he i s
hypo hesis posi s posi i e e ec o ceOP on FR .
cOgen BUsiness & ManageMen 5
h1: ceO powe posi i ely in luences i m isk- aking.
Va ious s udies ha e explo ed he in ica e ela ionship be ween ceOP and FR , conside ing di e -
en aspec s o ceOP. examina ion o ceOP componen s such as p es ige (academic deg ee), owne ship,
expe (ceO enu e), s uc u al (duali y o ceO and inside di ec o s), and demog aphic (age and gen-
de ) powe was conduc ed by haide and Fang (2018). Resul s e ealed a signi ican nega i e associa-
ion be ween ceOP and bo h o al and idiosync a ic isks, challenging he no ion ha ceOs consis en ly
a ou isky en u es. Zou e al. (2020) di e en ia ed o mal (owne ship and duali y) and in o mal
(independence and enu e) ceOP, inding a posi i e link be ween o mal powe om owne ship and
i m isk, while in o mal powe om expe ise ( enu e) showed a nega i e associa ion. ceO owne ship
was pe cei ed as closely linked wi h i m pe o mance, possibly mo i a ing he pu sui o en u es
wi h ele a ed isks. in con as , he du a ion o a ceO’s enu e was associa ed wi h diminished i m
isk, as i augmen ed decision-making cau ion in si ua ions cha ac e ized by unce ain y. ceO duali y,
howe e , p o ided insu icien incen i es o inc eased isk- aking (Foong e al., 2021). in a nuanced
app oach, Foong e al. (2021) s udied ceOP in amily i ms, e ealing mixed indings ega ding s uc-
u al and expe powe p omo ing highe isk- aking and owne ship powe co ela ing wi h lowe
isk- aking. li (2019) explo ed ceOP ac oss a di e se sample, inding ha powe ul ceOs ended o
ake highe isks, in luenced by oppo unis ic decision-making p io i izing pe sonal in e es s. ceO en-
u e eme ged as a signi ican ac o , allowing o g ea e isk emb acemen due o ex ensi e amilia i y
wi h he i m’s s uc u e and p ocesses (cheikh, 2014). Va ied heo e ical and me hodological app oaches
a e a ibu ed o he di e gen esea ch indings. his s udy unde sco es he mul idimensional na u e
o ceOP, inco po a ing enu e, owne ship, duali y and independence in he di ec o boa d o ceO
(Foong e al., 2021; Zou e al., 2020). hence, he second hypo hesis posi s di e se e ec s o ceOP
cha ac e is ics on FR .
h2: ceO powe ’s cha ac e is ics yield a ied impac s on i m isk- aking.
While agency heo y adi ionally add esses con lic s be ween manage s and sha eholde s, i s applica-
bili y ex ends o explaining he conduc o s a e owne s as s akeholde s (nguyen & Wong, 2021; an
e al., 2023). indeed, he dynamics di e o di e en owne s, whose in e es s a e in ica ely linked o
o e all weal h po olios, pe sonal gains and losses, and he po en ial o en enchmen (Uddin, 2016).
sO in oduces a scena io whe e he owne o p esen e o en e p ises unc ions unde s a e in luences.
Unde p essu e o p ese e capi al, ep esen a i es o sO a ely en u e in o high- isk in es men p oj-
ec s, o en op ing o isk a e sion o sa egua d hei posi ions and bene i s (nguyen e al., 2020).
al hough he co po a ion’s isk p o ile e lec s di e se sha eholde in e es s and is no ably in luenced by
he go e nmen , sO o en holds he p eeminen posi ion as he mos poli ically powe ul sha eholde ,
i espec i e o pe cen age (sha ma e al., 2020).
app oaching i om an agency heo y s andpoin , he ex en o which a ceO shapes a i m’s isk- aking
beha iou is in ica ely ied o he i m’s owne ship s uc u e, as no ed by haide and Fang (2018). he
owne ship s uc u e delinea es he decision-making p ocesses, manage ial o e sigh , and compensa ion
mechanisms, he eby subs an ially in luencing a i m’s isk p o ile (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When he
go e nmen assumes a pi o al ole as a majo sha eholde , inhe en con lic s a ise be ween go e nmen-
al objec i es and hose o he ceOs. s a e-owned en e p ises juggle inancial and social goals concu -
en ly, whe eas ceOs p io i ize a mo e s aigh o wa d cos -bene i analysis (chin aka n e al., 2014).
Mo eo e , he socio-poli ical inclina ions o go e nmen o icials become c ucial in e alua ing and p o-
mo ing ceOs in s a e-owned en e p ises (Duong e al., 2023). se e al s udies, including hose by Vo
(2018) and nguyen e al. (2020), ha e e ealed ha s a e-owned lis ed co po a ions end o be mo e
isk-a e se compa ed o hei non-s a e-owned coun e pa s. D awing om his empi ical ounda ion,
signi ican sha eholde s shape he dynamic be ween ceOP and a i m’s willingness o ake isks h ough
ac i e moni o ing and con ol, ul ima ely aligning wi h he i m’s bes in e es s (haide & Fang, 2018). in
ligh o hese insigh s, we o mula e he hi d hypo hesis as ollows:
h3a: s a e owne ship educes he in luences o ceO powe on i m isk- aking.
h3b: s a e owne ship educes he in luences o ceO powe ’s cha ac e is ics on i m isk- aking.
6n. . Ran e al.
3. Da a and me hod
3.1. Da a
Da a o his s udy we e collec ed om lis ed i ms on he Vie nam s ock exchanges du ing he pe iod
om 2010 o 2020. Financial in o ma ion was ex ac ed om inancial s a emen s, and indica o s o ceOP
we e de i ed om i m go e nance epo s. Fi ms wi h incomple e in o ma ion we e excluded o ensu e
comp ehensi e da a, leading o a inal sample o 303 co po a ions wi h 3,121 obse a ions. addi ionally,
i is essen ial o no e ha ins i u ions in he inancial sec o , including banking, secu i ies, and insu ance
indus ies, we e no included in he s udy.
3.2. Va iable desc ip ions
3.2.1. Fi m isk- aking
Fi m execu i es seek o emb ace highe isks in pu suing s a egies, aiming o maximize p o i s despi e
he inc eased ola ili y in inancial pe o mance caused by in e nal and ex e nal unce ain ies (Da sono
e al., 2022; nguyen e al., 2020). he luc ua ion in e u ns o e ime se es as an indica o o he i m’s
le el o isk- aking. in alignmen wi h p e ious s udies, we employ wo a iables as p oxies o FR .
Fi s , Risk1 is measu ed as he s anda d de ia ion o e u n on asse s (ROa), and a highe s anda d
de ia ion in his a iable e lec s inc eased FR , ollowed by Zou e al. (2020) and nguyen e al.
(2020). his measu e cap u es deb isk and encompasses any ealized isks a ec ing a i m’s p o i s
(Mihe , 2013). calcula ing he s anda d de ia ion o ROa equi es a leas h ee yea s o ROa da a
(e.g. -2 o ).
RISK
T
ROA
T
ROA T
i
T
i
T
i
11
1
1
3
11
2
=−
−≥
=
∑∑
( )| (1)
second, Risk2 is measu ed by he s anda d de ia ion o daily s ock e u ns (DsR) in a yea (chak abo y
e al., 2019; Zou e al., 2020). Rega ded as he ma ke isk gauge, his p oxy signi ies he ex en o equi y
isk mani es ed in he ola ili y o s ock e u ns (T is he numbe o ading days in a yea ).
RISK
T
DSR
T
DSR
i
T
i
T
i
21
1
1
11
2
=−−
=
∑∑
()
(2)
3.2.2. CEO powe
Fou ceOP aspec s, namely s uc u al Powe , expe Powe , Owne ship Powe , and P es ige Powe , we e
iden i ied by Finkels ein (1992). howe e , ang e al. (2011) elimina ed P es ige Powe , deeming i
non-essen ial. Following hei sugges ion and ha o han e al. (2016), his s udy ocuses on h ee
dimensions o ceOP: (i) s uc u al Powe showing he ceO’s au ho i y, measu ed by he p opo ion o
independen boa d membe s and duali y o ceO. (ii) Owne ship Powe , e lec ing he ceO’s in luence
o e compensa ion and decision-making, gauged by he pe cen age o sha es held by he ceO. (iii)
expe Powe , ans e ing he ceO’s knowledge and expe ience, measu ed by ceO enu e. o add ess he
limi a ion o p io s udies measu ing ceOP sepa a ely, he s udy employs he en opy weigh me hodol-
ogy o combine indica o s in able 1. his app oach enhances objec i i y by a oiding human ac o in e -
e ence in indica o weigh s (Ding e al., 2017; Wu e al., 2017). he en opy me hod, p o en eliable in
Table 1. CeoP indica o s.
aspec s Va iables De ini ion
s uc u e powe independence o boa d (Ceo_inDe) he p opo ion is assigned by independen membe s in he o al membe s o he
di ec o boa d.
Duali y (Ceo_DuaL) he dummy a iable is assigned a alue o 1 when he Ceo ac s as he chai man
o he boa d and 0 o he wise.
owne ship powe owne ship (Ceo_oWn) he p opo ion o common sha es being held by he Ceo.
expe powe enu e (Ceo_ enuRe) he du a ion o he Ceo’s enu e in yea s.
sou ce: ang e al. (2011) and Finkels ein (1992).
cOgen BUsiness & ManageMen 7
calcula ing weigh s, is applied a e s anda dizing all ceOP- ela ed a iables. he s udy calcula es each
a iable’s weigh ela ed o ceOP based on en opy alues. ceOP, anging om ze o o one, is hen
de e mined by weigh ing each a iable’s sco e, wi h a highe alue indica ing g ea e ceOP (Dong e al.,
2016; eixei a e al., 2021).
3.3. Models
he ollowing equa ions a e employed o examine he co ela ion be ween he isk- aking beha iou and
ceOP o selec ed i ms in Vie nam. Ou models a e ca ego ized in o 04 dis inc g oups ep esen ing i m
isk, ceOP, i m cha ac e is ics, and mac o ac o s:
FRISK *FRISK *CEOP *SIZE *DEBT
i i i i i
=+ + ++ +
−
βγ β β β
30 3 1 31 32 33
ββ β
β β βε
34 35
36 37 38
*CE *TBQ
*SALEGR *HHI *INF
i i
i i i i
+
+ + ++ (3)
whe e FRiski ep esen s he i m isk- aking and is desc ibed in sec ion 4.2. ceOi e lec s he le el o
ceOP, which is measu ed in sec ion 3.2.2. sOi is measu ed by he pe cen age o sha es held by he s a e
o s a e agen s o s a e-owned en e p ises (nguyen & Wong, 2021).
FRISK *FRISK *CEOP *CEOP *SO *SI
i i i i i
=+ ++ +
−
βγ β β β
50 5 1 51 52 53 ZZE *DEBT *CE
*TBQ *SALEGR *HHI
i i i
i i i
++
++ +
ββ
ββ β
54 55
56 57 58 ++ +
βε
59 *INFi i (4)
as in p io s udies o Zou e al., 2020, nguyen e al. (2020), sheikh (2019), haide and Fang (2018) and
assidi e al. (2016) and o he p e ious s udies, siZei , DeB i , cei , BQi , and salegRi p esen he i m
cha ac e is ics, meanwhile, mac o ac o s include hhii (he indahl-hi schman index), e lec ing ma ke
concen a ion, and in la ion (inFi ), ga he ed om he Wo ld Wide indica o .
εi
ep esen s he esidual. all
o he a ibale desc ip ions a e shown in able 2. hen, we ex end he models by using ceOP cha ac e -
is ics o assess hei di e en ial impac on isk- aking beha iou in he ollowing eg ession model:
FRISK *FRISK *CEOC *SIZE *DEBT
i i i i i
=+ + ++ +
−
βγ β β β
40 4 1 41 42 43
ββ β
β β βε
44 45
46 47 48
*CE *TBQ
*SALEGR *HHI *INF
i i
i i i i
+
+ + ++ (5)
las , we examine he in luence o sO on ceOP and changes in isk- aking beha iou , including he ceOP
index and he componen s o ceOP (ceOc) indexes as ollows:
FRISK *FRISK *CEOC *CEOC *SO *SIZ
i i i i i
=+ ++ +
−
βγ β β β
0 6 1 61 62 63 EE *DEBT *CE
*TBQ *SALEGR *HHI
i i i
i i i
++
++ ++
ββ
ββ β
64 65
66 67 68
ββ ε
69 *INFi i
+ (6)
whe e ceO owne ship (ceO_OWn), ceO duali y (ceO_DUal), ceO enu e (ceO_ enURe) and ceO in
boa d independence (ceO_inDe) a e componen s o ceOc.
Table 2. Va iable desc ip ions.
Va iable De ini ion Measu emen
RisK1 Fi m isk- aking as indica ed in sec ion 3.2.1.
RisK2 Fi m isk- aking as indica ed in sec ion 3.2.1.
CeoP Powe o Ceo as indica ed in sec ion 3.2.2.
so s a e owne ship he p opo ion is assigned by numbe o sha es held by he s a e/s a e agen s/s a e owne ship
en e p ises in o al sha es.
siZe Fi m size o al asse s’ na u al loga i hm a he yea -end.
DeB Fi m deb he p opo ion o o al deb in o al asse s a he yea -end.
Ce Fi m capex expendi u e he p opo ion o capi al cos in o al asse s a he yea -end.
BQ Fi m ma ke alue he a io o ma ke alue o book alue o asse s.
saLegR Fi m de elopmen he annual a e o change in i m sale
HHi He indahl-Hi schman index squa ing he ma ke sha e o each compe ing i m in a gi en ma ke and summing up hese
squa ed alues
inF in la ion he changes in he yea ly consume p ice index
sou ce: au ho .
14 n. . Ran e al.
Baldenius, ., Melumad, n., & Meng, X. (2014). Boa d composi ion and ceO powe . Jou nal o Financial Economics,
112(1), 53–68. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.j ineco.2013.10.004
Band, D. (1992). co po a e go e nance: Why agency heo y is no enough. Eu opean Managemen Jou nal, 10(4),
453–459. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/0263-2373(92)90011-
Benlemlih, M., shauka , a., Qiu, Y., & ojanowski, g. (2016). en i onmen al and social disclosu es and i m isk. Jou nal
o Business E hics, 152(3), 613–626. h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10551-016-3285-5
Ben-nas , h., Boubak i, n., & cosse , J. c. (2015). ea nings quali y in p i a ized i ms: he ole o s a e and o eign
owne s. Jou nal o Accoun ing and Public Policy, 34(4), 392–416. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2014.12.003
Be and, M., & Mullaina han, s. (2003). enjoying he quie li e? co po a e go e nance and manage ial p e e ences.
Jou nal o Poli ical Economy, 111(5), 1043–1075. h ps://doi.o g/10.1086/376950
Bha i, B. h., & sa we , a. (2011). Financial pe o mance o s a e owned en e p ises in eme ging economies. Cha e ed
Ins i u e o Managemen Accoun an s, 8, 1–14.
B aga-al es, M. V., & shas i, k. (2011). co po a e go e nance, alua ion, and pe o mance: e idence om a olun a y
ma ke e o m in B azil. Financial Managemen , 40(1), 139–157. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01137.x
can a, c., nilsen, Ø. a., & Ulsake , s. a. (2023). compe i ion and isk aking in local bank ma ke s: e idence om he
business loans segmen . Jou nal o Empi ical Finance, 73, 153–169. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.jemp in.2023.06.003
chak abo y, a., gao, l., & sheikh, s. (2019). co po a e go e nance and isk in c oss-lis ed and canadian only com-
panies. Managemen Decision, 57(10), 2740–2757. h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/MD-10-2017-1052
cheikh, s. B. (2014). De e minan s o ceO powe and cha ac e is ics o manage ial p o ile: implica ions o isk- aking
in lis ed unisian i ms. In e na ional Jou nal o Economics and Finance, 6(6). h ps://doi.o g/10.5539/ije . 6n6p140
cheng, . Y., lee, c. i., & lin, c. h. (2020). he e ec o isk- aking beha io on P o i abili y: e idence om u u es
ma ke . Economic Modelling, 86, 19–38. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.04.017
chin aka n, P., Ji apo n, P., & ong, s. (2014). how do powe ul ceOs iew co po a e isk- aking? e idence om he
ceO pay slice (cPs). Applied Economics Le e s, 22(2), 104–109. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/13504851.2014.927565
cho, M., & kel ne , D. (2020). Powe , app oach, and inhibi ion: empi ical ad ances o a heo y. Cu en Opinion in
Psychology, 33, 196–200. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.08.013
c ossland, c., Zyung, J., hille , n. J., & hamb ick, D. c. (2014). ceO ca ee a ie y: e ec s on i m-le el s a egic and
social no el y. Academy o Managemen Jou nal, 57(3), 652–674. h ps://doi.o g/10.5465/amj.2012.0469
Da sono, s. n. a. c., Wong, W.-k., nguyen, . . h., & Wa dani, D. . k. (2022). he economic policy unce ain y and
i s e ec on sus ainable in es men : a panel aRDl app oach. Jou nal o Risk and Financial Managemen , 15(6), 254.
h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/j m15060254
Ding, X., chong, X., Bao, Z., Xue, Y., & Zhang, s. (2017). Fuzzy comp ehensi e assessmen me hod based on he en-
opy weigh me hod and i s applica ion in he wa e en i onmen al sa e y e alua ion o he heshangshan d ink-
ing wa e sou ce a ea, h ee go ges ese oi a ea, china. Wa e , 9(5), 329. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/w9050329
Dong, X., lu, h., Xia, Y., & Xiong, Z. (2016). Decision-making model unde isk assessmen based on en opy. En opy,
18(11), 404. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/e18110404
Duong, k. D., an, P. M. D., & Pham, h. (2023). ceO o e powe and co po a e social esponsibili y o comme cial
banks: he mode a ing ole o s a e owne ship. Cogen Economics & Finance, 11(1), 2171609. h ps://doi.o g/10.10
80/23322039.2023.2171609
Faccio, M., Ma chica, M.- ., & Mu a, R. (2011). la ge sha eholde di e si ica ion and co po a e isk- aking. Re iew o
Financial S udies, 24(11), 3601–3641. h ps://doi.o g/10.1093/ s/hh 065
Faccio, M., Ma chica, M.- ., & Mu a, R. (2016). ceO gende , co po a e isk- aking, and he e iciency o capi al alloca-
ion. Jou nal o Co po a e Finance, 39, 193–209. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.jco p in.2016.02.008
Fa ag, h., & Mallin, c. (2016). he in luence o ceO demog aphic cha ac e is ics on co po a e isk- aking: e idence
om chinese iPOs. The Eu opean Jou nal o Finance, 24(16), 1528–1551. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/135184
7X.2016.1151454
Fas , n. J., si ana han, n., Maye , n. D., & galinsky, a. D. (2012). Powe and o e con iden decision-making.
O ganiza ional Beha io and Human Decision P ocesses, 117(2), 249–260. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.11.009
Finkels ein, s. (1992). Powe in op managemen eams: Dimensions, measu emen , and alida ion. Academy o
Managemen Jou nal. Academy o Managemen , 35(3), 505–538. h ps://doi.o g/10.5465/256485
Finkels ein, s., hamb ick, D. c., & cannella, a. a. (2008). Do op execu i es ma e ? in S a egic leade ship (pp. 16–42).
Ox o d Uni e si y P ess.
Foong, s.-s., khong, J.-s., & lim, B.-l. (2021). chinese ceO, isk aking and he powe o ceO: empi ical e idence om
Malaysian amily i ms. Malaysian Jou nal o Economic S udies, 58(1), 59–84. h ps://doi.o g/10.22452/MJes. ol-
58no1.4
haide , J., & Fang, h.-X. (2018). ceO powe , co po a e isk aking and ole o la ge sha eholde s. Jou nal o Financial
Economic Policy, 10(1), 55–72. h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/JFeP-04-2017-0033
haleblian, J., & Finikels ein, s. (1993). op managemen eam size, ceO dominance, and i m pe o mance: he mod-
e a ing oles o en i onmen al u bulence and disc e ion. Academy o Managemen Jou nal, 36(4), 844–863. h ps://
doi.o g/10.2307/256761
han, s., nanda, V. k., & sil e i, s. D. (2016). ceO powe and i m pe o mance unde p essu e. Financial Managemen ,
45(2), 369–400. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/ ima.12127
cOgen BUsiness & ManageMen 15
hang, n. P. . (2022). he impac o go e nance cha ac e is ics on he co po a e pe o mance: e idence om
Vie namese non- inancial lis ed companies. In e na ional Jou nal o Ope a ions and Quan i a i e Managemen , 28(1),
242–258.
hi sh, J. B., galinsky, a. D., & Zhong, c.-B. (2011). D unk, powe ul, and in he da k. Pe spec i es on Psychological
Science: A Jou nal o he Associa ion o Psychological Science, 6(5), 415–427. h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/1745691611416992
hi shlei e , D., low, a., & eoh, s. h. (2012). a e o e con iden ceOs be e inno a o s? The Jou nal o Finance, 67(4),
1457–1498. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x
Jensen, M. c., & Meckling, W. h. (1976). heo y o he i m: Manage ial beha io , agency cos s and owne ship s uc-
u e. Jou nal o Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
Jo, h., & na, h. (2012). Does csR educe i m isk? e idence om con o e sial indus y sec o s. Jou nal o Business
E hics, 110(4), 441–456. h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10551-012-1492-2
kahneman, D., & e sky, a. (1979). P ospec heo y: an analysis o decision unde isk. Econome ica, 47(2), 263.
h ps://doi.o g/10.2307/1914185
kang, Y.-s., & kim, B.-Y. (2012). Owne ship s uc u e and i m pe o mance: e idence om he chinese co po a e e-
o m. China Economic Re iew, 23(2), 471–481. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.03.006
kel ne , D., g uen eld, D. h., & ande son, c. (2003). Powe , app oach, and inhibi ion. Psychological Re iew, 110(2),
265–284. h ps://doi.o g/10.1037/0033-295x.110.2.265
kennedy, J. a., & ande son, c. (2017). hie a chical ank and p incipled dissen : how holding highe ank supp esses
objec ion o une hical p ac ices. O ganiza ional Beha io and Human Decision P ocesses, 139, 30–49. h ps://doi.
o g/10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.01.002
khaw, k. l.-h., no din, s., & Wong, W. c. (2019). Fi m isk and co po a e policies: F om he sha iah ce i ica ion pe -
spec i e. In e na ional Jou nal o Business & Socie y, 20(3), 1257–1275.
kim, k.-h., & Buchanan, R. (2011). ceO duali y leade ship and i m isk- aking p opensi y. Jou nal o Applied Business
Resea ch (JABR), 24(1). h ps://doi.o g/10.19030/jab . 24i1.1364
le, h. . M., kweh, Q. l., ing, i. W. k., & nou ani, M. (2022). ceO powe and ea nings managemen : Dual oles o
o eign sha eholde s in Vie namese lis ed companies. In e na ional Jou nal o Finance & Economics, 27(1), 1240–
1256. h ps://doi.o g/10.1002/ij e.2211
lewellyn, k. B., & Mulle -kahle, M. i. (2012). ceO powe and isk aking: e idence om he subp ime lending indus y.
Co po a e Go e nance: An In e na ional Re iew, 20(3), 289–307. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00903.x
li, J., & ang, Y. (2010). ceO hub is and i m isk aking in china: he mode a ing ole o manage ial disc e ion.
Academy o Managemen Jou nal, 53(1), 45–68. h ps://doi.o g/10.5465/amj.2010.48036912
li, h. (2019). CEO Powe and Risk- aking: Based on he Di e en Owne ship Backg ounds [Pape p esen a ion]. Pape
P esen ed a he 2019 in e na ional con e ence on educa ional Re o m, Managemen science and sociology
(eRMss 2019), shanghai, china.
loukil, n., & Yous i, O. (2022). Do ceO’s a ibu es inc ease isk- aking? empi ical e idence om F ance. Asia-Paci ic
Jou nal o Business Adminis a ion, 15(5), 721–745. h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/aPJBa-07-2021-0330
Mane , J. k., gaillio , M. ., Bu z, D. a., & Pe uche, B. M. (2007). Powe , isk, and he s a us quo. Pe sonali y & Social
Psychology Bulle in, 33(4), 451–462. h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/0146167206297405
Mihe , R. (2013). e ec s o cul u e on i m isk- aking: a c oss-coun y and c oss-indus y analysis. Jou nal o Cul u al
Economics, 37(1), 109–151. h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s10824-012-9186-2
Mi za, s. s., sa da , R., Yu, Y., & gulza , M. a. (2019). Manage ial empowe men and i m isk- aking. SAGE Open, 9(2),
215824401985696. h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/2158244019856963
Mubeen, R., han, D., abbas, J., Ál a ez-O e o, s., & sial, M. s. (2021). he Rela ionship Be ween ceO Duali y and
Business Fi ms’ Pe o mance: he Mode a ing Role o Fi m size and co po a e social Responsibili y. F on ie s In
Psychology, 12, 669715. h ps://doi.o g/10.3389/ psyg.2021.669715
nguyen, . . h., Moslehpou , M., Vo, . . V., & Wong, W.-k. (2020). s a e owne ship and isk- aking beha io : an
empi ical app oach o ge be e p o i abili y, in es men , and ading s a egies o lis ed co po a es in Vie nam.
Economies, 8(2), 46. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/economies8020046
nguyen, . . h., & Wong, W.-k. (2021). Do s a e owne ship and business en i onmen explain co po a e cash hold-
ings? empi ical e idence om an eme ging coun y. Asian Academy o Managemen Jou nal o Accoun ing and
Finance, 17(1), 1–33. h ps://doi.o g/10.21315/aamja 2021.17.1.1
Pa ick, c. J., Fowles, D. c., & k uege , R. F. (2009). ia chic concep ualiza ion o psychopa hy: De elopmen al o igins
o disinhibi ion, boldness, and meanness. De elopmen and Psychopa hology, 21(3), 913–938. h ps://doi.o g/10.1017/
s0954579409000492
P e e , J., & salancik, g. R. (1978). he ex e nal con ol o o ganiza ions: a esou ce dependence pe spec i e. Academy
o Managemen Re iew, 4, 521–532.
Pham, D. h., & Pham, Q. V. (2020). he impac o ceO duali y on i m pe o mance: examining he li e-cycle heo y
in Vie nam. Accoun ing, 737–742. h ps://doi.o g/10.5267/j.ac.2020.6.010
sande s, W. g., & hamb ick, D. c. (2007). swinging o he ences: he e ec s o ceO s ock op ions on company isk
aking and pe o mance. Academy o Managemen Jou nal, 50(5), 1055–1078. h ps://doi.o g/10.5465/
amj.2007.27156438
16 n. . Ran e al.
sassenbe g, k., elleme s, n., & scheepe s, D. (2012). he a ac ion o social powe : he in luence o cons uing pow-
e as oppo uni y e sus esponsibili y. Jou nal o Expe imen al Social Psychology, 48(2), 550–555. h ps://doi.
o g/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.11.008
schweize , D., Walke , ., & Zhang, a. (2019). c oss-bo de acquisi ions by chinese en e p ises: he bene i s and dis-
ad an ages o poli ical connec ions. Jou nal o Co po a e Finance, 57, 63–85. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.jco p-
in.2017.12.023
shabi , M., Jiang, P., shahab, Y., & Wang, P. (2023). geopoli ical, economic unce ain y and bank isk: Do ceO powe
and boa d s eng h ma e ? In e na ional Re iew o Financial Analysis, 87, 102603. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.
i a.2023.102603
shahab, Y., n im, c. g., Ullah, F., Yugang, c., & Ye, Z. (2020). ceO powe and s ock p ice c ash isk in china: Do emale
di ec o s’ c i ical mass and owne ship s uc u e ma e ? In e na ional Re iew o Financial Analysis, 68, 101457.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.i a.2020.101457
sha ma, P., cheng, l. . W., & leung, . Y. (2020). impac o poli ical connec ions on chinese expo i ms’ pe o -
mance: lessons o o he eme ging ma ke s. Jou nal o Business Resea ch, 106, 24–34. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.
jbus es.2019.08.037
sheikh, s. (2019). ceO powe and co po a e isk: he impac o ma ke compe i ion and co po a e go e nance.
Co po a e Go e nance: An In e na ional Re iew, 27(5), 358–377. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/co g.12285
shiah-hou, s.-R. (2021). Powe ul ceOs and ea nings quali y. Manage ial Finance, 47(12), 1714–1735. h ps://doi.
o g/10.1108/MF-07-2020-0363
song, M., Wang, s., & Zhang, h. (2020). could en i onmen al egula ion and R&D ax incen i es a ec g een p oduc
inno a ion? Jou nal o Cleane P oduc ion, 258, 120849. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.jclep o.2020.120849
soude , D., & sha e , J. M. (2010). cons ain s and incen i es o making long ho izon co po a e in es men s. S a egic
Managemen Jou nal, 31(12), 1316–1336. h ps://doi.o g/10.1002/smj.862
ang, J., c ossan, M., & Rowe, W. g. (2011). Dominan ceO, de ian s a egy, and ex eme pe o mance: he mode a ing
ole o a powe ul boa d. Jou nal o Managemen S udies, 48(7), 1479–1503. h ps://doi.o g/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00985.x
eixei a, s. J., Fe ei a, J. J., Wanke, P., & Mo ei a an unes, J. J. (2021). e alua ion model o compe i i e and inno a i e
ou ism p ac ices based on in o ma ion en opy and al e na i e c i e ia weigh . Tou ism Economics, 27(1), 23–44.
h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/1354816619878995
hi Pham, P. M., & hi Dao, B. . (2022). a me a-analysis o isk aking and co po a e pe o mance. Cogen Business &
Managemen , 9(1), 2064263. h ps://doi.o g/10.1080/23311975.2022.2064263
ing, h.-i., chueh, h., & chang, P.-R. (2017). ceO powe and i s e ec on pe o mance and go e nance: e idence om
chinese banks. Eme ging Ma ke s Re iew, 33, 42–61. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j.emema .2017.09.005
an, . P., & le, a.- . (2022). Which o mula o co po a e isk- aking a ound he wo ld? explo ing happiness as he
“black box”. Jou nal o Asian Business and Economic S udies, 29(4), 242–262. h ps://doi.o g/10.1108/
JaBes-01-2021-0009
an, . k., uong, M. ., Bui, k. ., Duong, P. D., huynh, M. V., & nguyen, . . (2023). Fi m isk and ax a oidance in
Vie nam: Do good boa d cha ac e is ics in e e e e ec i ely? Risks, 11(2), 39. Re ie ed om h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/
isks11020039
Uddin, M. h. (2016). e ec o go e nmen sha e owne ship on co po a e isk aking: case o he Uni ed a ab emi a es.
Resea ch in In e na ional Business and Finance, 36, 322–339. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j. iba .2015.09.033
Vo, X. V. (2018). Do i ms wi h s a e owne ship in ansi ional economies ake mo e isk? e idence om Vie nam.
Resea ch in In e na ional Business and Finance, 46, 251–256. h ps://doi.o g/10.1016/j. iba .2018.03.002
Vu, .-h., nguyen, V.-D., ho, M.- ., & Vuong, Q.-h. (2019). De e minan s o Vie namese lis ed i m pe o mance:
compe i ion, wage, ceO, i m size, age, and in e na ional ade. Jou nal o Risk and Financial Managemen , 12(2),
62. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/j m12020062
Wiseman, R. M., & gomez-Mejia, l. R. (1998). a beha io al agency model o manage ial isk aking. The Academy o
Managemen Re iew, 23(1), 133–153. h ps://doi.o g/10.2307/259103
Wu, J., Xue, c., ian, R., & Wang, s. (2017). lake wa e quali y assessmen : a case s udy o shahu lake in he semi-
a id loess a ea o no hwes china. En i onmen al Ea h Sciences, 76(5). h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s12665-017-6516-x
Zhou, k. Z., gao, g. Y., & Zhao, h. (2016). s a e owne ship and i m inno a ion in china: an in eg a ed iew o ins i u-
ional and e iciency logics. Adminis a i e Science Qua e ly, 62(2), 375–404. h ps://doi.o g/10.1177/0001839216674457
Zhou, Y., Zhu, h., Yang, J., & Zou, Y. (2021). Does ceO powe back i e? he impac o ceO powe on co po a e s a-
egic change. Sus ainabili y, 13(16), 8847. h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/su13168847
Zou, h., Qi, g., Xie, X., & Ma, h. (2020). he e ec s o o mal and in o mal ceO powe on i m isk in china: he
media ing ole o co po a e social esponsibili y. Asia Paci ic Business Re iew, 27(5), 749–775. h ps://doi.o g/10.108
0/13602381.2020.1843243
