Winners, Losers, and the Implications of Inequality in Biodiversity Conservation Policies: Insights From European Development Aid to Central Africa

Rasoamanana, Alexandra; Krott, Max; Ongolo, Symphorien Article — Published Version Winners, Losers, and the Implications of Inequality in Biodiversity Conservation Policies: Insights From European Development Aid to Central Africa Environmental Policy and Governance Provided in Cooperation with: John Wiley & Sons Suggested Citation: Rasoamanana, Alexandra; Krott, Max; Ongolo, Symphorien (2025) : Winners, Losers, and the Implications of Inequality in Biodiversity Conservation Policies: Insights From European Development Aid to Central Africa, Environmental Policy and Governance, ISSN 1756-9338, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 35, Iss. 5, pp. 839-851, https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.70004 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/329787 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Environmental Policy and Governance, 2025; 35:839–851 https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.70004 839 Environmental Policy and Governance RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS Winners, Losers, and the Implications of Inequality in Biodiversity Conservation Policies: Insights From European Development Aid to Central Africa AlexandraRasoamanana1 | MaxKrott1 | SymphorienOngolo1,2 1Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, University of Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany | 2SENS/IRDFrance, University of Montpellier PaulValéry 3, Montpellier,France Correspondence: Alexandra Rasoamanana ([email protected]; [email protected]) Received: 13 October 2024 | Revised: 16 April 2025 | Accepted: 19 June 2025 Funding: This work was supported by Volkswagen Foundation, A.Z. 96 964 (FOREQUAL). Keywords: aid allocation| Central Africa| conservation policies| power relations| technical solutions ABSTRACT International aid for biodiversity conservation is expected to provide alternative livelihoods for forestdependent communities to offset restrictions on forest use. This aligns with the contemporary conservation discourse that promotes propoor, human rightsbased, and sustainability principles. We used the Central Africa Forest Ecosystem Program (ECOFAC), the longestrunning EUfunded initiative with nearly 200 million euros invested for about 30 years, as a case study to analyze how international aid, has attempted to achieve fair and sustainable conservation practices. Through a longitudinal study of the design of ECOFAC, we assessed its implementation arrangements, budget distribution, prioritized technical solutions, and target actors to identify to whom it has benefited the most (winners) and for whom it has not been beneficial or even harmful (losers). Our findings show that the EU biodiversity conservation program has prioritized the reinforcement of state administrations to strengthen their coercive power in protected areas. A codependency has developed between transnational actors, preferred by the EU as implementing partners, and state conservation actors. This relationship has become a barrier to meaningful reform within ECOFAC despite decades of policy learning. The propoor discourse and human rights concerns of the EU aid have not been reflected in the types of activities funded nor in the level of investments aimed at incentivizing forestdependent communities to support conservation restrictions. EU policymakers need to pay more attention to how their interventions in biodiversity conservation policies create or reinforce power asymmetries and inequality, especially in Central Africa. 1 | Introduction Tropical biodiversity and ecosystems are increasingly recognized as global public goods (Scales2017), valued not only for their critical ecosystem services (Dargie etal.2017; Lawrence and Vandecar 2015) but also for their vital role in advancing global sustainability (Bonan2008; Lawrence etal.2022). This recognition has led to a rise in international aid directed toward biodiversity conservation in tropical forest regions (Miller2014; Reed et al. 2020). Despite this trend, biodiversity loss and deforestation remain alarmingly high (Mace et al. 2018). At the same time, persistent issues of social inequality and injustice continue to characterize many conservation initiatives (Kashwan2017; Luoma2022). Much of the literature on biodiversityrelated international aid has focused on the geographical allocation of funds to forestrich tropical countries (Qin etal.2022; Waldron etal.2013), as well as on the effects of such aid on deforestation rates (Bare et al. 2015) and development outcomes (Waeber et al. 2016). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2025 The Author(s). Environmental Policy and Governance published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 840 Environmental Policy and Governance, 2025 However, fewer studies have analyzed which actors benefit the most from specific technical solutions prioritized within these aidfunded policies (Corson2018). This paper addresses this gap by analyzing how the design of aidfunded conservation policies empowers certain actors through access to resources, enhanced capabilities, and increased agency to pursue both formal and informal interests. In many forestrich and aiddependent countries, conservation policies are often designed via technocratic processes led by experts from transnational organizations such as western consultancy firms, transnational conservation NGOs, and international multilateral and development agencies (Majambu et al. 2021; Sarrasin 2007). These actors are often in close collaboration with influential bureaucrats in the recipient countries to legitimize their intervention in the policy process (Diallo2012; Ehrenstein2013). These topdown approaches often lack meaningful democratic engagement and tend to favo r actors with the strategic capacity to align with donor expectations while benefiting elite bureaucrats in aid recipient countries (Trefon2011). Using policy design theory, this paper analyzes the content and implications of conservation policy solutions to identify which actors have been advantaged or disadvantaged by implementation (Schneider and Ingram1997). By interrogating the embedded preferences and exclusions within selected policies, the analysis sheds light on the power dynamics at play and enables discussion on the broader political and social implications for sustainability, poverty alleviation, and equity. This study adopts a Weberian conceptualization of power as the ability of an actor to impose their will despite resistance (Weber1978), to explore how conservation policy design and implementation in aiddependent settings reflect unequal relationships among involved and affected actors. In these settings, actors often mobilize various powerbased instruments, such as coercion, economic capital, political influence, discursive frameworks, symbolic representations, and dominant information, to influence policies in ways that maximize their material and nonmaterial gains (Karsenty and Ongolo2012; Marijnen and Verweijen2016; Poteete and Ribot2011). Since the late 1980s, the European Union (EU) has been a leading donor in efforts to reconcile biodiversity conservation and development in Central Africa, notably through the European Development Fund (EDF) (Landell Mills2022, 5). The EU has financed numerous regional and national initiatives1 to promote biodiversity conservation for both local development and global sustainability. Among these, the Central Africa Forest Ecosystem program (ECOFAC) stands out as the longestrunning EUfunded program, with nearly 200 million euros allocated over 30 years of policy interventions. Across its six phases (1992–2024), the programme has consistently aimed to reconcile biodiversity conservation and development objectives in selected Central African countries. In a 2022 speech celebrating 30 years of the program- , Gilberto Da Piedade Verissimo, President of ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), referred to ECOFAC as an initiative contributing to the creation of a “biodiversity conservation economy” (ECOFAC 2022, 4), emphasizing its developmental aspirations. Using ECOFAC as a case study, this paper analyzes the distributional effects of international aid in conservation policy to identify those who have benefited the most (winners) and those for whom it has not been beneficial or even harmful (losers). This analysis provides insights into how biodiversity conservation strategies funded by international aid are designed and implemented in line with propoor approaches, human rights commitments, and sustainability objectives. 2 | Theoretical and Analytical Framework Policy design theory posits that the deliberation process involved in formulating policy solutions is socially constructed (Schneider and Ingram1997). The resulting technical choices, often reflect the power dynamics between actors who stand to benefit most (Cairney2021). However, from the perspective of development practitioners with significant influence over policy design and implementation in aiddependent countries, this process is typically seen as a technical, neutral and antipolitics exercise (Li2007, 7). In practice, the selection of instruments or technical solutions is not always anchored in knowledgebased and truly participatory approaches (Ehrenstein 2013; Walters et al. 2021). It often fails to align goals, actors' interests and means toward longterm solutions jointly defined by all actors, undermining fair and equitable biodiversity conservation and development objectives (Corson2017). In aiddependent contexts, policy design is often influenced more by the preferences of powerful actors, such as donors, state administration in the recipient countries, and international organizations, than by the needs of affected communities (Nago2021). As a result, aid allocation and the selection of technical solutions tend to be driven by strategic and interestbased agendas (Rahman and Giessen2017), rather than by equitable, needsbased considerations (Rasoamanana etal.2023). 2.1 | Policy Design Theory and the Social Construction of an Unequal Conservation Policy Reform Central Africa states are home to the Congo Basin forests, the second largest tropical forest after the Amazon (Vancutsem etal.2021). These forests host a high level of biodiversity, including many endemic and charismatic species such as gorillas, elephants, lions, okapis, and bonobos (Grantham etal.2020). This ecological richness has attracted international donors and transnational conservation NGOs, which have strongly encouraged the creation or expansion of staterun protected areas in the region (Proces etal.2021). To date, about 15% of the Congo Basin forests fall within protected areas, with most restrictions affecting forestdependent land users (Walters and Wardell2023). Despite increased conservation funding (Favada et al. 2025), biodiversity and forest loss persist both within and beyond protected areas (Tyukavina etal.2018). These losses are often linked to the livelihood strategies of forest dependent landusers, which are influenced by both local needs and global market demands (Ladewig etal.2024; Trefon2023). Depictions of marginalized, apolitical forestdependent communities as principal drivers of deforestation and biodiversity loss (Shapiro 841 etal.2023) contribute to their negative portrayal in conservation discourse and policy (Windey and Van Hecken2019; Wong etal.2022). This stigmatizing social construction can significantly influence policy decisions, particularly in determining who is considered eligible to benefit from a policy and who is expected to bear its costs (Schneider and Ingram1993). International conservation aid in the region is framed as supporting technical solutions that are just, sustainable, and inclusive (ECOFAC2022; USAID2022). These interventions aim to address conservation and development challenges without exacerbating poverty or inequality. However, achieving conservation outcomes that are simultaneously fair, locally beneficial, and globally sustainable remains a major challenge (Ramutsindela etal.2022). A central question is how development practitioners are responding to these challenges through the bricolage of technical solutions integrated into aidfunded programs and projects such as ECOFAC. In this context, bricolage refers to the use of theory of change (ToC) approaches, where timebound desired outcomes are pursued through a combination of technical solutions (Cleaver2012). These solutions focus on particular actors who, in turn, gain the capacity to influence behavior and actions aligned with policy goals. Drawing on policy design theory (Schneider and Sidney2009), four variables are particularly useful in assessing the distributional effect of policy solutions, to define the winners and losers (Table1): (i) implementation arrangement; (ii) budget distribution; (iii) technical solutions; and (iv) target actors. 2.2 | Method for Analysing Inequality and Policy Implications Within the EU ECOFAC Programme This empirical study tests the hypothesis that EUregional aid for biodiversity conservation has focused on reinforcing state control over protected areas while putting marginal investment in longterm solutions supporting forest dependent communities. This hypothesis draws on existing literatures which describes how the state administrations in Central Africa countries (Ongolo2015) and elsewhere (Diallo2015; Horning2008), despite their negative constructions, remain in dominant positions in forest and biodiversity conservation governance, capturing the benefits of international aid. To assess this hypothesis, we employed a longitudinal method to collect both qualitative and quantitative data over the 30year period of ECOFAC. We reviewed policy documents such as financial agreements, reports, and evaluations (Annex 3), complemented by 48 interviews with consultants, government officials, and conservation NGOs (Annex 4). Snowball sampling allowed us to engage both current and former individuals and organizations involved in the program, offering deeper insights into the policy process. Field observations were carried out in two longsupported ECOFAC protected areas: Lopé National Park (Gabon, July 2022) and Dja Faunal Reserve (Cameroon, February 2023) (Figure1). A total of 68 forestdependent landusers participated in interviews and focus group discussions within these protected areas. Our observations extended to regional political arenas by attending the 19th meeting of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, held in early July 2022 in Libreville, Gabon. All data were coded and analyzed to identify patterns and shifts in ECOFAC implementation arrangements, funding distribution, technical solutions, and targeted actors across the 30year period. 3 | Results 3.1 | Enduring Policy Priorities Despite Evolving Implementation and Budget Shifts Analysis of the financial allocation within the ECOFAC program shows an uneven distribution of funding across four categories: (a) the formulation of objectives, (b) the technical solutions TABLE 1 | Variables for assessing inequality implications in policy solution design. Observed variable Scientific questioning Description Implementation arrangement Which actors decide on budget allocation and which technical solutions are prioritized? Who designs and executes technical solutions? The bureaucratic rules structuring implementation, clarifying roles and determining who is involved in designing and executing policy solutions at various stages (Annex 1). Budget distribution How much funding is allocated to each actor and technical solution? What rules guide allocation? The financial resources allocated to technical solutions and recipient countries. Budget distribution reveals which activities and actors receive the most or least funding. Technical solutions What technical solutions support biodiversity conservation and development objectives? How have these evolved to enhance impact? Activities or processes designed to generate specific outputs expected to lead to desired outcomes. These solutions can be implemented at various levels (site, actor, scale) (Annex 2). Target actors Who were the target actors? Which actors benefited most from the technical solutions and why? Various actors played different roles in designing, executing and benefiting from the selected technical solutions. The target actors may include state organizations, NGOs, or forestdependent communities. 842 Environmental Policy and Governance, 2025 supported, (c) the actors in charge of implementation and (d) the scales of interventions (Figure2). When grouping the technical solutions financed through ECOFAC, there is a clear prioritization of biodiversity conservation over community development. The latter received less than 10% of the total budget (Figure2a). Over the course of three decades, the most frequently supported technical approaches were those that reinforced commandandcontrol mechanisms of state administrations in charge of protected areas, especially through financing operational management costs (Figure2b). Regarding implementation arrangements, transnational nonstate actors have consistently been favored as direct recipients of EU funding (Figure2c). The allocation of funds across Central African countries has varied significantly across ECOFAC phases, shaped largely by political and diplomatic relations between national governments and the EU (Figure 2d). For instance, although the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaïre) has been included in the program since the early 1990s, political instability disrupted ECOFAC implementation. Equatorial Guinea was removed from the list of beneficiary countries after 2011, following its reclassification under the Cotonou Agreement in 2008. Although implementation arrangements and budget allocations have evolved over time, these changes largely reflect underlying political power dynamics among actors involved in the program. Despite these shifts, the continued reliance on coercivebased conservation measures has kept forest dependent landusers in a marginal position, particularly when compared to the consistent support directed toward state administrations and the transnational nonstate actors leading ECOFAC implementation. FIGURE 1 | Map of protected areas in Central Africa Member States highlighting protected areas benefiting from ECOFAC and nonECOFAC phase 6 and protected areas of ECOFAC observed (database OFACCOMIFAC2022 and UNEPWCMC and IUCN2022). 843 3.2 | Navigating Dual Allegiances: The Political Strategies of Transnational Actors in Shaping Policy Priorities ECOFAC began as a centralized program but gradually adopted a polycentric model involving a wider range of actors. Three actors influenced its design and priorities by shaping technical solutions and funding decisions (Annex 5). First were the signatories of financial agreements compromising EU officials (from the Commission and delegations) and elite bureaucrats from Central African states. Second were the organizations contracted by the EU mainly Western consultancy firms and transnational conservation NGOs to design technical solutions prior to the signatory of the financial agreements (EU2016, 16–32). Third were the implementing bodies, including transnational actors, national administrations, and local civil society organizations registered in Central Africa. From 1992 to 2010, ECOFAC followed a centralized model, with Western consultancy firms collaborating closely with national administrations for protected areas. During the 1990s, these actors framed conservation issues in Central Africa as resulting from institutional weaknesses, arguing that: “While conservation policies have been implemented for several decades in various parts of Africa, it must be acknowledged that Central Africa's experience in this area is more limited. Often highly centralized and dramatically lacking in resources, the administrations in charge of protected areas have had few opportunities to implement conservation program.” (AGRECO1996, 12). This framing justified reforms aimed at strengthening state structures, reactivating the management of protected areas established during the colonial era (e.g., Dja reserve, Odzala NP and Lopé NP) and creating new ones (e.g., Obo NP). Consultancy firms were granted considerable flexibility to develop technical responses tailored to state administration needs (AGRECO1996, 12–14). EU bureaucrats, national bureaucrats, and consultancy experts collaborated closely, particularly in setting priorities. As one former expert observed: “the power to set priorities was in the hands of those who managed the fund. It was about buying expensive materials abroad, providing sophisticated monitoring material to equip the forest administration to carry the surveillance of protected areas. There was not much left to do proper community development.” (I25, former expert from nonstate organization). Community development was further sidelined due to the absence of interdisciplinary teams in decisionmaking roles. An independent evaluation report stated that: “The academic profiles and expertise of the component managers, who are generally more specialized in biology than in sociology or community development, have had a decisive influence on the priorities established.” (Earth2003, 29). A shift occurred during phase 5 (2011–2015), when the EU delegated implementation responsibilities to regional bodies such as ECCAS and RAPAC2. ECCAS led statedriven policy coordination, while RAPAC operated as a regional NGO for protected area management. Despite these structural changes, Western consultancy firms retained control over technical design and the selection of implementing partners (AGRECO2011). These reforms aimed to align ECOFAC with regional frameworks, including the 1999 Yaoundé Declaration and the COMIFAC Convergence Plan (2005–2015). However, implementation was hindered by rigid funding structures and continued reliance on international consultants, which limited institutional capacitybuilding as impending ownership (Geotest and Particip GmbH2015, 20–21). The expansion of the program across the region was not matched by proportional funding, leading to limited support for community initiatives: “The level of investment for incomegenerating activities for local communities (1.5 million FIGURE 2 | Matching percentage of funds allocated through ECOFAC since 1992 until the midterm evaluation report in 2021 based on objectives (a), activities (b), implementing actors (c) and scales (d). 844 Environmental Policy and Governance, 2025 euros) is largely insufficient for a largescale programme such as ECOFAC 5.” (Geotest and Particip GmbH2015, 14). The ongoing reliance on Western consultancies perpetuated a pattern of repetitive technical solutions and maintained inequalities established in earlier phases. Phase 6 (2017–2024) introduced a polycentric funding structure (EU2016, 9), in which grants were provided directly to private and nonprofit organizations working under formal agreements with national administrations. These agreements took the form of delegated management arrangements lasting 10–25 years, comanagement for up to 10 years, or shortterm technical assistance contracts lasting 1–5 years (BRL ingénierie2021, 13). Gabon was a notable exception. The government rejected the model involving intermediary organizations and received direct funding from the EU, channeled through the national park agency (ANPN) without participation by external nonstate actors. In contrast, other countries in Central Africa faced significant pressure from donors to adopt governance models based on delegation to private or nongovernmental actors. As noted in a program evaluation: “the way in which ECOFAC evolved during this phase 6 can be misunderstood locally. Indeed, the program moved from a rationale of direct support to public administrations to one of supporting operators who, in principle, act on behalf of and under mandate from these public administrations. However, in Sao Tomé and Principe, the selected operator, BirdLife and its partners, does not benefit from total management delegation, as is the case for other operators of the program. Its contractual framework for intervention with the national authorities is based on the technical assistance model and consists of three memorandums of understanding (with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Environment for Sao Tomé, and with the Autonomous Region of Principe) which define BirdLife's mandate in a rather broad way, which can be a source of divergent interpretations.” (BRL ingénierie 2021, 32). Despite shifts in funding structures and institutional actors, transnational organizations have consistently retained the mandate to design technical components (see Figure2c). Gabon's ability to secure direct EU funding highlights how power dynamics enable certain states to bypass intermediaries. Most Central African governments lacked this leverage, underscoring how transnational actors strategically navigate their dual allegiance to both EU institutions and domestic bureaucracies (I11, civil servant, forest administration). This dual alignment has allowed them to secure privileged access to funding and shape the design of the program. 3.3 | CoerciveBased Technical Solutions to Reinforce State Administration Authority Over Protected Areas Biodiversity conservation efforts in Central Africa through ECOFAC have largely relied on two interlinked strategies: the expansion of staterun protected areas and the reinforcement of their operational capacities through technical and material support. The first strategy focused on enlarging the network of protected areas where strict regulations on access and resource use were enforced. By 2017, the conservation areas receiving management funding under ECOFAC had increased twelvefold from 1,586,000 ha in 1992 to 20,109,800 ha (Figure3). This expansion was supported by financial resources and technical expertise, facilitating the creation of new national parks such as Monte Alen National Park (NP) in Equatorial Guinea, Obo NP in Sao tomé Principe NP, Mbaéré Bodingué NP in Central African Republic in 2007 (Earth2003, 172) and the contested3 creation of Messok Dja NP in the Republic of Congo. Existing parks were extended. For instance, OdzalaKokoua NP in the Republic of Congo grew from 28,300 ha in 1935 to 1,354,600 ha in 2001, a 45% increase (Earth2003, 171). Program actors emphasized that “ECOFAC is the first regional foreign aid in the forest sector to revive the management of former national parks and reserves implemented during the colonial period in the Congo Basin and to expand them to meet the land requirements for large iconic species such as the elephant and gorilla to thrive.” (I2, civil servant from a forest administration). Despite longstanding tensions with forestdependent communities, ECOFAC played a pivotal role in supporting statemanaged protected areas (AGRECO2002, vi). Internal assessments claimed the program contributed to the management costs of 40% of protected areas in Central Africa and facilitated the legal designation or boundary expansion of 15% (ECOFAC2022, 12). The second strategy centred on strengthening the operational capacities of protected area management units. This entailed equipping ecoguards and managers with the necessary tools and infrastructure to enforce access restrictions. Financial, technical, and material inputs delivered across successive program phases enabled the construction and maintenance of access roads, life base camps, and ecoguard posts (e.g., in. AGRECO1996, 11; Earth2003, 172–173; Landell Mills2021, 4). Surveillance equipment such as allterrain vehicles, GPS units, and camera traps further enhanced monitoring capabilities (e.g., in AGRECO1996, 15; BRL ingénierie 2021, 61). Training initiatives targeted primarily on ecoguards and government officials, covering law enforcement, spatial analysis, and species monitoring (e.g., in AGRECO1996, 20; BRL ingénierie 2010, 8; Landell Mills2021, 4). Knowledge production was also supported, particularly in relation to species assessments and patrol system development. However, this research was criticized for being “more fundamental than applied,” benefiting the research institutions more than ontheground park management (Earth2003 171). Much of this data was centralized within the Central Africa Forest Observatory (OFAC) to archive policy documents and grey literature to support regional actors. Beyond fieldbased interventions, ECOFAC contributed to biodiversityrelated policy reform at both national and regional levels, primarily through funding expert consultancy services. For example, during the 2007–2010 phase, the lead implementing agency, supported the drafting of at least 12 implementing decrees for NPs in Gabon (BRL ingénierie 2010, 9). At the regional level, 11 policy decisions were endorsed by ECCAS in 2015, including declarations against poaching4 and in support of the green economy5 (Geotest and Particip GmbH2015, 22). These legal reforms emphasized restrictive measures to enforce conservation through myriad statutory tools. As one civil servant noted, the program aimed to equip governments with legal mechanisms to assert control over forest resources: “In 845 the 1990s and early 2000s, ECOFAC, although conceived as a regional program, focused on the level of protected areas in the different countries. It worked on the adoption of legal means such as the protected area code, restriction on wildlife consumption and commercialisation. These regulations were mainly based on the idea of strengthening state control over the use of forest resources through legal means. In 2015, ECCAS played a key institutional role in transforming this national focus on regional policy reform that was expected to be easily adopted and translated into country law.” (I9, civil servant from state organization). Evaluation reports, narrative accounts, interviews with actors, and field observations reveal that ECOFAC invested considerable effort in legitimizing and institutionalizing the coercive authority of state bureaucracies and their nonstate partners in protected area management. As Figures2 and 3 illustrate, the majority of funding supported “fence and fine” strategies, whereby land use and settlement conflicts were primarily addressed through restrictive regulations. According to a former practitioner in ECOFAC: “Protected area could not get out of the paper park problem without the resources provided by ECOFAC. Many of the investments of ECOFAC 1 to 3 have been the basis for having an operational unit of its own for the management of the park. Infrastructure was built, such as a life base camp, roads and patrol tracks. Financial resources have been given to support staff through per diems and bonuses because you know that salaries in administration cannot cover even your basic monthly needs.” (I10, civil servant from state organization). However, this coercive and resourceintensive model proved financially unsustainable (AGRECO2005, iv; Earth2003, 181; Landell Mills2018, 39). A dependency on ECOFAC funding was established, and the experience of those working in these protected areas was: “Every time ECOFAC is in transition from one phase to another, the site simply stops. We no longer have an operating budget to continue work properly, such as patrols, due to lack of fuel. But the worst is that the ecoguards are left without per diems which are for many their official salary as they were recruited under the ECOFAC project.” (I26, former expert from nonstate organization). This statement was confirmed by the independent evaluation carried in 2006: “The cessation or slowing down of field actions on ECOFAC sites in each country in 2003 has led to a deterioration in essential management structures (infrastructure, buildings, equipment, means of transport, administrative structures, etc.)” (DRN etal.2006, 133). Although each implementation phase of ECOFAC has exposed the limitations of an overreliance on coercive enforcement, this approach continues to underpin dominant conservation practices. 3.4 | Marginalization of Investment in IncentiveBased Measures for ForestDependent LandUsers In 1992, forest dependent landusers began contesting the presence of the ECOFAC within protected areas, as stated by a report: “Furthermore, the implementation of ECOFAC at protected area level has also encountered numerous problems of misunderstanding with local populations, who often live in very precarious conditions, take little interest in conservation imperatives and are essentially looking for a material improvement in their living conditions.” (AGRECO1996, 12). In response, ECOFAC implemented a community development approach intended to foster acceptance of landuse restrictions among forest dependent communities and demonstrate to state administrations the economic value of maintaining protected areas. Three strategies were developed depending on the ecological and social context of each protected area, as well as on the primary threats to biodiversity. These involved promoting tourism based on natural attractions, developing incomegenerating activities as alternatives to traditional practices, and building or renovating infrastructure in neighboring villages. Between 1992 and 2005, ecotourism was promoted in protected areas such as Odzala NP in the Republic of the Congo, Obo NP in São Tomé and Príncipe, Monte Alén NP in Equatorial Guinea, and Lopé NP in Gabon. However, the limited economic impact at both local and national levels led FIGURE 3 | Evolution of area covered by the ECOFAC programme and fund allocated to the protected areas. 846 Environmental Policy and Governance, 2025 to skepticism among local communities and state authorities. Misunderstandings arose over expected financial benefits. “[…] expectations regarding the benefits of tourism development: most of the time, revenues and profits are confused, and even the administrations in charge think that as soon as there are revenues, they must be redistributed to the State and the local population. However, they don't always realize the investments and costs involved in tourism development operations in very difficult access conditions.” (AGRECO2002, 155). The essential conditions for ecotourism development were lacking in many protected areas supported by ECOFAC such as essential infrastructure, political stability, and affordability: “In terms of tourism development, the aim was to consolidate the potential of the Monte Alén, Odzala and Lopé sites, and to a lesser extent Sao Tomé, and to entrust the management of these activities to private operators. Unfortunately, this objective was only partially achieved, for a variety of reasons: sociopolitical unrest and the Ebola epidemic (Odzala), insufficient resources (directed to each protected area to promote ecotourism), lack of political will or response (Lopé) to privatization procedures for tourism management, etc.” (AGRECO2005, vii). Despite the unsuccessful attempt to stimulate thriving ecotourism in the early phases of ECOFAC, this activity remained supported in later phases (Geotest and Particip GmbH 2015, 15; Landell Mills2021, 44). Where ecotourism succeeded, it remained accessible only to elite visitors6. For example, in Odzala NP, a 7day visit including a gorilla trek cost around 13,000 euros per person. Despite the acclaimed success of Odzala NP7, the fragility of ecotourism as a reliable income source was evident: “In the wake of the COVID19 pandemic, the halt to tourist activity has had an impact on business, as a percentage of the 5% tax levied on tourists is paid into the community development fund (FDC). This fund has not been supplied since the closure of the borders and the lockdown decreed in April 2020 in Congo, and although most control measures have been relaxed by the government, the park remains closed to tourists to this day.” (BRL ingénierie 2021, 22). In addition to ecotourism, alternative livelihood initiatives were developed in response to the specific needs and pressures of each protected area. These initiatives aimed to offer forest users new forms of employment and to promote practices compatible with biodiversity conservation. Based on document review and fieldwork, approximately 11 types of employment not previously available in the area were introduced. These jobs included positions such as ecoguard, ecoguide, field research assistant, housekeeper, luggage porter, temporary intensive labor for infrastructure construction or renovation, rural animator, field guardian, grocer, craftsman carpenter and brickmaker. However, access to these jobs often required basic education or specific competencies, such as literacy, knowledge of other languages, or physical endurance. For instance, in Mbaéré Bodingué NP (Ngotto Forest complex) in Central African Republic: “the impact in terms of employment of the ECOFAC installation on the intervention sector was quite low due to the lack of qualified local labor.” (AGRECO 1996, 121). Even when skills were present, job availability remained insufficient. For example, in Lopé NP in Gabon: “25 ecoguards had their salary and training paid by the ECOFAC programme” in 2017 (BRL ingénierie 2021, 16) compared to the number of potential applicants among the 1214 forestdependent land users identified8 in 2002 as living around the park. In other words, the number of jobs offered by ECOFAC in the case of Lopé NP provided only about 2% of the local inhabitants with an employment opportunity. In Mbaéré Bodingué NP in Central African Republic: “18 ecoguards were trained but only 4 were recruited in the site.” (AGRECO1996, 110). Furthermore, as these roles were funded through temporary project budgets, employment opportunities fluctuated. Jobs would often disappear, reappear, or change in alignment with ECOFAC priorities and funding. An example of this situation was reported in the case of Mbaéré Bodingué NP (Ngotto Forest complex): “In 1995, the ECOFAC team recruited and trained 6 local rural animators. In theory, these animators were to act as a link between the ECOFAC team and villagers. Unfortunately, this training led the animators to believe that they would be hired permanently by the ECOFAC team, which was never the case. This misunderstanding led to a host of subsequent problems. In 1998, the animator team was strengthened to 10 people, but the recurring problem of hiring remained unresolved. This highlighted the fact that the people chosen by the ECOFAC team to be the real “drivers” of development were in fact only interested in becoming employees.” (AGRECO2005, 200). Beyond job security, different conditions required for decent work were also questionable in terms of risk or proven situations of unfairness and inequity: “One day, I was hit by a buffalo, and I was pregnant at that time. I had to be hospitalised. I did not ask for a medical certificate at the hospital as I was afraid to lose my job by complaining about the situation.” (I20, forestdependent land user). Various initiatives in agriculture, animal husbandry, and harvesting of nontimber forest products (NTPF) were introduced to reach a broader group of forest users. In 2020, a compensation scheme for crop losses caused by wildlife was also introduced in Odzala NP. These projects aimed to reduce reliance on hunting by introducing fish farming, poultry rearing, beekeeping, and goat husbandry, to discourage slashandburn agriculture through the promotion of cash and subsistence crops, and to link smallscale producers to markets (Geotest and Particip GmbH2015, 15; BRL ingénierie 2021, 26). The limited success of these activities was linked to three issues. First, the alternative promoted was poorly designed to match forestdependent land users' priorities, as for example in Monte Alen NP in Equatorial Guinea: “Livestock activities were also initiated (grasscutters, snails, goats, etc.), but these practices did not fit with the local sociocultural context, they did not gain the support of the local population. The activities were soon abandoned by the people responsible for them. The ECOFAC project also tried to revitalize agriculture by offering to subsidize a truck to take production to Bata. In most cases, the truck made the journey empty, and the experiment was stopped.” (AGRECO2002, 126). Second, the shortterm support provided by the project failed to consider the longterm assistance needed to ensure the adoption of the alternative practices: “During the 5 years of ECOFAC, there have been only two cycles of calls for projects for community development. All these projects have a maximum duration of 2 years. It is highly doubtful that this type of funding can produce sustainable results. No project promoter (except APN in OdzalaKokoua) has been able to provide longterm support to communities in developing these incomegenerating activities.” (Geotest and Particip