Ho o i z, Li iu; Suh, Elisabe h
Resea ch Repo
T ump II and US nuclea assu ances in he Indo-Paci ic:
Why Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea ha e o he
conce ns
SWP Commen , No. 36/2024
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Ge man Ins i u e o In e na ional and Secu i y A ai s,
Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Ho o i z, Li iu; Suh, Elisabe h (2024) : T ump II and US nuclea assu ances in
he Indo-Paci ic: Why Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea ha e o he conce ns, SWP Commen , No.
36/2024, S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Be lin,
h ps://doi.o g/10.18449/2024C36
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
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NO.
36
AUGUST 2024
In oduc ion
T ump II and US Nuclea Assu ances in
he Indo-Paci ic
Why Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea Ha e O he Conce ns
Li iu Ho o i z and Elisabe h Suh
While hea ed deba es in Eu ope ha e ocused on how o espond i Donald J. T ump
is e-elec ed o he Whi e House, discussions in Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea
e eal a g ea e sense o con idence in Washing on’s commi men s. The ea ha he
Uni ed S a es would wi hd aw i s nuclea assu ances is much less p onounced in
he Indo-Paci ic han in Eu ope. This se eni y appea s p ima ily g ounded in a sha ed
unde s anding ha a bipa isan consensus is d i ing he US commi men o con ain
China’s ise – a goal ha equi es eliable allies ac oss he Paci ic. A he same ime,
US allies wan o main ain he egional s a us quo and a e willing o suppo Washing-
on’s e o s. T ump’s po en ial e u n does li le o change hese s uc u al incen-
i es. Ins ead, Paci ic allies ea challenges o he Eas Asian egional o de , challenges
ha a e also ele an o Eu ope’s secu i y and p ospe i y.
Eu opean and Paci ic US allies sha e simila
conce ns abou a po en ial second T ump
adminis a ion: allies e e ywhe e ea ha
T ump would once again pu sue a ans-
ac ional app oach o US o eign policy.
Dispu es be ween allies would play ou in
public, unse ling domes ic popula ions,
deligh ing ad e sa ies, and endange ing
he pe cei ed c edibili y o he common
de ence policy. Gi en T ump’s penchan
o cosying up o au oc a s, bo h Eu opean
and Paci ic allies wo y ha Washing on
will ei he ade away key sha ed in e es s
o ex ac ques ionable concessions om
dic a o s o , i nego ia ions ail (again), ha
T ump will d ag hem in o unwan ed
con lic s.
Howe e , beyond hese sha ed conce ns,
policymake s in Canbe a, Seoul, and Tokyo
seem o be mo e con iden . They belie e
hey know how o manage T ump’s ego and
can o e him luc a i e deals. Fu he mo e,
hey assume ha a second T ump adminis-
a ion will emain engaged in he Wes e n
Paci ic, necessi a ing he p esence o eli-
able pa ne s o main ain in luence and
con ain China. These assump ions do no
lead o ewe conce ns, bu o less unda-
men al conce ns in ans-Paci ic ela ions.
Howe e , Eu opean allies exp ess ea ha
T ump may seek o unde mine o e en e -
mina e NATO, which would esul in he
wi hd awal o US nuclea assu ances. E en
in Sou h Ko ea, public deba e abou i s own
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
2
nuclea weapons is p ima ily ocused on he
pe cei ed h ea om No h Ko ea, a he
han on conce ns wi hin he alliance.
I is p ima ily he changed egional bal-
ance o powe and China’s ambi ions ha
wo y he ans-Paci ic allies. On he one
hand, he ex ensi e compe i ion be ween
he US and China gi es ise o he expec a-
ion ha Washing on will emain engaged
and ha he secu i y ela ionship and
ex ended nuclea de e en in he Paci ic will
emain s able. On he o he hand, his com-
pe i ion demons a es o Paci ic allies ha
he ac ions o he cu en and subsequen
US adminis a ions will ha e a decisi e
impac on he e olu ion o he balance o
powe and he egional cons ella ion in he
decades o come. The e is he e o e conce n
ha a ansac ional second T ump adminis-
a ion could unde mine p o ac ed join
e o s o main ain o de , laying he g ound-
wo k o e en ual Chinese dominance in
his s a egically impo an egion.
A changing mili a y
balance o powe
Regional and global economic, poli ical,
and echnological de elopmen s a e shi -
ing he balance o powe in he Asia-Paci ic
egion in e y di e en ways han in Eu ope.
A e all, he s a ing posi ion is comple ely
di e en : Russia’s economy is only one-
en h he size o he EU’s, and Eu ope lacks
poli ical esol e and ope a ional mili a y
capabili ies a he han esou ces pe se. The
c i ical ques ions a e whe he he Uni ed
S a es would de end Eu ope in a geog aph-
ically limi ed c isis, whe he he Wes e n
Eu opean na ions would go o wa o hei
Eas e n Eu opean allies, and whe he he
cu en o ces a e adequa e o de e o epel
Russian agg ession.
In con as , China’s economy is almos
wo and a hal imes la ge han he com-
bined economies o Aus alia, Japan, and
Sou h Ko ea – a di e ence ha oughly
mi o s he dispa i y in mili a y spending.
While Eu opeans ha e consciously delega ed
hei secu i y o Washing on, US allies in
he Wes e n Paci ic ha e limi ed op ions
o de eloping hei own con en ional
capabili ies o coun e balance China.
Hence, he US allies a e p ima ily con-
ce ned wi h China’s de e mina ion o e-
shape egional dynamics. Unde Xi Jinping,
Beijing has pu sued a mo e con on a ional
o eign policy designed o ad ance China’s
egional in e es s and diminish, i no
elimina e, US in luence ac oss he Paci ic.
China has p o ed willing o unde pin i s
comba i e diplomacy h ough bo h cos ly
economic measu es and he apid mode ni-
sa ion o i s a med o ces. I is s ill assumed
ha he US will con inue o play he lead-
ing mili a y ole o he ime being, as
Washing on e ains supe io i y in con en-
ional and nuclea capabili ies as well as
in many o he a eas. Howe e , China is
apidly ca ching up and asse ing i s egional
claims, making i inc easingly di icul o
he Uni ed S a es o e ec i ely p ojec powe
so a om i s own sho es. This is why allies
ea ha China could domina e he Asia-
Paci ic egion in u u e.
Agains his backd op, many see Taiwan’s
u u e as he ha binge o he egion’s pos-
sible de elopmen . I Beijing we e o con-
ol his cen al componen o he i s
island chain, i would gain bo h mili a y
and poli ical le e age o e he Eas and
Sou h China Seas – bo h o which a e s a-
egically impo an . To signal i s esol e,
Beijing equen ly conduc s demons a ions
o mili a y powe such as in he ai space
sepa a ing he mainland om Taiwan. The
ans-Paci ic allies suspec ha China could
(soon) le e age bo h con en ional and
nuclea capabili ies o p esen hem wi h
a ai accompli, hus gaining con ol o e
Taipei be o e he US could in e ene. This
would also damage Washing on’s c edibili y
as he gua dian o egional o de . Whe he
Beijing would indeed wage wa agains he
Uni ed S a es o e Taiwan, o whe he i
me ely seeks o al e he mili a y balance o
powe by exposing Washing on, Taipei, and
egional US allies o unaccep able escala-
ion isks emains unclea – bu he e y
ac ha China keeps i s in en ions ambigu-
ous aises wo s -case ea s.
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
3
Nuclea h ea s
In ecen yea s, Beijing has been engaged
in a majo expansion o i s nuclea a senal.
Acco ding o US o ecas s, China could
double he numbe o i s nuclea wa heads
om he cu en es ima e o 500 nuclea
wa heads by 2030. While Russia and he
Uni ed S a es would s ill dwa China’s
nuclea o ces nume ically, Beijing appea s
o be aiming o he same quali a i e league
o s a egic nuclea weapons sys ems as
possessed by Washing on and Moscow. The
exac mo i es behind China’s nuclea build-
up emain con o e sial. Ye he ypes o
weapons and he pace o hei de elopmen
sugges ha Beijing would a leas like o
weaken Washing on’s escala ion dominance
in a c isis. Such de elopmen s could heo-
e ically s eng hen he mu ual nuclea
de e en be ween China and he US. On
he one hand, i could educe he isk o a
global wa . On he o he hand, o Washing-
on’s Paci ic allies his means ha hei
p o ec i e powe could no longe c edibly
h ea en nuclea escala ion and e ec i ely
de e Beijing. As a esul , hey would be
ou gunned in a con en ional wa wi h
China.
No h Ko ea’s o eign policy, coupled
wi h i s nuclea build-up is a u he cause
o conce n. Acco ding o es ima es, Pyong-
yang could cu en ly ha e 90 nuclea wa -
heads a mos a i s disposal. Howe e , i
has signi ican ly di e si ied i s deli e y
sys ems. No h Ko ea emphasizes a nuclea
doc ine wi h which i could d i e a wedge
be ween he Paci ic allies by h ea ening
Sou h Ko ea wi h ac ical nuclea s ikes
and he US wi h s a egic nuclea s ikes. In
addi ion, Washing on and i s allies pe cei e
No h Ko ea’s h eshold o using nuclea
weapons o be e y low, as hey assume
ha Pyongyang is also ying o de e con-
en ional a acks in his way.
Finally, he policy changes Moscow has
implemen ed a e in ensi ying egional con-
ce ns wi h espec o he u u e beha iou
o China and No h Ko ea. Russia main ains
impo an mili a y acili ies in No h-Eas
Asia, mili a ises he Ku il Islands, and con-
duc s s a egic ai and na al pa ols wi h
China ac oss he Wes e n Paci ic. Moscow’s
ocus, howe e , is clea ly on Eu ope. Ne e -
heless, Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea
ea he conc e e consequences o Russia’s
coope a ion wi h Beijing and Pyongyang. I
is clea ha his coope a ion uels Moscow’s
wa in Uk aine. In he wo s -case scena io,
close mili a y coope a ion could esul in
mo e coo dina ion and oppo unis ic be-
ha iou o exploi each o he ’s con lic s o
challenge he US and i s allies wi h addi-
ional c ises. Wha is mo e likely, howe e ,
is no a ila e al on , bu a iangula dy-
namic ha emains suscep ible o mis us ,
powe calcula ions, and p io i y se ing
by he espec i e ule s – and which can
none heless boos exis ing challenges
o egional secu i y and non-p oli e a ion.
Mo eo e , he ou come o Moscow’s on-
going wa o agg ession in Uk aine could
se isky p eceden s o e isionis agendas
in Eas Asia. A his poin , China and No h
Ko ea could lea n om Russia’s nuclea
he o ic how allies can be unse led and
de e ed om going “ oo a ” in suppo ing
Uk aine.
Con e ging in e es s and
( adical) al e na i es
The challenges in he Asia-Paci ic egion
could ha e a mo e se ious impac on he
egional and global o de han he con lic s
in Eu ope. They a e he e o e al eady in lu-
encing he balance o in e es s and hus he
oom o manoeu e o he ac o s in ol ed.
Fi s , he e is a bipa isan consensus in
Washing on ha Ame ican in luence in
he Paci ic mus be p ese ed. Mos see he
la ge Indo-Paci ic as he s a egic cen e o
g a i y, pe cei e US in luence in he egion
as key o sus aining Ame ica’s p eeminen
posi ion in in e na ional ela ions, and
conclude ha con aining China is a mus .
Thus, e en in a highly pa isan poli ical
en i onmen , he s a us o Taiwan and i s
ea y alliances wi h Aus alia, Japan, and
Sou h Ko ea emain essen ially o unques-
ioned impo ance o he Uni ed S a es.
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
4
Second, Washing on needs i s allies in
he Wes e n Paci ic. As he mili a y gap
wi h China na ows, he US mili a y mus
ely on he c i ical bases, logis ical suppo ,
and complemen a y capabili ies o egional
allies. Consequen ly, Aus alia, Japan and
Sou h Ko ea hos signi ican US mili a y
o ces, acili a ing apid deploymen and
sus ained ope a ions in he egion. The US
is no only seeking o s eng hen bila e al
secu i y coope a ion and can also wo k
wi h Aus alia and Japan as indispensable
pa ne s o egional o ma s – such as
he Quad ha includes India – o pool
esou ces o con ain Beijing’s ambi ions.
Con e sely, gi en China’s conside able
economic powe , any a emp o cons ain
i s echnological o inancial capabili ies
equi es wide- anging coope a ion. I is
hus unsu p ising ha he Biden adminis-
a ion has ac i ely sough o ga ne sup-
po ac oss he Indo-Paci ic egion o os e
economic pa ne ships, supply chain esili-
ence, echnology ans e s and esea ch
collabo a ions.
Thi d, allies in he Wes e n Paci ic a e
p epa ed o con ibu e o mo e e ec i e
mili a y ac ion. Many Eu opean go e n-
men s, on he o he hand, ake US secu i y
measu es o g an ed and a e eluc an o
di e unds om social and o he pu poses
o hei a med o ces. Aus alia, Japan, and
Sou h Ko ea each ha e ex ensi e ade ela-
ions wi h China, ha ing ied hei p ospe -
i y o Beijing. To ensu e ha his bene icial
balance can be main ained, Canbe a,
Tokyo, and Seoul ha e eliably in es ed in
allied de e ence and de ence. Aus alia and
Sou h Ko ea ha e done and con inue o do
so, e en unde go e nmen s ha a e mo e
scep ical abou ela ions wi h Washing on.
Fou h, al hough US allies in he Wes -
e n Paci ic g ea ly bene i om he cu en
s a egic a angemen s, hey ha e al e -
na i e (e en i no a ac i e) op ions a ail-
able – and Washing on is acu ely awa e o
his eali y. On he one hand, policymake s
in Washing on suspec ha i mis us o
US commi men we e o each an in ole -
able le el, i s Paci ic allies migh decide o
bandwagon wi h China. As Aus alia has no
e i o ial dispu e wi h Beijing, and Japan
and Sou h Ko ea ha e only one limi ed
e i o ial dispu e espec i ely wi h China,
hei conce ns a e mo e economic and po-
li ical in na u e. A di e en egional a chi-
ec u e, hough signi ican ly less a ac i e,
would no di ec ly h ea en hei unda-
men al in e es s and, he e o e, would
p obably be ole able. On he o he hand,
Japan and Sou h Ko ea ha e he echnical
capabili ies and su icien ly limi ed egional
ins i u ional ies – in Seoul also signi ican
domes ic poli ical suppo – o cons ain
China’s coe ci e capabili ies by acqui ing
hei own nuclea weapons. In he absence
o US eassu ance, hey could combine he
wo al e na i es and side wi h Beijing om
behind hei own nuclea shield.
Gi en hese ou undamen als, he e is
ela i e con idence in Canbe a, Tokyo,
and Seoul ha he US will con inue wi h i s
secu i y a chi ec u e in – and he e o e
wi h i s ex ended nuclea de e en o –
he Wes e n Paci ic, whe he o no Donald
T ump wins he 2024 p esiden ial elec ion.
Mo eo e , bo h T ump and his suppo e s
ha e epea edly s uck a con on a ional
one owa d China, emphasising hei wil-
lingness o inc ease US powe p ojec ion
h ough mili a y means.
Coun e -balancing by he
Uni ed S a es and i s allies
Amid a shi ing poli ico-mili a y landscape
and aligned US and allied in e es s in p e-
se ing he s a us quo, a conce ed e o o
coun e balance China’s mili a y expansion
is e iden . These e o s a e ex emely ex-
pensi e. The sunk cos s o his e o s ongly
sugges o all conce ned ha , ega dless o
who occupies he Whi e House, he majo
s a egic ques ion acing he u u e admin-
is a ion will likely be how o e ec i ely
con ain China while bo h main aining s a-
egic de e ence agains Russia and a oiding
he escala ion o po en ial c ises. Fo now,
he Uni ed S a es seems o pu sue a ou -
p onged s a egy ha in ol es de eloping
addi ional nuclea capabili ies, building
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
5
up con en ional op ions, enhancing allies’
capabili ies, and expanding secu i y co-
ope a ion.
Fi s , planne s and pundi s in Washing-
on a e assessing how o make be e use o
US nuclea op ions. While a majo nuclea
mode nisa ion e o is unde way, a g ow-
ing numbe o expe s and poli icians ha e
concluded ha he US a senal needs o
be expanded. In addi ion, he legisla i e
b anch has been pushing he Pen agon o
pu sue addi ional nuclea op ions, such as
a nuclea -a med c uise missile (SLCM-N).
The T ump adminis a ion al eady called
o his in 2018 and would likely con inue
o pu sue i , i i e u ns o powe . Mo e-
o e , some in he hawkish Republican
camp a e e en calling o he i s use o
such low-yield nuclea weapons o be con-
side ed in o de o o se China’s ope a ional
ad an ages and p e en an in asion o
Taiwan – bu i is unclea how much weigh
such oices could ca y in a second T ump
e m.
Second, and mo e impo an ly, he US
go e nmen is building up i s con en ional
capabili ies. Al hough many Democ a s
c i icised he T ump adminis a ion’s 2019
decision o abandon he legal p ohibi ion
on deploying in e media e- ange missiles,
he Biden adminis a ion has pu sued his
same cou se. As a esul , US a med o ces
will soon be deploying such missile sys ems
o hei Eu opean and Paci ic bases; a
planned eloca ion o he US base in Wies-
baden was ecen ly announced. Fo Asia, i
has al eady been announced ha he Da k
Eagle hype sonic sys em will be ielded on
Guam. In o de o equalise he con en ion-
al balance o powe wi h China, howe e ,
he a ious o he US medium- ange sys ems
would ha e o be s a ioned on allies’ e i-
o y. Gi en he high p obabili y ha Beijing
would espond wi h ha sh economic e alia-
ion, i emains unclea whe he – o unde
wha condi ions – Canbe a, Tokyo, o
Seoul would ag ee o such deploymen s.
Thi d, he US go e nmen has been
wo king wi h i s allies in he egion o im-
p o e hei own mili a y capabili ies. Fi s ,
Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea con inue
o de elop hei na ional capabili ies, pa -
icula ly whe e long- ange s ike capabili ies
and s a egic na al asse s a e conce ned. Sec-
ond, he US go e nmen seeks o s eng hen
i s allies’ ea ly wa ning and missile de ence
capabili ies. I is especially ele an ha
Washing on appea s o ha e shi ed i s
posi ion o weigh de e ence challenges
mo e hea ily han p oli e a ion conce ns.
Indica i e o his is he unp eceden ed
echnology ans e in ol ed in p o iding
Aus alia wi h s eal hy nuclea -powe ed
subma ines. This ans e equi es an un-
pa alleled le el o e i ica ion o make i
anspa en ha Canbe a does no di e
some o he highly en iched u anium needed
o subma ine p opulsion o build i s own
nuclea weapons. Ano he example is he
US decision om 2021 o li all es ic ions
ha had long been placed on Sou h Ko ea’s
missile de elopmen p og ams. Equally
impo an is he widesp ead sale o Toma-
hawk c uise missiles in ecen yea s, includ-
ing o Aus alia and Japan.
Finally, while bila e al alliances wi h
Washing on con inue o be cha ac e ised
by pa on-clien ela ionships, Washing on
appea s commi ed o empowe ing egional
powe s no only by helping enhance hei
capabili ies, bu also by expanding secu i y
coope a ion and allies’ oles he ein. Fo
ins ance, he Biden adminis a ion wan s
Japanese shipya ds o egula ly o e haul US
wa ships, which allows o hei cons an
p esence in Eas Asia. I also upg aded bi-
la e al consul a ions which ca e ou a
Sou h Ko ean ole in US nuclea ope a ions.
Fu he , i is pu suing echnology ans e s
in ad anced mili a y capabili ies ha will
bu ess Aus alia’s s a egic each. Al hough
hese alliance ini ia i es bea he hall-
ma ks o he Biden adminis a ion, hey i
he “bu den-sha ing while p ese ing in lu-
ence” man a. This ac ic cha ac e ised
T ump’s e m in o ice and is cu en ly
aspi ed o by b oad segmen s o he Repub-
lican Pa y. Thus, while o icials and expe s
in Aus alia, Japan, and Sou h Ko ea expec
communica ion and coo dina ion mishaps,
p ocedu al quibbles, unding challenges,
and implemen a ion delays, hese indi id-
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
6
uals s ongly belie e ha bipa isan US sup-
po o hese measu es will emain s ong.
Ne e heless, conce ns abound
Al hough some o T ump’s domes ic sup-
po e s would welcome any educ ion in
US commi men s ab oad, a second adminis-
a ion would ha e o ace he eali y ha
abandoning ex ended nuclea de e ence
emains undamen ally a odds wi h i s
p ima y goals. Abandoned by hei long-
ime p o ec o and acing massi e h ea s,
o me allies would likely seek o appease
China, and could acqui e nuclea a senals
independen ly. Such de elopmen s would
un coun e o he in e es s o any US ad-
minis a ion, including a T ump Whi e
House. Fea s o nuclea abandonmen a e
he e o e no he dominan conce n, lea -
ing plen y o oom o allies’ o he wo ies.
The Paci ic allies in es ela i ely hea ily
in na ional and join de e ence, and de ence.
Bu hey a e also wo ied abou T ump’s
penchan o p essu ing allies o make con-
cessions. Mos in Seoul, o example, expec
a leas a epea o he ough cos -sha ing
nego ia ions o he i s e m. T ump and his
suppo e s ha e been ocal abou demand-
ing inc eased inancial con ibu ions om
Seoul o he US oops s a ioned on he
Ko ean Peninsula, equen ly coupled wi h
h ea s o wi hd aw some o all o hose
o ces, e e ences o he ade imbalance,
and downplaying he h ea s posed by
No h Ko ea. Cong essional suppo ensu es
he p esence o US soldie s, bu he Whi e
House has conside able leeway in de e min-
ing he size and manda e o hese deploy-
men s – and many expec T ump o use
secu i y commi men s o ex ac economic
concessions om allies. Con e sely, some
in Canbe a and Tokyo wo y ha a T ump
adminis a ion would seek o enego ia e
a ious mili a y p ocu emen ag eemen s
o sho e up US inancial gains – bu ew
belie e ha exis ing ag eemen s would be
e oked in he cou se o such dispu es.
Ano he ea in Aus alia, Japan, and
Sou h Ko ea is ha a second T ump admin-
is a ion will educe o abandon he Biden
Whi e House’s a ious egional secu i y
coope a ion ini ia i es and wan all ela-
ions o again go h ough Washing on i s .
On he one hand, T ump and his ad ise s
may be pleased wi h he bu den-sha ing
bene i s associa ed wi h hese new o ms o
coope a ion and con inue o pu sue hem.
On he o he hand, a GOP-led adminis a-
ion migh seek a e u n o he adi ional
cen alising “hub-and-spokes” sys em in
o de o exe mo e con ol o e allies. The
allies he e o e ea ha wi hou US leade -
ship, hese in e go e nmen al ini ia i es a e
likely o s agna e, and compe i ion among
p o égés o he a en ion o he common
pa on will be eigni ed. This migh apply
pa icula ly o he e y p ac ical, bu poli i-
cally sensi i e, ila e al pa ne ship be-
ween Japan, Sou h Ko ea and he Uni ed
S a es.
Less p onounced han he a o emen-
ioned ea s a e conce ns abou T ump’s
“deal-making” endencies, such as being
abandoned in a cos ly c isis o en angled in
a egional con lic . Ambigui y su ounding
T ump’s policies is-à- is China, No h
Ko ea and Russia e lec gene al unce ain-
ies abou u u e de elopmen s in Eu ope
and Eas Asia as well as T ump-speci ic
inconsis encies. Wi h ega d o China, mos
expec con on a ional secu i y and eco-
nomic policies, while a ew ea ha T ump
will seek a g and ba gain wi h Xi. T ump
has kep his s ance on he s a us o Taiwan
ambiguous: he could ei he ejec all sup-
po o Taiwan o , i aced wi h Chinese
in ansigence, decide o explici ly commi
o de ending Taipei. While he o me
would expose US allies o po en ial Chinese
coe cion, he la e could lead o an open
mili a y con lic wi h Beijing – and many
allies do no us T ump’s esol e in such
a c isis. Rega ding No h Ko ea, mos hope
ha T ump’s ailed summi y wi h Kim
Jong Un se ed as a su icien lesson. How-
e e , some wo y he may seek o p o e ha
pe sonal ela ionships acili a e ag eemen s
ha would o he wise be di icul o achie e.
Fo example, he could again y o pe suade
Kim Jong Un o s op his nuclea build-up
SWP Commen 36
Augus 2024
7
by o e ing economic incen i es ( hus e ec-
i ely b eaking sanc ions). As a quid p o
quo o Seoul, T ump could go so a as o
quie ly accep Sou h Ko ean nuclea p o-
li e a ion. Finally, conce ning Russia, many
ea ha T ump migh p opose a deal o
Pu in o eeze he con lic in Uk aine, an
app oach om which Xi could d aw con-
clusions o e isionism in Eas Asia.
Implica ions o Eu ope
As T ump is p one o miscalcula ions and
e a ic beha iou , cau ion is equi ed when
ying o p edic his u u e policy a e e-
elec ion. Ne e heless, i is impo an
o unde s and why Aus alia, Japan, and
Sou h Ko ea a e less conce ned abou US
nuclea assu ances. Th ee conclusions can
be d awn om his analysis o Eu ope.
Fi s , e en i T ump is e-elec ed, unda-
men al changes in Washing on’s ela ions
wi h i s Paci ic allies a e unlikely – which
is good news o Eu ope. Fo one hing,
Eu opean economic success depends on he
absence o open con lic be ween China and
he US. Fo ano he , s able ela ions in he
Asia-Paci ic a e indi ec ly a boon o NATO,
since US secu i y p o ision in Eu ope is
hea ily dependen upon he success o i s
mo e impo an commi men s ac oss he
Paci ic. Ne e heless, conside able unce -
ain ies emain due o s uc u al challenges
as well as T ump’s poli ical agenda and pe -
sonal idiosync asies. Howe e , he p essu e
om Washing on on Eu ope o adap i s
China policy is likely o inc ease unde a
second T ump adminis a ion, especially
as i is likely o be almos exclusi ely com-
posed o China ha dline s (China hawks).
Second, in he ace o hese isks, Eu o-
peans should ecognise ha Washing on
and he Paci ic allies will expec economic-
poli ical a he han mili a y con ibu ions
om Eu ope. I would he e o e be ad an-
ageous i Eu opean go e nmen s could use
hei weigh wi hin he global economic
sys em o suppo he US in con aining
China’s mili a y expansion. I Eu ope now
helps o in luence Beijing’s echnological
and inancial capabili ies, i could imply
Eu opean willingness o impose sanc ions
on China in he e en o wa . This would
also send a s ong signal agains e ision-
ism in Eas Asia. Gi en T ump’s unp edic -
abili y, s eps ha seem cos ly oday may
p o e wo hwhile in e ospec i egional
s abili y in Asia is se e ely damaged.
Las bu no leas , one aluable lesson
can be gleaned om unde s anding why US
allies in Asia hold mo e op imis ic expec-
a ions abou a po en ial second T ump
adminis a ion. Ul ima ely, he sou ce o
hei op imism lies in Washing on’s depend-
ence on i s allies and hei eadiness o ake
on g ea e esponsibili y. A guably, his
pa icula equa ion is p ima ily a esul
o exogenous ac o s – such as he egion’s
s a egic impo ance und China’s ambi ions.
Bu i should also now be clea o Eu ope’s
decision-make s, expe s and public ha
he mo e hey in es in hei own capabil-
i ies o in luence egional secu i y policy,
he less hey will ha e o wo y abou
Washing on’s acilla ions.
D Li iu Ho o i z and Elisabe h Suh a e esea che s in he In e na ional Secu i y Resea ch Di ision.
This pape is published as pa o he S a egic Th ea Analysis and Nuclea (Dis-)O de (STAND) p ojec .
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unde CC BY 4.0
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Ge man Ins i u e o
In e na ional and
Secu i y A ai s
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ISSN (P in ) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
DOI: 10.18449/2024C36
(English e sion o
SWP-Ak uell 42/2024)
