Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance

Hallinan, Blake; Reynolds, C. J.; Rothenstein, Omer Article Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance Internet Policy Review Provided in Cooperation with: Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), Berlin Suggested Citation: Hallinan, Blake; Reynolds, C. J.; Rothenstein, Omer (2024) : Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance, Internet Policy Review, ISSN 2197-6775, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin, Vol. 13, Iss. 2, pp. 1-43, https://doi.org/10.14763/2024.2.1770 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300744 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/de/legalcode Volume 13 | Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance Blake Hallinan Hebrew University of Jerusalem CJ Reynolds Hebrew University of Jerusalem Omer Rothenstein Hebrew University of Jerusalem DOI: https://doi.org/10.14763/2024.2.1770 Published: 26 June 2024 Received: 30 October 2023 Accepted: 22 March 2024 Funding: This research was funded by a grant from the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist that have influenced the text. Licence: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (Germany) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/de/deed.en Copyright remains with the author(s). Citation: Hallinan, B. & Reynolds, C. & Rothenstein, O. (2024). Copyright callouts and the promise of creator-driven platform governance. Internet Policy Review, 13(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2024.2.1770 Keywords: Copyright, Creators, Norms, Platform governance, YouTube Abstract: Responding to frustrations with the enforcement of copyright on YouTube, some creators publish videos that discuss their experiences, challenge claims of infringement, and critique broader structures of content moderation. Platform callouts, or public complaints about the conduct of or on platforms, are one of the primary ways creators challenge the power imbalance between users and corporations. Through an analysis of 135 videos, we provide a rich empirical account of how creators publicly define the problem of copyright enforcement, propose solutions, and attribute responsibility to other creators, the platform, and external actors like media conglomerates. Creators criticise the prevalence of “false” copyright claims that ignore fair use or serve ulterior motives like harassment, censorship, and financial extortion, as well as the challenges of communicating with the platform. Drawing inspiration from organisational theory, we differentiate horizontal and vertical callouts according to the institutional positioning of the speaker and target. Horizontal callouts, or public complaints between peers, offer a mechanism for community self-policing, while vertical callouts, or public complaints directed towards organisations, provide a mechanism for influencing centralised content moderation policies and practices. We conclude with a discussion of the benefits and limitations of callouts as a strategy of creator-driven platform governance. Issue 2 This paper is part of Locating and theorising platform power, a special issue of Internet Policy Review guest-edited by David Nieborg, Thomas Poell, Robyn Caplan and José van Dijck. Introduction Social media platforms are more popular than ever due, in part, to a growing subset of “commercializing and professionalizing” users known as creators (Cunningham & Craig, 2021, p. 1). Through ad-revenue sharing agreements (Caplan & Gillespie, 2020), brand deals (Hund, 2023), and a combination of merchandise, fan funding, and affiliate programs (Rieder et al., 2023), creators monetise their audiences and contribute to the “creator economy,” currently valued at 250 billion USD (Perelli, 2023). As a career path, content creation offers significant flexibility and autonomy (Cunningham & Craig, 2021), yet comes with precarious working conditions (Duffy et al., 2021). Creators, like all social media users, are subject to opaque and often automated forms of platform governance where content can be removed and accounts terminated with little notice or explanation (Gorwa et al., 2020). These conditions generate a “crisis of legitimacy” (Zuckerman & RajendraNicolucci, 2023), with polls finding, for example, that three-quarters of Americans do not trust social media companies to moderate content fairly (Kemp & Ekins, 2021). Issues with content moderation also generate social, emotional, and economic consequences for creators (Are & Briggs, 2023; Kingsley et al., 2022), chill speech (Myers West, 2018), deter the use of platform reporting tools (Vaccaro et al., 2020), and promote conspiracy theorising about platform operations (Riedl et al., 2023). In the face of such frustrations, creators have little recourse given the implicitly feudal design of platforms where users are “subject to a power structure that is apparently absolute and unalterable by those who lack such power” (Schneider, 2022, p. 1966). As a consequence, creators employ an assortment of strategies to navigate the fickle creator economy, including optimising content production (Hallinan, 2023), sharing theories about how platforms operate (Kaye & Gray, 2021), and joining intermediary commercial organisations (Siciliano, 2020). However, each strategy concerns opportunities for success within a given platform context. Creators who seek to transform platform operations have two primary strategies for organisational change: exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970; see Frey & Schneider, 2023 for an elaboration of these options in a platform context). In other words, creators can either leave the platform or communicate their displeasure. Neither 2 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 option is necessarily appealing: the former is disincentivised by the lack of market competition and the latter beset with questions of who can or should address their complaints. Platform callouts, or public complaints about the conduct of or on platforms, are one of the primary ways that creators voice their frustrations with governance issues. Compared to other expressions of consumer discontent, creators benefit from in-built audiences and their professional specialisation in public communication. Such conditions also differentiate creator complaints from other callouts on social media associated with the collective behaviour of semi-anonymous masses (Kim et al., 2022). While creators have spoken up about censorship, economic opportunity, copyright abuse, algorithmic bias, and predatory behaviour (Kaye & Gray, 2021; Kumar, 2019; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024; Tarvin & Stanfill, 2022), questions remain over the ability of voice-based strategies to overcome the inherent imbalances of platform power (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022). Platforms are selective about which controversies they respond to (Shapiro et al., 2024) and public responses can leave structural issues unchecked, resulting in what Tarvin and Stanfill call “governance washing” (2022). Furthermore, the reliance on public outrage, from creators or otherwise, may trap platforms in reactionary cycles with unsatisfying solutions (Annany & Gillespie, 2016). Despite these structural constraints, the persistence of public complaints motivates our investigation into the role platform callouts play in the broader governance ecosystem. To do so, we turn to a particularly entrenched domain of platform governance where we would expect creators to have little influence: copyright policy. Platforms’ copyright policies are heavily shaped by regulations that favour the interests of major corporate rights holders (Dergacheva & Katzenbach, 2023; Gray, 2020) and copyright enforcement is an established point of frustration for creators (Fiesler et al., 2023; Kaye & Gray, 2021). Focusing on YouTube, an industry leader in copyright management (Gray, 2020) and creator monetisation programmes (Caplan & Gillespie, 2021), we analyse callout videos, defined as social media content where creators discuss their experiences with copyright enforcement, challenge claims of infringement, and critique the broader structures of content moderation. In what follows, we present the possibilities for user participation in platform governance and briefly describe YouTube’s copyright management system. We then outline our methodological approach and show how callout videos alternatively address other creators, the platform itself, and external actors like corporate rights holders, spammers, and scammers. Finally, we differentiate between horizontal and vertical callouts, distinguished by the relationship between institutional posi3 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein tioning of the speaker and target, and discuss the implications of both as tools of creator-driven platform governance. Participation structures of platform governance While content moderation includes advanced automation (Gorwa et al., 2020), most platforms also delegate work to their users via tools to report violations (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). User reports of copyright infringement or community guidelines violations provide a valuable signal for platforms’ Trust and Safety teams (Pfefferkorn, 2022) and offer a mechanism of user participation in platform governance, although the design of reporting systems minimises public deliberation and collective action (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016). Even in these circumstances, users across platforms and the political spectrum have appropriated flagging tools (e.g. Fiore-Silfvast, 2012; Zhao & Chen, 2023), transforming reports into a site of “contested platform governance” where users challenge the “core values, identity, and/or purposes of the platform” (Sybert, 2022, p. 2312). In doing so, users threaten the integrity of user reports as a signal for corporate platform governance objectives (Zhao & Chen, 2023). Some platforms further delegate responsibility, consulting with civil society organisations (Caplan, 2023) and providing tools for community-driven moderation (Zuckerman & Rajendra-Nicolucci, 2023). The latter setup is particularly evident on decentralised platforms (Struett et al., 2023) and forum platforms like Reddit, where individual interest groups, or subreddits, have specific rules and volunteer moderators who enforce them (Seering, 2020). Seemingly centralised platforms like Facebook provide users tools to moderate different “sub-platforms” like personal profiles, pages, and Facebook groups (Navon & Noy, 2023). Similarly, YouTube provides tools for creators to moderate the comments that appear alongside their videos, posts, and livestreams. Although a community-driven approach to participation is more robust than flagging tools, it remains limited by how platforms define community (e.g. individual accounts on YouTube vs. subreddits on Reddit), the tools they provide, and the supplementary status of community moderation, where users can add new rules but cannot challenge platform-wide policies. For users frustrated with centralised platform governance, there are few opportunities for recourse. Like any consumer, users can exit the market (Hirshman, 1970) and switch to a new platform or reduce social media use. However, as an industry, social media is dominated by a few big players and lacks robust competition. Furthermore, platforms heavily draw their value from network effects, making plat4 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 form migration socially and technically difficult (Fiesler & Dym, 2020). These factors are intensified for creators, who draw personal and economic value from the audiences they foster on particular platforms (Cunningham & Craig, 2021). While the rare creator has successfully transitioned their career from one platform to another (Shapiro et al., 2024), this remains an exceptional accomplishment. Finally, given the scale of major platforms, a substantial number of users must exit to send a clear signal to corporate leadership. Given the constraints on leaving a platform, some users try to change platforms from within through voice-based strategies (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30). Users can express frustrations through official channels such as appealing a content moderation decision. When official channels fail or are unavailable, users may go public with their complaints (Meisner, 2023; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). However, platforms are selective in which voices they respond to (Shapiro et al., 2024), favouring users with important roles for platform functionality like moderators on Reddit or high-profile creators on YouTube. Even among these populations, there are concerns about the efficacy of voice as a response, reflected in Frey and Schneider’s (2023) distinction between effective and affective voice where the former refers to direct influence and the latter to indirect persuasion. Public complaints clearly fall in the category of affective voice, joining a broader conversation about callouts, cancellations, and new strategies of public accountability (Lewis & Christin, 2021). As public complaints that use shaming to promote social norms, callouts heavily depend on social media platforms for circulation. Most research focuses on callouts that target individuals rather than engage in institutional or organisational critique (e.g. Kim et al., 2022; Lee & Abidin, 2024). In this context, researchers have expressed concern that callouts may facilitate harassment or struggle to promote behavioural change (Billingham & Parr, 2020; Kim et al., 2022; Marwick, 2021). Despite these concerns, the act of calling out can provide expressive benefits for speakers (Herbison & Podosky, 2024) and constitute a form of civic engagement (Kligler-Vilenchik, 2017). Furthermore, as a public conversation, the target is not the only relevant audience; indeed, callouts can promote communal norms without changing the attitude or behaviour of the target (Lewis & Christin, 2021). To investigate the role of callouts in platform governance, we turn to a fundamental source of friction between users and platforms: copyright policy. Copyright on YouTube as a test case for platform power Copyright has long been a source of contention on YouTube as an area where “balancing the interests of the platform’s various ‘markets’ (of content suppliers, audi5 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein ences, advertisers, and media partners) is most complex and questionable in the fairness of its application” (Burgess & Green, 2018, p. 48). States legislate copyright agendas to protect intellectual property rights, foster innovation, and, occasionally, serve the public interest (Gray, 2020). Platforms enforce policies and develop technological solutions to maintain legal compliance, pre-empt potentially burdensome legislation, appease copyright holders, and foster an appealing environment for users (Gray, 2020; Suzor, 2019). Where copyright was “once the exclusive domain of corporate lawyers and policymakers”, its centrality on digital platforms has increased public awareness and interest (Gillespie, 2007, p. 5), reflected in the prevalence of “copyright gossip” on YouTube (Kaye & Gray, 2021) and discussions among transformative fandom communities (Fiesler et al., 2023). Yet, as Gray argues, when it comes to legislation, the public interest is poorly represented and large corporate stakeholders dominate (Gray, 2020, p. 132). The external governance of copyright on YouTube includes a diverse and international patchwork of legislation. Central among these is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act from the United States, passed in 1998, which instituted the “notice and takedown” approach to copyright violations (Decherney, 2014). Even beyond the context of copyright, the notice and takedown approach “has become the go-to model for those attempting to solve any number of online disputes over intellectual property, online speech, and other issues”, including trademark and the right to be forgotten claims (Decherney, p. 19). Google has also played a major role in exporting U.S. copyright norms, including the “notice and takedown” approach and “fair use” principles, to other countries through policies, lobbying, and user education initiatives (Decherney, 2014). Yet the United States is not the only relevant regulatory actor, as the 2019 passage of Article 17 of the European Union Copyright Directive demonstrates. This legislation addressed long-standing complaints of music rights holders in Europe that digital platforms, especially YouTube, used safe harbour principles to undervalue copyrighted works (Bridy, 2019). While the implications of the Copyright Directive continue to unfold, research suggests that its enactment has led to increased copyright takedowns on YouTube (Dergacheva & Katzenbach, 2023). The internal governance of copyright by YouTube revolves around the platform’s Content Management Suite which includes three primary tools: the Webform, the Copyright Match Tool, and the Content ID system. The Webform is an online reporting tool that allows anyone to manually claim infringing content. The Copyright Match tool automatically identifies videos reuploaded by other channels and is available to members of the YouTube Partner Program or creators with a history 6 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 of content takedowns. Finally, Content ID is a “scaled tool” that fully automates the copyright claim process and is available to “those with the most complex rights management needs, such as movie studios, record labels, and collecting societies” (Google, 2022, p. 3). In the first half of 2022 alone, ContentID processed more than 750 million claims, accounting for 98% of all copyright claims on the platform (Google, 2022, p. 4). Automated copyright enforcement is both an expression of Google’s platform power and a reflection of the economic power of media conglomerates. Indeed, part of the market appeal of Content ID is that it enables rights holders to earn significant revenue, upwards of US$30 billion over the past three years (Google, 2022, p. 1). YouTube’s Content Management Suite offers unequal resources to corporate stakeholders and independent content creators, leading some creators to conclude that copyright governance on the platform does not serve their interests (Fiesler et al., 2023; Hui, 2021). As ethnographer Michael Siciliano explains, many creators he spoke with “felt powerless, describing a silence and inscrutability similar to other users of Google’s infrastructures and recounting lengthy appeal processes that often failed” (2020, p. 149). One way that creators aim to make their work less precarious is through the circulation of “gossip” in videos where they share “their experiences with copyright enforcement on YouTube” and strategies for avoiding or addressing copyright enforcement (Kaye & Gray, 2021, p. 1). Creators have also critically engaged with copyright policy in the case of the #WTFU hashtag campaign1 started by The Nostalgia Critic in 2016 over frustrations with Content ID, which led the YouTube policy team to issue a statement acknowledging community concerns (Edwards, 2018). Together, this work provides evidence that users play a role in the governance of copyright enforcement on the platform, fitting within a broader pattern of “communal solidarity” emerging among creators (Kumar, 2019), although the particular norms, community boundaries, and mechanisms of governance remain opaque. Methods To collect YouTube copyright callout videos, we conducted targeted keyword searches using YouTube Data Tools (Rieder, 2015).2 We restricted the results to videos published after 2019 to update existing research,3 and removed videos that 1. An acronym for “Where’s the fair use?”. 2. We collected 50 videos for each of the following search terms: copyright, copyright claim, copyright strike, DMCA, content id YouTube, YouTube copyright system, YouTube copyright drama, YouTube copyright abuse, YouTube copyright update, YouTube copyright fair use, false copyright, copyright troll, copystrike, copyright claim steal, and copyright rant. 7 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein were off-topic, uploaded by non-creators (i.e. from an official YouTube channel), and not primarily in English. We also screened out exclusively descriptive videos for lacking the element of “complaint” central to our definition of callouts. We then manually added 20 videos that appeared in platform recommendations or news coverage of copyright issues, resulting in a dataset of 230 videos. Two authors watched 10 videos from the dataset to develop the codebook, adapting categories from previous research to fit with the data (Kaye & Gray, 2021; Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). Our codebook addresses how callout videos define the problem of copyright enforcement, attribute responsibility, and propose solutions (see Appendix 1 for the full codebook). Given prior research showing strong gender segregation in YouTube communities (Wegener et al., 2020) and greater representation of men in platform callout videos (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024), we also coded the perceived gender of creators, prioritising self-identification when available, using conventional visual and verbal markers otherwise,4 and treating VTubers and furries as a separate category.5 Two authors began independently coding the videos, one working from the top and the list and the other from the bottom, meeting to discuss findings throughout. We stopped coding at 135 videos when we noticed significant repetition in the results (see Appendix 2 for video details). Most videos received more than 50,000 views, although there was nearly an even split (see Table 1). The overwhelming majority of speakers were men (n=101), along with a small minority of women (n=13) and VTubers/furries (n=7), aligning with prior work on YouTube callouts (Hallinan & Reynolds, 2024). Channels represented various genres including gaming, music reviews, film reviews, react videos, and cultural commentary. TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics of videos included in the final dataset DATE N VIDEO LENGTH N VIEWS N 2019 35 0:00-4:59 19 <1000 16 2020 22 5:00-9:59 53 1000-10,000 24 3. Kaye and Gray’s study of copyright gossip focuses on videos published from 2017 – 2019; we chose 2019 as the starting point for our study to provide a point of overlap with their research without fully duplicating their time period. 4. We recognise that this approach is problematic and risks reinforcing gender stereotypes and a binary approach to gender. To mitigate the risks, we report on the coding in aggregate and do not assign labels (or pronouns) to specific creators in the text when self-definition is not available. 5. VTuber, or virtual YouTuber, is a creator that uses a virtual avatar. While not all furries are VTubers, and not all VTubers are furries, the furries in our dataset used virtual anthropomorphized animal avatars. 8 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 making a fair use evaluation.27 The popularity of fair use discourse may be due to the concept's prominence in YouTube's "Copyright School", a set of educational videos that creators must watch after receiving a copyright strike (Fiesler et al., 2023). Regardless of its origins, the repeated invocation of fair use as a friend to creators that is overlooked by the platform and ignored by corporations fosters an affinity between creators and the law. Vertical and horizontal callouts as tactics of platform governance Our dataset of copyright callout videos indicates that frustration with the prevalence of “false” copyright claims is a primary motivator for creators to speak out. As a category, the strategic ambiguity of false claims makes the accusation persuasively appealing: it is broad enough to encompass a wide variety of behaviour, it is prohibited by both YouTube’s policies and copyright law (Google, 2022; Mazzone, 2011), and the label’s negative associations make few likely to defend it wholesale. Despite general agreement over the problem of false copyright claims, creators offered diverse accounts of what distinguishes fraudulent uses of copyright management tools. While a few videos expressed extreme views such as the position that claiming copyright “is the worst thing you can do”28 or that copyright enforcement is a “no man’s land” where valid strategies are only determined by what someone can get away with,29 most professed relatively moderate positions somewhere between total freedom and total control. For example, H3 Podcast host Ethan Klein described the competing interests of different stakeholders shaping copyright policy to his audience: You guys got to understand there are laws that YouTube has to abide by. There are legal precedents that if they don't abide by — the DMCA — then the system which we enjoy is just simply not possible. YouTube cannot exist. Because they have this treaty, it's like a diplomatic agreement in a war. 30 In approaching copyright management as a balancing act, most creators adopted the general disposition of copyright law (Burgess & Green, 2018; Gray, 2020), even if they disagreed on what constitutes balance in practice. 27. YTC103, YTC110, and YTC122 28. YTC093 29. YTC024 30. YTC076 15 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein Despite their shared concern with “false” copyright claims, we found a distinction in how the videos leveraged shame that broadly aligns with who they deem responsible for the problem. Creators who called out other creators addressed their peers, while creators who called out the platform or other corporations addressed entities with greater institutional status. While all callouts present a violation of social norms and appeal to (presumably) shared values (Herbison & Podosky, 2024), we argue that callouts perform different functions for platform governance depending on the institutional relationship between the speaker and the target of the callout. The distinction between horizontal and vertical communication in organisational scholarship helps clarify our argument. Horizontal communication “refers to that between colleagues on an equal hierarchical level” while vertical communication “is that which travels up and down the hierarchy” (Bartels et al., 2010, p. 212). Building on this distinction, we differentiate between horizontal and vertical callouts. Horizontal callouts refer to public criticism where the speaker and the target share the same institutional status, which, in the context of our study, involved social media creators addressing other creators. Horizontal callouts primarily appealed to community as a shared value. Although it would be a mistake to speak of a singular culture on YouTube given its scale, geographic reach, and linguistic diversity, as well as the platform’s commercialisation (Burgess & Green, 2018), creators and audiences alike have long adopted the language of community, especially when engaging in normative debates about platform values (Burgess et al., 2016; Lewis & Christin, 2021). Some callout videos specified particular groups on the platform such as the “gacha reaction community”,31 while others appealed to a broader platform identity through the use of terms like “creators” or “YouTubers”. While community is an expansive category in copyright callout videos, it is not limitless. We did not, for example, find any callouts trying to enrol spammers or scammers into the shared norms of a community — instead, creators typically appealed to the platform to intervene or encouraged other creators to protect themselves. In drawing boundaries around communal identity and acceptable behaviour, horizontal callouts perform a similar function to metadiscussion on forums, with both offering a “mechanism through which groups can interrogate the boundaries of what is acceptable, can construct norms… and can enforce a certain degree of compliance to those norms” (Burnett & Bonnici, 2003, p. 342). Vertical callouts refer to public criticism where the speaker and the target have dif31. YTC017. Gacha refers to video games such as Genshin Impact that implement a “gashapon” mechanic, referring to toy vending machines popular in Japan. 16 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 ferent institutional statuses: in the context of our study, this typically involved creators addressing social media platforms. Vertical callouts primarily appealed to fairness as a shared value, highlighting both individual content moderation decisions and the structural conditions of copyright enforcement on YouTube as unfair. However, the entrenched power disparity between creators and corporations requires a collective response to increase the chance of being heard (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024). Thus, calling out platforms and external actors is largely about marshalling a community, composed of audiences and fellow creators, to draw attention to an area of concern and appeal to broadly endorsed values. Where horizontal callouts direct community practices, vertical callouts seek corporate intercession to address problems that cannot be resolved through community agreement, including specific content moderation actions like removing a copyright strike, as well as more structural factors involving the process of adjudicating copyright claims. Although the vertical callouts in our dataset primarily addressed YouTube, a few creators requested media conglomerates like Nintendo and Universal Music Group to treat users more fairly and acknowledge reviewing a video game or teaching audiences how to play music as fair use. The infrequency of addressing external corporations may reflect a lack of confidence that callout videos are an effective mechanism for change. While creators also expressed doubt that “YouTube” was listening, they invoked precedents from their own experience or the experience of other creators where going public with a problem successfully led to its resolution. Conclusion Responding to the call to analyse how “power is distributed amongst various stakeholders whose platforms exert distinctive yet interdependent functions in the ecosystem” (van Dijck et al., 2019, p. 12), our account foregrounds the existing and potential role of creators in platform governance without romanticising the agency of individuals or overlooking structural factors. While platforms configure highly asymmetrical relationships among different stakeholders (Nielsen & Ganter, 2022; Shapiro, 2024), scholarly focus on the exercise of power by a platform risks treating the power of platforms as an overly deterministic, top-down affair, something done to and through users. In so doing, these theorisations struggle to account for a distinctive feature of social media as a venue where messages circulate and publics form, and thus downplay the role of users as “vital agents of platform politics” (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2021, p. 3268). Although YouTube lacks any “formalised process of stakeholder participation” (Kumar, 2019, p. 15), contributing to the precarity of creators and giving the company significant discretion in the concerns it 17 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein chooses to address, creators engage in platform governance through novel strategies of “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). We identified two strategies of participation: horizontal callouts, which direct public criticism towards peers, and vertical callouts, which direct public criticism towards institutional superiors including the leadership of commercial platforms. Horizontal and vertical callouts serve different roles in the platform governance ecosystem: the former offers a mechanism for community self-policing (Seering, 2020) while the latter provides a mechanism for influencing centralised content moderation policies and practices (Shapiro et al., 2024). Assessing the efficacy of callouts, or the “conditions under which voice-based mechanisms” can “ensure accountability” (Schneider, 2022, p. 1980), would thus benefit from understanding the different functions that callouts serve. For example, the effectiveness of horizontal callouts could be reflected in shared ideas of acceptable conduct, along with behavioural or attitudinal changes from the target of the callout. While the creators in our dataset roughly agreed that false copyright claims are a problem, to what extent other creators or audiences share particular ideas of platform community or “fair” use remains an open question. Similarly, the effectiveness of vertical callouts could be reflected in whether, and in what ways, the platform responds to publicised complaints, only some of which will be reflected in public statements. Although our dataset contained stories of YouTube overturning particular decisions, the prevalence of this practice, as well as the inequalities involved in who is able to successfully leverage public appeal (Reynolds & Hallinan, 2024; Shapiro et al., 2024), merit further investigation. Finally, the assessment of both horizontal and vertical callouts would benefit from greater attention to the expressive benefits of calling out as a practice (Herbinson & Podosky, 2024; Kligler-Vilenchik, 2017). What factors lead creators to go public with their problems? How do they evaluate the experience of doing so? And is there variation between the motivations and experiences of horizontal versus vertical callouts? Horizontal callouts, like any form of community governance, raise important considerations around the boundaries of the community (Marwick, 2021; Seering, 2022), especially on a platform the scale of YouTube. While we found significant commonalities in the articulation of community in our dataset, our study also highlights a few prominent limitations. First, we only analysed English-language videos on a profoundly multi-lingual, multi-national platform. Second, the speakers in our sample are overwhelmingly men, even though women actively participate in copyright discussions in other contexts (Fiesler et al., 2023) and engage in other genres of YouTube callouts (Lewis and Christin, 2022). More work is needed 18 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 to understand the relatively low levels of participation from women in copyright disputes and its implications for community governance. Third, our dataset highlights the meaningful differences in participation among big and small creators. YouTube provides big creators with better tools for managing copyright and official channels for voicing frustrations (Caplan & Gillespie, 2021). While small creators may be able to leverage community-directed power within particular niches on the platform, their overall ability to participate is contingent on catching the attention of a larger creator or going viral. Although vertical callouts can be successfully mobilised to affect the platform’s decision-making, they are a blunt and unwieldy tool that reactively responds to issues with existing policies and enforcement rather than proactively participating in the development of new policies. Vertical callouts may also be a strategy of diminishing returns. Social media platforms are no strangers to controversy, resulting in a situation where “individual controversies — small shocks that make platform governance look less legitimate — can be weathered by technology companies without real lasting change” as tech companies develop and adopt crisis communication strategies (Suzor, 2019, p. 121; see also Ananny & Gillespie, 2017). Furthermore, the platform ecosystem itself is changing. While YouTube seems relatively stable in social media terms, X, the other platform that YouTubers relied on to mobilise public attention, is in a more liminal state following its purchase by Elon Musk. Whether X will continue to help users attract the right type of attention to publicly pressure YouTube and other corporations remains an open question. Together, practical considerations about the continued efficacy of vertical callouts combined with the exclusions inherent to any conception of community invoked through horizontal callouts, especially in large and diverse platform environments, offer reasons to resist any simple celebration of user agency. At the same time, our analysis of copyright callouts complicates accounts of platform power that focus on the technological and economic influence of major corporations. Theorisations of platform power should consider not only the power of platforms or the regulatory power over platforms but also the power afforded to creators by virtue of the audiences they garner and the communities they cultivate on and through digital media platforms. Here we invoke a different connotation of platform as “a place from which to speak and be heard” (Gillespie, 2010, p. 352). Yet creator-driven approaches to platform governance need not stop at callouts. Platforms like YouTube can move beyond the minimal tools for user involvement like flagging systems (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016), taking inspiration from the community moderation 19 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein tools developed on other platforms (Seering, 202) to harness community expertise and bring more humans into the moderation process — a feature consistently requested by users (Vaccaro et al., 2020). For regulators, creators represent an opportunity to bring more public participation into legislation. As the early example of the Nostalgia Critic’s #WTFU campaign attests, creators can effectively mobilise their audiences and networks of other creators to participate in public hearings (Edwards, 2018). Such opportunities promise ways of expanding an understanding of the unspoken rules governing digital platforms, the roles of creators in shaping and enforcing them, and pathways towards a more balanced configuration of platform power. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors thank the journal, special issue editors, and reviewers for a rigorous and lively revision process that significantly improved the paper. Blake also thanks D. Bondy Valdovinos Kaye and Limor Shifman for their feedback, Ted Striphas for the reading recommendations, Casey Fiesler’s inspirational work on copyright culture, and the bird app’s commitment to delivering creator drama to their feed. References Ananny, M., & Gillespie, T. (2016). Public platforms: Beyond the cycle of shocks and exceptions. IPP2016 The Platform Society, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. https://blogs.oii.ox.a c.uk/ipp-conference/2016/programme-2016/track-b-governance/platform-studies/tarleton-gillespi e-mike-ananny.html Are, C., & Briggs, P. (2023). The emotional and financial impact of de-platforming on creators at the margins. Social Media + Society, 9(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231155103 Bartels, J., Peters, O., de Jong, M., Pruyn, A., & van der Molen, M. (2010). Horizontal and vertical communication as determinants of professional and organisational identification. Personnel Review, 39(2), 210–226. https://doi.org/10.1108/00483481011017426 Berge, P. (2023). #Answerusyoutube: Predatory influencers and cross-platform insulation. Feminist Media Studies, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2023.2231655 Billingham, P., & Parr, T. (2020). Enforcing social norms: The morality of public shaming. European Journal of Philosophy, 28(4), 997–1016. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12543 Bridy, A. (2019). The price of closing the ‘value gap’: How the music industry hacked EU copyright reform. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, 22(1), 323–358. https://doi.org/10.213 9/ssrn.3412249 Burgess, J., & Green, J. (2018). YouTube: Online video and participatory culture (2nd ed.). Polity Press. 20 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 Burnett, G., & Bonnici, L. (2003). Beyond the FAQ: Explicit and implicit norms in Usenet newsgroups. Library & Information Science Research, 25(3), 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1016/S074 0-8188(03)00033-1 Caplan, R. (2023). Networked platform governance: The construction of the democratic platform. International Journal of Communication, 17, 3451–3472. Caplan, R., & Gillespie, T. (2020). Tiered governance and demonetization: The shifting terms of labor and compensation in the platform economy. Social Media + Society, 6(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/2056305120936636 Channel Awesome. (2016). Where’s the fair use progress [Video]. Youtube. https://youtu.be/oYWNtkls 2Jw Crawford, K., & Gillespie, T. (2016). What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the vocabulary of complaint. New Media & Society, 18(3), 410–428. https://doi.org/10.1177/146144481 4543163 Cunningham, S., & Craig, D. (2021). Introduction. In S. Cunningham & D. Craig (Eds.), Creator culture: An introduction to global social media entertainment (pp. 1–20). New York University Press. http://ww w.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv27ftts6.4 Decherney, P. (2014). Fair use goes global. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 31(2), 146–152. h ttps://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2014.921321 Dergacheva, D., & Katzenbach, C. (2023). Mandate to overblock? Understanding the impact of the European Union’s Article 17 on copyright content moderation on YouTube. Policy & Internet, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.379 Duffy, B. E., Pinch, A., Sannon, S., & Sawey, M. (2021). The nested precarities of creative labor on social media. Social Media + Society, 7(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211021368 Edwards, D. W. (2018). Circulation gatekeepers: Unbundling the platform politics of YouTube’s Content ID. Computers and Composition, 47, 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compcom.2017.12.001 Fiesler, C., & Dym, B. (2020). Moving across lands: Online platform migration in fandom communities. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 4(CSCW1), 1–25. https://doi.or g/10.1145/3392847 Fiesler, C., Paup, J., & Zacher, C. (2023). Chilling tales: Understanding the impact of copyright takedowns on transformative content creators. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 7(CSCW2), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1145/3610095 Fiore-Silfvast, B. (2012). User-generated warfare: A case of converging wartime information networks and coproductive regulation on YouTube. International Journal of Communication, 6, 1965–1988. Frey, S., & Schneider, N. (2023). Effective voice: Beyond exit and affect in online communities. New Media & Society, 25(9), 2381–2398. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211044025 Gillespie, T. (2007). Wired shut: Copyright and the shape of digital culture. MIT Press. https://doi.org/1 0.7551/mitpress/7253.001.0001 Gillespie, T. (2010). The politics of ‘platforms’. New Media & Society, 12(3), 347–364. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1461444809342738 21 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein Gillett, R., Gray, J. E., & Valdovinos Kaye, D. B. (2023). ‘Just a little hack’: Investigating cultures of content moderation circumvention by Facebook users. New Media & Society. https://doi.org/10.117 7/14614448221147661 Google. (2022). YouTube copyright transparency report (Report H1 2022; pp. 1–13). Google. https://st orage.googleapis.com/transparencyreport/report-downloads/pdf-report-22_2022-1-1_2022-6-30_e n_v1.pdf. Gorwa, R., Binns, R., & Katzenbach, C. (2020). Algorithmic content moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance. Big Data & Society, 7(1). https://doi.o rg/10.1177/2053951719897945 Gray, J. E. (2020). Google rules: The history and future of copyright under the influence of Google. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190072070.001.0001 Gray, J. E., & Suzor, N. P. (2020). Playing with machines: Using machine learning to understand automated copyright enforcement at scale. Big Data & Society, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/205395 1720919963 Hallinan, B. (2023). No judgment: Value optimization and the reinvention of reviewing on YouTube. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 28(5), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmad034 Herbison, K., & Podosky, P.-M. C. (2024). Call-outs and call-ins. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2023.29 Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organisations and States. Harvard University Press. Hui, A. (2021). Mashup music as expression displaced and expression foregone. Internet Policy Review, 10(4), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.4.1604 Hund, E. (2023). The influencer industry: The quest for authenticity on social media. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691234076 Kaye, D. B. V., & Gray, J. E. (2021). Copyright gossip: Exploring copyright opinions, theories, and strategies on YouTube. Social Media + Society, 7(3), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211036 940 Kemp, D., & Ekins, E. (2021). Poll: 75% don’t trust social media to make fair content moderation decisions, 60% want more control over posts they see (Survey report). Cato Institute. https://www.cat o.org/survey-reports/poll-75-dont-trust-social-media-make-fair-content-moderation-decisions-6 0-want-more Kim, H., Kim, H., Kim, J., & Jang, J. (2022). When does it become harassment?: An investigation of online criticism and calling out in Twitter. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 6(CSCW2), 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1145/3555575 Kingsley, S., Sinha, P., Wang, C., Eslami, M., & Hong, J. I. (2022). ‘Give everybody [..] a little bit more equity’: Content creator perspectives and responses to the algorithmic demonetization of content associated with disadvantaged groups. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 6(CSCW2), 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1145/3555149 Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2017). Alternative citizenship models: Contextualizing new media and the new “good citizen”. New Media & Society, 19(11), 1887–1903. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448177 13742 22 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 Kumar, S. (2019). The algorithmic dance: YouTube’s adpocalypse and the gatekeeping of cultural content on digital platforms. Internet Policy Review, 8(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1417 Lee, J., & Abidin, C. (2024). Backdoor advertising scandals, Yingyeo culture, and cancel culture among YouTube influencers in South Korea. New Media & Society, 26(1), 405–425. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/14614448211061829 Lewis, R., & Christin, A. (2022). Platform drama: “Cancel culture,” celebrity, and the struggle for accountability on YouTube. New Media & Society, 24(7), 1632–1656. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614 448221099235 Marwick, A. E. (2021). Morally motivated networked harassment as normative reinforcement. Social Media + Society, 7(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211021378 Mazzone, J. (2011). Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual property law. Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804779159 Meisner, C. (2023). Networked responses to networked harassment? Creators’ coordinated management of “hate raids” on Twitch. Social Media + Society, 9(2), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2 0563051231179696 Myers West, S. (2018). Censored, suspended, shadowbanned: User interpretations of content moderation on social media platforms. New Media & Society, 20(11), 4366–4383. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/1461444818773059 Navon, S., & Noy, C. (2023). Conceptualizing social media sub-platforms: The case of mourning and memorialization practices on Facebook. New Media & Society, 25(11), 2898–2917. https://doi.org/1 0.1177/14614448211035769 Nielsen, R. K., & Ganter, S. (2022). The power of platforms: Shaping media and society. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908850.001.0001 Pappalardo, K., Aufderheide, P., Stevens, J., & Suzor, N. (2017). Imagination foregone: A qualitative study of the reuse practices of Australian creators [Report]. Australian Digital Alliance. https://eprint s.qut.edu.au/115940/ Perelli, A. (2023, November 16). The creator economy is a $250 billion industry and it’s here to stay. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/creator-economy-250-billion-market-and-here-t o-stay-2023-11. Pfefferkorn, R. (2022). Content-oblivious trust and safety techniques: Results from a survey of online service providers. Journal of Online Trust and Safety, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.54501/jots.v1i2.14 Reynolds, C., & Hallinan, B. (2021). The haunting of GeoCities and the politics of access control on the early web. New Media & Society, 23(11), 3268–3289. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448209516 09 Reynolds, C., & Hallinan, B. (In press). User-generated accountability: Publicizing engagement with automated algorithmic governance on YouTube. New Media & Society. Rieder, B. (2015). YouTube data tools (1.30) [Computer software]. https://tools.digitalmethods.net/net vizz/youtube/. Riedl, M. J., Martin, Z. C., & Woolley, S. C. (2023). ‘I get suppressed:’ Proand anti-abortion activists’ folk theories of platform governance and shadowbanning. Information, Communication & Society, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2289976 23 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein Rosenstein, D. (2016, April 28). Improving Content ID for creators. YouTube Official Blog. https://blo g.youtube/news-and-events/improving-content-id-for-creators/. Schneider, N. (2022). Admins, mods, and benevolent dictators for life: The implicit feudalism of online communities. New Media & Society, 24(9), 1965–1985. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448209 86553 Seering, J. (2020). Reconsidering self-moderation: The role of research in supporting communitybased models for online content moderation. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 4(CSCW2), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1145/3415178 Shapiro, A., Pippert, C., Smith, J. K., & Taylor, Z. A. (2024). Patrons of commerce: Asymmetrical reciprocity and moral economies of platform power. Information, Communication & Society, 1–22. htt ps://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2024.2331753 Siciliano, M. L. (2020). Creative control: The ambivalence of work in the culture industries. Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/sici19380 Struett, T., Sinnreich, A., Aufderheide, P., & Gehl, R. (2023). Can this platform survive? Governance challenges for the fediverse. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4598303 Suzor, N. P. (2019). Lawless: The secret rules that govern our digital lives. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108666428 Sybert, J. (2022). The demise of #NSFW: Contested platform governance and Tumblr’s 2018 adult content ban. New Media & Society, 24(10), 2311–2331. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444821996715 Tarvin, E., & Stanfill, M. (2022). “YouTube’s predator problem”: Platform moderation as governancewashing, and user resistance. Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, 28(3), 822–837. https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565211066490 Vaccaro, K., Sandvig, C., & Karahalios, K. (2020). ‘At the end of the day Facebook does what it wants’: How users experience contesting algorithmic content moderation. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 4(CSCW2), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1145/3415238 van Dijck, J., Nieborg, D., & Poell, T. (2019). Reframing platform power. Internet Policy Review, 8(2). h ttps://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1414 Wegener, C., Prommer, E., & Linke, C. (2020). Gender representations on YouTube: The exclusion of female diversity. M/C Journal, 23(6). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2728 Zhao, A., & Chen, Z. (2023). Let’s report our rivals: How Chinese fandoms game content moderation to restrain opposing voices. Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media, 3. https://doi.org/10.51 685/jqd.2023.006 Zuckerman, E., & Rajendra-Nicolucci, C. (2023). From community governance to customer service and back again: Re-examining pre-web models of online governance to address platforms’ crisis of legitimacy. Social Media + Society, 9(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231196864 Appendices Appendix 1: Codebook 1. What aspect of copyright enforcement is discussed in the video? (check all 24 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS Copyright Claims under FAIR USE for any YouTube reactors YTC027 Nik Nocturnal Canada xRwwYwko2 cA Youtube's Copyright System is BROKEN! 48497 3282 256 YTC028 baldbookge ek United Kingdom 0idSfl5V7X U youtube fix your copyright and fair use / rant 158 13 10 YTC029 The Act Man United States k1OWLq2dO 2c Copyright Abuse on YouTube - Featuring Quantum TV 2536546 185165 25197 YTC030 igobyneq United States 4XvweoOhx lw How distribution services are trying to steal your copyrights 424 29 15 YTC031 3kliksphilip United Kingdom Ia1Li_AtZa0 Bob Tik VS Door Stuck Meme 511253 28839 1202 YTC032 Screen Sanctum United States WhEnYFA8P _E YouTube Copyright Strike / Dispute Rant 76 7 7 YTC033 DJ Pain 1 United States ZkrcT2O0TC 8 The Problem With Uploading Beats to YouTube: How I Deal With Copyright Claims 43186 2320 396 YTC034 Asmongold TV United States PzhcRBYGM y4 Asmongold Reacts to Copyright Abuse on YouTube by The Act Man 1428193 39731 3968 YTC035 Matt Lowne United Kingdom FylSosFlGIA IT'S OVER - CopyrightClaim FINAL Update 121788 7441 746 31 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS YTC036 Anime America United States 6OkPsYilc5o Is Toei Animation Going Too Far? - Copyright and Fair Use Rant 21753 1642 304 YTC037 Simon Mas Italy 7vbmrl32Bi w The IDIOCIES of Music Copyright: A rant 11 2 0 YTC038 YT Torials United States G0MkO5gp_Y How to make a Copyright claim on YouTube 2021 37848 836 114 YTC039 TJR N/A IX5fu4vcDjo Youtube Admits To Millions Of False Copyright Claims 988 99 24 YTC040 Bowblax Canada Cu246b4W4 h4 The Most Insecure Commentat or on YouTube (JustDestiny Copystrike Abuse) 16912 608 229 YTC041 David Pakman Show United States Z43JMffa1x 0 CNN AND NBC Drop Hammer on David Pakman Show 68417 5364 968 YTC042 Edy Chandra N/A pPOqqkckSs How Do You Get Copyright Strikes on Youtube 3682 85 22 YTC043 MinxyOne United States BF3hUy4Qx 1w Copyright Abuse on Youtube By The Act Man | Minxy Reacts 7270 275 52 YTC044 Optimus United States QjNvTCcQug 8 YouTube Is SUING A Notorious Copyright Troll 167043 8610 996 YTC045 Celpon N/A RE9KL5l7X1 Kobo 65359 3849 83 32 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS Ceha. c worried about getting copyright (DMCA)?Call i Kobo? YTC046 ReviewTech USA United States z_JUQd8syN E Angry Joe Is Getting Screwed Over By False Copyright Claims 107425 6447 766 YTC047 Papa Gut Archive N/A uIdR2qIsjk8 Educating Myself On The Quantum TV Copyright Abuse Controversy 9423 363 44 YTC048 The Act Man United States XOQhv6YqIf I The YouTube Drama Never Ends... 663816 51486 3204 YTC049 tfatk United States _ImE2OffRR w Chris D'Elia Filed False Copyright Claim In Attempt To Takedown Documentar y 35111 753 230 YTC050 YongYea United States dG7duZ56d B0 Jukin Media Extorts YouTuber MxR By Abusing YouTube's Awful Copyright System 475453 37518 4629 YTC051 Novakast United States CWtO6fDfEl c False Copyright Claim - Onision - ONISION TRIES TO RELATE TO GAMERS | Novakast 1048 73 25 YTC052 Upper Echelon United States GueXtu54CY g This Needs to END - False Copyright Strike SAGA 100643 10155 688 33 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS YTC053 Amanda the Jedi Canada j27bj2Z9q_I Chris Hansen is False Copyright Striking Channels ALL over YouTube 36661 2017 144 YTC054 EckhartsLad der Canada 5R6j6jIU3tY The Scumbags Abusing YouTube's TERRIBLE Copyright System 131079 11324 1231 YTC055 DarkFlare United States 3XCQvXJeK_ w Nintendo: The Biggest Copyright Trolls 2126 126 36 YTC056 Video Marketing Unicorn - Karin Angelly United States bGzLyVw99 MI Should You Remove Copyright Claims On YouTube? 47197 2063 947 YTC057 Quissath United Kingdom GXcScBqIyz w Quissath Reacts to Copyright Abuse on YouTube - Featuring Quantum TV 1069 54 16 YTC058 TwoSetVioli n Australia uoT3jCOZwl I Update on the Copyright Issue 504087 34482 2201 YTC059 Moist Meta United States NR0qWUwZ fD4 Moistcr1tika l Reacts To Copyright Abuse on Youtube By The Act Man 234 4 0 YTC060 Internet Comment Etiquette with Erik United States dwp881tK6I A Internet Comment Etiquette: "Bogus Copyright Claims" 600968 37315 1378 YTC061 Dave Simpson N/A rfDemC45YY Yet More Copyright Strikes (RANT ALERT) 7561 626 313 YTC062 SmokingEss y7887 United States XTxLwOFKK kw What is a copyright ©️ troll 17 1 0 34 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS YTC063 PewDiePie Japan yMuEeUyMf Uo STOP DOING THIS! - Copyright Striking Criticism etc 9179842 558591 40528 YTC064 justmehabib i N/A 7_CQonpTS Ro YouTube Copyright is Broken... 129084 7365 663 YTC065 Islam Critiqued N/A lZ9K0xgcB8 An Open Letter to YouTube: Yasir Qadhi and Copyright Abuse 18008 1885 191 YTC066 GalaxyIsOk Belarus sn0dDnWSh Vc Jellobug Abuses The Copyright System: Rant Pt2 75727 4042 1531 YTC067 Andrei Terbea Romania 7iRILbewgo s The Lamentable Tale of POKIMANE 6096963 352698 32898 YTC068 Canadian Gamer Canada OAb7KCHrd a8 It's all an act! (Lady Decade rant) 3893 233 253 YTC069 fantano N/A wLRJhjQ4Dy 8 YouTube Updates Copyright Claiming Policy 123308 4839 395 YTC070 TreasureChri st N/A u4Qa8jGtNF s Pastors Abuse YouTube Copyright | Joel Osteen, Steven Furtick, Benny Hinn, Mike Winger 56162 3985 199 YTC071 PewDiePie Japan Ku1ykhGP7 64 Youtube copyright seriously pisses me off.. PEW NEWS 3044074 307211 12145 YTC072 MadcoreMo Fo Australia zzyeg6wKVr s Faran Balanced Tries To Delete Divinity Said - 1437 183 25 35 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS YouTube False Copyright Abuse, Guest Tell Stories YTC073 Cxlvxn United States y5_SsmxqRX I YOUTUBE SUES THE PERSON THAT FALSE COPYRIGHT ED MY VIDEOS (Chris Brady) 52276 3096 272 YTC074 PyroLIVE N/A eJSwv1DHL mA Huge Nikocado Avocado Drama 875352 49895 2315 YTC075 Pointless United Kingdom cG0NwmY4 BL4 IShowSpeed IS OFFICIALLY CANCELLED. .. (exposed) 16449 864 197 YTC076 H3 Podcast United States lYeKevWNU 0g YouTube Ends Copyright Abuse - H3 Podcast #135 1127427 27323 5414 YTC077 InfernoPlus United States PrpOh0Qo8I w Copyright Abuse Is Killing Youtube 1636716 122324 16838 YTC078 Kavos United Kingdom V2hdgb9Tq3 E IShowSpeed Has Been Doing This Behind Everyone's Back... (CAUGHT RED HANDED) 124736 7394 918 YTC079 Chef Bojack United States Z9Kou_HplD s An Intervention with Jalyn About False Copyright Strikes and Mental Health 461 35 30 YTC080 Tipster United States mJqegC7itC U YouTuber Lady Decade EXTORTED by Copyright 5346 271 449 36 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS Troll!?!? YTC081 Boid N/A _aA52v193 mo My False Copyright Striker's Email Reponse [Reupload] 83513 5252 481 YTC082 GamerThum bTV United States KcweFAuuk 1k It's Time to Fight Back Against Copyright Claim Abuse 16471 1541 319 YTC083 TheProfessi onal N/A AsxiDwueqk UMG Claimed My 11 Hour Walkthroug h For 11 Seconds!!, Copyright Abuse Proof! 57819 3725 1007 YTC084 Daniel Batal United States FrZQNS_JvQ What Happens if You Steal YouTube Videos? | YouTube Copyright Rules 40250 1443 823 YTC085 GiBi N/A 9Nv65vuslb 0 Copyright Trolls | How YouTube Fails Its Users 4343 291 67 YTC086 JackSucksAt Stuff United Kingdom UiW7IPsSk1 s This Youtube channel is stealing ALL my videos!! 1156639 45448 1697 YTC087 Matt Lowne United Kingdom jnvBIl-Whbk Channel Update after the Copyright Claims 78315 7532 967 YTC088 Paul Barton Thailand 2Ap9mkgV5 2Q YouTube Copyright Abuse and Scammers 21261 2037 249 YTC089 Freedom! United States 9JhUIaIlfB8 What is Content ID and How can You Use it | Freedom! Quick Tips 6665 109 69 37 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS (2020) YTC090 PapitronPri me Ireland C1N5dL9d7 0o iShowSpeed Caught Stealing From Fans | Copyright Abuse Drama | Thumb Media & Cartigan Exposed 318 20 14 YTC091 SomeOrdina ryGamers Canada Px14aJGZRH Y This YouTuber Keeps Abusing The Copyright System... 711342 43727 3599 YTC092 Mattias Holmgren Sweden AFhkiHyTcB k Copyright Strikes - TikTok vs YouTube (Rant) 1431 99 71 YTC093 PyroLIVE N/A AEtYaMtsZc 4 Huge IShowSpeed Drama 708191 43248 1589 YTC094 JobbytheHo ng United States DxfexPENM Wc COPYRIGHT CLAIM REVIEW 143199 11261 2080 YTC095 Tech Informant Nigeria HLE2BLzW5 2g New Monetizatio n Update | YouTube Shorts | Creator Music Copyright 1925 103 43 YTC096 Chris Zissis United States meM8f1I4X DY How to NEVER Get A Copyright Strike On YouTube.. 2734 115 1 YTC097 The Original Ace United States NLA5b_UaIP I Abusing YouTube Copyright Claims 2 435614 25988 1174 YTC098 TankTheTec h United States jMIu2taavhg Why I REFUSE to Battle the YouTube Copyright System 23997 2004 443 YTC099 KinetiK001 N/A d2fmpGMg3 00 KinetiK001 Channel 254558 14518 753 38 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024 LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS Update (R.I.P. Door Stuck!?) YTC100 Perfecto De Castro United States oXoq6L96n H8 214 Copyright Claim UPDATE + Rico's Comment 296639 4770 582 YTC101 Mental Outlaw United States tasgdeBvRgI The Biggest YouTube ContentID Scam in History. 94933 6064 536 YTC102 dial2fast United States 62xktLJVXd 0 Using Youtube Copyright Match Tool - Stolen Videos 3846 216 55 YTC103 Beyond the Game Canada gjH7QEOCu kM How does FAIR USE apply to sports on YouTube 16401 951 80 YTC104 Rick Beato United States F7AyZq5dVF I How I Fixed My COPYRIGHT STRIKE Takedowns 575740 30315 4215 YTC105 Daniel Greene United States 2PZTBj5SXT E I Got A Copyright Strike and Now Have To Stop... 175129 12559 929 YTC106 Kira United Kingdom gHPLsCJ7R8 w Earth 2 Youtuber Filing False Copyright Takedowns on my Channel 81414 5874 1082 YTC107 Business English Success Germany I0Xn8eaCgH I YouTube Copyright Claim Abuse Solution - Business English Success 19 2 0 YTC108 SmellyOcto pus Canada w4WC9CbFE y8 Youtube Copyright Claimed My Voice ~ What's Going On? 734575 27878 5593 39 Hallinan, Reynolds, Rothenstein LABEL CHANNEL NAME CHANNEL LOCATION VIDEO ID VIDEO TITLE VIEWS LIKES COMMENTS YTC109 The Ultimate Classical Music Guide by Dave Hurwitz United States FUSE1xqbFv g Music Chat: A Rant About YouTube Copyright Claims 4430 340 143 YTC110 Ian Corzine United States j9WFGSEKFt M YouTube COPYRIGHT Rules 2021 | LAWYER's EASY Tutorial!!! 46334 1478 328 YTC111 YongYea United States J6gtmZI8oU U Nintendo Attempts DMCA/ Copyright Abuse On Did You Know Gaming's Heroes Of Hyrule Video, Backfires 269915 15481 2357 YTC112 EckhartsLad der Canada -D2KPK89X oI My channel is being ATTACKED by Copyright Trolls... and it has me worried 95861 11564 2086 YTC113 pwnyy United States uWnmxiQup e0 Youtube Copyright System Abuse 672 34 4 YTC114 TheTekkitRe alm United States Md2R3Io9o kg Man Strikes Over 1,000,000 Videos by Abusing The YouTube Copyright System 171495 7405 766 YTC115 CrasherTalks &More Canada 4CuO28XhN Qg RE: This channel is being deleted... Here's why | YOUTUBE, FIX YOUR COPYRIGHT SYSTEM!! 630 57 21 YTC116 vidIQ United States iUlUFO9kgh Q COPYRIGHT STRIKE: What It Is & How To Fix It 18268 1464 117 40 Internet Policy Review 13(2) | 2024