Da o, Simon; F iehe, Tim
A icle — Published Ve sion
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes: he ole o gende
and social no ms
Social Choice and Wel a e
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Da o, Simon; F iehe, Tim (2025) : Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes: he ole
o gende and social no ms, Social Choice and Wel a e, ISSN 1432-217X, Sp inge Be lin Heidelbe g,
Be lin/Heidelbe g, Vol. 65, Iss. 4, pp. 853-882,
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s00355-025-01596-9
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Social Choice and Wel a e (2025) 65:853–882
h ps://doi.o g/10.1007/s00355-025-01596-9
ORIGINAL PAPER
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes: he ole o gende
and social no ms
Simon Da o1
·Tim F iehe2
Recei ed: 26 Janua y 2023 / Accep ed: 16 Ma ch 2025 / Published online: 11 Ap il 2025
© The Au ho (s) 2025
Abs ac
Indi iduals o en e alua e o he s’ ac ions based on bo h hei pe cei ed in en ions
and hei esul ing ou comes, ewa ding a o able ac ions and punishing un a o able
ones. This s udy aims o isola e he in luence o hese ac o s on punishmen . We
expe imen ally demons a e ha , when ou comes a e held cons an , second mo e s
punish i s mo e s who choose sel ish ac ions mo e se e ely han hose who selec
conside a e ones. Con e sely, when in en ions a e ixed, he se e i y o punishmen
does no signi ican ly di e be ween ai and un ai ou comes on a e age. Howe e ,
his a e age masks gende -speci ic a ia ions. Men end o p io i ize punishing unkind
in en ions, while women a e mo e sensi i e o he pe cei ed ai ness o ou comes.
Social no ms help explain punishmen choices and gende di e ences.
1 In oduc ion
Cos ly punishmen plays a pi o al ole in os e ing coope a ion and sus aining he
well-being o socie ies, as demons a ed by ex ensi e esea ch (e.g., Gü e k e al. 2006;
Bala ou as e al. 2014). Ye , he unde lying mo i a ions o indi iduals o engage in
cos ly punishmen emain a subjec o ongoing inqui y (e.g., Colman 2006). Empi -
ical e idence sugges s ha indi iduals a e mo e likely o punish hose who iola e
clea -cu social no ms, pa icula ly when he consequences o hese iola ions a e
unambiguous (e.g., Feh and Fischbache 2004). Howe e , when ambigui y in his
espec eme ges, such as in scena ios in ol ing chance, indi iduals end o base hei
punishmen decisions also on pe cei ed in en ions a he han solely on ou comes
(e.g., Falk and Fischbache 2006).
While bo h ou comes and in en ions can in luence punishmen choices, unde -
s anding hei ela i e impo ance a he agg ega e and indi idual le els is c ucial
BTim F iehe
im. iehe@uni-ma bu g.de
Simon Da o
[email p o ec ed]
1EBS Uni e si y o Business and Law, Rheingaus . 1, 65375 Oes ich-Winkel, Ge many
2Uni e si y o Ma bu g, Am Plan 2, 35037 Ma bu g, Ge many
123
854 S.Da o,T.F iehe
o p edic ing beha io and in o ming e ec i e policy in e en ions. Fo ins ance,
unde s anding employee p e e ences ega ding p ocedu al ai ness o equi able ou -
comescanin o me ec i eleade shipdecisions.Mo egene ally, hein e playbe ween
p ocedu al and ou come jus ice is a c i ical ac o in a ious economic and poli ical
con ex s (e.g., Bol on e al. 2005; Cappelen e al. 2007). Exis ing esea ch (e.g., Cha -
ness 2004;Falke al.2008) p o ides aluable insigh s, bu u he in es iga ion is
needed o unde s and he p ecise in e play be ween hese ac o s and hei indi idual-
le el he e ogenei y.
To elucida e he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and ou comes in shaping pun-
ishmen , we conduc ed an expe imen whe e i s mo e s chose be ween wo lo e ies
wi h iden ical ou comes bu di e ing p obabili ies. The Conside a e lo e y o e ed a
highe likelihood o an equal spli , while he Sel ish lo e y a o ed an unequal spli ,
bene i ing he i s mo e . Second mo e s, awa e o he i s mo e ’s choice and he
esul ing ou come, could punish hei i s mo e . This expe imen al design allows us
o isola e he e ec s o in en ions and ou comes on punishmen decisions. Fixing he
ou come and compa ing punishmen ac oss di e en lo e y choices, we demons a e
how unkind ins ead o kind in en ions in luence punishmen . Likewise, holding con-
s an he i s -mo e ’s lo e y choice (i.e., he in en ion) and compa ing punishmen
ac oss ou comes, we isola e how he unequal compa ed o he equal ou come a ec s
he second-mo e ’s punishmen choice.
Ou indings e eal signi ican ly mo e punishmen when i s mo e s selec he
sel ish lo e y han when hey selec he conside a e one, indica ing a s ong a e sion o
unkind in en ions. In con as , when in en ions a e held cons an , punishmen se e i y
does no a y when he ou come changes. This does no imply ha ou comes a e
i ele an , as he insigni icance can also s em om coun e balancing e ec s such as
income e ec s.
Gi en he ex ensi e li e a u e on gende -speci ic social p e e ences (e.g., Eckel and
G ossman 2008; C oson and Gneezy 2009; Niede le 2016), ou s udy in es iga es he
po en ial impac o gende on he ela i e alua ion o ou comes and in en ions when
making punishmen decisions. Unde s anding gende di e ences in ai ness pe cep-
ions is c ucial o add essing socie al and o ganiza ional inequali ies. As wo kplaces
and ins i u ions s i e o gende balance, i is impe a i e o ecognize ha women may
ha e dis inc expec a ions ega ding ai ness. Recognizing hese di e ences allows o
de eloping mo e sui able compensa ion and p omo ion schemes. Ou indings e eal
ha women and men espond di e en ly o unkind in en ions and unequal ou comes.
Women a e mo e likely o inc ease hei punishmen le els in esponse o unequal ou -
comes, sugges ing a g ea e conce n o ai ness. Con e sely, men a e mo e inclined
o punish sel ish in en ions, indica ing a heigh ened sensi i i y o unkind in en ions.
To in es iga e he unde lying d i e s o punishmen beha io , we implemen ed
a cooling-o pe iod be o e he second mo e s’ decisions. This manipula ion aimed
o educe emo ional in ol emen , ollowing es ablished esea ch (e.g., Ca della and
Chiu 2012; Neo e al. 2013). Gi en he connec ion be ween punishmen and emo-
ional exp ession (e.g., Xiao and House 2005), we hypo hesized ha a cooling-o
pe iod would lowe punishmen . Addi ionally, conside ing he li e a u e on gende
di e ences in emo ional in ol emen (e.g., C oson and Gneezy 2009; Fuji a e al.
1991), we an icipa ed a s onge impac o he cooling-o pe iod on women’s punish-
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 855
men decisions. Howe e , ou esul s did no e eal a signi ican ea men e ec on
punishmen o ei he men o women.
To del e deepe in o how social no ms shape punishmen decisions, we employed
he me hodology ou lined by K upka and Webe (2013). A g owing body o esea ch
sugges s ha a p e e ence o choosing socially app op ia e ac ions can signi ican ly
in luence economic beha io . In ou con ex , second mo e s may be guided by pe -
cei ed social no ms ega ding punishmen , leading hem o choose socially accep able
le els o punishmen .
By elici ing indi iduals’ pe cep ions o he social app op ia eness o punishmen ,
we demons a e ha a p e e ence o no m compliance plays a signi ican ole in shap-
ing hei choices. Fu he mo e, gende -speci ic social no ms can pa ially explain he
obse ed gende di e ences in punishmen beha io . This sugges s ha unde s anding
he in e play be ween indi idual p e e ences and socie al expec a ions is essen ial o
ully comp ehending he dynamics o social punishmen .
Ou esea ch con ibu es o he exis ing li e a u e in h ee key ways. Fi s , we p o-
ide a comp ehensi e analysis o he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and ou comes
in shaping punishmen decisions, highligh ing he gende -speci ic na u e o hese p e -
e ences. While p e ious s udies (e.g., Bol on e al. 2005;Falke al.2008; F iehe and
U ikal 2018) ha e emphasized he dis inc ion be ween ou come-based and in en ion-
based punishmen , ou esea ch o e s no el insigh s in o how hese ac o s di e
ac oss gende s. Second, we demons a e a s ong alignmen be ween he punishmen
beha io obse ed in ou da a and he p e ailing social no ms. Ou indings con-
ibu e o he g owing body o esea ch on he ela ionship be ween social no ms and
decision-making, pa icula ly in he con ex o punishmen (Ba e al. 2018; Chang
e al. 2019). Thi d, we add ess he ongoing deba e aised by Feh e al. (2018) ega d-
ing he exis ence and ele ance o social no ms in shaping punishmen choices. Ou
esul s p o ide compelling e idence suppo ing hei in luence on decision-making
p ocesses.
The pape ’s s uc u e is as ollows. In Sec .2, we discuss he ela ed li e a u e.
We explain he expe imen al design and p ocedu es in Sec .3. Sec ion4p esen s ou
main hypo heses. Sec ion5 epo s ou empi ical indings ega ding ac ual punishmen
choices and social no ms on punishmen choices. Sec ion6concludes.
2 Rela ed li e a u e
This pape examines he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and ou comes in shaping
indi idual beha io . P io esea ch has u ilized wo p ima y app oaches o isola e
in en ion e ec s: (i) compa ing pa icipan esponses o he choices o o he s wi h
hei eac ions o ac ions imposed exogenously (e.g., Bloun 1995; Cha ness 2004;
Cox 2004;Falke al.2008), and (ii) analyzing choices made a speci ic decision
nodes wi hin a game based on how hese nodes we e eached (e.g., Falk e al. 2003;
McCabe e al. 2003).
Bloun (1995) analyzes ul ima um games and compa es second-mo e s’ minimum
accep able o e s. She a ies whe he he o e is implemen ed by a sel -in e es ed
pa y, a hi d pa y, o by chance. She inds ha second-mo e s a e mo e willing
123
856 S.Da o,T.F iehe
o accep a low o e i implemen ed by chance han by a sel -in e es ed pa y. In
Cox (2004), decision-making in a s anda d us game is compa ed o choices when
alloca ions a e exogenously imposed o ma ch in e im ou comes o he s anda d us
game. In o he wo ds, subjec s in his la e ea men do no espond o a i s mo e .
Simila ly, Cha ness (2004) s udies a gi -exchange game and analyzes second-mo e
beha io when he employe selec s wages compa ed o an ex e nal p ocess. In he
moonligh ing-game se up o Falk e al. (2008), i s -mo e choices we e ei he chosen
delibe a ely by a subjec in he In en ions ea men o andomly d awn in he No
In en ions ea men . In hese con ibu ions, he second-mo e eac ion is s onge
when he i s -mo e choice is in en ional. Despi e his commonali y, he di e en
pape s ea u e design di e ences ha may be impo an . Fo example, in Cha ness
(2004), e iciency mo i es possibly in e ac ed wi h pu e ecip oci y conce ns in a
se ing ea u ing epe i ion. In con as , he game in Cox (2004) was played once, and
he second mo e decided abou an e iciency-neu al ans e . Compa ed o he o he
wo con ibu ions, Falk e al. (2008) allows o posi i e and nega i e ecip oci y.
Ou se up di e ges om hose employed in p e ious esea ch, as we do no imple-
men sepa a e ea men s o isola e in en ion e ec s. Ou design lacks an in en ion- ee
condi ion. Ins ead, in e im ou comes a e join ly de e mined by he in en ional choices
o a i s -mo e and he ealiza ion o a andom a iable. Consequen ly, a speci ic ou -
come can a ise om a a ie y o i s -mo e decisions. We cap u e he in en ion e ec
by examining how changes in i s -mo e beha io in luence subsequen esponses,
holding he ou come cons an . This app oach con as s wi h he p edominan me hod-
ology in exis ing li e a u e, which p ima ily compa es eac ions o in en ionally
implemen ed and andomly d awn ou comes.
The dis inc ion be ween ou app oach and p e ious con ibu ions is impo an .
Fo example, he p e ious li e a u e in neu oeconomics has shown ha pa icipan s’
emo ional esponse o a human ac is e y di e en om he esponse o an ac by
he compu e (e.g., Rilling and San ey 2011). Fo example, an’ Wou e al. (2006)
ind ha un ai o e s in an ul ima um game igge ed highe skin conduc ance ac i i y
and ejec ion a es only i he o e came om a human p opose . Ou in en ion-e ec
iden i ica ion main ains his emo ional in luence by compa ing esponses o kind and
unkind i s -mo e beha io , whe eas compa isons o esponses o i s -mo e and
andom choices do no . This seems pa icula ly ele an in ligh o s udies iden i ying
he ole o punishmen o emo ional exp ession (e.g., Xiao and House 2005).
Fu he mo e, ou app oach allows us o assess he ou come e ec wi hin he con ex
o au hen ic i s -mo e decision-making a he han elying on compa isons be ween
eac ions o a bi a ily d awn ou comes. In his ega d, ou s udy esembles ha o
Cha ness and Le ine (2007), whe e p incipals ini ially selec be ween a high and a low
wage.C ucially,bo hwagechoicescanul ima ely esul inanin e media e wage o he
agen due o he ealiza ion o a andom e en . This ea u e enables in es iga ing how
a single ou come can be achie ed h ough di e en i s -mo e in en ions. Cha ness
and Le ine (2007) demons a e he signi icance o bo h ou comes and in en ions in
shaping ecip ocal beha io , wi h in en ions exe ing a s onge in luence. Howe e ,
hei se up di e s om ou s in a c ucial aspec : he lo e ies associa ed wi h high
and low wages in ol e dis inc ou come dis ibu ions. In con as , ou design employs
lo e ies ha di e only in hei p obabili y dis ibu ions while main aining iden ical
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 857
ou come se s. This dis inc ion may ende he lo e y choice less salien and po en ially
in luence how subjec s in e p e he i s -mo e ’s in en ions.
We ind ha ou comes a e ela i ely mo e impo an o women, whe eas he e e se
is ue o men. We a e he i s o sepa a e he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and
ou comes by gende , e en hough a la ge s and o he li e a u e analyzes po en ial
gende di e ences in social p e e ences. Fo example, C oson and Buchan (1999)
s udy gende di e ences in us games, inding ha sende beha io is simila ac oss
gende swhile women e u ned ahighe p opo ion o hei weal h. Buchan e al. (2008)
ind ha men us mo e while women a e mo e us wo hy. In con as , Chaudhu i and
Gangadha an (2007) ind no di e ences in ecip ocal beha io . Using he ul ima um
game, Eckel and G ossman (2001) ind ha women a e mo e likely o accep lowe
o e s han men. O e all, he li e a u e p esen s qui e mixed esul s (e.g., C oson and
Gneezy 2009), meaning ha mo e e idence is needed. Whe eas p e ious con ibu ions
use expe imen al pa adigms in which an ac ion’s in en ions and consequences we e
inex icably linked (e.g., he ul ima um game), ou expe imen disen angles in en ions
and ou comes. This allows us o cleanly iden i y gende di e ences in he impo ance
o (i) ou comes and (ii) in en ions on punishmen .
Ou esul s also con ibu e o he ecen and g owing li e a u e documen ing he
explana o y powe o social no ms o obse ed beha io . We build on K upka and
Webe (2013) and ind ha e en gende di e ences in punishmen decisions can be
pa ly explained by e e ence o gende -speci ic social no ms. Simila o Ba e al.
(2018) and Chang e al. (2019), we can hus show ha pe cep ions o social no ms a e
iden i y-speci ic.
Ou ea men a ia ion includes a cooling-o pe iod. This ollows con ibu ions
such as G imm and Mengel (2011). Using an ul ima um game, hey ind ha a delay o
a ound 10min a e he p esen a ion o he o e and be o e he inal accep ance choice
causes a signi ican inc ease in he accep ance a e o low o e s. Whe eas mos s udies
(e.g., Ca della and Chiu 2012; Neo e al. 2013) also conside a ela i ely sho delay,
Oechssle e al. (2015) s udy how a 24-hou delay in luences ul ima um-game play,
dis inguishing a ea men in which subjec s a e paid in cash om one in which hey
a e compensa ed wi h lo e y icke s. They ind ha he cooling-o pe iod in luences
ejec ion choices only when subjec s ecei e lo e y icke s. The ewe ejec ions ha
Neo e al. (2013), o example, ind in hei delay- ea men o he ul ima um game
align wi h he idea ha immedia e decisions show he pa icipan s’ in ui i e esponses
o he inequi y. In con as , delayed decisions esul a e mo e ca e ul delibe a ion
abou mone a y payo consequences. Simila ly, ou cooling-o pe iod was expec ed
o educe punishmen s. Howe e , delibe a ion may also inc ease punishmen . The da a
in Philippsen e al. (2024) is consis en wi h he idea ha he pa icipan s’ in ui i e
esponse is a sel ish payo maximiza ion and ha a p e e ence o cos ly punishmen
eme ges only wi h ime o delibe a e.
3Design
The expe imen consis ed o wo p ima y pa s. In Pa 1, Playe A selec ed one o
wo lo e ies, each o e ing a di e en p obabili y o an equal o unequal ou come.
123
858 S.Da o,T.F iehe
Playe B, awa e o Playe A’s choice and he esul ing payo alloca ion, hen assigned
punishmen poin s. In Pa 2, ollowing he me hodology o K upka and Webe (2013),
weelici edpa icipan s’pe cep ionso socialno ms ela ed o hegame.Pa 3in ol ed
a ques ionnai e, including an incen i ized social alue o ien a ion es and a su ey
on pa icipan s’ jus ice a i udes. Addi ionally, we employed he expe imen al ask
de eloped by Kimb ough and Vos oknu o (2018) o assess pa icipan s’ adhe ence
o social no ms.
A he ou se , pa icipan s we e in o med abou he s udy’s s uc u e, including he
exis ence o Pa 1 and he subsequen payo -independen pa s. In line wi h Da o and
Nieken (2014), we collec ed demog aphic in o ma ion om ou subjec s be o e Pa 1
o enable gende -speci ic ma ching in Pa 2. Ou expe imen ea u ed wo ea men s:
DELAY and IMMEDIATE. We will i s desc ibe ea men IMMEDIATE and hen
ou line he key di e ences in ea men DELAY.
3.1 Pa 1: Fi s -mo e ’s lo e y choice and second-mo e ’s punishmen choice
Pa 1 comp ised wo s ages. In S age 1, Playe A selec ed ei he he Sel ish (abb e i-
a ed S) o he Conside a e (abb e ia ed C) lo e y. Lo e y Sel ish led o he unequal
payo alloca ion (abb e ia ed U) (π A
U,πB
U)=(1350,150)wi h p obabili y 80% and
he equal payo alloca ion (abb e ia ed E) (π A
E,πB
E)=(750,750)wi h p obabil-
i y 20%. Lo e y Conside a e e e sed he p obabili ies (i.e., i yielded he unequal
payo alloca ion wi h p obabili y 20%). Playe A could no dic a e a di ision o he
endowmen amoun ing o 1500 poin s bu skew he p obabili y dis ibu ion owa ds
he unequal o he equal payo alloca ion.
Playe A’s expec ed payo exceeded Playe B’s in bo h lo e ies. Wi h Sel ish,
Playe A (B) expec s 1230 (270). Wi h Conside a e, Playe A (B) expec s 870 (630).
Rega ding he inequi y a e sion model o T au mann (2009), he choice o Sel ish
subs an ially inc eases Playe B’s disad an ageous inequi y.
A he end o S age 1, Playe B was in o med abou Playe A’s lo e y choice and
he lo e y’s ou come. Thus, a andomly ma ched pai o Playe s A and B had common
knowledge abou which one ou o ou possible scena ios is ele an o hem:
•Scena io SE: Playe A’s choice o Sel ish combined wi h he d aw o he equal
payo alloca ion,
•Scena io SU: Sel ish combined wi h unequal payo s,
•Scena io CE: Conside a e combined wi h he d aw o he equal payo alloca ion,
o
•Scena io CU: Conside a e combined wi h unequal payo s.
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 859
Knowing he ele an scena io, Playe B could deduc ppoin s om Playe A’s
accoun in S age 2 a a cos p/4.1Subjec s could choose a punishmen le el p, whe e
p∈{0,60,120,180,240,300}.
The maximum punishmen le el is su icien ly high o allow B o spend a sizable
sha e o he in e im payo on punishmen . I is, howe e , also su icien ly low o
allow a clea ole o punishmen depending upon he scena io: punishmen inc eases
ad an ageous payo inequali y in SE and CE, and dec eases disad an ageous payo
inequali y in SU and CU. This allows de i ing clea -cu p edic ions ega ding he
ou come e ec based on he model’s p imi i es in oduced by Cha ness and Rabin
(2002) in Sec .4. To enable emo ional in ol emen (one o he hypo hesized channels
o gende di e ences), we pu pose ully implemen ed a di ec - esponse o ma and
elied on be ween-subjec compa isons (B and s and Cha ness 2011). The inal payo s
amoun o
A
i(p)=πA
i−pand B
i(p)=πB
i−p
4,
whe e i∈{E,U}depic s he ou come d awn in S age 1. Be o e making hei decisions
in Pa 1, pa icipan s p o ided incen i ized belie s a emen s. Playe A indica ed he
expec ed punishmen le el om hei espec i e Playe B ac oss he ou scena ios.
Con e sely, Playe B s a ed hei an icipa ed lo e y choice. Pa icipan s ea ned 200
poin s o each accu a ely p edic ed choice.
When collec ing choice and belie da a om he same subjec , he o de o elici-
a ion becomes a c ucial conside a ion. Schlag e al. (2015) p o ide a comp ehensi e
e iew o ele an esea ch, examining a ious expe imen al pa adigms. This e iew
concludes ha he impac o belie elici a ion on subsequen decisions emains unce -
ain, bo h in e ms o i s p esence and di ec ion. Simila ly, Alempaki e al. (2022),
whe e pa icipan s anked ou comes and conside ed belie s be o e making choices,
also ound inconclusi e e idence ega ding he in luence o p io belie elici a ion.
In ou se up, how an incen i ized belie elici a ion in luences subsequen decisions
is also unclea . To illus a e ha he e ec on punishmen choices is ambiguous, con-
side he case whe e Playe B co ec ly guessed Playe A’s lo e y choice. As a esul ,
B ecei es an addi ional payo , which can ha e wo implica ions. Fi s , Playe B
may wan o choose highe punishmen due o he educed ma ginal u ili y o income.
Howe e , second, he addi ional income migh educe nega i e emo ions (i A chose
he sel ish lo e y) o in ensi y posi i e emo ions (i A chose he conside a e lo e y),
making less punishmen likely.
1We implemen ed a cos -e ec i eness a io o 1:4, which is simila o he 1:3 a io used in Feh and
Fischbache (2004) and Leibb and and Lopez-Pe ez (2012). Niki o akis and No mann (2008) es ed a ios
1:1, 1:2, 1:3, and 1:4 in a compa a i e-s a ics exe cise, inding ha a ios 1:3 and 1:4 pe o m simila ly in
nume ous ega ds. O he pape s use an e en highe punishmen e ec i eness. Fo example, Ba ling e al.
(2014) used a 1:5 a io. On a di e en no e, we ollow he li e a u e by using he e m punishmen o
Playe B’s ac ion in all scena ios. No e ha Playe B’s payo change in scena ios in ol ing Conside a e as
Playe A’s lo e y choice p esumably se ed dis ibu ional p e e ences and no a uly puni i e mo i a ion.
In a s ic e unde s anding, punishmen is a ha dship imposed on someone o a w ong hey ha e (o a e
belie ed o ha e) commi ed (e.g., Baga ic 2001).
123
860 S.Da o,T.F iehe
Impo an ly,as we pay pa icula a en ion ogende di e ences,no e ha he e is no
gende gap in he a e age payo om he belie elici a ion (p=0.226, Fishe ’s exac
(FE)). E en hough hese a gumen s and he indings om he ela ed li e a u e do no
hin a a sys ema ic e ec o incen i ized belie s, we can, o cou se, no de ini i ely
ule ou ha punishmen beha io was a ec ed by he incen i ized belie elici a ion
p ocedu e.
3.2 Pa 2: Elici a ion o social no ms
Following Ba e al. (2018), d’Adda e al. (2016), and E ku e al. (2015), we elici ed
social no ms om ou pa icipan s ega ding he game hey played in Pa 1.2Pa ici-
pan s we e asked o gi e 26 social app op ia eness a ings: six punishmen le els o
he ou scena ios possible plus he wo lo e y choices. The o de o social app o-
p ia eness a ings was andomized a he subjec le el. We employed he six-poin
scale om Chang e al. (2019) comp ising: “ e y socially app op ia e” (la e assigned
a sco e o 5 in ou empi ical wo k), “socially app op ia e” (4), “somewha socially
app op ia e” (3), “somewha socially inapp op ia e” (2), “socially inapp op ia e” (1),
and “ e y socially inapp op ia e” (0).
The e alua ion o choices was incen i ized. One o he 26 choices was andomly
selec ed, and each pa icipan ’s e alua ion o ha choice was compa ed o ha o
ano he expe imen al subjec (Ba e al. 2018; E ku e al. 2015). I a pa icipan ’s
e alua ion ma ched he o he subjec ’s a ing, his pa icipan ea ned 1200 poin s; o h-
e wise, his pa icipan ea ned no hing. S ipula ing payo s like his means ha subjec s
play a coo dina ion game whe e pa icipan s a e incen i ized o s a e he no ma i e
e alua ion o hei ma ch. Acco ding o K upka and Webe (2013), his scheme incen-
i izes pa icipan s o e eal hei pe cep ion o wha is commonly ega ded as socially
app op ia e o inapp op ia e beha io in he con ex a hand ins ead o elici ing hei
p i a e e alua ion.
We in o med subjec s abou he gende o hei andomly ma ched subjec be o e
hey made hei a ings (p oducing obse a ions om single-gende and mixed-gende
pai s) o accommoda e he possibili y o commonly known gende -speci ic social
no ms. We can use his da a o assess whe he pa icipan s condi ion hei a ing on he
ma ched playe ’s gende . Impo an ly, gende di e ences in social no ms ha a e no
commonly known will no p oduce such an adjus men in esponse o he e ela ion
o he andomly ma ched subjec ’s gende .
3.3 Pa 3: Ques ionnai e
To assess ule- ollowing beha io , we employed he ask in oduced by Kimb ough
and Vos oknu o (2018), which is conside ed a eliable measu e o an indi idual’s
p opensi y o adhe e o social no ms (see, among o he s, Kimb ough and Vos oknu o
2016,2018; G oss and D eu 2021). Pa icipan s d agged and d opped 50 balls in o
one o wo bucke s: yellow o blue. Ins uc ions clea ly s a ed ha he ule was o
2We elici ed social app op ia eness a ings in Pa 2 ha desc ibe injunc i e social no ms. In con as , he
belie s elici ed in Pa 1 conce n desc ip i e social no ms.
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 867
Fig. 1 Le panel: A e age punishmen choices by scena io. Righ panel: A e age punishmen choices by
gende and scena io
Ou indings p o ide s ong e idence o a signi ican in en ion e ec on punish-
men , hus suppo ing Hypo hesis 1 (b). This con i ms ha in en ions-based ecip oci y
plays a c ucial ole in d i ing punishmen decisions. Rega ding he lack o a signi -
ican ou come e ec , ou esul s sugges ha he income and inequi y e ec s o se
each o he . Compa ed o he d aw o he equal payo , he in e im payo o Playe
B is subs an ially educed (by 80%) ollowing an unequal ou come. E en hough he
absolu e le el o punishmen emains unchanged, Playe s B alloca e a signi ican ly
highe p opo ion o hei in e im payo owa ds punishmen in esponse o inc eased
inequi y. This inding aligns wi h p e ious esea ch demons a ing he signi ican ole
o inequi y a e sion in d i ing second-pa y punishmen (e.g., Leibb and and Lopez-
Pe ez 2012).
To speak abou gende di e ences, we sepa a e he a e age punishmen le els by
gende in he igh panel o Fig.1. Playe A’s choice o Sel ish ins ead o Conside -
a e, gi en he equal payo alloca ion, inc eases males’ punishmen by 87.86 poin s
(p<0.01, WRT). In con as , women’s punishmen inc eases only by 35.66 poin s
(p=0.090, WRT). Appa en ly, men espond mo e s ongly o Playe A’s sel ish lo -
e y choice han women. Nex , we u n o po en ial gende di e ences in Playe B’s
esponse o he unequal payo alloca ion. Men’s punishmen condi ional on unkind
in en ions is 24.11 poin s lowe in SU han in SE, a di e ence ha is no s a is ically
signi ican (p=0.198, WRT). In con as , women’s punishmen in SU is 30.23 poin s
highe han in SE, which is again no s a is ically signi ican (p=0.343). Al hough
each gende ’s eac ion is insigni ican , he hypo hesized gende e ec migh s ill exis
as women and men change hei beha io in opposi e di ec ions.8
Ou esul s om non-pa ame ic es s a econ i medin o dina y leas squa es eg es-
sions (Table 1). In Columns (1) and (2), he dependen a iable is he punishmen le el,
whe eas i is a dummy a iable equal o one when posi i e punishmen was selec ed
in Columns (3) and (4). The in e ac ion o he dummy a iables o he sel ish lo e y
8Gi en he opposing esponses o women and men, a signi ican eac ion om ei he gende would su ice
o demons a e di e en ial esponses o unequal payo s. A powe analysis indica es ha a sample size o
oughly 800 subjec s in he ole o Playe B is necessa y o de ec a signi ican ou come e ec o women.
Howe e , Table 1le e ages he con as ing esponses o women and men by employing eg ession analyses
wi h in e ac ion e ms. Despi e ou small sample size, his app oach p o ides e idence o a gende -speci ic
ou come e ec .
123
868 S.Da o,T.F iehe
Table 1 De e minan s o punishmen le els and incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Punishmen Punishmen Punishmen Punishmen
Le el Le el Dummy Dummy
Unkind In en ion 85.44∗∗∗ 87.69∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(23.55) (24.67) (0.0923) (0.0986)
Female −3.630 −7.866 −0.0179 −0.0366
(17.09) (19.12) (0.0654) (0.0728)
Unkind In en ion x Female −64.85∗−64.82∗−0.296∗∗ −0.288∗
(37.14) (37.54) (0.147) (0.152)
Unequal Payo s −22.42 −28.54 −0.181∗−0.193∗
(27.04) (28.09) (0.107) (0.111)
Unequal Payo s x Female 64.76 74.95∗0.344∗∗ 0.368∗∗
(39.52) (39.91) (0.159) (0.163)
Cons an 16.24 −144.2∗∗ 0.0719 −0.301
(13.61) (56.41) (0.0471) (0.239)
Con ols No Yes No Yes
N190 190 190 190
R20.084 0.120 0.114 0.129
No es: Analysis o punishmen le els (Columns (1) & (2)) and punishmen dummy (=1 i posi i e punish-
men was chosen; Columns (3) & (4)). We epo esul s om o dina y leas squa es eg essions. Unkind
In en ion is a dummy a iable equal o one when Playe A chose lo e y Sel ish.Unequal Payo s is a
dummy a iable equal o one when he payo alloca ion (1350,150)was d awn. Con ols include age,
numbe o siblings, social alue o ien a ion, jus ice sensi i i y, and ule- ollowing p opensi y. S anda d
e o s in pa en heses. ∗p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
choice and emale is nega i e and a leas weakly signi ican in e e y speci ica ion. The
magni ude o he coe icien s indica es he economic signi icance o he gende e ec .
The in e ac ion o he dummy a iables o unequal payo s and emale is posi i e and
signi ican in Columns (2)-(4). Acco dingly, as a eac ion o a d aw o unequal pay-
o s, women aise hei punishmen and a e mo e likely han men o choose a posi i e
punishmen le el. Compa ing he esul s in Columns (1) and (3), we ind ha bo h
in e ac ion e ms’ signi icance le els a e highe o he bina y punishmen decision
han o punishmen le els. This indica es ha he gende e ec s eme ge mainly due
o a change a he ex ensi e ma gin ( he decision whe he o no o punish): a d aw o
he unequal payo mo i a es emales mo e s ongly han males o punish A, whe eas
he choice o Sel ish mo e s ongly p omp s males o punish A han emales. We sum-
ma ize ou esul s ega ding a gende -speci ic ela i e impo ance o in en ions and
ou comes o punishmen as ollows:
Resul 2 (a) A e a d aw o he equal payo alloca ion, men assign g ea e inc emen-
al punishmen han women o Playe A’s choice o he sel ish lo e y ins ead o he
conside a e one. (b) A e a sel ish lo e y choice o Playe A, women assign g ea e
inc emen al punishmen han men when he unequal ou come esul ed ins ead o he
equal one.
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 869
Table 2 Punishmen le els: la en class analysis o men and women
Punishmen Le el
Men Women
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unkind In en ion 6.53 286.11∗∗∗ 3.01 −8.42
(13.16) (20.82) (10.19) (23.90)
Unequal Payo s −22.50∗∗ −10.84 10.18 75.58∗∗∗
(11.23) (18.07) (9.67) (18.68)
Cons an 21.20∗∗ 2.28 −0.783 202.21∗∗∗
(10.65) (16.50) (6.08) (23.67)
La en Class Ma ginal P obabili ies 72% 28% 81% 19%
No es: Analysis o punishmen le els using GSEM eg ession. Unkind In en ion is a dummy a iable equal
o one when Playe A chose lo e y Sel ish.Unequal Payo s is a dummy a iable equal o one when he
payo alloca ion (1350,150)was d awn. S anda d e o s in pa en heses. ∗p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗
p<0.01
Ou indings indica e ha , on a e age, women exhibi g ea e conce n o equi-
able payo s han men, who p io i ize kind in en ions. To in es iga e he p e alence
and cha ac e is ics o dis inc ypes wi hin each gende , we conduc ed a la en class
analysis. This analysis aimed o de e mine (i) he exis ence and p opo ion o di e -
en playe ypes wi hin each gende and (ii) how hese ypes di e en ially espond o
unequal payo s and unkind in en ions in hei punishmen decisions.
Table 2 e eals dis inc playe ypes o each gende . Bo h men and women exhibi
a p e alen Class 1 ype ha is la gely indi e en o unkind in en ions and unequal
payo s, exhibi ing no inc ease in punishmen in esponse o ei he . No ably, wi hin
his class, men end o dec ease punishmen ollowing unequal payo s, po en ially
d i en by an income e ec . This ype, cha ac e ized by low punishmen le els, aligns
wi h a na owly sel -in e es ed decision-making s yle. C ucially, gende -speci ic ypes
eme ge. Men display a second ype ha s ongly punishes unkind in en ions while
demons a ing indi e ence o unequal payo s. Con e sely, he second ype among
women p io i izes punishing unequal payo s while exhibi ing li le conce n o in en-
ions.Ou s uc u al es ima ion esul s hushighligh as ikinggende dispa i y.Wi hin
ou sample and expe imen al design, only women demons a e a p opensi y o punish
unequal payo s, while only men end o punish unkind in en ions.
5.2 Social no ms (pa 2)
When elici ing social app op ia eness a ings, we in o med each subjec abou he
gende o he subjec whose no m a ing hey mus ma ch o ob ain addi ional paymen .
Howe e , none o he 24 punishmen a ings depends on he announced gende o
he pai ed subjec (p>0.150 o women and p>0.237 o men). Rega ding he
app op ia eness o lo e y choices, a ings do no depend on he ma ched subjec ’s
gende excep ha women a e he Sel ish choice as mo e app op ia e when ma ched
123
870 S.Da o,T.F iehe
Fig. 2 Mean no m a ings o punishmen in scena ios SU, SE, CU, and CE
wi h a man (p=0.064). This sugges s ha any gende di e ences in social no ms a e
no commonly known. In ou analysis, we pool he da a o same-sex and mixed-sex
pai s.
5.2.1 Punishmen
We iden i y how unkind in en ions and he unequal ou come in luenced he no ma i e
e alua ion o punishmen be o e we explo e po en ial gende di e ences.
Ze o punishmen ecei es he highes a e age app op ia eness a ing in all scena -
ios (Fig.2).9This speaks o he ques ion ecen ly aised by Feh e al. (2018) abou
whe he a social no m o punishmen exis s. The social app op ia eness o punishmen
s ongly depends on Playe A’s lo e y choice and he d awn payo alloca ion (Fig.2).
Below, we s a e ha punishmen is mo e app op ia e in Scena io X han Y i posi i e
punishmen le els a e mo e and ze o punishmen is less app op ia e in Scena io X
han in Y.
Independen o he ou come, punishmen is mo e socially app op ia e when Playe
A’s in en ions we e unkind ins ead o kind (p<0.0001 o e e y compa ison, WSR).
Hence, Playe A’s choice o Sel ish p omo es punishmen . Condi ional on he (un)kind
in en ion o Playe A, punishmen is mo e socially app op ia e when he unequal
ins ead o he equal ou come was d awn (p<0.0001 o e e y compa ison, WSR).
Thus, inequi y legi imizes punishmen . These esul s imply ha punishmen is leas
(mos ) app op ia e in Scena io CE (SU). Compa ing Scena ios SE and CU (i.e., sce-
na ios wi h in en ions and ou comes o opposi e alence), we ind ha ze o punishmen
9The e is some he e ogenei y in his ega d a he subjec le el. Fo some subjec s, he maximal app op i-
a eness a ing applies o a posi i e punishmen le el (a leas in some scena ios).
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 871
Table 3 De e minan s o punishmen le els and incidence condi ional on no m in o ma ion
Punishmen Le el
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unequal Payo s 3.520 −8.941 4.793 −7.145
(20.23) (19.57) (20.73) (19.94)
Unkind In en ion 59.37∗∗∗ 37.11∗62.64∗∗∗ 39.66∗∗
(19.12) (19.78) (19.20) (19.91)
Inapp op ia eness o Punishmen −10.05∗∗∗ −9.718∗∗∗
(3.008) (3.017)
Cons an 14.53∗73.27∗∗∗ −112.8∗∗ −37.42
(8.568) (20.20) (53.09) (60.21)
Con ols No No Yes Yes
N190 190 190 190
R20.063 0.147 0.089 0.166
No es: Analysis o punishmen le els. We epo esul s om o dina y leas squa es eg essions. Unkind
In en ion is a dummy a iable equal o one when Playe A chose he lo e y Sel ish.Unequal Payo s is a
dummy a iable equal o one when he payo alloca ion (1350,150)was d awn. The a iable Inapp op i-
a eness o Punishmen is hedi e encein app op ia eness a ing be weenze o andmaximum punishmen o
he ele an scena io. Con ols include age, numbe o siblings, social alue o ien a ion, jus ice sensi i i y,
and ule- ollowing p opensi y. S anda d e o s in pa en heses. ∗p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
is conside ed equally app op ia e in bo h cases (p=0.834, WSR). In con as , all pos-
i i e punishmen le els a e signi ican ly mo e app op ia e in SE (p<0.0001, WSR).
This demons a es ha unkind in en ions inc ease he app op ia eness o punishmen
by mo e han a d aw o unequal payo s and esona es well wi h obse ed punishmen
choices.
We summa ize ou esul s ega ding he a e aged social no m o punishmen as
ollows:
Resul 3 (a) Punishmen is mo e socially app op ia e i in en ions a e unkind ins ead
o kind, and i ou comes a e unequal ins ead o equal. (b) Unkind in en ions inc ease
he social app op ia eness o punishmen by mo e han unequal payo s, ela i e o a
scena io wi h kind in en ions and equal payo s.
To assess he explana o y powe o social no ms ega ding punishmen , we exploi
indi idual he e ogenei y ega ding he inapp op ia eness o punishmen . Con olling
o Playe A’s in en ions and he d awn ou come, Playe s B who a ed punishmen
as mo e inapp op ia e should punish Playe A less. The eg ession esul s displayed
in Columns (2) and (4) o Table 3con i m his p edic ion: he coe icien Inapp o-
p ia eness o Punishmen , which is calcula ed as he di e ence in app op ia eness
a ings be ween ze o and maximum punishmen , is nega i e and highly signi ican .
S ikingly, he Unkind In en ion coe icien , which cap u es he impac o unkind in en-
ions, becomes smalle and less signi ican . A wo- ailed - es on he equali y o he
Unkind In en ion coe icien s in Columns (1) and (2) (and in Columns (3) and (4))
e eals ha he di e ence o coe icien s is highly signi ican (p<0.01). Hence,
123
872 S.Da o,T.F iehe
he e ec o unkind in en ions on punishmen can (a leas pa ly) be explained by a
p e e ence o no m compliance.
Nex , we analyze gende di e ences in no m a ings. Fi s , we aim o unde s and
whe he he impac o unkind in en ions on he pe cei ed social app op ia eness o
punishmen is di e en o women and men. We un eg essions wi h he app op i-
a eness a ing o punishmen as he dependen a iable. As independen a iables, we
conside he gende o he a e , Playe A’s in en ion, and whe he a ze o o a posi i e
punishmen le elwas a ed.Fixing heou come( oE in Column (1) and oUinColumn
(2)), he coe icien o he iple in e ac ion shows ha , o women, unkind in en ions
a e associa ed wi h a smalle inc ease in he app op ia eness a ings o posi i e punish-
men le els ela i e o ze o punishmen han o men. In o he wo ds, men’s pe cei ed
social no m o punishmen is mo e s ongly a ec ed by a change in in en ions han
he co esponding pe cep ion o women. Likewise, we explo e he implica ions o he
ou come, ixing Playe A’s lo e y choice ( o Conside a e in Column (3) and Sel ish
in Column (4)). The coe icien o he iple in e ac ion is insigni ican in (3) and only
weakly signi ican in (4). Thus, he impac o he ou come d aw on he pe cei ed social
no m o punishmen seems no o be gende -speci ic.
Second, we e alua e whe he gende di e ences in pe cei ed social no ms can help
o explain gende di e ences in punishmen . Table 5p esen s esul s om augmen -
ing he empi ical model om Table 1by inco po a ing indi idual app op ia eness
a ings. The in e ac ion o Sel ish and Female becomes insigni ican in ou analyses
o punishmen le els (Columns (1) and (2)). In con as , he gende -speci ic punish-
men esponse o unequal payo s canno be simila ly explained by he e ogenei y in
no m a ings. The in e ac ion o Unequal Payo s and Female emains signi ican in
ou analysis o punishmen le els. In sum, gende -speci ic punishmen no ms (i) can
help o explain he gende e ec in e ms o punishing unkind in en ions, bu (ii) ha e
li le explana o y powe ega ding he gende -speci ic ou come e ec .10
Resul 4 Inco po a ing social-no m a ings a he subjec le el helps o explain he
(gene al as well as he gende -speci ic) impac o in en ions on punishmen choices.
5.2.2 Lo e y choice
Sel ish is pe cei ed as signi ican ly less socially app op ia e han Conside a e (Fig.3).
Acco dingly, A’s choice o Sel ish is a clea no m iola ion. This holds o bo h gende s
(p<0.01, WRT). I is well es ablished ha no m iola ions a e equen ly punished
(Feh and Fischbache 2004) and ha such punishmen s help o sus ain coope a ion.
Acco dingly, Playe s B migh ha e punished A o iola ing he lo e y choice no m.
This mo i e could be e lec ed in Playe B’s punishmen no m: his is ue i A’s no m
iola ion ende s B’s punishmen mo e app op ia e. I could, howe e , also ope a e
independen ly om punishmen no ms: one possibili y would be ha A’s no m iola-
ion igge s a socially inapp op ia e e alia ion mo i e in B.
10 Acco dingly, we ha e es ed wo po en ial explana ions o he gende -speci ic punishmen esponse o
unequal payo s (emo ions and social no ms) and ha e o ejec bo h. Hence, u he esea ch is needed o
explain his esul .
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 873
Table 4 De e minan s o he app op ia eness a ings o punishmen le els
Punishmen App op ia eness Ra ing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SE s. SU s. CE s. SE s.
CE CU CU SU
Female 0.130 0.510∗∗∗ 0.130 0.296∗
(0.114) (0.169) (0.114) (0.151)
Punishmen Dummy −4.864∗∗∗ −3.365∗∗∗ −4.864∗∗∗ −2.707∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.221) (0.139) (0.193)
Female x Punishmen
Dummy
−0.126 −0.318 −0.126 −0.717∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.281) (0.191) (0.257)
Unkind In en ion −0.490∗∗∗ −0.898∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.164)
Female x Unkind
In en ion
0.166 0.333
(0.158) (0.209)
Unkind In en ion x
Punishmen Dummy
2.157∗∗∗ 2.856∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.235)
Female x Unkind
In en ion x Punish-
men Dummy
−0.591∗∗ −0.862∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.310)
Unequal Payo s −0.672∗∗∗ −1.081∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.139)
Female x Unequal
Payo s
0.380∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.185)
Unequal Payo s x
Punishmen Dummy
1.499∗∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.203)
Female x Unequal
Payo s x Punishmen
Dummy
−0.191 −0.463∗
(0.265) (0.270)
Cons an 5.686∗∗∗ 5.014∗∗∗ 5.686∗∗∗ 5.196∗∗∗
(0.0919) (0.137) (0.0919) (0.122)
N4560 4560 4560 4560
R20.489 0.274 0.488 0.205
No es: Analysis o app op ia eness a ings o di e en punishmen le els. We epo esul s om o dina y leas squa es
eg essions. Unkind In en ion (Unequal Payo s) is a dummy a iable equal o one when Playe A chose he lo e y Sel ish
(when he payo alloca ion (1350,150)was d awn) in he ele an scena io ha he subjec e alua ed. Punishmen Dummy
is equal o one when he ci cums ance o be e alua ed ea u es a posi i e punishmen by Playe B. S anda d e o s (in
pa en heses) a e clus e ed a he subjec le el. ∗p<0.1,∗∗ p<0.05,∗∗∗ p<0.01
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874 S.Da o,T.F iehe
Table 5 De e minan s o punishmen le els and incidence condi ional on no m in o ma ion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Punishmen Punishmen Punishmen Punishmen
Le el Le el Dummy Dummy
Unkind In en ion 58.88∗∗ 61.96∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(24.74) (25.46) (0.0971) (0.102)
Female −0.737 −3.038 −0.00803 −0.0195
(15.41) (17.46) (0.0609) (0.0684)
Unkind In en ion x Female −54.65 −55.72 −0.261∗−0.256∗
(35.73) (36.22) (0.143) (0.148)
Unequal Payo s −38.23 −41.96 −0.235∗∗ −0.240∗∗
(27.01) (27.81) (0.107) (0.111)
Unequal Payo s x Female 68.60∗77.99∗∗ 0.357∗∗ 0.379∗∗
(38.48) (39.10) (0.156) (0.160)
Inapp op ia eness −10.07∗∗∗ −9.563∗∗∗ −0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0339∗∗∗
o Punishmen (3.081) (3.104) (0.0115) (0.0116)
Cons an 73.78∗∗∗ −63.71 0.268∗∗∗ −0.0159
(22.61) (62.72) (0.0818) (0.258)
Con ols No Yes No Yes
N190 190 190 190
R20.164 0.189 0.171 0.182
No es: Analysis o punishmen le els (Columns (1) & (2)) and punishmen dummy (=1 i posi i e punish-
men was chosen; Columns (3) & (4)). We epo esul s om o dina y leas squa es eg essions. Unkind
In en ion is a dummy a iable equal o one when Playe A chose he lo e y Sel ish.Unequal Payo s is a
dummy a iable equal o one when he payo alloca ion (1350,150)was d awn. The a iable Inapp op i-
a eness o Punishmen is hedi e encein app op ia eness a ing be weenze o andmaximum punishmen o
he ele an scena io. Con ols include age, numbe o siblings, social alue o ien a ion, jus ice sensi i i y,
and ule- ollowing p opensi y. S anda d e o s in pa en heses. ∗p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Fig. 3 Mean No m Ra ings and 95% con idence in e als o Lo e y Choice by Gende
123
Punishmen o in en ions o ou comes… 875
Table 6 The impac o he social app op ia eness o lo e y choices on punishmen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SU SU SE SE CE CE
Lo e y No m −3.161 −6.172 1.319 −4.372 −9.076∗∗ −2.572
(7.366) (7.842) (6.581) (6.464) (4.054) (3.500)
Punishmen No m −7.649 −10.51∗∗∗ −35.83∗∗∗
(6.985) (3.041) (7.172)
Cons an 90.02∗∗∗ 129.0∗∗ 70.46∗∗ 118.0∗∗∗ 48.42∗∗ 228.7∗∗∗
(32.83) (48.34) (28.83) (30.66) (18.40) (38.98)
N35 35 103 103 45 45
R20.006 0.041 0.000 0.107 0.104 0.438
No es: Analysis o he punishmen le el using o dina y leas squa es eg essions. Lo e y No m is he
di e ence in app op ia eness a ings be ween he choices Conside a e and Sel ish.Punishmen No m is he
di e ence in app op ia eness a ings be ween ze o and maximum punishmen o he ele an scena io. ∗
p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
The esul s in Table 6documen ha he punishmen le el is signi ican ly co ela ed
wi h he lo e y no m only in CE: he mo e inapp op ia e he Sel ish choice is, he less
B punishes A when she complies wi h he no m by choosing Conside a e. Fo all
h ee scena ios, he coe icien o he lo e y no m is insigni ican when con olling
o he punishmen no m. In summa y, ou esul s indica e ha , a leas o some ex en ,
he social app op ia eness o lo e y choices a ec s punishmen no ms and de e mines
punishmen choices his way. Ou esul s do no p o ide e idence in a o o a sepa a e
channel, un ela ed o punishmen no ms.
6 Conclusion
Cos ly punishmen plays a pi o al ole in os e ing coope a ion and p omo ing soci-
e al well-being (e.g., Bowles and Gin is 2004). To e ec i ely assess and espond o
beha io , indi iduals e alua e o he s’ choices based on bo h in en ions and ou comes.
While p e ious esea ch has explo ed he in luence o hese ac o s on punishmen
decisions, he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and ou comes emains a subjec o
inqui y.
Ou s udy demons a es ha unkind in en ions signi ican ly inc ease punishmen
le els a he agg ega e le el. In con as , when in en ions a e held cons an , he se e i y
o punishmen does no a y subs an ially wi h he ou come. We obse e gende -
speci ic di e ences in he ela i e impo ance o in en ions and ou comes. Men end
o p io i ize punishing unkind in en ions, aligning wi h hei p e e ence o adhe ing
o p inciples (e.g., Del Giudice e al. 2012; Eckel and G ossman 1996). In con as ,
women espond mo e s ongly o unequal ou comes, sugges ing a g ea e conce n o
equal payo s.
By examining elici ed social no ms, we shed ligh on he unde lying mechanisms
d i ing hese gende di e ences.Ou indingssugges ha menandwomenmayadhe e
o dis inc pe cep ions o social no ms ega ding punishmen .
Ou esul s unde sco e he impo ance o conside ing gende -speci ic p e e ences in
a ious domains. Fo example, we may conside simila i ies o he ques ion abou he
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876 S.Da o,T.F iehe
ela i e desi abili y o equal oppo uni ies (i.e., a ai p ocedu e) and simila ou comes
(i.e., a ai ou come). This ques ion is impo an in an o ganiza ional and a wide
socie al con ex (e.g., in e ms o p e e ences o edis ibu ion). Conside ing his
eali y, addi ional esea ch abou gende di e ences ega ding p ocedu al and ou come
ai ness using di e en expe imen al se ups is wa an ed.
Acknowledgemen s We hank wo anonymous e iewe s o hei aluable sugges ions on ea lie
manusc ip e sions. In addi ion, we g a e ully acknowledge he help ul commen s ecei ed om Flo-
ian Baumann, And eas G unewald, Zohal Hessami, Ma io Mech el, Ca Lam Pham, Ch is oph Rössle ,
Hannes Rusch, and pa icipan s o he CESi o A ea Con e ence on Public Economics, he semina LIEN
a Pa is Nan e e, and he LawEcon Wo kshop a he Uni e si y o Bonn.
Funding Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
Da a a ailabili y Da a a e a ailable om he au ho s upon eques .
Decla a ions
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