Climate Policy Obstruction on the Right and the Far Right

Plehwe, Dieter et al. Book Part — Published Version Climate Policy Obstruction on the Right and the Far Right Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Plehwe, Dieter et al. (2025) : Climate Policy Obstruction on the Right and the Far Right, In: Roberts, J. Timmons Milani, Carlos R.S. Jacquet, Jennifer Downie, Christian (Ed.): Climate Obstruction. A Global Assessment, ISBN 9780197787182, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 139-160, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197787144.003.0005 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/331743 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 CHAPTER 5 Climate Policy Obstruction on the Right and the Far Right LEAD AUTHORS: DIETER PLEHWE AND JUSTIN FARRELL CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: LUCAS ARALDI, ROBERT J. BRULLE, JESSE CALLAHAN BRYANT, WILLIAM CALLISON, KERT DAVIES, RUTH E. MCKIE, SOTIRIS MITRALEXIS, AND ALEXANDRU RACU INTRODUCTION The political complexity of climate obstruction has increased in recent years, with conservative and far-right movements playing interconnected yet distinct roles. While each movement actively resists climate policy at national and international levels, their respective philosophies and tactics differ significantly. Understanding these similarities and differences is critical to forming a more complete understanding of climate obstruction globally. This chapter untangles and reveals the overlaps in these intertwined narratives, highlighting the increasing power of far-right movements in climate obstruction and presenting research on ways these movements seek to dismantle international governance and cooperation to hinder meaningful global action on climate change. As these movements grow and as neoliberal conservatism continues to be a deregulatory force in global politics, it is important to carefully catalogue their similarities, differences, and impacts. The chapter begins by examining climate obstruction efforts within contemporary conservativism, focused on its anti-regulatory roots in the United States before turning to a global analysis of its organizational, financial, and cultural linkages. Here we describe how mainstream conservatism has successfully obstructed climate policy by advocating for deregulation of free markets, defending private property rights, and challenging the veracity of scientific consensus. Dieter Plehwe et al., Climate Policy Obstruction on the Right and the Far Right. In: Climate Obstruction. Edited by: J. Timmons Roberts, Carlos R. S. Milani, Jennifer Jacquet, and Christian Downie, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press (2025). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197787144.003.0005 Next, we consider the role of the far right in global climate obstruction today, a movement rooted in antipathy toward multiculturalism and cooperation among nation states and in support for ethnopluralism. While often sharing neoliberal conservatism’s goal of climate obstruction, the far right tends to take a more radical approach. As we show, the far right’s major problem with climate change is not necessarily the science per se, but rather the alleged attempts by elites and global powers to use climate science and climate policy as a Trojan horse to expand global governance and undermine ethnic heritage, cultural identity, and national sovereignty. Finally, we present research on its specific tactics before offering avenues for future research on this evolving global movement. CONSERVATISM A network of organizations and advocacy groups has promoted approaches to environmental management that emphasize local control, private property, and individual rights. Over time, these efforts have expanded globally through coordinated initiatives and partnerships focused on shaping public policy and climate discourse. “Wise Use” Roots A long history of right-wing anti-environmental ideology, activism, and political action in the United States continues to play a role in the contemporary opposition to effective global climate policy. Nonprofit organizations and their front groups have fought against federal and state environmental regulations protecting everything from wetlands and waterways to endangered species. These organizations have been supported by corporate funders who have an interest in weakening or eliminating environmental regulations1and tend to adopt a property-rights-based counternarrative against federal and state environmental regulation. For example, a landmark event in this history is the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s–1980s, a battle over federal-versus-state land management in Western states that was emblematic of a policy debate over public-versus-private control of nature. Named for the contested land (the sagebrush steppe), the “rebellion” was part of a growing conservative movement that advocated for commercial use if not outright privatization of land under government control and mobilized against federal environmental laws and environmentalism generally.2The “wise use” concept emerged from this movement, emphasizing [ 140 ] Climate Obstruction local stewardship and broad individual rights to use nature for human benefit. The Wise Use Movement was founded in 1988 out of fear that George Bush Sr. was going to live up to his campaign pledge to be “the environmental president.” This cabal of anti-environmental activists, organized by federally subsidized industries dependent on public lands, issued a natal document, the Wise Use Agenda. It called for, among other things: drilling the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, logging Alaska’s Tongass National Forest, opening wilderness to energy development, gutting the Endangered Species Act, and privatizing national parks.3 Mirroring the strategies of environmental movements, wise use organizations succeeded in mobilizing a wide range of conservative constituencies. For example, the movement in 1994 succeeded in blocking US ratification of the international Convention on Biological Diversity.4 This anti-environmental, property-based “guardianship” agenda spread beyond the United States to countries including Canada (with the formation of organizations such as Canadian Women in Timber, Share Canada, etc.) and Australia (Forest Protection Society, etc.).5The global expansion also included financial support and promotion of the Wise Use Movement by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church.6In addition to advancing wise-use arguments, the conservative conservation movement during this period began to associate environmental activism with terrorism, and contemporary framing of “last generation” climate activism as “eco-terrorism” echoes these earlier versions of that narrative.7 Organizational Linkages The climate policy landscape includes a broad range of think tanks and nonprofit organizations with diverse secular and religious backgrounds. Many of these groups are connected through shared funding sources and networks, forming a transnational civil society that engages in coordinated efforts to shape climate governance through a variety of strategies and approaches. Think Tanks Conceptual overlap exists between the rhetoric of “free markets” and concepts of “wise use,” stewardship, and subsidiarity. US-based think tanks are significant curators and amplifiers of opposition to scientific evidence related to CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 141 ] climate change and related policy action such as legislation and regulations.8 Outside of the United States, these organizations work within a universe of think tanks operating across countries—sometimes connected under large umbrella organizations such as the global Atlas Network, the European Stockholm Network, and the Epicenter Network—to produce and distribute policy reports and otherwise attempt to influence politics and politicians on the issue of climate change. Most of these organizations and figures oppose ambitious climate policy, in particular the close international cooperation and coordination required to create and implement such policies. Through information dissemination including not just policy reports but also research papers, conferences, and other branded activities, think tanks present quasi-academic positions on the best approaches to tackling the climate crisis. Many of their positions are grounded in the same narrative: positioning climate change not as a sciencebased issue but as an inherently political topic. Underlying this way of thinking is an economic philosophy of individual liberty and economic and political freedom expressed in a triad of values: property rights, cost-benefit analysis, and local mandate.9 Think tanks focused specifically on climate denial—such as the US-based Heartland Institute, the UK-based Global Warming Policy Foundation, and South Africa’s Free Market Foundation10—challenge the veracity of climate science and attack environmental activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Other think tanks involved in climate-obstructing activities emphasize market-based mechanisms as a solution to most contemporary social and political problems. According to this worldview, private initiative and the vital role of business will stimulate both a free-market economy and a free-market environmentalism of ideas11 that will help solve the world’s biggest challenges. Some right-wing think tanks in the climate space, such as the Heritage Foundation, promote traditionally conservative values. Others, such as the Mises Institutes, advocate a more libertarian position.12 Yet all have a fundamental commitment to influence policy and public opinion in favor of economic and political freedoms with limited to no government intervention. The Atlas Network The Atlas Network is an important US-based umbrella organization for the neoliberal free-market movement (or “Freedom Movement”13), which includes numerous climate obstructionist groups around the world. Founded in 1981 by Antony Fisher, the organization (then named the Atlas Economic Research Foundation) coordinated think tanks Fisher had helped to set up and supported efforts in numerous countries to found new think tanks modelled after [ 142 ] Climate Obstruction the British Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), which had been the first think tank founded by Fisher, in 1955.14 Fisher established these and other think tanks on the advice of economist Friedrich August von Hayek. Both were members of the Mont Pèlerin Society of neoliberal intellectuals, which Hayek founded in 1947 and that continues to serve as a pipeline for the board and staff members of Atlas Network partners.15 Most think tanks involved in this free-market advocacy network share a basic anti-collectivist and anti-regulatory ideology, which in many cases includes opposition to environmental and climate policymaking. For example, research has revealed the close links between fossil fuel capital, Rupert Murdoch’s media empire, and Australian neoliberal think tanks that are part of the network.16 Recent investigative journalism has documented the role of Atlas Network partners in various countries in a strategic mobilization to criminalize climate justice movements.17 To this end, Atlas think tanks from diverse regions that have a long history of opposition to the environmental movement have deployed similar strategies and media-savvy campaigns. These tactics have included ad-hominem attacks against climate leaders such as Greta Thunberg, organizations such as Greenpeace, and protest tactics such as sit-down blockades that liken activists to terrorists or Nazis. Atlas partners have also used such “strategy mobility,” similar to “policy mobility,” to prevent or oppose climate mitigation policies across borders.18 Right-wing conservatism remains central to contemporary climate obstructionist mobilizations beyond the United States, and key organizations in the history of the anti-environmental movement19 (such as the American Legislative Exchange Council) are also partners of the Atlas Network. Atlas is also home to think tanks strongly emphasizing propertyand property rights– based forms of conservation such as the Property and Environment Research Center. In 2020, Atlas partner the Austrian Economics Center, in collaboration with two recently founded conservation groups in the United States and the United Kingdom,20 radicalized the right-wing conservation approach with their book Green Market Revolution: How Market Environmentalism Can Protect Nature and Save the Planet. Remarkably, the authors suggest that post-Paris climate policy development is moving in the right direction thanks to the increasing use of market-based instruments, although the book suggests that the privatization of nature must be a precondition of global warming mitigation.21 Another evolving campaign in Atlas Networkcircles22 is the “alternative solution” free-market advocacy of foundation president Rod Richardson, successor of one of the early funders of Atlas think tanks around the world.23 Richardson created the “clean capitalism without borders” concept, which advocates giving tax breaks for “green” investments secured in international treaties.24 The Ludwig von Mises Institute, based in the US state of Alabama, is another far-right/libertarian force in climate obstruction that has evolved CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 143 ] into a global network of think tanks.25 Several Mises Institutes in different countries have been active in the Atlas network; according to the results of two global surveys of both networks, about one-quarter of the individuals affiliated with Mises Institutes are also affiliated with Atlas think tanks.26 In turn, leading intellectuals involved in Mises Institutes around the world, including economist Hans Hermann Hoppe, founded the Property and Freedom Society. The Society advocates a new version of far-right neoliberalism that opposes almost any state interventionism and supports radical privatization and decentralization. The group’s rejection of global policy coordination under the umbrella of the United Nations is similar to that of the anti-systemic far right. Property and Freedom split away from the Mont Pèlerin Society in 2004; the latter supports both culturally progressive and conservative varieties of neoliberalism and, in the context of climate change, is home to supporters of global economic constitutionalism and both supporters and opponents of international policy coordination.27 Discourses of Delay Beyond their free-market rhetoric, a wide range of think tanks has developed other discourses of climate delay,28 including promoting nontransformative solutions and advocating limited responsibility for addressing climate change. These strategies include the growing emphasis on achieving net-zero emissions, a focus on carbon sequestration rather than de-carbonization, and an emphasis on “discounting” in economic models (which asserts that mitigation can wait because it will be less expensive in the future). These delay-focused forms of discursive obstruction have not only been integrated across the political and corporate policy spheres, but also accepted in the public mind.29 These narratives have been echoed by individual members of these think tanks, who spread these ideologically supported positions on climate change via public-facing media appearances.30 Murdoch media regularly feature content from both free-market conservative and hard-right climate denialist think tanks, companies, and funders in North America, particularly those based in the United States31 (e.g., the Heartland Institute). They also spotlight speakers and content from think tanks based in Canada (Frontier Centre for Public Policy), Australia (Institute of Public Affairs, Centre for Independent Studies), Europe (Institute of Economic Affairs, the Austrian Economics Center), and South Africa (Free Market Foundation, South African Institute of Race Relations), for example. Consequently, partisan think tanks have ultimately been able to guide “public opinion, political debate, economic discourse and even academic discussions on climate change mitigation” in several countries and policy arenas.32 [ 144 ] Climate Obstruction Financial Linkages Scholarly research on the relationship between conservative foundations and climate obstruction began with a seminal quantitative 2014 analysis of the US Climate Change Countermovement (CCCM).33 The CCCM is a network of organizations (including think tanks), individuals, and activities dedicated to preventing ambitious climate policy. Since then, research on philanthropic financial support within the political economy of climate obstruction has revealed three themes. The first theme is opacity: reliable data on foundation support are difficult to obtain. When such data are gathered, it can be difficult to discern the intent and influence of this type of financial support. For example, 74% of donations made through donor-advised funds come from unidentified sources.34 To learn more about funding patterns, it can be helpful to trace funding flows and board membership. The Dunn Foundation, for example, has funded several think tanks involved in climate denial, including the Heartland Institute and the Cato Institute. Between 2002 and 2017, the latter received more than $7 million from the Dunn Foundation;35 a foundation member also serves on Cato’s supervisory board. While some such think tanks in the United States reportedly benefit from untraceable contributions from conservative family donations and the libertarian/conservative Donors’ Trust,36 others lack even limited transparency when it comes to their funding sources. Recent research has documented the funding patterns established by brothers Charles and David Koch of corporate giant Koch Industries, who discreetly fund the climate change countermovement by directing money through their family foundations (the Charles Koch Foundation and the David H. Koch Charitable Foundation). The beneficiaries are a network of conservative think tanks and advocacy groups that actively promote climate change skepticism and oppose environmental regulations, often funneling the funds through “dark money” organizations such as Donors Trust to obscure the source of these donations. (This network is sometimes referred to as the “Kochtopus” due to its extensive reach and influence.)37 The second theme is concentration. Despite the fact that many contributions to obstructionist think tanks and civil society groups are made anonymously, research has found that a small group of foundations tends to provide the bulk of financial support for organizations involved in climate obstruction efforts:38 “The top 1% of grant makers account for 67% of grants, and the top 10% of grant makers account for 95% of grants.”39 In Europe, the number of foundations involved in promoting and/or funding climate change denial is smaller than in the United States. To compare the two regions, one can examine the foundations supporting think tanks that are partners of the global Atlas Network. Many Atlas think tanks are involved in climate denial CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 145 ] and other forms of obstruction, as discussed earlier. While there is no information on foundation funding in Europe comparable to that available in the United States, a recent survey found forty-eight foundation representatives on the boards of Atlas think tanks in Europe, compared with almost three hundred individuals representing more than two hundred foundations who served on the boards of Atlas think tanks in the United States.40 A few European foundations in the survey sample are notable for funding Climate Countermovement organizations in Latin America, including the Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales in Spain, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, for example, funds them in Germany. Both European foundations fund Latin American think tanks. The European arm of the Atlas Network, the International Policy Network, was involved in channeling US funding to European denial organizations.41 The third theme is heterogeneity. Scholars have noted the variety of the climate obstruction actors funded. Foundation support flows to many different organizations, with varied levels of focus on climate change; thus, scholars face a challenge in isolating the impact of these flows on climate obstruction when it is one among many issues of concern within the neoliberal and conservative movement.42 Cultural Linkages: The Role of Religion Many major religions embrace ambitious environmental action and endorse climate mitigation, out of concern over, for example, protecting God’s creation. There are also some religious linkages to climate obstruction, especially among rank-and-file adherents whose traditions are more closely aligned with right-wing politics.43 In the United States and Australia, for example, religiosity has been found to be a key factor in the popularization of climate science skepticism.44,45 Research on spirituality on the Netherlands has mirrored American patterns.46 Other types of religious organization have been involved in climate obstruction, notably the US-based Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation. Its founder, E. Calvin Beisner of the Catholic Acton Institute, described the group as a “network of evangelical theologians, scientists, and economists.”47 Its activities have included organizing a seminar in Rome with the Acton and Heartland institutes to mobilize against the language of “environmental crisis” in Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si.48 Like the Cornwall Alliance’s, many of the best-studied Catholic denialist activities have been traced to the United States. Their main themes are reflected in the prominent blog and forum Catholic Answers: climate change is natural, not anthropogenic; anthropogenic climate change is “prudential judgment” (i.e., belonging to the scientific sphere, which is not infallible); climate concern reflects pantheism and neopaganism; support for subsidiarity [ 146 ] Climate Obstruction right has become entangled with environmental ideologies in ways that ideologies of the mainstream right have not. In a manifesto published online before the attack, the shooter wrote: The inconvenient truth is that our leaders, both Democrat and Republican, have been failing us for decades . . . the decimation of the environment is creating a massive burden for future generations. Corporations are heading the destruction of our environment by shamelessly over-harvesting resources . . . The government is unwilling to tackle these issues beyond empty promises since they are owned by corporations . . . that also like immigration because more people mean [cheap labor and] a bigger market for their products.79 Although revolutionary far-right movements differ substantially across the globe, two lessons can be gleaned from a survey of their shared characteristics: (1) science skepticism and climate policy obstruction are not necessarily linked; and (2) environmental concern is present, albeit in very different forms, across the conservative political spectrum. CONCLUSION The chapter’s survey of the right is anchored by the role of neoliberalism, highlighting climate obstruction within public-facing institutions often backed by hidden funding from fossil fuel and agribusiness interests. We traced the history of neoliberal narratives linking the early conservation rhetoric of wise use as an alternative to public regulation to present-day rhetoric of freemarket environmentalism. We also considered the far right, conceptualized as a revolutionary movement, sometimes at odds with both neoliberalism and conservatism, that attempts to obstruct climate policy as part of a larger effort to disrupt international cooperation itself. The chapter emphasizes the importance of civil society in right-wing obstruction, focusing on the network of actors collaborating through think tanks, foundations, and other organizations. While right-wing narratives differ, civil society networks have offered spaces where the various factions of neoliberalism and other far-right forces intersect. Turning to European and global climate governance and the notion of shared responsibility, we then pointed to the revitalization of reactionary, nationalistic ideologies shared by the diverse sectors of the right. Religion and spirituality also play a significant role in climate obstruction when they are mobilized against scientific evidence and scientifically grounded policymaking. Here we provided the case studies of Eastern Europe and Latin America to demonstrate how religion can reinforce climate obstruction ideology, despite that many leaders of world religions have made addressing climate CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 153 ] change a theological imperative. Finally, we demonstrated how, despite their differing ideologies and goals, the actors and organizations on the right are to some degree unified under “big tent” groups including the Atlas network and the International Democratic Union, amplifying their messages via media outlets that reach successfully across space and time. Topics for Future Research Scholars are increasingly focusing attention on the far right and, within that arena, a literature on the relationship between the far right and the environment is growing rapidly.80 However, much less work is being done on the role of the far right in climate obstruction. This is a critical gap; this chapter lays the groundwork for a basic research program on the subject, which must be undertaken separately from—but in conversation with—the tendency to focus on more traditional, neoliberal conservative climate obstruction efforts. However, scholars should continue to study the ways in which various movements converge and interact. Far from a sign of weakness or fragmentation, the right’s diversity and network overlaps have engendered a growing variety of options and strategies for climate obstruction that coincide with dedicated efforts to communicate across the broadening spectrum. While there are important ideological differences between the more recent far-right obstructionist groups and older right-wing conservative and neoliberal groups, big-tent think tank networks such as Atlas offer an arena in which this synthesizing research might be conducted. Cultural influences on obstruction also deserve more scholarly attention. While the chapter has focused on the far right’s opposition to multiculturalism and the preference for “natural” ethnopluralist enclaves, the role of religion is still largely understudied, especially its more diffuse aspects beyond the institutions and organizations considered here. Researchers should attempt to quantify, or tease apart qualitatively, the influence of causal mechanisms in the relationship between religion and climate obstruction, with a particular focus on the relative importance of political ideology or religious belief in driving outcomes. The role of global religious communication channels such as the Eternal Word TV Network81 deserve closer attention in conjunction with other commercial right-wing media outlets. Researchers would do well to expand beyond the focus on examining specific religions or denominations to explore religion’s noninstitutionalized forms.82 For example, beliefs and orientations toward time and temporality (cyclical versus linear; finite versus eternal) and the concept of nature’s inherent “sacredness” can have dramatic impacts on the perceived urgency of climate action as well as the level of perceived need to obstruct ongoing climate efforts. [ 154 ] Climate Obstruction Finally, there is very little research on the organizational and financial linkages between the far right and climate obstruction efforts. The decentralized nature of this movement makes such study difficult, but in addition to examining the organizational and financial networks of national far-right parties, scholars should begin to piece together regional and subnational linkages between movement actors to gain a clearer picture of potential coordination among them. NOTES 1. David Helvarg, The War Against the Greens: The “Wise-Use” Movement, the New Right and Anti-environmental Violence (Sierra Club Books, 1997); Carl Deal, The Greenpeace Guide to Anti-environmental Organizations (Odonian Press, 1933). 2. Justin Farrell, The Battle for Yellowstone: Morality and the Sacred Roots of Environmental Conflict (Princeton University Press, 2015). 3. 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Boykoff, “Media and Scientific Communication: A Case of Climate Change,” Geological Society London Special Publications 305, no. 1 (2008): 11–18; M. Boykoff and J. Farrell, “Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations and Media Attention in the United States,” in Climate Change Denial and Public Relations: Strategic Communication and Interest Groups in Climate Inaction, ed. xxx (Routledge, 2019), 121–139; A. M. Petersen, E. M. Vincent, and A. L. Westerling, “Discrepancy in Scientific Authority and Media Visibility of Climate Change Scientists and Contrarians,” Nature Communications 10 (2019): 3502, https://doi.org/10.1038/ s41467-019-09959-4. [ 156 ] Climate Obstruction 31. Edson C. Tandoc, Bruno Takahashi, and Ryan J. Thomas, “Bias vs. Bias,” Journalism Practice 12, no. 7 (2018): 834–849. 32. Dieter Plehwe, “Think Tank Networks and the Knowledge–Interest Nexus: The Case of Climate Change,” Critical Policy Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 101–115. 33. R. J. Brulle, “Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation Funding and the Creation of US Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations,” Climate Change 122, no. 4 (2014): 681–694. 34. R. J. Brulle, G. Hall, L. Loy, and K. Schell-Smith, “Obstructing Action: Foundation Funding and US Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations,” Climatic Change, 166 (2019): 1–7. 35. “Dunn’s Foundation for the Advancement of Right Thinking,” DeSmog, https:// www.desmog.com/dunn-s-foundation-advancement-right-thinking/ (accessed February 27, 2025); Ruth McKie, Atlas Think Tank Main Employers, dataset (De Montfort University, 2023), https://doi.org/10.21253/DMU.22217050.v1. 36. Brulle, “Institutionalizing Delay”; Brulle et al., “Obstructing Action.” 37. Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right (Doubleday, 2016). 38. A. Hertel-Fernandez, T. Skocpol, and J. Sclar, “When Political Mega-Donors Join Forces: How the Koch Network and the Democracy Alliance Influence Organized US Politics on the Right and Left,” Studies in American Political Development 32, no. 2 (2018): 127–165; J. Farrell, “The Growth of Climate Change Misinformation in US Philanthropy: Evidence from Natural Language Processing,” Environmental Research Letters 14, no. 3 (2019): 034013, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ aaf939. J. Farrell, “Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization About Climate Change,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 1 (2016): 92–97. 39. Brulle et al., “Obstructing Action.” 40. McKie, Atlas Think Tank Main Employers. 41. “Concealing Their Sources: Who Funds Europe’s Climate Change Deniers?,” Corporate Europe Observatory, December 2010, https://corporateeurope.org/sites/ default/files/sites/default/files/files/article/funding_climate_deniers.pdf, 4. 42. While we know from Internal Revenue Service documents (990 forms) that Templeton Foundation provides the largest amount of funds to Atlas Network (https://www.desmog.com/atlas-economic-research-foundation/#h-atlasnetwork-as-nbsp-recipient) and from the Templeton Foundation grant database (https://www.templeton.org/grants) that it also funds many Atlas Network partner organizations around the world, recipients include think tanks that produce climate denial content and think tanks that do not publish on climate policy related issues, for example. 43. A. Aspelund, M. Lindeman, and M. Verkasalo, “Political Conservatism and Left– Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries,” Political Psychology 34 (2013): 409–417. 44. Simona-Nicoleta Vulpe, “Belief and Skepticism. Religious Justifications for Vaccine Reluctance and Climate Skepticism,” Sociologie Romˆ aneascˇ a19, no. 1 (2021): 69–88. 45. Mark Morrison, Roderick Duncan, and Kevin Parton, “Religion Does Matter for Climate Change Attitudes and Behavior,” PLOS One 10, no. 8 (2015): e0134868. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0134868; Miriam Pepper and Leonard Rosemary, “Climate Change, Politics and Religion: Australian Churchgoers’ Beliefs about Climate Change,” Religions 7, no. 5 (2016): 47, doi:10.3390/rel7050047. CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 157 ] 46. Bastiaan T. Rutjens and Romy van der Lee, “Spiritual Skepticism? Heterogeneous Science Skepticism in the Netherlands,” Public Understanding of Science 29, no. 3 (2020): 335–352, doi:0.1177/0963662520908534. 47. Anton Alumkal, Paranoid Science: The Christian Right’s War on Reality (NYU Press, 2017), 158. 48. Lynn Vincentnathan, S. Georg Vincentnathan, and Nicholas Smith, “Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism,” Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology 20, no. 2 (2016): 125–149, 135. 49. Vincentnathan et al., Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism. 50. “AUR cere renegocierea Pactului Verde (Green Deal) de guvernul romˆan cu Comisia Europeană,” November 18, 2021, https://partidulaur.ro/aur-cere-renegociereapactului-verde-green-deal-de-guvernul-roman-cu-comisia-europeana/. 51. Boris Knorre, “The Church and Environmentalists: Friends or Foes?,” Russia.Post, February 8, 2023, https://russiapost.info/society/environmentalists. 52. The Russian Orthodox Church, “The Basis of the Social Concept,” XIII, 1, 5, https:// old.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/xiii/ (accessed February 27, 2025). 53. John Chryssavgis (ed.), Patriarch Bartholomew, On Earth as it is in Heaven: Ecological Vision and Initiatives of Patriarch Bartholomew (Fordham University Press, 2012). 54. The Vatican, “Meeting on ‘Faith and Science: Towards COP 26,’ Promoted by the Embassies of Great Britain and Italy to the Holy See, Together with the Holy See,” Holy See Press Office, 2021, https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/ en/bollettino/pubblico/2021/10/04/211004a.html. 55. See, for example, Brandon Smith, “Șocul financiar și controlul climei, pe agenda globaliștilor,” R3Media, August 4, 2023, https://r3media.ro/soculfinanciar-si-controlul-climei-pe-agenda-globalistilor/; Nick Griffin, “Despre încălzirea globală, Cuvˆantul Ortodox,” February 22, 2011, http://www.cuvantulortodox.ro/recomandari/de-la-minciuna-incalzirii-globale-la-criza-alimentarasi-infometarea-populatiei-codul-muncii-legalizarea-sclaviei-munca-la-negruinchisoare/; Adrian Pătrușcă, “Opt dovezi ale escrocheriei încălzismului,” July 25, 2023, https://www.activenews.ro/opinii/Opt-DOVEZI-ale-EscrocherieiIncalzismului-183360. 56. “Un geofizician eminent respinge teoria încălzirii globale și spune că lumea este în pragul unei ‘Mini Ere Glaciare,’” Cuvˆantul Ortodox, February 22, 2011, http://www.cuvantul-ortodox.ro/recomandari/de-la-minciuna-incalzirii-globalela-criza-alimentara-si-infometarea-populatiei-codul-muncii-legalizarea-sclavieimunca-la-negru-inchisoare/; Virgil Șerban, “Un om de știință înfruntă isteria: Dr. John Clauser, cˆaștigător al premiului Nobel în 2022 pentru fizică, spune răspicat că ‘NU există o criză climatică și schimbările climatice NU provoacă fenomene extreme,’” R3Media, July 31, 2023, https://r3media.ro/un-om-de-stiintainfrunta-isteria-dr-john-clauser-castigator-al-premiului-nobel-in-2022-pentrufizica-spune-raspicat-ca-nu-exista-o-criza-climatica-si-schimbarile-climatice-nuprovoaca-fe/. 57. Radu Ursan, “Pastorala incendiară de Crăciun a Episcopului Slatinei: a vorbit împotriva „pandemiilor planificate,” a crizelor confecționate și de „obsesii climatice exagerate.” PS Sebastian l-a pus pe Soroș pe coperta pastoralei, alături de Hitler și Stalin, R3Media, December 26, 2022, https://r3media.ro/pastoralaincendiara-de-craciun-a-episcopului-slatinei-a-vorbit-impotriva-pandemiilorplanificate-a-crizelor-confectionate-si-de-obsesii-climatice-exagerate-ps-s/. [ 158 ] Climate Obstruction 58. A. Banzatto and R. Tapia, “‘Conectando boas intenções com economia sólida’: O Acton Institute,” OPEU, July 13, 2023, https://www.opeu.org.br/2023/07/13/ conectando-boas-intencoes-com-economia-solida-o-acton-institute/; JeanCarlos Hochsprung Miguel, “A ‘meada’ do negacionismo climático e o impedimento da governamentalização ambiental no Brasil,” Revista Sociedade e Estado 37, no. 1 (January/April 2022): 219–315. 59. H. Silva, “Os novos atores ‘evangélicos’ e a conquista do espaço público na América Latina,” Reflexão 43, no. 2 (2022): 244–263. 60. Miguel, “A ‘meada’ do negacionismo climático e o impedimento da governamentalização ambiental no Brasil,” 293. 61. A. C. de Oliveira, “A ‘meada’ do negacionismo climático e o impedimento da governamentalização ambiental no Brasil,” Sociedade e Estado 37, no. 1 (2022): 263–284. 62. Behr, Klaus Ramalho von. A conspiração do clima: populismo e negacionismo climático no início do governo Bolsonaro (2018–2020). Master’s thesis, (2022) Universidade de Brasília. 63. Instituto Talanoa. Reconstrução: 401 atos do Poder Executivo Federal (2019–2022) a serem revogados ou revisados para reconstituição da agenda climática e ambiental brasileira, (2022). 64. Miguel, “A ‘meada’ do negacionismo climático e o impedimento da governamentalização ambiental no Brasil,” 305. 65. K. M. Blee, and K. A. Creasap, “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements,” Annual Review of Sociolog 36, no. 1 (2010): 269–286. 66. Bourdieu’s field theory is particularly useful for understanding climate policy obstruction because it theorizes interactions between dominant and subordinate groups within a field of power relations. It assists researchers with providing a clearer understanding of where and how actors mobilize capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic) to preserve or expand power within the field. Fields also have boundaries, thus delimiting the area of study, and allowing for researchers to identify key actors, institutions, and the rules that govern some fields, but not others. We apply this frame to our current analysis. P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Harvard University Press, 1987). 67. Jesse Callahan Bryant and Justin Farrell, “Conservatism, the Far-Right, and the Environment,” Annual Review of Sociology 50 (2024): 273–296. 68. A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “The Conservative Movements Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy,” Social Problems 50 (2003): 348–373. 69. Blair Taylor, “Alt-Right Ecology: Ecofascism and Far-Right Environmentalism in the United States,” in The Far-Right and the Environment, ed. Bernhard Forchtner (Routledge, 2019), 275–292. 70. Daniel Rueda, “Alain de Benoist, Ethnopluralism and the Cultural Turn in Racism,” Patterns of Prejudice 55, no. 3 (2021): 213–235. 71. Henrik Arnstad, “Ikea Fascism: Metapedia and the Internationalization of Swedish Generic Fascism,” Fascism 4, no. 2 (2015): 194–208; Benjamin R. Teitelbaum, War for Eternity: Inside Bannon’s Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers (Dey Street Books, 2020). 72. M. Varga and A. Buzogány, “The Two Faces of the ‘Global Right’: Revolutionary Conservatives and National-Conservatives,” Critical Sociology 48, no. 6 (2022): 1089–1107. 73. Mattias Ekman, “The Great Replacement: Strategic Mainstreaming of Far-Right Conspiracy Claims,” Convergence 28, no. 4 (2022): 1127–1143. CLIMAT E POLICY OBSTRUCTION ON T HE RIGHT A ND T HE FAR RIGHT [ 159 ] 74. Shweta Desai, “Inside Hindutva’s Great Replacement Conspiracy,” GNET, August 10, 2022, https://gnet-research.org/2022/08/10/inside-hindutvas-greatreplacement-conspiracy/. 75. M. Loadenthal, “Feral Fascists and Deep Green Guerrillas: Infrastructural Attack and Accelerationist Terror,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 15, no. 1 (2022): 169–208. 76. A. Newhouse, “The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of NeoFascist Accelerationism,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 5 (2021): 17–25. 77. M. Bourekba, Climate Change and Violent Extremism in North Africa (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2021). 78. Callahan and Farrell, “Conservatism, the Far-Right, and the Environment.” 79. K. Campion, “Defining Ecofascism: Historical Foundations and Contemporary Interpretations in the Extreme Right,” Terrorism and Political Violence 35, no. 4 (2021): 926–944 80. Callahan and Farrell, “Conservatism, the Far-Right, and the Environment.” 81. Vincentnathan et al., “Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism,” 137f. 82. Justin Farrell, “Environmental Activism and Moral Schemas: Cultural Components of Differential Participation,” Environment and Behavior 45, no. 3 (2013): 399–423. [ 160 ] Climate Obstruction