Schülle , Ma go
A icle
Mission Impossible? The EU's Sea ch o an Independen
Tech Policy Amid US-China Decoupling
In e economics
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Schülle , Ma go (2025) : Mission Impossible? The EU's Sea ch o an
Independen Tech Policy Amid US-China Decoupling, In e economics, ISSN 1613-964X, Sciendo,
Wa saw, Vol. 60, Iss. 2, pp. 96-100,
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In e economics 2025 | 2
96
Fo um
Ma go Schülle
Mission Impossible? The EU’s Sea ch o an Independen Tech
Policy Amid US-China Decoupling
© The Au ho (s) 2025. Open Access: This a icle is dis ibu ed unde he
e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion 4.0 In e na ional License
(h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/).
In e economics, 2025, 60(2), 96-100
JEL: F50, O33
DOI: 10.2478/ie-2025-0019
Ma go Schülle , Ge man Ins i u e o Global and
A ea S udies (GIGA), Hambu g, Ge many.
Eu ope has become he ba leg ound o he ech wa
be ween he Uni ed S a es and China. I s a ed o wi h
China’s ambi ious Made in China 2025 p og amme in
2015, pe cei ed by he US as a h ea o i s echnological
leade ship and global mili a y dominance. O e he las
en yea s, US go e nmen s ha e ied o es ic China’s
u he ise as an economic and echnological powe wi h
a se ies o con ainmen measu es. Du ing he i s p esi-
dency o Donald T ump (2017-2021), China hawks became
he d i e s o US-China ela ions. They will ha e a s ong-
e posi ion in T ump’s second e m (2025-2029). They a e
now no only inc easing a i s and ech es ic ions bu
aiming a comple e decoupling. Wi hou he pa icipa ion
o i s allies in massi e cu o s om China, he US decou-
pling s a egy will no be success ul. Among US allies,
membe coun ies o he Eu opean Union play a c ucial
ole. The EU single ma ke o e s huge ma ke ing po en ial
o US p oduc s and se ices.
In Eu ope, he geopoli ical con lic be ween he US and
China, wi h i s s ong ocus on ech sup emacy, igge ed
a discussion abou how Eu opean coun ies could e-
main compe i i e and whe he mo e ech so e eign y is
needed. Due o Eu ope’s high dependency on US ech-
nology and mili a y secu i y, he se ing up o a egula o y
en i onmen ha p o ec s Eu opean alues and imp o es
indus ial compe i i eness migh p esen a challenge o
EU policymake s. Mo eo e , gi en he close economic
and ech coope a ion o many EU membe coun ies wi h
China, i is ques ionable whe he hey a e willing o join an
an i- ech alliance wi h he US agains China and eplace
hei cu en de- isking policy wi h comple e decoupling.
This pape s a s wi h a discussion o he di e ences be-
ween he EU and he US wi h espec o alues and s a-
egic in e es s. I hen s udies he EU’s posi ion in u u e
echnologies and he need o s onge compe i i eness,
ollowed by an analysis o he EU’s ques o ech so -
e eign y and he eac ion o he US. Finally, i co e s he
con ex o US-China decoupling.
EU-US di ides o e alues and s a egic in e es s
Wi h T ump’s e u n in 2025 and his Ame ica Fi s agenda,
US-Eu ope di ides o e alues and s a egy ha e esu -
aced. Leblond and Vannie (2024) poin o majo di e -
ences in h ee c i ical policy a eas: de ence and secu i y,
clima e change, and ade and echnology. To add ess he
las o hese, he EU-US T ade and Technology Council
(TTC) was ounded in 2021. I ocused on i e key ields
o coope a ion: expo con ols, o eign di ec in es men
sc eening, secu e supply chains (especially ega ding
semiconduc o s), echnology s anda ds, and coope a ion
on a i icial in elligence (AI) and global ade challenges.
Ten wo king g oups we e se up on he ollowing opics:
echnology s anda ds coope a ion, clima e and clean
ech, secu e supply chains, ICT secu i y and compe i i e-
ness, da a go e nance and echnology pla o ms, misuse
o echnology h ea ening secu i y and human igh s, ex-
po con ols coope a ion, in es men sc eening coop-
e a ion, p omo ing SME access o and use o digi al ech-
nologies, and global ade challenges.1
The TTC was supposed o imp o e bila e al coope a ion.
Al hough i was he EU ha ook he ini ia i e, bo h sides
we e mo i a ed o eam up wi h a long- e m ocus o p o-
mo ing join s anda ds a ound eme ging echnologies
o be e mee he challenges o China’s ise as a ech
powe . Following Sco and Ba igazzi (2021), om he pe -
spec i e o he US, he TTC was p ima ily an ins umen
o pushing back agains China h ough ansa lan ic co-
ope a ion in he ield o ade and echnology s anda ds.
The commen by o me Whi e House na ional secu i y
ad ise Jake Sulli an ega ding he US’s mo i a ion con-
i ms his iew, emphasising ha he TTC “will ocus on
aligning ou app oaches o ade and echnology so ha
democ acies and no anyone else, no China o o he au-
oc acies, a e w i ing he ules o ade and echnology
o he 21s cen u y” (Sco & Ba igazzi, 2021).
Be ween 2021 and 2024, six minis e ial TTC mee ings
we e held, chai ed by high le el EU and US o icials. In
1 h ps://commission.eu opa.eu/abou /o ganisa ion/college-commis-
sione s/henna- i kkunen_en
ZBW – Leibniz In o ma ion Cen e o Economics 97
Fo um
addi ion, he TTC’s wo king g oups se ed as channels
o communica ion and diplomacy on a egula basis. Al-
hough he ac shee o he TTC’s pe o mance since
2021 shows an imp essi e lis o bila e al ac i i ies and
achie emen s (Eu opean Commission, 2024b), c i ics
pe cei e a mixed eco d. The de e io a ion o he in e na-
ional poli ical en i onmen igge ed by he impac o he
COVID-19 pandemic and he Russian in asion o Uk aine
led o a s ong ocus on secu i y and esilience. Domes i-
cally, o example, changes in clima e policy in bo h he
EU and he US impeded he implemen a ion o ansa lan-
ic g een ade policy measu es. Tha he TTC’s ambi ious
goals we e no me is also asc ibed o he b oad scope
o opics and he inadequa e o ganisa ional s uc u e ha
ailed o su icien ly engage s akeholde s (Bel on & G u-
ening, 2025).
Whe he he TTC will con inue i s wo k unde he T ump
p esidency emains unclea gi en ecen US policy de-
cisions on AI go e nance, de egula ion and a i s. An
example o he la es policy measu e on AI is Donald
T ump’s execu i e o de (EO) on Remo ing Ba ie s o
Ame ican Leade ship in A i icial In elligence published
on 23 Janua y 2025 (The Whi e House, 2025), which e-
placed he EO o o me p esiden Biden o 30 Oc obe
2023, en i led Sa e, Secu e, and T us wo hy De elop-
men and Use o A i icial In elligence (The Whi e House,
2023). Compa ing he wo policy documen s, c i ics see a
signi ican shi away om he Biden Adminis a ion’s o-
cus on o e sigh , isk mi iga ion and equi y in a ou o
de egula ion and suppo o AI inno a ion ha should en-
able he US o main ain i s global dominance. The T ump
Adminis a ion’s new de egula o y policy on AI go e n-
ance con as s sha ply wi h he p ecau iona y app oach
pu sued by he EU. The EU’s A i icial In elligence Ac o
2024 (EUAIACT) s esses sa e y, anspa ency, accoun -
abili y and e hics. In p inciple, US companies ha do no
comply wi h EUAIACT s anda ds will no ha e access o
he Eu opean ma ke (Ca illo e al., 2025).
A he AI Ac ion Summi in Pa is in Feb ua y 2025, US Vice
P esiden JD Vance c i icised ha US business could no
compe e on he Eu opean ma ke because o he es ic-
i e egula o y amewo k o AI. He wa ned ha “Ame ica
canno and will no accep ” o eign go e nmen s “ igh -
ening he sc ews” on US ech companies (The Ame ican
P esidency P ojec , 2025). A he summi , 62 coun ies
and he EU signed a olun a y commi men o de elop-
ing and making AI “open, inclusi e, anspa en , e hical,
sa e, secu e and us wo hy” (Elysee, 2025). The US and
he Uni ed Kingdom did no sign he documen (Bi cha d,
2025). The p esiden o he Eu opean Commission, U -
sula on de Leyen, used he AI Ac ion Summi in Pa is o
announce ha he EU plans – a e es ablishing a secu e
legal amewo k o AI – o suppo he comme cial de-
elopmen o AI wi h inc eased unding o e he coming
yea s o ca ch up wi h he US and China (Bi cha d, 2025).
The EU has, howe e , allen behind he US no jus in AI
bu in mos u u e echnologies. This is one o he con-
clusions Ma io D aghi, o me p esiden o he Eu opean
Cen al Bank and I alian p ime minis e , p esen ed in his
epo on The Fu u e o Eu opean Compe i i eness o he
Eu opean Pa liamen in Sep embe 2024. The ollowing
sec ion p esen s indings om a ious da abases ha
show Eu ope’s weakness in ad anced and u u e ech-
nologies, unde lining he u gen need o a new indus ial
s a egy in Eu ope.
The EU’s weak posi ion in u u e echnologies
Al hough Eu ope has se e al leading coun ies in science
and echnology, he EU has allen behind he US and, in
some ields o science and echnology, behind China. Ac-
co ding o da a on inno a ion in 133 coun ies, he Wo ld
In ellec ual P ope y O ganisa ion (WIPO) shows ha i e
coun ies (Sweden, Finland, he Ne he lands, Ge many
and Denma k) ou o he EU27 belong o he op en global
leade s in he 2024 inno a ion index. The non-EU mem-
be coun ies Swi ze land and he UK, ank i s and i h,
espec i ely, among he op en. The Global Inno a ion In-
dex (GII) cap u es pe o mance ac oss ou key s ages o
he inno a ion cycle – in es men in science and inno a-
ion, echnological p og ess, echnological adop ion and
socioeconomic impac o inno a ion (WIPO, 2024).
The indings o he Eu opean Inno a ion Sco eboa d
(EIS) con i m he majo challenges he EU is acing on
science and echnology de elopmen . In 2023, only 12
EU coun ies’ pe o mance in he digi alisa ion dimen-
sion was abo e a e age, while 15 coun ies pe o med
below a e age, including Ge many. F om 2017 o 2024,
he EIS eco ded a decline in he EU’s in ellec ual asse s
as a sha e o in e na ional pa en and design applica-
ions. Compa ed o he EU’s global compe i o s, he EIS
ound lowe in es men in esea ch and inno a ion (R&I),
especially by he p i a e sec o , in he EU (Eu opean
Commission, 2024a).
When i comes o eme ging echnologies, he epo
on Weak Signals in Science and Technology 2024 inds
ha he US and China a e he leade s in p oducing sci-
en i ic knowledge ac oss mos clus e s o wel e eme g-
ing echnologies. The EU plays a s ong ole in esea ch
and ela ed scien i ic publica ions o some o he wel e
eme ging echnologies, namely, digi al wins, AI and ma-
chine lea ning, he apeu ics and bio echnologies, ene gy
and en i onmen , and ag icul u e. China and he US a e
In e economics 2025 | 2
98
Fo um
leading in pa en ing o all wel e ca ego ies o eme g-
ing echnologies, which include ad anced ma e ials and
ad anced manu ac u ing, ae ospace, mobili y and ans-
po , in o ma ion and communica ion echnologies, medi-
cal imaging, and quan um c yp og aphy. The epo also
no ed ha he Eu opean esea ch and de elopmen (R&D)
ecosys em appea s agmen ed, wi h many s ong bu
small-sized ac o s lacking c i ical mass. While China’s
R&D ecosys em exhibi s specialisa ion ac oss mos o he
wel e clus e s o eme ging echnologies, he Eu opean
ecosys em is assessed as ocusing only on AI and ma-
chine lea ning (Eulae s, 2025).
Agains he backg ound o he EU’s weak posi ion in
eme ging echnologies and esul ing low p oduc i i y, he
D aghi epo de ines majo a eas o ac ion. Ou o his
comp ehensi e s udy co e ing wo olumes, only some
poin s can be add essed in his con ibu ion. The epo
ep esen s a diagnosis o whe e Eu ope s ands and ec-
ommenda ions o policymaking ocusing on h ee policy
ac ions. Fi s , Eu ope needs o close he inno a ion gap
wi h he US and China on ad anced echnologies. The
D aghi epo poin s o he p oblem ha EU companies
a e mos ly specialised in ma u e echnologies ha o e
less oppo uni y o b eak h oughs and spend less on
R&I compa ed o US companies. To unlock hei inno a-
i e po en ial, companies should no only in es mo e bu
also in eg a e AI in o exis ing indus ies. O he challenges
ela e o inconsis en and es ic i e EU egula ions ha
hinde inno a i e companies om scaling up in Eu ope.
Second, he D aghi epo sugges s a join plan o deca -
bonisa ion and compe i i eness gi en he in e depend-
ence o ene gy p ices and he abili y o compe e in e na-
ionally. The e o e, ene gy p ices should be educed and
made less ola ile. While deca bonisa ion o e s com-
me cial oppo uni ies, EU companies ace s ong Chi-
nese compe i ion. Taking he a ious clean echnologies
in o accoun , he epo ecommends a di e en ia ed ap-
p oach acco ding o sec o s and echnologies. Thi d, he
epo sees a need o inc ease secu i y and educe de-
pendencies. This ac ion cen es on secu e supply chains
o c i ical aw ma e ials and echnologies, as well as on
de eloping he EU’s de ence capabili y. To be e coo di-
na e na ional policies among he EU membe coun ies,
he epo ad ises in oducing a ac ual EU o eign eco-
nomic policy based on Eu opean alues ha conside s
he si ua ions o middle- and low-income membe coun-
ies (D aghi, 2024).
The D aghi epo o e s a wide ange o in-dep h analysis
and ecommenda ions ha a e designed o b ing abou
he necessa y changes o he EU. One o he unde lying
p inciples in he epo is he ques o ech so e eign y,
which is men ioned explici ly a ew imes. Al hough he
EU aces a compe i i e disad an age in some digi al
sec o s, he epo emphasises, o example, ha “i is
impo an ha EU companies main ain a oo hold in a -
eas whe e echnological so e eign y is equi ed, such
as secu i y and enc yp ion (‘so e eign cloud’ solu ions)”
(D aghi, 2024, p. 24). While he epo acknowledges he
dominance o US cloud p o ide s, i s a es ha “ he EU
mus ind a middle way be ween p omo ing i s domes ic
cloud indus y and ensu ing access o he echnologies
i needs” (D aghi, 2024, p. 34). E e e e al. (2024) poin
o he epo ’s sugges ions o se e al egula o y ini ia-
i es ha should b ing abou so e eign y objec i es, es-
pecially o c i ical echnologies. These include a new EU
cloud and AI de elopmen ac , be e in e play be ween
he Gene al Da a P o ec ion Regula ion (GDPR) and he AI
Ac , as well as ecommenda ions a ound digi al ne wo ks.
I is no su p ising ha he discussion on EU ech so e -
eign y ecei es c i icism om he US.
The EU’s ques o ech so e eign y
The composi ion o he new Eu opean Commission dem-
ons a es ha he D aghi epo ’s ecommenda ions a e
being aken se iously. Fo he i s ime in he his o y o he
EU, one o he six ice p esiden s in he Eu opean Com-
mission has been asked wi h esponsibili y o ech so -
e eign y oge he wi h secu i y and democ acy, as well as
o he digi al and on ie echnologies po olio (Eu opean
Commission, 2024c). O e he nex i e yea s, Henna Vi k-
kunen has o wo k h ough a long lis o opics ha ha e
a di ec impac on he EU’s ech so e eign y, o example,
de elopmen o an Apply AI S a egy ha imp o es indus-
ial uses and public se ices, de elopmen o an EU Cloud
and AI De elopmen Ac oge he wi h an EU-wide cloud
policy and a long- e m EU quan um chips plan, and p e-
sen ing a Eu opean Da a Union S a egy.
C i ics o en equa e ech so e eign y wi h p o ec ionism.
The way he D aghi epo and he Eu opean Commission
a e embedding his p inciple in o he o e all indus ial
policy, howe e , wo ks like a ame o inno a ion policy.
In hei pape on ech so e eign y as addi ional a ionale
o inno a ion policy, Edle e al. (2023) a gue ha “ ech-
nology so e eign y should be concei ed as s a e-le el
agency wi hin he in e na ional sys em, i.e. as so e eign y
o go e nmen al ac ion”. The au ho s de ine ech so e -
eign y “no as an end in i sel , bu as a means o achie ing
he cen al objec i es o inno a ion policy – sus aining na-
ional compe i i eness and building capaci ies o ans-
o ma i e policies”. Fo Edle e al. (2020), ech so e eign-
y encompasses “ he abili y o a s a e o a ede a ion o
s a es o p o ide he echnologies i deems c i ical o i s
wel a e, compe i i eness, and abili y o ac , and o be able
o de elop hese o sou ce hem om o he economic a -
ZBW – Leibniz In o ma ion Cen e o Economics 99
Fo um
eas wi hou one-sided s uc u al dependency”. In sum,
he main cha ac e is ic o ech so e eign y ollowing Edle
e al. is he abili y o go e nmen s o ac independen ly in
he global ech sys em, no ollowing an isola ionis policy
bu coope a ing wi h obus and eliable na ional, egional
and in e na ional ne wo ks.
Commen s by Foss (2025) om Think Tank Eu opa ol-
low a simila line o a gumen , s essing ha “a majo i y
o planned ech ini ia i es ocus on enabling inno a ion
by building digi al in as uc u e”. He expec s ha he
Da a Union S a egy, o example, will help he EU le e -
age high-quali y da a as a sou ce o compe i i eness. The
Digi al Ne wo k Ac , oo, will ha e he po en ial o imp o e
connec i i y and b ing he EU close o achie ing i s Digi-
al Decade goals.
Building a Eu oS ack as a co e echnology in as uc u e
o Eu ope which co e s semiconduc o s, ne wo ks, AI,
cloud compu ing, he In e ne o Things, da a pla o ms
and digi al ID, is ano he concep discussed o inc ease
he EU’s digi al so e eign y. Acco ding o he au ho s o
he s udy “Eu oS ack – A Eu opean Al e na i e o Digi al
So e eign y” (B ia e al., 2025), his ini ia i e p esen s an
ambi ious ision o Eu ope’s digi al u u e, o e coming
he bloc’s hea y eliance on ex e nal echnologies. Cu -
en ly, mo e han 80% o Eu ope’s digi al in as uc u e
and echnologies a e impo ed and abou 70% o oun-
da ional AI models a e de eloped in he US (Bo ak, 2025;
B ia e al., 2025).
The EU’s ocus on ech so e eign y is c i icised by a i-
ous expe s and o ganisa ions in he US, such as he In-
o ma ion Technology and Inno a ion Founda ion (ITIF), a
hink ank suppo ed by many US ech companies, and
inc easingly om big ech companies di ec ly (Meye s,
2025). Robe A kinson, p esiden o he ITIF, o exam-
ple, a gues ha he EU’s disc imina o y egula ions ha e
led o a loss o e enue o US indus ies. He complained
ha “[i]n i s bid o ech so e eign y, he EU has been ag-
g essi ely a ge ing U.S. i ms and indus ies, wi h un-
ai p o ec ionis policies” (A kinson, 2024). As coun e
measu es, A kinson sugges s upda ing Sec ion 301 o
he T ade Ac o add ess digi al ade, using ICT se ice
e iews agains Eu opean companies, imposing axes o
o se he EU’s digi al se ice axes and limi ing US da a
lows o he EU. As de ensi e measu es, he ecommends,
o example, limi ing EU access o ede al p ocu emen
oppo uni ies, in es iga ing c i ical expo s and exclud-
ing Eu opean i ms om he US de ence indus ial base.
Al hough A kinson’s policy ecommenda ions seem o be
excessi e, hey demons a e he ange o po en ial sanc-
ions he US go e nmen can apply agains EU compa-
nies.
US an i-China ech alliance – Wha is Eu ope’s ole?
Wi h T ump’s sweeping a i s on EU impo s in Ma ch
2025 and his h ea o escala e a global ade wa wi h u -
he a i s on Eu opean goods, he US-EU bila e al eco-
nomic ela ionship eached i s lowes poin . Tha T ump
would wi hd aw om he Wo ld Heal h O ganiza ion and
he Pa is Clima e Ag eemen once back in o ice had been
expec ed by many obse e s in he EU. His bullish poli-
cies is-à- is Eu ope, o he US NATO allies and Uk aine,
howe e , came as a shock. I signaled o US allies ha
hey can no longe ely on he US. Mo eo e , acco d-
ing o S e e Tsang (2025), T ump’s o eign policy is also
s eng hening China’s a gumen ha he US “will use he
libe al in e na ional o de o pu Ame ica i s ”, es ablish-
ing an o de ha is un i o he wen y- i s cen u y and
needs o be changed.
US policy on China unde T ump 2.0 is expec ed o be
e en mo e agg essi e han ha o his i s e m, bu al-
so mo e ansac ional and less p edic able (China B ie -
ing, 2025). In The P esiden ’s 2025 T ade Policy Agenda,
China is add essed as “ he single bigges sou ce o ou
coun y’s la ge and pe sis en ade de ici and a unique
economic challenge” (Uni ed S a es T ade Rep esen a-
i e [USTR], 2025). This documen e e s o he ade
ag eemen T ump nego ia ed wi h China in his i s e m
(Phase One Ag eemen ) and announces ha he USTR
will assess China’s compliance wi h his ag eemen , o-
cusing on echnology ans e , in ellec ual p ope y and
inno a ion, and o he un ai p ac ices. The assessmen
will also be used o discussion in he US Cong ess on
China’s Pe manen No mal T ade Rela ion (PNTR) s a us.
The e oca ion o China’s “mos a o ed na ion” s a us,
ollowed by he phasing ou o he impo o essen ial
goods, we e lis ed as he i s s eps in decoupling om
China in he Republican Pa y’s 2024 pla o m. Wi h he
ambi ious aim o “build he g ea es economy in his o y”,
he pla o m also lis ed blocking Chinese in es men in
US eal es a e and indus y, and encou aging US compa-
nies o lea e China and b ing c i ical supply chains back
o he US. Addi ional goals include sa ing he US au o in-
dus y, he Buy Ame ican and Hi e Ame ican concep s,
and es o ing he Ame ican Manu ac u ing Supe powe
(Kwan, 2025).
Gi en he g owing ic ions ac oss he A lan ic o e ade
and echnology on he one hand and he US decoupling
app oach is-à- is China on he o he , Eu ope has li -
le incen i e o ollow T ump’s China policy. In con as ,
a mo e p agma ic ela ionship wi h China o e s no only
be e ma ke condi ions o Eu opean companies bu
also coope a ion in a eas o global impo ance such as
In e economics 2025 | 2
100
Fo um
clima e change and AI go e nance. China’s ise as a sci-
ence and echnology powe is one o he mos impo an
de elopmen s, con ibu ing o he wo ldwide inc ease o
knowledge (Xie e al., 2014). In e na ional da a show ha
China has made emendous p og ess in some speci ic
ields o science and echnology, making he coun y an
a ac i e pa ne o he EU in u u e echnologies. How-
e e , he ela ionship be ween he EU and China should
be be e balanced and Eu ope migh be be e o con-
inuing i s de- isking policy owa ds China, educing o e -
dependency on some Chinese impo s, p o ec ing he EU
agains un ai compe i ion om China and s eng hening
Eu ope’s echnological and indus ial capaci ies.
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