Ada , Sinem; Assebu g, Mu iel; Azizi, Hamid eza; Klein, Ma ga e e; S einbe g,
Guido
Resea ch Repo
The all o he Assad egime: Regional and in e na ional
powe shi s
SWP Commen , No. 9/2025
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Ge man Ins i u e o In e na ional and Secu i y A ai s,
Be lin
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Ada , Sinem; Assebu g, Mu iel; Azizi, Hamid eza; Klein, Ma ga e e; S einbe g,
Guido (2025) : The all o he Assad egime: Regional and in e na ional powe shi s, SWP Commen ,
No. 9/2025, S i ung Wissenscha und Poli ik (SWP), Be lin,
h ps://doi.o g/10.18449/2025C09
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
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NO.
9
FEBRUARY 2025
In oduc ion
The Fall o he Assad Regime:
Regional and In e na ional Powe Shi s
Sinem Ada , Mu iel Assebu g, Hamid eza Azizi, Ma ga e e Klein and Guido S einbe g
On 8 Decembe 2024, he Assad egime in Sy ia was o e h own by a ebel alliance
led by Hay’a Tah i al-Sham (HTS). The collapse o he amily dic a o ship was made
possible by shi s in egional and in e na ional powe dynamics. Key ac o s included
Tu kish suppo o he ebels, he weakening o I an and Hezbollah owing o Is aeli
mili a y s ikes and Russia’s changing p io i ies in he con ex o i s wa agains Uk aine.
A he same ime, he all o he Assad egime has led o ano he shi in powe ela-
ions in he egion. The in e es s, p io i ies and ac ions o egional and in e na ional
ac o s will de ine he oom o manoeu e o he new ule s in Damascus. Tu key and
Is ael ha e occupied e i o ies in he no h and sou hwes o he coun y, espec i ely.
The A ab mona chies o he Pe sian Gul a e expec ed o exe cise in luence, oo, as
hey will play a c ucial ole in he econs uc ion o Sy ia. And he Uni ed S a es s ill
main ains a mili a y p esence in Sy ia, al hough i s u u e in ol emen in he coun y is
unce ain.
Following i s mili a y in e en ion in he
Sy ian ci il wa in 2015, Russia es ablished
he so-called As ana Fo ma some wo yea s
la e . Wi hin his amewo k, i coope a ed
wi h Tu key and I an o eeze he con lic s
in Sy ia, cu b he iolence and map ou
sphe es o in luence. As a esul , he balance
o powe in he egion shi ed, as did he
p io i ies o he egional and in e na ional
ac o s in Sy ia. No ably, he suppo e s o
he Sy ian opposi ion ceased o ocus on
oppling he egime and ins ead p io i ised
hei own na ional, economic and secu i y
in e es s. The Uni ed S a es concen a ed on
igh ing he so-called Islamic S a e (IS). Tu -
key sough o p e en he es ablishmen o
a con iguous e i o y unde he con ol o
he Ku dish-domina ed Sy ian Democ a ic
Fo ces (SDF) along i s sou he n bo de
and called o he e u n o Sy ian e ugees.
And Is ael, which had emained neu al
in Sy ia’s in e nal powe s uggle, bombed
posi ions and con oys o I anian and
I anian-aligned mili ias o p e en hos ile
bases om being es ablished in he bo de
egion, he cons uc ion o a ms ac o ies
and he ans e o weapons o Hezbollah.
In May 2023, Sy ia was eadmi ed o he
A ab League, i s membe ship o he egional
o ganisa ion ha ing been suspended in
A o hcoming SWP
Commen on he all
o he Assad egime will
analyse he e ec s o
he egional and in e -
na ional powe shi s
on he poli ical an-
si ion in Sy ia.
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
2
2011. Tha de elopmen was hanks mainly
o he Uni ed A ab Emi a es (UAE) and Sy ia’s
A ab neighbou s and ook place agains he
backd op o he app ochemen be ween
Saudi A abia and I an.
The ole o ex e nal ac o s in he
o e h ow o he egime
The egional balance o powe shi ed once
again ollowing he 7 Oc obe 2023 a acks
ca ied ou by Hamas and o he a med Pal-
es inian g oups agains Is ael and Is ael’s
esponse o hem. By Oc obe 2024, he “axis
o esis ance” led by Teh an had been
se e ely weakened by Is aeli mili a y ope a-
ions. This was ue, abo e all, o I an i sel
as well as o he Lebanese Hezbollah, which,
alongside Russia, had been he main sup-
po e s o he Assad egime. Fo i s pa , he
Russian mili a y was ocused on he wa in
Uk aine. These changing p io i ies and s a-
egic calcula ions o he key egional and in-
e na ional ac o s in Sy ia pa ed he way o
he ebels o seize powe in Decembe 2024.
Tu key
Acco ding o he Tu kish go e nmen , he
all o Basha al-Assad was due o his in-
abili y and unwillingness o use he ozen
con lic si ua ion ha had p e ailed in
Sy ia since he 2017 As ana ag eemen s o
s abilise and econs uc his coun y. Po -
aying he ebel o ensi e led by HTS as an
ope a ion planned and execu ed by Sy ians,
Anka a denied di ec Tu kish in ol emen .
Howe e , p o-go e nmen media sugges ed
ha Tu key’s mili a y and in elligence
se ices had no only closely moni o ed he
o ensi e bu had also di ec ly suppo ed
he Sy ian Na ional A my (SNA) and A ab
ibes. Jus wo mon hs be o e he demise
o he Assad egime, in Oc obe 2024, he
Tu kish mili a y ein o ced i s p esence and
equipmen in no he n Sy ia, pa icula ly
in Idlib and a ound Aleppo, whe e i had
main ained a p esence since 2017.
O he g oups in ol ed in he ebel o en-
si e, HTS and he SNA (which comp ises
elemen s om he F ee Sy ian A my and
he Islamic F on ) ha e pa icula ly close
ies wi h Tu key. Since 2015–16, Anka a
has s uck a ious ag eemen s wi h hese
a med g oups and con inued o empowe
hem as i s p io i ies in Sy ia shi ed. Whe e-
as ea lie Tu key had ocused on Assad’s
o e h ow, i s p ima y goal became p e-
en ing he es ablishmen o Ku dish
au onomy unde he leade ship o he PYD/
YPG ( he Sy ian a ilia e o he PKK, which
is designa ed as a e o is o ganisa ion by
Tu key, he EU and he US) and s emming
new wa es o e ugees in o Tu key. The SNA,
which is en i ely dependen on Anka a mili-
a ily, inancially and logis ically, ope a es
in he no he n Sy ian e i o ies ha , one
by one, we e occupied by Tu key be ween
2016 and 2019 and ha e since been la gely
in eg a ed in o he Tu kish economy and
adminis a ion. Anka a’s ela ionship wi h
HTS is mo e one o pa onage. While Tu -
key classi ies HTS as a e o is o ganisa ion,
i assumed he ole o p o ec i e powe
in Idlib unde he e ms o he 2018 Sochi
ag eemen wi h Russia. Tu key’s mili a y
in e en ion in 2020 p e en ed he Assad
egime om e aking Idlib and s eng hened
Anka a’s ela ionship wi h HTS.
The ebel o ensi e o 2024 would no
ha e been possible wi hou a g een ligh
om Tu key. Howe e , Tu kish P esiden
E doğan la e exp essed unease o e he
pace o he ebel ad ance, which sugges s
ha Anka a had expec ed a limi ed ope a-
ion only. I is likely ha he objec i e o
backing he ebel o ensi e was o p essu e
Assad o ake pa in alks on no malising
Tu kish-Sy ian ela ions and acili a ing
he e u n o Sy ian e ugees.
A ab mona chies o
he Pe sian Gul
O he Gul A ab s a es, i was, abo e all,
Qa a ha con ibu ed o he o e h ow o
he Assad egime as Tu key’s junio pa ne .
A he u n o he yea 2011–12, Qa a ,
Saudi A abia and he UAE had all suppo ed
ebels in Sy ia. Bu disag eemen s soon a ose,
mainly o e Qa a (and Tu key) suppo ing
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
3
Islamis s, Sala is s and Jihadis s. Be ween
2015 and 2017, Saudi A abia and he UAE
ended o back ideologically indi e en
ebels in he sou h o he coun y while
lea ing he no h o Qa a and Tu key.
When he up ising in sou he n Sy ia col-
lapsed in 2017–18, Saudi A abia was no
longe a playe , while he UAE had wi h-
d awn i s suppo e en ea lie .
Fo a long ime, he Sala is ebel g oup
Ah a al-Sham was Qa a ’s mos impo an
clien in Sy ia. A he same ime, i is likely
ha Doha was suppo ing he jihadis Nus a
F on , which o igina ed om al-Qaeda.
Qa a i policy enjoyed a majo success when
Nus a leade Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani
b oke away om al-Qaeda in 2016, adop ed
a Sy ian na ional Islamis s ance and allied
himsel wi h simila ly minded g oups. This
made i much easie o Tu key and Qa a
o suppo HTS, which Jawlani and his
ollowe s es ablished in 2017.
The ull ex en o Qa a i suppo o HTS
be ween 2017 and 2024 emains unknown.
The Gul emi a e likely played no mili a y
ole. Howe e , i can be assumed ha he
“Sal a ion Go e nmen ” es ablished by HTS
in Idlib p o ince in No embe 2017 and
pe haps HTS i sel ecei ed inancial aid
om Qa a . Addi ionally, he in luen ial
Qa a i ele ision ne wo k Al Jazee a has un-
equi ocally sided wi h HTS, o en equa ing
i wi h he b oade Sy ian opposi ion.
I an
F om he beginning o he Sy ian up ising
in 2011, I an played a key ole in ensu ing
he su i al o he Assad egime. I in e -
ened in he ci il wa on he side o Assad
and spen mo e han a decade building an
ex ensi e mili a y in as uc u e in Sy ia,
including bases in s a egic loca ions, weap-
ons depo s and ac o ies supplying Hez-
bollah in Lebanon, as well as a ne wo k
o local and o eign mili ias. A he same
ime, I an gained poli ical in luence wi hin
Sy ia’s mili a y and secu i y appa a us. On
he diploma ic on , he Islamic Republic
pa icipa ed in he As ana Fo ma , along-
side Russia and Tu key.
Despi e such in ensi e in ol emen ,
I an was unable o p e en he collapse o
he Sy ian egime a he end o 2024. A key
eason was ha i had been g adually e-
ducing i s mili a y p esence in ha coun y
in he p eceding yea s. On he one hand,
his had o do wi h Assad’s desi e o econ-
cile wi h A ab s a es ha we e demanding
a educ ion in I anian in luence. On he
o he hand, i was linked o he in ensi ied
Is aeli ai s ikes on I anian acili ies and
I anian-aligned mili ias in Sy ia, which
o ced Teh an o pull ou key pe sonnel and
send hem home. By la e 2024, he Islamic
Republic had only a con ingency o ce in
Sy ia o p o ec i s bases and in e es s. Tha
is why i was unp epa ed o he apid ad-
ance o he ebels. Ano he decisi e ac o
was he Sy ian a my’s lack o comba eadi-
ness. acco ding o s a emen s by I anian
commande s, who explained ha I an could
no go in o ba le on behal o Assad’s
demo alised and unmo i a ed oops.
Mo e impo an , he “axis o esis ance”
led by Teh an was disin eg a ing a e a
yea o in ense mili a y con on a ions wi h
Is ael. Nei he he Lebanese Hezbollah,
weakened by a de as a ing wa wi h Is ael,
no I aqi mili ias, which we e wa y o
po en ial US and Is aeli e alia o y s ikes,
showed willingness o in e ene in Sy ia.
Is ael’s a acks on I anian supply ou es,
which a ge ed land c ossings, ai co ido s,
and con oys, u he es ic ed Teh an’s
op ions, a ac e en Sup eme Leade Ali
Khamenei acknowledged. A he same ime,
Teh an’s abili y o espond was also con-
s ained by ea s o di ec escala ion wi h
Is ael. An unp eceden ed Is aeli mili a y
ope a ion in la e Oc obe 2024 had se e ely
weakened I an’s ai de ences and aised
conce ns abou a po en ial ollow-up a ack.
Teh an esponded by p io i ising i s own
na ional secu i y o e egional in luence
and le Assad o his a e.
Russia
Simila ly, Russia, which had in e ened in
Sy ia om Sep embe 2015 onwa ds o en-
su e Assad emained in powe , was unable
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
4
o p e en he Sy ian p esiden ’s o e h ow
a he end o 2024. This was because o
Moscow’s educed mili a y pos u e in Sy ia
owing o he wa in Uk aine and i s shi ing
poli ical p io i ies.
Moscow’s mili a y p esence in Sy ia had
always been limi ed. Es ima es sugges ha
in 2024, he Russian con ingen numbe ed
a ound 7,500 pe sonnel and comp ised
mainly ai o ce uni s, special o ces and mili-
a y police. The numbe o g ound oops,
which was low om he beginning, dwin-
dled u he ollowing he edeploymen o
“Wagne ” igh e s o Uk aine om 2022
onwa ds and he disman ling o he me ce-
na y g oup in 2023. Mo eo e , Russia was
p io i ising he wa agains Uk aine, which
p e en ed i om bols e ing i s g ound
o ces in Sy ia and le i elian on p o-
I anian mili ias and he Sy ian a my. How-
e e , Russia’s in e en ion model eached
i s limi s when con on ed wi h he 2024
ebel o ensi e. Assad’s oops o e ed li le
esis ance and/o apidly collapsed, includ-
ing he Fi h Co ps o he Sy ian a my,
which had ecei ed s ong inancial and
mili a y suppo om Moscow.
F om ha poin onwa ds, Russia ocused
on damage con ol. The ai s ikes on ebel
posi ions, p e iously ca ied ou by Mos-
cow, we e hal ed on 8 Decembe . Assad and
his amily we e pe suaded o go in o exile
in Moscow – a mo e ha he K emlin hoped
would p ese e i s image as a eliable p o-
ec o o i s au ho i a ian allies. A he
same ime, Pu in was in en on emo ing
Assad as a dis up i e ac o , since his con-
inued ule would only ha e complica ed
Russia’s e o s o eshape i s Sy ia policy
unde he new geopoli ical eali ies.
Regional and in e na ional
consequences o he all o Assad
The collapse o he Assad egime has led o
u he shi s in he balance o powe in he
egion and beyond. While Russia and I an,
along wi h hei allies, ha e been weak-
ened, Tu key and Qa a see hemsel es in
he ascendancy, as hey a e close pa ne s
o Sy ia’s new ule s. Is ael, oo, has been
able o imp o e i s s a egic posi ion in he
egion.
Russia
The all o Assad has done mo e han jus
in lic epu a ional damage on Russia; i
has also unde mined one o he mo e im-
po an pilla s – i no he mos impo an
pilla – o Russian policy owa ds he Middle
Eas o e he pas decade. A e la gely
wi hd awing om he egion ollowing he
Cold Wa , Moscow saw i s in luence dimin-
ish e en u he du ing he 2003 I aq Wa
and he “A ab Sp ing”. Howe e , ollowing
i s mili a y in e en ion in Sy ia in 2015,
Russia ea i med i s ambi ion o e-es ab-
lish i sel as a key ac o in he egion and
he eby egain global ecogni ion as a g ea
powe . In his ein, he K emlin wen on o
expand i s ies wi h such impo an egional
powe s as Tu key, Is ael and he Gul mon-
a chies and hus a oided excessi e depend-
ence on I an.
Russia’s op and immedia e p io i y igh
now is o e ain i s mili a y bases in Sy ia,
pa icula ly he Ta us na al base and he
Hmeimim mili a y ai ield, bo h o which
a e essen ial no only o ope a ions in
Sy ia bu also o Russia’s mili a y pos u e
in he b oade egion. Ta us emains Rus-
sia’s only pe manen na al base in he
Medi e anean and p o ides access o he
Red Sea. And because o he es ic ions
on Russian wa ships passing h ough he
Bospo us since he ull-scale in asion o
Uk aine, he Ta us epai and supply acil-
i ies ha e been playing an e en mo e c u-
cial ole. Fo i s pa , he Hmeimim ai base
has se ed as a logis ical hub o Russian
mili a y and me cena y ope a ions in Libya
and a ious o he A ican coun ies. Mos-
cow has al eady eloca ed pa o i s mili-
a y equipmen om Sy ia o ai ields in
eas e n Libya, which is unde he con ol
o Gene al Khali a Ha a , he commande
o he Libyan Na ional A my. Bu e en i
Russia has success ully concluded a deal
wi h he leade ship o Sudan o es ablish a
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
5
na al base a he Red Sea, as was epo ed
in mid-Janua y 2025, and/o could po en-
ially secu e addi ional usage igh s o
po s and ai ields in Libya o Alge ia, he
usage igh s and in as uc u e capaci ies
o hose acili ies would be mo e limi ed
han hose in Sy ia.
Agains his backg ound, Moscow is
seeking o each a deal wi h he new Sy ian
leade ship on he con inued ope a ion o
i s wo mili a y bases. Those si es we e
leased o Russia o 49 yea s unde a con-
ac signed in 2017. While Sy ia’s new
ule s ha e gene ally acknowledged Rus-
sia’s global impo ance, hey cancelled a
leasing ag eemen wi h he Russian com-
pany S oy ansgaz o he ci ilian sec ion
o he po o Ta us in Janua y. I emains
unclea whe he he closu e o he Russian
mili a y base will ollow o i he cancella-
ion o he lease is me ely he p elude o
u he nego ia ions in which Moscow may
be allowed a educed mili a y p esence in
e u n o concessions in o he policy a eas.
The ac ha Russia’s p esence in Sy ia
has weakened bo h mili a ily and poli ically
will impac i s ela ions wi h o he egional
ac o s. Fo example, as Moscow does no
ha e con ol o e Sy ian ai space, i loses
signi icance o Is ael. F om 2015 onwa ds,
Is ael elied on mili a y decon lic ing wi h
Russia o ca y ou s ikes on I anian posi-
ions and I an-backed mili ias in Sy ia. This
coo dina ion has now ceased, which means
i may be easie o Is ael o adjus i s
Uk aine policy. A he same ime, Russia’s
g owing coope a ion wi h I an – especially
in he mili a y sphe e – is expec ed o
deepen. In Janua y 2025, Teh an and Mos-
cow signed a s a egic pa ne ship ag ee-
men .
Meanwhile, he all o Assad will u he
shi he ecalib a ion o Russian-Tu kish
ela ions o Moscow’s disad an age. Russia’s
in luence has diminished no only in Sy ia
bu Tu key has also gained in in luence in
Russia’s immedia e neighbou hood and
claimed a zone o in e es in he Sou h Cau-
casus, whe e Anka a has inc eased i s in-
luence in ecen yea s. Moscow is likely o
seek common g ound wi h Tu key in he
ene gy sec o and e o s o con ain Wes -
e n policies. I s goal would be o gain
Anka a’s suppo o Russia’s inclusion in
egional con lic - esolu ion amewo ks,
simila o he As ana Fo ma .
I an
The all o he Assad egime is a signi ican
se back o I an’s egional in luence and
s a egic ambi ions; and he Teh an-led
“axis o esis ance” is pa icula ly ha d hi
by his de elopmen . Geog aphically, Sy ia
was a cen al componen o a “land co i-
do ” ha connec ed I an o Hezbollah in
Lebanon and he Medi e anean coas ia
I aq. This co ido was c ucial in acili a ing
a ms ans e s and logis ical suppo o
Hezbollah, whose mili a y capabili ies ha e
been se e ely weakened by he ecen wa
wi h Is ael. The collapse o his land ou e
will make i much mo e di icul o I an o
ea m Hezbollah and main ain i s b oade
egional ne wo k o allied mili ias.
Unde Assad’s con ol, Sy ia also played a
key ole in I an’s geo-economic ambi ions.
Teh an aimed o posi ion i sel as a majo
playe in China’s “Bel and Road Ini ia i e”
and le e age Sy ia as pa o a land ou e
linking China o he Medi e anean. Losing
Sy ia as a close pa ne unde mines his
ision. Addi ionally, Tu key’s g owing in-
luence h ea ens I an’s geopoli ical in lu-
ence no only in he Le an bu also in I aq
and he Sou h Caucasus. O pa icula con-
ce n o Teh an is Anka a’s push o he
cons uc ion o he so-called Zangezu Co -
ido , a ansi ou e linking Tu key o
Aze baijan ia A menian e i o y. I buil
in acco dance wi h Tu kish and Aze baijani
plans, he co ido would bypass I an and
cu o ha coun y’s di ec land access
o A menia; as a esul , I an would be eco-
nomically isola ed and i s ole in he egion’s
ade and ansi ou es weakened.
The po en ial esu gence o jihadis
g oups in Sy ia, such as IS, could u he
nega i ely impac I an’s egional in e es s,
as hese ac o s pose a h ea bo h o Teh-
an’s allies in I aq and o I an i sel . A he
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
6
same ime, he Islamic Republic is ala med
by Is ael’s g owing p esence in Sy ia – no
jus i s occupa ion o mo e Sy ian e i o y
bu also i s con ac s wi h Sy ian Ku dish
g oups, which could lead o s eng hened
coope a ion. Wi hin I anian poli ical
ci cles, i is ea ed ha a “Da id Co ido ”
could eme ge, p o iding Is ael wi h access
o he Euph a es and allowing i o expand
i s in luence. In such a case, Teh an would
be u he ma ginalised.
Tu key
Wi h he all o he Assad egime, Anka a
belie es i has signi ican ly mo e oom o
manoeu e in Sy ia. F om 2020 onwa ds,
Tu key was in a diploma ic and mili a y
s alema e; no leas , ha was ue o i s
e o s o p e en Ku dish sel - ule in no h-
eas e n Sy ia and acili a e he e u n o
Sy ian e ugees o hei home coun y. To
achie e hose ends, Anka a pu sued wo
s a egies: no malising ela ions wi h Assad
and launching a mili a y ope a ion in
no he n Sy ia aimed a pushing he Ku d-
ish-domina ed SDF ou o key ci ies such as
Tel Ri aa and Manbij. Howe e , bo h s a -
egies ailed. No comp omise was eached
wi h Assad and no malisa ion e o s aced
esis ance om Sy ian opposi ion g oups.
A he same ime, Anka a was unable o
ini ia e a la ge-scale mili a y o ensi e in
he no h o Sy ia wi hou a g een ligh
om he US and Russia. Meanwhile, he
Ku dish-led Au onomous Adminis a ion
o No h and Eas Sy ia was able o u he
consolida e i s go e nance s uc u es.
Fo Tu key, Assad’s all ep esen s a
“now o ne e ” momen o p e en he
scena io o Ku dish au onomy domina ed
by he PYD/YPG. Du ing he ebel o ensi e
in No embe and Decembe 2024, Tu kish-
backed SNA mili ias seized con ol o Tel
Ri aa and Manbij; Anka a subsequen ly
suppo ed he SNA o ensi e wi h ai s ikes
wi h he aim o ed awing he on lines in
no he n Sy ia. Today, Tu key iews Donald
T ump’s e u n o he Whi e House as an
oppo uni y o push Washing on o aban-
don i s suppo o he SDF, which he US
has backed in i s igh agains IS and con-
inues o p o ec . Whe he Tu key succeeds
will depend la gely on he policy decisions
o he T ump II adminis a ion.
Wi h HTS a he helm, he in e im go -
e nmen in Damascus is now illed wi h
ac o s whom Tu key sees as coope a i e
and iendly and wi h whom he Tu kish
leade ship main ains close pe sonal ies.
This means Anka a should be able o exe -
cise signi ican in luence o e Sy ia’s u u e
ajec o y. A he same ime and amid he
ecalib a ion o i s o eign policy p io i ies,
he weakening o I an and he con inued
lack o a esolu ion o he Is aeli-Pales inian
con lic , Tu key is pu suing i s app oche-
men wi h A ab s a es. Thus, in i s e o s o
s abilise Sy ia, Anka a hopes o coope a e
wi h egional ac o s such as Saudi A abia,
he UAE, Qa a , Egyp , Jo dan and I aq,
acco ding o Fo eign Minis e Hakan Fidan.
A ab mona chies o
he Pe sian Gul
The all o he Assad egime has signi ican ly
al e ed he balance o powe be ween he
Gul A ab s a es. Qa a ’s suppo o jihadis
g oups, such as he Sy ian Nus a F on , was
one o he easons why Saudi A abia, he
UAE, Bah ain and Egyp imposed a land, sea
and ai blockade on he emi a e in 2017.
Al hough he c isis was esol ed in Janua y
2021, he e has been no undamen al change
in Doha’s policies, meaning ha ensions
be ween he Gul A ab mona chies could
eigni e a any ime.
Assad’s down all and HTS’s akeo e o
powe a e majo successes o Qa a i policy.
Since he “A ab Sp ing” in 2011, Doha has
be on Islamis s o a ious o ien a ions as
he o ces o he u u e, in he belie ha
o ging alliances wi h hem would inc ease
i s own egional in luence.
By con as , Saudi A abia and he UAE
posi ioned hemsel es as leade s o he
coun e e olu ion, suppo ing he es o a-
ion o au oc a ic ule in Egyp and Tunisia
while aking on Islamis mo emen s mili-
a ily elsewhe e. The UAE was pa icula ly
uncomp omising: i e en backed Assad om
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
7
2015 onwa ds o p e en u he Islamis
gains; and in 2018, i became he i s A ab
s a e o es o e ies wi h Sy ia a e hey
had been se e ed owing o he ci il wa . Abu
Dhabi hen sough o ehabili a e Assad
wi hin he A ab wo ld. While he UAE may
welcome he ac ha I an is weake owing
o he loss o Sy ia as a key ally, he all o
he Damascus egime emains a signi ican
se back o Emi a i policy.
Saudi A abia’s a i ude owa ds he powe
shi in Sy ia is simila ly ambi alen ,
al hough i iews HTS’s ic o y om he
s andpoin o g ea e p agma ism han does
he UAE. While Riyadh suppo ed econcil-
ia ion wi h Assad’s Sy ia, i did no es o e
ela ions un il 2023 – much la e han
he UAE – and kep mo e dis ance om
Damascus. Like he Emi a i leade ship,
Saudi A abia wo ies abou he b oade
egional impac o an Islamis akeo e in
Sy ia; howe e , i is less ideologically d i en
han Abu Dhabi in i s igh agains Islamis
mo emen s. A he same ime, Riyadh wel-
comes he weakening o I an and Hezbollah.
Recen ly, he e ha e been g owing signs
o Saudi A abia’s willingness o engage –
p agma ically – wi h HTS-led Sy ia.
Is ael
The all o he Assad egime has u he
shi ed he egional balance o powe in
Is ael’s a ou , no leas because I anian
oops and allied A ghan mili ias (such as
he Fa emiyoun B igade) ha e been pulled
ou o Sy ia. Be o e hose de elopmen s,
Is ael had in lic ed signi ican losses on i s
ad e sa ies – including Hamas, Hezbollah
and I an – in he wake o he 7 Oc obe
2023 a acks.
Immedia ely a e he all o Assad, Is ael
decla ed he collapse o he 1974 Is aeli-
Sy ian cease i e ag eemen and launched
he “A ow o Bashan” ope a ion. Acco ding
o De ence Minis e Is ael Ka z, Is ael’s
objec i es we e o es ablish an obse a ion
pos on Moun He mon o e looking Leba-
non’s Beqaa Valley, a Hezbollah s onghold;
c ea e a new bu e zone and de e ence
agains he ebels in Damascus; and p e en
he weapons ha belonged o he Assad
egime alling in o he ebels’ hands. De-
spi e hei mild he o ic, he new ule s in
Damascus we e deemed un us wo hy by
Is ael owing o hei ex emis pas and on-
going ies o ex emis g oups.
Acco dingly, he Is aeli mili a y ook
o e con ol o he demili a ised zone es ab-
lished unde he 1974 cease i e ag eemen
(and p e iously o e seen by he UNDOF
mission) and he peak o Moun He mon.
Bo h si es a e on Sy ian e i o y ex ending
beyond he Golan Heigh s, which Is ael
occupied in 1967 and annexed in 1981.
Is ael also se up checkpoin s ou side he
UN bu e zone. And i seized he oppo -
uni y o des oy mos o he Assad egime’s
emaining mili a y capabili ies. The Is aeli
Ai Fo ce ca ied ou mo e han 130 ai -
s ikes ac oss Sy ia – p ima ily, bu no
exclusi ely, in he wes e n and sou he n
egions o he coun y. Wi hin 48 hou s,
acco ding o an Is aeli mili a y spokes-
pe son, 70–80 pe cen o Sy ia’s mili a y
capaci y was wiped ou , including he nea
o al des uc ion o i s ai de ence and ada
sys ems. An obs acle o u u e Is aeli ai -
s ikes agains I an was he eby emo ed.
In mid-Decembe 2024, he Ne anyahu
go e nmen announced plans o expand
se lemen s in he Golan Heigh s and double
he Is aeli popula ion he e. This mo e is
likely o s and in he way o a peace ul eso-
lu ion wi h Sy ia, ega dless o who holds
powe in Damascus.
Uni ed S a es
The balance o powe in Sy ia and he
b oade egion has also shi ed in a ou o
he US: he Assad egime was an ad e sa y
and bo h I an and i s allied mili ias ha e
been weakened. A he same ime, US
policy goals is-à- is Sy ia ha e no ye been
ully achie ed and emain p oblema ic o
Tu key: Washing on con inues i s campaign
agains IS alongside he Ku dish-domina ed
SDF, while Tu key and he SNA a e ac i ely
a ge ing he SDF. Meanwhile, Damascus
is seeking o in eg a e SDF igh e s in o i s
new a my, albei as indi iduals, no as mem-
SWP Commen 9
Feb ua y 2025
8
be s o he SDF. Agains his backg ound,
he US go e nmen has been wo king o-
wa ds a peace ul se lemen be ween HTS
and he SDF, on he one hand, and be ween
he SDF and Tu key, on he o he .
A sus ainable solu ion is also needed o
he IS igh e s and hei ela i es who a e
being held in p isons, de en ion cen es and
in e nmen camps con olled by he SDF.
When he T ump adminis a ion suspended
all US o eign aid in Janua y 2025, a em-
po a y wo ka ound was es ablished o pay
he gua ds a de en ion camps such as
al-Hol and al-Roj. Howe e , i such unding
we e o be hal ed pe manen ly, he e could
be signi ican ins abili y.
Righ now, wha cou se he T ump II
adminis a ion is going o ollow emains
unce ain and US policy owa ds Sy ia
could shi ab up ly. No leas , his unce -
ain y ex ends o he p esence o Ame ican
oops on Sy ian e i o y in he u u e and
Ame ica’s pa ne ship wi h he SDF. Sho ly
a e he all o Assad, T ump himsel called
o he US o e ain om in ol emen in
Sy ia’s in e nal dynamics, while Na ional
Secu i y Ad iso Mike Wal z has suppo ed
wi hd awing Ame ican o ces om he coun-
y. By con as , Sec e a y o S a e Ma co
Rubio a gued in Janua y 2025 o con inued
US engagemen in Sy ia and ongoing sup-
po o he SDF. Acco ding o him, he p i-
o i y is no only o pa e he way o an “in-
clusi e ansi ion” bu also o ensu e ha
hos ile ac o s do no exploi he ansi ional
p ocess in o de o push hei own agendas.
Sy ia, he emphasised, mus no become a
“sou ce o in e na ional e o ism”.
D Sinem Ada is Associa e a he Cen e o Applied Tu key S udies (CATS) a SWP. D Mu iel Assebu g is Senio Fellow
in he A ica and Middle Eas Resea ch Di ision. D Hamid eza Azizi is a Visi ing Fellow in he A ica and Middle Eas
Resea ch Di ision. D Ma ga e e Klein is Head o he Eas e n Eu ope and Eu asia Resea ch Di ision. D Guido S einbe g
is Senio Associa e in he A ica and Middle Eas Resea ch Di ision.
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ISSN (P in ) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
DOI: 10.18449/2025C09
(English e sion o
SWP-Ak uell 6/2025)
