Pa ei o-Rod íguez, Ca los; Ma ín-Be múdez, Fede ico; Ba os-Campello, Es he ;
Pa ei o-López, Ca los
A icle
On he weak impac o base money on b oad money in
he con ex o uncon en ional mone a y policy: Eu o A ea
2008-2024
Economies
P o ided in Coope a ion wi h:
MDPI – Mul idisciplina y Digi al Publishing Ins i u e, Basel
Sugges ed Ci a ion: Pa ei o-Rod íguez, Ca los; Ma ín-Be múdez, Fede ico; Ba os-Campello, Es he ;
Pa ei o-López, Ca los (2025) : On he weak impac o base money on b oad money in he con ex o
uncon en ional mone a y policy: Eu o A ea 2008-2024, Economies, ISSN 2227-7099, MDPI, Basel,
Vol. 13, Iss. 5, pp. 1-24,
h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/economies13050130
This Ve sion is a ailable a :
h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/329410
S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen
Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den.
Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle
Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich
machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen.
So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen
(insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en,
gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do
genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e.
Te ms o use:
Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal
and schola ly pu poses.
You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o
exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he
in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public.
I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en
Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise
u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence.
h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by/4.0/
Academic Edi o s: Robe Czudaj and
An hony J. E ans
Recei ed: 28 Ma ch 2025
Re ised: 1 May 2025
Accep ed: 8 May 2025
Published: 12 May 2025
Ci a ion: Pa ei o-Rod íguez, C.,
Ma ín-Be múdez, F., Ba os-
Campello, E., & Pa ei o-López, C.
(2025). On he Weak Impac o Base
Money on B oad Money in he
Con ex o Uncon en ional Mone a y
Policy: Eu o A ea 2008–2024.
Economies,13(5), 130. h ps://
doi.o g/10.3390/economies13050130
Copy igh : © 2025 by he au ho s.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Swi ze land.
This a icle is an open access a icle
dis ibu ed unde he e ms and
condi ions o he C ea i e Commons
A ibu ion (CC BY) license
(h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/
licenses/by/4.0/).
A icle
On he Weak Impac o Base Money on B oad Money in he
Con ex o Uncon en ional Mone a y Policy: Eu o A ea
2008–2024
Ca los Pa ei o-Rod íguez
1
, Fede ico Ma ín-Be múdez
1,
* , Es he Ba os-Campello
2
and Ca los Pa ei o-López
3
1Depa men o Applied Economics, Uni e si y o A Co uña, 15008 A Co uña, Spain; ca los.pa ei [email p o ec ed]
2Depa men o Bussines, Uni e si y o A Co uña, 15008 A Co uña, Spain; es he .ba [email p o ec ed]
3Facul y o Law, Uni e si y o A Co uña, 15008 A Co uña, Spain; [email p o ec ed]
*Co espondence: [email p o ec ed]
Abs ac : In i s esponse o he economic and inancial c ises o 2008, he so e eign deb
and eu o c isis o 2010–2015, and he COVID-19 pandemic o 2020–2023, he Eu opean
Cen al Bank (ECB) implemen ed an uncon en ional mone a y policy aimed a p o iding
liquidi y o mo e han a decade, h ough a complex se o ools and ope a ions ha make
up he so-called quan i a i e easing. The esul s o all o hem a e being analyzed om
di e en pe spec i es. This pape s udies he ela ionship be ween a la ge base money,
cha ac e ized by a oluminous concen a ion o liquidi y in he o m o excess ese es, and
b oad money ( he b oad M3 agg ega e). Ou econome ic wo k shows a low elas ici y o
b oad money wi h espec o base money, concluding he exis ence o a weak ela ionship
be ween bo h mone a y magni udes, wi h a sha p decline in he money mul iplie . The
demand o money has emained s able ela i e o i s de e mining a iables, in e es a es
and income. A he same ime, some p ac ices ela ed o he handling o excess liquidi y by
Eu opean banks h ough deposi acili ies dese e conside a ion. We p opose s ic con ol
by he mone a y au ho i y o e he na u e and o igin o he unds ha cons i u e he excess
liquidi y de i ed om he ECB’s uncon en ional ope a ions, and o e i s managemen .
Keywo ds: quan i a i e easing; base money; b oad money; deposi acili y; cen al bank
1. In oduc ion
Following he economic and inancial c isis a he end o 2007, majo cen al banks
adop ed a se o uncon en ional mone a y policy measu es o add ess he liquidi y c isis.
The ECB was no excep ion o he new mone a y policy o ien a ion. A a ime o se e e
ins abili y and a ma ked educ ion in agg ega e demand, he objec i e o p ice s abili y
los p ominence in he ECB’s immedia e conce ns. Since he beginning o he inancial
c isis in la e 2007, he ECB has edi ec ed adi ional mone a y policy based on in e es
a es, o an uncon en ional mone a y policy ocused on he quan i a i e expansion o i s
balance shee . The massi e injec ion o liquidi y in o he sys em, known as quan i a i e
easing (QE), occupied he ECB o a decade. Then, he COVID19 pandemic con ibu ed
o he leng hening o he uncon en ional mone a y policy, especially du ing he pe iod
2020–2023.
Along wi h quan i a i e easing, he 2022 used wo o he non-s anda d measu es,
wi hin he amewo k o an uncon en ional mone a y policy: Fi s , he nega i e in e es a e
policy (NIRP)
1
. In 2014, he ECB ins i u ed a nega i e in e es a e ha only applied o bank
Economies 2025,13, 130 h ps://doi.o g/10.3390/economies13050130
Economies 2025,13, 130 2 o 24
deposi s in ended o p e en he Eu ozone om alling in o a de la iona y spi al. Second,
he ECB began using o wa d guidance (FG)
2
in July 2013, when he ECB’s Go e ning
Council said ha i expec ed in e es a es o emain low o an ex ended pe iod.
Wi hin he uncon en ional mone a y policy ollowing he 2007 inancial c isis, as well
as in he eu o and so e eign deb c ises o 2012–2013, and in he COVID19 pandemic o
2020, QE was he main ins umen among hose used by he ECB.
The p o ound change in he ECB’s mone a y policy s ance, oge he wi h he excep ion-
ally high olume o liquidi y injec ed in o he sys em be ween 2009 and 2023, undoub edly
o m a much b oade and mo e complex pe spec i e o he unc ions o a Cen al Bank
whose ul ima e goal, as is he case o he ECB, is p ice s abili y.
A i s e lec ion a ises a ound he po en ial isk o he new and long-las ing uncon-
en ional mone a y policy on he s abili y o money demand. Indeed, he ex ao dina y
mone a y expansion p ac iced by he ECB o mo e han a decade may ha e a ec ed he
s abili y o b oad money M3. The componen s o M3 a e cu ency in ci cula ion, o e nigh
deposi s, deposi s wi h ma u i ies o up o wo yea s, deposi s edeemable a no ice o up
o h ee mon hs, epu chase ag eemen s, money ma ke und sha es/uni s and MFI deb
secu i ies o up o wo yea s.
As we will see in he sec ion on ele an li e a u e, s udies on he s abili y o money
demand ca ied ou in eu ozone, p io o and du ing he s age o uncon en ional mone a y
policy gene ally e eal he pe sis ence o s abili y o he b oad mone a y agg ega e M3.
Howe e , o ou knowledge, he e a e no s udies on he s abili y o money demand
ha p e iously add ess he possible e ec s o quan i a i e easing on b oad money (M3),
which could, in u n, a ec he s abili y o money demand.
Ou pape a emp s o shed ligh on he ela ionship be ween uncon en ional mone a y
policy and he beha io o he b oad money (M3) in eu ozone in he pe iod 1999M1–2024M7.
We also analyze he e ec o he combina ion o he wo measu es, QE and NIRP, on he
beha io o Eu opean comme cial banks.
We mus bea in mind ha , om a mone a y analysis pe spec i e, b oad money is
ele an because i is associa ed wi h he o al esou ces a ailable in he economy o he
pu chase o goods, se ices and non-mone a y asse s as well as o in es men expendi u es.
As he ECB i sel poin s ou , “In de ining money, bo h he mic oeconomic pe spec i e o he
indi idual holde o money and he empi ical p ope ies o mone a y agg ega es esul ing
om he join beha io o holde s o money a e ele an ” (ECB,1999, p. 31).
Thus, he b oad money (mone a y agg ega e M3), bo h in he app oach o he indi id-
ual demand unc ions o he componen s o M3 and in a po olio demand app oach o
he componen s o M3, mus be pe manen ly ul illed:
The mic oeconomic c i e ia: Money se es as a medium o exchange, as he uni o
accoun and as a s o e o alue.
The mac oeconomic c i e ia: S abili y, Con ollabili y, Leading indica o p ope ies.
S abili y: The usual app oach is o in es iga e he s abili y o a money demand ela-
ionship, whe e he money s ock is ela ed o he p ice le el, eal income and in e es a es.
Con ollabili y: Is gi en i i s g ow h a e can be s ee ed o e a sho ime ho izon by
he cen al bank using mone a y policy ins umen s; con ollabili y is impo an especially
i he cen al announces a a ge o mone a y g ow h.
Leading indica o p ope ies. I he mone a y agg ega e con ains in o ma ion ha will
help o p edic he p ice le el in he u u e.
As we will see in Sec ion 3, he uncon en ional mone a y policy, in pa icula QE,
did no p o oke majo mo emen s in he b oad money (M3). Since he inancial c isis o
2008, he g ow h end o he base money has been inc easingly d i en by Eu osys em
mone a y policy ope a ions. Howe e , b oad money (M3) has s opped closely mimo ing
Economies 2025,13, 130 3 o 24
de elopmen s in base money. As we will see, he elas ici y o M3 wi h espec o base
money and wi h espec o QE ope a ions is low. Indeed, he esponse o b oad money o
changes in base money and QE ope a ions is e y weak a e 2008. The elas ici y is a ound
0.30, and is s a is ically signi ican in all cases.
The s uc u e o he pape is as ollows: a e he in oduc ion, Sec ion 2 e iews he
ele an li e a u e on he e ec s o uncon en ional mone a y policy on he eal economy,
clea ing po en ial si ua ions o unce ain y on he so e eign deb o some membe s a es
and on he common cu ency i sel . In addi ion, he li e a u e e iew also ex ends o he
e ec s o he wo- ie sys em (TTS), be ween 2019 and 2022, in o de o show he ex eme
sensi i i y o banks in he managemen o excess liquidi y o changes o he key ECB in e es
a es. As we will see la e , he TTS p o ides ha a pa o he excess ese es is exemp
om he nega i e in e es a e o deposi acili y. The olume o ese e holdings in excess
o minimum ese e equi emen s ha is exemp om he nega i e deposi acili y in e es
a e is de e mined as a mul iple o c edi ins i u ion’s minimum ese e equi emen s. This
is so-called as he allowance.
Sec ion 3deals wi h he e olu ion o base money, whose composi ion shows a ma ked
change since he 2008 c isis. The s ong injec ion o liquidi y om he quan i a i e easing
ope a ions, be ween 2009 and 2023, mo es he base money away om i s adi ional
con o ma ion as he sum o bankno es in ci cula ion and he le el o equi ed cen al
bank ese es.
In Sec ion 4, we analyze he e ec s o he non-s anda d measu es on b oad money
(M3). We s udy o wha ex en he e ec s o he la ge non-s anda d inancing p og ams
(APPs, VLTROs, TLTROs, PEPPs, PELTROs) ha e concen a ed on he base money a e
2007. The ends o he base money and b oad money (M3) ha e decoupled. The expansion
in base money due o non-s anda d measu es has no suppo ed a simila up end in M3.
This sec ion s udies he money mul iplie , which shows a s ongly nega i e end as a esul
o he educed in luence o base money on b oad money. Emphasis is placed on he s ong
accumula ion o excess ese es and he use o he deposi acili y by Eu ozone inancial
ins i u ions. Sec ion 5discusses he elas ici y o b oad money wi h espec o base money, as
well as he elas ici y o he la e wi h espec o QE ope a ions. In Sec ion 6, we p esen he
discussion and main conclusions. Finally, Sec ion 7shows he bibliog aphical e e ences.
2. Li e a u e Re iew
The e ec s o uncon en ional mone a y policy measu es ha e been he subjec o
mul iple heo e ical and empi ical pape s. Mos o he e e ences ci ed in his pape ocus
on he consequences o he la ge liquidi y expansion be ween 2008 and 2023. Howe e , a
he end o his sec ion, we include a small se o bibliog aphic e e ences on he s udy o
he s abili y o money demand ha may be use ul o he eade . Despi e he wide a ie y o
quan i a i e easing ope a ions ca ied ou by he ECB du ing his pe iod, hei con inui y,
and hei eno mous quan i a i e olume, money demand in he eu ozone was no subjec
o no able episodes o ins abili y.
A he onse o he c isis, he ECB ocused i s mone a y policy on inancing he ma ke s.
Some esea che s e e as he ma ke ope a ions app oach o his pe iod. Reichlin (2014)
and Pill and Reichlin (2014), conside ing he ole o he cen al bank as lende o las eso ,
a gue ha hese decisions con ibu ed o a i s economic eco e y in he las qua e o
2009. In he same ein, Lenza e al. (2010), Pee sman (2011) and Giannone e al. (2012)
conclude ha hese liquidi y injec ion measu es p e en ed a mo e d ama ic igh ening o
c edi o he eal economy. No ice ha , howe e , a ha ime in e es a es we e s ill a
om he ze o bound.
Economies 2025,13, 130 4 o 24
A e he Co e ed Bonds Pu chase P og ammes (CBPP1, 7 May 2009, and CBPP2,
6 Oc obe 2011), he Secu i y Ma ke s P og amme (SMP) was designed o conduc a massi e
pu chase o go e nmen bonds om May 2010 o Decembe 2012, p ima ily a ge ing he
deb c isis o G eece, Po ugal and Spain. Ghysels e al. (2017) conclude ha he pu chase
o I alian and Spanish bonds lowe ed yields 320 and 180 basis poin s, espec i ely, e en
hough he olumes we e no announced in ad ance. In he same ield, Ese and Schwaab
(2016) inds a signi ican impac o he SMP on yields o pu chased bonds. Ra e educ ions
a e la ge in hose ma ke s wi h lowe liquidi y and highe isk p emium. T ebesch and
Ze elmeye (2018) and De Poo e e al. (2018) ha e ob ained simila esul s.
In 2012 was ac i a ed he Ou igh Mone a y T ansac ions (OMTs), a second massi e
public deb pu chase p og am in he seconda y so e eign bond ma ke in he Eu ozone,
ending he SMP. Rega ding OMTs, Al a illa e al. (2016,2020) show ha he announcemen
o he p og am educes he in e es a e on Spanish and I alian wo-yea bonds, while
lea ing hose o F ance and Ge many unchanged. In u n, he OMT is associa ed wi h
signi ican eal economic, c edi and p ice g ow h in I aly and Spain, wi h posi i e e ec s
in F ance and Ge many. Fe ando e al. (2015) ind a no able educ ion in c edi a ioning
o i ms, which saw signi ican ly imp o ed access o c edi . O he wo ks in his line a e
hose o K ishnamu hy e al. (2017), Aghion e al. (2017).
The ECB deployed, be ween 2014 and 2016, i s powe ul Asse Pu chase P og amme
(APP), composed o : CBPP3, Oc obe 2014; ABSPP, No embe 2014; PSPP, Ma ch 2015 and
CSPP, June 2016. In addi ion o he weak impac o APP on b oad money M3, Die ks (2020)
inds Eu ozone GDP g owing a a disappoin ing 1.2% in Q3 2019 compa ed wi h he same
qua e o 2018.
The heo e ical and empi ical wo ks on he impac o he APP on he eu o a ea
mac oeconomy a e nume ous. Among o he s, And ade e al. (2016) s udy he e ec s o he
APP on yields and on he mac oeconomy, and shed some ligh on i s ansmission channels.
The asse pu chase p og am, in combina ion wi h o wa d guidance, imp o es in la ion
and ou pu expec a ions.
Al a illa e al. (2015) ind ha he ECB asse pu chase p og am has signi ican ly
lowe ed yields in a b oad se o ma ke segmen s. Al a illa e al. (2016), using a s anda d
mac oeconomic model ind ha in absence o hese measu es bo h in la ion and ou pu
would ha e been signi ican ly lowe .
Wieladek and Ga cia Pascual (2016) use a BVAR amewo k o examine he impac
o ECB quan i a i e easing on he Eu o A ea eal GDP and co e CPI in a numbe o ways.
Weale and Wieladek (2016) examine he impac in a s uc u al VAR amewo k. The esul s
o bo h wo ks, al hough di e en o each membe s a e, sugges ha Eu o a ea eal GDP
and co e CPI would ha e been 1.3% and 0.9% lowe in he absence o his policy.
A pape by Gambe i and Musso (2017) poin s o a signi ican impac o he APP on
bo h eal GDP and HICP in la ion. Mo e p ecisely, hey ind ha he con ibu ion o he
APP shock o eal GDP was s onge in he sho e m, going om 0.18% du ing he i s
qua e o 2015 o a e y weak 0.02% in he ou h qua e o 2016.
Unde 2- and 3-yea e y long- e m e inancing ope a ions (VLTROs) in Decembe
2011 and Feb ua y 2012, Da acq-Pa ies and De San is (2015) ind ha VLTROs p omo ed
ou pu g ow h and lending o non- inancial i ms. Ga cia-Posada and Ma che i (2016) ind
e idence o Spain. Simila indings o he case o Po ugal a e ound in Jaso a e al. (2018).
Howe e , he huge liquidi y injec ed o banks, h ough VLTROs, caused, in some cases, he
e ec o inc easing so e eign asse pu chases, pa ially cu ing he posi i e e ec s on c edi .
C osignani e al. (2020) inds e ec s o his na u e in Po ugal.
Finally, he so-called Ta ge ed Longe -Te m Re inancing Ope a ions (TLTROs), in
Ap il 2014, Juin 2016 and Ma ch 2019 (TLTRO I, TLTRO II, TLTRO III, espec i ely) and
Economies 2025,13, 130 5 o 24
he Pandemic Eme gency Longe -Te m Re inancing Ope a ions (PELTROs), on 30 Ap il
2020 (PELTRO), helped educe in e es a es o banks ha exceeded ce ain lending a ge s
(Ros agno e al.,2016). Some pape s show ha banks ha bo owed unde TLTRO-I
educed hei a es o a g ea e ex en han banks ha e ained om bidding (Al a illa
e al. (2016). In he Spanish case, acco ding o Cas illo Lozoya e al. (2022), all banks
pa icipa ing in TLTROS ope a ions ha e me he c edi a ge du ing he pe iod o analysis
( om 28 Feb ua y 2020 o 31 Ma ch 2021), and e en he as majo i y ha e exceeded i
by a . Rega ding he TLTRO III edemp ions, Cas illo Lozoya e al. (2024) s a e ha he
smoo h unc ioning o he money ma ke made i possible o edis ibu e ese es among
ma ke pa icipan s wi hou gene a ing ensions. The TLTRO III edemp ions did no al e
he g an ing o c edi by ins i u ions and had no nega i e e ec s on he Spanish economy.
The ecen expe ience wi h TLTROs a e Ma ch 2020, when he demand o loans
egis e ed unp eceden ed le els, indica es he heigh ened ele ance o a leas wo addi ional
mechanisms o p opaga ion a e speci ic o he pandemic. Fi s , he a ailabili y o TLTRO
unds con ibu ed o mi iga ing a po en ial inc ease in lending a es, due o he su ge in c edi
isk in he con ex o he economic dis up ions b ough o h by he pandemic. Second, he
sha p and la ge inc ease in unce ain y abou he mac oeconomic ou look induced s ong
p ecau iona y beha io on he pa o i ms and households (Ba bie o e al.,2021).
On he o he hand, and in his sense, Ha mann and Sme s (2018) conside e ha i is
di icul o sepa a e he e ec s o TLTROs om o he measu es ha oge he make up wha
we know as he ECB’s uncon en ional mone a y policy.
Finally, se e al wo ks add ess he e ec s o he Pandemic Eme gency Pu chase P o-
g amme (PEPP), Ma ch 2020. The esul s o Moessne and De Haan (2022) no only show
ha he announcemen o PEPP a ec ed go e nmen bond yields, bu also sugges ha
he e m p emia o go e nmen bonds in eu o a ea coun ies wi h highe so e eign isk,
dec eased mo e in esponse o he announcemen o he PEPP. Pin o and Cos a (2023) show
ha PEPP educes co po a e, co e ed, and so e eign bond sp eads, du ing he implemen-
a ion pe iod and also du ing he implemen a ion pe iod, which is in line wi h he di ec
channel o mone a y policy. In addi ion, he PEPP’s impac on bond sp eads is signi ican ly
highe o hose issued in GIIPS (G eece, I eland, I aly, Po ugal and Spain) e sus co e
Eu opean coun ies (F ance and Ge many). Unde a no el app oach, Co adin e al. (2021)
and Co adin and Schwaab (2023) decompose eu o a ea so e eign bond yields in o i e
dis inc componen s and ind ha all i e isk p emia became sizable ollowing he onse o
he pandemic, and ha bo h mone a y and iscal policy announcemen s had a p onounced
and a o able e ec on yields.
The e ec s o he wo- ie sys em (TTS) we e s udied, among o he s, by Boucinha e al.
(2022), who s a e ha , ollowing i s implemen a ion, he TTS e ec i ely educed banks’ cos
o holding excess liquidi y and hus mi iga ed he isk o impai men s in he ansmission o
mone a y policy h ough banks. TTS suppo ed he ECB’s o wa d guidance on key policy
a es. Baldo e al. (2022) show, ha eu o a ea banks we e able o maximise he bene i s o
he ECB TTS by inc easing ne bo owing in he money ma ke , inc easing ne bo owing
om hei banking g oup, and educing holdings o ma ke able secu i ies. Al a illa e al.
(2022) show ha eu o a ea banks ex ended mo e c edi o he eal economy a e he TTS
was implemen ed. The banks bene i ing he mos om he TTS aised household deposi
a es in con as o banks less able o exploi he TTS.
The TTS could also ha e exe cised upwa d p essu e on longe - e m a es i he incen-
i e o banks o in es ese es was educed. Ryan and Whelan (2021), Ros agno e al.
(2019) and Demi alp e al. (2021) main ain ha he TTS may ha e pa ially o se his e ec
by p o iding elie o banks, which hen saw less need o in es hei ese e holdings.
Economies 2025,13, 130 6 o 24
Du ing he pe iod 2015–2022, he deposi acili y a e (DFR) was nega i e. The esul
was ha he banks paid in e es o he Eu osys em du ing ha pe iod. De G auwe and Ji
(2023,2024), aking in o accoun he wo- ie sys em ha was in ope a ion du ing
2019–2022
,
ob ain a o al paymen by banks o e he pe iod 2015–2022 o €61,000 million. La e we
will see ha du ing he 8 ese e main enance pe iods o 2021, he applica ion o he TTS
allowed banks o sa e app oxima ely €4707 million. In Sep embe 2022 he ECB se he
DFR = 0.75. Once he TTS is abolished (Sep embe 2022), he ECB pays o banks an annual
amoun ha De G auwe and Ji (2024) es ima e a €140,000 million on an annual basis.
In Sep embe 2022, banks shi ed mo e han €3,500,000 million om excess ese es o
deposi acili ies.
While his es ima e is e y op imis ic, De G auwe and Ji (2023,2024) poin ou , in one
yea , banks will ecei e compensa ion, which is mo e han double he in e es paymen s
hey made o e se en yea s. F om a c i ical pe spec i e, De G auwe and Ji s a e “now
ha he banks ecei e signi ican ans e s ha dwa wha hey had o pay in he pas ,
he ECB has been unwilling o impose a simila wo- ie sys em ha would exemp pa
o he banks’ deposi s om ecei ing in e es ans e s”. This new p oposed TTS would
alle ia e he bu den on axpaye s, in he same way, as i was willing o alle ia e he bu den
on banks when hey we e hi by a nega i e in e es a e. In Sec ion 3o ou pape , we make
an adjus ed calcula ion o he ECB’s compensa ion o banks o deposi acili y in 2022,
2023 and 2024.
Howe e , he e a e a gumen s agains such a TTS because i could lead o u he
es ic ions and/o highe cos s o bank c edi o households and businesses, he eby
o se ing pa o he expec ed elie o axpaye s and economic ac i i y
We p opose a mo e e ec i e al e na i e o limi po en ial undesi able p ac ices by
banks in he managemen o excess liquidi y. This al e na i e would ake he o m o
igo ous analysis by he Eu osys em on he o igin o he excess liquidi y ha cons i u es
he deposi acili y, especially when he DRF is high, as was he case in 2023, 2024 and ea ly
2025, wi h a maximum o 4% be ween Sep embe 2023 and June 2024. This issue will be
add essed in Sec ion 6.
The a e on he deposi acili y, is he a e which banks may use o make o e nigh
deposi s wi h he Eu osys em a a p e-se in e es . In his con ex , he Go e ning Council o
he ECB con inuously ea i ms he decision o s ee i s mone a y policy s ance h ough his
a e. Sho - e m money ma ke in e es a es a e expec ed o e ol e in he icini y o he
deposi acili y a e wi h ole ance o some ola ili y as long as i does no blu he signal
abou he in ended mone a y policy s ance
The deposi acili y a e is unique o he en i e eu o a ea and no mally ep esen s he
lowe bound o he o e nigh in e bank ma ke in e es a e, and he e o e guides sho -
e m in e es a es in he wholesale money ma ke . Deposi acili y a e is cu en ly 2.75%.
Nume ous esea ch pape s add ess he analysis o he s abili y o money demand
du ing he long pe iod o uncon en ional mone a y policy. Taken oge he , he heo e ical
and empi ical pape s show ha quan i a i e easing has no signi ican ly changed he
s abili y o money demand in he Eu ozone. Wi h di e en me hodologies, using he
usual s a is ical and econome ic analysis echniques, he conclusions lean owa ds he
pe sis ence o money demand s abili y in he Eu ozone. Among o he s, see: Fische e al.
(2009); Papademos and S a k (2010); Belke and Czudaj (2010); Nau z and Rondo (2011); De
San is e al. (2013); D ege and Wol e s (2014); Fo es i and Napoli ano (2014); Jung (2015);
Jung (2016a,2016b); Albulescu and Pepin (2018); Ba igozzi and Con i (2018); Bahamani-
Oskooee e al. (2015); Bahamani-Oskooee and Naye i (2020); Ba ne e al. (2022); Leb e de
F ei as (2022); Bissoondeeal e al. (2023); Pa ei o-Rod íguez e al. (2016,2020,2024).
Economies 2025,13, 130 7 o 24
In he empi ical wo k, all he da a used a e om o icial sou ces: The Eu opean Cen al
Bank (ECB Da a Po al) and Spanish Cen al Bank. Fo easons o space, we do no include
he iden i ica ion o each se ies.
3. Eu osys em Uncon en ional Mone a y Policy Ope a ions and
Base Money
F om 1999 un il he economic and inancial c isis o 2008, he base money is almos
en i ely he sum o he wo essen ial elemen s ha make up his mac o-magni ude, i.e., cu -
ency and he minimum ese e equi emen s. The e olu ion o hese wo componen s
shapes o base money ajec o y be ween 1999 and 2008, because du ing ha pe iod, excess
ese es ha e been insigni ican . On a e age, he a io o excess ese es o he base money
did no each 0.5% be ween 1999 and 2008.
Howe e , i should be no ed ha cu ency and bo h he minimum ese es equi e-
men and he c edi ins i u ions’ holding ese es o e and abo e he le el o equi ed
cen al bank ese es o m base money, o M0. Du ing he QE pe iod, he a io
Excess Rese es
Base money
eached e y high alues. Fo example, on a e age, in 2013, 2017 and 2020, eached 30%,
57% and 65%, espec i ely, as can be seen in he ECB s a is ical da abase.
The uncon en ional measu es ab up ly al e ed he e olu ion o base money because
a ele an pa o he liquidi y injec ed in o he banking sys em was no alloca ed o
con en ional lending ope a ions (loans and c edi s) by banks, bu emained s agnan in he
o m o excess ese es. Un il 2019, excess o ese es and deposi acili y we e emune a ed
by he ECB a he deposi acili y a e (DFR). Be ween June 2014 and July 2022, he ECB se
a nega i e deposi acili y a e ( om DFR =
−
0.10 o DFR =
−
0.50). On 27 July 2022, i se
DFR = 0 and on 14 Sep embe 2022, DFR = 0.75. In e ms o p o i abili y, banks held excess
liquidi y as excess ese es o as a deposi acili y, depending on he espec i e in e es a es.
Conside ing he high olume o excess ese es caused by QE ope a ions, he applica ion
o DFR < 0 o i , ega dless o i s conside a ion as excess ese es o deposi acili y, was a
conside able cos o he banks. As an example, he Table 1shows he excess cos o banks
o excess ese es in he 8 main enance pe iods in 2021. The banking sys em should ha e
paid he ECB an annual amoun o app oxima ely €18,265 million. Howe e , in 2019 he
ECB designed he wo- ie sys em o emune a ing excess ese e holdings. The TTS as
o he se en h main enance pe iod o 2019 s a ing on 30 Oc obe 2019. On 27 July 2022,
he ECB se DFR = 0 and on 14 Sep embe 2022, i se DFR = 0.75. On 8 Sep embe 2022 o
aise he DFR o abo e ze o, he ECB decided, on he same da e, o o mally suspend he
wo- ie sys em, ceasing o be e ec i e since he ou h main enance pe iod o 2022.
On Sep embe 2019, he ECB Go e ning Council decided o se he ini ial mul iplie
o he calcula ion o he allowance a six, and he ini ial applicable emune a ion a e a
0%. Du ing he wo- ie sys em, he non-exemp excess ese e holdings con inue o be
emune a ed a ze o pe cen o he deposi acili y a e, whiche e is lowe .
I we apply he TTS o he yea 2021 (DFR =
−
0.50), he p oduc o he minimum
ese es equi ed by six esul s in an a e age o app oxima ely €896,000 million o each
o he 8 main enance pe iods which would be exemp om emune a ion. The es o he
excess ese es will ha e o pay he nega i e DFR =
−
0.50. Wi h he da a o he yea
2021, he bu den o he excess ese es o he banking sys em would be app oxima ely
€13,578 million, ha is, €4707 million less. In he absence o he TTS, he o al emune a ion
o excess ese es would amoun o €18,265 million. In summa y, he wo- ie sys em
p o ided banks wi h sa ings o a ound €5000 million in 2021. See Table 1.
No ice ha deposi acili y holdings a e no subjec o he TTS and a e ins ead emu-
ne a ed a he DFR, i espec i e o whe he i is ze o, nega i e o posi i e.
Economies 2025,13, 130 8 o 24
Table 1. Cos o excess ese es in 2021 unde he Two- ie sys em (DFR = −0.5).
Main en.
Pe iods
2021
Leng h
Main enance
Pe iod (days)
Excess
Re-
se es
Exemp ed
Rese es
Non
Exemp ed
Rese es
Remune a .
Ra e
Allowance
(0%)
Remune a .
Non Exemp ed.
Rese es
(−0.5%)
Remune a .
Excess
Rese es
Wi hou TTS
Fi s 49
3,011,200
871,400 2,139,900 593,036,111 1,456,320,833 2,049,288,888
Second 42
3,273,600
876,800 2,396,900 511,466,666 1,398,191,666 1,909,600,000
Thi d 49
3,443,900
879,500 2,564,500 598,548,611 1,745,284,722 2,343,765,277
Fou h 42
3,502,900
894,800 2,608,100 521,966,666 1,521,391,666 2,043,358,333
Fi h 49
3,575,300
899,200 2,675,300 611,955,555 1,820,690,277 2,433,190,277
Six h 49
3,653,700
909,200 2,743,700 618,761,111 1,867,240,277 2,486,545,833
Se en h 49
3,689,100
919,600 2,769,500 625,838,888 1,884,798,611 2,510,637,500
Eigh h 49
3,656,900
919,600 2,769,500 625,838,888 1,884,798,611 2,488,723,611
To al
4,707,412,500
13,578,716,666
18,265,109,722
Excess ese es, exemp ed and non-exemp ed ese es a e exp essed in millions o eu o; emune a ion allowance,
emune a ion non exemp ed ese es and emune a ion o al excess ese es wi hou TTS a e exp essed in eu os.
Own elabo a ion. Da a ECB.
Du ing 2021, banks held a mon hly a e age o €704,000 million in deposi acili ies.
Wi h a DFR o
−
0.50%, he co esponding annual emune a ion o his acili y is a ound
€3500 million. The cos s o excess liquidi y, e en aking in o accoun he sa ings om he
TTS, would amoun o app oxima ely €17,200 million in he yea in ques ion.
Cu en ly, bo h he minimum ese e equi emen s and he excess ese e holdings
a e emune a ed a he a e o 0%.
In con as o hese cos s incu ed by banks due o excess liquidi y when he in e es
a es on deposi acili y a e nega i e (be ween June 2013 and July 2022), he p o i s ob ained
om his same concep when in e es a es a e posi i e a e e y signi ican . As we can see
in he Table 2, in 2022, 2023 and 2024, deposi acili ies allowed banks o ob ain in e es
income o a ound €11,526, €126,000 and €121,000 million, espec i ely. As De G auwe
and Ji (2024) poin ou , in jus one yea , banks ecei e om ECB o excess liquidi y a
compensa ion equi alen o wice he cos s incu ed du ing he se en yea s o nega i e
in e es a es. F om Sep embe 2022 o Decembe 2024, his compensa ion is equi alen o
mo e han ou imes he cos s incu ed in he long pe iod o nega i e in e es a es.
Table 2. App oxima e emune a ion o he ECB o banks o deposi acili y in 2022, 2023, 2024.
2022 1Deposi Facili y (Millions) 2DFR % DFR Leng h Pe iod (Days)
Same DFR
Remune a ion
(Millions)
14/09–30/09 707,017 0.75 17 250.4
01/10–31/10 4,490,010 0.75 31 2899.8
01/11–30/11 4,490,010 1.5 30 5612.5
01/12–20/12 4,521,540 1.5 20 3768
21/12–31/12 4,521,540 2 11 2763.2
To al days and app oxima e compensa ion 2022 109 11,526
Economies 2025,13, 130 15 o 24
The eg ession Equa ions (3)–(5) es ima ed by o dina y leas squa es (OLS), wi h all
a iables in loga i hms, allow ob aining he elas ici y o he dependen a iable wi h espec
o he independen a iable.
M3 =β0+β1BM +ϵ(3)
BM =λ0+λ1QE +ϵ(4)
M3 =γ0+γ1QE +ϵ(5)
M3, b oad money; BM, base money; QE, o al quan i a i e easing measu es. Va iables
in loga i hms.
We pe o med he Augmen ed Dickey-Fulle es (ADF) (Dickey & Fulle ,1979),
he non-pa ame ic Phillips-Pe on (PP) es (Phillips & Pe on,1988), and he KPSS es
(Kwia kowski e al.,1992) o uni oo s. The null hypo hesis o he la e es is he
s a iona i y o he se ies, while he null hypo hesis o he i s wo is he exis ence o uni
oo s (non-s a iona y se ies). In ou wo k, we conside a a iable o con ain a uni oo o
be uni - oo non-s a iona y i he null hypo hesis o non-s a iona i y is no ejec ed by he
ADF and PP es s bu he null hypo hesis ha he a iable is mean s a iona y is ejec ed by
he KPSS es .
Table 3shows he esul s o he h ee es s, in le els and i s di e ences. The se ies
used in his sec ion a e in eg a ed se ies o o de one, ha is, hey a e I(1) se ies.
Table 3. Uni oo es s.
ADF PP KPSS
Le els 1s Di . Le els 1s Di . Le els 1s Di .
M3 −1.30 −5.61 −1.16 −14.62 0.27 0.106
BM −1.37 −5.90 −1.80 −16.78 0.41 0.07
QE −2.21 −4.24 −1.76 −12.43 0.416 0.09
ADF and PP: C i ical alues:
−
3.98 (0.01),
−
3.424 (0.05),
−
3.135 (0.10). KPSS: cons an , linea end. C i ical
alues: 0.216 (0.01), 0.146 (0.05), 0.119 (0.10).
The usual no mali y es s (Kolmogo o -Smi no , Shapi o-Wilk, Ande son-Da ling,
and Ja que-Be a) con i m he no mali y o he esiduals. We ind e y limi ed excep ions
in he case o eg ession Equa ion (5). As we ha e seen, QE consis s o e y la ge, and
some imes unexpec ed, liquidi y injec ions. They a e subjec o he ECB’s disc e ion. This
QE beha io complica es he he e oskedas ici y es s in Equa ion (5). The alues o he
γ1
coe icien in Table 4and he p- alues should be aken wi h cau ion.
B oad money and base money exhibi elas ici y close o uni y, be ween 1999 and 2008.
This esul is consis en wi h he ECB’s asse ion: “p io o he inancial c isis, base money
and b oad money de elopmen s we e un olding along simila ends” (ECB,2017, p. 62).
Indeed, he econome ic wo k shows ha he elas ici y o b oad money wi h espec o
base money, be ween 1999 and 2008, is
β1=
0.82. On he con a y, be ween 2009 and 2024
he e is a weak ela ionship be ween b oad money and base money (
β1=0.31)
. The same
applies o he link be ween b oad money and he olume o uncon en ional (QE) mone a y
policy ope a ions (γ1= 0.17).
The only pe iod in Table 4 ha shows a close ela ionship be ween b oad money and
base money is he pe iod om June 2021 o June 2022. As Schnabel (2023a) s a es, “in sha p
con as o he expe ience be o e he pandemic, he money mul iplie ell only b ie ly”.
Indeed, he money mul iplie emained s able om Ap il 2022 o Janua y 2023 and began
a new upwa d end un il July 2024, he end o he pe iod analyzed. F om mid-2021 o
mid-2022, b oad mone a y agg ega es we e inc easing a he same pace as he mone a y
Economies 2025,13, 130 16 o 24
base. This was he case al hough asse pu chases we e s ill being conduc ed on a scale
ha led o an inc ease in he mone a y base ha was signi ican ly la ge han du ing he
p e ious QE episode (Schnabel,2023a).
Table 4. The elas ici y o b oad money and base money in p esence o QE.
Pe iod β1( )λ1( )γ1( )p-Value
(β1,λ1,γ1)
1999–2008 0.82 35.51 (0.000)
1999–2024 0.41 61.24 0.48 96.3 (0.000)
2009–2024 0.31 57.04 0.84 70.9 0.17 37.14 (0.000)
2016–2023 0.34 36.6 0.80 58.6 0.26 27.3 (0.000)
2018–2023 0.35 25.9 0.90 53.2 0.31 22.3 (0.000)
2019–2023 0.30 23 0.91 42.1 0.27 17.5 (0.000)
2020–2023 0.26 14 0.93 25.4 0.22 9.29 (0.000)
2021/6–2022/6 0.72 16.9 (0.000)
β1
is he elas ici y o M3 wi h espec o he BM;
λ1
is he elas ici y o BM wi h espec o he QE;
γ1
is he elas ici y
o M3 wi h espec o he QE; is he -s uden s a is ic. Own elabo a ion, Da a ECB, (So wa e used E iews8).
In e ec , he ansmission o mone a y policy was a lo mo e powe ul du ing ha
pe iod. A he heigh o he pandemic, his was c i ical o sa egua d inancial s abili y and
mi iga e he social cos s o he c isis.
E en so, he elas ici y be ween b oad money and base money in he pe iod om
mid-2021 o mid-2022, al hough i expe iences a s ong inc ease o 0.72 (compa ed o ha
o ou 4-yea pe iods, be ween 2016 and 2023 (0.26; 0.34; 0.35; 0.30), is s ill sligh ly a
om uni y.
In he same pe iod (2009–2024), he elas ici y o he base money wi h espec o
QE ope a ions s ands a (
λ1
= 0.84). As Schnabel (2023a) poin s ou , “because o QE,
he mone a y base inc eased in a mechanical way one- o -one a e 2015 when he ECB
launched i s APP p og amme, and again du ing he pandemic when we c ea ed he PEPP
p og amme and conduc ed u he pu chases unde he APP”. This elas ici y s ood abo e
0.90 be ween 2015 and 2024, As he ECB c ea ed new QE measu es (APP, TLTROs, PELTROs,
PEPP), he elas ici y o base money wi h espec o QE inc eased, as shown by he alues o
λ1in Table 3.
6. Discussion
Pa o he excess ese es may o igina e om he pe iodic alloca ions o he main
e inancing ope a ions (MRO) and longe - e m e inancing ope a ions (LTROs) and, o
a lesse ex en , om he ma ginal lending acili y (MLF). Open ma ke ope a ions MRO
and LTROs a e egula open ma ke ope a ions. MRO and LTROs consis o one-week
liquidi y-p o iding ope a ions in eu o and h ee-mon h liquidi y-p o iding ope a ions in
eu o, espec i ely.
The in e es a es o he MROs and MLFs a e highe han he DFR. In his case, he
in es men o he excess liquidi y om MROs, LTROs, and MLFs in he o m o a deposi
acili y is una ac i e.
Du ing he so e eign deb c isis and, abo e all, wi h he a i al o COVID-19, egula
open ma ke ope a ions ha e been complemen ed by longe - e m e inancing ope a ions in
eu o wi h ma u i ies o up o 12 mon hs, 18 mon hs, 3 and 4 yea s. These a e he non- egula
Economies 2025,13, 130 17 o 24
open ma ke ope a ions TLTROs (TLTRO I in 2014, TLTRO II in 2016, and TLTRO III in
2019) and PELTROs (in 2021 and 2022).
TLTROs ha e been used by he ECB o o e longe - e m loans o banks a a o able
cos s. This suppo s banks in lending o i ms and households, which in u n makes su e
ha ou mone a y policy eaches people all ac oss he eu o a ea. Fo example, TLTRO III
was one o he key measu es o he ECB o igh he impac o he co ona i us c isis on
he economy. These unds we e o e ed a 0.5 pe cen age poin s below he ECB’s deposi
acili y a e. Banks we e ewa ded wi h his lowe in e es a e i hey kep lending o i ms
and households. The incen i e o in es excess liquidi y om TLTROs in a deposi acili y,
al hough i exis s, is low.
The ECB (2020) es ablishes ha he PELTROs will be conduc ed as ixed- a e ende
p ocedu es wi h ull allo men . The ope a ions will be o e ed a accommoda i e e ms.
The in e es a e will be 25 basis poin s below he a e age a e applied in he Eu osys em’s
MRO o e he li e o he espec i e PELTRO. Be ween Decembe 2019 and June 2024, he
main e inancing ope a ions a e (MROR) is 50 basis poin s highe han he DFR. Be ween
Sep embe 2024 and Janua y 2025, his di e ence is educed o 15 basis poin s.
The po en ial p o i abili y o excess liquidi y om PELTRO ope a ions ia he deposi
acili y may be signi ican , bu by Sep embe 2023 bo h MROR and DFR had eached hei
highes alues o he 2003–2025 pe iod: 4.5% and 4%, espec i ely.
Be ween July 2019 and Sep embe 2023, he ECB inc eased he main e inancing
ope a ions a e (MROR) 10 imes, om 0.50% o 4.50% (DFR om 0% o 4%). Subsequen ly,
a e 5 dec eases, MROR and DFR s ood in Janua y 2025 a 2.90% and 2.75%, espec i ely.
Gi en he sha p ise in he ECB’s key a es om July 2022, i is in e es ing o know
whe he he in e es a es ha banks pay on household and co po a e sa ings in o e nigh
deposi s and sho - e m and medium- e m deposi s ha e ollowed a simila pa h. Eu ozone
banks aised in e es a es on sho and medium- e m deposi s as he ECB aised i s key
in e es a es. Some la ge banks aised deposi a es slowly and smoo hly. Smalle banks
we e mo e agile. In some Eu osys em coun ies, such as Spain (Muñoz,2024), he inc ease
was clea ly smalle and ex emely slow, especially by he la ge banks. F om Sep embe 2023,
he expec a ion o a decline in he ECB key in e es a es led o an accele a ed educ ion
in deposi a es o all e ms. Some ecen publica ions a e sensi i e o he disc epancy
be ween ECB key in e es a es, in pa icula , he DFR, and he in e es a es ha banks pay
on sa e s’ deposi s. Tha is a clea ques ion: Is i possible ha banks could ha e used he
deposi acili y wi h a po ion o he sum o o e nigh , sho - and medium- e m deposi s o
capi alize on in e es a e di e en ials be ween he DFR and he deposi in e es a es? In
some ways, his ques ion unde lies he p oposal by De G auwe and Ji (2023,2024) o a
new TTS in he case o a posi i e deposi acili y a e.
Once he ECB s a ed lowe ing a es in June 2024 (Muñoz,2024), Spanish banks
implemen ed in ense cu s in deposi in e es a es, ha we e al eady compa a i ely e y
low. Figu e 5shows he weigh ed a e age in e es a e o ime deposi s (solid line) in Spain,
om Janua y 2003 o Janua y 2025. The olume o o e nigh deposi s ep esen s a high
pe cen age o all deposi s. Wi h €862,203 million, in Sep embe 2023 hey ep esen ed 89.5%
o o al household deposi s (Ca bó Val e de & Rod íguez Fe nández,2023). As can be
seen, he o e nigh deposi a e does no each 25 basis poin s a any ime be ween 2012
and 2024. The weigh ed a e age in e es a e o deposi s, including o e nigh , does no
each 1%. Figu e 5shows an excep ional si ua ion since he c ea ion o he ECB: The DFR is
signi ican ly highe han he a es o all deposi s o households and non-p o i ins i u ions
se ing households (NPISHs), be ween Sep embe 2022 and Janua y 2025.
Economies 2025,13, 130 18 o 24
Economies 2025, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 18 o 24
Figu e 5. Deposi in e es a es in Spain, MROR, and DFR: 2033M1–2025M1. Own elabo a ion. Da a
ECB and Spanish Cen al Bank.
Figu e 6. Deposi acili y: Spain 2016–2024 (Millions €). Own elabo a ion. Da a ECB. Se ies
(ILM.M.ES.N.L020200.U2.EUR).
Bayona (2023) emphasizes he ac ha Eu opean comme cial banks as a whole held
€4,080,000 million a he ECB in he o m o a deposi acili y, which could gene a e com-
pensa ion o €140,000 million on an annual basis. As Table 2 shows, be ween Sep embe
2022 and Decembe 2024, once he wo- ie sys em is abolished, Eu opean comme cial
banks could ha e ob ained €259,594 million om he ECB by using a deposi acili y.
The amoun o deposi acili y held by Spanish banks in Oc obe 2022 amoun ed o
€362,000 million (8.8% o o al DF). In Sep embe 2023, when he DFR was a i s peak o
4%, his olume ell o €226,721 million, which ep esen ed 6.22% o he €3,647,438 million
held by Eu opean banks as a whole. The amoun pa ked in DFs declined as he DFR did.
Using he ECB da a in Figu e 6, we es ima e ha placing he la e amoun in he o m o
a deposi acili y could p o ide Spanish banks wi h addi ional e enues o €9069 million,
on an annual basis.
We es ablish wo assump ions, wi h diffe en p opo ions o he componen s ha
make up he deposi acili y. We calcula e he a e age in e es a e ha banks should pay
o he diffe en componen s. By doing so, we can es ima e he ne income ha Spanish
−0.75
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25
4.50
4.75
5.00
5.25
5.50
ENE 2003
JUL 2003
ENE 2004
JUL 2004
ENE 2005
JUL 2005
ENE 2006
JUL 2006
ENE 2007
JUL 2007
ENE 2008
JUL 2008
ENE 2009
JUL 2009
ENE 2010
JUL 2010
ENE 2011
JUL 2011
ENE 2012
JUL 2012
ENE 2013
JUL 2013
ENE 2014
JUL 2014
ENE 2015
JUL 2015
ENE 2016
JUL 2016
ENE 2017
JUL 2017
ENE 2018
JUL 2018
ENE 2019
JUL 2019
ENE 2020
JUL 2020
ENE 2021
JUL 2021
ENE 2022
JUL 2022
ENE 2023
JUL 2023
ENE 2024
JUL 2024
ENE 2025
MROR DFR TERM DEP RATE AVGE OVERNIGHT DEP RATE
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
220,000
240,000
260,000
280,000
300,000
320,000
340,000
360,000
2016Jun
2016Sep
2016Dec
2017Ma
2017Jun
2017Sep
2017Dec
2018Ma
2018Jun
2018Sep
2018Dec
2019Ma
2019Jun
2019Sep
2019Dec
2020Ma
2020Jun
2020Sep
2020Dec
2021Ma
2021Jun
2021Sep
2021Dec
2022Ma
2022Jun
2022Sep
2022Dec
2023Ma
2023Jun
2023Sep
2023Dec
2024Ma
2024Jun
2024Sep
2024Dec
Figu e 5. Deposi in e es a es in Spain, MROR, and DFR: 2033M1–2025M1. Own elabo a ion. Da a
ECB and Spanish Cen al Bank.
Figu e 6shows he mon hly olume (end o pe iod) o deposi acili ies in Spain
be ween June 2016 and Janua y 2025. Be o e Sep embe 2022, hey s ood a a ound
€5000
million
. Deposi acili ies suddenly inc eased o €348,841 million in Sep embe
2022 (peaking a €362,008 million he ollowing mon h). Wi h he decline in he DFR, he
deposi acili y declined con inuously o €186,256 million in Decembe 2024.
Economies 2025, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 18 o 24
Figu e 5. Deposi in e es a es in Spain, MROR, and DFR: 2033M1–2025M1. Own elabo a ion. Da a
ECB and Spanish Cen al Bank.
Figu e 6. Deposi acili y: Spain 2016–2024 (Millions €). Own elabo a ion. Da a ECB. Se ies
(ILM.M.ES.N.L020200.U2.EUR).
Bayona (2023) emphasizes he ac ha Eu opean comme cial banks as a whole held
€4,080,000 million a he ECB in he o m o a deposi acili y, which could gene a e com-
pensa ion o €140,000 million on an annual basis. As Table 2 shows, be ween Sep embe
2022 and Decembe 2024, once he wo- ie sys em is abolished, Eu opean comme cial
banks could ha e ob ained €259,594 million om he ECB by using a deposi acili y.
The amoun o deposi acili y held by Spanish banks in Oc obe 2022 amoun ed o
€362,000 million (8.8% o o al DF). In Sep embe 2023, when he DFR was a i s peak o
4%, his olume ell o €226,721 million, which ep esen ed 6.22% o he €3,647,438 million
held by Eu opean banks as a whole. The amoun pa ked in DFs declined as he DFR did.
Using he ECB da a in Figu e 6, we es ima e ha placing he la e amoun in he o m o
a deposi acili y could p o ide Spanish banks wi h addi ional e enues o €9069 million,
on an annual basis.
We es ablish wo assump ions, wi h diffe en p opo ions o he componen s ha
make up he deposi acili y. We calcula e he a e age in e es a e ha banks should pay
o he diffe en componen s. By doing so, we can es ima e he ne income ha Spanish
−0.75
−0.50
−0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25
4.50
4.75
5.00
5.25
5.50
ENE 2003
JUL 2003
ENE 2004
JUL 2004
ENE 2005
JUL 2005
ENE 2006
JUL 2006
ENE 2007
JUL 2007
ENE 2008
JUL 2008
ENE 2009
JUL 2009
ENE 2010
JUL 2010
ENE 2011
JUL 2011
ENE 2012
JUL 2012
ENE 2013
JUL 2013
ENE 2014
JUL 2014
ENE 2015
JUL 2015
ENE 2016
JUL 2016
ENE 2017
JUL 2017
ENE 2018
JUL 2018
ENE 2019
JUL 2019
ENE 2020
JUL 2020
ENE 2021
JUL 2021
ENE 2022
JUL 2022
ENE 2023
JUL 2023
ENE 2024
JUL 2024
ENE 2025
MROR DFR TERM DEP RATE AVGE OVERNIGHT DEP RATE
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
220,000
240,000
260,000
280,000
300,000
320,000
340,000
360,000
2016Jun
2016Sep
2016Dec
2017Ma
2017Jun
2017Sep
2017Dec
2018Ma
2018Jun
2018Sep
2018Dec
2019Ma
2019Jun
2019Sep
2019Dec
2020Ma
2020Jun
2020Sep
2020Dec
2021Ma
2021Jun
2021Sep
2021Dec
2022Ma
2022Jun
2022Sep
2022Dec
2023Ma
2023Jun
2023Sep
2023Dec
2024Ma
2024Jun
2024Sep
2024Dec
Figu e 6. Deposi acili y: Spain 2016–2024 (Millions €). Own elabo a ion. Da a ECB. Se ies
(ILM.M.ES.N.L020200.U2.EUR).
Bayona (2023) emphasizes he ac ha Eu opean comme cial banks as a whole held
€4,080,000 million a he ECB in he o m o a deposi acili y, which could gene a e compen-
sa ion o €140,000 million on an annual basis. As Table 2shows, be ween Sep embe 2022
and Decembe 2024, once he wo- ie sys em is abolished, Eu opean comme cial banks
could ha e ob ained €259,594 million om he ECB by using a deposi acili y.
The amoun o deposi acili y held by Spanish banks in Oc obe 2022 amoun ed o
€362,000 million (8.8% o o al DF). In Sep embe 2023, when he DFR was a i s peak o
4%, his olume ell o €226,721 million, which ep esen ed 6.22% o he €3,647,438 million
held by Eu opean banks as a whole. The amoun pa ked in DFs declined as he DFR did.
Using he ECB da a in Figu e 6, we es ima e ha placing he la e amoun in he o m o a
deposi acili y could p o ide Spanish banks wi h addi ional e enues o €9069 million, on
an annual basis.
Economies 2025,13, 130 19 o 24
We es ablish wo assump ions, wi h di e en p opo ions o he componen s ha make
up he deposi acili y. We calcula e he a e age in e es a e ha banks should pay o he
di e en componen s. By doing so, we can es ima e he ne income ha Spanish comme cial
banks could ha e ob ained h ough he deposi acili y, using da a om Sep embe 2023,
on an annual basis. Table 5p esen s he p opo ions o he wo assump ions and hei
espec i e a e age in e es a es.
Table 5. The cos o deposi acili y.
Sou ce o Excess Liquid y Ra e Sha e 1 (%) Sha e 2 (%)
OD 0.131 10 75
MRO 4.5 5 5
QE 2.83 55 10
Te m DEP. 2.341 30 10
A e age a e 2.497 0.84
Own elabo a ion. Da a ECB and Spanish Cen al Bank.
In ou i s assump ion, wi h sha e 1, we es ima e ha he annual ne income (a e
cos s
3
) could be close o €3408 million i he sha e o o e nigh deposi s is ze o o insigni i-
can . The emaining €5661 million would be he g oss income ecei ed by households and
NPISHs om hei sa ings deposi ed in banks, on an annual basis. Howe e , he banks
did no align hei e m deposi in e es a es wi h he ECB key in e es a es, ei he in ime
o in ensi y.
In he second assump ion, sha e 2, o e nigh deposi s a e included in he deposi
acili y in a high p opo ion. The cos can be educed conside ably. The highe he sha e
o o e nigh deposi s, he lowe he cos o banks and he highe hei ne income. The
weigh ed a e age deposi a e
4
could be signi ican ly below 1%. In his case, he ne
income o banks could inc ease conside ably, up o €7164 million, on an annual basis, o
he de imen o sa e s.
In he absence o igo ous and con as ing esea ch wo k, he con o e sy su ounding
he use o deposi acili ies as a empo a y e uge o unds om o e nigh deposi s and
sho - and medium- e m deposi s o sa e s seems o be a suspicion i mly es ablished in
public opinion.
We p opose ha he ECB should ca y ou s ic ongoing moni o ing o he na u e
and o igin o he componen s o banks’ excess liquidi y, as well as he o igin o he unds
ha banks pa k in he deposi acili y. In o de o p o ec sa e s, he di e en ials be ween
deposi acili y a es and deposi a es a di e en ma u i ies dese e supe ision by
he Eu osys em. This con ol is aimed a limi ing po en ial p ac ices ha could modi y
he in e empo al choice o agen s (households and business) be ween consump ion and
sa ings, as well as any ype o in e es ed use o he di e en ials be ween o icial and ma ke
a es. Wi hou a doub , his con ol will con ibu e o he ansmission o mone a y policy
h ough he in e es a e channel.
Res ic i e mone a y policies, h ough inc eases in o icial in e es a es, mus be
ansmi ed o all ma ke a es, bo h o ac i e ope a ions (loans and c edi s) and passi e
ope a ions (deposi s) o banks. In his way, he oppo uni y cos o main aining liquidi y
is co ec ly o med, he in e empo al choice o consump ion and sa ings is con enien ly
modi ied, and i con ibu es o con aining agg ega e demand when mone a y policy is
aimed a educing in la ion.
As we ha e indica ed, wi h e y limi ed excep ions, con ibu ions o occasional excess
liquidi y do no ha e ze o cos . Belie ing ha ex a ese es a e “ ee money” o banks is
Economies 2025,13, 130 20 o 24
he i s o wo misconcep ions abou how QE wo ks, as McLeay e al. (2014, p. 24) poin
ou . Consequen ly, in o de o ob ain ne income, i is necessa y o sub ac he cos s o
excess liquidi y. In a high p opo ion o cases, he DFR and he cos s o excess liquidi y
end o adjus o e ime.
Con aining in e es a es on sa e s’ deposi s and hei po en ial e uge in he o m
o a deposi acili y when ECB key in e es a es a e high is a p ac ice ha , i i exis s, he
Eu osys em mus s ic ly moni o . Doing so con ibu es o s eng hening he anspa ency
o he in e es a e ansmission channel.
7. Conclusions
The uncon en ional mone a y policy measu es ha make up he so-called quan i a-
i e easing, oge he wi h he nega i e in e es a e policy and o wa d guidance, we e
cons uc ed o deal wi h a succession o c ises: he 2008 economic and inancial c isis, he
so e eign deb c isis o some membe s a es (2010–2015), he B exi p ocess (2016–2020), he
COVID19 pandemic c isis (2020–2023) and, inally, he un inished wa in Uk aine (2022).
The a ious quan i a i e easing decisions had a o able e ec s on he sol ency o
banks because hey elimina ed o clea ly educed he isks o insol ency de i ed om he
po en ial lack o liquidi y. Ano he a o able ou come was economic g ow h, educing he
pe nicious unce ain ies ha he a ious c ises ha e gene a ed. The inc ease in esou ces
a ailable o p ojec inancing and low in e es a es con ibu ed o his.
In e ms o he s abili y o he so e eign deb o some coun ies wi h high deb - o-
GDP a ios, he uncon en ional mone a y policy measu es undoub edly con ibu ed o he
educ ion o isk p emia, enabling se e al eu ozone coun ies o inance hei de ici s by
issuing go e nmen bonds a low in e es a es. A he same ime, he QE measu es as a
whole b ough s abili y o he common cu ency in he o eign exchange ma ke s.
Howe e , he eno mous olume o inancing p o ided by he ECB h ough he di e -
en igu es adop ed la gely shi ed o excess ese es o Eu opean banks, wi h li le impac
on he b oad mone a y agg ega e M3.
The ex eme educ ion o he money mul iplie , especially in he pe iods om Sep em-
be 2017 o June 2019 (m < 4), and om Decembe 2020 o Oc obe 2023 (m < 3), os ensibly
limi ed he expansiona y e ec o he mone a y base on he money supply, sepa a ing
om he close ela ionship es ablished by he adi ional academic app oach be ween base
money and b oad money, as shown in Sec ion 4.
Finally, ega ding he deba e su ounding he wo- ie sys em, one b anch o cu en
li e a u e conside s ha ECB p oposals when he DFR is nega i e e sus hose when he
DFR is posi i e su e om a ce ain asymme y. Fu he esea ch will con inue he analysis
and sea ch o al e na i e p oposals.
Au ho Con ibu ions: Concep ualiza ion, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B-C, and C.P.-L.; me hodology, C.P.-R.,
F.M.-B., E.B.-C. and C.P.-L.; o mal analysis, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B-C, and C.P.-L.; in es iga ion, C.P.-R.,
F.M.-B., E.B.-C. and C.P.-L.; esou ces, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B.-C. and C.P.-L.; w i ing—o iginal d a
p epa a ion, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B.-C. and C.P.-L.; w i ing— e iew and edi ing, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B.-C.
and C.P.-L.; supe ision, C.P.-R., F.M.-B., E.B.-C. and C.P.-L. All au ho s ha e ead and ag eed o he
published e sion o he manusc ip .
Funding: This esea ch ecei ed no ex e nal unding.
Ins i u ional Re iew Boa d S a emen : No applicable.
In o med Consen S a emen : No applicable.
Da a A ailabili y S a emen : The aw da a suppo ing he conclusions o his a icle will be made
a ailable by au ho s on eques .
Economies 2025,13, 130 21 o 24
Con lic s o In e es : The au ho s decla e no con lic o in e es .
No es
1A nega i e in e es a e policy (NIRP) occu s when a cen al bank se s i s a ge nominal in e es a e a less han ze o pe cen .
2
FG means he ECB is p o iding in o ma ion abou i s u u e mone a y policy in en ions, based on i s assessmen o he ou look
o p ice s abili y.
3We use a e age a e = 2.497%.
4We use a e age a e = 0.84%.
Re e ences
Aghion, P. E., Fa hi, E., & Kha oubi, E. (2017). On he in e ac ion be ween mone a y policy, co po a e balance shee s and s uc u al
e o ms. In In es men and g ow h in ad anced economies. ECB. A ailable online: h ps://api.seman icschola .o g/Co pusID:
35881970 (accessed on 1 Ma ch 2025).
Albulescu, C. T., & Pepin, D. (2018). Mone a y in eg a ion. money demand s abili y, and he ole o mone a y o e hang in o ecas ing
in la ion in CEE coun ies. Jou nal o Economic In eg a ion (JEI),33(4), 841–879. [C ossRe ]
Al a illa, C., Boucinha, M., Bu lon, L., Gianne i, M., & Schumache , J. (2022). Money ma ke s and bank lending: E idence om he
adop ion o ie ing. ECB Wo king Pape , No. 2649. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://pape s.ss n.com/sol3/
pape s.c m?abs ac _id=4044233 (accessed on 15 Janua y 2025).
Al a illa, C., Cano a, F., & Cicca elli, M. (2020). Mending he b oken link: He e ogeneous bank lending a es and mone a y policy
pass- h ough. Jou nal o Mone a y Economics,110, 81–98. [C ossRe ]
Al a illa, C., Ca boni, G., & Mo o, R. (2015). Asse pu chase p og ammes and inancial ma ke s: Lessons om he eu o a ea. ECB
Wo king Pape Se ies, No. 1864. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /scpwps/
ecbwp1864.en.pd (accessed on 25 Janua y 2025).
Al a illa, C., Giannone, D., & Lenza, M. (2016). The inancial and mac oeconomic e ec s o OMT announcemen s. In e na ional Jou nal
o Cen al Banking,12(3), 29–57. [C ossRe ]
And ade, P., B ecken elde , J., De Fio e, F., Ka adi, P., & T is ani, O. (2016). The ECB’s asse pu chase p og amme: An ea ly assessmen . ECB
Wo king Pape Se ies. No. 1956. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /scpwps/
ecbwp1956.en.pd (accessed on 7 June 2024).
Bahamani-Oskooee, M., Bahamani, S., Kones, A., & Ku an, A. M. (2015). Policy unce ain y and he demand o money in he Uni ed
Kingdom. Applied Economics,47, 1151–1157. [C ossRe ]
Bahamani-Oskooee, M., & Naye i, M. M. (2020). Policy unce ain y and he demand o money in Japan. Re iew o Economic Analysis,
12, 73–87. [C ossRe ]
Baldo, L., Heide , F., Ho mann, P., Sigaux, J. D., & Ve go e, O. (2022). How do banks manage liquidi y? E idence om he ECB’s ie ing
expe imen . ECB Wo king Pape Se ies, No. 2732. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/
pd /scpwps/ecb.wp2732~9bb7 4e4cc.en.pd (accessed on 3 Janua y 2025).
Ba bie o, F., Boucinha, M., & Bu lon, L. (2021). TLTRO III and bank lending condi ions. In ECB economic bulle in (pp. 104–127). Issue
6/2021. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /ecbu/eb202106.en.pd (accessed on
3 No embe 2024).
Ba igozzi, M., & Con i, A. (2018). On he s abili y o eu o a ea money demand and i s implica ions o mone a y policy. Ox o d Bulle in
o Economics and S a is ics,80(4), 755–787. [C ossRe ]
Ba ne , W. A., Ghosh, T., & Adil, M. H. (2022). Is money demand eally uns able? E idence om di isia mone a y agg ega es. Economic
Analysis and Policy,74, 606–622. [C ossRe ]
Bayona, E. (2023). La banca española gua da en la caja del BCE 234.000 millones pa a luc a se de la subida de ipos. Público. A ailable
online: h ps://www.publico.es/economia/banca-espa%C3%B1ola-gua da-caja-bce-234-000-millones-luc a se-subida- ipos.h ml
(accessed on 6 Ma ch 2025).
Belke, A., & Czudaj, R. (2010). Is eu o a ea money demand (s ill) s able? Coin eg a ed VAR e sus single equa ion echniques. Applied
Economic Qua e ly,56(4), 285–315. [C ossRe ]
Bissoondeeal, R. K., Binne , J. M., & Ka oglou, M. (2023). The impac o unce ain y on money demand in he UK, US and eu o a ea.
The Eu opean Jou nal o Finance,29(16), 1866–1884. [C ossRe ]
Boucinha, M., Bu lon, L., Co si, M., Della Valle, G., Eisenschmid , J., Ma ma a, I., Pool, S., Schumache , J., & Ve go e, O. (2022). Two- ie
sys em o emune a ing excess ese e holdings. ECB Occasional Pape Se ies, No. 302. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online:
h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /scpops/ecb.op302~4963a079c .en.pd (accessed on 24 No embe 2024).
Ca bó Val e de, S., & Rod íguez Fe nández, F. (2023). The emune a ion o deposi s in Spain. Cuade nos de In o mación Económica,
297, 35–39.
Economies 2025,13, 130 22 o 24
Cas illo Lozoya, M. C., Es eban Ga cía-Escude o, E., & Pé ez O iz, M. L. (2022). The e ec o TLTRO III on he balance shee
o Spanish c edi ins i u ions. In Economic bulle in. 2/2022. Banco de España. A ailable online: h ps://www.bde.es/ /
webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/In o mesBole inesRe is as/A iculosAnali icos/22/T2/Fich/be2202-a 09.pd (accessed
on 1 Ma ch 2025).
Cas illo Lozoya, M. C., Es eban Ga cía-Escude o, E., & Pé ez O iz, M. L. (2024). The e ec o TLTRO III amo iza ion on he balance
shee o Spanish c edi ins i u ions. In Economic bulle in. 2024/T2, A icle 02. Banco de España. [C ossRe ]
Co adin, S., G imm, N., & Schwaab, B. (2021). Eu o a ea so e eign bond isk p emia du ing he COVID-19 pandemic (pp. 1–40). ECB Wo king
Pape Se ies. No. 2561. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://ideas. epec.o g/p/ecb/ecbwps/20212561.h ml
(accessed on 14 Feb ua y 2025).
Co adin, S., & Schwaab, B. (2023). Eu o a ea so e eign bond isk p emia be o e and du ing he COVID-19 pandemic. Eu opean
Economic Re iew,153, 104402. [C ossRe ] [PubMed]
Cou -Thimann, P., & Winkle , B. (2013). The ECB’s non-s anda d mone a y policy measu es: The ole o ins i u ional ac o s and inancial
s uc u e. ECB Wo king Pape No. 1528. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://ss n.com/abs ac =2239093 (accessed
on 18 Sep embe 2024).
C osignani, M., Fa ia-e-Cas o, M., & Fonseca, L. (2020). The (unin ended) consequence o he la ges liquidi y injec ion e e . Jou nal o
Mone a y Economics,112, 97–112. [C ossRe ]
Da acq-Pa ies, M., & De San is, R. (2015). A non-s anda d mone a y policy shock: The ECB’s 3-yea LTROs and he shi in c edi
supply. Jou nal o In e na ional Money and Finance,54, 1–34. [C ossRe ]
De G auwe, P., & Ji, Y. (2023). Towa ds mone a y policies ha do no subsidise Banks. CEPS. A ailable online: h ps://www.ceps.eu/
ceps-publica ions/ owa ds-mone a y-policies- ha -do-no -subsidise-banks/ (accessed on 26 Feb ua y 2025).
De G auwe, P., & Ji, Y. (2024). How o conduc mone a y policies. The ECB in he pas , p esen and u u e. Jou nal o In e na ional Money
and Finance,143, 103048. [C ossRe ]
Demi alp, S., Eisenschmid , J., & Vlassopoulos, T. (2021). Nega i e in e es a es. excess liquidi y and e ail deposi s: Banks’ eac ion o
uncon en ional mone a y policy in he eu o a ea. Eu opean Economic Re iew,136, 1–29. [C ossRe ]
De Poo e , M., Ma in, R., & P ui , S. (2018). The liquidi y e ec s o o icial bond ma ke in e en ion. Jou nal o Financial and
Quan i a i e Analysis,53(1), 243–268. [C ossRe ]
De San is, R., Fa e o, C., & Ro ia, B. (2013). Eu o a ea money demand and in e na ional po olio alloca ion: A con ibu ion o
assessing isks o p ice s abili y. Jou nal o In e na ional Money and Finance,32, 377–404. [C ossRe ]
Dickey, D. A., & Fulle , W. A. (1979). Dis ibu ion o he es ima o s o au o eg essi e ime se ies wi h a uni oo . Jou nal o he Ame ican
S a is ical Associa ion,74, 427–431. [C ossRe ]
Die ks, L. H. (2020). Comp ehensi e mone a y easing in he Eu ozone: Lessons lea n om Japan. Re is a P ocesos de Me cado,17(2),
331–343. [C ossRe ]
D ege , C., & Wol e s, J. (2014). Uncon en ional mone a y policy and money demand. Jou nal o Mac oeconomics,46, 40–54. [C ossRe ]
ECB. (1999). Eu o a ea mone a y agg ega es and hei ole in he Eu osys em’s mone a y policy s a egy. In ECB mon hly bulle in
(pp. 29–46). Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /o he /p.29
_
46
_
mb199902en.pd
(accessed on 20 July 2024).
ECB. (2017). Base money, b oad money and he APP. In ECB economic bulle in (pp. 62–65). Issue 6/2017-Boxes. Eu opean Cen al Bank.
A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /o he /ebbox201706_07.en.pd (accessed on 10 Janua y 2025).
ECB. (2020). P ess elease. ECB ex ends pandemic eme gency longe - e m e inancing ope a ions. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa
.eu/p ess/p /da e/2020/h ml/ecb.p 201210~8ac a5026 .es.h ml.
ECB. (2022a, Ma ch 10). P ess elease. Mone a y policy decisions. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/p ess/p /da e/2022/
h ml/ecb.mp220310~2d19 8ba60.en.h ml (accessed on 2 No embe 2024).
ECB. (2022b, July 21). P ess elease. Mone a y policy decisions. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/p ess/p /da e/2022/h ml/
ecb.mp220721~53e5bdd317.en.h ml (accessed on 2 No embe 2024).
Ese , F., & Schwaab, B. (2016). E alua ing he impac o uncon en ional mone a y policy measu es: Empi ical e idence om he ECB’s
secu i ies ma ke s p og amme. Jou nal o Financial Economics,119(1), 147–167. [C ossRe ]
Fe ando, A., Popo , A., & Udell, G. (2015). So e eign s ess. uncon en ional mone a y policy, and SME access o inance. ECB Wo king
Pape , No. 1820. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /scpwps/ecbwp1820.en.pd
(accessed on 15 No embe 2024).
Fische , B., Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2009). Mone a y analysis and mone a y policy in he eu o a ea 1999–2006. Jou nal o
In e na ional Money and Finance,38(7), 1138–1164. [C ossRe ]
Fo es i, P., & Napoli ano, O. (2014). Money demand in he Eu ozone: Do mone a y agg ega es ma e ? Inzine ine Ekonomika-Enginee ing
Economics,25(5), 497–503. [C ossRe ]
F oyen, R. T. (2013). Mac oeconomics: Theo ies and policies (10 h ed.). Pea son Educa ion.
Economies 2025,13, 130 23 o 24
Gambe i, L., & Musso, A. (2017). The mac oeconomic impac o he ECB’s expanded asse pu chase p og amme (APP) (pp. 1–41). ECB Wo king
Pape , No. 2075. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://ss n.com/abs ac =2985385 (accessed on 3 Decembe 2024).
Ga cia-Posada, M., & Ma che i, M. (2016). The bank lending channel o uncon en ional mone a y policy: The impac o he VLTROs
on c edi supply in Spain. Economic Modelling,58, 427–441. [C ossRe ]
Ghysels, E., Idie , J., Manganelli, S., & Ve go e, O. (2017). A high equency assessmen o he ECB Secu i ies Ma ke s P og amme.
Jou nal o he Eu opean Economic Associa ion,15(1), 218–243. [C ossRe ]
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2012). The ECB and he in e bank ma ke . Economic Jou nal,122, 467–486. [C ossRe ]
Ha mann, P., & Sme s, F. (2018). The i s wen y yea s o he Eu opean Cen al Bank: Mone a y policy. ECB Wo king Pape Se ies. No.
2219. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /scpwps/ecb.wp2219.en.pd (accessed on
10 Decembe 2024).
Jaso a, M., Mendicino, C., & Supe a, D. (2018). Rollo e isk and bank lending beha io : E idence om uncon en ional cen al bank liquidi y.
Mimeo. ECB. A ailable online: h ps://ideas. epec.o g/p/ ed/sed018/500.h ml (accessed on 2 Feb ua y 2025).
Jung, A. (2015). Does liquidi y ma e o money demand in eu o a ea coun ies? Economics Bulle in,35(2), 1383–1391.
Jung, A. (2016a). A po olio demand app oach o b oad money in he eu o a ea. ECB Wo king Pape , No. 1929. Eu opean Cen al Bank.
A ailable online: h ps://pape s.ss n.com/sol3/pape s.c m?abs ac _id=2805023 (accessed on 28 Feb ua y 2025).
Jung, A. (2016b). Is eu o a ea money demand o M3 s ill s able? The Qua e ly Re iew o Economics and Finances,60, 29–39. [C ossRe ]
K ishnamu hy, A., Nagel, S., & Vissing-Jo gensen, A. (2017). ECB policies in ol ing go e nmen bond pu chases: Impac and channels.
Re iew o Finance,22(1), 1–44. [C ossRe ]
Kwia kowski, D., Phillips, P. C., Schmid , P., & Shin, Y. (1992). Tes ing he null hypo hesis o s a iona i y agains he al e na i e o a uni
oo : How su e a e we ha economic ime se ies ha e a uni oo ? Jou nal o Econome ics,54, 159–178. [C ossRe ]
Leb e de F ei as, M. (2022). In e na ional cu ency subs i u ion and he demand o money in he eu o a ea. Economic Modelling,
117, 1–11. [C ossRe ]
Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2010). Mone a y policy in excep ional imes. Economic Policy,62, 295–339. [C ossRe ]
McLeay, M., Radia, A., & Thomas, R. (2014). Money c ea ion in he mode n economy (pp. 14–27). Qua e ly Bulle in, Nº 54(1). Bank o
England. A ailable online: h ps://www.banko england.co.uk/-/media/boe/ iles/qua e ly-bulle in/2014/money-c ea ion
-in- he-mode n-economy (accessed on 3 Decembe 2024).
Moessne , R., & De Haan, J. (2022). E ec s o mone a y policy announcemen s on e m p emia in he eu o a ea du ing he COVID-19
pandemic. Finance Resea ch Le e s,44, 102055. [C ossRe ] [PubMed]
Muñoz, C. (2024). La banca española me e la ije a al in e és de los depósi os y los eduzca a ni eles de junio de 2023. A ailable online:
h ps://www.20minu os.es/lain o macion/econom%C3%ADa-y- inanzas/banca- educe-in e es-deposi os-5661383/ (accessed
on 6 Ma ch 2025).
Nau z, D., & Rondo , U. (2011). The (in)s abili y o money demand in he eu o a ea: Lessons om a c oss coun y analysis. Empi ica,
38(4), 539–553. [C ossRe ]
Papademos, L., & S a k, J. (Eds.). (2010). Enhancing mone a y analysis. ECB. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/pd /
o he /enhancingmone a yanalysis2010en.pd (accessed on 7 Oc obe 2024).
Pa ei o-Rod íguez, C., Ba os-Campello, E., Va ela-Candamio, L., & Pa ei o-López, C. (2016). The beha io o he componen s o M3 in
he eu o a ea: 1999–2014. Open Jou nal o Business and Managemen ,4, 606–620. [C ossRe ]
Pa ei o-Rod íguez, C., F ei e-Seoane, M. J., López-Be múdez, B., & Pa ei o-López, C. (2020). Liquidi y end analysis o he M3
mone a y agg ega e in he eu ozone: 1997–2018. El T imes e Económico,LXXXVII(1), 171–201. [C ossRe ]
Pa ei o-Rod íguez, C., Ma ín, F., & Ba os, E. (2024). S abili y analysis in he po olio model o money demand in he Eu ozone:
1999–2023. In e na ional Jou nal o P o essional Business Re iew,9(1), e04114. [C ossRe ]
Pee sman, G. (2011). Mac oeconomic e ec s o uncon en ional mone a y policy in he eu o a ea. CEPR Discussion Pape s, No. 8348. A ailable
online: h ps://pape s.ss n.com/sol3/pape s.c m?abs ac _id=1934167 (accessed on 13 Decembe 2024).
Phillips, P. C., & Pe on, P. (1988). Tes ing o a uni oo in ime se ies eg ession. Biome ika,75(2), 335–346. [C ossRe ]
Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2014). Excep ional policies o excep ional imes: The ECB’s esponse o he olling c ises o he eu o a ea, and how i
has b ough us owa ds a new g and ba gain. CEPR Discussion Pape , No. 10193. CEPR P ess. A ailable online: h ps://cep .o g/
publica ions/dp10193 (accessed on 16 No embe 2024).
Pin o, J., & Cos a, T. (2023). The impac o he ECB’s PEPP on Eu o a ea bond sp eads. Eu opean Re iew o Business Economics,II(2),
53–81. [C ossRe ]
Reichlin, L. (2014). Mone a y policy and banks in he eu o a ea: The ale o wo c ises. Jou nal o Mac oeconomics,39, 287–400. [C ossRe ]
Ros agno, M., Al a illa, C., Ca boni, G., Lemke, W., Mo o, R., Sain Guilhem, A., & Yiangou, J. (2019). A ale o wo decades: The ECB’s
mone a y policy a 20. ECB Wo king Pape , No. 2346. Eu opean Cen al Bank. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/pub/
pd /scpwps/ecb.wp2346~dd78042370.en.pd (accessed on 27 No embe 2024).
Economies 2025,13, 130 24 o 24
Ros agno, M., Bindseil, U., Kamps, A., Lemke, W., Sugo, T., & Vlassopoulos, T. (2016). B eaking h ough he ze o line: The ECB’s
nega i e in e es a e policy. B ookings Ins i u e. A ailable online: h ps://www.b ookings.edu/wp-con en /uploads/2016/07/
Ros agno.pd (accessed on 28 Feb ua y 2025).
Ryan, E., & Whelan, K. (2021). Quan i a i e easing and he ho po a o e ec : E idence om Eu o a ea banks. Jou nal o In e na ional
Money and Finance,115, 102354. [C ossRe ]
Schnabel, I. (2023a). Money and in la ion. Thünen lec u e by Isabel Schnabel. Membe o he Execu i e Boa d o he ECB, a he annual con e ence
o he Ve ein ü Socialpoli ik (Regensbu g, 25 Sep embe 2023). A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/p ess/key/da e/
2023/h ml/ecb.sp230925_1~7ad8e 22e2.en.h ml (accessed on 3 Janua y 2025).
Schnabel, I. (2023b). “Back o no mal? Balance shee size and in e es a e con ol”, speech by Isabel Schnabel a an e en o ganised by Columbia
Uni e si y and SGH Mac o Ad iso s. New Yo k. 27 Ma ch. A ailable online: h ps://www.ecb.eu opa.eu/p ess/key/da e/2023/
h ml/ecb.sp230327_1~ e4adb3e9b.en.h ml (accessed on 19 Feb ua y 2025).
T ebesch, C., & Ze elmeye , J. (2018). ECB in e en ions in dis essed so e eign deb ma ke s: The case o G eek bonds. IMF Economic
Re iew,66(2), 287–332. [C ossRe ]
Weale, M., & Wieladek, T. (2016). Tha a e he mac oeconomic e ec s o asse pu chases? Jou nal o Mone a y Economics,79, 81–93.
[C ossRe ]
Wieladek, T., & Ga cia Pascual, A.I. (2016). The Eu opean Cen al Bank’s QE: A new hope. CESi o Wo king Pape , no. 5946. CESi o.
[C ossRe ]
Disclaime /Publishe ’s No e: The s a emen s, opinions and da a con ained in all publica ions a e solely hose o he indi idual
au ho (s) and con ibu o (s) and no o MDPI and/o he edi o (s). MDPI and/o he edi o (s) disclaim esponsibili y o any inju y o
people o p ope y esul ing om any ideas, me hods, ins uc ions o p oduc s e e ed o in he con en .
