Heubeck, Tim; Ah ens, Annina
A icle — Published Ve sion
Sus ainable by Ideology? The In luence o CEO
Poli ical Ideology and I y League Educa ion on ESG
(En i onmen al, Social, and Go e nance) Pe o mance
Business S a egy and he En i onmen
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Sugges ed Ci a ion: Heubeck, Tim; Ah ens, Annina (2025) : Sus ainable by Ideology? The In luence o
CEO Poli ical Ideology and I y League Educa ion on ESG (En i onmen al, Social, and Go e nance)
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Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025; 34:4785–4810
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4785
Business S a egy and he En i onmen
RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS
Sus ainable by Ideology? The In luence o CEO Poli ical
Ideology and I y League Educa ion on ESG (En i onmen al,
Social, and Go e nance) Pe o mance
TimHeubeck | AnninaAh ens
Chai o In e na ional Managemen , Uni e si y o Bay eu h, Bay eu h,Ge many
Co espondence: Tim Heubeck ( im.heubeck@uni-bay eu h.de)
Recei ed: 24 July 2024 | Re ised: 12 Decembe 2024 | Accep ed: 8 Feb ua y 2025
Funding: This s udy is suppo ed by P ojec DEAL–enabled open- access unding. No o he unding was ecei ed o assis wi h he p epa a ion o he
manusc ip .
Keywo ds: CEO| eli e educa ion| ESG| I y League| poli ical ideology| uppe echelons heo y
ABSTRACT
Building on uppe echelons heo y, his s udy posi s ha poli ical ideology se es as a ounda ional ac o in luencing whe he
CEOs p io i ize en i onmen al, social, and go e nance (ESG) ou comes, whe eas I y League educa ion ac s as a con ex ual ac-
o ha mode a es his ela ionship. Analyzing da a om S&P 900 manu ac u ing i ms, he indings e eal ha libe al CEOs
enhance ESG pe o mance—pa icula ly in he social and go e nance pilla s—in con as o hei conse a i e coun e pa s.
CEO poli ical ideology's e ec on ESG pe o mance does no depend on whe he CEOs g adua ed om an I y League ins i u ion.
Ins ead, I y League–educa ed CEOs di ec ly de e ESG pe o mance, possibly due o speci ic alues, pe spec i es, and social
connec ions shaped by hei eli e educa ional backg ound. This s udy con ibu es o uppe echelons heo y by illumina ing wo
c i ical mic ole el ac o s—CEO poli ical ideology and eli e educa ion— ha shape i ms' ESG s a egy, o e ing aluable impli-
ca ions o boa ds and s akeholde s when selec ing and e alua ing co po a e leade ship.
1 | In oduc ion
O ganiza ions and hei s a egic leade ship ace inc easing p es-
su e o balance sha eholde in e es s wi h hose o hei s akehold-
e s (Fa ima and Elbanna2023; Reime e al.2018). The P inciples
o Responsible In es men (PRI), ini ia ed by he Uni ed Na ions,
p omo e a global shi owa d mo e sus ainable and esponsible
business p ac ices, which signi ican ly aised awa eness among
co po a ions o p io i ize en i onmen al, social, and go e nance
(ESG) ini ia i es (Peng and Chen 2024). Heigh ened socie al
awa eness and he bene i s o ESG—including supe io inan-
cial pe o mance (F iede e al.2015; Vel e2017), enhanced op-
e a ional e iciency (Kao 2023), s onge go e nance (Peng and
Chen2024), and educed manage ial misconduc (He e al.2022;
Yuan e al.2022)—ha e led o he in eg a ion o ESG in o co po-
a e s a egy (Sandbe g e al.2023; Tagliala ela e al.2023).
Wi h he g owing emphasis on a s akeholde - cen ic iew o he
i m (Ca oll1991; F eeman1984), esea ch has begun o iden i y
he ac o s d i ing i ms' ESG s a egies (Seow2025; We nicke
e al.2022). Howe e , his li e a u e s eam p ima ily ocuses
on mac ole el ac o s acili a ing ESG (Gillan e al.2021), such
as ins i u ional (e.g., C. Liu e al.2023; Wang e al.2023) and
o ganiza ional ac o s (e.g., D empe ic e al.2020; Heubeck and
Ah ens2024). Recen s udies, howe e , ha e shi ed a en ion
o mic ole el d i e s, pa icula ly he ole o a i m's chie ex-
ecu i e o ice (CEO) (Seow2025; We nicke e al.2022). These
s udies emphasize CEO cha ac e is ics and expe iences, in-
cluding epu a ional conce ns (Cab e os e al. 2024), o ma-
i e ea ly expe iences like childhood po e y (Liu e al.2024b),
dynamic capabili ies (Heubeck 2024b), o o eign expe ience
(Liu e al.2024a), as key de e minan s in luencing i ms'ESG
pe o mance.
This is an open access a icle unde he e ms o he C ea i e Commons A ibu ion License, which pe mi s use, dis ibu ion and ep oduc ion in any medium, p o ided he o iginal wo k is
p ope ly ci ed.
© 2025 The Au ho (s). Business S a egy and he En i onmen published by ERP En i onmen and John Wiley & Sons L d.
4786 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
Building on uppe echelons heo y (Hamb ick and Mason1984),
we p opose ha CEOs' poli ical ideology ep esen s a signi ican
an eceden o i ms' ESG pe o mance because i ins ills dis inc
alue sys ems ha in luence ESG- ela ed decisions. Acco ding
o uppe echelons heo y, he backg ound cha ac e is ics o
op execu i es shape hei s a egic decisions by in using hem
wi h alues, pe sonali ies, and expe iences (Hamb ick 2007;
Hamb ick and Mason 1984). Gi en he signi ican sway o
CEOs o e o ganiza ional decision- making (Quigley and
Hamb ick2015), hei i m's s a egy o en e lec s hei p e e -
ences and alues, pa icula ly in complex and ambiguous con-
ex s whe e pe sonal p edisposi ions play a c i ical ole (Cannella
and Holcomb2005; Hamb ick2007). Al hough uppe echelons
esea ch highligh s he impac o CEOs' cha ac e is ics on o -
ganiza ional ou comes, i has been c i icized o o e - elying on
isible ai s like age o gende as p oxies o psychological ac-
o s (Finkels ein e al.2009; Neely e al. 2020). Recen s udies
add ess his limi a ion by examining less- obse able cha ac e -
is ics, such as poli ical ideology, as key p edic o s o CEO deci-
sions and o ganiza ional ou comes (Jeong e al.2021; Semadeni
e al.2022; Swiga e al.2020).
Among hese cha ac e is ics, poli ical ideology is a pa icula ly
powe ul p edic o in shaping a CEO's iden i y, alues, and be-
ha io s (Chandle e al. 2023; Swiga e al. 2020). Resea ch
in poli ical psychology demons a es ha poli ical ideology
p o oundly impac s pe sonal wo ld iews, a ec ing decision-
making p e e ences (Jos e al. 2008, 2009). Libe al CEOs,
whose poli ical alue sys ems emphasize communal alues like
human igh s, en i onmen al p o ec ion, and egali a ianism,
a e mo e likely o pu sue ESG s a egies (Jos and Amodio2012;
Y. Kim2024b). Con e sely, conse a i e CEOs, wi h a p e e -
ence o main aining he s a us quo and p io i izing sha eholde
capi alism, a e less likely o implemen ESG ini ia i es (Jos
e al.2003; Weng and Yang2024; Wolman e al.2024). This he-
o e ical p esump ion is also suppo ed by anecdo al e idence,
which a es s o he e ec o poli ical ideology on ESG (e.g.,
Segal2023; So kin e al.2022).
This s udy con ibu es o his g owing body o esea ch by ex-
plo ing he dis inc ions be ween co po a e social esponsibili y
(CSR) and ESG amewo ks. Al hough CSR emphasizes olun-
a y e hical p ac ices and social ini ia i es, ESG p o ides mea-
su able c i e ia ac oss en i onmen al, social, and go e nance
dimensions, o e ing a mo e comp ehensi e e alua ion o co po-
a e sus ainabili y and esponsibili y (Liu e al.2024b; Ma iny
e al.2024). Thus, ESG expands he adi ional CSR cons uc
by adding en i onmen al and go e nance dimensions, which
a e c ucial o unde s anding he impac o CEO poli ical ide-
ology on co po a e s a egy (Gillan e al. 2021; Huang 2021).
Al hough he e is e idence ha CEOs wi h libe al poli ical ide-
ologies encou age CSR (e.g., Chin e al.2013; Jeong e al.2021),
he ole o CEO poli ical ideology in connec ion o ESG emains
unde explo ed.1
We ex end uppe echelons heo y, pa icula ly esea ch on CEO
poli ical libe alism, by in oducing CEO I y League educa ion as
a bounda y condi ion mode a ing he ela ionship be ween po-
li ical ideology and ESG ou comes (Mille e al.2015; U quha
and Zhang2022). I y League educa ion ep esen s an eli e ed-
uca ional expe ience ha signi ican ly enhances g adua es'
human and social capi al (Mille e al.2015) and shapes hei
decision- making p ocesses h ough ideological alue sys ems
(Mullen 2009). This educa ional backg ound, linked o enhanced
human capi al and s a egic ap i ude (Bailey and Hel a 2003;
Heubeck2024a; Wally and Baum1994), is pa icula ly ele an
in he complex con ex o ESG s a egy (Heubeck2024b).
Al hough many US CEOs a e I y League–educa ed (Moody2021;
Whi le 2019), his cha ac e is ic emains unde s udied in he
con ex o ESG. I y League educa ion could lead libe al CEOs o
emphasize ESG u he while po en ially de e ing conse a i e
CEOs om p io i izing i . The e o e, ou second esea ch goal
explo es he mode a ing in luence o eli e educa ion a ained a
I y League ins i u ions on he ela ionship be ween CEO poli i-
cal ideology and ESG ou comes.
We es ou hypo heses using longi udinal da a om a sample o
US S&P 900 manu ac u ing i ms. The US p o ides a compel-
ling con ex o s udying ESG s a egy because—unlike egions
wi h manda o y ESG disclosu es, such as he UK, EU, o China
(Busch 2023; Peng and Chen 2024)—i s olun a y epo ing
en i onmen allows us o examine he disc e iona y p ac ices
o i ms.
By e ealing ha CEO poli ical ideology signi ican ly impac s
ESG pe o mance—wi h a posi i e e ec o libe al CEOs and
an ad e se e ec o conse a i e CEOs—we con ibu e o uppe
echelons heo y by b idging i wi h poli ical psychology. Ou ind-
ings demons a e ha beha io al consis ency applies o poli ical
ideology in he ealm o uppe echelons heo y, ex ending p io
esea ch by showing ha CEOs' poli ical ideologies no only in-
luence CSR (e.g., Chin e al. 2013; Gup a e al. 2021) bu also
shape ESG- ela ed decisions. This insigh en iches he poli ical
psychology li e a u e wi hin he uppe echelons amewo k, a
c i ical con ibu ion gi en he inc easing poli ical pola iza ion
su ounding ESG (A ms ong 2023). Addi ionally, we p o ide
nuance o uppe echelons heo y by e ealing ha CEO poli ical
ideology dis inc ly a ec s social and go e nance s a egies bu no
en i onmen al s a egy. Thus, we illumina e ideologically d i en
a ia ions ac oss speci ic ESG pilla s, which di e signi ican ly
in scope (Deng e al.2024; LSEG2023; T ahan and Jan z2023).
Fu he , we ad ance he unde s anding o uppe echelons he-
o y by demons a ing ha I y League educa ion unc ions no
as a bounda y condi ion bu as a backg ound cha ac e is ic ha
di ec ly in luences CEOs' decisions in ela ion o ESG s a egy.
Speci ically, we ind ha I y League–educa ed CEOs de e
ESG ou comes, po en ially due o p io i izing adi ional busi-
ness goals o e ESG conce ns. These indings unde sco e wo
dis inc e ec channels: he ideological channel, e lec ing how
poli ical ideology a ec s ESG s a egy, and he eli e educa ion
channel, cap u ing how I y League educa ion shapes CEO p i-
o i ies ega ding ESG s a egy. Impo an ly, nei he poli ical ide-
ology no I y League educa ion uni o mly a ec ESG ou comes
ac oss all pilla s. These esul s, obus o endogenei y conce ns,
al e na e measu es, and sample de ini ions, p o ide c i ical he-
o e ical and empi ical insigh s in o he nuanced mechanisms
d i ing ESG s a egy wi hin he uppe echelons amewo k.
We begin by in oducing he main heo e ical amewo k ha
unde pins his s udy, based on which we de i e he wo esea ch
4787
hypo heses. Nex , we ou line ou esea ch me hodology, de-
ailing da a collec ion and a iable measu emen p ocedu es.
Following his, we p esen he main eg ession esul s and
conduc se e al addi ional es s o demons a e he obus ness
o ou indings. Finally, we discuss ou esul s' heo e ical and
p ac ical implica ions and ou line u u e esea ch di ec ions.
2 | Theo e ical Backg ound and Hypo hesis
De elopmen
2.1 | CEO Poli ical Ideology and ESG Pe o mance
Uppe echelons heo y unde sco es he c i ical ole o CEOs—
as he p ima y a chi ec s o a i m's s a egy and ope a ions—
in shaping co po a e ou comes, emphasizing he p o ound
in luence o hei psychological cha ac e is ics on decision-
making (Finkels ein e al.2009; Hamb ick2007; Hamb ick and
Mason 1984). Among hese cha ac e is ics, poli ical ideology
has eme ged as a powe ul p edic o o CEOs' decision- making
p e e ences wi hin he uppe echelons li e a u e (Chandle
e al. 2023; Kashmi i and Mahajan 2017). Building on his
concep ual amewo k, we p opose ha CEOs' backg ound
cha ac e is ics—speci ically, poli ical ideology—signi ican ly
in luence a c ucial and imely o ganiza ional ou come—speci -
ically, ESG pe o mance—due o CEOs' subs an ial powe o e
o ganiza ional decision- making.
Poli ical ideology is a key de e minan o psychological di e -
ences and a p edic o o he alues and belie s ha shape CEOs'
decision- making (Swiga e al. 2020) and encompasses a se
o i mly oo ed belie s abou how socie y should be o ganized
and go e ned (E ikson and Tedin2019; Jos e al.2009). Despi e
he mul idimensionali y o poli ical ideology, he libe al–con-
se a i e spec um is commonly used o ca ego ize poli ical
iews and p edic beha io s (G aham e al.2009; Jos 2006). In
his sense, poli ical ideology is no a s ic libe al–conse a i e
dicho omy bu a sys em o alues and belie s ha a e socially
cons uc ed, wi h he libe al–conse a i e di ide se ing as a
sui able amewo k (Swiga e al.2020).
The poli ical psychology li e a u e consis en ly demons a es
ha ideological o ien a ion shapes a i udes owa d change and
ambigui y (Swiga e al. 2020). Libe als a e gene ally mo e
ecep i e o change and ole an o unce ain ies, whe eas
conse a i es a e inclined o main ain he s a us quo, seeking
s abili y and a oiding unce ain y (Cono e and Feldman1981;
Giddens2013; Jos e al.2003). These psychological endencies
ex end beyond he pe sonal domain and con inue o in luence
decision- making in he p o essional con ex , including co po-
a e leade ship (Cheng e al. 2024; Chin e al. 2013; Swiga
e al.2020).
D awing on beha io al consis ency heo y, which sugges s ha
indi iduals uphold s able co e alues ac oss a ious con ex s
(Cain and McKeon2016; C onq is e al.2012), we a gue ha
CEOs' poli ical ideologies signi ican ly shape no only hei
decision- making in he p i a e con ex bu also in he p o es-
sional ealm—especially conce ning ESG s a egy. Poli ical
belie s a e deeply ing ained and ela i ely s able o e ime
(Ba els2002; Jos e al.2009). The e o e, CEOs' i mly ancho ed
poli ical belie s may cause hem o align hei s a egic choices
wi h hei poli ical ideology (Gup a e al.2021; Weng e al.2023).
This ideological di ide is pa icula ly ele an in he con ex o
ESG s a egy, which equi es CEOs o na iga e complex issues
in ol ing en i onmen al sus ainabili y, social esponsibili y,
and go e nance anspa ency (Heubeck 2024b; Mah an and
Elame 2024). High ESG sco es can signal esponsible business
p ac ices o s akeholde s and lead o inancial and non inancial
bene i s (MacNeil and Esse 2022; Sandbe g e al.2023).
We p opose ha ideological di e ences in openness, egali a ian-
ism, and iews on inequali y u he unde sco e how libe al and
conse a i e CEOs app oach ESG s a egy. Conse a i e CEOs
may pe cei e ESG as a h ea o adi ional business p ac ices
(G aham e al.2009; Swiga e al.2020), iewing i as an unnec-
essa y o e en ha m ul depa u e om hei p ima y espon-
sibili y o sha eholde s. Libe al CEOs, con e sely, due o hei
openness o change and egali a ian alues (Jiang e al.2018; Jos
e al.2003), a e likely o see ESG as an oppo uni y o d i e soci-
e al p og ess and emb ace long- e m sus ainabili y.
Speci ically, we p opose ha libe al CEOs a e mo e inclined o
emb ace change, pe cei ing ESG s a egyas a means o ackle
global challenges like clima e change and inequali y. This
openness con as s wi h conse a i e CEOs, who end o be
less esponsi e o ex e nal p essu es, such as social and en i-
onmen al demands, ocusing ins ead on main aining in e nal
business p io i ies. These p e e ences align wi h he openness–
closedness amewo k in s a egic leade ship esea ch (Gup a
e al.2021; Gup a and B iscoe2020). Acco dingly, libe al CEOs
p e e an open- sys em decision- making p ocess ha ac i ely
conside s ex e nal s akeholde s—including he b oade soci-
e y—in hei s a egic decisions. In con as , conse a i e CEOs
end o ake a closed- sys em app oach, isola ing he i m om
i s ex e nal en i onmen and p io i izing in e nal objec i es
and esou ce conse a ion (Chandle e al. 2023; Gup a and
B iscoe2020). This di e ence in decision- making s yle unde -
sco es he ideological di ide be ween libe al and conse a i e
CEOs (Chandle e al. 2023). Libe al CEOs, aluing ex e nal
engagemen , a e mo e likely o collabo a e wi h s akeholde s,
including egula o y bodies, nongo e nmen al o ganiza ions,
and socially conscious consume s (Chandle e al.2023; Gup a
and B iscoe2020), o p omo e ESG ini ia i es. This open- sys em
app oach allows hem o inco po a e b oade social and en i-
onmen al issues in o hei s a egic p io i ies (Gup a e al.2021;
Gup a and B iscoe2020). In con as , conse a i e CEOs ocus
on in e nal e iciency and p o i abili y, iewing ESG demands
p ima ily as ex e nal p essu es ha could comp omise hese
goals (Chandle e al.2023; Gup a and B iscoe2020). As a esul ,
hey may esis adop ing ESG p ac ices, p io i izing he i m's
in e nal in e es s and shielding he o ganiza ion om ex e nal
s akeholde demands.
Beyond openness o change, he second c i ical alue ha
se s libe al CEOs apa is hei mo e asse i e ad ocacy o
equali y. Libe al CEOs end o iew ESG as aligned wi h hei
egali a ian p inciples, which a e in insically ocused on p o-
mo ing ai ness and educing inequali ies (Jos e al. 2003;
Jos and Amodio2012). Thus, libe al CEOs pe cei e ESG as
a mechanism o d i ing social change and ecognize hei
4788 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
agency in add essing g and socie al challenges by p omo -
ing, o example, ai labo p ac ices o communi y engage-
men (Gup a e al.2021; Weng e al.2023). This egali a ian
o ien a ion con as s wi h conse a i e CEOs, who p io i ize
main aining exis ing s a us hie a chies and iew inequal-
i y as a na u al ou come o me i oc a ic sys ems whe e in-
di iduals succeed based on hei own e o s (E ikson and
Tedin 2019; Jos e al. 2009). The e o e, conse a i e CEOs
a e less inclined o iew ESG as a p io i y since hey may see
i as imposing ex e nal con ols ha dis up he na u al o de
o o ganiza ional and socie al hie a chies.
In line wi h hese ideological di e ences, libe al and conse a-
i e CEOs also di e in hei unde s anding o he oo s o in-
equali y (G aham e al.2009). Poli ically libe al CEOs ecognize
he si ua ional and con ex ual ac o s—such as his o ical injus-
ices, sys emic biases, and unequal access o oppo uni ies—
ha ha e con ibu ed o socie al dispa i ies (G aham e al.2009;
Jos e al.2003). They belie e add essing hese inequali ies e-
qui es collec i e ac ion, aligning wi h ESG p inciples ha os e
g ea e equali y ac oss en i onmen al, social, and go e nance
dimensions (Jos e al.2003; Y. Kim2024b; Swiga e al.2020).
In con as , conse a i e CEOs emphasize indi idual agency,
which implies ha indi iduals can imp o e hei s a us h ough
pe sonal e o —wi hou he need o b oade s uc u al
changes o ex e nal in e en ion (G aham e al.2009; Jasinenko
e al.2020).
Di e ences in openness, egali a ianism, and pe spec i es on in-
equali y in luence how libe al and conse a i e CEOs app oach
ESG ini ia i es. Libe al CEOs, wi h hei openness o change
and ocus on equali y, see ESG s a egy as a ool o add ess so-
cie al challenges like clima e change. They a o collabo a ion
wi h ex e nal s akeholde s and in eg a e b oade social con-
ce ns in o co po a e s a egies. In con as , conse a i e CEOs
p io i ize in e nal e iciency and indi idual agency, o en iew-
ing ESG as an ex e nal p essu e ha dis up s business ope a-
ions. Conside ing hese ideological dis inc ions, we p opose he
ollowing hypo hesis:
Hypo hesis 1. The poli ical ideology o CEOs in luences
a i m's ESG pe o mance. Speci ically, libe al CEOs end o
enhance ESG pe o mance, whe eas conse a i e CEOs hin-
de i .
2.2 | Mode a ing Role o I y League Educa ion
Al hough he di ec in luence o CEO poli ical ideology on ESG
pe o mance has been es ablished, i is essen ial o conside
how o he ac o s migh shape his ela ionship (Ba on and
Kenny1986; Campbell e al.2019). We p opose ha I y League
educa ion ac s as a c i ical bounda y condi ion, in ensi ying he
connec ion be ween a CEO's poli ical ideology and hei engage-
men in ESG p ac ices by p o iding he human and social capi-
al needed o suppo ideologically d i en decisions.
The eigh I y League ins i u ions—Ha a d, Yale, P ince on,
Columbia, Da mou h, B own, he Uni e si y o Pennsyl ania,
and Co nell—a e synonymous wi h academic excellence and
social p es ige (He nández2009; Lilla d and Ge ne 1999). I y
League educa ion signi ican ly in luences he ca ee s o i s g ad-
ua es, pa icula ly hose who ise o co po a e leade ship posi-
ions, such as CEOs (Ma elli and Abels2010; Mille e al.2015).
G adua es o hese schools bene i om igo ous educa ion, ex-
pansi e ne wo ks, and epu a ional capi al, which collec i ely
shape hei pe spec i es and os e a sense o esponsibili y and
leade ship ha ex ends in o hei p o essional li es (Lilla d and
Ge ne 1999; Mullen2009).
Fo CEOs, an I y League educa ion o e s access o eli e so-
cial ne wo ks ha enhance hei in luence in business, go -
e nmen , and o he domains (Alba and Moo e 1982; Chou
e al.2015; Mille e al.2015). These ne wo ks a e pa icula ly
ele an in he con ex o ESG s a egy, whe e c edibili y and
esou ces om in luen ial connec ions can help align s a e-
gic decisions wi h socie al expec a ions—including hose e-
la ed o ESG ini ia i es(Gassmann and Jackson- Moo e2023).
Mo eo e , I y League educa ion ends o ins ill a sense o se-
cu i y ha enables CEOs o exp ess hei pe sonal iews wi h
less ea o s igma o backlash (E. Kim2024a). Consequen ly,
libe al CEOs may eel encou aged o champion p og essi e
ESG s a egies, whe eas conse a i e CEOs may become mo e
pe sis en in opposing hem. Suppo ing his, esea ch indi-
ca es ha I y League–educa ed CEOs “ eel com o able wi h
pushing hei opinions wi hou ea s o being s igma ized/de-
alued” (E. Kim2024a, 1080).
Beyond social ne wo ks, I y League ins i u ions emphasize
c i ical hinking, p oblem- sol ing, and global awa eness
(Ma elli and Abels2010; Mille e al.2015)—skills pa icu-
la ly aluable in na iga ing he complexi ies o mode n co -
po a e esponsibili y (Heubeck2024b). These abili ies enable
CEOs o balance di e se s akeholde demands e ec i ely
(Mille e al. 2015), which is essen ial o ESG decision-
making. Fo example, Yale Uni e si y's Sus ainabili y Plan
2025 exempli ies ins i u ional commi men o sus ainabili y,
aiming o shape leade s who align business s a egies wi h
global sus ainabili y goals (Goodall and Moo e 2019; Yale
Uni e si y2016).
Howe e , I y League educa ion p o ides mo e han decision-
making ools—i in luences how poli ical ideology shapes co -
po a e s a egy. Fo libe al CEOs, he alues p omo ed wi hin
he I y League's academic and social ne wo ks may ein o ce
hei commi men o ESG s a egy. Con e sely, o conse a i e
CEOs, he p i ilege and social powe con e ed by an I y League
educa ion enable hem o asse hei ideological belie s mo e de-
cisi ely (Chou e al.2015; Moo e2008). Thus, I y League–edu-
ca ed CEOs a e uniquely posi ioned o le e age he impac o
hei poli ical ideologies on ESG- ela ed decisions.
In summa y, I y League educa ion is likely o mode a e he ela-
ionship be ween CEO poli ical ideology and ESG pe o mance.
By p o iding social capi al (e.g., in luen ial ne wo ks and epu a-
ional bene i s) and human capi al (e.g., ad anced cogni i e skills
and global pe spec i es), I y League ins i u ions empowe CEOs
o ac wi h g ea e con idence and alignmen wi h hei ideologi-
cal iews (Bonilla- Sil a e al.2006; Chou e al.2015; Moo e2008).
This ins i u ional con ex magni ies he endencies o CEOs o p i-
o i ize hei ideological inclina ions in co po a e decision- making.
Based on hese a gumen s, we p opose he ollowing hypo hesis:
4789
Hypo hesis 2. The ela ionship be ween CEO poli ical ide-
ology and i m ESG pe o mance is mode a ed by whe he he
CEO holds an I y League deg ee, wi h eli e educa ional back-
g ounds ampli ying he alignmen be ween CEO poli ical ideol-
ogy and ESG ou comes.
In conclusion, he di ec e ec o CEO poli ical ideology on
ESG pe o mance (Hypo hesis1) and he con ingency e ec o
CEO I y League on his di ec e ec (Hypo hesis2) lead o his
s udy's esea ch model, as shown in Figu e1.
3 | Resea ch Me hodology
3.1 | Da a Collec ion
In his s udy, we analyzed manu ac u ing i ms om he S&P 900
mid- and la ge- cap index, co e ing he pe iod om 2016 o 2019.2
To mi iga e su i o ship bias, we included all i ms lis ed a any
poin wi hin his ime ame (B own e al. 1992; Ca pen e and
Lynch1999). We chose his ime ame o a oid he yea s in luenced
by he Global Financial C isis and he COVID- 19 pandemic, min-
imizing po en ial dis up ions o i m ope a ions (He mundsdo i
e al.2022; Issah e al.2023). The s a yea , 2016, was speci ically
chosen as i ma ks a pe iod o ela i e economic s abili y ollow-
ing he eco e y om he Global Financial C isis (Pa iće ić and
Keil2024). Mo eo e , beginning he sample in 2016 p o ided a su -
icien numbe o obse a ions while ensu ing he da ase e lec ed
ecen ends in he manu ac u ing sec o , such as echnological
ad ancemen s and Indus y 4.0 (Ghobakhloo2020), sus ainabili y
and en i onmen al conce ns (Buallay 2019; Heubeck2024b), o
ade policy unce ain y (Handley and Limão2022), wi hou being
skewed by subsequen ma ke dis up ions.
We excluded 607 nonmanu ac u ing i ms based on hei p i-
ma y NAICS codes, ocusing on manu ac u ing i ms due o
signi ican a ia ions in ESG p ac ices ac oss indus ies (F ink
e al.2003; Solakoglu2013). Manu ac u ing i ms ace signi i-
can s akeholde p essu e and play a c ucial ole in ad ancing
sus ainable p ac ices (Buallay2019; Mani e al.2014), making
hem pa icula ly well- sui ed o s udying ESG ac o s and en-
abling meaning ul compa isons be ween i ms.
Ou ini ial sample included 322 manu ac u ing i ms om
2016 o 2019, o which we e ie ed da a om LSEG Eikon.
When mul iple CEOs we e p esen in a yea , we selec ed he
longes se ing CEO (Quigley and Hamb ick2015), which e-
sul ed in 419 CEOs. We collec ed missing and addi ional da a
om i ms' annual s a emen s and o icial company websi es
and compiled addi ional CEO da a om publicly a ailable in-
o ma ion. Speci ically, we manually e ie ed and e i ied he
co ec ness o demog aphic cha ac e is ics and educa ion da a
om mul iple sou ces, including annual epo s, business social
media pla o ms such as LinkedIn, eliable business da a om
Bloombe g, o o he sou ces such as uni e si y websi es, alumni
associa ions, o he No able Names Da abase.
Following p e ious esea ch (e.g., Bhanda i e al.2020; Elnahas
and Kim 2017), we collec ed poli ical dona ion da a om
he Fede al Elec ion Commission (FEC) and he Cen e o
Responsible Poli ics' OpenSec e s websi es. We made signi ican
e o s o ensu e accu a e da a collec ion o each CEO. Using
OpenSec e s, we ini ially sea ched by he CEO's i s and las
name. This sea ch yielded co ec esul s o unique names, bu
addi ional e i ica ion was needed o mo e common names.
We used middle names, employe s, and loca ions o accu a ely
compile dona ion da a, in ol ing ex ensi e esea ch on a CEO's
employmen his o y and esidences. This p ocedu e esul ed in
o e 22,000 dona ions, which we ca e ully sc eened o ensu e
co ec a ibu ion o he espec i e CEOs.
To ensu e ha he con ibu ions o CEOs a e a alid p edic o o
hei poli ical ideology, we dele ed all dona ions o nonpa isan
PACs o Supe PACs om he da ase , as hese dona ions e lec
s a egic in e es s (Bhanda i e al.2020; Fe is e al.2019). We
manually sea ched publicly a ailable in o ma ion o disce n
whe he nondona ing CEOs publicly iden i ied as libe al o
conse a i e o we e pa y membe s. The absence o poli ically
ocal CEOs wi hou co esponding dona ion da a u he ali-
da es he eliabili y o he dona ion- based measu e o assessing
CEO poli ical ideology.
The inal esea ch sample comp ises he dona ions o 216 CEOs,
which we ma ched wi h da a sou ced om LSEG Eikon and sup-
plemen ed wi h hand- collec ed da a (F ancis e al.2016; Hu on
e al.2014). The inal da ase is an unbalanced panel comp ising
769 i m- yea obse a ions om 233 i ms.
3.2 | Va iable Measu emen s
3.2.1 | S udy Va iables
The measu emen and da a sou ces o all a iables a e sum-
ma ized in Table 1 and de ailed below. ESG pe o mance
da a we e collec ed om LSEG Eikon, which is known o i s
comp ehensi e co e age and objec i e measu emen o ESG
pe o mance ac oss en i onmen al, social, and go e nance
pilla s (Del Vi o e al.2023). LSEG Eikon has become one o
he p ima y sou ces o ESG da a used in empi ical esea ch.3
I ca ego izes ESG sco es in o pe cen iles anging om D−
(ESG lagga ds) o A + (ESG leade s) (LSEG2023). We used he
pe cen ile sco e, anging om 0 o 100. Ou dependen a i-
able, ESG pe o mance, conside s he ESG pe cen ile sco e
( anging om 0 o 100) a + 1 o mi iga e causali y conce ns
and conside he ime lag be ween CEOs' decision- making
and he e en ual ma e ializa ion o hei decisions (Semadeni
e al.2022).
CEO poli ical ideology is an index a iable indica ing a CEO's po-
li ical o ien a ion on he conse a i e–libe al spec um (Elnahas
and Kim 2017; Jos e al. 2009). The US bipa isan poli ical
FIGURE 1 | Resea ch model: CEO poli ical ideology, CEO I y
League deg ee, and ESG pe o mance.
4790 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
TABLE 1 | Va iable desc ip ions.
Va iable ype Va iable Measu emen Da a sou ce
S udy a iables ESG pe o mance ESG a ing pe cen ile sco es, anging
om 0 o 100, wi h low sco es
co esponding o ESG lagga ds (D)
and high sco es o ESG leade s (A)
LSEG Eikon
CEO poli ical ideology Calcula ed as he di e ence be ween
con ibu ions o he Republican and
Democ a ic pa ies, di ided by o al
con ibu ions; his a iable anges om
−1 (indica ing e y conse a i e ideology)
o +1 (indica ing e y libe al ideology)
FEC da a e ie ed
om OpenSec e s
CEO I y League deg ee Dummy a iable coded 1 i he CEO
has a deg ee om an I y League
ins i u ion (P ince on Uni e si y, Ha a d
Uni e si y, Yale Uni e si y, Uni e si y
o Pennsyl ania, B own Uni e si y,
Columbia Uni e si y, Co nell Uni e si y,
Da mou h College) and 0 o he wise
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
(e.g., annual epo s, LinkedIn,
Bloombe g, uni e si y
websi es, alumni associa ions,
and No able Names da abase)
CEO- le el con ol
a iables
CEO age Cu en age o he CEO (calcula ed
as ollows: iscal yea − bi h yea )
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
CEO gende Dummy a iable coded 1 o emale
CEO and 0 o male CEO
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
CEO i m enu e Yea s he CEO has wo ked a he i m
(calcula ed as ollows: cu en yea − yea
s a ed wo king o he i m).
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
CEO STEM deg ee Dummy a iable coded 1 o CEO
wi h a deg ee in science, echnology,
enginee ing, o ma hema ics (i.e., highe
educa ion in STEM ields) and 0 o he wise
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
CEO dona ion numbe Numbe o poli ical dona ions
o pa ies o candida es
FEC da a e ie ed
om OpenSec e s
Fi m- le el con ol
a iables
Fi m pe o mance Re u n on asse s (calcula ed as ollows:
ne income di ided by o al asse s)
LSEG Eikon
Fi m age Yea s since inco po a ion (calcula ed as
ollows: cu en yea − yea o ounding)
LSEG Eikon, manual esea ch
Fi m size Na u al loga i hm o he o al
numbe o employees
LSEG Eikon
R&D in ensi y R&D spending di ided by sales,
wi h missing alues being eplaced
wi h 0 (Koh and Reeb2015)
LSEG Eikon
Le e age To al deb di ided by o al asse s LSEG Eikon
Slack esou ces A ailable slack, calcula ed as
ollows: cu en a io = cu en
asse s di ided by cu en liabili ies
(Ma lin and Geige 2015)
LSEG Eikon
Go e nance- le el
con ol a iables
Boa d size To al numbe o di ec o s LSEG Eikon
Boa d enu e A e age enu e o di ec o s LSEG Eikon
(Con inues)
4791
sys em allows di e en ia ion be ween libe al (Democ a ic Pa y)
and conse a i e (Republican Pa y) ideologies (Weng and
Yang2024). Dona ions exceeding $200 o any poli ical pa y mus
be epo ed o he FEC, o e ing a ounda ion o analyzing poli -
ical leanings (Weng and Yang2024). Gi en he s abili y o po-
li ical ideology o e ime, we examined a CEO's en i e dona ion
his o y o a comp ehensi e unde s anding (G een e al.2004).
To de e mine CEO poli ical ideology, we measu ed he di e ence
be ween hei con ibu ions o he Republican and Democ a ic
pa ies, hen di ided by he o al con ibu ions. This app oach
e lec s a CEO's poli ical o ien a ion on a scale om −1 ( e y
conse a i e) o +1 ( e y libe al) (Hu on e al. 2015; Unsal
e al.2016). To con i m hei poli ical o ien a ion, we manually
sea ched publicly a ailable da a o CEOs wi hou dona ion e-
co ds. We excluded nondona ing CEOs wi h no public poli ical
a ilia ion o p e en in oducing bias o he sample by making
assump ions abou CEOs' poli ical leanings.4
To assess whe he CEOs possess an eli e educa ion, we examined
whe he he CEO holds a deg ee om an I y League ins i u ion.
CEO I y League deg ee was measu ed using a dummy a iable,
indica ing whe he CEOs ob ained deg ees om one o he eigh
I y League ins i u ions: P ince on, Ha a d, Yale, Uni e si y
o Pennsyl ania, B own, Columbia, Co nell, and Da mou h.
These da a we e ob ained om LSEG Eikon and supplemen ed
wi h o he eliable sou ces, including i ms' annual epo s,
LinkedIn, Bloombe g, uni e si y websi es, alumni associa ions,
and he No able Names da abase. The CEO I y League deg ee
a iable is coded wi h he alue 1 i he CEO ecei ed a deg ee
om an I y League ins i u ion (and 0 i no ) (Mille e al.2015).
3.2.2 | Con ol Va iables
We included se e al o he a iables in he esea ch model o
accoun o ac o s po en ially a ec ing ESG pe o mance. We
included i e con ol a iables a he CEO le el based on p io
esea ch. CEO age and CEO gende accoun o isk p e e ences
and po en ial e ec s on ESG pe o mance (Glass e al.2016; Le
e al.2024). CEO i m enu e cap u es he impac o accumula ed
i m- speci ic knowledge and socializa ion p ocesses (Chen e al.
2019; Da ouichi e al.2021). CEO STEM deg ee, a dummy a i-
able, indica es a backg ound in science, echnology, enginee ing,
o ma hema ics ha may in luence decision- making conce n-
ing ESG pe o mance(Cahyono e al. 2024; Zizka e al.2021).
Las , CEO dona ion numbe , e lec ing poli ical ac i ism (J. Liu
e al.2023), was included as i may also ela e o ESG pe o mance.
We included six i m- le el con ols. Fi m pe o mance, mea-
su ed by e u n on asse s (ROA), e lec s he po en ial o highe
pe o ming i ms o in es in ESG ini ia i es (Huang 2021).
Fi m age conside s olde i ms' p io i iza ion o ESG due o epu-
a ional conce ns (D'Ama o and Fali ena2020). Fi m size, mea-
su ed by he na u al loga i hm o o al employees, in luences
ESG pe o mance due o esou ce a ia ions and da a a ailabil-
i y be ween smalle and la ge i ms (D empe ic e al. 2020).
R&D in ensi y, calcula ed as R&D spending o o al sales, may
d i e ESG pe o mance (Aguile a- Ca acuel and Gue e o-
Villegas2018). Le e age, indica ed by o al deb o o al asse s,
cap u es i s p esumed posi i e e ec on ESG pe o mance
(Ala eeni and Hamdan2020). Las ly, slack esou ces ep esen
disc e iona y inancial esou ces i ms could in es in ESG ini-
ia i es (Aguile a- Ca acuel e al.2015).
Va iable ype Va iable Measu emen Da a sou ce
Boa d gende di e si y Pe cen age o emale di ec o s
(calcula ed as ollows: numbe o emale
di ec o s di ided by boa d size)
LSEG Eikon
Boa d a ilia ions A e age numbe o ex e nal
di ec o ial a ilia ions
LSEG Eikon
Boa d independence Pe cen age o independen
di ec o s (calcula ed as ollows:
numbe o independen di ec o s
di ided by boa d size)
LSEG Eikon
CEO duali y Dummy a iable coded 1 i CEO is also
he boa d chai pe son and 0 o he wise
LSEG Eikon
Managemen
compensa ion
To al compensa ion o he
managemen in millions USD
LSEG Eikon
Sus ainabili y
compensa ion incen i es
Dummy a iable coded 1 i senio
execu i e compensa ion is linked o
CSR, sus ainabili y, o heal h and
sa e y a ge s and 0 o he wise
LSEG Eikon
CSR sus ainabili y
commi ee
Dummy a iable coded 1 i i ms ha e
a CSR commi ee and 0 o he wise
LSEG Eikon
TABLE 1 | (Con inued)
4792 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
We included nine go e nance- le el con ol a iables. Boa d
size accoun s o moni o ing di e ences be ween smalle and
la ge boa ds (Goods ein e al.1994). Boa d enu e add esses
po en ial declines in moni o ing e iciency wi h longe di ec-
o enu es (Jeong e al.2021). Boa d gende di e si y cap u ed
he dynamics o di e se boa ds (Issa2023). Boa d a ilia ions
con ol he bene i s o mo e connec ed boa ds in ad ising on
ESG issues (de Villie s e al. 2011). Boa d independence ac-
coun s o he enhanced ESG pe o mance associa ed wi h
mo e independen boa ds (B ine e e al. 2023). CEO dual-
i y conside ed he dual e ec o CEOs on ESG p io i ies (de
Villie s e al.2011). Managemen compensa ion was included
as highly compensa ed manage s may be less conce ned abou
ESG p ac ices (de Villie s e al.2011). Sus ainabili y compen-
sa ion incen i es can mo i a e execu i es o p io i ize CSR
issues in hei decision- making, impac ing ESG pe o mance
(Ba aiba - Diez e al.2019). Las , he con ol CSR sus ainabili y
commi ee cap u es he possible bene i s o a designa ed com-
mi ee o ESG pe o mance (Vel e2016).
Yea con ols and indus y con ols ( wo- digi NAICS le el) we e
inco po a ed o mi iga e po en ial ime and indus y- speci ic
a iances in ESG pe o mance. These ixed e ec s help es-
ablish a causal link be ween CEO poli ical ideology and ESG
pe o mance while accoun ing o empo al and sec o - speci ic
ac o s (E hemjam s e al.2013; Hu on e al.2014).
4 | Analysis Me hod and Resul s
4.1 | Main Resul s
We selec ed a panel da a es ima o due o he longi udinal
na u e o ou da a, which is consis en wi h p e ious e-
sea ch g ounded in uppe echelons heo y (e.g., O'Sulli an
e al. 2024). Fi s , we used he B eusch and Pagan (1980)
es o de e mine he app op ia e eg ession echnique. The
es esul s suppo ed a andom- e ec s model o e a simple
OLS eg ession (p = 0.000), alida ing he panel s uc u e o
he da a (Bal agi 2021). We hen conduc ed a Du bin–Wu–
Hausman es o compa e he andom- e ec s and ixed- e ec s
models, which con i med he ixed- e ec s model as he p e-
e ed app oach (p = 0.000) (Bal agi e al.2003; G eene2019).
We hen es ed o possible he e oscedas ici y using he mod-
i ied Wald es , which de ec ed he e oscedas ici y (p = 0.000)
(G eene 2019; Woold idge 2002). Consequen ly, we imple-
men ed a ixed- e ec s model wi h obus s anda d e o s clus-
e ed a he i m le el.
We calcula ed desc ip i e and bi a ia e s a is ics o all s udy
a iables, as summa ized in Table2. The sampled i ms show-
case a mean ESG sco e o 57.45, which co esponds o a B− sco e
equi alen o abo e- a e age ESG pe o mance (LSEG2023). The
mean poli ical libe alism o CEOs is −0.31, which sugges s ha
CEOs lean owa d conse a i e ideologies. Addi ionally, 18.9%
o CEOs ha e ob ained a deg ee om an I y League ins i u ion.
Table3 epo s he hie a chical eg ession esul s. The e is no
e idence o mul icollinea i y in he da a, wi h he maximum
a iance in la ion ac o (VIF) o 2.39 well below he con en-
ional h esholds o 5 o 10 (Johns on e al.2018; Kennedy2008).
Hypo hesis1 p oposed ha CEO poli ical ideology a ec s ESG
pe o mance. The coe icien o CEO poli ical ideology is posi i e
and signi ican in Model 1 (b = 1.720, p = 0.036), and his posi-
i e e ec is consis en ac oss all subsequen models. Due o he
alue ange o CEO poli ical ideology be ween −1 (conse a i e)
o +1 (libe al), his inding implies ha libe al CEOs p omo e
i ms' ESG pe o mance, whe eas conse a i e CEOs ha m
ESG pe o mance. Thus, he indings suppo Hypo hesis1 by
demons a ing ha CEO poli ical ideology signi ican ly a ec s
ESG pe o mance.
Hypo hesis2 posi ed ha I y League deg ee mode a es he ela-
ionship be ween CEO poli ical ideology and ESG pe o mance.
This mode a ion e ec is es ed in Model 4, whe e he in e ac-
ion coe icien is posi i e bu insigni ican (b = 0.921, p = 0.694).
The e o e, he e is no e idence suppo ing he mode a ion e ec
o I y League deg ee on he CEO poli ical ideology–ESG pe -
o mance ela ionship, leading o he ejec ion o Hypo hesis2.
In conclusion, he eg ession esul s suppo he e ec o
CEO poli ical ideology on ESG pe o mance (Hypo hesis 1)
bu no o he mode a ion e ec s o CEO I y League deg ee
(Hypo hesis2). Howe e , he esul s e ealed ha I y League
deg ee has a signi ican nega i e di ec e ec onESG pe o -
mance (Model 3: b = −4.913, p = 0.022). Thus, he indings
demons a e ha CEO I y League deg ee is no a mode a o o
he CEO poli ical ideology–ESG pe o mance ela ionship bu
a manage ial backg ound ac o ha di ec ly hinde s ESG pe -
o mance. The “Discussion and Implica ions” sec ion u he
de ails hese esul s.
4.2 | Addi ional Analyses
4.2.1 | Endogenei y Analyses
We used mul iple app oaches o handle endogenei y conce ns.
Fi s , we employed an ins umen al a iable (IV) wo- s age leas
squa es (2SLS) model. Following p e ious esea ch on poli ical
ideology (Hu on e al.2014; Kashmi i and Mahajan2017), we
ini ially conside ed ou CEO cha ac e is ics as possible IVs:
CEO age, CEO gende , CEO mino i y s a us (dummy coded 1 o
nonwhi e CEOs), and CEO mili a y expe ience (dummy coded 1
o CEOs wi h mili a y expe ience o educa ion). Howe e , since
CEO age and gende we e included in he eg ession model, hey
could no se e as IVs (Ullah e al. 2021). F om a heo e ical
pe spec i e, as also a gued and con i med in p e ious esea ch
on CEO poli ical ideology (e.g., Hu on e al.2014; Kashmi i and
Mahajan2017), hese a iables a e alid ins umen s ha a e
co ela ed wi h a CEO's poli ical ideology bu no wi h he de-
penden a iable5 while hey a e also s able e en a e he CEO
is appoin ed.
We collec ed he da a o CEO mili a y educa ion om execu i e
biog aphies om LSEG Eikon and o he eliable da a sou ces
(e.g., annual epo s, LinkedIn, Bloombe g, uni e si y websi es,
alumni associa ions, and he No able Names da abase). Due o
conce ns abou he accu acy and de ini ion o CEO mino i y
s a us in p io esea ch, we adop ed an al e na i e app oach
as he adi ional ca ego iza ion in o “whi e” and “non-
whi e” o e looks he di e si y wi hin he nonwhi e ca ego y
4799
League unde g adua e deg ee (b = −7.303, p = 0.030) and CEO I y
League g adua e deg ee (b = −3.570, p = 0.078) ha e a di ec neg-
a i e and s a is ically signi ican e ec on ESG pe o mance. The
esul s show ha he nega i e e ec o CEO I y League deg ees
seems o be d i en p ima ily by he e ec o unde g adua e educa-
ion due o he la ge and mo e signi ican coe icien .
4.2.3 | Robus ness Analyses
We pe o med se e al obus ness analyses o con i m he
alidi y o he esul s. Fi s , we es ed o he possibili y o
o e con olling o inadequa e con ols by using a mo e con-
se a i e se o con ol a iables ha a e likely o be exoge-
nous. The addi ional analysis (see Table 10) shows ha ou
esul s emain consis en wi h he main esul s when con-
olling o a minimum o ele an a iables ( i m age, i m
size, boa d size, boa d independence, yea , and indus y dum-
mies) o e en when con olling o no i m o go e nance ac-
o s (i.e., only yea and indus y dummies). Thus, we can ule
ou ha he choice o con ol a iables has d i en he e ec s
in ou esul s.
Second, we d opped all CEOs wi h a o al dona ion amoun
below $1000 o ule ou he possibili y ha less dona ing CEOs
a e less s able in hei poli ical ideology. The esul s using his
modi ied subsample emained consis en wi h ou main esul s
(see Table11). Thus, we can ule ou ha sample selec ion has
in luenced ou esul s.
Thi d, we used al e na i e measu es o CEO poli ical ideology
o ule ou ha he measu emen has in luenced he esul s (see
Table12). The i s was CEO libe al, a dummy a iable aking
he alue o 1 i a CEO made mo e han 50% o hei dona ions
o Democ a s and 0 o he wise (Bhanda i and Golden 2021;
Hu on e al.2014). The esul s emained in line wi h he main
esul s; he posi i e e ec o CEO libe al on ESG pe o mance
was e en s onge using he al e na i e measu e han in he
o iginal model (b = 3.468, p = 0.011). The second was CEO s ong
libe al, a dummy a iable coded 1 i a CEO made no dona ions o
TABLE 9 | Addi ional es : CEO I y League unde g adua e and g adua e educa ion as mode a ion a iables.
ESG
pe o mance Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien S d. e o
CEO poli ical
ideology
2.219*** 0.822 2.136** 0.882 2.128*** 0.766 2.158** 0.877
CEO I y
League
unde g adua e
deg ee
−7.303** 3.352 −7.250** 3.203
CEO poli ical
ideology × CEO
I y League
unde g adua e
deg ee
1.297 4.049
CEO I y
League
g adua e deg ee
−3.570* 2.018 −3.575* 1.988
CEO poli ical
ideology × CEO
I y League
g adua e deg ee
−0.127 2.401
Con ol
a iables
YES YES YES YES
Yea con ols YES YES YES YES
Indus y
con ols
YES YES YES YES
R2wi hin 0.258 0.258 0.253 0.253
R2be ween 0.115 0.110 0.175 0.174
R2o e all 0.112 0.108 0.149 0.149
F5.69 5.46 5.46 5.28
P ob > F0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No es: Fixed e ec s wi h obus s anda d e o s clus e ed a he i m le el, numbe o obse a ions = 769, numbe o g oups = 233; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
4800 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
TABLE 10 | Robus ness es : Di e en con ol a iables.
ESG pe o mance Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien
S d.
e o Coe icien
S d.
e o
CEO poli ical
ideology
1.406** 0.604 1.881*** 0.664 1.782** 0.749 1.344** 0.600 1.798*** 0.642 1.663** 0.737
CEO I y League
deg ee
−3.941* 2.198 −3.884* 2.016 −3.900* 2.192 −3.823* 2.002
CEO poli ical
ideology × CEO I y
League deg ee
0.319 2.144 0.448 2.160
Fi m age −0.001 0.008 −0.002 0.008 −0.002 0.008
Fi m size 0.072 0.203 0.079 0.203 0.076 0.202
Boa d size −0.020 0.080 −0.025 0.080 −0.024 0.080
Boa d independence −0.007 0.028 −0.007 0.028 −0.007 0.028
Cons an 54.340*** 2.834 55.236*** 2.902 55.203*** 2.864 54.201*** 0.799 55.020*** 0.920 54.972*** 0.860
Yea con ols YES YES YES YES YES YES
Indus y con ols YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2wi hin 0.212 0.218 0.218 0.211 0.218 0.218
R2be ween 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010
R2o e all 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.026
F9.87 9.36 8.61 15.76 14.02 12.31
P ob > F0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No es: Fixed e ec s wi h obus s anda d e o s clus e ed a he i m le el, numbe o obse a ions = 772, numbe o g oups = 233; ***p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
4801
Republicans h oughou hei en i e dona ion his o y (Elnahas
and Kim2017). The esul s also emained obus ; he coe icien
o CEO s ong libe al on ESG pe o mance was e en s onge
han in he o iginal model (b = 3.719, p = 0.009). The nega i e di-
ec e ec o CEO I y League deg ee on ESG pe o mance pe -
sis s ac oss all models.
Fou h, we winso ized all con inuous a iables a he 1% and
99% le els o ule ou ha ou esul s we e impac ed by po en-
ial ou lie s (see Table13). Ou main esul s emain consis en
when using winso ized a iables. Speci ically, he e ec o
CEO poli ical ideology on ESG emains posi i e and signi i-
can (b = 2.175, p = 0.006), and he mode a ion e ec emains
posi i e bu insigni ican (b = 0.694, p = 0.767). The nega i e
e ec o CEO I y League deg ee on ESG also pe sis ed ac oss
he models using winso ized a iables (b = −5.073, p = 0.017).
The e o e, we can e ec i ely ule ou ha ou lie s in luence
ou esul s. These obus ness analyses collec i ely demon-
s a e ha ou esul s emain consis en ac oss a ious model
speci ica ions.
5 | Discussion and Implica ions
This s udy add esses a imely ye unde explo ed opic: he e-
la ionship be ween CEOs' poli ical ideology and hei i ms'
ESG pe o mance and he mode a ing ole o eli e educa ion
om I y League ins i u ions. In suppo o ou i s hypo hesis,
we ound ha CEO poli ical ideology signi ican ly a ec s ESG
ou comes. Speci ically, libe al CEOs a e associa ed wi h highe
ESG pe o mance, whe eas conse a i e CEOs end o de e
ESG ini ia i es. These indings ans e he co e p inciples o
poli ical psychology (e.g., Jos e al.2003; Jos and Amodio2012)
o uppe echelons heo izing (Hamb ick2007; Hamb ick and
Mason 1984), ein o cing he iew ha libe al CEOs, cha ac-
e ized by g ea e openness o change and conce n o socie al
wel a e in hei decision- making, a e mo e likely o p io i ize
ESG e o s. Con e sely, conse a i e CEOs p io i ize p o i abil-
i y and sha eholde alue in hei mo e closed- sys em decision-
making. They a e mo e eluc an o engage in ESG ini ia i es,
which may be pe cei ed as di e ging om adi ional busi-
ness goals.
Th ough i s ocus on ESG s a egy, ou s udy adds new insigh s
in o he poli ical ideology li e a u e wi hin he uppe echelons
amewo k. Speci ically, we o e a nuanced unde s anding o
how CEO poli ical ideology a ec s co po a e ESG e o s. Unlike
CSR, which has been widely s udied (e.g., Chin e al.2013; Gup a
e al.2021), ESG ep esen s a b oade amewo k ha encom-
passes no only social esponsibili y bu also en i onmen al and
go e nance dimensions (Gillan e al.2021; Huang2021). Gi en
he inc easing poli ical pola iza ion su ounding ESG, pa icu-
la ly in he US (Wins on2023), ou indings unde sco e he im-
po ance o unde s anding how ideological pe spec i es shape
co po a e ESG s a egies.
Mo eo e , his s udy con ibu es o a mic ole el unde s and-
ing o he d i e s behind ESG pe o mance by e ealing how
poli ical ideology di e en ially a ec s he h ee pilla s o ESG
pe o mance. This o e s an impo an ex ension o p e ious
esea ch, which has p ima ily ocused on he ole o CEO po-
li ical ideology in CSR (e.g., Chin e al.2013; Gup a e al.2021).
By ocusing on ESG, we highligh he b oade implica ions o
i ms seeking o na iga e co po a e sus ainabili y challenges
in an inc easingly poli icized en i onmen . Ou addi ional
analyses os e a nuanced unde s anding o how CEOs' poli i-
cal ideology ansla es in o ESG ou comesas we examine he
e ec s on he h ee ESG pilla s. Al hough ou indings con-
i m he in luence o CEO poli ical ideology on he social and
go e nance pilla s o ESG, we obse ed no signi ican ela-
ionship be ween poli ical ideology and en i onmen al pe o -
mance, con as ing p e ious esea ch (e.g., Chin e al.2013;
Y. Kim 2024b). This inding sugges s ha en i onmen al
pe o mance migh be d i en by ac o s beyond he CEO's po-
li ical ideology. Fi s , CEOs may ha e less la i ude o e en i-
onmen al issues han social o go e nance issues. S ic legal
s anda ds and indus y- speci ic equi emen s ela ed o en i-
onmen al issues migh lead o g ea e uni o mi y in en i on-
men al ou comes ac oss i ms (Delmas and To el2008; Shao
e al.2020), ega dless o a CEO's poli ical ideology. Second,
TABLE 11 | Robus ness es : Minimum dona ion amoun o $1000.
ESG pe o mance Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien S d. e o
CEO poli ical ideology 2.296*** 0.810 1.952* 1.104
CEO I y League deg ee −5.110** 2.273 −4.842** 2.025
CEO poli ical ideology × CEO I y League deg ee 1.063 2.596
Con ol a iables YES YES
Yea con ols YES YES
Indus y con ols YES YES
R2wi hin 0.254 0.254
R2be ween 0.137 0.143
R2o e all 0.124 0.127
F4.93 4.75
P ob > F0.000 0.000
No es: Fixed e ec s wi h obus s anda d e o s clus e ed a he i m le el, numbe o obse a ions = 742, numbe o g oups = 225; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
4802 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
TABLE 12 | Robus ness es : Al e na i e measu es o CEO poli ical ideology.
ESG pe o mance Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien S d. e o Coe icien S d. e o
CEO libe al 3.468** 1.345 3.451* 1.883
CEO s ong libe al 3.719*** 1.407 4.380*** 1.673
CEO I y League deg ee −4.443** 2.137 −4.459 2.795 −5.020** 2.138 −4.601* 2.457
CEO libe al × CEO I y League deg ee 0.041 2.876
CEO s ong libe al x CEO I y League deg ee −2.058 3.574
Con ol a iables YES YES YES YES
Yea con ols YES YES YES YES
Indus y con ols YES YES YES YES
R2wi hin 0.258 0.258 0.257 0.257
R2be ween 0.138 0.138 0.117 0.107
R2o e all 0.127 0.127 0.113 0.107
F5.15 4.98 5.59 5.47
P ob > F0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No es: Fixed e ec s wi h obus s anda d e o s clus e ed a he i m le el, numbe o obse a ions = 769, numbe o g oups = 233; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
4803
ex e nal s akeholde p essu es may push libe al and conse a-
i e CEOs o adop en i onmen al s a egies. Fo his eason,
en i onmen al issues ha e become one o he op boa d oom
opics (Deloi e Global 2022), and he ocus on ESG has in-
c easingly shi ed disp opo iona ely owa d en i onmen al
issues (M chko ska e al.2023). Addi ionally, en i onmen al
ini ia i es o en in ol e long- e m isks and equi e sus ained
in es men be o e angible ou comes a e ealized (Bansal
and DesJa dine2014; Qadi e al.2021). CEOs may p io i ize
social and go e nance ini ia i es o e longe - e m en i on-
men al e o s, which can yield mo e immedia e epu a ional
bene i s. En i onmen al issues a e also equen ly pe cei ed
as ope a ional o echnical challenges, which may lead CEOs
o app oach hem om a mo e apoli ical s andpoin (Ioannou
and Se a eim2023). The e o e, he e ec o a CEO's poli ical
ideology on en i onmen al ou comes migh be dilu ed.
Fu he mo e, his s udy p o ides aluable insigh s in o he in-
e sec ion o CEO poli ical ideology, I y League educa ion, and
ESG pe o mance. By demons a ing ha I y League educa ion
does no mode a e he ela ionship be ween a CEO's poli ical
ideology and ESG pe o mance—bu ins ead has a di ec nega-
i e e ec on ESG—ou s udy highligh s no ewo hy discussion
poin s and implica ions o u u e heo izing.
Fo one, he absence o he mode a ion e ec sugges s ha a
CEO's eli e educa ional backg ound does no al e how hei po-
li ical belie s in luence ESG p ac ices. This no el inding sug-
ges s ha CEOs may b ing exis ing ideological iews in o hei
execu i e ole, whe e hese belie s guide hei decision- making
on ESG issues independen ly o hei I y League educa ion. In
his sense, a CEO's poli ical ideology will likely emain in ac
and unin luenced by he pe spec i es acqui ed h ough eli e
educa ion.
We ind con as ing e idence o he uppe echelon's p esump-
ion ha a CEO's poli ical ideology p o ides he p ima y cog-
ni i e amewo k o ESG- ela ed decisions. Unlike Mille
e al.(2015), we do no ind e idence suppo ing he “s a egic
alue o an I y educa ion” (p. 942) wi hin he ESG con ex .
Ins ead, ou s udy sugges s ha I y League educa ion i sel
di ec ly co ela es wi h lowe ESG pe o mance, i espec i e
o poli ical ideology. In o he wo ds, ou esul s do no suppo
he no ion ha CEOs use hei I y League backg ound o e-
in o ce ideologically d i en p e e ences o mo e o less ESG
emphasis.
Ins ead, he indings e eal wo la gely independen channels.
Fi s , he ideological channel highligh s how a CEO's poli i-
cal ideology shapes he decision- making p e e ences ega d-
ing ESG ini ia i es. Libe al CEOs a e ideologically inclined o
p omo e ESG s a egy, d i en by hei open- sys em decision-
making app oach and s akeholde - o ien ed alues. In con as ,
conse a i e CEOs end o dep io i ize ESG ou comes, a o -
ing a sha eholde - cen ic app oach oo ed in a closed- sys em
decision- making amewo k.
Second, he eli e educa ion channel cap u eshow an I y League
backg ound a ec s decision- making by o ien ing i owa d a-
di ional business goals. I y League–educa ed CEOs may p io -
i ize ca ee ad ancemen and epu a ion- building, ocusing on
inancial me ics a he han ESG ou comes. Thus, I y League
educa ion appea s o in luence he means o achie e co po a e
goals—by p o iding connec ions and esou ces— a he han
he ends, especially ega ding ESG s a egy.
In his sense, I y League educa ion may p o ide epu a ional
bene i s and p es ige, o en associa ed wi h ca ee p og ession
a he han p o oundly in luencing a CEO's alues o ideologi-
cal app oach o speci ic business issues like ESG s a egy. Wi h
espec o his, I y League educa ion could po en ially o e ide
pe sonal poli ical p e e ences. Fo ins ance, e en i libe al CEOs
a e ideologically inclined o alue ESG, hei eli e educa ional
backg ound may s ee hem owa d p io i izing mo e con en-
ional business objec i es o e hei pe sonal poli ical leanings.
Thus, he in luence o I y League educa ion appea s o impac
TABLE 13 | Robus ness es : Winso ized a iables.
ESG pe o mance Coe icien Robus s d. e o Coe icien Robus s d. e o
CEO poli ical ideology 2.175*** 0.781 1.982** 0.963
CEO I y League deg ee −5.073** 2.104 −4.952** 1.901
CEO poli ical ideology × CEO I y League deg ee 0.694 2.339
Con ol a iables YES YES
Yea con ols YES YES
Indus y con ols YES YES
R2wi hin 0.255 0.256
R2be ween 0.122 0.124
R2o e all 0.118 0.119
F5.26 5.02
P ob > F0.000 0.000
No es: Fixed e ec s wi h obus s anda d e o s clus e ed a he i m le el, numbe o obse a ions = 769, numbe o g oups = 233, all con inuous a iables a e
winso ized a he 1% and 99% le els; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
4804 Business S a egy and he En i onmen , 2025
decision- making p ocesses ela ed o ESG s a egy by emphasiz-
ing epu a ional and adi ional business ou comes o e ideolog-
ically mo i a ed ones.
I is impo an o no e ha , a i s glance, ou indings ap-
pea o con adic a key s udy on I y League educa ion by
Mille e al. (2015), which concluded ha i ms led by I y
League–educa ed CEOs, pa icula ly hose wi h unde g adu-
a e deg ees, achie e highe and mo e sus ained ma ke alua-
ions. Howe e , ou esul s a e consis en wi h he unde lying
a ionale: Financial pe o mance o en aligns wi h sha e-
holde in e es s, which may bene i om he eli e ne wo ks
cul i a ed by I y League–educa ed CEOs. These ne wo ks,
howe e , could nega i ely impac ESG pe o mance by p io -
i izing sha eholde alue o e b oade social esponsibili ies.
The addi ional analysis highligh s ha he nega i e impac o
I y League educa ion on ESG pe o mance is especially e i-
den among CEOs wi h unde g adua e deg ees. This inding
sugges s ha o ma i e educa ional expe iences a eli e in-
s i u ions may cul i a e alues o beha io s less aligned wi h
s ong ESG ou comes. Consis en wi h imp in ing heo y
(Ma quis and Tilcsik2013), he esul s unde sco e ha o ma-
i e li e expe iences, pa icula ly du ing unde g adua e edu-
ca ion, ha e endu ing consequences in shaping beha io s and
decision- making p ocesses ha in luence ESG pe o mance.
Al oge he , ou s udy expands uppe echelons heo y by iden i-
ying how hese mic ole el ac o s—poli ical ideology and eli e
educa ion— unc ion as channels in luencing s a egic ou comes
in ela ion o con empo a y ESG challenges.
5.1 | P ac ical Recommenda ions
This s udy o e s se e al p ac ical implica ions by e ealing
ha CEOs' poli ical ideologies and I y League educa ion in-
luence hei decision- making conce ning ESG ou comes.
Consequen ly, i is c ucial o CEOs o c i ically assess how
hei pe sonal ai s and educa ional backg ounds align wi h
he ou comes hey seek o achie e, which migh in ol e delib-
e a e e o s o balance hei inna e decision- making enden-
cies (Chin e al.2021). Fo ins ance, CEOs wi h conse a i e
poli ical iews migh conside adop ing a mo e collabo a i e
app oach wi hin di e se op managemen eams (TMTs) o
enhance hei ocus on ESG p io i ies.
Simila ly, ou indings sugges ha co po a e boa ds should
ailo go e nance s uc u es o complemen hei CEOs'
decision- making s yles o suppo he o ganiza ion's o e a -
ching goals. Fo i ms commi ed o ESG objec i es, g an ing
libe al- leaning CEOs g ea e au onomy may le e age hei
na u al inclina ions owa d decision- making ha aligns wi h
hese goals. On he o he hand, his s udy unde sco es ha an
I y League educa ion— ypically iewed posi i ely—may inad-
e en ly hinde s akeholde in e es s in ela ion o ESG issues.
Companies led by mo e conse a i e o I y League–educa ed
CEOs—who migh in insically dep io i ize ESG ini ia i es—
should emphasize a eam- based app oach in decision- making.
Such a s a egy encou ages le e aging he b oade pe spec i es
o he en i e TMT a he han elying solely on he CEO's indi-
idual p e e ences.
Beyond implica ions o decision- making amewo ks and
go e nance s uc u es, his s udy o e s sugges ions o op
managemen s a ing, incen i e s uc u es, and leade ship de-
elopmen p og ams. Fi ms should adop a holis ic app oach
o alen managemen by conside ing he di e si y o poli i-
cal ideologies and educa ional backg ounds, which can os e
a b oade ange o pe spec i es wi hin he o ganiza ion—
pa icula ly aluable o na iga ing complex ESG issues.
Leade ship de elopmen p og ams should aim o b oaden
he pe spec i es o CEOs, especially hose who a e poli ically
conse a i e o I y League–educa ed, by enhancing social
awa eness and s akeholde - o ien ed decision- making skills.
Inco po a ing ESG me ics in o CEO pe o mance e alua ions
can u he incen i ize alignmen wi h sus ainabili y goals,
leading o imp o ed o e all ESG pe o mance. This app oach
ensu es ha CEOs a e mo i a ed o p io i ize ESG ini ia i es,
ul ima ely esul ing in enhanced o ganiza ional ou comes in
ela ion o ESG.
By implemen ing hese p ac ical implica ions, o ganiza ions
can mo e e ec i ely align hei s a egies wi h desi ed ou comes
and con ibu e posi i ely o b oade socie al and en i onmen al
challenges, ad ancing a mo e sus ainable and equi able u u e
in ligh o oday's g and socie al challenges.
5.2 | Fu u e Resea ch
Ou indings indica e ha a CEO's poli ical ideologies signi i-
can ly p edic hei alues and decision- making p ocesses.
Poli ically libe al CEOs end o adop a mo e s akeholde -
o ien ed pe spec i e o business esponsibili ies compa ed o
hei conse a i e coun e pa s. Fu u e esea ch migh ex-
plo e he impac o CEO poli ical ideology on ESG ou comes
ac oss di e en coun ies and poli ical sys ems o in es iga e
he poli ical ideologies o en i e TMTs (Chin e al.2013).
In pu suing his line o inqui y, u u e esea ch should inco -
po a e addi ional ac o s when assessing he impac o poli ical
ideology on ESG pe o mance o de elop a mo e comp ehen-
si e unde s anding o he unde lying dynamics. Fu he s ud-
ies migh also in es iga e he ole o mode a ing ac o s, such
as CEO powe (B ahma and Economou2024; Chu e al.2023),
wi hin he con ex o CEO poli ical ideology and ESG s a -
egy, as powe dynamics may play a c i ical ole in in luencing
CEOs' capaci y o shape s a egic ou comes (Chin e al.2013).
Ou esea ch lays c ucial g oundwo k o u he explo a ion
o he in e sec ion be ween CEO poli ical ideology, decision-
making, and co po a e s a egy. Fu u e s udies could in es iga e
he long- e m impac o ESG decisions in luenced by poli ical
ideology on i m pe o mance o conduc c oss- cul u al analy-
ses o explo e how he link be ween CEO poli ical ideology and
ESG p ac ices di e s ac oss a ious cul u al o poli ical se -
ings. In conclusion, his s udy u he enhances he academic
unde s anding o how CEOs' pe sonal backg ounds shape hei
decision- making p ocesses and o ganiza ional ou comes. The
indings emphasize he need o op manage s, o ganiza ions,
and s akeholde s o c i ically e alua e he biases and inequi ies
associa ed wi h CEOs' poli ical ideologies and eli e educa ional
backg ounds.
4805
Au ho Con ibu ions
Tim Heubeck: concep ualiza ion, me hodology, da a cu a ion, o mal
analysis, isualiza ion, p ojec adminis a ion, w i ing – o iginal d a ,
w i ing – e iew and edi ing. Annina Ah ens: concep ualiza ion,
w i ing – o iginal d a , w i ing – e iew and edi ing.
Acknowledgemen s
Open Access unding enabled and o ganized by P ojek DEAL.
Con lic s o In e es
The au ho s decla e no con lic s o in e es .
Da a A ailabili y S a emen
Da a sha ing is no possible due o p o ide es ic ions. All o he da a
a e publicly a ailable.
Use o AIGC Tools
The au ho s acknowledge ha AIGC ools, including G amma ly and
Cha GPT 4o, we e used o imp o e spelling and g amma and pe o m
gene al edi ing.
Endno es
1 We acknowledge he dis inc ion be ween ESG and CSR. None heless,
ou ocus is on s udying he e ec o CEO poli ical ideology on he h ee
ESG pilla s. ESG encompasses a b oade spec um o issues compa ed o
CSR, co e ing en i onmen al aspec s (like ene gy e iciency and pollu-
ion con ol), social conside a ions (such as communi y engagemen and
wo kplace sa e y), and go e nance ac o s (including execu i e accoun -
abili y and e hical business p ac ices) (Ma iny e al.2024). Because o
he comp ehensi e scope and quan i iable na u e o ESG pe o mance
(LSEG2023), we use i ms' ESG pe o mance as a me ic o assess he
impac o CEO poli ical ideology on he h ee ESG pilla s.
2 Ou dependen a iable, ESG pe o mance, is lagged by one yea , ex-
ending ou da ase h ough 2020.
3 ESG a ings can a y among di e en ESG a ing agencies due o he
absence o s anda dized ESG disclosu es and he inhe en in luence o
a ing agencies (Be g e al.2022). Al hough we u ilized LSEG Eikon,
one o he mos used ESG a ing agencies, i is possible ha ESG da a
om o he agencies could ha e p oduced di e en esul s because o
he inconsis encies in ESG a ings ac oss a ious da a p o ide s.
4 We acknowledge ha nondona ing CEOs may hold hei poli ical
belie s p i a e, especially wi h inc easing public sc u iny agains
CEO ac i ism (Feix and We nicke2024). Assuming ha nondona -
ing CEOs a e poli ically mode a e migh in oduce se e e bias o
he sample because CEOs migh no dona e due o ea ing public
sc u iny o hei pe sonal poli ical ideology. Thus, o di e en ia e
be ween di e en poli ical ideologies, p e ious esea ch has used
sepa a e ca ego ies o poli ically libe al, conse a i e, mode a e,
and una ilia ed indi iduals (e.g., Vaidyana han e al. 2011). This
a gumen a ion also co esponds o poli ical esea ch, which inds
ha indi iduals gene ally dona e o candida es and pa ies ha
align wi h hei own poli ical ideology (Ba be 2016). In limi ing ou
analysis o dona ing CEOs, we can e ec i ely gauge CEOs' pe sonal
poli ical con ic ions and unco e he undis o ed e ec o CEO po-
li ical o ien a ion on ESG. We excluded 83 nondona ing CEOs, o
which no public da a on hei poli ical dona ion was a ailable. This
s ep is also necessa y o conduc addi ional es s and assess po en ial
endogenei y in ou esea ch da a.
5 We no e ha ecen esea ch has begun o explo e he in luence o CEO
mino i y s a us on CSR. Howe e , his s udy by Do and He bohn(2024)
ocused on he mode a ion e ec o CEO mino i y s a us on he main
ela ionship be ween boa d e hnic di e si y and CSR. Ou use o CEO
BIPOC s a us, as an ex ension o CEO mino i y s a us, does no con lic
wi h his s udy, as we ocus on a s uc u ally di e en ou come a iable,
and hei use o mino i y s a us as a mode a o di e s undamen ally
om ou use o he a iable as an ins umen o cap u e exogenous a ia-
ion in CEO poli ical ideology. Ou app oach is u he alida ed by pos -
es ima ion diagnos ics, which con i m he exogenei y o his ins umen .
6 We a e highly awa e o he po en ial acial bias in oduced by ou own
p edisposi ions in e iewing a CEO's p o ile pho og aphs. We used
his al e na e de ini ion o CEO mino i y s a us o p o ide a mo e
comp ehensi e accoun o mino i y s a us and aise he awa eness
ha he dis inc ion in o “whi e” and “nonwhi e” ca ego ies migh be
highly p oblema ic. We u ge he eade s o be awa e o his p oblem in
he exis ing esea ch and hope ha ou di e en ia ed examina ion has
emedied—and a leas no con ibu ed o— acial biases.
7 Despi e adhe ing o bes p ac ices, ecen me hodological guidelines,
and employing a wo- me hod app oach combining he IV 2SLS and
GMM models o suppo ou main indings, we acknowledge ha endog-
enei y canno be de ini i ely uled ou in ou esea ch model. Reade s
a e ad ised o in e p e he esul s wi h his limi a ion in mind.
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