From Kant to Dostoyevsky: Dmytro Čyževs’kyj’s Literary Anthropology

F om Kan o Dos oye sky:
Dmy o Čyže s’kyj’s Li e a y An h opology
Pa ick Flack
Uni e si é de F ibou g
[email p o ec ed]
SYNOPSIS
This pape econs uc s he co e a gumen o Dmy o Čyže s’kyj’s un inished p ojec on o malism
in e hics, de eloped in he la e 1920s du ing his exile in P ague. Al hough he planned book ne e
ma e ialized, Čyže s’kyj published h ee a icles and ab oade se o ela ed ex s which, aken o-
ge he , a icula e adis inc i e and cohe en heo e ical posi ion. A i s cen e lies acompelling in u-
i ion: ha li e a u e plays a undamen al ole in he cons i u ion o mo al subjec i i y— wha may
be e med Čyže s’kyj’s li e a y an h opology. Čyže s’kyj begins wi h ac i ique o Kan ian o malism,
iden i ying i s abs ac ion om he conc e e will o he indi idual subjec as he oo o ab oade
c isis in e hical heo y. Ra he han abandoning o malism, howe e , he seeks o econ igu e i ,
p oposing ha e hical meaning is no logically subsumed bu symbolically embodied. This claim
is de eloped bo h philosophically— in a ypology o he o ms o gene ali y— and in e p e i ely,
h ough eadings o Dos oye sky’s mo i o he double. Posi ioned alongside con empo a ies such
as Bakh in, Lukács, and Kojè e, Čyže s’kyj o e s aunique esponse: no polyphony, bu on ological
doubling as he si e o e hical indi idua ion.
KEYWORDS
Dmy o Čyže s’kyj; Mikhail Bakh in; Fyodo Dos oe sky; philosophical an h opology; li e a y he-
o y; Kan ; o malis e hics; double; ecep ion.
DOI
h ps://doi.o g/10.14712/23366680.2025.1.5
INTRODUCTION
In he la e 1920s, while in exile in P ague, Dmy o Čyže s’kyj se abou w i ing abook
on he ques ion o o malism in e hics, he ‘ undamen al heme’, acco ding o him, o
a‘con empo a y c isis o e hical heo y so ex ao dina ily p o ound and signi ican
ha i calls in o ques ion he e y possibili y o e hical heo y in i s adi ional o m’
(Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.15). While he book ne e ma e ialized as awhole, Čyže s’kyj
published h ee a icles p o iding ‘asumma y o i s indi idual chap e s’ (Čyže s’kyj
1931a, p.50): ‘On Fo malism in E hics: Rema ks on he Con empo a y C isis o E hi-
cal Theo y’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a), ‘Logic and E hics: The Ques ion o O e coming E hical
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PATRICK FLACK 87
“Fo malism”’ (1928/1931, Čyže s’kyj 1931a)1 and ‘On he P oblem o he Double in Dos-
oye sky: APhilosophical In e p e a ion’ (Čyže s’kyj 1929a).2 Addi ionally, ab oade
body o ela ed w i ings om he 1920s and 30s (e.g. ‘Hegel e Nie zsche’, ‘Schil-
le und die B üde Ka amazo ’, ‘Dos oye sky-psycholog’) also deals wi h he main
hemes b oached by Čyže s’kyj in he h ee explici ly eclaimed chap e s ‘ om he
book on o mal e hics’ (c . Janzen 2008, p.132; Plo niko 2024, p.194).
As he i les o Čyže s’kyj’s a ious a icles sugges , hei hema ic ange is s ik-
ingly b oad— ex ending om e hics and logic o philosophical an h opology and li -
e a y c i icism. Gi en he un inished s a e o his book p ojec , mo eo e , i is no im-
media ely appa en whe he hese di e se explo a ions eally cons i u e acohe en
whole, o how exac ly hey we e mean o coalesce in o asys ema ic esponse o he
ques ion o o malism in e hics. Ne e heless, se e al co e conce ns ecu h ough-
ou : he no ion o e hical pe sonali y and i s dual o di ided na u e, he p oblem o
he (logical o li e a y) ‘ o m’ o e hical p oposi ions, and he endu ing cen ali y o
igu es such as Kan and Dos oye sky, whose p esence emains cons an despi e dis-
ciplina y and hema ic shi s. I is also clea ha Čyže s’kyj did a leas ha e ab oad,
o e a ching p ojec , and ha hese w i ings amoun o an a emp a ‘sys ema ic phi-
losophy’ (c . Janzen 2008, pp.125–127)— a iew a i med by Zenko ’skij (1950, p.460),
and mo e ecen ly by Nikolaj Plo niko , who has pe suasi ely p oposed econs uc -
ing Čyže s’kyj’s e o as he ‘d a o aphenomenological e hics’ (Plo niko 2024).
Ou aim in his s udy, in his con ex , is o con ibu e o sha pening ou unde -
s anding o he na u e and impo o Čyže s’kyj’s p ojec on o malism in e hics by
examining mo e p ecisely how his seemingly sca e ed and incomple e in es iga-
ions can indeed be unde s ood as a icula ing an o iginal and cohe en posi ion. We
ocus on one cen al in ui ion ha appea s o unde lie— o a he o cons i u e he
po en ial heo e ical poin o c ys alliza ion o — he en i e p ojec : he c ucial—
pe haps e en necessa y— ole o li e a u e in he conc e e p ocess by which mo al, human
subjec i i y is cons i u ed o indi idua ed. In his ligh , Iwish speci ically o a gue ha
Čyže s’kyj’s w i ings collec i ely ou line a heo y ha , while agmen a y, may jus-
i iably be desc ibed as his ‘li e a y an h opology’.
Amajo g ound o aking he pe spec i e ou lined in Čyže s’kyj’s w i ings on
o malism in e hics se iously as acohe en posi ion is ha i did no exis in a ac-
uum, bu clea ly demands o be si ua ed in he discu si e space cons i u ed by e y
simila , i much mo e ex ensi e and sys ema ic explo a ions conduc ed by he likes
o Mikhail Bakh in, Gyö gy Lukács, and Alexand e Kojè e (c . Tihano 1999, 2000;
Jacobs 2023) o , la e , by such hinke s as Jako Goloso ke (Kan iDos oe skij, 1963),
Mikhail Li šic (P oblema Dos oe skogo, 2013), and Vale ij Podo oga (Roždenie d ojnika,
2019). All hese au ho s, indeed, ace ab oadly pa allel ajec o y, om ac i ique
o Kan , h ough Hegel and Ge man idealism (as well as, mo e o en han no , Neo-
Kan ianism and phenomenology), owa ds philosophical an h opology and inally,
h ough Dos oye sky, owa ds ali e a y an h opology. The ques ion o he ele ance
1 This a icle is an ex ended e sion o he p o ocol o a alk gi en o he Dos oye sky Soci-
e y (‘Rep esen an , Sign, Concep , Symbol’, 1928) and hus comes bo h ch onologically and
concep ually be o e he pape on he double.
2 We p o ide he ansla ion o he mo e explici i le o he la e Ge man e sion o 1931.
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and o iginali y o Čyže s’kyj in his ascina ing con ex has ne e been p ope ly
add essed,3 and he econs uc ion p oposed he e is mean as a i s s ep owa ds
such acompa a i e analysis.
Fo wan o space and ime, he aim o his pape will s ic ly consis in econ-
s uc ing and leshing ou he basic ou lines o Čyže s’kyj’s li e a y an h opology,
wi hou ei he con ex ualising o assessing i s b oade signi icance o his wo k and
hough as awhole. I is qui e ob ious, howe e , ha his pa icula ace o episode
did play ac ucial ole in Čyže s’kyj’s in ellec ual ansi ion om his ea ly in e es in
philosophy o his li e-long ocus on li e a u e (c . Mnich 2021, p.95 ). Much mo e,
he li e a y an h opology he de eloped ou o his c i ique o o malism in e hics
seems o p o ide an essen ial key o unde s anding he speci ic o ien a ion he ga e
owa ds he ques ion o ecep ion in his ma u e app oach o li e a u e i sel (c . ibid.,
esp. pp.23–50).
1. ‘ON FORMALISM IN ETHICS’: PARADOXES OF KANTIAN ABSTRACTION
The s a ing poin o Čyže s’kyj’s heo e ical jou ney owa ds ali e a y an h opol-
ogy, b oached in ‘On Fo malism in E hics’, is he pa adoxical na u e o Kan ian e h-
ics, which has been widely ecognised— well be o e Čyže s’kyj, by Schille , Fich e,
e c.— bo h as ha ing decisi ely con ibu ed o de ining he gene al condi ions o
possibili y o a ee mo al human subjec , bu , a he exac same ime, as p ecluding
any unde s anding o he p ac ical dimension o ha conc e e mo al subjec ’s in-
di idual ac ions. While Čyže s’kyj hus c edi s Kan wi h ha ing o mula ed ‘wi h
maximal sha pness he basic p o isions o e hical o malism’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a,
p.197), he also sees his o malism as ha ing c ea ed he condi ions o he con empo-
a y c isis o e hical heo y.
In ag eemen wi h hinke s such as Max Schele , Geo g Simmel, and Geo ges
Gu wi sch— whose own c i iques o o malism he exp essly acknowledges wi hou
ho oughly discussing hem—, Čyže s’kyj sees in Kan ’s o malism a ounda ional
momen , which no pos -Kan ian philosophy has been able o shake o o e u e (c .
Schele 1913, p.405) and whose essen ial p emise, ‘in an unclea and unconscious
o m, has been acommon p ope y o almos all e hical heo ies up un il he end o
he 19 h cen u y’ (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.196). Al hough Čyže s’kyj ne e qui e s a es
his in explici e ms, his assump ion is clea ly ha Kan success ully ede ined he
en i e possible heo e ical space o any u u e e hics and ha his o malism hus e -
ec i ely cons i u es anecessa y basis o any e lec ion on he condi ions o e hical
subjec i i y.
A he same ime, Čyže s’kyj also acknowledges a a al law a he e y co e o
Kan ’s o malis e hics, namely his adical cha ac e iza ion o ‘e hical will as inde-
penden o all subjec i e di e ences o empi ical condi ions, as abs ac om any
ma e , and he eby abs ac om any objec o desi e o conc e e goal’ (ibid., p.197).
By sepa a ing in his dualis ic way he gene al p inciples o mo al ac ion om he
condi ions o hei conc e e, speci ic applica ions, in Čyže s’kyj’s iew, Kan ian o -
3 The only aces o such ac i ical app oach a e o be ound in Bi sili (c . Vasil’e a 2008).
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PATRICK FLACK 89
malism makes i all bu impossible o add ess he eal ques ion o e hics, i.e. he p ac-
ical dilemmas aced by he indi idual in he conc e e de e mina ions o his will:
E hical ac ion is only possible i one chooses aside: o e use adecision is o wi hd aw
om he e hical sphe e in gene al, o o e use gene ally o be an e hical subjec . This
means ha he ocus o e hical ac ion as such lies no in he applica ion o gene al
p inciples o he will, bu in he e y ac o he de e mina ion o he will in all i s
conc e eness and indi iduali y (ibid., p.201).4
Gi en he c ucial ole o Kan ian o malism in ede ining he ounda ions o e hical
heo y in gene al, i s own con adic ions hus seem o p eclude he e y possibil-
i y o any e hics wha soe e and he e o e o plunge i in o he p o ound c isis diag-
nosed by Čyže s’kyj. As he poin s ou , ‘ou own objec ions agains e hical o malism
seem, a i s glance, o unde mine he e y possibili y o e hical heo y in gene al’
(ibid., p.202).
While he is no alone in a acking he excessi e abs ac ion and dualism o Kan ’s
e hics, Čyže s’kyj p oposes away ou o i s pa adoxes ha se s him dis inc ly apa
bo h om he a emp s o ‘ eg ound’ o ‘conc e ise’ Kan made by Schille , Fich e,
o Hegel, and om he la e u n by Schele o such no ions as ‘ma e ial alues’.
Čyže s’kyj, indeed, sees Kan ’s weakness no in he sel -subsump ion o he e hical
subjec o gene al, o mal laws ( h ough he ca ego ical impe a i e)— i.e. in he e y
essence o o malism as acommi men o he uni e sali y, a ionali y, and necessi y
o mo al laws— bu much mo e echnically, in his speci ic concep ion o he indi-
idual subjec ’s ela ion o hese no ms. Čyže s’kyj disc e ely alludes o he speci ic
na u e o his c i icism o Kan in a elling oo no e on Schele :
We belie e ha he c i ique o Kan , gi en in b oad s okes in Max Schele ’s De
Fo malismus in de E hik, is in signi ican ways unjus and oo ha sh. The objec o
ou own c i ique is no he his o ical Kan , bu only dis inc elemen s o his heo y
(ibid., p.209).5
In his na ow sense, Čyže s’kyj iden i ies wo main p oblema ic poin s in Kan ’s
cha ac e iza ion o he indi idual subjec ’s ela ion o e hical law.
The i s is o alogical na u e. Fo Čyže s’kyj, an essen ial p emise o Kan ’s o -
malism consis s in he ecogni ion ha ‘e hical heo y mus in e p e eali y in he
same way and along he same pa h as any “ heo y” in gene al’ (ibid., p.196). I i is o
4 ‘В этическом действовании возможно только стать на одну или другую сторону; от-
каз же от решения— есть выпадение из этической сферы вообще, есть вообще отказ
быть этическим субъектом.— А это значит, что центр тяжести этического действо-
вания как такового— не в приложении к воле общих принципов, а в самом факте
определения воли во всей её конкретности и индивидуальности.’ T ansla ions by me
unless o he wise no ed— P.F.
5 ‘Мы считаем критику этики Канта, данную в широких рамках цитированной книги
М.Шелера, в значительной части несправедливой и слишком суровой. Объектом же
нашей критики был не исторический Кант, а только отдельные элементы его теории.’
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90 SLOVO A SMYSL 46
be a heo y a all, e hics mus ollow he same ules as any heo e ical knowledge o
o mal logic. Fo Kan , acco ding o Čyže s’kyj, his implies ha e hical heo y canno
ocus on con ingen ma e ial o empi ical ac s, bu only on hei mos gene al o m,
on he ‘necessa y possibili y’ o wha ‘mus happen, e en i i has ne e happened
be o e’ (ibid., p.198). Fu he ,
[i] necessa ily ollows om his ha he s uc u e o e hical ‘p inciples’, ‘no ms’,
‘laws’ is s ic ly he same as he s uc u e o any o he judgmen : he ela ion o an
e hical ‘pa icula case’ o he gene al ule, he conc e e de e mina ion o he will
wi h espec o he e hical law is he logical ela ion o ‘subsump ion’ (ibid.).6
The ca ego ical impe a i e ep esen s exhibi numbe one o his logical unde -
s anding o he indi idual subjec ’s will and ac ions as being subsumed, as neu al
o indi e en ins an ia ions, unde ahomogenous, uni e sal law. Indeed, Kan pos-
i s ha he e hical maxims o he will ‘mus be chosen in such away ha hey can
be alid as gene al laws o na u e’ (quo ed ibid., p.199) and hus display no indi idual
speci ici y wha soe e . Acco ding o Čyže s’kyj, i is p ecisely his dogma ic deci-
sion o p i ilege he s ic subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al as he
only possible ela ion be ween he wo ha ul ima ely leads Kan o he ‘s ange con-
clusion ha he e hical cha ac e o an ac ion is linked o i s abs ac edness om he
conc e e, ha he ounding ai o he mo al wo ld is i s uni o mi y and mono ony’
(ibid., p.200).
O cou se, ‘ he undamen al dogma ic assump ion o Kan ’s logic does no appea
o be indispu able’ (ibid.), and Čyže s’kyj hus explici ly decla es ha i needs o be
ejec ed in o de o sal age he e y possibili y o e hical heo y (ibid., p.202). In
con as o Kan , he o e s o ‘ ecognize he possibili y o knowing an indi idual-con-
c e e e hical eali y, which a he same ime does no absolu ely ha e o be empi ico-
sensible’ (ibid.). In o he wo ds, Čyže s’kyj pos ula es he necessi y o concei ing
ano he kind o logical ela ion be ween indi idual eali y and gene al no m han he
un enable o m o logical subsump ion, o example in he ollowing way:
The applica ion o an ideal is no he subsump ion o apa icula case unde agen-
e al ule bu a he ace ain app oxima ion o he maximum possible ealiza ion
o he ideal e hical o m as i appea s o us, in all he inexhaus ible complexi y o i s
con en and s uc u e (ibid., p.202–203).7
Wi hou elabo a ing his poin any u he , Čyže s’kyj hen u ns o he second un-
damen al p oblem he sees in he abs ac edness o Kan ’s o malism, namely i s e-
6 ‘А отсюда следует с необходимостью, что структура этических «принципов, норм»,
«законов»— совершенно та же самая, что и структура всяких иных суждений; от-
ношение этического «частного случая» к общему правилу, конкретного этического
определения воли к этическому закону— есть отношение логического «подчинения».’
7 ‘«Приложение» идеала— не есть подведение частного случая под общее правило, но
известное приближение к максимальной возможной реализации предстоящего эти-
ческого «облика» во всей неисчерпаемой сложности его содержания и структуры.’
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PATRICK FLACK 91
jec ion ‘o he e hical cha ac e o any de e mina ion o he will ha is in any way
o ien ed on he subjec i sel , on his enjoymen , sa is ac ion, pleasu e’ (ibid., p.203).
Kan ’s own g ound o his ejec ion is, o cou se, his same ini ial commi men o
deal only wi h he gene al condi ions o he de e mina ions o he will, in abs ac-
ion o i s conc e e, ma e ial si ua ion. Čyže s’kyj’s coun e -a gumen , simila ly, is
hus again di ec ed no agains he main pos ula ion o Kan ’s o malism, bu agains
he ‘dogma ic’ exclusion o conc e e, indi idual ac o s in he e y p ocess o being
o ien ed o de e mined by a o mal, gene al law.
As Čyže s’kyj ies o show by con as ing Kan ’s dismissi e a i ude owa ds he
‘hedonis ic’ p inciples o enjoymen , sa is ac ion, and pleasu e wi h Pla o’s, hese
p inciples a e no necessa ily ied o he conc e e, ma e ial (i.e. basely biological and
libidinal) dimension o he subjec , bu can also be seen as he luid, un eliable e ec s
o asubjec ’s wa e ing aims. In o he wo ds, enjoymen , sa is ac ion, pleasu e a e
also goal-o ien ed ac ions, ‘ hey g ow ou o se ice’ (ibid.), and could hus po en ially
be in eg a ed in o ano he concep ion o o malism ha seeks o g asp no only asub-
jec ’s pu e o ien a ion owa ds gene al laws, bu his en i e in en ional in ol emen
owa ds hese same e hical p inciples. Fo Čyže s’kyj, p obably ollowing aphenom-
enological a gumen in his case (c . Plo niko 2024, p.186), ha in ol emen is no
simply acciden al o con ingen , bu happens a an ‘on ological’ le el and in ol es he
en i e pe sonali y o he e hical subjec :
All he mo e so, he hedonis who has linked he a e o his pleasu e wi h ali ing in-
di iduali y, who has allen in lo e, e en i only ca nally, o example Fjodo Pa lo ič
Ka amazo , who has allen in lo e egois ically wi h his child, e c., goes beyond he
limi s o he hedonis ic wo ld- iew. E e y conc e e elemen o exis ence b ings wi h
i he o e coming and disin eg a ion o hedonism. Thus, in his c i icism o hedonism,
Kan is comple ely w ong, di ec ing his a acks p ecisely agains he li ing and on o-
logically meaning ul elemen s o pleasu e (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.207).8
2. ETHICS AND LOGIC
In he second ‘chap e ’ o his planned book, ‘E hics and Logic’, Čyže s’kyj u ns his
sigh s owa ds add essing he i s o he wo main weaknesses he iden i ied in Kan-
ian e hics, namely i s commi men o he abs ac subsump ion o he indi idual
unde he gene al (c . Čyže s’kyj 1931a, p.50). In ‘Fo malism in E hics’ Čyže s’kyj’s
main ocus had been o c i icise he dogma ic and unsus ainable use o subsump-
ion and he only al e na i e o he model o logical subsump ion he pu o wa d, as
8 ‘Тем более выходит из пределов гедонистического мироотношения гедоник, связав-
ший судьбу своего наслаждения с живой индивидуальностью, влюбившийся, хотя
бы и чисто плотски, Фёдор Павлович Карамазов, эгоистический, но полюбивший
своего ребёнка отец и т.п. Всякий конкретный элемент бытия несёт с собою преодо-
ление и разложение гедонизма.— Итак, в критике гедонизма сугубо неправ Кант,
направляющий удары как раз против живых и онтологически-содержательных эле-
ментов наслаждения.’
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92 SLOVO A SMYSL 46
we saw, was he (i sel a he Kan ian) idea o ‘ace ain app oxima ion o he maxi-
mum possible ealiza ion’. In ‘E hics and Logic’, he se s ou on adi e en ack, lea -
ing al oge he he amewo k o Kan ian philosophy aside o ques ion whe he ‘ he
“applica ion” o gene al p inciples o speci ic cases, conside ed om apu ely logical
poin o iew, is exhaus ed by he ypes and o ms, which a e adi ionally accep ed
in (school!) logic’ (ibid., p.50). His answe , unsu p isingly, is nega i e, leading him
o de elop acomple ely di e en concep ion o he logical ela ions be ween he gen-
e al and he pa icula .
Čyže s’kyj’s e lec ion on he opic, i has o be said, is idiosync a ic. Excep o
acouple o quick e e ences o Gessen, Losskij, Webe , Ma bu g Neo-Kan ianism,
phenomenology, and his own wo k on logic (ibid., p.53), he chooses no o si ua e his
a gumen explici ly in ace ain school o mo emen . He begins ins ead wi h a e y
succinc e iew o he impo ance o he heme o he ‘gene al’ (obščee) in he his o y
o Wes e n philosophy, which ‘in ace ain sense is e en mo e undamen al, mo e
o iginal han, o example, he no o ious “gnoseological” p oblem o he knowledge
o he “ex e nal wo ld”’ (ibid., p.51). Ha ing es ablished he ‘o iginal’ impo ance o
he p oblem o he gene al, Čyže s’kyj mo es on o he c ux o his a icle, namely
‘ he o ms o gi enness o he gene al’ ( o my dannos i obščego), which he sees no
as as ic ly abs ac o concep ual p oblem, bu a he as pe aining mo e la gely
and undamen ally o he meaning ul s uc u es o expe ience i sel . As Čyže s’kyj
poin s ou :
he p oblem o he mul iplici y o o ms o gi enness o he gene al is no exhaus ed
by he p oblem o he mul iplici y o aspec s o concep s. The gene al encompasses
amuch wide sphe e han ha o abs ac hinking, and has deepe oo s han only
in he concep (ibid., p.53).9
Ins ead,
E en he mos nai e app oach o being i sel can con ince us ha being is immedi-
a ely gi en o us as pe mea ed, in e wined, and in e linked wi h elemen s o he
gene al. We do no e en ha e o look o hem, we do no need o ‘ques ion’ being, o
i e eals i sel as gene al (ibid.).10
On he basis o his asse ion, Čyže s’kyj p oceeds o dis inguish ou di e en modes
o immedia e gi enness o he gene al: epe i ion, concen a ion, conjuga ion, mo emen
(ibid., p.56). As he poin s ou :
9 ‘Но ведь проблема многообразия форм данности общего не исчерпывается пробле-
мой множественности видов понятия. Общее охватывает более широкую сферу, чем
только абстрактное мышление, и коренится глубже, чем только в понятии.’
10 ‘Уже самый непосредственный, непредвзятый, наивный подход к бытию убеждает
нас, что бытие непосредственно предстоит нам пронизанное, оплетённое и связан-
ное элементами общего. Их даже не приходится искать, не нужно «вопрошать» бы-
тие, ибо оно само раскрывается как общее.’
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PATRICK FLACK 93
These ca ego ies do no ake us beyond he bounds o immediacy. They all p o ide us
in immedia e, i.e. in undi e en ia ed and un o med being, a ious o ms and ‘s yles’
o he gene al in he indi idual (ibid.).11
Ha ing de ined hese ou gene al modes o gi enness o he gene al, Čyže s’kyj can
hen explain wha o m hey ake on conc e ely, a icula ing he eby a ypology ha
is no dissimila o ha o Cha les Sande s Pei ce, bo h in i s gene al concep ion o
‘logic’ as essen ially a o mal semio ic and in he speci ic a icula ion i es ablishes
be ween he ypes o semio ic unc ions o uni s:
The gene al can be gi en ei he as asingle link o he epea ing chain, as apoin o
concen a ion o ‘collec ion’, as he cen e o ag oup, o as he o m emb acing ha
g oup, o , inally, as amo emen , acons i u ing commonali y.
As a esul , we achie e asys em o ou undamen al aspec s o he gi enness o
he gene al, which we shall call, in adequa ion wi h hei essence: ep esen a i e,
sign, concep , symbol (ibid., p.58).12
The es o he a icle is dedica ed o he de ails o his semio ic ypology, which
cons i u es aso o p og ession: while he ep esen a i e cons i u es he mos ab-
s ac ela ion be ween he gene al and he singula (by simply epea ing he gen-
e al in he singula ), he symbol appea s as aconc e e being ‘exp essing’ ano he be-
ing (which can be gene al) in he ullness o i s conc e eness (ibid., p.62). We a e no
able, un o una ely, o linge u he on his model, which, as Čyže s’kyj himsel
no es, equi es u he de elopmen by adding 4 sub-modes o each main aspec ,
and wi h which, a he e y ime o w i ing ‘E hics and Logic’, he was al eady ‘no
longe sa is ied’ (ibid., p.58). In any case, wha we ha e seen so a is enough o il-
lus a e wha Isee as he wo main poin s o Čyže s’kyj’s answe o he abs ac ion
o Kan ’s o malism.
Fi s ly, on agene al le el, we see ha Čyže s’kyj chooses he somewha su p is-
ing pa h o a acking Kan on he echnical e ain o logic: i is nei he Kan ’s con-
cep ion o eason (and i s limi s) no o man, much less his deon ology and he o -
malism o he ca ego ical impe a i e ha a e he a ge o Čyže s’kyj’s c i ique, bu
he a he na ow ques ion o he logical subsump ion o he indi idual unde he
gene al. Whe he one wishes o ag ee wi h Čyže s’kyj’s speci ic ypology o no , i
is clea ha his is a alid and in e es ing a enue o c i icism, one ha de eloped a
app oxima ely he same ime in anumbe o wo ks by o he hinke s (we men ioned
11 ‘Эти категории не выводят нас за границы непосредственности. Все они— в непо-
средственности, т.е. в недифференцированном и неоформленном бытии— дают нам
в различном виде и «стиле» общее в единичном.’
12 ‘Общее может быть дано или в одном звене повторяющегося, или как пункт концен-
трации, «собирания», как средоточие группы, или как охватывающая группу форма,
или, наконец, как движение, конституирующее общность.
Таким образом, мы получаем систему четырёх основных видов данности общего,
которые мы и назовём— соответственно с их существом: представитель, знак, поня-
тие, символ.’
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94 SLOVO A SMYSL 46
he ob ious case o Pei ce, bu one could add he phenomenologis s Husse l and
Heidegge , as well as he Neo-Kan ians Cohen and Cassi e ).
Secondly, Čyže s’kyj makes adecisi e mo e by u ning away om as a ic, ho-
mogenous unde s anding o he subsump ion o he indi idual unde he gene al,
p i ileged in he ca ego ies o pu e ep esen a ion, semio ic desc ip ion o concep-
ual dis illa ion, owa ds he dynamic, li ing o m o he symbol. The in ima ion o
Čyže s’kyj’s ypology, when unde s ood in connec ion wi h his c i icism o Kan , is
indeed ha e hical no ms a e ins an ia ed and can be co ec ly unde s ood no as
he pu e applica ion o agene al idea o as pu ely applied concep s, bu as conc e e,
in ini ely a ying symbols. In o he wo ds, he e hical dimension o he indi idual
ac ions o asubjec a e no o be abs ac ed om hei conc e e de e mina ions, bu
a e o be seen as being ealized and exp essed symbolically, o in symbolic o m, by
he en i e y o he conc e e con ex o he subjec ’s li e and ac i i y. He e again, i is
wo h no ing, Čyže s’kyj is no alone in his u n o he symbolic as he locus o he
possibili y and ealiza ion o he wo lds o e hics and cul u e in aKan ian pe spec-
i e ( he mos e iden poin o e e ence is o cou se Cassi e , c . Mnich 2015).
3. DOSTOYEVSKY’S DOUBLES
Ha ing hus ‘ escued’ he e y possibili y o e hical heo y by acing he ou lines
o o malism’s escape om he clu ches o logical subsump ion— by demons a ing
how he exp ession o gene al e hical laws a ains an inexhaus ible complexi y and
a ie y in conc e e, li ing symbolic o ms—, Čyže s’kyj u ns, in he hi d ‘chap e ’
o his book, ‘On he P oblem o The Double’, o ace he second o he wo conund ums
he has iden i ied in Kan ’s o malism, namely he dualism i in oduces be ween in-
clina ion (Neigung) and du y (P lich ), o mo e gene ally be ween he conc e e de e -
mina ions o asubjec ’s will and i s ela ion o he gene al e hical no m.
As was he case in ‘E hics and Logic’, Čyže s’kyj’s s a egy is no o y o wo k
di ec ly wi hin he amewo k o Kan ’s philosophy ( o example by conside ing his
Thi d C i ique o his An h opology), bu a he o a icula e a heo e ical posi ion ha
answe s he pa adox i aises while espec ing he gene al p emises o e hical o -
malism. Ins ead o de eloping his own heo e ical model, Čyže s’kyj o e s his ime
o use he igu e o he double in he wo k o Fyodo Dos oye sky as he basis o his
a gumen .
While his u n o li e a u e and Dos oye sky migh appea qui e sudden, i is in
ac o eshadowed in se e al signi ican ways. In ‘Fo malism in E hics’, o example,
Dos oye sky’s Fedo Ka amazo is men ioned as an illus a ion o he ‘on ological’
( a he han ‘acciden al’ and pu ely ‘empi ical’) dimension o he conc e e elemen s
de e mining ape son’s e hical ho izon (Čyže s’kyj 1928a, p.207). In asho au obio-
g aphical ex om 1945, Čyže s’kyj e en sugges s ha ‘some o my Dos oye sky-a -
icles should be conside ed as p elimina y s udies o my book on o malism in e hics’
(quo ed in Janzen 2008, p.125). As o he u n o li e a u e, i mus be in e p e ed
as alogical consequence o Čyže s’kyj’s a gumen in ‘E hics and Logic’: gi en ha
e hical no ms mani es hemsel es in indi idual human ac ions in he o m no o
abs ac , concep ual judgemen s, bu o complex, li ing symbols, i bea s o eason
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PATRICK FLACK 101
happened as a esul […]. A he hea o he plo is he e o e Goljadkin’s a emp ,
ollowing he o al ejec ion o his pe son by o he s, o eplace o he s wi h himsel
(Bakh in 1929, p.32).
Fa om p o iding acoun e o Čyže s’kyj’s insis ence on he impo ance o he dou-
ble and endency on he pa o Dos oye sky’s cha ac e s o mani es schizoph enic
inne dialogue, he ob iously Hegelian unde ones o his passage, which sees he
Double as an abo ed a emp a dialogical ecogni ion and cons i u ion o he sel ,
a e p ecisely wha dis inguishes Bakh in om Čyže s’kyj.
Fo Čyže s’kyj, indeed, Goljadkin’s schizoph enia and doubling a e no in e -
p e ed as a ailing o symp om o his unsuccess ul a emp owa ds aHegelian con-
s i u ion o he sel h ough ecogni ion and dialogue, bu as acons i u i e momen
in he c ea ion o any mo al subjec . As we ha e seen, some o he s onges o Dos-
oye sky’s cha ac e s seem o be cons uc ed almos solely h ough aschizoph enic
de-doubling in o o he cha ac e s, and no h ough an ‘in e nalized dialogue’. This
is he case mos spec acula ly wi h S a ogin, who seems o in o m he cons uc ion
o all he o he cha ac e s in Demons, bu also wi h I an Ka amazo , who engages
bo h in ‘ eal’ dialogues, o example wi h his b o he s, bu who also has apowe ul
double in he igu e o Sme djako . Again, he e is no ho izon he e o o e coming
he schizoph enic spli o he subjec h ough a adical opening o dialogue and po-
lyphony. Schizoph enic doubling o Čyže s’kyj is an una oidable momen o i e
o passage in he cons i u ion o he e hical subjec bo h in Dos oye sky, and mo e
gene ally. Asubjec i i y ha does no go h ough he con on a ion wi h i s semi-
ex e io ized sel emains abs ac , and can ha e no claim o be cons i u ed as a ull,
in eg al, mo al subjec .
This o cou se aises wi h ex eme acui y one u he p oblem, which Bakh in’s
polyphony had seemingly add essed: namely ha o he s a us o he wo k o a
i sel , and he au ho ’s posi ion is-à- is he wo k.21 I one ejec s he Bakh inian
idea ha an au ho can di es himsel o his own posi ion, and le he o he speak in
his wo k, hen he wo k i sel mus be conside ed as aschizoph enic ope a ion o
exe cise o de-doubling: in his sense, hey a e only abs ac , in ellec ual p oduc s
ha do no e eal he ull pe sonali y ei he o hei au ho o o he cha ac e s he
has c ea ed. This ac ualiza ion can in e ene only h ough he ‘comple ion’ o he ex
in he ac o i s eading: he p oduc i e, mo al ension o he double ha is awo k
o li e a u e in ela ion o i s au ho s mus be enli ened and ealized in a ecep i e
ho izon by a eade , who will ul ima ely decide and esol e ( o himsel ) he ensions
be ween he eal and an as ical, abs ac and conc e e. The main p oblem o o mal-
ism in e hics hus appea s o be, and was indeed ea ed as such by Čyže s’kyj, he
ques ion o eade - esponse and ecep ion.
21 As belie es Zenkin, ha p oblem is in ac al eady p esen in Bakh in himsel : ‘The p ob-
lem o he an as ic in li e a u e, as shown by Dos oe sky’s The Double, lies no only in he
e bal economy o a ex bu also, and pe haps p ima ily, in i s ecep i e s uc u e, whe e
he “a chi ec onic” o de imposed by he au ho is o e u ned. Bakh in’s me alinguis ic
analysis p o es alid in i s essen ials, bu i mus be aken u he —beyond he au ho ial
ac i i y— owa d he expe ience o he eade ’ (Zenkin 2021, p.534).
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102 SLOVO A SMYSL 46
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