Re iew o Ga e-Le el Ha dwa e Coun e measu e
Compa ison Agains Powe Analysis A acks
E. Tena-S´
anchez
IMSE-CSIC/U. Se illa
[email p o ec ed]
F. E. Po es ad-O d´
o˜
nez
IMSE-CSIC/U. Se illa
[email p o ec ed]
V. Zu˜
niga-Gonz´
alez
IMSE-CNM-CSIC
i [email p o ec ed]
C. Fe n´
andez-Ga c´
ıa
IMSE-CNM-CSIC
[email p o ec ed]
J. M. Mo a-Gu i´
e ez
IMSE-CNM-CSIC
[email p o ec ed]
C. J. Jim´
enez-Fe n´
andez
IMSE-CSIC/U. Se illa
[email p o ec ed]
A. J. Acos a-Jim´
enez
IMSE-CSIC/U. Se illa
[email p o ec ed]
Abs ac —In his pape , we p esen a e iew o he wo k [1].
The as se lemen o P i acy and Secu e ope a ions in he
In e ne o Things (IoT) is appealing he selec ion o mechanisms
o achie e a highe le el o secu i y a he minimum cos and wi h
easonable pe o mances. In ecen yea s, dozens o p oposals
ha e been p esen ed o design ci cui s esis an o Powe Analysis
a acks. In his pape a deep e iew o he s a e o he a o
ga e-le el coun e measu es agains Powe Analysis a acks has
been done, pe o ming a compa ison be ween hiding app oaches
( he powe consump ion is in ended o be he same o all he
da a p ocessed) and he ones conside ing a masking p ocedu e
( he da a a e masked and beha e as andom). The mos ele an
p oposals in he li e a u e, 35 o hiding and 6 o masking, ha e
been analyzed, no only by using da a p o ided by p opose s,
bu also hose included in o he e e ences o compa ison.
Index Te ms—ha dwa e coun e measu es; ga e le el; VLSI
design o c yp og aphic ci cui s; side-channel a acks (SCAs);
in o ma ion secu i y; logic design; In e ne o hings (IoT).
Tipo de con ibuci´
on: In es igaci´
on ya publicada.
I. INTRODUCTION
The high g ow h ha he In e ne o Things (IoT) is
expe iencing has b ough wi h i an inc ease in he exchange
o sensi i e in o ma ion om in e connec ed use s. T adi-
ionally, he ma hema ical algo i hm and he leng h o he
key de ined he secu i y o c yp o-sys ems. Howe e , he
physical implemen a ion o c yp og aphic algo i hms leads o
in o ma ion leakages ha can be exploi ed by hi d pa ies
o e eal c i ical da a [2], [3]. Among he di e en ypes o
a acks, he so-called Side-Channel A acks (SCAs) belong o
he g oup o passi e nonin asi e a acks and a e hose whe e
he c yp og aphic de ice is no manipula ed, e.g. he e is no
ace ha a malicious agen has had access o he de ice and
he e is no damage o he ci cui [2], [3]. Among SCAs, hose
based on analysis o he powe consump ion (Powe Analysis,
PA) p oduced by he ci cui ha e a ac ed signi ican a en ion
om he esea ch communi y [3].
Since he eme gence o powe analysis a acks in he la e
1990s, nume ous coun e measu es ha e been p oposed by he
scien i ic communi y o sea ch o al e na i es o minimize
he weak poin s o c yp o-ci cui s [4], [5], [6]. The e a e
se e al coun e measu e s a egies a he ha dwa e le el. These
coun e measu es ange om he layou up o algo i hm le el
and go om a ack de ec ion o adding edundan blocks o
ob usca e possible in o ma ion leakage. They can be clas-
si yed depending on he echnique used o b eak he da a
co ela ion wi h he powe consump ion: hiding ( he powe
consump ion is in ended o be he same o all he da a
p ocessed) o masking ( he da a a e masked and beha e as
andom). This e iew ocus on ga e-le el hiding and masking
coun e measu es.
II. STATE OF THE ART: GATE-LEVEL COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST POWER ANALYSIS ATTACKS
PA a acks exploi he co ela ion be ween powe con-
sump ion and he da a ha a e p ocessed by he c yp o-
g aphic de ice du ing enc yp ion, ollowing se e al s a egies,
o e eal he c i ical da a. Ha dwa e coun e measu es a e
o ien ed owa ds b eaking he ela ionship be ween da a being
p ocessed and consumed powe . To b eak his a e a he
ga e le el, wo di e en mechanisms a e widely used: hiding
and masking echniques. The hiding a emp s o ha e he
same powe consump ion a he ga e, ci cui , o algo i hm
le el, independen ly o he da a being p ocessed. In masking,
he c i ical da a a e masked wi h a andom da a sequence
du ing enc yp ion such ha ope a ions on he masked da a
a e indis inguishable om andom da a.
A. Ga e-le el masking
Ga e-le el masking consis s o compu ing bo h he inpu s
and he mask inside he ga e i sel . In hese implemen a ions,
each masked signal amis p opaga ed along wi h i s mask
ma, being he unmasked signal a=am⊕ma. The simples
way o pe o m masking is h ough boolean masking, whe e
an inpu wo d ge s masked by being XOR-ed by a andom
alue. A i hme ic masking in ol es mo e complex a i hme ic
ope a ions wi hin speci ic algo i hms. Boolean masking is
p e e ably used a he ga e le el, while a he algo i hm
o ci cui le el, he use o dedica ed a i hme ic masking
echniques ha bes sui he algo i hm a e ecommended.
B. Ga e-le el hiding
Hiding ies o achie e exac ly he same powe consump ion
in ope a ions, ega dless o he da a being p ocessed. Since he
i s PA a acks we e p esen ed, he e ha e been nume ous
logic s yle p oposals ha seek o be esis an o hese a acks
by ha ing da a-independen powe consump ion. In a i s
app oach, his iden ical consump ion can be achie ed using
dual- ail signals and di e en ial ga es, whe e he ue and
Sesión Pos e 2 - In es igación ya publicada II
290
Fig. 1. Top 5 coun e measu es in secu i y le els (a) and op 5 coun e measu es wi h bes ade-o be ween pe o mance and secu i y le els (b).
complemen ed ou pu s a e simul aneously gene a ed: in e e y
clock cycle, one o he di e en ial b anches pe o ms he ga e
unc ion and he o he one i s complemen a he same ime.
Since hiding means exac powe consump ion indepen-
den ly o he da a p ocessed, i implies ull symme y. How-
e e , mos o hese echniques su e om he di icul y o
ailo ing he place and ou e ope a ion so ha he capaci i e
load o wo wi es is equal. This is pa icula ly di icul in
nanome ic echnologies, whe e he ansis o sizes and wi ing
wid hs con inuously sh ink. Placing and ou ing a ci cui
manually, i.e. doing a ull-cus om (FC) design, signi ican ly
inc eases he design cos s. An addi ional d awback is he so-
called ea ly e alua ion, also called da a-dependen ime-o -
e alua ion, e e ing o he cases whe e a ga e e alua es i s
ou pu a di e en ime ins ances depending on he alue o
i s inpu . I becomes mo e p oblema ic when se e al o such
ga es a e cascaded o ealize a combina ional ci cui , causing
he powe consump ion pa e n o he ci cui o ha e a clea
dependency on i s inpu alue.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GATE-LEVEL
COUNTERMEASURES
The p esen ed analysis conside s he mos ele an solu ions
in he li e a u e, 35 hiding p oposals, and 6 based on masking,
no only by using he da a p o ided by p oposing au ho s, bu
also hose included in he o he e e ences o compa ison.
Fo a comple e analysis, please e e o [1]. Ad an ages and
d awbacks o he p oposals a e analysed, showing quan i ied
da a o cos , pe o mance (delay and powe ), and es ima ed
secu i y le el, when a ailable. The compa ison be ween pe -
o mances, ea u es, and secu i y le els o hese p oposals
is no easy o ca y ou , gi en he a ie y o app oaches
and conside ed echnologies. Howe e , a summa y o he
compa a i e analysis is p esen ed using he no malized alues
p esen ed by he e e ence au ho s o each coun e measu e.
Fig. 1-a p o ides a isual compa ison o he op 5 coun-
e measu es wi h he bes secu i y le els. Fig. 1-b depic s
he op 5 coun e measu es wi h he bes ade-o be ween
secu i y alues and a ea-delay-p oduc pe o mance and a ea
o e head. F om hese igu es, i can be seen ha , ypically
and as expec ed, he highe he secu i y he highe he cos .
Howe e , his is no always he case. Fo example, in Fig. 1-b
i can be seen ha he SABL app oach has app oxima ely he
same powe and a ea cos s as BCDL bu p o ides signi ican ly
less p o ec ion agains PA. Ne e heless, in addi ion o pe -
o mance deg ada ion and secu i y le els, i is also impo an
o conside he inhe en design di icul ies o each p oposal,
as well as he easibili y o including he coun e measu e in
he design.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In his pape a deep e iew o he s a e-o - he-a o ga e-
le el coun e measu es agains powe analysis a acks has been
done. This wo k also isually depic s he pe o mance, cos ,
and secu i y le el ela ion o he se e al solu ions o be e as-
sis c yp odesigne s in he selec ion o he bes solu ion, s yle
acco ding o hei cons ain s. O e all, hese esul s sugges
ha RSL and DRSL solu ions a e he bes app oaches when
conside ing masking, while BCDL, SDMLp, TSPL, HDRL
and SABL a e hose wi h bes secu i y-pe o mance igu es.
I can also be concluded ha hiding p oposals each highe
secu i y le els, bu wi h mo e di icul design cons ain s,
which, i no me , can esul in secu i y weaknesses. Finally,
his e iew also sugges s ha he combina ion o masking
and hiding, as in Masked SABL, can p o ide he mos secu e
solu ion, bu a he cos o mo e complexi y.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This wo k has been unded by p ojec SCAROT 1380823-
US/JUNTA/FEDER, UE. Thanks o SPIRS P ojec wi h G an
Ag eemen No. 952622 unde he Eu opean Union’s Ho izon
2020 p og amme and G an PID2020-116664RB-I00 unded
by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033.
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o˜
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