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Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

Abstract

This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-know solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that, in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original linear production process. In this paper a new solution set named EOwen is introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to such player.

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Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

Author: Perea Rojas-Marcos, Federico; Puerto Albandoz, Justo; Fernández García, Francisco Ramón
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.01.013
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Else ie
Pe ea Rojas Ma cos, F.; Pue o Albandoz, J.; Fe nández Ga cía, FR. (2012). A oiding
un ai ness o Owen alloca ions in linea p oduc ion p ocesses. Eu opean Jou nal o
Ope a ional Resea ch. 220(1):125-131. doi:10.1016/j.ejo .2012.01.013.
A oiding un ai ness o Owen alloca ions in linea
p oduc ion p ocesses
Fede ico Pe ea1(Co esponding Au ho ),
Jus o Pue o2, F ancisco R. Fe n´andez2
email: p[email p o ec ed] .es,{pue o, e nande}@us.es,
elephone and ax: +34 963877490 / +34 963877499
1Uni e si a Poli `ecnica de Val`encia (Spain)
2Uni e sidad de Se illa (Spain)
Abs ac
This pape deals wi h coope a ion si ua ions in linea p oduc ion p oblems
in which a se o goods a e o be p oduced om a se o esou ces so ha
a ce ain bene i unc ion is maximized, assuming ha esou ces no used
in he p oduc ion plan ha e no alue by hemsel es. The Owen se is a
well-know solu ion ule o he class o linea p oduc ion p ocesses. Despi e
hei s abili y p ope ies, Owen alloca ions migh gi e null payo o playe s
ha a e necessa y o op imal p oduc ion plans. This pape shows ha ,
in gene al, he a o emen ioned d awback canno be a oided allowing only
alloca ions wi hin he co e o he coope a i e game associa ed o he o iginal
linea p oduc ion p ocess. In his pape a new solu ion se named EOwen is
in oduced. Fo any playe whose esou ces a e needed in a leas one op imal
p oduc ion plan, he EOwen se con ains a leas one alloca ion ha assigns
a s ic ly posi i e payo o such playe .
Keywo ds: Coope a i e games, Linea p oduc ion games, Alloca ions.
P ep in submi ed o EJOR Sep embe 23, 2011
1. In oduc ion
A bene i coope a i e game is a pai (N, ), whe e N={1,2, ..., n}is
he se o playe s and : 2N→Ris he cha ac e is ic unc ion assigning o
e e y coali ion S⊂N he maximum bene i ha he coope a ion be ween
playe s in Swould yield. Fo a comple e in oduc ion on coope a i e game
heo y see o ins ance Owen (1995) o Fo g´o e al. (1999). Assuming ha
he game is supe addi i e, ha is (S) + (T)≤ (S∪T),∀S, T ⊂N,
coope a ion among all playe s is bene icial and, he e o e, he g and coali ion
Nis o o m.
One o he main ques ions in coope a i e game heo y is how o dis-
ibu e he bene i ob ained by he g and coali ion Namong he playe s.
An alloca ion is a ec o α∈Rn, such ha αiis he payo o playe iand
Pn
i=1 αi= (N). One well-accep ed way o alloca ing (N) among he play-
e s is o ind alloca ions in he co e. The co e o a game (N, ), deno ed by
Co e(N, ), is he se o alloca ions sa is ying ha no coali ion o playe s can
ob ain a be e payo by ac ing sepa a ely om he es o playe s. Tha is,
Co e(N, ) = {α∈Rn: (S)≤α(S)∀S⊂N, (N) = α(N)},(1)
whe e α(S) = Pi∈Sαi,∀S⊂N. In p inciple, he co e has a leas wo
p oblems: he co e o a game migh be emp y, ha is, he e a e games o
which no co e alloca ions exis , and inding a co e alloca ion migh be a NP-
ha d p oblem. Along he yea s, many o he alloca ion ules ha e appea ed
in he li e a u e. One o he mos used alloca ion ules is he Shapley alue,
2
which has a ac ed a lo o in e es o i s many applica ions, see Mo e i
and Pa one (2008).
A linea p oduc ion p oblem is a si ua ion in which ce ain goods ha
can be sold in a ma ke a e o be p oduced om a se o a ailable dis inc
esou ces. An implici ea u e o he linea p oduc ion p oblems we deal
wi h in his pape is ha he esou ces no used in he p oduc ion plan
ha e no alue a all. Si ua ions like his may a ise when he esou ces a e
pe ishable and, i no used in he nex p oduc ion plan, hey a e was ed.
Ano he example o his si ua ion is ound in some indus ies in de eloped
coun ies ha gi e hei excesses o unde de eloped coun ies, o cha i y
o ganiza ions, o e en o o he companies wi hin he same a ea as long as
hey a e no compe ing ones. This is bene icial o bo h pa ies: he dono
pa y ge s id o excesses which, i no used, mus be elimina ed a ce ain
cos , and he ecei ing pa y only has o pay o he shipping cos s, which is
usually cheape han ha ing o buy he ma e ial.
In his pape we s udy a new se o alloca ions o linea p oduc ion
p ocesses (LP p ocesses o sho ), which a ise when a bunch o playe s N=
{1,...,n}wi h con lic ing objec i es con ol he esou ces o a LP p oblem.
A coope a i e game, called LP game, can be associa ed o each LP p ocess.
(No e ha di e en LP p ocesses may gene a e he same LP game.) An ea ly
e e ence o LP games can be ound in Owen (1975). LP games a e o ally
balanced games, so e e y subgame o a LP game has a non-emp y co e. By
sol ing he dual p oblem o he unde lying linea p oduc ion p oblem we
can ob ain a se o alloca ions o LP p ocesses known as Owen alloca ions
(see Owen (1975)), which has been well-s udied in he li e a u e. One o i s
3
main p ope ies is ha Owen alloca ions a e always co e alloca ions, and
a e easily compu ed. Mo e ecen ly, Van Gellekom e al. (2000) p o ided an
axioma ic cha ac e iza ion o his solu ion se . In his pape we show ha ,
despi e hei s abili y p ope ies, Owen alloca ions do no always yield a ai
dis ibu ion o he bene i ob ained. Fo ins ance, a playe whose esou ces
a e necessa y o any op imal plan may ecei e a null payo om Owen
alloca ions. Such d awback is discussed in his pape , and an al e na i e
alloca ion se is p oposed.
Since he pionee ing wo k by Owen, se e al gene aliza ions o LP games
ha e appea ed in he li e a u e. Dubey and Shapley (1984) s udy a game in
which playe s ha e pa ial con ol o e he cons ain s o a gene al ma hema -
ical p og amming p oblem. G ano (1986) in oduces ano he gene aliza ion
in which he esou ces owned by a coali ion a e no es ic ed o be he sum
o he esou ces o playe s in he coali ion. Cu iel e al. (1989) in oduce
LP games wi h commi ee con ol, ob aining esul s on he balancedness
o hese games, whose co e has been mo e ecen ly s udied by Molina and
Tejada (2004).
The goal o his pape is o in oduce a new se o alloca ions o linea
p oduc ion p ocesses ha a oid some o he a o emen ioned d awbacks o he
Owen se . To his end, he es o he pape is s uc u ed as ollows. Sec ion
2 gi es a sho in oduc ion o LP p ocesses and a mo i a ion o he s udied
p oblem. Some de ini ions and echnical esul s a e gi en in Sec ion 3. The
alloca ion se p oposed in his pape is in oduced and analyzed in Sec ion 4.
An axioma ic cha ac e iza ion and some o i s p ope ies a e gi en, as well
as a discussion abou he impossibili y o inding co e alloca ions ha a oid
4

he un ai ness p oblem o he Owen alloca ions we add ess in his pape .
2. Linea P oduc ion p ocesses
A LP p oblem is a si ua ion in which he e is a ini e se o esou ces
R={1,2,..., }and om hose esou ces a se P={1,2,...,p}o con-
sump ion goods can be p oduced. The p oduc ion echnologies a e gi en by
a ma ix A∈R ×p, whe e Aij ≥0 deno es he amoun o esou ce inec-
essa y o p oduce one uni o p oduc j,∀i= 1, . . . , , j = 1,...,p. I is
also assumed ha he demand o e e y p oduc is la ge enough o sell all
p oduced p oduc s, he uni a y ma ke p ice o p oduc jbeing cj≥0. The
objec i e o a LP p oblem is o decide how much o each p oduc should be
p oduced so ha he gene al bene i is maximized.
Assume now ha a g oup o playe s N={1,...,n}con ol he esou ces
R={1,2,..., }, ha is, playe kowns Bik ≥0 uni s o esou ce i,k=
1, . . . , n, i = 1,..., . The e o e, le B= (Bik) ×nbe he esou ce-playe
ma ix. Le b∈R be he esou ce ec o , ha is b=BeN, whe e eS∈Rn
sa is ying (eS)k= 1 i k∈S, and ze o o he wise o all S⊆N. In o he
wo ds, biis he o al amoun o esou ce iowned by he g and coali ion, ha
is, bi=Pn
k=1 Bik ∀i∈R. Thus, he maximum p o i ha can be made by
he coope a ion o all playe s is he alue o p oblem PN:
max cx
s. . Ax ≤b
x≥0
(PN),
min yb
s. . yA ≥c
y≥0
(DN),(2)
whe e DNis he dual p oblem o PN(see Baza aa e al. (1990) o a de-
sc ip ion o duali y heo y in linea p og amming). I is easy o check ha ,
5
al hough playe s can y o p oduce sepa a ely, i is always mo e p o i able
o join hei esou ces since he bene i hey ob ain his way is a leas as
high as he sum o he possible coali ions’ p o i s sepa a ely. Fo a coali ion
S⊂N, we de ine i s cha ac e is ic unc ion, (S), ia he op imal alue o
p oblem PS:
max cx
s. . Ax ≤BeS
x≥0
(PS),
min yBeS
s. . yA ≥c
y≥0
(DS),(3)
whe e DSis he dual o PS.
P oblem PSis easible and bounded o all possible coali ions i BeS>0,
c≥0 and ∀j:cj>0 he e is a leas one esou ce i∈Rwi h Aij >0.
Each iple (A, B, c) sa is ying he condi ions abo e will be called in he
ollowing, acco ding o Van Gellekom e al. (2000), a linea p oduc ion p o-
cess. Le Ldeno e he class o LP p ocesses. F om he de ini ion o he
cha ac e is ic unc ion one can associa e o each LP p ocess a coope a i e
game (N, ). The eade may no e ha he same LP game can o igina e
om di e en LP p ocesses.
Now a na u al ques ion a ises: how o di ide he p o i made by he
g and coali ion among he playe s. Le us in oduce some no a ion ha will
be use ul in he es o he pape .
Le (A, B, c)∈ L. The easible egions o p oblems PNand DN, see (2),
a e deno ed by
Fmax(A, B, c) := {x∈Rp
+:Ax ≤b},
Fmin(A, B, c) := {y∈Rn
+:yA ≥c},
(4)
6
espec i ely. The op imal alues o p oblems PNand DNa e deno ed by
max(A, B, c) := max{cx :x∈Fmax(A, B, c)},
min(A, B, c) := min{yb :y∈Fmin(A, B, c)},
(5)
espec i ely, and he se o op imal solu ions o PNand DNby
Omax(A, B, c) := {x∈Fmax(A, B, c) : cx = max(A, B, c)},
Omin(A, B, c) := {y∈Fmin(A, B, c) : yb = min(A, B, c)}.
(6)
Asolu ion ule ϕon Lis a map assigning o e e y LP p ocess (A, B, c)∈
La se Γ ⊂Rnsuch ha Pi∈Nγi= max(A, B, c) o all γ∈Γ. Each membe
o his se is an alloca ion. A well-known solu ion ule o coope a i e games
is he co e, see (1). One well-accep ed solu ion ule speci ic o LP p ocesses
is he Owen se , de ined om op imal solu ions o he dual p oblem DN.
De ini ion 1. Le (A, B, c)∈ L. The Owen se o (A, B, c)is
Owen(A, B, c) := {yB :y∈Omin(A, B, c)}.(7)
Owen (1975) p o ed ha Owen(A, B, c)⊆Co e(A, B, c) o e e y (A, B, c)∈
L. Tha is, Owen alloca ions a e s able in he sense ha no g oup o playe s
can ob ain a be e payo by ac ing sepa a ely. Despi e hese good p op-
e ies, hey should no be conside ed as ideal alloca ions. See he ollowing
example.
Example 1. Conside he 3-playe game (A, B, c)∈ L whe e
A=








1 0
1 1
0 1
1 2








, B =








101
040
100
050








, c =
1
2

.
7
The co esponding dual p oblem D(N)is
min 2y1+ 4y2+y3+5y4
s. . y1+y2+y4≥1
y2+y3+2y4≥2
y1, y2, y3, y4≥0.
(8)
The cha ac e is ic unc ion o he associa ed game is ({i}) = ({1,3}) =
0∀i= 1,2,3, ({1,2}) = 3, ({2,3}) = 1, ({1,2,3}) = 4. I can be
checked ha Omin(A, B, c) = {(1,0,2,0)}and, he e o e, Owen(A, B, c) =
{(1,0,2,0)B}={(3,0,1)}.
This alloca ion is in he co e o he game bu , is i a “ ai ” alloca ion?
No e ha playe 2 ecei es no hing bu , wi hou his esou ces, he op imal
p oduc ion plan canno be achie ed. So, he Owen alloca ion gi es a null
payo o a playe whose esou ces a e necessa y o he op imal p oduc ion
plan.
Wha happened in Example 1 is a gene al d awback o he Owen se in LP
p ocesses. This is a consequence o he complemen a y slackness heo em,
see Baza aa e al. (1990), which says ha i he e is some su plus o esou ce
iin an op imal solu ion x∗∈Omax(A, B, c) (meaning (Ax∗)i< bi), hen
y∗
i= 0 ∀y∗∈Omin(A, B, c). This condi ion o op imali y con eys a simple
economic p inciple: i he e is a posi i e slack in a cons ained p imal e-
sou ce, i.e. he e a e le o e s, hen he addi ional quan i ies o ha esou ce
mus ha e no alue (shadow p ices a e ze o). This means ha only playe s
owning esou ces ha gene a e no su plus ha e he chance o ecei ing a
s ic ly posi i e payo om Owen alloca ions, which a e based on shadow
p ices. This ac could make playe s ge id o hei su pluses so ha he
8
P oposi ion 1. Le b
B∈[Bx∗, B] o some educed ma ix Bx∗associa ed o
an op imal p oduc ion plan x∗. Then we ha e ha :
Owen(A, B, c)⊆Owen(A, b
B, c)⊆Owen(A, Bx∗, c).
P oo . Le α∈Owen(A, B, c)⇒ ∃ y∈Omin(A, B, c) : α=yB. Le us
see ha y∈Omin(A, b
B, c).
min yb
s. . yA ≥c
y≥0
(D),
min yb
b
s. . yA ≥c
y≥0
(b
D).
Since y∈Omin(A, B, c), by de ini ion one has ha yis op imal o p oblem
D. The e o e, yis easible o p oblem b
D. Besides, as we p o ed in Lemma 1,
pa 4, yb =yb
b. Thus y∈Omin(A, b
B, c). Applying again he complemen a y
slackness heo em, one has ha :
αk=
n
X
i=1
yiBik =X
i:yi6=0
yiBik =X
i:yi6=0
yib
Bik ⇒α=yb
B.
The e o e we ha e p o en ha α∈Owen(A, b
B, c), and as a consequence
Owen(A, B, c)⊆Owen(A, b
B, c). Owen(A, b
B, c)⊆Owen(A, Bx∗, c) can be
p o en analogously. 
An immedia e co olla y o he p e ious esul s a es ha he name Ex ended
Owen se is meaning ul, as EOwen con ains he Owen se .
Co olla y 1. Owen(A, B, c)⊆EOwen(A, B, c) o all (A, B, c)∈ L.
The ollowing example p o es ha he inclusions in P oposi ion 1 and Co ol-
la y 1 may be s ic .
15

Example 2. Take he LP p ocess om Example 1. One can see ha Omax(A, B, c) =
{x∗= (2,1)}. The e o e, Bx∗(in his case unique) and a choice o b
Ba e:
Bx∗=








1 0 1
0 3 0
1 0 0
0 4 0








,b
B=








1 0 1
0 3 0
1 0 0
0 5 0








.
Then, we ob ain ha p oblem DN(Bx∗)and ha co esponding o b
B,DN(b
B),
a e, espec i ely:
min 2y1+ 3y2+y3+4y4
s. . y1+y2+y4≥1
y2+y3+2y4≥2
y1, y2, y3, y4≥0
DN(Bx∗),
min 2y1+ 3y2+y3+5y4
s. . y1+y2+y4≥1
y2+y3+2y4≥2
y1, y2, y3, y4≥0
DN(b
B).
(16)
F om he solu ions o hese p oblems, which a e he con ex hulls o {(1,0,2,0),
(0,1,1,0),(0,0,0,1)}and {(1,0,2,0),(0,1,1,0)}, espec i ely, one can see
ha Owen(A, Bx∗, c)(which in his example coincides wi h EOwen(A, B, c))
is he con ex hull o {(3,0,1),(1,3,0),(0,4,0)}and Owen(A, b
B, c)is he
con ex hull o {(3,0,1),(1,3,0)}. This way we p o e ha he ela ions de-
sc ibed in P oposi ion 1 a e s ic . Besides, no e ha he e a e alloca ions in
EOwen(A, B, c) ha gi e playe 2 a s ic ly posi i e payo , unlike Owen(A, B, c).
No e as well ha EOwen(A, B, c)⊂Co e(A, B, c).
16
F om hei de ini ions, i is easy o p o e ha o educed LP p ocesses,
as in oduced in De ini ion 2, he EOwen se and he Owen se coincide.
Analogously, one can s a e ha in LP p ocesses whe e all he esou ces a e
comple ely used, he EOwen se coincides wi h he Owen se .
The ollowing p oposi ion p o es ha alloca ions in he EOwen se dis-
ibu e exac ly (N) among he playe s.
P oposi ion 2. Le (A, B, c)∈ L and le γ∈EOwen(A, B, c). Then γis
e icien .
P oo . Le γ∈EOwen(A, B, c). Then he e exis s x∗∈Omax(A, B, c),
Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗) and by∈Omin(A, Bx∗, c) such ha γk=P
i=1 byiBx∗
ik ∀k=
1,...,n. The e o e
γ(N) =
n
X
k=1
γk=
n
X
k=1
X
i=1 byiBx∗
ik =
X
i=1 byi
n
X
k=1
Bx∗
ik =
X
i=1 byibx∗
i=bybx∗.(17)
Since by∈Omin(A, Bx∗, c) and x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), we know ha bybx∗=cx∗=
(N). This concludes ha γ(N) = (N). 
Ano he in e es ing p ope y s a es ha , o all playe s whose esou ces a e
necessa y o p oduce he maximum bene i (N) in some op imal p oduc ion
plan, he e exis s an alloca ion in EOwen ha assigns hem a s ic ly posi i e
payo .
Theo em 1. Le (A, B, c)∈ L and x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), and le k∈Nbe a
playe such ha some o he esou ces ha he owns a e needed o he op imal
p oduc ion plan x∗ o be de eloped. Then he e exis s α∈EOwen(A, B, c)
such ha αk>0.
17
P oo . Le x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), and Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗). By he s ic
complemen a y slackness heo em, i he slack in he i h cons ain o p oblem
PN(Bx∗) is ze o, hen he e exis s a solu ion y o DN(Bx∗) such ha yi>0
(see Theo em 10.7 in Vande bei (1997)). Assuming ha he uni s o he i h
esou ce owned by playe ka e needed o he op imal p oduc ion plan x∗,
i is easy o see ha Bx∗
ik >0. Then, he payo o playe k om he EOwen
alloca ion αBx∗=yBx∗is, a leas , yiBx∗
ik >0.

No e ha his p oposi ion allows us o s a e ha he EOwen se always
o e comes he un ai ness p oblem illus a ed in Example 1.
Le us now in oduce he p ope y o uppe limi inclusion (ULI), which
will be use ul o ou cha ac e iza ion o EOwen.
P ope y 1 (ULI). A solu ion ule ϕsa is ies ULI i o e e y (A, B, c)∈
L, e e y x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), and e e y ma ix B′such ha B′∈[Bx∗, B] o
e e y Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗), we ha e ha ϕ(A, B′, c)⊆ϕ(A, B, c).
The ollowing esul p o es ha EOwen sa is ies his p ope y.
P oposi ion 3. EOwen sa is ies ULI.
P oo . Le (A, B, c)∈ L. Conside x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), and le B′∈
[Bx∗, B] o e e y Bx∗ educed ma ix associa ed o x∗. Simila ly as we
p o ed in P oposi ion 1, i can be seen ha Omax(A, B′, c)⊆Omax(A, B, c).
Besides, since we p o ed in Lemma 2 ha B(A, B, x∗)⊇ B(A, B′, x∗), we
18
ha e
EOwen(A, B, c) = Sx∗∈Omax(A,B,c)SBx∗∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A, Bx∗, c)
⊇Sx∗∈Omax(A,B′,c)SBx∗∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A, Bx∗, c)
⊇Sx∗∈Omax(A,B′,c)SBx∗∈B(A,B′,x∗)Owen(A, Bx∗, c)
=EOwen(A, B′, c).

Now we a e eady o gi e a cha ac e iza ion o he EOwen solu ion ule
o linea p oduc ion p ocesses.
Theo em 2. Le ϕbe a solu ion ule o e L.ϕsa is ies ULI, coincides wi h
he Owen se o e LP p ocesses wi hou le o e s and is minimal i and only
i ϕ≡EOwen.
P oo .
•Clea ly EOwen coincides wi h he Owen se in LP p ocesses wi hou
le o e s, and as p o en in P oposi ion 3, EOwen sa is ies ULI. Le
us see ha EOwen is minimal. Fo his pu pose, le ϕbe a solu ion
se ha coincides wi h he Owen se in LP p ocesses wi hou le o e s
and sa is ies ULI, and le (A, B, c)∈ L. The e o e, Owen(A, Bx∗, c) =
ϕ(A, Bx∗, c)⊆ϕ(A, B, c) o all x∗∈Omax(A, B, c) and all Bx∗∈
B(A, B, x∗). Hence
EOwen(A, B, c) = Sx∗∈Omax(A,B,c)SBx∗∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A, Bx∗, c)
=Sx∗∈Omax(A,B,c)SBx∗∈B(A,B,x∗)ϕ(A, Bx∗, c)
⊆ϕ(A, B, c)
which p o es ha EOwen is minimal.
19
•Le ϕbe a solu ion ule o e Lsa is ying he hypo heses o he heo em.
The e o e ϕ(A, Bx∗, c) = Owen(A, Bx∗, c)∀x∗∈Omax(A, B, c) and o
e e y Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗), because (A, Bx∗, c) has no le o e s. Now,
since ϕsa is ies ULI we ha e ha ϕ(A, Bx∗, c)⊆ϕ(A, B, c), he e o e
EOwen(A, B, c) = [
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)[
Bx∗∈B(A,B,x∗)
ϕ(A, Bx∗, c)⊆ϕ(A, B, c).
F om he minimali y o ϕ, and since EOwen sa is ies he hypo heses o
he heo em, ϕ(A, B, c)⊆EOwen(A, B, c). Thus, EOwen(A, B, c) =
ϕ(A, B, c).

Le us now in oduce he ollowing inc easing mono onici y (IM) p ope y
ha will lead us o ano he cha ac e iza ion o EOwen se :
P ope y 2 (IM). A solu ion ule ϕsa is ies IM i o e e y (A, B, c)∈ L,
e e y x∗∈Omax(A, B, c), and e e y B1, B2such ha B1∈[Bx∗, B] o each
Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗)and B2∈[B1, B], we ha e ha ϕ(A, B1, c)⊆ϕ(A, B2, c).
The ollowing esul s a es ha inc easing mono onici y is equi alen o up-
pe limi inclusion.
Lemma 4. Le ϕbe a solu ion ule o e L. Then ϕsa is ies ULI i and only
i ϕsa is ies IM.
P oo . T i ially, i ϕsa is ies IM hen i sa is ies ULI oo. Con e sely,
le (A, B, c)∈ L, and x∗∈Omax(A, B, c). Mo eo e , le B1∈[Bx∗, B]
o each Bx∗∈ B(A, B, x∗) and B2∈[B1, B]. I is s aigh o wa d ha
20

x∗∈Omax(A, B2, c). Then, since B1∈[Bx∗, B2] and ϕsa is ies IM, we ha e
ha ϕ(A, B1, c)⊆ϕ(A, B2, c), which concludes he p oo . 
F om he equi alency be ween inc easing mono onici y and uppe limi in-
clusion, he ollowing al e na i e cha ac e iza ion o EOwen i ially ollows
om Theo em 2.
Co olla y 2. Le ϕbe a solu ion ule o e L.ϕsa is ies IM, coincides wi h
he Owen se o e LP p ocesses wi hou le o e s and is minimal i and only
i ϕ≡EOwen.
We inish his sec ion by s udying he ela ion be ween EOwen, he Owen
se , and he co e o he o iginal game. I is ob ious ha Co e(A, B, c)⊆
Co e(A, Bx∗, c) o e e y op imal p oduc ion plan x∗and e e y educed ma-
ix Bx∗associa ed o i , since Bx∗
(S)≤ (S) and Bx∗
(N) = (N), whe e
Bx∗
deno es he cha ac e is ic unc ion o he co esponding educed game.
The ollowing example shows ha his ela ion may be s ic .
Example 3. Conside he LP p ocess (A, B, c)whe e
A=





1 0
1 1
0 1




, B =





1 0
1 3
1 0




, c =
2
1

.
I can be seen ha Omax(A, B, c) = {x∗= (1,1)}, and he cha ac e is ic
unc ion o he associa ed game is ({1}) = 2, ({2}) = 0, ({1,2}) = 3.
The e is a su plus o esou ce 2. One educed ma ix (in which bo h playe s
21
d op hal o he uni s o esou ce 2 hey had) is
Bx∗=





1 0
0.5 1.5
1 0




,
and x∗({1}) = 1, x∗({2}) = 0, ({1,2}) = 3. The e o e, Co e(A, B, c)
Co e(A, Bx∗, c).
Un o una ely, no all EOwen alloca ions a e co e alloca ions. Howe e ,
i is no always possible o ind alloca ions ha a oid he un ai ness d awback
o he Owen se men ioned in his pape and emain in he co e o he o iginal
game a he same ime. The e o e, one has o look o some comp omise
be ween null-payo o absolu ely necessa y playe s and un-s abili y. The
ollowing example illus a es he abo e s a emen s.
Example 4. Conside he LP p ocess (A, B, c)wi h he ollowing da a,
A=





1 0
1 1
0 1




, B =





100
010
001




, c =
1
1

.
The cha ac e is ic unc ion o he associa ed game is ({1,2}) = ({2,3}) =
({1,2,3}) = 1, and ze o o any o he coali ion. The e o e, he co e o
his game consis s o he single on {(0,1,0)}. No e as well ha wi hou he
esou ces o playe s 1 and 3, playe 2 ge s no hing, bu i is no possible o
gi e a posi i e payo o playe s 1 and 3 wi h a co e alloca ions.
Le us calcula e he EOwen se o his example. One can see ha he
ex eme op imal p oduc ion plans a e x1= (1,0) and x2= (0,1), and ha
22
B(A, B, x1)and B(A, B, x2)consis only o one ma ix each (named B1and
B2, espec i ely). B1has a diagonal equal o (1,1,0) and B2has a diagonal
equal o (0,1,1). All non-diagonal en ies a e null o bo h ma ices. I is
easy o see ha Omin(A, B1, c)is he union o e 1≥1and 2≥0o he
con ex hulls o {(1,0, 1),(0,1, 2)}, and ha Omin(A, B2, c)is he union o e
1≥1and 2≥0o he con ex hulls o {( 1,0,1),( 2,1,0)}. The e o e,
Owen(A, B1, c)is he con ex hull o {(1,0,0),(0,1,0)}and Owen(A, B2, c)
is he con ex hull o {(0,0,1),(0,1,0)}. Fo e e y non-ex eme op imal solu-
ion xa= (a, 1−a) (a∈(0,1)),B(A, B, xa)consis s only o one ma ix Ba,
in which he diagonal is (a, 1,1−a), and he es is ze o. The co espond-
ing Omin(A, Ba, c)is he con ex hull o {(0,1,0),(1,0,1)}, and he e o e he
Owen se o he co esponding educed LP p ocess is {(0,1,0),(a, 0,1−a)}.
The e o e, EOwen(A, B, c)is he con ex hull o {(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}
(all playe s can ob ain a posi i e payo om alloca ions in his se ).
To summa ize, he Owen se , he EOwen se and he co e o he o iginal
game ha e a ela ionship as shown in Figu e 1.
&%
'$
&%
'$
Owen
EOwen
Co e(A, B, c)
Figu e 1: Gene al ela ion be ween EOwen,Co e and Owen .
23
Conclusions
In his wo k we ha e in oduced he EOwen se , a new solu ion ule on
he class o linea p oduc ion p ocesses which o e comes ce ain d awbacks o
he well-known Owen se , in he sense ha one can always ind an alloca ion
ha gi es a s ic ly posi i e payo o playe s whose esou ces a e needed o
(a leas ) one op imal p oduc ion plan. Some examples in he pape show
ha Owen alloca ions do no sa is y his p ope y.
EOwen is de ined as he union, o e all possible op imal p oduc ion plans
and all possible educed ma ices, o he Owen se s o e he co esponding
educed LP p ocesses, in which playe s ge id o he le o e s in hei e-
sou ces acco ding o a educed ma ix. Se e al heo e ical p ope ies and an
axioma ic cha ac e iza ion o his new solu ion ule a e gi en. By means o
an example we also p o e ha , in gene al, i is no possible o ind alloca ions
ha gi e non-null payo s o playe s ha a e necessa y in o de o achie e
he op imal alue o (N) by es ic ing o he co e.
We no e ha wo ypes o playe s ha e been in ol ed in his pape : g oup
T1, consis ing o playe s such ha some o he esou ces hey own a e needed
o (a leas ) one op imal p oduc ion plan; and g oup T2, consis ing o playe s
whose esou ces a e ne e comple ely used in any o he op imal p oduc ion
plans. Theo em 1 ensu es ha playe s in T1 can always ind an alloca ion in
EOwen ha gi es hem a s ic ly posi i e payo . Examples ha e shown ha
playe s in T2 may ecei e only ze o payo s om Owen alloca ions. Playe s
in bo h T1 and T2 a e o special in e es , since hey ecei e s ic ly posi i e
payo s om EOwen alloca ions, and may only ecei e ze o payo s om
Owen alloca ions (see o ins ance examples 1 and 2).
24