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Evolution of cooperation in multilayer networks

Abstract

Individuals take part in multiple layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. These interdependent networks account for the different sort of social ties individuals maintain per layer. In each layer individuals participate in N-Player Public Goods Games where benefits collected increase with amounts invested. It is, however, tempting to be a free-rider, i.e., to take advantage of the common pool without contributing to it, a situation from which a social dilemma results. This thesis offers new insights on how cooperation dynamics is shaped by multiple layers of social interactions and diversity of contributions invested per game. To this end, we resort to Evolutionary Game Theory and Network Science to provide a convenient framework to address the most important prototypical social conflicts and/or dilemmas in large networked populations. In particular, we propose a novel mean-field approach capable of tracking the self-organization of Cooperators when co-evolving with Defectors in a multilayer environment. We show that the emerging collective dynamics, which depends (i) on the underlying layer networks of interactions and (ii) on the criteria to share a finite investment across all games, often does not bear any resemblance with the local processes supporting them. Our findings suggest that, whenever individual investments are distributed among games or layers, resilience of cooperation against free-riders increases with the number of layers, and that cooperation emerges from a non-trivial organization of cooperation across the layers. In opposition, under constant, non-distributed investments, the level of cooperation shows little sensibility to variations in the number of layers. These findings put in evidence the importance of asymmetric contributions across games and social contexts in the emergence of human cooperation.

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Evolution of cooperation in multilayer networks

Author: Sardinha, Paulo Barreto Valeriano de Albuquerque
Year: 2020
Source: https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/110811/1/TGI0372.pdf
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E olu ion o Coope a ion in Mul ilaye Ne wo ks
Paulo Ba e o Vale iano de Albuque que Sa dinha
Disse a ion p esen ed as pa ial equi emen o ob aining
he Mas e ’s deg ee in In o ma ion Managemen
i
Managemen School
Ins i u o Supe io de Es a ís ica e Ges ão de In o mação
Uni e sidade No a de Lisboa
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN MULTILAYER SOCIAL
NETWORKS
by
Paulo Ba e o Vale iano de Albuque que Sa dinha
Disse a ion p esen ed as pa ial equi emen o ob aining he Mas e ’s deg ee in In o ma ion
Managemen , wi h a specializa ion in In o ma ion Sys ems and Technologies Managemen
Ad iso : p o . Dou o Flá io L. Pinhei o (NOVA IMS)
Co Ad iso : p o . Dou o F ancisco C. San os (INESC-ID/Ins i u o Supe io Técnico)
July 2020
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To my pa en s, Eulália and F ancisco,
wi h lo e and g a i ude
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like o hank my supe iso , D Flá io Pinhei o, o his op imism, o he
oppo uni y c ea ed and o p o iding me guidance and eedback h oughou his p ojec .
Wi hou his suppo I would no ha e been able o comple e his esea ch.
I would also like o hank my co-supe iso D F ancisco San os o his insigh ul
commen s on his esea ch.
The pape s I had he chance o ead om hem we e inspi ing and decisi e in my
decision o unde ake his esea ch.
I would also like o hank Ma ga ida o he cons an encou agemen , in e es and help
in he subjec s I s udied du ing he mas e 's cu icula componen leading o his hesis.
Las bu no leas I wan o hank my amily and iends o hei incen i e and o
pu ing up wi h he ime I in es ed in his mas e p og am dep i ing me o social
ga he ings.
i
ABSTRACT
Indi iduals ake pa in mul iple laye s o ne wo ks o in e ac ions simul aneously.
These in e dependen ne wo ks accoun o he di e en so o social ies indi iduals
main ain pe laye . In each laye indi iduals pa icipa e in N-Playe Public Goods Games
whe e bene i s collec ed inc ease wi h amoun s in es ed. I is, howe e , emp ing o be a
ee- ide , i.e., o ake ad an age o he common pool wi hou con ibu ing o i , a si ua ion
om which a social dilemma esul s. This hesis o e s new insigh s on how coope a ion
dynamics is shaped by mul iple laye s o social in e ac ions and di e si y o con ibu ions
in es ed pe game. To his end, we eso o E olu iona y Game Theo y and Ne wo k
Science o p o ide a con enien amewo k o add ess he mos impo an p o o ypical
social con lic s and/o dilemmas in la ge ne wo ked popula ions. In pa icula , we
p opose a no el mean- ield app oach capable o acking he sel -o ganiza ion o
Coope a o s when co-e ol ing wi h De ec o s in a mul ilaye en i onmen . We show ha
he eme ging collec i e dynamics, which depends (i) on he unde lying laye ne wo ks o
in e ac ions and (ii) on he c i e ia o sha e a ini e in es men ac oss all games, o en does
no bea any esemblance wi h he local p ocesses suppo ing hem. Ou indings sugges
ha , whene e indi idual in es men s a e dis ibu ed among games o laye s, esilience
o coope a ion agains ee- ide s inc eases wi h he numbe o laye s, and ha
coope a ion eme ges om a non- i ial o ganiza ion o coope a ion ac oss he laye s. In
opposi ion, unde cons an , non-dis ibu ed in es men s, he le el o coope a ion shows
li le sensibili y o a ia ions in he numbe o laye s. These indings pu in e idence he
impo ance o asymme ic con ibu ions ac oss games and social con ex s in he
eme gence o human coope a ion.
KEYWORDS
E olu iona y Game Theo y, Ne wo ks, E olu ion, Coope a ion, Public Goods Games,
Mul ilaye , A e age G adien o Selec ion

INDEX
1. In oduc ion ................................................................................................................. 1
1.1. Thesis S uc u e ..................................................................................................... 4
2. Li e a u e Re iew ......................................................................................................... 7
2.1. The P oblem O Coope a ion ................................................................................ 7
2.1.1. Two Pe son Games, he P isone ’s Dilemma .............................................. 8
2.1.2. Public Goods Games .................................................................................. 11
2.1.3. E olu iona y dynamics in ini e popula ions ............................................. 13
2.1.4. The Replica o Dynamics .......................................................................... 22
2.2. The Mechanisms o Coope a ion......................................................................... 26
2.3. The Science o Ne wo ks..................................................................................... 30
2.3.1. Models o Ne wo ks ................................................................................... 35
2.3.1.1. Random Ne wo ks .......................................................................... 35
2.3.1.2. Ho and Ne wo ks ............................................................................ 38
2.3.1.3. Scale-F ee Ne wo ks ....................................................................... 38
2.3.1.4. Mul ilaye s ...................................................................................... 40
2.3.1.5. De ini ion o a Mul ilaye Ne wo k ................................................ 42
2.3.1.6. Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion ............................................................. 44
2.3.1.7. O e lapping .................................................................................... 46
2.4. E olu iona y Games on S uc u ed Popula ions.................................................. 46
2.4.1. Accumula ed e sus A e age Payo s ....................................................... 48
2.4.2. Upda e Rules .............................................................................................. 49
2.4.3. G adien o Selec ion ................................................................................. 52
2.4.4. The S uc u e o Social G aphs .................................................................. 55
2.5. O he Rele an Bibliog aphy o he Thesis ........................................................ 57
2.5.1. Mul ilaye ne wo ks ................................................................................... 58
2.5.2. Coope a ion in Mul ilaye Ne wo ks ......................................................... 58
3. Model And Me hods ................................................................................................... 63
3.1. Model ................................................................................................................... 63
3.2. Compu e Simula ions ......................................................................................... 65
3.2.1. Nume ical Me hods .................................................................................... 70
4. Resul s and Discussion ............................................................................................... 72
4.1. Topological Ensla emen unde Dis ibu ed In es men s and La ge
Numbe o Laye s ............................................................................................... 77
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4.2. Laye and Popula ion Pola iza ion ...................................................................... 80
4.3. Agg ega ed A e age G adien o Selec ion ......................................................... 85
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 91
5.1. Fu u e Wo k......................................................................................................... 93
6. Bibliog aphy ............................................................................................................... 95
Appendix A. Algo i hm o Payo and AGoS Calcula ion ...................................... 102
Appendix B. Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion and O e lapping ...................................... 107
Appendix C. C i e ia and Topological Ensla emen ................................................ 114
Appendix D. Theo e ical Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion wi h
Dis ibu ed In es men ........................................................................ 129
Appendix E. Mul ilaye s wi h di e en Types o Ne wo ks .................................... 133
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figu e 1- T-S Quad an s o 2-Playe Games ............................................................................ 9
Figu e 2- Ma ko Chain o a Laye wi h S a e e lec ing he Numbe o Coope a o s .......... 16
Figu e 3- Examples o supe exponen ial and subexponen ial g ow hs. ................................... 25
Figu e 4- Mechanisms o Coope a ion. .................................................................................... 27
Figu e 5- Ne wo k Adjacency Ma ix ...................................................................................... 31
Figu e 6- Examples o Ne wo k Asso a i i y and Disasso a i i y. ....................................... 33
Figu e 7- Examples o Clus e ing Coe icien Calcula ions o 3 Ne wo ks. .......................... 34
Figu e 8- F om Regula o Random Newo ks. ......................................................................... 37
Figu e 9- Poisson e sus Powe -law Dis ibu ions. ................................................................. 39
Figu e 10- Mul ilaye Ne wo ks. .............................................................................................. 43
Figu e 11-E ec s o Popula ion S uc u e on 2-Playe Games. ............................................... 48
Figu e 12- Applica ion o Upda e Rule in a Mul iplex ............................................................ 52
Figu e 13-A e age G adien o Selec ion ................................................................................ 55
Figu e 14- Le el o Coope a ion as a Func ion o Ne wo k ype, In es men C i e ia,
Numbe o Laye s, In ensi y o Selec ion (β) and Enhancemen Fac o (F). ........ 72
Figu e 15- Quasi-S a iona y P obabili y o an 8-Laye Mul ilaye wi h BA Ne wo ks
and Baseline In es men C i e ia .......................................................................... 74
Figu e 16- Le el o Coope a ion in Mul ilaye Ne wo ks in 2-Playe Dis ibu ed
P isone Dilemma (=0.1). .................................................................................... 75
Figu e 17- Expe imen al Quasi-S a iona y Dis ibu ion o Mul ilaye s a e aged
ac oss Ne wo k Laye s. ......................................................................................... 78
Figu e 18- Indi idual S a egy Consis ency ac oss an 8 laye BA mul ilaye wi h
k=4,β=0.1,N=1000. .................................................................................... 81
Figu e 19- Sa u a ion in Mul ilaye s as he Numbe o Laye s a y. ..................................... 82
Figu e 20- Sa u a ion o Laye s in a Mul ilaye as In es men C i e ia and he Numbe o
Laye s a y. ........................................................................................................... 83
Figu e 21- Laye and Node Consis ency in a Mul ilaye as In es men C i e ia and he
Numbe o Laye s a y. ......................................................................................... 84
Figu e 22- A e aged Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) a e aged ac oss
Laye s and Time. ................................................................................................... 85
Figu e 23- Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) o 4 Laye s Mul ilaye o e Time. .... 87
Figu e 24- Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) o Mul ilaye s a e aged o e Time. . 88
Figu e B-1- Example o a Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion Ma ix ............................................. 107
Figu e B-2- A e age Le el o Coope a ion o Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion e sus
In ensi y o Selec ion (β). ................................................................................. 109
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Figu e B-3- A e age Le el o Coope a ion o Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion e sus
Enhancemen Fac o . ......................................................................................... 111
Figu e B-4- A e age Le el o Coope a ion in BA Mul ilaye s as a unc ion o Link
O e lapping and Enhancemen Fac o . ............................................................. 112
Figu e C-1- Payo s Dis ibu ion o Ho and Mul ilaye wi h In es men pe Game
e sus Numbe o Laye s. ................................................................................. 117
Figu e C-2- Time Se ies o E olu ion o Coope a ion Le el in 16 Laye Ho and
Mul ilaye wi h In es men dis ibu ed pe Game. ........................................... 118
Figu e C-3- Ma ko Chain co esponding o D unka d’s Walk P ocess .............................. 119
Figu e C-4- Theo e ical esul s o a Mean-Field app oxima ion o a Laye wi h
Nodes wi h equal Payo . .................................................................................. 121
Figu e C-5- Topological and C i e ia Ensla emen in Mul ilaye s wi h 16 Laye s,
In es men dis ibu ed pe Game. ..................................................................... 123
Figu e C-6- Final Le el o Coope a ion as a Func ion o ini ial One. .................................. 124
Figu e C-7- Topological and C i e ia Ensla emen o 16-laye s Mul ilaye , 1000
nodes (N) pe laye . ........................................................................................... 125
Figu e C-8 - Domain o Topological Ensla emen o In es men dis ibu ed pe Game. .... 126
Figu e C-9 - Consis ency T end in Mul ilaye s wi h In es men dis ibu ed pe Game. ....... 127
Figu e C-10- Consis ency in Ho and Mul ilaye s as he Numbe o Laye s a ies. .............. 127
Figu e D-1- Theo e ical AGoS o Ho and Ne wo ks in Mul ilaye s wi h In es men
pe Game C i e ia .............................................................................................. 132
Figu e E-1- Mul ilaye wi h 8 laye s BA o Ho and s. Mixed Mul ilaye wi h 4 laye s
Ho and plus 4 laye s BA. .................................................................................. 133
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a ou ed. Ye , coope a ion is obse ed on many le els o biological and social o ganiza ions.
The nex sec ion a emp s o explain mechanisms ha may be pu in place o na u al selec ion
o a ou coope a ion and how hey o se he cos s o coope a ion by causing Coope a o s o
also be on he ecei ing end mo e o en. An o e iew o he mos ele an concep s om he
no el ield o Ne wo k Science o be used h oughou he ex ollows wi h a cha ac e iza ion
o he ne wo ks ha suppo he expe imen a ions. Game dynamics, whe he un olding o e
con inuous o disc e e ime, go e ned a he mic oscopic-agen le el by s ochas ic ules o
ollowing de e minis ic ules modelling he di ec ion and in ensi y o selec ion as a unc ion
o ela i e popula ion concen a ions is ocused nex . Fo he sake o comple eness, chap e 2
inishes wi h a su ey on publica ions ela ed o he opics pu sued in his hesis.
Expe imen s we e conduc ed ia compu e simula ions ha un on a amewo k buil ad
hoc, implemen ing mul iple ins ances o agen s wi h beha iou s go e ned by s ochas ic
p ocesses. Chap e 3 aims o explain his amewo k, o de ail he models cons uc ed, o
discuss he implemen a ion op ions a ailable and he a ional beyond he op ions aken.
Independen pa ame e s, bo h opological and beha iou al, and me ics o collec (ou pu s) as
well as he me hodologies ollowed a e iden i ied.
Chap e 4 p esen s he main esul s collec ed om he simula ions, highligh ing he
indi idual in luence o he pa ame e s on he coope a ion le els a ained by he sys em. In
pa icula , i shows how he combina ion o opology and he c i e ia o deciding on how o
sha e a ini e in es men among all games each indi idual pa icipa es in impac s he
coope a ion le el achie ed, leading, in ex eme ci cums ances, o an ensla emen in which
he le el o coope a ion a ained becomes insensi i e o o he en i onmen pa ame e s. A
limi ed se o pa ame e s dic a e he ensla emen condi ion. When his condi ion se s in,
changes in o he pa ame e s ha e a ma ginal e ec on he le els o coope a ion a ained which
is p ese ed since mul ilaye ini ializa ion ime. Ma hema ical explana ions o ensla emen
o occu and o i s consequences a e explo ed. In o de o be e unde s and he dynamics
unleashed on complex sys ems o en un ela ed o he s ochas ic ules p og ammed a agen -
le el he o me a e buil upon, one has eso ed o A e age G adien o Selec ion (AGoS), a
ime and con ex independen me ic, because o being a e aged ac oss ime and he
popula ion, bu dependen on pa ame e s such as he ne wo ks suppo ing he in e ac ions
among indi iduals ha e lec s a end o he e olu ion o he numbe o Coope a o s o e
ime. The use o AGoS ini ially concei ed o a single laye is gene alized o a mul ilaye case.
AGoS esul s a e in e p e ed and co ela ed wi h ensla emen . Finally, in chap e 5, we d aw
concluding ema ks and discuss u u e s eps.

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The hesis includes a numbe o appendixes complemen ing he esul s shown in chap e
4. Appendix A complemen s chap e 3 in p esen ing he algo i hm concei ed in o de o
minimize he du a ion o he simula ions execu ed. In appendix B, we discuss he e ec s o
deg ee-deg ee co ela ion and o e lapping on he e olu ion o coope a ion le els eached by
he mul ilaye a e explo ed. In appendix C, a ma hema ical analysis explaining he opological
and in es men c i e ia ensla emen is de eloped. Wi h condi ions o ensla emen me and
aking a mean ield app oach, expec ed AGoS is an icipa ed ia a ma hema ical pa h pu sued
in appendix D. Finally, in appendix E, we p esen esul s conce ning coope a ion le els and
AGoS a ained in mul ilaye s wi h di e en ypes o ne wo ks a e p esen ed.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In his sec ion we mo i a e he s udy o he p oblem o coope a ion. A li e a u e e iew is
unde aken om seminal pape s owa ds a gene al objec i e o assessing he cu en s a e o
knowledge on he subjec . The li e a u e e iew allowed us o iden i y di ec ions o esea ch
and unexplo ed ques ions. I also helped in adop ing a consis en e minology and on building
up he ounda ions o a heo e ical amewo k. Along his chap e , he li e a u e e iew is
p esen ed wi h an emphasis on a numbe o concep s ha a e he co ne s one o he esea ch
conduc ed and p esen ed in his hesis and ha se ed as he g ound/baseline o he ex ensi e
compu e simula ions conduc ed.
Impo an keywo ds ha summa ize he opics esea ched in his sec ion include
Coope a ion; Game Theo y; Complex Ne wo ks; E olu iona y Dynamics; Public Goods
Games; Mul ilaye Ne wo ks, and G adien o Selec ion.
2.1. THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION
All g ea human achie emen s and he eme gence o human cul u e a e esul s o coope a i e
en e p ises. Genes coope a e o o m a genome, cells coope a e o p oduce mul icellula
o ganisms, indi iduals coope a e o o m g oups and socie ies. Language and human cul u e
a e jus examples o esul s om coope a i e en e p ises.
Coope a ion ela es o al uism, which opposes o compe i ion, a co ne s one o e olu ion
in Biology. Coope a ion can be iewed as an ou come o a game ha , despi e po en ial cos s
incu ed by pa icipa ing indi iduals, is “good” (measu ed by some app op ia ed i ness
measu e) o hem and ha equi es some so o collec i e ac ion. In his sense, o coope a e
means o beha e coope a i ely, o b ing some hing o he able.
The p oblem wi h coope a ion is ha equen ly i is cos ly, weighs on indi idual wellbeing
and p ospe i y and is, hus, always ulne able o exploi a ion by De ec o s. Indi iduals a e,
hus, di ided be ween ac ing sel ishly and sac i icing pa o hei sel in e es in exchange o
b inging alue o socie y.
The heo e ical amewo k used mos equen ly o s udy coope a ion among sel ish
indi iduals is E olu iona y Game Theo y (Nowak M. , 2006), whe e he concep o a social
dilemma cap u es he essence o he p oblem.
Social dilemmas o collec i e ac ion p oblems a e si ua ions whe e he e is a con lic
be ween indi idual and g oup in e es s so ha i he indi iduals y o maximize hei own
payo he whole g oup ends up wi h less han i hey had ac ed in ano he - ega ding way.
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This ension be ween a ional choice and success ul coope a ion is he opic o a as li e a u e
sp ead o e disciplines o social science (E iksson & S imling, 2012).
Because coope a ion is bene icial o socie y, unde s anding he mechanisms and condi ions
ha encou age i and iden i ying he uning pa ame e s ha may in luence and ca alyse i s
eme gence is o u mos impo ance.
2.1.1. Two Pe son Games, he P isone ’s Dilemma
Classic game heo y is based on wo key assump ions. One is ha playe s ac a ionally,
hey a e ully awa e o hei and hei opponen ’s s a egy op ions and payo alues. They a e
capable o co ec ly assessing missing in o ma ion (i applicable) and p ocess new
in o ma ion e ealed by he play o opponen s (in dynamic games) in e ms o p obabili y
dis ibu ions.
The second assump ion is one o common knowledge, i.e., ha each playe knows no only
ha all o he s ac a ionally bu also ha o he s a e awa e ha he/she knows hey know, and
so on ecu si ely (Szabo & Fa h, 2007).
Playe s’ a ionali y assump ion has been elaxed o e ime in o de o push u he he
limi s o classic game heo y. Playe s ha e well de ined and consis en goals and p e e ences,
which can be desc ibed by a u ili y unc ion. A u ili y unc ion measu es he sa is ac ion
esul ing om a ce ain ou come o he game, and playe s’ goal is o maximize hei u ili y. I
mus be s essed he e ha he maximiza ion p oblem o game heo y di e s om a gene al
one o physics. In physics, one gene ally has a single pa ame ized unc ion whose ex eme
condi ion cha ac e izes he whole sys em. In game heo y, i is common o ha e ins ead a se
o unc ions o op imize as many as he numbe o in e ac ing playe s, as hey con inuously
es uc u e he landscape o each o he in pu sui o hei sel ish indi idual goals (op imum).
Playe s need o ha e a leas wo s a egies o choose om. The combina ion o s a egies
chosen by each playe , called s a egy p o iles, yields a esul . In classic game heo y, he
payo co esponds o he playe s’ e alua ions o his esul . A s a ic one-sho 2-playe game
can be ep esen ed as in able 3 by 𝑁 imes 𝑀 ma ices (no mal o m) wi h 𝜋1𝑖𝑗=𝑢1(𝑆1𝑖,𝑆2𝑗)
ep esen ing he u ili y unc ion o playe 1, when playe 1 and 2 apply 𝑆1𝑖 and 𝑆2𝑗 s a egies,
espec i ely. Recip ocally, 𝜋2𝑖𝑗
𝑇=𝑢2(𝑆1𝑖,𝑆2𝑗), whe e 𝑢2 ep esen s he u ili y unc ion o
playe 2 in he same ci cums ances.
Roles o he playe s de ine he game (a)symme y. In a symme ic game playe s’ oles a e
iden ical and in e changeable, which implies ha hey possess he same s a egy op ions and
payo s, N = M and 𝜋1𝑖𝑗=𝜋2𝑖𝑗.
9
Table 3 – Gene alized Payo Ma ix o a 2-Playe , 2-S a egy Game
Playe 2

(Payo )
𝑆21
…
𝑆2𝑀
Playe 1
𝑆11
(𝜋111,𝜋211
𝑇)
…
(𝜋11𝑀,𝜋21𝑀
𝑇)
⋮
⋮
⋱
⋮
𝑆1𝑁
(𝜋1𝑁1,𝜋2𝑁1
𝑇)
…
(𝜋1𝑁𝑀,𝜋2𝑁𝑀
𝑇)
A pa icula g oup o a symme ic wo-playe games, he only ones o be he subjec o his
hesis, happen when he numbe o pu e s a egies is 2, C (Coope a ion) and D (De ec ion),
wi h payo ma ix as in able 2.
In o de o be e cha and no malize e i o ies o ea and g eed in he playg ound o 2-
Pe son games and as p oposed in (San os, Pacheco, & Lenae s, 2006; San os F. C., Pinhei o,
Lenae s, & Pacheco, 2012) payo ma ix is linea ly ans o med in o de o and R and P o
alue 1 and 0, espec i ely.
Figu e 1- T-S Quad an s o 2-Playe Games
Ha ing applied his ans o ma ion and as depic ed in igu e 1, he S ag–Hun (SH) also
known as he Coo dina ion Dilemma eme ges wi h 𝑅>𝑇>𝑃>𝑆 and un olds in he lowe
le quad an , when he ea o being chea ed by 𝐷 (𝑃>𝑆) may jus i y de ec ion ins ead o
coope a ion.
In an isola ed en i onmen , each playe may decide o beha e as a C o a D. When bo h
playe s decide o coope a e, each ecei es a ewa d R. Mu ual de ec ion esul s in a
punishmen o P. I hey choose di e en s a egies, he one o e ing coope a ion ecei es S,
10
Sucke ’s payo , whe eas he De ec o collec s T, in e p e ed as he Temp a ion o de ec .
Di e en dilemmas esul om di e en o de ing o hese payo s.
Whene e 𝑇>𝑅, g eed eme ges and de ec ion is emp ing as i is he bes s a egy agains
a Coope a o . In he absence o ea (𝑃<𝑆), g eed leads o Chicken, Hawk-Do e o
Snowd i (SG) game wi h 𝑇>𝑅>𝑆>𝑃. Wi h bo h g eed and ea p esen , 𝑇>𝑅>𝑃>
𝑆, he game ob ained is P isone Dilemma (PD) (San os F. C., Pinhei o, Lenae s, & Pacheco,
2012).
Mo e gene ally, a game is a coope a i e dilemma when wo Coope a o s ge a highe
payo han wo De ec o s, 𝑅>𝑃, and s ill he e is an incen i e o de ec . This incen i e mus
exis s when a leas one o he ollowing condi ions hold ue: (i) i 𝑇>𝑅 hen i is be e o
de ec when playing agains a Coope a o ; (ii) i 𝑃>𝑆 hen i is be e o de ec when playing
agains a De ec o ; and (iii) i 𝑇>𝑆 hen i is be e o be he De ec o in an encoun e be ween
a Coope a o and a De ec o (Nowak M. , 2012).
This so o dilemma is p esen in anyone’s e e yday li e, when one has o decide be ween
commi ing o being lazy, being sel ish o al uis ic, e c.
A game is in a Nash equilib ium (NE) i , o each playe , he s a egy applied is he one
ha b ings him he highes payo conside ing he s a egies chosen by o he playe s, wi h is
he same o say ha he s a egy ollowed by each playe is he one he/she has no in e es o
de ia e om, as i maximizes his/he payo , aking in o accoun he s a egies chosen by
his/he pee s. The dilemma unde lying p isone ’s game is ha ac ing a ionally unable o
an icipa e opponen ’s s a egy, playe s will de ec and NE occu s wi h mu ual de ec ion,
al hough bo h playe s would be be e o i hey coope a ed.
NE is insensi i e o payo ma ix scaling o an addi ion o a bi a y cons an s o payo
columns (Szabo & Fa h, 2007). Thus, o se ing he ma ix in o de o ge a null payo when
De ec o s mee each o he and u he scaling i in o de o a 1 uni payo o esul be ween
Coope a o s in e ac ion as was pe o med in igu e 1, is a linea ans o ma ion om which
no loss o gene ali y in game dynamics esul s (B oom, 2005). The o se is i ele an in
eplica o dynamics based on payo di e en ial. As o he posi i e mul iplica i e ac o , i
only escales he ime.
Along he ex he concep o E olu iona y S able S a egy ela ed o he p obabili y o a
homogenous popula ion o be immune agains he in asion o a mino i y o in ude s o
mu an s will eme ge. A s a egy S is conside ed o be an E olu iona y S able S a egy (ESS)
i a popula ion composed only by S indi iduals is esilien o he in asion om a mino i y o
in ade s wi h any o he s a egy. Being a e inemen o a NE, no all NE a e necessa ily ESS.

11
2.1.2. Public Goods Games
The e a e many socially and economically impo an examples wi h a numbe o decision
make s in ol ed g ea e han wo. Al hough some imes hese si ua ions can be modelled as
epea ed play o simple pai in e ac ions, he e a e many cases whe e he mos undamen al
uni o he game is i educibly o mul i-playe na u e. These games canno be cas in a ma ix
o bi-ma ix o m. S ill he basic solu ion concep is he same: when played by a ional agen s
he ou come should be a Nash equilib ium whe e no playe has an incen i e o de ia e
unila e ally.
One example o Public Goods Games (PGG) is he T agedy o he Commons, an abs ac
game ha exempli ies wha has been one o he majo conce ns o poli ical philosophy and
economic hinking since he 19 h cen u y (Ha din, 1968) and is now pa o he mains eam
economic heo y, assuming ha he sel ish and a ional human na u e will lead o he deple ion
o essen ial and common esou ces, e.g. wa e , soil, e c., in he absence o well-de ined
p ope y igh s, o mal, op-down managemen ins i u ions, ules o access and exploi a ion.
In o de o quan i a i ely be e illus a e how he T agedy o Commons un olds, one can
assume a common ini e esou ce, e.g. a illage g een, and N playe s, a me s. The cos o
aking one goa g azing in he g een is c. I is up o each playe i o decide on how many goa s
𝑔𝑖 he/she will ake g azing. In o al he e will be 𝐺=𝑔1+⋯+𝑔𝑁 goa s g azing. u(G) is an
u ili y unc ion ha e u ns he indi idual bene i om aking a goa g azing as a unc ion o
g een u iliza ion. As he g een su e s om o e g azing, no only will 𝑢(𝐺) dec ease wi h G,
which means 𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝐺<0, as his dec ease will be sha pe o highe G, which means 𝑑2𝑢
𝑑𝐺2<0. The
payo o each playe will be o
𝑝𝑖=(𝑢(𝐺)−𝑐)𝑔𝑖
(1)
A a Nash equilib ium, ame s’ decision on he numbe o goa s g azing will be (𝑔1∗,…,𝑔𝑁
∗)
as no a me will be be e o i he changes his/he chosen numbe o goa s in he g een. Thus,
a Nash equilib ium 𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖=0, i.e.,
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑔𝑖=𝑢(𝐺∗)+𝑑𝑢(𝐺∗)
𝑑𝐺 𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑔𝑖𝑔𝑖∗−𝑐=𝑢(𝐺∗)+𝑑𝑢(𝐺∗)
𝑑𝐺 𝑔𝑖∗−𝑐= 0
(2)
Summing up le iden i y o igh mos equa ion o all playe s, one ge s
𝑢(𝐺∗)+𝐺∗
𝑁𝑑𝑢(𝐺∗)
𝑑𝐺 −𝑐=0
(3)
12
I 𝑢(𝐺) is known, he op imum 𝐺∗ can be ound. Howe e , we e he e a cen al managemen
en i y in place, he social wel a e would ake place a 𝐺∗∗which maximizes o al payo 𝑝=
(𝑢(𝐺)−𝑐)𝐺. This implies
𝑢(𝐺∗∗)+ 𝐺∗∗𝑑𝑢(𝐺∗∗)
𝑑𝐺 −𝑐= 0
(4)
Compa ing bo h equa ions and aking in o accoun he ac o 𝑢(𝐺) and i s de i a e dec easing
wi h 𝐺, one concludes ha 𝐺∗∗<𝐺∗, which means ha a Nash equilib ium compa ed wi h
social wel a e op imum he common esou ce is o e u ilized. This makes he game a social
dilemma (Szabo & Fa h, 2007).
In ano he a ia ion o PGG (Kleinebe g & Helbing, 2018; Ba is on, Ma jaz, & La o a,
2017; Li, Shen, & Jiang, 2016; Pacheco, Pinhei o, & San os, 2009; San os, San os, & Pacheco,
2008) each playe 𝑖 in a o al o 𝑁 makes a con ibu ion 𝑐𝑖 o a common pool, opped a bi a ily
by 1. The o al collec ed, ∑𝑐𝑖𝑖 is mul iplied by an enhancemen ac o 𝐹,1<𝐹<𝑁, a
syne gy ac o e lec ing how much he whole is g ea e han he sum o he pa cels, o be
equally di ided among all pa icipa ing playe s, no ma e he amoun o indi idual
con ibu ions,. Being a De ec o in his game means con ibu ing wi h 𝑐𝑖=0. Those who
con ibu e wi h 𝑐𝑖>0 a e Coope a o s.
Maximum o al income is achie ed i all playe s con ibu e maximally. In his case each
playe ecei es 𝐹𝑐, esul ing in a inal payo is (𝐹−1)𝑐. Playe s a e aced wi h he
emp a ion o being ee- ide s, i.e., o ake ad an age o he common pool wi hou
con ibu ing o i , as any indi idual in es men is a loss o he playe because only he ac ion
𝐹
𝑁<1 will be epaid. Consequen ly, a ional playe s in es no hing and one ends up wi h
ano he T agedy o Commons, F ee Ride p oblem, Social Dilemma on N-Playe PD (Szabo
& Fa h, 2007).
I he numbe o playe s is 2 and playe s’ choices a e bina y, i.e., hey a e cons ained o
no in es o o in es a ixed amoun , hen he game becomes a P isone ’s Dilemma. Wi h
due uning o pa ame e s, a N-pe son ound obin PD game can simula e a PGG.
As i will be he ea e discussed in Ne wo k sec ion indi iduals a e loca ed as nodes in a
ne wo k. Each PGG ins ance makes use o a ocal node such ha he ocal node has all i s
di ec neighbou s, i.e., all nodes di ec ly linked o he ocal node, cons i u e he N playe s o
he game.
While i is common o assume ha in e e y game indi iduals can con ibu e/in es a ixed
amoun c o he public good, a b oade scena io inspi ed in he 2-Playe Dis ibu ed P isone
Dilemma (DPD) om (Pacheco, Pinhei o, & San os, 2009) is explo ed. Hence, a PGG
13
in ol ing wo indi iduals ha pa icipa e in mul iple games is conside ed, in es men alues
being dis inc pe playe s. In he dis ibu ed scena io, indi iduals ha e o spli hei in es men
ac oss a se o games hey pa icipa e ( ha can be all o hem, o pa o hem). In ha case,
he possible ou comes o each playe ac ions can be summa ized in a payo ma ix as in able
4 wi h 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 ep esen ing, espec i ely, he in es men s o playe s 1 and 2.
Table 4 - Payo ma ix o Public Goods Games in he 2-Playe Dis ibu ed
(Ve sion in Playe 1’s Pe spec i e)
𝜋
(Payo )
Playe 2
C
D
Playe 1
C
(𝐹2−1)𝐶1 + 𝐹2 𝐶2
(𝐹2−1)𝐶1
D
𝐹2𝐶2
0
Depending on he assump ions o he DPD he alues o 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 may be compu ed
di e en ly. The single N+1-Playe game is subs i u ed by N 2-Pe son games, one pe each o
he N neighbou s he ocal node can play wi h.
2.1.3. E olu iona y dynamics in ini e popula ions
The e olu iona y game dynamics o a ini e popula ion can be desc ibed by a s ochas ic
p ocess, an app oach well sui ed o compu e simula ion ha models he mic oscopic
mechanisms unde lying s a egy ans e ence be ween indi iduals. Once he e olu iona y pa h
is aced, one will o ce bo h (i) popula ion size o end o in ini y and (ii) ime in e als
be ween sys em upda es o end o ze o, looking o a con e gence wi h he solu ion ha would
ha e been eached had he popula ion been conside ed in ini e and dynamical ules de ined a
popula ion le el.
As a mechanism o s a egy ans e ence, some al e na i es can be conside ed om which
he ollowing a e highligh ed:
 Pai wise compa ison- Along his al e na i e, a ocal indi idual a ailable o upda e
his s a egy is andomly selec ed. A second dis inc indi idual is also andomly
selec ed. All indi iduals ha e an equal p obabili y o being chosen in any selec ion.
14
The i s indi idual copies a s a egy o a second indi idual wi h a p obabili y ha
inc eases wi h he i ness di e en ial be ween hem. The e e ence p obabili y can be
P ob =12+𝑤2𝜋𝑟−𝜋𝑓
△𝜋
(5)
wi h △𝜋 ep esen ing he maximum payo di e ence ha can be ound be ween
indi iduals, he nume a o o he ac ion s anding o he di e ence be ween and
indi iduals’ payo and 0≤𝑤≤1 . 𝑤 measu es he ela i e impo ance o selec ion
compa ed o neu al d i .
An al e na i e o no ha ing o an icipa e △𝜋 is o ely on Fe mi dis ibu ion and
ha e (T aulsen, Nowak, & Pacheco, 2006)
P ob =1
1+𝑒−𝑤(𝑛𝑟−𝑛𝑓)
(6)
In bo h pai wise compa isons, o 𝑤=0 he decision o upda e a s a egy has 0.5
p obabili y and does no ake in o accoun payo di e ences. Fo 0<𝑤≪1, he wo
e e ence p obabili ies become simila because 1
1+𝑒−𝑤(𝑛𝑟−𝑛𝑓) =12+ 𝑤
2(𝑛𝑟−𝑛𝑓)+
𝑂(𝑤2). Speci ically o he Fe mi case, i 𝑤→∞ he p ocess becomes de e minis ic:
an indi idual swi ches s a egy i and whene e he one he compa es o has an highe
payo (T aulsen & Haue , 2008).
Pai wise compa ison models a p ocess o cul u al e olu ion by lea ning and imi a ion.
 Mo an bi h-dea h p ocess- Fi s ly a ocal indi idual is andomly selec ed o
ep oduc ion wi h a p obabili y p opo ional o i s i ness. His/He o sp ing inhe i s
ances o ’s s a egy. Ano he dis inc indi idual is selec ed andomly wi h uni o m
p obabili y. In o de o p ese e he size o he popula ion, he indi idual is eplaced
by he o sp ing. The Mo an bi h-dea h p ocess (Mo an, 1958) o igina ed in gene ics
p o ides a mechanism o mos i indi iduals o sp ead ac oss he popula ion. Fi ness
o an indi idual as p oxyed by i s payo can be gi en by 1−𝑤+𝑤𝜋, wi h 0≤𝑤≤
1 s anding o he balance be ween selec ion and neu al d i .
The Mo an bi h-dea h p ocess maps o he adi ional in e p e a ion o e olu iona y
game dynamics in which s a egies a e encoded in genomes and sp ead h oughou he
popula ion as a unc ion o i s ela i e i ness.
In o de o be e illus a e how ini eness impac s e olu ion, one s a s conside ing a well-
mixed popula ion wi h N indi iduals and wi h wo s a egies, A and B, a ailable o
indi iduals o choose om wi h a gene ic payo ma ix 𝜋𝑖𝑗 as in able 5.
21
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝜌(𝑥,𝑡0)=−𝜕
𝜕𝑥[(𝑇+(𝑥0)−𝑇−(𝑥0))𝜌(𝑥0,𝑡0)]+
12𝜕2
𝜕𝑥2[(𝑇+(𝑥0)+𝑇−(𝑥))𝜌(𝑥0,𝑡0)]
𝑁 + 𝑂(𝑁−2)
(36)
𝑥0 and 𝑡0 a e poin s wi hin in e als ]𝑥,𝑥+1
𝑁[ and ]𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑁[, espec i ely, wi h 𝑁 ending o
in ini y. In o de o sol e his equa ion, a pa en hesis is opened o de i e he same equa ion
ia a S ochas ic Di e en ial equa ion o he o m
𝑑𝑋𝑡=𝜇(𝑥,𝑡)𝑑𝑡+𝜎(𝑥,𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡
(37)
𝑋𝑡 is a s ochas ic p ocess wi h a d i o e ime o 𝜇(𝑥,𝑡) and a local ola ili y gi en by 𝜎(𝑥,𝑡).
Bo h 𝜇 and 𝜎 unc ions a e de e minis ic. 𝐵𝑡 is a B ownian p ocess, also known as Wiene
p ocess, esul ing om he in eg a ion o whi e noise. I is cha ac e ized by being s a iona y
wi h 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐵0=0)=1 and 𝐵𝑡−𝐵𝑠~𝑁(0,|𝑡−𝑠|). Di e en ial calculus will be o no use
he e as 𝐵𝑡, al hough con inuous, is no di e en iable. Howe e , I ô lemma can be applied.
Fu he calcula ing densi y p obabili y 𝑝(𝑥,𝑡) o p ocess X, one ge s a simila Fokke -Planck
equa ion (Oksendal, 2003)
𝜕
𝜕𝑡𝑝(𝑥,𝑡)=−𝜕
𝜕𝑥(𝜇(𝑥,𝑡)𝑝(𝑥,𝑡))+12𝜕2
𝜕𝑥2(𝜎2(𝑥,𝑡)𝑝(𝑥,𝑡))
(38)
Compa ing equa ion 36 o 38 and conside ing p ocess X as de ined in 37 o be a solu ion o
equa ion 38, a solu ion o equa ion 36 is
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 =(𝑇+(𝑥)−𝑇−(𝑥))+√𝑇+(𝑥)+𝑇−(𝑥)
𝑁𝜂(𝑡)
(39)
Second e m on he igh hand side, which includes a whi e noise componen 𝜂(𝑡) de i a e o
he B ownian p ocess can be disca ded, because o 𝜂(𝑡) ha ing a no malized Gaussian
ampli ude p obabili y and he popula ion size 𝑁 ending o in ini y. Payo o ollowe s o A
and B s a egy om a S ochas ic Ma ko Bi h-Dea h p ocess as in equa ions 7 and 9 adap ed
o he con inuous case and s ill conside ing payo as a p oxy o i ness esul s in
𝑓𝐴(𝑥)=𝑎𝑥+(1−𝑥)𝑏
𝑓𝐵(𝑥)=𝑐𝑥+(1−𝑥)𝑑
(40)
(41)
𝑇±(𝑥) o he Fe mi dis ibu ion pai wise compa ison, he one o be explo ed along he hesis,
alues
𝑇±(𝑥)= 𝑥(1−𝑥) 1
1+𝑒±𝛽(𝑓𝐵(𝑥)−𝑓𝐴(𝑥))
(42)
Fo 𝑇+(𝑥), 1−𝑥 s ands o he p obabili y o i s indi idual o be andomly selec ed om B
popula ion, 𝑥 o he p obabili y o second selec ed indi idual o be om popula ion A and

22
inally he ac ion ep esen s he Fe mi p obabili y o i s indi idual o copy s a egy om
second one.
In oducing equali ies om equa ion 40 o 42 in o equa ion 39 and conside ing in his las
equa ion only he i s e m om igh side, as second one is disca dable when N ends o
in ini y, one ge s
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑥(1−𝑥)(1
1+𝑒𝛽(𝑓𝐵(𝑥)−𝑓𝐴(𝑥))−1
1+𝑒−𝛽(𝑓𝐵(𝑥)−𝑓𝐴(𝑥)))=
𝑥(1−𝑥) anh (𝛽2(𝑓𝐴(𝑥)−𝑓𝐵(𝑥)))
(43)
which o o 𝛽≪1 simpli ies o
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡 =𝛽2𝑥(1−𝑥)(𝑓𝐴(𝑥)−𝑓𝐵(𝑥))=𝛽2𝑥(𝑓𝐴(𝑥)−〈𝑓(𝑥)〉)
(44)
wi h 〈𝑓(𝑥)〉 s anding o he a e age payo o he popula ion, equal o 𝑥𝑓𝐴(𝑥)+(1−
𝑥)𝑓𝐵(𝑥).
This is he eplica o equa ion, a de e minis ic equa ion o in ini e popula ions o be
in oduced in he ollowing chap e s a ing ha he ela i e g ow h a e o a popula ion
(1𝑥𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
𝑑𝑥 ) is p opo ional o he di e en ial o i s i ness o a e age i ness. I assumes
indi iduals a e equally likely o in e ac wi h any o he s. (T aulsen, Claussen, & Haue , 2006;
T aulsen & Haue , 2008) show ha he eplica o equa ion is also he limi o equa ion 36 o
in ini e popula ions o Mo an bi h-dea h p ocess.
2.1.4. The Replica o Dynamics
On a la ge uns uc u ed popula ion ending o in ini y, he ules desc ibing he selec ion
among a limi ed numbe o s a egies is de ined a mac oscopic le el. They assume he o m
o nonlinea di e en ial equa ions coined as he eplica o dynamics ha ake in o
conside a ion he selec ion mechanism applicable, modelling he e olu ion o he popula ions’
equency by means o i ness compa isons. The eplica o equa ion p o ides a mean- ield
de e minis ic desc ip ion o a popula ion e olu iona y dynamics, which means conside ing an
in ini e and well-mixed popula ion d i en by a con inuous ime dynamical p ocess.
Conc e izing, by aking a dynamic pe spec i e in E olu iona y Game Theo y and by
in e p e ing he a e o ep oduc ion o a popula ion as i s i ness, a popula ion wi h x( )
indi iduals a ime wi hou en i onmen cons ain s agains i s g ow h and ep oducing a a
a e o pe indi idual and uni o ime has an e olu ion o e ime ha can be desc ibed by
he di e en ial equa ion
23
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = x
(45)
wi h he solu ion
x( ) = 𝑥0𝑒𝑟𝑡
(46)
whe e 𝑥0 ep esen s he size o he popula ion a 𝑡=0. I 𝑟 is posi i e, he popula ion g ow hs
o in ini y. I popula ion dea h is o be conside ed, he di e en ial equa ion is o be eplaced
by
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡=(𝑟−𝑑)𝑥
(47)
wi h 𝑑 ep esen ing he dea h a e pe indi idual and uni o ime.
I one conside s addi ionally a maximum en i onmen ca ying capaci y 𝐾, g ow h a e can
be opped by a (1−𝑥
𝐾) ac o as in
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = (𝑟−𝑑)𝑥(1−𝑥
𝐾)
(48)
wi h solu ion
𝑥(𝑡)= 𝐾𝑥0𝑒(𝑟−𝑑)𝑡
𝐾+𝑥0(𝑒(𝑟−𝑑)𝑡−1)
(49)
So a , a single popula ion o indi iduals was conside ed. When second popula ion is
in oduced, na u al selec ion ge s in he play because i is a key mechanism o e olu ion ha
ope a es whene e di e en ypes o indi iduals ep oduce a di e en a es.
Wi h mo e han one popula ion and conside ing a scena io in which he o al popula ion is
held cons an , e.g. due o he ecosys em ha ing a maximum cons an ca ying capaci y, on he
mac oscopic le el he eplica o dynamics can be pos ula ed di ec ly wi h he easonable
assump ion ha he pe capi a g ow h a e o a popula ion, 1𝑥𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡, is p opo ional o he
popula ion i ness o a e age i ness di e en ial (Szabo & Fa h, 2007; Nowak M. , 2006),.
The i ness measu es he indi idual’s e olu iona y success, i.e., he payo o he game in his
game heo y con ex .
Along his a ional, le 𝑥 and 𝑦 ep esen he a io o indi iduals o e o al popula ion and
le 𝑎 and 𝑏 s and o ep oduc ion a ios o X and Y popula ions, espec i ely. Ob iously
𝑥 + 𝑦 = 1. Le also ∅=ax+by s and o he a e age i ness o he all popula ion. Then,
acco ding o assump ions abou popula ions’ g ow h, one has
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑥(𝑎−∅)
(50)
(51)
24
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑦(𝑏−∅)
Because he sum o 𝑥 and 𝑦 p opo ions is ixed, he sum o hei de i a e equals 0. So, i igh
sides o bo h equa ions a e added one ge s (ax + by) − (x+y)∅, which equals ze o as
expec ed. P e ious sys em o equa ions is edundan , so eplacing y by 1 –𝑥 in i s equa ion
(o ice- e sa) one ge s
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑥(1−𝑥)(𝑎−𝑏)
(52)
Equilib ium is eached when 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡=0, i.e., when 𝑥=0 o 𝑥=1. This makes sense, because i
co esponds o all popula ion consis ing only o X o Y indi iduals. The equa ion highligh s
ano he aspec . I 𝑎>𝑏, 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡>0, which implies ha X popula ion will domina e and Y be
ex inc . I 𝑎<𝑏 i is Y ime o domina e. I 𝑎=𝑏, wha e e he ini ial ela i e p opo ions
o X and Y popula ion, hey a e p ese ed.
The e olu iona y scena io analysed is an example o he su i al o he i es , bu o he
scena ios can be an icipa ed in which bo h popula ion can co-exis . Such scena ios can be
ep esen ed by mo e gene al e olu iona y equa ions such as
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑎𝑥𝑐−∅𝑥
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑏𝑥𝑐−∅𝑦
(53)
(54)
whe e 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎, and 𝑏 main ain hei p e ious meaning. The e is now a new a iable, 𝑐. I 𝑐=
1, he p e ious scena io is eco e ed. In o de o keep o al popula ion cons an , i.e., o he
sum o a ia ions in X and Y popula ions o be ze o, ∅ is upda ed o ∅=𝑎𝑥𝑐+
𝑏𝑦𝑐. Subs i u ing ∅ in i s sys em o equa ions one ge s
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑎𝑥𝑐−(𝑎𝑥𝑐+𝑏𝑦𝑐)𝑥 =
𝑥(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1−𝑎𝑥𝑐−𝑏𝑦𝑐)=
𝑥((1−𝑥)𝑎𝑥𝑐−1−𝑏(1−𝑥)𝑐−1 =
𝑥(1−𝑥)(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1−𝑏(1−𝑥)𝑐−1)
(55)
The de i a e o X popula ion equency is ze o o 𝑥=0 o 𝑥=1, as in p e ious scena io.
The e is howe e a new oo o his de i a e ha alues
𝑥∗= 1
1+ √𝑎𝑏
𝑐−1
(56)
Depending on he combina ion o 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 pa ame e s, his oo can be s able o uns able.
25
Figu e 3- Examples o supe exponen ial and subexponen ial g ow hs. G ow h is go e ned by 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 =
𝑥(1− 𝑥)(𝑎𝑥𝑐−1−𝑏(1−𝑥)𝑐−1) equa ion. Le panel ob ained wi h 𝑎=9, 𝑏=2, 𝑐=3 has an uns able oo .
In igh panel, he combina ion 𝑎=3, 𝑏=8, 𝑐=0.5 leads o a s able oo .
Figu e 3 p esen s examples o bo h so s o oo s. The oo 𝑥∗ na u ally belongs o in e al
]0,1[. Howe e , depending on 𝑐− 1 signal, he beha iou o he sys em changes. I 𝑐 > 1,
he de i a e o X popula ion equency will be nega i e in in e al ]0,𝑥∗[, posi i e in ]𝑥∗,1[.
I he de i a e is posi i e, he end o he popula ion is o g ow. Thus, in i s in e al he
popula ion sh inks, o g ow on he second one.
No ma e how small he pe u ba ion is, i 𝑥 su passes 𝑥∗, because o 𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡 being posi i e, 𝑥
keeps inc easing un il 𝑥=1. The ecip ocal happens i a pe u ba ion makes 𝑥 smalle han
𝑥∗, wi h 𝑥 da ing o 0. This makes 𝑥∗ is an uns able equilib ium poin .
The ema kable aspec o s ess is ha his conclusion is i espec i e o he a es o g ow h
o X and Y popula ions. E en i Y has a highe ep oduc ion a e, i a a ce ain poin in ime
equency o popula ion X goes beyond 𝑥∗, popula ion Y is doomed.
I 𝑐<1, 𝑥=0 and 𝑥 = 1 a e s ill equilib ium poin s bu uns able. The in oduc ion o a
minimum numbe o indi iduals om X o Y popula ion in a popula ion o all Y o all X
indi iduals, espec i ely, d i es he sys em o a co-exis ence scena io wi h 𝑥∗ and 𝑦∗ =
1 – x∗ as he ela i e equencies o X and Y popula ions, espec i ely. Again, i espec i e
o he ep oduc ion a es o bo h popula ions. The ela i e ep oduc ion a es o he
popula ions only de e mines whe e x* is loca ed.
Because s a ing ela i e equency dic a es he s able equilib ium poin o con e ge o,
supe exponen ial g ow h (𝑐>1) a ou s whoe e was he e i s (su i al o he i s ),
whe eas subexponen ial g ow h (𝑐 < 1) leads o he su i al o all. This is illus a ed in
igu e 3.
26
2.2. THE MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION
Coope a ion p oblems eme ge as a esul om a misalignmen be ween indi idual
mo i a ions and collec i e goals. This ension is bes cap u ed by he p isone 's dilemma a
2-Playe game wi h 𝑇>𝑅 >𝑃 >𝑆, played in bo h e i o ies o g eed, as i is emp ing o
de ec agains a Coope a o because 𝑇 > 𝑅, and ea as wi h 𝑃 > 𝑆 de ec ion a ises as he
bes s a egy agains a De ec o (see igu e 1). Thus, no ma e he s a egy ollowed by he
opponen , he bes op ion o a a ional playe is always o de ec . By seeking sel ishly o
maximize his/he own p o i s, a ional playe s end up in a less desi able collec i e ou come,
ins ead o 2𝑅 hey ge 2𝑃.
Na u al selec ion is a key mechanism o e olu ion ha ope a es whene e di e en ypes
o indi iduals ep oduce a di e en a es (Nowak M. , 2006) which leads one o expec ha
e e y indi idual should be designed o p omo e i s own e olu iona y success a he expense
o i s compe i o s. This is why, in he absence o any o he assump ion and in a well‐mixed
popula ion, De ec o s always ha e a highe expec ed payo han Coope a o s, and he e o e
na u al selec ion ewa ds sel ish beha iou and a ou s De ec o s.
In opposi ion, coope a ion is an al uis ic ac ha is cos ly o pe o m, because i means
indi iduals gi ing up pa o hei ( ep oduc i e) po en ial in o de o bene i s o he s and in
a ou o a common good
Besides, coope a ion is always ulne able o exploi a ion by De ec o s. Thus, his s a ed,
coope a ion u u e does no look p omising.
Ye coope a ion is obse ed on many le els o biological o ganiza ion, om bac e ia and
cellula o ganisms o animals (Nowak M. , 2007). Coope a ion is he decisi e o ganizing
p inciple o human socie y. Many g ea achie emen s o humankind we e accomplished ia
coope a ion. Addi ionally, popula ions o De ec o s ha e a lowe i ness han i hey played
he coope a ion ole.
So, besides elying on indi idual social alue o ien a ion (Bogae , Boone, & Decle ck, 2007),
a concep om social psychology a emp ing o e lec how much weigh a pe son a aches o
he wel a e o o he s in ela ion o i s own, o jus i ying coope a ion, explaining he

27
Figu e 4- Mechanisms o Coope a ion. Clockwise om op le co ne di ec ecip oci y mechanism is
p esen ed wi h indi iduals epea edly in e ac ing and helping each o he . Indi ec ecip oci y ollows. By
helping a pee an indi idual builds on his epu a ion. In kin selec ion he le el o help depends on pee
ela edness. In g oup selec ion when a an indi idual ep oduces in a g oup al eady a i s maximum capaci y he
g oup spli s in wo and ano he al eady exis ing g oup is chosen o ex inc ion. Popula ion s uc u e dic a es
who in e ac s wi h whom allowing he o ma ion o clus e
eme gence o coope a ion equi es ce ain mechanisms in place o na u al selec ion o a ou
coope a ion o e de ec ion and o p e en Coope a o s om losing g ound o De ec o s. Such
mechanisms will ha e o su e o o se he cos s o coope a ion by causing Coope a o s o
also be on he ecei ing end mo e o en.
In (Nowak M. , 2007) 5 such mechanisms a e iden i ied: kin selec ion, di ec ecip oci y,
indi ec ecip oci y, g oup selec ion and ne wo k ecip oci y, which a e schema ically
ep esen ed in igu e 4. Fo each mechanism, he au ho s s a om a PD payo ma ix duly
adap ed wi h new pa ame e s in o de o i o co ec ly e lec he in e ac ion be ween wo
basic s a egies wi h he mechanism in ac ion. In doing so ewa ds om choosing a
coope a ion s a egy ge mo e appealing. Condi ions a e e en c ea ed o coope a ion o
become an e olu iona y s able s a egy. A six h mechanism o punishmen was also
conside ed as s udied in (Feh & Gäch e , 2002; Fowle & Ha pending, 2005).
These mechanisms can be b ie ly summa ized as ollows:
 Kin Selec ion- Kin selec ion ope a es whene e in e ac ions occu among gene ic
ela i es, i.e., among indi iduals who a e mo e p obable o sha e a common ances o
28
han i hey we e andomly sampled om he whole popula ion. Rela edness o
indi iduals is de ined as he p obabili y o hem sha ing a gene. The coe icien o
ela edness be ween wo indi iduals, 𝑟, a alue in he in e al [0,1] equals 1/2 o wo
b o he s, 1/8 o cousins (Nowak M. , 2007).
 Di ec Recip oci y- In na u e coope a ion be ween un ela ed indi iduals is no iceable,
so kin selec ion ails sho o explain coope a ion in mo e gene al ci cums ances. In
o de o ackle his limi a ion, (T i e s, 1971) p oposed di ec ecip oci y as ano he
mechanism o he e olu ion o coope a ion based upon he p inciple o “I will help
you i you help me la e ”. The ac o encoun e s be ween he same playe s been
epea ed u ns coope a ion mo e in i ing.
 Indi ec Recip oci y- Di ec ecip oci y elies on epea ed encoun e s be ween he
same wo indi iduals. Help p o ided by he dono is less cos ly han bene icial o he
ecipien . Howe e , pa icula ly in human ela ions, in e ac ions a e asymme ic and
unbalanced. Indi ec ecip oci y elies on epu a ion and applies mos ly o human
ela ionships. “Fo di ec ecip oci y one needs a ace, bu o indi ec ecip oci y a
name is needed ins ead”. Indi ec ecip oci y is build ou o di ec ecip oci y
wi nessed by an in e es ed audience. Encoun e s a e obse ed by o he s and
in o ma ion sp eads h ough communica ion channels, allowing indi iduals o adop
condi ional s a egies depending on he epu a ion o he pee in he game. Di ec
ecip oci y elies on a playe ’s own expe ience wi h someone, while indi ec
ecip oci y uses he expe ience o o he playe s. In indi ec ecip oci y he help
p o ided may ne e be e u ned by he bene icia y, o by indi iduals who in u n ha e
been helped by he bene icia y (Nowak M. S., 1998).
 G oup Selec ion- G oup selec ion also known as mul ile el selec ion is based on he
assump ion ha compe i ion occu s no only be ween indi iduals bu also be ween
g oups. (T aulsen & Nowak, 2006) p opose a minimalis s ochas ic model o g oup
selec ion whe e he popula ion is subdi ided in o 𝑛𝑔 g oups, which g ow in size as
indi iduals wi hin hem ep oduce. In any one ime s ep, a single indi idual om he
en i e popula ion is chosen o (gene ic) ep oduc ion wi h a p obabili y p opo ional
o i s payo . The o sp ing is added o he same g oup. When a g oup eaches a
h eshold size N, i ei he di ides in o wo child g oups wi h p obabili y q (in which
case a andom g oup om he popula ion is elimina ed), o i does no di ide (wi h
complemen a y p obabili y 1−𝑞), in which case a andom indi idual in he g oup is
29
elimina ed so ha g oups do no ge o e popula ed. Social in e ac ions occu only
among membe s o he same g oup and indi iduals bea ing a mu an allele, a pa icula
o m o a gene, help o he s by dec easing hei payo by 𝑐 as he coun e pa o
gene a ing a bene i 𝑏 o be sha ed by all o he g oup membe s. As a esul , sel ish
indi iduals end o eplica e as e han helpe s wi hin g oups, bu g oups comp ising
helpe s g ow as e and ha e a g ea e chance o di iding be o e isking ex inc ion.
 Ne wo k Recip oci y - Wi h no mechanisms o ca alyse coope a ion, na u al selec ion
a ou s de ec ion because a well-mixed popula ion is assumed whe e a playe
po en ially can play any o he wi h equal p obabili y. This app oxima ion is used by
all s anda d app oaches o e olu iona y game dynamics (Nowak M. , 2007). Howe e ,
in eali y popula ions a e no well-mixed and i is no equally likely ha a playe mee s
any o he . In ac indi iduals end o in e ac wi h a limi ed numbe o pee pe
geog aphic easons o any o he s. Thus, wi h ne wo k ecip oci y popula ions a e
suppo ed in ne wo ks wi h indi iduals a hei nodes, links ep esen in e ac ions and
de e mine who can in e ac wi h whom. In his con ex , i has been shown ha
coope a ion may eme ge (o no ) depending on he opology o he in e ac ion g aph
(San os & Pacheco, 2005; San os, Pacheco, & Lenae s, 2006). As discussed in mo e
de ail below, he ne wo k s uc u e changes he e ec i e game played a a popula ion-
wide le el, e en i , locally, indi iduals con inue o ace he same dilemma (Pinhei o,
Pacheco, & San os, 2012). The ne wo k ecip oci y mechanism elies on wo ac o s.
The i s is a limi a ion in he numbe o game opponen s, ha is, “dep essing
anonymi y,” a he han ha ing an in ini e and well-mixed popula ion (Oh suki,
Haue , Liebe man, & Nowak, 2006). Second one is a local adap a ion mechanism, in
which a playe can only copy a s a egy om a di ec ly linked neighbou as de e mined
by unde lying ne wo k (Tanimo o, 2015).
 Punishmen - F om an e olu iona y pe spec i e, coope a ion is a double-edged swo d.
On he one hand, i b ings an edge ad an age o a communi y, since some asks can
only be achie ed h ough coope a ion. On he o he hand, since punishmen in ol es
addi ional cos s (Feh & Gäch e , 2002; Fowle & Ha pending, 2005) om an
indi idual's pe spec i e i becomes emp ing o enjoy he esul s o coope a ion,
wi hou in es ing in i . This is he ypical ee- ide p oblem ha cha ac e izes social
dilemmas and i allowed o p oli e a e can b eak down coope a ion. Since selec ion in
e olu ion akes place on he le el o he indi idual, Coope a o s a e eplaced by ee-
ide s, pu ing coope a ion o an end. In o de o discou age ee- ide s beha iou , a
30
mechanism o punishmen is conside ed wi h wo main objec i es: i s one is o expel
om he g oup ee- ide membe s, om which decision a payo pe capi a inc ease
esul s; second one is o accoun o he cos s o a g oup exclusion in de ec ion s a egy,
which ends up as a dissuasi e measu e.
A mo e exhaus i e lis o suppo ing mechanisms o he e olu ion o coope a ion can be
ound in (Zaggi, 2013).
O all hese coope a ion mechanisms conside ed, his hesis ocus on ne wo k ecip oci y.
2.3. THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS
A ne wo k in i s simples o m is a collec ion o poin s joined oge he in pai s by lines.
Poin s a e e e ed o as nodes o e ices (V) and ep esen he elemen s in a sys em, e.g.
s a ions in subway map, and he lines, e e ed o as links o edges, ep esen a di ec ela ion
be ween he nodes hey connec , e.g. a line connec ion be ween wo s a ions.
Many objec s o in e es in he physical, biological, and social sciences can be hough o
as ne wo ks. F om a modelling s andpoin , a ne wo k is a ela i ely simple objec , consis ing
o only nodes and links o mally desc ibed by 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) whe e 𝑉 ep esen s he se o nodes
and 𝐸

𝑉 𝑥 𝑉 he se o links conside ed as pai s o nodes linked oge he .
Social ne wo ks is a ecen ja gon e e ing o he mesh o social ela ionships be ween
indi iduals in a g oup, communi y o popula ion. The ype o ela ionships dic a es he ype
o ne wo k, be i scien i ic collabo a ion, p o essional, hobby-o ien ed, e c. The ubiqui y o
ne wo ks a ex end social domain, o en e hose o anspo a ion /subway, ai lines), powe
g id, elecommunica ions, heal h ca e and o he s (Kim, Ola e-Rojas, Ál a ez-Mi anda, &
Seung-Woo, 2018).
In gene al, no only a e ne wo ks shaped om indi iduals’ ac ions as ecip ocally
indi iduals’ ai s and beha iou a e la gely in luenced by he ne wo k (Gi a d, He , &
Schunk, 2014). In he pa icula case o social ne wo ks, his indi idual e sus collec i e
beha iou had al eady been add essed decades ago in Sociology wi h S uc u a ion heo ies
which eme ged as an a emp o dispel di ision wi hin he social sciences be ween hose who
conside ed social phenomena o be de e mined by objec i e social s uc u es (de e minism)
and o he s who saw social phenomena as he ou come o human agen s subjec i ely
in e p e ing he wo ld ( olun a ism) (Timb ell, Delaney, Chan, Yue, & Gable, 2005).
37
N (see 2.3.1.1), a he han ollowing a polynomial expec ed o egula la ices.
 High Clus e ing
The a e age clus e ing coe icien o eal ne wo ks is much highe han he one
expec ed o a andom ne wo k o simila numbe o nodes and links.
Figu e 8- F om Regula o Random Newo ks. (sou ce: (Wa s & S oga z, 1998)). L is de ined as he
numbe o edges in he sho es pa h be ween wo e ices, a e aged o e all pai s o nodes. C measu es
clus e ing coe icien a e aged o e all nodes. A p obabili y o 10−3is enough o making a e age dis ance in
he ne wo k o decay a ound 45%. A p obabili y o 10−2al eady makes a e age dis ance o decay 80% wi h
almos no deg ada ion o clus e ing index.
As in igu e 8, one s a s wi h a egula ing la ice whe e nodes a e posi ioned. Each node
is connec ed o <𝑘>
2 neighbou s on each side, wi h 〈𝑘〉 deno ing he in ended a e age deg ee.
I 〈𝑘〉 is odd i is a bi a ed which side has egula ly minus one neighbou s.
In a second s ep, o each node 𝑛1, he connec ion o each o i s 𝑛2 igh side neighbou s is
conside ed o ewi ing wi h p obabili y p, a pa ame e o he algo i hm. In case o ewi ing,
a node 𝑛3 is andomly chosen wi h uni o m p obabili y among hose wi h which 𝑛1 has no
ye a connec ion and excluding 𝑛1. Rewi ing consis s o 𝑛1 connec ing o 𝑛3 and
disconnec ing om 𝑛2.
The Wa s-S oga z ne wo k in e pola es be ween a egula la ice, which has high
clus e ing bu lacks he small-wo ld phenomenon, and a andom ne wo k, which has low
clus e ing, bu displays he small-wo ld p ope y.
Because o he small-wo ld cha ac e inhe i ed om andom ne wo k in luence ia he
ewi ing mechanism ac i a ed, Wa s-S oga z ne wo ks a e also known as small-wo ld
ne wo ks .
This small-wo ld e ec had al eady been iden i ied by S anley Milg am in an expe imen
conduc ed in he la e six ies ha was la e coined as six deg ees o sepa a ion. Su p ising
Regula
Random
Small-Wo ld
(Wa s-

38
esul s showed ha despi e socie y huge size o 6 billion indi iduals, by ollowing social links
any pai o nodes is on a e age six links apa , equi ing each pe son o ha e an a e age deg ee
lesse han 2 (Ba abási & F angos, Linked, 2002).
2.3.1.2. Ho and Ne wo ks
In a homogeneous ne wo ks such as la ices, all nodes sha e he same deg ee implying
deg ee dis ibu ion o be a del a unc ion exhibi ing a single peak a 〈𝑘〉.
This use ul ea u e is combined wi h he small-wo ld one in Ho and ne wo ks (San os,
Rod igues, & Pacheco, 2005; San os F. C., Pinhei o, Lenae s, & Pacheco, 2012). The
cons uc ion o a Ho and ne wo k as in Wa s-S oga z model s a s wi h a egula ing la ice
whe e nodes a e posi ioned. Being 〈𝑘〉 he in ended deg ee o he ne wo k, each node connec s
o he closes <𝑘>
2 nodes on i s le and igh side. Up o now, he ne wo k exhibi s he in ended
deg ee, has maximum clus e ing coe icien bu lacks small-wo ld ea u e. Second s ep o
Wa s-S oga z algo i hm p o ides he small-wo ld cha ac e bu a expenses o deg ee
a ia ion among nodes. To acqui e he small-wo ld ea u e wi hou sac i icing deg ee
homogenei y a pai o links is chosen andomly. Subjec o a ce ain p obabili y p, one node
o one link is exchanged wi h one node in he o he link, ensu ing no duplica ion o links
among he same pai o nodes. The p ocess is epea ed i e a i ely un il a ac ion p o all links
has been ewi ed.
The appea ance o a Ho and ne wo k is simila o a Wa s-S oga z one bu wi h a ixed
deg ee dis ibu ion.
2.3.1.3. Scale-F ee Ne wo ks
The deg ee dis ibu ion o a andom ne wo k is o Poisson o m, which means ha mos
nodes ha e a deg ee ha is close o i s a e age. I implies addi ionally ha he e a e ex emely
ew nodes highly connec ed, because he cu e alls away om i s peak as e han
exponen ially.
The andom model o E dős-Rényi es s on wo simple and o en dis ega ded assump ions.
The i s one is ha he se o nodes i ixed, emains unchanged h oughou he ne wo k
li e ime and is known up on om he beginning o ne wo k concep ion. The second one is
ha all nodes a e equal. Unable o dis inguish be ween he nodes, hey link andomly o each
o he (Ba abási & F angos, 2002).
39
Figu e 9- Poisson e sus Powe -law Dis ibu ions. (Sou ce: (Ba abási & Pós ai, Ne wo k Science, 2016))
On he le panel o igu e 9 a Poisson dis ibu ion o he p obabili y o inding a node wi h
deg ee k (𝑝𝑘) om andom ne wo ks is compa ed o a powe -law dis ibu ion (γ= 2.1) om
Scale- ee ne wo ks on a log-log plo . Bo h dis ibu ions ha e ⟨k⟩= 11.
On he cen al and igh panel a andom and a scale- ee ne wo ks a e plo . Bo h ne wo ks
ha e 50 nodes and 〈𝑘〉=3. The size o each node is p opo ional o i s deg ee.
(Reka, Jeong, & Ba abasi, 1999) s udied he Wo ld Wide Web and ound ou ha deg ee
dis ibu ion ollows a powe law, whe e he p obabili y o a node ha ing deg ee 𝑘 is
p opo ional o 𝑘−

wi h


2. The same conclusion was d awn o o he ne wo ks analysed
as powe -g id, Hollywood ne wo k o ac o s o IBM chip wi ing diag am. A Scale-F ee (SF)
ne wo k is a ne wo k whose deg ee dis ibu ion ollows a powe law as in igu e 9. The SF
quali ie de i es om he ac al-like cha ac e o he ne wo k, namely ha he dis ibu ion o
he nodes’ deg ee is p ese ed no ma e he scale o analysis. Thus, o popula ions ending
o in ini y, he dis ibu ion o he node deg ee in in e al [a, b], apa om a mul iplica i e
ac o , is in a ian whene e in e al bounda ies a e mul iplied by ano he posi i e ac o .
The second and highe momen s o he deg ee dis ibu ion goes o in ini y when  < 3. Fo
many SF ne wo ks,  is loca ed be ween 2 and 3.
This ype o dependency on k, which is no exclusi e o he echnology ield o online
communi ies bu also cha ac e izes o he ne wo ks in he na u al wo ld and social ields, is
no o ui ous bu de i es ins ead om he p ocess conduc ing o ne wo k g ow h o e ime.
In (Ba abási, 2013) ou o ganizing p inciples a e iden i ied o ne wo ks such as web and
social ne wo ks o be held oge he . SF is he i s o ganizing p inciple, which implies ha
hubs a e no only ole a ed, bu expec ed. Small-wo ld is he second p inciple, which s a es
ha wo nodes a e likely o be connec ed by a ela i ely sho pa h o nodes, e en in a e y
Scale-F ee
Random
40
la ge and spa se SF ne wo k as he Web. The hi d p inciple is o p e e en ial a achmen by
which newcome s o he ne wo k p e e ably connec o nodes wi h highe deg ee. The o h
p inciple is ela ed o he no ion o i ness and allows me i o p e ailed o e senio i y and
p o ide compe i ion. Ne wo k g ow h de elops o e ime, new links a e s ablished be ween
old nodes, bu he a e o g ow h is con olled by he i ness and he nodes wi h a g ea e i ness
will end o ‘win ou ’ and become e y highly connec ed. This explains why Google o
Facebook a i ed la e o he web bu became winne s. By iewing ne wo ks as dynamical
sys ems ha change con inuously o e ime, he SF model embodies a new modelling
philosophy.
SF opology is he esul o o ganizing p inciples ac ing a each s age o he ne wo k
o ma ion p ocess. G ow h and p e e en ial a achmen explain he basic ea u es o many o
he ne wo ks seen in na u e, social ne wo ks included. As long as hese ing edien s a e p esen ,
i will main ain i s hub-domina ed SF opology.
One impo an p ope y o SF ne wo ks is esilience agains andom e o . I nodes a e
emo ed a andom om mos ypes o ne wo ks hey will e en ually agmen in o a se o
smalle ne wo ks o indi idual nodes, bu ins ead a SF ne wo k will emains obus agains
andom decay; i may sh ink bu no all apa . I e en emains connec ed inde ini ely i  < 3
as in he case o Wo ld Wide Web. The Achilles’ heel o a SF ne wo k is an in en ional a ack
a ge ing he mos connec ed nodes (Ba abási, 2013).
(Ba abási, 1999) p opose an algo i hm o gene a e a SF ne wo k wi h  = 3 used ex ensi ely
along he simula ions in his hesis. I s a s wi h 𝑚0 nodes ully connec ed. Then i e a i ely
nodes a e added. Each new node is connec ed o 𝑚 dis inc nodes (𝑚

𝑚0) al eady pa o
he ne wo k. A new node choses andomly a node in he ne wo k o connec o wi h a
p obabili y p opo ional o i s deg ee. This mechanism a ou s senio i y and c ea es hubs. In
o de o a oid a co ela ion be ween he index o he nodes and i s deg ee, a inal s ep once
he ne wo k is cons uc ed consis s o sc ambling he indexes o he nodes. The a e age deg ee
o c ea ed ne wo k ends o 〈𝑘〉=2𝑚. SF ne wo ks wi h

=3 a e called Ba abási-Albe .
Ba abási-Albe s esses he small-wo ld cha ac e is ic o he ne wo k by ha ing
〈𝑑〉~ln (𝑁)
𝑙𝑛(ln(𝑁))
(73)
2.3.1.4. Mul ilaye s
Ne wo ks consis ing o a se o nodes o e ices connec ed by links o edges ha e been
ypically used o desc ibe o example a ic in a ci y, in e ac ions be ween indi iduals, he
41
ade among ma ke s o he Wo ld Wide Web. In o ma ion in he o m o news, messages, o
digi al i uses can be ansmi ed h ough ne wo ks, as well as in ec ious diseases o gene al
goods. Se e al algo i hms ha e been p oposed o gene a e and eplica e he mos impo an
s uc u al p ope ies o eal-wo ld ne wo ks om which examples we e p esen ed in p e ious
chap e s.
In spi e o he p og ess achie ed in ne wo k science du ing ecen decades, adi ionally
one has assumed ha nodes a e connec ed o each o he wi hin he same, isola ed
in as uc u e, he so-called single-laye ne wo k.
This assump ion, howe e , may in some ci cums ances be an o e simpli ica ion,
conside ing ha some nodes can simul aneously be he building blocks o mo e han jus one
ne wo k. This impo an conside a ion applies o na u al as well as o social sys ems. Many
complex sys ems demand mani old esou ces o be supplied om dis inc channels o unc ion
p ope ly, such as wa e , gas, and elec ici y o a ci y (De Domenico, e al., 2013).
As majo ci ies a e in e connec ed no jus by means o oads, bu also by means o ails,
as well as by means o ai anspo a ion, simila ly, people in e ac ace- o- ace, ia phone, on
online social ne wo ks, in hei wo k en i onmen , and so on (Min, 2014). I is hus o en
jus i ied o abandon he adi ional assump ion o a single-laye ne wo k and eplace i wi h a
mul ilaye ne wo k o malism. No su p isingly hen, he mul ilaye ne wo k, de ined as a
combina ion class o ne wo ks ha a e in e ela ed in a non i ial way, has ecen ly eme ged
as a undamen al concep o quan i a i ely desc ibe he in e ac ions no jus wi hin, bu also
among di e en ne wo ks.
Ne wo ks o ne wo ks ha e been b ough o he spo ligh by he disco e y ha e en small
and seemingly i ele an changes in one ne wo k can ha e ca as ophic and e y much
unexpec ed consequence in ano he ne wo k (Buldy e , Pa shani, Paul, S anley, & Ha lin,
2010).
Wha se s a mul ilaye ne wo k apa om he adi ional single-laye ne wo k is ha a
mul ilaye ne wo k ypically consis s o 𝑀 (𝑀 > 1) ne wo ks (o laye s), whe e he nodes in
each ne wo k (laye ) a e connec ed ia in a-laye links, bu he e may be also in e -laye links
ha connec oge he nodes om o he ne wo ks. Some imes he in e -laye links do no se e
o connec he nodes, bu me ely se e o communica e in o ma ion o some o he o m o
in luence be ween he nodes o ming he 𝑀 ne wo ks.
42
The same node may appea in mo e han one ne wo k and some imes all he nodes pe ain
o all 𝑀 ne wo ks wi h he di e ence be ween hem being he in a-laye links. Depending on
hese pa icula i ies, he e minology ha is used also a ies.
One o he challenges in ne wo k heo y is he e o e o ea oge he ies o di e en kind
p ese ing exis ing di e ences. The mul ilaye me apho , which allows o dis inguish he
di e en kinds o ela ionships among a se o nodes, cons i u es a p omising amewo k o
s udy and model mul ilaye sys ems.
I e olu iona y games a e played on mul iplex ne wo ks, s a egy imi a ion and payo
accumula ion can ake place ei he in he local neighbou hood o a pa icula laye o ac oss
he laye s, since all nodes exis in all laye .
2.3.1.5. De ini ion o a Mul ilaye Ne wo k
When nodes a e connec ed o each o he in a single in as uc u e one has a single-laye
ne wo k o g aph o mally desc ibed by G = (V, E) whe e V ep esen s he se o nodes and E
 V x V he se o links conside ed as pai s o nodes linked oge he .
Howe e , a single-laye can be an o e simpli ica ion, e.g. i nodes ep esen ai po s and
he links he di e en ai line companies ligh s. Ai lines ha e hei own se o connec ions
linking he ai po s, cons i u ing a laye o co e age independen om he ones co esponding
o o he companies. Whene e he e a e di e en in as uc u es o conside and he e a e cos s
lowing be ween hem, i is p e e able o conside a mul ilaye o mally desc ibed as 𝐺𝑀=
(𝑉𝑀,𝐸𝑀) whe e 𝑀 ep esen s he numbe o laye s, 𝑉𝑀= 𝑈𝛼=1
𝑀 𝑉𝛼 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑉𝛼={𝑉1𝛼,…,𝑉𝑁𝛼
𝛼}
and 𝑁𝛼 equal o he numbe o nodes in laye α. 𝑉𝛼 and 𝑉𝑀 ep esen , espec i ely, he se o
nodes in laye α and in he all mul ilaye .
In wha conce ns mul ilaye edges one has 𝐸𝑀 = {𝐸𝛼 𝑈 𝐸𝛼

:𝛼,

𝜖 {1,…,𝑀},𝛼 ≠

}
wi h 𝐸𝛼⊆ 𝑉𝛼𝑥 𝑉𝛼 and 𝐸𝛼𝛽⊆ 𝑉𝛼𝑥 𝑉𝛽.
Acco ding o (Wang, Wang, Szolnoki, & Pe c, 2015) and as in igu e 10 mul ilaye s can
be classi ied in o h ee b oad ca ego ies:
 Mul iplex Ne wo ks
In a mul iplex ne wo k all he laye s con ain he same se o nodes o sha e a leas
some ac ion o he nodes. The di e ence be ween he laye s is he way he nodes a e
connec ed wi h each o he in each pa icula laye .
The ne wo k o ai po s can be ansla ed in o a mul iplex o m wi h di e en laye s
consis ing o he ou es o di e en ai plane ca ie s. The collabo a ion and he ci a ion
ne wo ks cons i u e ano he example o laye s o a mul iplex.

43
Figu e 10- Mul ilaye Ne wo ks. Mul iplex ne wo k ha e he same nodes ac oss all laye s. In e dependen
ne wo ks ypically ha e di e en nodes in di e en laye s. Addi ionally well-being o nodes in one laye may
depend o he well-being o o he nodes in o he laye s. In e connec ed ne wo k a e like in e dependen ones
bu wi h physical connec ions in e -laye . In all he h ee ypes o mul ilaye s in a-laye connec ions a e
independen ac oss laye s.
All laye s ha ing he same nodes and no in e -laye links can be o mally exp essed as
𝑉𝛼 ∩ 𝑉

= 𝑉𝑀 = 𝑉,∀ 𝛼 ≠

. Addi ionally, Eα =∅,∀ α ≠  , i.e., no links
be ween laye s.
 In e dependen Ne wo ks
An in e dependen ne wo k is ypical made up o wo o mo e di e en ne wo ks, such
ha he e is li le o no o e lap be ween he nodes in he di e en laye s. The
pe o mance o nodes in a pa icula laye depend on he pe o mance o nodes in a
di e en laye , and ice e sa. Thus, he e exis s he so-called dependency links
be ween he nodes ha a e pa o di e en laye s. These links a e no ac ual physical
links, bu a he imagina y links ha deno e he co-dependence; hence he name
in e dependen ne wo ks.
The concep o in e dependen ne wo ks is e e ed o in (Buldy e , Pa shani, Paul,
S anley, & Ha lin, 2010) whe e cascading ailu es be ween an elec ical g id ne wo k
and a compu e ne wo k a e s udied. Ai po s and seapo ne wo ks can be in e p e ed
as in e dependen ne wo ks, because he p ope unc ioning o a seapo may depend
on goods deli e ed by ai .
44
Each laye ha ing di e en ypes o nodes and he e being no dependency links (no
physical connec ions) be ween he nodes can be o malized as 𝑉𝛼 ∩ 𝑉

= ∅ ∀ 𝛼≠
𝛽.
 In e connec ed ne wo ks
An in e connec ed ne wo k is simila o an in e dependen ne wo k in ha i is ypical
made up o wo o mo e di e en ne wo ks, such ha he e is li le o no o e lap
be ween he nodes in he di e en laye s. In he in e connec ed ne wo k, howe e ,
he e a e ac ual physical links ha connec oge he he nodes om di e en laye s.
In e connec ed ne wo ks can hus be ega ded as in e connec ed communi ies o
clus e s wi hin a single la ge ne wo k.
The clima e ne wo k can be decomposed in o di e en ne wo k in e connec ed laye s
in exploi ing he s a i ica ion and ci cula ion o he e es ial a mosphe e.
Each laye ha ing di e en ypes o nodes and he e being ac ual physical links
be ween he nodes in di e en laye s can be o malized as ∃𝛼,𝛽∈ {1,…,𝑀} 𝑉𝛼 ∩
𝑉

≠ ∅ ⋀ 𝛼≠ 𝛽.
Real mul iplex ne wo ks a e a om andom supe posi ion o hei cons i uen laye
opologies. Ins ead, he deg ees o he same nodes in di e en laye s may be co ela ed, as
hey may end o connec o simila nodes in di e en laye s c ea ing o e lapping edges.
In his hesis only mul iplex ne wo ks will be add essed. Whene e he ea e mul ilaye
social ne wo k a e e e ed o, i is i s mul iplex a ian o be assumed.
2.3.1.6. Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion
An in e es ing p ope y obse ed in eal mul iplex ne wo ks is he p esence o co ela ions
be ween he deg ees o he same node a di e en laye s. This is no mally signalled by he
ac ha he p obabili y 𝑃(𝑘𝛼= 𝑘11,𝑘

= 𝑘2) o ind a node wi h deg ee 𝑘1 on laye α and
deg ee 𝑘2 on laye  does no ac o ize in he p oduc 𝑃𝛼(𝑘)𝑃

(𝑘) o he deg ee dis ibu ions
o he wo laye s.
Wi hin a laye , deg ee co ela ion cap u es he ela ionship be ween he deg ees o nodes
linking o each o he . Laye s can be asso a i e, i nodes wi h a highe (lowe ) deg ee end o
link o nodes wi h a highe (lowe ) deg ee, disasso a i e i he end is he o he way a ound
o neu al i no end is iden i ied.
Mul iplex ne wo ks, because o ha ing he same nodes in all laye s, allow he ex ension o
in a-laye deg ee co ela ion concep o mul iplex scope. This is he a ionale behind deg ee-
45
deg ee co ela ion index designed o quan i y asso a i e (disasso a i e) mixing pa e n
be ween laye s. The deg ee-deg ee co ela ion is e iden in social ne wo ks. I a amous
indi idual like a singe o a spo sman is amous in one ne wo k, e.g. Facebook o Twi e ,
p obabili y he/she will also be amous in ano he one. Deg ee-deg ee co ela ion is supposed
o e lec his asso a i e pa e n.
(Nicosia & La o a, 2015) p opose se e al me hods o calcula e deg ee-deg ee co ela ions.
One possibili y is he Pea son's linea co ela ion coe icien . I 𝑘𝑖𝛼and 𝑘𝑖𝛽 deno e espec i ely
de deg ee o node 𝑖 in laye 𝛼 and 𝛽, Pea son's co ela ion coe icien o he wo-deg ee
sequences is de ined as:
𝑟𝛼𝛽 = 1
𝑁∑𝑘𝑖𝛼𝑘𝑖𝛽
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 1
𝑁2∑𝑘𝑖𝛼∑𝑘𝑖𝛽
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
√1
𝑁∑(𝑘𝑖𝛼)2−(1
𝑁∑𝑘𝑖𝛼
𝑁
𝑖=1 )2
𝑁
𝑖=1 √1
𝑁∑(𝑘𝑖𝛽)2−(1
𝑁∑𝑘𝑖𝛽
𝑁
𝑖=1 )2
𝑁
𝑖=1
(74)
which can succinc ly be s a ed as
𝑟𝛼𝛽 = <𝑘𝑖𝛼𝑘𝑖𝛽>− <𝑘𝑖𝛼><𝑘𝑖𝛽>
𝜎𝑘𝛼𝜎𝑘𝛽
(75)
Ano he possibili y is o use he Spea man's ank co ela ion coe icien , which o he wo
𝑅𝑖𝛼 and 𝑅𝑖𝛽 ank sequences o deg ee in laye α and β, espec i ely, is gi en by:
𝜌𝛼,𝛽=∑(𝑅𝑖𝛼−𝑅𝛼




)(𝑅𝑖𝛽−𝑅𝛽




)
𝑖
√∑(𝑅𝑖𝛼−𝑅𝛼




)2∑(𝑅𝑗𝛽−𝑅𝛽




)2
𝑗𝑖
(76)
whe e 𝑅𝑖𝛼 and 𝑅𝑖𝛽a e he anks o node i due o i s deg ee in laye s α and β, espec i ely, and
𝑅𝛼




and 𝑅𝛽




a e he a e age anks o nodes in he same laye s
1
.
A hi d al e na i e would be o use Kendall’s 𝜏 ank co ela ion coe icien .
(Nicosia & La o a, 2015) calcula e he 3 co ela ion coe icien s o Ame ican Physical
Socie y co-au ho ship ne wo k wi h 10 laye s each one assigned o sub ields o esea ch a ea.
The p ocedu e is epea ed o IMDb ne wo k o collabo a ion be ween ac o s wi h laye s
de ined acco ding o mo ie gen e. In bo h ne wo ks, he 3 co ela ion coe icien s p o ide a
consis en indica ion abou asso a i eness be ween laye s.
(Nicosia & La o a, 2015) p o ide wo algo i hms based on simula ed annealing o cons uc
mul iplex ne wo ks wi h con ollable in e -laye deg ee-deg ee co ela ion, use ul o
1
Wi hin laye 𝛼, node 𝑖 ha ing ank 𝑅𝑖𝛼 means ha in his laye nodes wi h an highe
deg ee han 𝑖’s ha e 𝑅𝑖𝛼−1 dis inc alues o deg ee. E.g., nodes wi h second g ea e deg ee
in a laye ha e ank 2 in ha laye .
46
simula ions in o de o be e unde s and how deg ee co ela ions ac oss laye s in luence
mul iplex pe o mance.
2.3.1.7. O e lapping
In mul iplexes, ne wo ks nodes ake pa in all laye s o ne wo ks simul aneously. Social
ne wo ks whe e each indi idual node has di e en kind o social ies, one o amily ones,
ano he o iendship, o p o essional, e c., o anspo a ion sys ems whe e each loca ion is
connec ed o ano he loca ion by di e en ypes o anspo , one pe laye , a e jus examples
o mul iplex cha ac e ized by a signi ican o e lap o he links in di e en laye s (Bianconi,
2013).
O e lapping be ween wo laye s 𝛼 and 𝛽 p o ides an indica o on how p obable i is o an
a bi a y pai o nodes o be linked in bo h laye s. I is de ined acco ding o (Ba is on, Ma jaz,
& La o a, 2017) as
o e lapping𝛼𝛽= ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛽
𝑖<𝑗
∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼+ ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛽
𝑖<𝑗 − ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛽
𝑖<𝑗𝑖<𝑗
(77)
wi h 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼 and 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛽 ep esen ing, espec i ely, he adjacency ma ixes in laye s 𝛼 and 𝛽 and
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼= {1, i nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 a e linked in laye 𝛼
0, o he wise
(78)
O e lap be ween wo laye s alls in he in e al [0,1]. Minimum alue is achie ed i laye s
ha e no links in common. Maximum alue e lec s he case o bo h laye s coinciding. Deg ee-
deg ee co ela ion is a mo e elaxed measu e o he simila i y be ween laye s, because a
co ela ion o 1 does no imply laye s’ coincidence. I only conce ns he same node on
di e en laye s ha ing he same numbe o neighbou s no ma e i hey di e be ween laye s.
The o e lapping o he whole mul iplex can be de ined as he a e age o he o e lap o
e e y pai o laye s:
o e lapping = 1
𝐶2𝑀∑o e lapping𝛼𝛽
𝑀
𝛼=1,𝛽=1,𝛼<𝛽 =
2
𝑀(𝑀−1)∑o e lapping𝛼𝛽
𝑀
𝛼=1,𝛽=1,𝛼<𝛽
(79)
2.4. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON STRUCTURED POPULATIONS
E olu iona y Game Theo y is a ma hema ical app oach aiming o desc ibe he compe i ion
o species in an ecosys em, he in e ac ion be ween indi iduals o dis inc popula ions,
whe he hey a e molecules, li ing o ganisms o humans ideas and beha iou s. The
mechanism ha leads o he e olu ion o coope a ion in hese se ings could be called ‘spa ial
53
Nowak, 2006; T aulsen, Sho esh, & Nowak, 2008), ailing o explain how a s a egy co-exis s
o ou compe es ano he . The weakness o analy ical s udies s em om hei alidi y scope,
o en equi ing un ealis ic popula ion s uc u es o o he ex eme condi ions such as weak-
selec ion o Mo an p ocesses, which means ha ing 𝑤≪1 when i ness (𝑓) is ela ed o
payo (𝜋) as in
𝑓=(1−𝑤)+𝑤𝜋
(83)
Besides, hese s udies a ge on ixa ion p obabili ies, a concep speci ic o biology, missing
he nexus be ween he ne wo k opology and he e olu iona y dynamics c ea ed. Un il
(Pinhei o, Pacheco, & San os, 2012), ne wo k s udies ailed o cha ac e ize he sel -o ganizing
p ocess by which one s a egy co-exis s wi h o displaces he o he .
In o de o shed some ligh on he opological mechanism ha depa ing om ne wo ked
indi iduals engaged in a local game leads o a global, popula ion wide, beha iou al dynamics
which de ia es s ongly om he o iginal one, (Pinhei o, Pacheco, & San os, 2012) de ine an
a e age g adien o selec ion (AGoS) o ack he sel -o ganiza ion o Coope a o s when
in e ac ing wi h De ec o s unde ne wo k ecip oci y. A any poin in ime, AGoS e lec s he
expec ed inc ease in he numbe o Coope a o s in he popula ion. In a bi a y ne wo k
popula ions, i is no possible o de i e a closed o m exp ession o he AGoS, bu i can be
nume ically calcula ed. I allows assessing he ole o popula ion s uc u e in he e olu iona y
dynamics since i is by design simila o he eplica o equa ion in an in ini e well-mixed
popula ion.
Fo AGoS calcula ion, e olu ion is modelled ia a s ochas ic bi h-dea h p ocess whe e
each indi idual 𝑖 wi h payo 𝑝𝑖 adop s he s a egy o a andomly selec ed neighbou 𝑗 wi h
payo 𝑝𝑗 wi h p obabili y gi en by he Fe mi unc ion
𝑝= 1
1+𝑒−𝛽(𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖)
(84)
Fo each indi idual i, he p obabili y o imi a ing he beha iou o any o i s neighbou s a
ime 𝑡, 𝑇𝑖(𝑡), is gi en by
𝑇𝑖(𝑡)= 1
𝑘𝑖∑1
1+𝑒−𝛽(𝑝𝑗−𝑝𝑖)
𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
(85)
wi h 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑛𝑖 ep esen ing, espec i ely, he deg ee o 𝑖 and he numbe o i s neighbou s
wi h a di e en s a egy hen he one om 𝑖.

54
I 𝑇𝑖(𝑡) is a e aged ac oss all Coope a o s o De ec o s, one ob ains he p obabili y o he
popula ion a ime 𝑡 o dec emen o inc emen by 1 he numbe o Coope a o s, espec i ely,
𝑇𝐴−(𝑐,𝑡) and 𝑇𝐴+(𝑐,𝑡), gi en by
𝑇𝐴±(𝑐,𝑡)= 1
𝑁∑ 𝑇𝑗(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑠
𝑗=1,𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑠
(86)
The i s pa ame e in 𝑇𝐴±(𝑐,𝑡) was added o make explici he dependency o his a iable
on he numbe o Coope a o s in he popula ion.
Du ing he cou se o simula ion s a ime , he expec ed inc ease in he numbe o
Coope a o s in he popula ion al eady wi h c Coope a o s is gi en by
𝐺𝑠(𝑐,𝑡)=𝑇𝐴+(𝑐,𝑡) - 𝑇𝐴−(𝑐,𝑡)
(87)
a quan i y wi h an absolu e alue no g ea e han 1.
T us ing on he e godici y o he p ocess, which means ha a e ages o e p obabili y space
and o e ime coincide, AGoS is ob ained by a e aging 𝐺𝑠(𝑐,𝑡) ac oss he ime o a la ge
numbe o samples:
AGoS(c) = 1
ΛΩ∑ ∑ 𝐺𝑠(𝑐,𝑡)
∈ Ωs ϵ Λ
(88)
whe e Λ ep esen s he space dimension o all ne wo k e olu iona y simula ions. Ω ep esen s
he numbe o ime s eps pe simula ion.
In a ne wo k wi h N nodes, he e a e 𝐶𝑐𝑁= 𝑁!
(𝑁−𝑐)!𝑐! dis inc con igu a ions wi h c
Coope a o s. Along he e olu ion simula ions, some s a egy con igu a ions will be mo e
likely han o he s, e.g. mo emen s om unco ela ed asso men s o co ela ed ones should
be mo e p obable han he o he way ound, which will make he p obabili ies o he a ious
con igu a ions wi h c Coope a o s unequal.
In o de o AGoS o be d awn o all possible c numbe o Coope a o s and o a maximum
numbe o dis inc con igu a ions wi h c Coope a o s o be e alua ed, each simula ion in he
Λ space is o be ini ialized wi h Coope a o s andomly posi ioned in he ne wo k in a numbe
gi en by a uni o mly dis ibu ed a iable in he in e al [0, N], in o de o p e en lack o
obse a ions in he s a e space.
AGoS being a opology dependen mean- ield desc ip o o a s uc u ed popula ion can be
compu ed o a bi a y popula ion s uc u e and a bi a y game pa ame e iza ion.
Figu e 13 exempli ies possible shapes o AGoS.
55
Figu e 13-A e age G adien o Selec ion
A e age G adien o Selec ion in s uc u ed popula ions a e measu ed ac oss ne wo ks
andomly sampled om a se o ne wo ks o he same ype, e.g. Ho and s BA, deg ee,
asso a i i y, e c.
Clockwise, s a ing in op le co ne in i s panel, he ne wo k will e ol e owa ds Full
Coope a ion. In nex panel he e olu ion is owa d Full De ec ion. In nex panel, he ne wo k
is bound o ei he Full Coope a ion o Full De ec ion, inal des ina ion depending on ini ial
Coope a o equency in ela ion o c i ical equency x*. One has a Coo dina ion Game. In
las panel, he sys em con e ges o a s a egy co-exis ence scena io. The ype o ne wo k o
he ela i e alues o payo ma ix con ibu e o dic a e he ype o AGoS applicable.
2.4.4. The S uc u e o Social G aphs
The connec i i y s uc u e can be cha ac e ized by a numbe o opological p ope ies
p esen ed in sec ion 2.3. The g aphs o conside along he hesis a e all connec ed, meaning
he e is a leas one pa h along links be ween any pai o nodes.
Ne wo ks co-exis in di e en laye s o a mul iplex. All laye s sha e he same se o nodes,
bu wi h a laye speci ic link se . Nodes in di e en laye s may ha e deg ee-deg ee co ela ion
o links ha e a ce ain amoun o o e lapping be ween laye s.
Squa e la ices a e one o he simples ne wo ks. They can be a la ice wi h on Neumann
neighbou hood, 4 connec ions be ween nea es neighbou nodes, o Moo e neighbou hood
wi h connec ions be ween nea es and nex -nea es neighbou s, in a o al o 8, e c. I may be
he case ha egula la ice only p o ides an ini ial s uc u e o he c ea ion o mo e ealis ic
56
social ne wo ks whe e a po ion o playe s and/o in e ac ions a e andomly emo ed (Nowak
M. , 2006).
La ices lack he small-wo ld ypical cha ac e is ic o eal-ne wo ks. Along he hesis,
Ho and ne wo ks will be conside ed. Due o hei cons uc ion p ocess no only do hey exhibi
he small-wo ld cha ac e is ics bu also a ixed deg ee, use ul when ying o unde s and
analy ically ce ain phenomena o he ole o ano he p ope y, wi hou deg ee a ia ion.
Homogenous ne wo ks, in which ca ego y Ho and ne wo ks i in, allow he c ea ion o
clus e s o Coope a o s ha in e ac and maximize payo in o de o be e esis De ec o s
exploi a ion, al hough wi h an high sensi i i y on he in ensi y o selec ion (Pinhei o, Pacheco,
& San os, 2012).
A pa e n obse ed in nume ical simula ions is ha o games played on ne wo ks, a he
beginning he numbe o Coope a o s dec eases, as a De ec o playing agains a Coope a o
ge s a highe payo . Howe e , on he long un, small clus e s o Coope a o s o m on he
la ice, because Coope a o s playing agains each o he pe o m be e han De ec o s agains
De ec o s. The ini ial dec ease in coope a ion is he p ice o pay o Coope a o s o eo ganize
and assemble (Pe c, 2013).
Fo Mo an p ocess o dea h-bi h ype in a dona ion game wi h weak selec ion (see equa ion
83), (Oh suki, Haue , Liebe man, & Nowak, 2006) s a e ha coope a ion is a ou ed
whene e 𝑏𝑐>〈𝑘〉, wi h b s anding o he bene i o an al uis ic ac , c o i s cos and 〈𝑘〉 o
he deg ee o he ne wo ks. The au ho s also concluded ha he a o emen ioned condi ion
leads Coope a o s (De ec o s) o a ixa ion p obabili y 𝜌𝐴(𝜌𝐷), such ha 𝜌𝐴>1
𝑁>𝜌𝐷, wi h
1
𝑁 s anding o he ixa ion o a single Coope a o wi h neu al d i , i.e. w=0 in equa ion 83.
These esul s holds o la ge popula ions wi h 𝑁≫〈𝑘〉.
Real ne wo ks ha e ol ed by adding nodes, such ha new nodes a ach andomly o
exis ing nodes wi h a p obabili y p opo ional o he deg ee o he la e a e be e desc ibed
by a SF ne wo k. Aged nodes end o ha e g ea e deg ee. Along he hesis, he BA model, a
SF ne wo k wi h

=3, is adop ed. These he e ogeneous ne wo ks p o ide no only an
adequa e opology o Coope a o s o ga he , in e ac and ein o ce mu ual payo s, bu also
unc ion as a e e ence landma k o coope a ion s a egy in luence o e he neighbou hood
due o he high payo achie ed.
The impac o he e ogeneous ne wo ks on coope a ion e lec ed in he igh panel o igu e
11 is poin ed ou in (San os & Pacheco, 2005) o 2-Playe s games and la e on ex ended o
PGG in (San os, San os, & Pacheco, 2008). Ini ially De ec o s pe o m well in e ac ing wi h
57
high-deg ee nodes, bu soon a e ic ims o hei own success as hei neighbou s cease being
Coope a o s. This allows a Coope a o o in ade he hub, seed a clus e and a oid exploi a ion
by o he De ec o s.
(Gómez-Ga deñes, Campillo, Flo ía, & Mo eno, 2007) show ha a mo e he e ogeneous
deg ee dis ibu ions esul s in inc eased coope a ion by measu ing he equency o p opo ion
o playe s ha consis en ly play ei he coope a ion o de ec ion a e he sys em eaching
equilib ium. In SF ne wo ks, he e is a single la ge co e o pu e Coope a o s di icul o in ade
o ganized in hubs. The smalle numbe o hubs on andom ne wo k is he eason o he lowe
le el o coope a ion in hese ne wo ks.
2.5. OTHER RELEVANT BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE THESIS
I p e ious sec ions a ge ed o es ablish a common g ound o consis en e minology and
o build up he ounda ions o a heo e ical amewo k, his sec ions accoun s o bibliog aphy
mo e speci ic o he subjec s o mul ilaye ne wo ks, modelling and s uc u al measu es,
suppo o e olu iona y dynamics and he so o Public Goods Games (PGG) ha can be
played in hese s uc u es.
(San os, San os, & Pacheco, 2008) ocus on PGG in a single laye . Each node wi h k deg ee
pa icipa es in 𝑘+1 games wi h a s a opology, cen e ed on each o i s 𝑘 neighbou s and
i sel .
The only wo s a egies conside ed a e coope a ion and de ec ion. The i ness o a playe
is associa ed wi h he accumula ed payo esul ing om all PGG in which he/she pa icipa es.
S a egy e olu ion is implemen ed ia eplica o dynamics: a each ime s ep, each indi idual
adop s he s a egy o a andomly chosen neighbou wi h a p obabili y p opo ional o he
payo ( i ness) di e ence.
The wo pa ame e a iables conside ed a e he ype o ne wo k, ei he egula g aphs o
SF, and he in es men o apply pe playe in each game. Pe Coope a o playe , ei he he e
is a ixed in es men o be applied pe game, o he e is a ixed in es men pe playe o be
equally di ided among he k+1 games he/she plays. Simula ion esul s show ha ne wo k
he e ogenei y a ou s coope a ion. Addi ionally, sha ing a ixed in es men ac oss all games,
i.e., ha ing ixed in es men by playe , lowe s he syne gy ac o no malized by 𝑘+1
h eshold beyond which coope a ion becomes iable.
A ma hema ical analysis o he esul s p esen ed in (San os, San os, & Pacheco, 2008) is
de eloped by (Pacheco, Pinhei o, & San os, 2009) in o de o explain why di e si y on
con ibu ion and on ne wo k a ou coope a ion. Condi ions o a Coope a o o in ade a
58
De ec o hub a e p esen ed o bo h cases o ixed in es men pe playe o pe game.
Condi ion o la e al e na i e is less s ingen ha i s coun e pa o he o me one. As in
(San os F. C., Pinhei o, Lenae s, & Pacheco, 2012) he AGoS e lec ing he a ia ion
(inc ease o dec ease) in he numbe o Coope a o s as a unc ion o Coope a o s equency is
plo . The plo s un eils ha he unde lying s uc u e e ec i ely ans o ms a local coope a i e
dilemma in o a global coo dina ion game. Fo ixed in es men pe game wi h unde lying SF
ne wo ks, he e is a c i ical ini ial le el o coope a ion, unc ion o applicable syne gy ac o ,
below (abo e) which he le el o coope a ion ends o an All-De ec o s (Coope a o s)
ne wo k.
Mo eo e , changing he con ibu i e scheme om ixed in es men pe game o ixed
in es men pe playe in a SF ne wo k popula ion s uc u es changes a PD e ec i ely in o a
Ha mony Game whe e coope a ion become ad an ageous i espec i ely o hei
concen a ion, which means e olu ion mo ed o an ALL-Coope a o s ne wo k.
2.5.1. Mul ilaye ne wo ks
A o malism o deal wi h sys ems composed o se e al laye s, ei he wi h bina y o
weigh ed links, is p oposed by (Ba is on, Nicosia, & La o a, 2014). Di e en pe spec i es o
desc ip ion o a mul iplex ne wo k a e in oduced: he agg ega ed opological ma ix, he
o e lapping and he weigh ed o e lapping ma ix, which a e simple and mo e compac
s uc u es, bu no so ich as he adjacency ma ix 𝐴𝑖𝑗 pe laye . Basic me ics o cha ac e ize
he s uc u al p ope ies o a single laye ne wo k such as deg ee dis ibu ion, node clus e ing,
sho es pa hs, be weenness o closeness a e ex ended o a mul iplex scena io. New measu es
as mul iplex deg ee en opy eme ge. The e is a ocus on he quan i ica ion o he pa icipa ion
o single nodes o he s uc u e o each laye , and on i s impo ance o he o e all e iciency
o he mul iplex ne wo k, in e ms o node eachabili y and clus e ing. P oposed measu es a e
es ed and alida ed on a genuine mul iplex eal-wo ld da ase , he one o Top Noo din
Te o is Ne wo k (Ba is on, Nicosia, & La o a, 2014).
2.5.2. Coope a ion in Mul ilaye Ne wo ks
(Li, Wang, & Sheng, 2017) s udy in a single laye ep esen ing a 2D space he e olu ion
o coope a ion on ne wo ks ha inco po a e geog aphical cos s in o he payo unc ion o
e olu iona y games. The longe he dis ance be ween a pai o playe s, he highe he spa ial
cos inco po a ed in o he payo ma ix o he game.
Nodes ha e weigh s s anding o i s ele ance, e.g. popula ion o a ci y. Ne wo ks a e ully
connec ed wi h s uc u es geog aphically induced, as bo h nodes’ ele ance and hei dis ance

59
a e aken in o accoun in a g a i y alike unc ion, used in cos -bene i analysis when deciding
which links o inco po a e in he ne wo k.
Nodes ha e 2D coo dina es and each link is cha ac e ized by he Euclidean dis ance
be ween he nodes i connec s. PGG a e played bu he amoun in es ed by a playe in each
game is now p opo ional o a cos unc ion gi en by a Fe mi dis ibu ion applied o he
Euclidean dis ance o each o his neighbou s.
A ele an esul is ha a pola ized dis ibu ion o geog aphical cos s can signi ican ly
lowe he h eshold alue o he syne gy ac o o coope a ion in ne wo ked PGG o succeed.
In o he wo ds, he geog aphical mechanism, which pola izes coope a i e cos s is able o
lowe he h eshold alue o he syne gy ac o o coope a ion in PGG. On he o he hand,
mo e uni o m alike dis ibu ion o geog aphical cos s hinde s he e olu ion o coope a ion.
(Nakamu , Nagashim, & Yasu ak, 2015) s udy a wo laye mul iplex wi h andom
ne wo ks, small-wo ld ne wo ks, ollowing Wa s-S oga z model, and SF g aphs, based on
Ba abási-Albe model. Nodes appea in all laye s wi h no in e -laye links and ha e a single
s a egy ac oss laye s. 3 ne wo k ypes in 2 independen laye s, in a o al o 32 combina ions
a e simula ed. In each laye , PD is played aking in o accoun payo s acqui ed exclusi ely in
ha laye . Each nodes upda es i s s a egy by copying i om a neighbou wi h a p obabili y
linea ly p opo ional o hei laye payo di e ence no malized by he maximum deg ee
be ween hem. Once a node upda es i s s a egy on one laye , i assumes i in all o he laye s
so ha a node’s s a egy is cohe en ac oss laye s. In his model, coope a ion only has a chance
i bo h laye s a e SF.
(Ba is on, Ma jaz, & La o a, 2017) explo e mul iplexes wi h laye s o med by egula
andom g aphs, nodes wi h independen s a egies pe laye . Playe ’s playo is accumula ed
ac oss laye s. Fo a common syne gy ac o ac oss all laye s, he mo e o e lapping a e links
ac oss laye s, he lesse is he c i ical syne gy ac o o coope a ion o se in. Mo eo e , o a
gi en posi i e a e age node o e lapping, he bigge he numbe o laye s he smalle he
c i ical syne gy ac o o coope a ion o p e ail. In a wo laye mul iplex case, ha ing
di e en syne gy ac o s in he laye s allows new abso bing s a es wi h Full Coope a ion on
one laye and Full De ec ion on he o he .
(Li, Shen, & Jiang, 2016) ackle a scena io o playe s ha ing limi ed esou ces a ailable o
be spen in PGG played ac oss all mul iplex laye s. An agen is ep esen ed by a uple o
nodes, one pe laye . The syne gy ac o is common o all laye s. Laye s ha e homogeneous
ne wo ks, E dős–Rényi o small-wo ld models, o SF he e ogeneous models. Each agen has
60
an in es men alloca ion, an a ay o in es men s, one elemen pe laye , such ha he
in es men pe laye is non-nega i e and he o al in es men pe agen is opped. Agen
payo s a e calcula ed pe laye .
Agen s ha e a iable con ibu ions ac oss laye s wi h null con ibu ions allowed. An Agen
beha es as a Coope a o o a De ec o when his/he con ibu ion is posi i e o null,
espec i ely. Pe i e a ion, an agen is andomly selec ed. Selec ed agen payo s ac oss laye s
a e compa ed and based on Fe mi dis ibu ion, a laye is selec ed. In he chosen laye , he
ocal node adop s he alloca ion s a egy o a andom neighbou in he same laye wi h Fe mi
p obabili y dis ibu ion applied o ocal and neighbou nodes’ payo s in ha laye . In case
alloca ion s a egy is copied, u he no maliza ion o he new in es men alloca ion o he
ocal agen is equi ed in o de o keep i s o al opped.
G eedy- i s mechanism was coined o he scena io when an agen in choosing he laye
o play p e e s o upda e he alloca ion s a egy in he highe payo laye as de e mined by
Fe mi dis ibu ion.
Simula ions o 2-laye mul iplex e eal ha g eedy- i s agen s can pe o m coope a i e
beha iou s in mul iplex ne wo ks when one laye is SF ne wo k and deg ee di e ences
be ween pee nodes inc ease. An addi ional conclusion is ha deg ee di e si y and g eedy-
i s mechanism can de ea emp a ion o de ec i e beha iou s and a oid he ex emely biased
coope a ion in a ce ain laye .
A c i ic o he pape om he au ho o his hesis is ha pa s o he o malism in oduced,
in pa icula he g eedy- i s mechanism, lacked gene aliza ion o mul iplexes o mo e han 2
laye s.
(Hayashi, Suzuki, & A i a, 2016) add ess a mul iplex scena io whe e an agen canno a o d
o play PGG in mo e han 1 laye a any ins an o ime. Thus, an agen can ha e a node in any
laye , bu exclusi ely, i.e., in any poin in ime an agen will ha e a single node ha will be
posi ioned in only one laye , al hough his p esence laye can dynamically e ol e o e ime.
Coope a ion and de ec ion a e he applicable s a egies. Game e olu ion allows an agen o
change he laye whe e i s single node lays.
All laye s, independen , a e de ined as E dös–Rényi andom g aph wi h he same cons an
deg ee.
The game oughly e ol es as ollows. Fo each agen he payo o i s ep esen a i e node
is calcula ed in i s laye o p esence by playing PGG wi h i s neighbou s as dic a ed by laye
ne wo k who a e necessa ily p esen in ha laye . Wi h payo s calcula ed, o each agen a
61
po en ial neighbou , no necessa ily p esen in he same laye , is iden i ied. A e e ence alue
unc ion o node’s payo s dic a es he p obabili ies wi h which s a egy and laye o p esence
is copied om ocal agen o i s neighbou o he o he way a ound.
Wi h a bi a y p obabili ies mu a ions hi agen s: laye o p esence o i s single node
upda es o a andomly chosen new one and s a egy o i s node changes.
As he numbe o laye s inc ease, o he hings being equal, coope a ion equency
inc eases, so does he no malized en opy o he dis ibu ion o he p esence o agen s pe
laye , esul ing his inc ease om he cyclic coe olu ion p ocesses o game s a egies and
laye selec ion s a egies.
Depa ing om a scena io wi h he same E dös–Rényi andom g aph ac oss all laye s and
hen andomly ewi ing hem in each laye , i was also showed ha he e ogenei y among
laye s is a ca alys in mul iplex ne wo ks o acili a e he e olu ion o coope a ion. In a way,
his esul is a eminiscence o he esul s ob ained by (San os F. C., Pinhei o, Lenae s, &
Pacheco, 2012) in a single laye case.
(Kleinebe g & Helbing, 2018) s udy mul iplexes wi h independen SF ne wo ks. Nodes
ha e independen s a egies pe laye . E olu ion o he sys em is go e ned by imi a ion
dynamics, which means indi iduals end o adop he s a egy o mo e success ul neighbou s.
In each ound o he game, i s ly each node chooses one laye andomly and hen, wi hin his
laye , one neighbou a andom. Neighbou ’s s a egy o ha laye is copied wi h a p obabili y
gi en by Fe mi dis ibu ion applied o he di e en ial o nodes payo . The payo o a node
is calcula ed as he a e age payo accomplished ac oss all laye s.
I PD is he game played and he e is no deg ee co ela ion be ween laye s, inc easing he
numbe o laye s only leads o minimum changes in inal le el o coope a ion om a single
laye scena io. Howe e , i deg ee co ela ions a e p esen and he numbe o laye s is la ge
enough, an a e age le el o coope a ion o 0.5 domina es he whole T-S pa ame e space and
jus i ies he ‘ opological ensla emen ’ i le o he a icle. Topological ensla emen eme ges
and highligh s payo i ele ance as bo h he numbe o laye s and he s eng h o deg ee
co ela ions a e inc eased.
Topological ensla emen is also obse ed wi h he Ha mony game (𝑆=𝑇=0.5) and PD
wi h 𝑆=−0.5,𝑇=1.5. In a single laye , o me game ends o All Coope a o s; la e one o
All De ec o s. Howe e , he same games wi h a su icien la ge numbe o laye s and s ong
deg ee co ela ion among laye s con e ge o a Coope a o concen a ion o 0.5.
Topological ensla emen implies also ha he ini ial mul iplex le el o coope a ion
de e mines he inal dis ibu ion o he le el o coope a ion ac oss laye s, almos i espec i e
62
o T-S pa ame e combina ion suppo ing he game played, subjec o he condi ion o exis ing
a s ong deg ee co ela ion ac oss laye s.
Topological ensla emen is no exclusi e o 2-Playe games like he PD o he Ha mony
game. I also occu s in PGG. PGG a e played independen ly in di e en laye s, and he o al
payo s a e agg ega ed and a e aged pe node. The e is a ixed in es men pe playe pe laye .
Coope a o s’ equency ge s la ge in he absence o deg ee co ela ions, bu i his co ela ion
is p esen and he numbe o laye s inc eases, Coope a o s’ equency d ops o a ixed alue
a ound 50%. These esul s a e independen o simila i y co ela ion o o e lapping, a end
nodes may ha e o connec o he same neighbou s in di e en laye s.
69
Table 6- Lis o he Pa ame e s used in he Compu e Simula ion model
Lis o pa ame e s used
 In es men C i e ia
 Ne wo k ype, BA o Ho and, common ac oss all laye s
 Numbe o laye s (M)
 In ensi y o selec ion (), wi hin he in e al be ween 0.01 and 10.0
 Enhancemen ac o (F), wi hin he in e al be ween 1 and 2
Table 7E o ! Re e ence sou ce no ound. summa ises he me ics ob ained om
compu e simula ions used o conduc he discussion and suppo ou indings.
Table 7- Lis o all he Me ics collec ed om Compu e Simula ions
Me ics o collec om Compu e Simula ions
 Le el o Coope a ion co esponding o he a e age le el o coope a ion o e all laye s snapsho ed a
he end o each simula ion
 Dis ibu ion o he p obabili y o he numbe o Coope a o s pe laye and agg ega ed, i.e., a e aged
ac oss all laye s, as obse ed du ing simula ions pe iod
 Dis ibu ion o he p obabili y o he numbe o Coope a o s pe laye and agg ega ed as snapsho ed a
he end o each simula ion
 Le el o Coope a ion co esponding o he a e age le el o coope a ion o e all laye s snapsho ed a
he end o each simula ion
 Dis ibu ion o he p obabili y o he numbe o Coope a o s pe laye and agg ega ed, i.e., a e aged
ac oss all laye s, as obse ed du ing simula ions pe iod
 Dis ibu ion o he inal e olu iona y ou come disc imina ed pe laye
 A e age G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) pe laye and a e aged ac oss all laye s snapsho ed a he end
o egula numbe o gene a ions and a he end o each simula ion
 S a egy cohe ence o node consis ency
Dis ibu ion o he inal e olu iona y ou come pe laye is snapsho ed a he end o
simula ions in each o he ollowing disjoin condi ions: (i) All laye s sa u a ed as ALLC; (ii)
All laye sa u a ed as ALLD; (iii) All laye s sa u a ed, a leas one as ALLC and a leas one
as ALLD; and (i ) A leas one laye no sa u a ed as ALLC o as ALLD.
S a egy cohe ence o node consis ency, which is compu ed as
 = 1
𝑁∑1
𝑀
𝑁
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒=1 |∑𝑆∗𝑖𝑙
𝑀
𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑙=1 |
(93)
wi h

70
𝑆∗𝑖𝑙 = {1, o a Coope a o
-1, o a De ec o
(94)
is measu ed a he end o each simula ion and a e aged ac oss all simula ions. I he e a e 𝑀
laye s and he node is Coope a o in 𝑀𝐶 o hem, hen consis ency equals |1−2𝑝|, wi h p =
𝑀𝐶/𝑀. Consis ency as a unc ion o 𝑝 is a 𝑣 line wi h a minimum o 0 a 𝑝=0.5.
3.2.1. Nume ical Me hods
Calcula ing AGoS is e y CPU demanding. Taking in o accoun ha he consequence o
an indi idual upda ing his/he s a egy is ha i s in es men s ac oss laye s a y, i s neighbou s
a dis ance 1 ac oss all laye s ha e hei payo upda ed and ha he impac on indi idual
con ibu ions o AGoS a laye le el is ci cumsc ibed o neighbou s a dis ance up o 2 in any
laye , an algo i hm was concei ed o inc emen ally upda e mul ilaye payo s and AGoS a
each s ochas ic p ocess i e a ion, ins ead o ecalcula ing hese me ic in eg ally om sc a ch.
Appendix A p esen s he algo i hm ollowed o inc emen ally calcula e AGoS and payo s
a each i e a ion o he s ochas ic p ocess ha ing nume ical op imiza ion in mind. The
algo i hm concei ed esul s om a ade-o be ween a lesse bu den on CPU ime and an
inc ease in memo y consump ion, wi h mo e auxilia y a iables being conside ed. Al hough
a ac i e because o i s pe o mance, he downside o adop ed inc emen al upda ing o
Table 8- Compa ison on he Numbe o Ope a ions equi ed o Payo and AGoS Calcula ion wi h and
wi hou Nume ical Op imiza ion
A e age numbe o Ope a ions pe a Node S a egy upda e in a Laye
Ope a ions
Unop imized Ve sion
Op imized Ve sion
# o indi idual Payo
Calcula ions
𝑁𝑀
Baseline:
2〈𝑘〉1
〈𝑘〉+1=3(1)
Dis ibu ed c i e ia:
2𝑀〈𝑘〉1
〈𝑘〉+M=3M(1)
# o indi idual AGoS
Calcula ions
𝑁𝑀
𝑀(〈𝑘〉+1)+2𝑀1
〈𝑘〉〈𝑘〉2=
𝑀(3〈𝑘〉+1) (3)
(1)F om s eps 2, 5 and 6 o he algo i m (see appendix A)
(2)F om s eps 1, 7 and 8 o he algo i m (see appendix A)
71
a iables pe i e a ion is ha ounding e o s due o machines ini e p ecision accumula e.
Measu es o mi iga e and con ol his consequence a e also men ioned in appendix A.
The compa ed numbe o ope a ions in op imized and non-op imized calcula ions o each
i e a ion o he s ochas ic p ocess on a mul ilaye wi h 𝑀 laye s o ne wo ks, each wi h 𝑁
nodes and 〈𝑘〉 a e age deg ee, is as in able 8.
In non-op imized e sion i is assumed ha a e e y i e a ion all payo s and AGoS a e
calcula ed om sc a ch.
As 𝑁≫〈𝑘〉, he sa ing o CPU u iliza ion in he op imized calculus o s ochas ic p ocess
e olu ion is e iden . We e o he ope a ions as he calculus o laye and mul ilaye agg ega ed
AGoS conside ed and he gain on he op imized e sion side would be s eng hened.
72
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The goal o his wo k is o explo e how di e en in es men c i e ia impac s he e olu ion
o coope a ion. Gi en he la ge pa ame e space, ou i s app oach was o slice i along a
numbe o dimensions. Tha means, keeping some a iables cons an while explo ing he
impac o a ying he emaining along a p ede ined domain. Hence, i made i possible o
in es iga e he impac o di e en condi ions g aphically and de i e some in ui ion on he
unde lying mechanics o coope a ion p omo ion.
Figu e 14 esul s om a coa se g ain sweeping o he pa ame e space and plo s le els o
coope a ion a e aged ac oss all laye s o he mul ilink colou coded. I is an eagle’s eye iew
on how he 5 pa ame e s conside ed, in es men c i e ia, ne wo k ype, numbe o laye s,
in ensi y o selec ion (𝛽) and enhancemen ac o (𝐹), de e mine he le els o coope a ion
a ained. In a single go i a emp s bo h o oughly assess he impac o di e en esou ce
in es men c i e ia in he e olu ion o coope a ion in popula ions in e ac ing h ough a
mul ilaye ne wo k and o assess how sensi i e is he o e all mul ilaye beha iou o
en i onmen pa ame e s, in pa icula he numbe o laye s and unde lying ne wo k ypes.
Figu e 14- Le el o Coope a ion as a Func ion o Ne wo k ype, In es men C i e ia, Numbe o Laye s,
In ensi y o Selec ion (𝛽) and Enhancemen Fac o (𝐹). Each laye wi h 𝑁=1000 indi iduals was ini ialized
wi h hal o hem andomly chosen as Coope a o s. The e is no deg ee-deg ee co ela ion o o e lapping.
O e all, we concluded ha in he p esence o dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, le els o
coope a ion inc eased wi h inc easing numbe o laye s. In opposi ion, o baseline c i e ia he
le el o coope a ion has li le sensibili y o a ia ions in he numbe o laye s. This is because
adding mo e laye s o a mul ilaye wi h baseline c i e ia has a limi ed impac on o iginal
73
laye s. Pa ial payo o indi iduals on o iginal laye s su e s no change; only he p obabili y
o copying he s a egy om a neighbou changes as accumula ed payo pe indi idual is
upda ed. On he o he hand, wi h dis ibu ed in es men he addi ion o a laye comple ely
changes he game. By o cing a ac ion o he in es men o each indi idual o low owa ds
he new laye , as long as he indi idual coope a es in he new laye , such low o in es men
impac s on he payo s o indi iduals’ neighbou s in all laye s he coope a es. This c ea es a
new dynamics by changing bo h indi iduals’ pa ial payo s in o iginal laye s as well as he
p obabili y o copying s a egies om neighbou s.
When all o he a iables a e se as cons an , coope a ion imp o es wi h inc easing
enhancemen ac o (𝐹) as expec ed, because a g ea e F implies ha in he payo ma ix o
DPD Coope a o s’ payo s ge close o De ec o s’ ones, hus p omo ing Coope a ion
3
.
Addi ionally, BA ne wo ks lead o b oade condi ions o he p omo ion o coope a ion han
Ho and ne wo ks.
Conce ning he ole o he in ensi y o selec ion (𝛽), we obse e ha coope a ion is
a ou ed in s ong selec ion egimes wi h la ge enhancemen ac o s. When he numbe o
laye s inc eases, coope a ion becomes dominan ac oss he en i e ange o selec ion p essu es
o an in ensi y o selec ion abo e a c i ical h eshold ha aises wi h he numbe o laye s,
bu in a way ha is no ans e sal o all pa ame e scena ios and hus equi es a segmen ed
analysis. No iceable in each hea map (see igu e 14), unde dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia
and o inc easing numbe o laye s he e is a egion on he le side wi h an uni o m colou
co esponding o hal way he colou map conside ed, p ecisely he same le el o coope a ion
wi h which laye s we e ini ialized. No iceable also is ha his egion ge s la ge wi h i s igh
on ie mo ing igh wa ds as he numbe o laye s inc eases. Wi hin his egion, he
coope a ion le el ends o become insensi i e o enhancemen ac o (𝐹). The o ma ion o
his egion is mo e e iden in Ho and ne wo ks and wi h in es men dis ibu ed pe laye
c i e ia, bu al hough no expe imen ed in he pa ame e subdomain unde lying he igu e i is
ex ensible o he o he dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia and BA ne wo ks. The phenomenon in
place is a combined opological and c i e ia ensla emen ha u he on we will elabo a e on
and ha in sho boos s mul ilaye ine ia o change, leading he mul ilaye o p ese e
3
In each i e a ion, would he choice o he laye whe e o play he DPD game be
de e minis ic, e.g. by choosing he laye whe e an indi idual maximizes i s local payo , and
coope a ion le el would no inc ease wi h enhancemen ac o .
74
h oughou simula ions wha e e le el o coope a ion i was ini ialized wi h. Cha ac e is ic o
his ensla emen egion is also ha he maximum in ensi y o selec ion (𝛽) delimi ing i s
bo de a ies in he same di ec ion as he numbe o laye s.
Unde he baseline c i e ia and wi h ou BA laye s o mo e, coope a ion le els a e high
(a ound 80%) in s ong selec ion and high enhancemen alues (F). This end has a di e en
mo i a ion han he one poin ed ou o dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia cases and had al eady
been iden i ied in (Kleinebe g & Helbing, 2018). Wha happens is ha in he absence o
co ela ions be ween laye s as hei numbe inc eases so do he odds o an indi idual being a
Coope a o and a hub in a leas one o he laye s. As payo s a e accumula ed and new laye s
do no change in es men al eady applied, he con ibu ion om new coope a i e hubs helps
an indi idual bo h o hold his/he g ound in laye s whe e he/she plays coope a ion wi h ew
neighbou s as in laye s whe e de ec ion was he op ion. We conside ed F = 1.7 in baseline
c i e ia, and we obse ed ha a e age coope a ion le el ops a a ound 80% wi h he
mul ilaye in a s able equilib ium poin wi h laye s holding indi iduals wi h bo h s a egies
and indi iduals wi h dis inc s a egies ac oss laye s. Figu e 15 plo s he p obabili y o inding
an 8-laye baseline mul ilaye a a pa icula a e age le el o coope a ion by he end o a
simula ion. The expec ed alue o his dis ibu ion co esponds p ecisely o he alues
measu ed in igu e 14.
Figu e 15- Quasi-S a iona y P obabili y o an 8-Laye Mul ilaye wi h BA Ne wo ks and Baseline
In es men C i e ia. In ensi y o Selec ion (𝛽) alues 1 and he numbe o indi iduals (𝑁) pe laye equals o
1000. P obabili ies we e calcula ed a he end o simula ions. Each laye was ini ialized wi h hal indi iduals
andomly chosen as Coope a o s. The e is no deg ee-deg ee co ela ion o o e lapping.

75
In o de o sh ink he pa ame e space and zoom in in o di e en sub-domains whe e
coope a ion is expe ienced, e e ence alues we e iden i ied o he in ensi y o selec ion (

).
Values chosen we e 1.0 and 0.1, based on he a ional ha mul ilaye s wi h his
pa ame iza ion can span he en i e ange o coope a ion le els.
Figu e 16 explo es how he le el o coope a ion esponds o di e en slices in pa ame e
space de ined by an in ensi y o selec ion (

); enhancemen ac o (𝐹) and numbe o laye s
(M). In each column we conside scena ios whe e wo pa ame e s a e cons an and he
emaining ones a y wi hin he in e al o analysis.
Figu e 16- Le el o Coope a ion in Mul ilaye Ne wo ks in 2-Playe Dis ibu ed P isone Dilemma (=0.1).
Le el o coope a ion was measu ed and a e aged a he end o simula ions. Ne wo ks in each laye ha e 1000
indi iduals (𝑁), hal andom and independen ly ini ialized as Coope a o s.
The uppe and bo om le panels show he le el o coope a ion as a unc ion o
enhancemen ac o (𝐹), wi h he numbe o laye s se o 8 and in ensi y o selec ion 𝛽=0.1.
Fo BA ne wo ks, unde he baseline c i e ia o F lowe han 1.5 we obse e ha ull de ec ion
(ALLD) is he dominan ou come, and o F g ea e han 1.8, popula ion eaches a ull
coope a ion s a e (ALLC). In be ween hese alues, we wi ness indi iduals changing s a egy
om De ec ion o Coope a ion. The exis ence o a c i ical enhancemen ac o (𝐹) beyond
which coope a ion le els ise had al eady been iden i ied in (Pacheco, Pinhei o, & San os,
2009) o a single laye . Al hough no shown, esul s om his a icle we e eco e ed.
In es men dis ibu ed pe laye line has a simila end o he one conce ning baseline. I
in es men is dis ibu ed pe game coope a ion aises s eadily wi h 𝐹, bu wi h a low slope.
76
Unde he baseline c i e ia wi h Ho and ne wo ks he c i ical enhancemen ac o (𝐹) is
loca ed nea 𝐹=1.9, meaning ha i is a mo e s ingen con ex o he e olu ion o
coope a ion. Only beyond his alue, he e is oom o coope a ion. Unde he dis ibu ed
in es men c i e ia he le el o coope a ion inc eases mono onically wi h F un il eaching a
le el o coope a ion o 0.5 o 𝐹=2.0. This beha iou is due o hese slices cu ing he
pa ame e space almos en i ely wi hin he a o emen ioned egions o uni o m coope a ion
le el o 0.5 in igu e 14.
The middle op and bo om panels show he e olu ion o coope a ion while a ying numbe
o laye s in he mul ilaye . We conside a cons an enhancemen ac o o 1.7 and an in ensi y
o selec ion o 𝛽=0.1. The selec ion o he enhancemen ac o ook in o conside a ion he
loca ion o he le el o coope a ion phase ansi ion obse ed on BA on op le panel.
On BA ne wo ks (uppe middle) panel we obse e he exis ence o an op imum numbe o
laye s ha maximizes coope a ion. This maximum can be explained by he combina ion o
wo mechanisms wi h opposing e ec s: i s , as he numbe o laye s inc eases he c i ical F
beyond which coope a ion is igge ed dec eases, as he case o in es men pe laye c i e ia
is he mos e iden one; secondly, as he numbe o laye s inc eases he coope a ion le el
ends o each a ixed alue de e mined by he ini ial p opo ion o coope a ion, a phenomenon
known as ensla emen egion (see appendix C). The baseline ela ed cu e aises wi h he
numbe o laye s bu opped by he al eady men ioned ba ie a ound 80%.
On Ho and ne wo ks and in he bo om middle panel we explo e a scena io whe e he
enhancemen ac o (𝐹) lies in a egion o ull de ec ion. Hence, a simila ou come is ob ained
when we inc ease he numbe o laye s. Howe e , when in es men is dis ibu ed pe laye ,
coope a ion becomes easible in ne wo ks wi h ou o mo e laye s. Fo in es men dis ibu ed
pe game, coope a ion becomes easible o ne wo ks wi h wo laye s o mo e. Unde
dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, he e is hus a c i ical numbe o laye s o coope a ion o
eme ge.
Rele an om middle panels is also ha o bo h dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia and o
bo h ypes o ne wo ks, al hough mo e e iden in he Ho and case, he le el o coope a ion
con e ges o 0.5 as he numbe o laye s inc ease. Again, his is due o poin {𝛽,𝐹}=
[0.1,1.7} o he numbe o laye s sampled lying wi hin he a o emen ioned egions o
uni o m le el o coope a ion o 0.5 in igu e 14.
Finally, on he uppe and bo om igh panels we explo e he le el o coope a ion as a
unc ion o he in ensi y o selec ion (

), o ne wo ks wi h 8 laye s and an enhancemen ac o
o 1.7. On BA ne wo ks, coope a ion is sus ained in he en i e in e al o selec ion p essu es
77
in es iga ed. Mo eo e , he e is an op imal in ensi y o selec ion (

) ha maximizes he le el
o coope a ion. A inding ha has been obse ed p e iously in single laye ed ne wo ks
(Pinhei o, Pacheco, & San os, 2012).
On Ho and ne wo ks, since o F = 1.7 unde he baseline c i e ia a egime o ull de ec ion
is in place, he e is li le impac in a ying he in ensi y o selec ion (

). Howe e , o he
dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, we obse e signi ican gains in he le el o coope a ion o
inc easing selec ion p essu e and in pa icula when in es men s a e dis ibu ed pe laye .
Fo bo h dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia and bo h ne wo ks, igh panels also highligh he
ac ha o minimal in ensi y o selec ion (

), he le el o coope a ion eached coincides wi h
he one o mul ilaye ini ializa ion. The de ia ion inc eases as in ensi y o selec ion (

) aises.
As expe imen ally e i ied, we e he igu e eplica ed wi h a highe numbe o laye s and he
c i ical

un il which ini ial and inal le els o coope a ion a e con e gen would inc ease.
Al hough no shown he e, we ha e epea ed he case whe e he i ness o indi iduals
co esponded o he a e aged payo ac oss laye s, ha is, ins ead o he accumula ed payo .
In ha con ex , he esul s a e simila o he ones discussed in he e wi h a escaled selec ion
p essu e o accoun o he no maliza ion done by he numbe o laye s.
Mo eo e , in appendix B we explo e he impac o deg ee-deg ee co ela ions in mul ilaye
social ne wo ks in he e olu ion o coope a ion o he h ee in es men c i e ia unde analysis.
We show ha while inc easing deg ee-deg ee co ela ions widens he ange o dilemmas o
which coope a ion is p e alen , he egion o pa ame e s whe e he popula ion is able o each
an ALLC s a e dec eases subs an ially.
4.1. TOPOLOGICAL ENSLAVEMENT UNDER DISTRIBUTED INVESTMENTS AND
LARGE NUMBER OF LAYERS
I is impo an o de ail he limi ing case o opological ensla emen ha eme ges when he
numbe o laye s is e y la ge. This scena io is speci ic o dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia,
al hough i can also be obse ed unde he baseline c i e ia in es ic ed subdomains o he
pa ame e space, e en ually equi ing addi ional condi ions on he mul ilaye deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion.
The p e alence o opological ensla emen s ems om he ac ha , in opposi ion o
baseline c i e ia, in dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia when an indi idual becomes a De ec o in
one laye he/she will edis ibu e his/he in es men owa ds he o he laye s whe e he/she
emains a Coope a o . As a esul , all indi iduals will ha e he same expec ed accumula ed
payo wi h minimal a iance. F om his, i esul s ha in he limi o many laye s he
78
e olu iona y dynamics eco e s a andom walk pa e n, whe e he ou come is a unc ion o
he ini ial abundance o Coope a o s and De ec o s.
Quasi-S a iona y Dis ibu ion o Ho and Mul ilaye a e aged ac oss Laye s (=
𝟏,〈𝐤〉=𝟒,𝐅=𝟏.𝟕)
Quasi-S a iona y Dis ibu ion o BA Mul ilaye a e aged ac oss Laye s (=
𝟎.𝟏,〈𝐤〉=𝟒,𝐅=𝟏.𝟕)
Figu e 17- Expe imen al Quasi-S a iona y Dis ibu ion o Mul ilaye s a e aged ac oss Ne wo k Laye s.
Laye s wi h 1000 indi iduals (𝑁) a e unco ela ed and we e independen ly ini ialized, each one wi h a numbe
o Coope a o s de e mined by a uni o mly dis ibu ed a iable wi h alues om 0 o 1000, inclusi e
85
This sec ion shed ligh on how he mic oscopic dynamics locally de ined a indi idual le el
ela es o he esul ing global dynamics and allowed o conclude on he inexis ence o pa e ns
o “sel -simila i y” a di e en scales.
4.3. AGGREGATED AVERAGE GRADIENT OF SELECTION
Up o now, we ha e analysed he e olu iona y dynamics o dis ibu ed in es men s in
mul ilaye ed social ne wo ks on he a ained le el o coope a ion. We now in oduce he
Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) ool in o de o ob ain a mo e accu a e desc ip ion
o he unde lying dynamics ha leads o he obse ed ou comes. Hence, we aim a answe ing
wha is he popula ion-wide dynamics ha cha ac e izes he social-dilemma aced by he
popula ion.
In a single laye wi h ini e popula ion, he AGoS is calcula ed as he di e ence in he
p obabili y o inc ease o he numbe o Coope a o s by one and he p obabili y o dec ease
he numbe o Coope a o s by one. The AGoS, which mus be compu ed nume ically, aims o
es ima e hese wo quan i ies o all possible s a e ansi ions h ough a la ge numbe o
compu e simula ions o he e olu iona y p ocess. The AGoS is, by de ini ion, ne wo k
dependen bu con ex independen , as i eco e s he popula ion mean- ield cha ac e . The
AGoS cap u es dynamical in o ma ion equi alen o ha p o ided by eplica o equa ion in
EGT o in ini e well-mixed popula ion p esen ed in 2.1.4.
Figu e 22- A e aged Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) a e aged ac oss Laye s and Time. All
ne wo ks ha e 1000 indi iduals (𝑁) wi h 〈𝑘〉=4,𝛽=1. Laye s we e independen ly ini ialized wi h a numbe
o Coope a o s gi en by a andom a iable uni o mly dis ibu ed be ween 0 and 1000, inclusi e

86
In o de o ex end he AGoS o mul ilaye social ne wo ks, we op ed o compu e he AGoS
independen ly pe laye , which is hen a e aged o ob ain a popula ion and laye wide AGoS
ep esen a ion o he dynamics a hand.
Figu e 22 shows he a e age AGoS on mul ilaye s wi h di e en numbe o laye s and
ypes o ne wo ks. We conside an in ensi y o selec ion o 1.0 (

=1.0) o bo h ypes o
ne wo ks. The c i e ia o selec ing he enhancemen ac o (𝐹) ollows om he ou comes
shown in igu e 14 o bo h ne wo k opologies and in ol es selec ing an enhancemen ac o
ha is p ecisely a he ansi ion be ween ALLD and ALLC ou comes. In ha sense, we will
be using 𝐹=1.6 o BA ne wo ks and 𝐹=1.9 o Ho and ne wo ks.
Fo baseline c i e ia and BA ne wo ks, he mul ilaye beha iou is one o coo dina ion. In
ha case, he e olu iona y dynamics is cha ac e ized by an uns able ixed poin . F om i esul s
ha depending on he ini ial abundance o Coope a o s and he loca ion o he in e nal ixed
poin all laye s will be d i en owa ds an ALLC o an ALLD ou come. In addi ion, he loca ion
o he ixed poin is seemingly in a ian wi h he numbe o laye s. Would he enhancemen
ac o (𝐹) inc ease (dec ease) he ixed poin would mo e o he le ( igh ). The BA ype o
ne wo k is esponsible o ans o ming a de ec ion dominan DPD game in a well-mixed
popula ion in o a game ha is commonly associa ed wi h a mild social dilemma o
coope a ion, a coo dina ion game o en known as a S ag Hun .
Coope a ion in Ho and mul ilaye s unde he baseline c i e ia is doomed o a small numbe
o laye s. Howe e , o 8 laye s popula ion e olu ion is such ha he possibili y o a co-
exis ence scena io wi h a s able equilib ium oo eme ges. The mul ilaye join ly wi h he
baseline c i e ia ans o m a de ec ion dominan DPD game in a well-mixed popula ion in o a
game wi h an AGoS ypical o a co-exis ence game. This means ha e en ough indi iduals
a e locally engaged in a DPD, mul ilaye leads o he eme gence o a global popula ion wide
dynamics ha p omo es he co-exis ence o Coope a o s and De ec o s.
In he case o a single laye and baseline c i e ia, esul s a e aligned wi h hose ob ained in
(Pinhei o, Pacheco, & San os, 2012). Fo in es men dis ibu ed pe laye and BA ne wo ks,
he cu es ha e a simila shape o he baseline case bu mo e le wa ds and cease sha ing he
same equilib ium poin . Wi h inc easing numbe o laye s, he ixed poin mo es owa ds 0.
Mo eo e , in a case in which he numbe o laye s is e y high he AGoS end o be ully
posi i e, ypical o a sys em e ol ing o ull coope a ion. Wi h Ho and ne wo k and a small
numbe o laye s, all de ec ion is mul ilaye a e as wi h baseline c i e ia. Howe e , as he
numbe o laye s inc ease, a s able equilib ium poin eme ges, and he absolu e alue o he
87
a e aged AGoS ends o ze o. In ac , his educ ion o AGoS magni ude was al eady
expe ienced in he BA case.
Wi h in es men dis ibu ed pe game and BA ne wo ks mul ilaye e ol es o ull
coope a ion. I is also no iceable he dec ease o he a e aged AGoS magni ude as he numbe
o laye s inc eases. In he case o Ho and ne wo ks, a simila beha iou is obse ed wi h he
excep ion ha e olu ion is di ec ed owa ds ull de ec ion in he cases ha ha e been s udied.
Common o bo h dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia is ha he magni ude o he a e age AGoS
dec eases as he numbe o laye s inc eases, some hing ha had al eady been an icipa ed in
p e ious sec ion. Ha ing AGoS wi h magni udes close o ze o simply means ha mul ilaye
end is o p ese e he le el o coope a ion wi h which i was ini ialized. In o he wo ds,
e olu ion app oaches neu al d i . Fo dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia and Ho and ne wo ks,
appendix D p esen s a ma hema ical explana ion o why AGoS magni ude ends o ze o as he
numbe o laye s inc eases.
Figu e 22 shows esul s o he a e age AGoS, ha is he a e age AGoS o all laye s
compu ed independen ly. Howe e , as laye s a e s a is ically indis inguishable among
hemsel es, indi idual AGoS conce ning each laye a e e y close be ween hemsel es and
hus close o hei a e age AGoS. Figu e 23 illus a es his esul o mul ilaye s wi h 4 laye s
and on bo h ypes o ne wo ks opologies.
Figu e 23- Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) o 4 Laye s Mul ilaye o e Time. All ne wo ks ha e
1000 indi iduals (𝑁) wi h 〈𝑘〉=4,𝛽=1. Laye s we e independen ly ini ialized wi h a numbe o
Coope a o s gi en by a andom a iable uni o mly dis ibu ed be ween 0 and 1000, inclusi e.
Mo eo e , he compu ed AGoS p esen ed so a esul s om a ime a e age ha spans o e
150 gene a ions. This disposi ion has he d awback o no cap u ing he e en ual e olu ion
o e ime ha AGoS may expe ience, hus ails o cap u e he sel -o ganizing p ocess ha
88
occu s as s a egy asso men s in he ne wo ks build up. In o de o epo he AGoS empo al
dynamics, he ime in e al was ac ioned in 150 in e als o 1 gene a ion each. In each o
hese in e als, AGoS was calcula ed independen ly.
BA Mul ilaye s wi h 𝜷=𝟏,𝑭=𝟏.𝟔,〈𝒌〉=𝟒
Ho and Mul ilaye s wi h 𝛃=𝟏,𝐅=𝟏.𝟗,〈𝐤〉=𝟒
Figu e 24- Agg ega ed G adien o Selec ion (AGoS) o Mul ilaye s a e aged o e Time. Laye s wi h
1000 indi iduals (𝑁) we e independen ly ini ialized wi h a numbe o Coope a o s gi en by a andom a iable
uni o mly dis ibu ed be ween 0 and 1000, inclusi e. The noise inc eases wi h gene a ion index due o
gene a ions ha ing ewe samples. We e he numbe o 300.000 simula ions inc eased and his noise would be
educed.
Figu e 24 exhibi s snapsho s o he AGoS a di e en gene a ions o mul ilaye s wi h
di e en ne wo ks and wi h di e en numbe o laye s. A common obse a ion o all
mul ilaye s conside ed is ha du ing he i s gene a ions AGoS is always nega i e, which
means ha mul ilaye s in i s e olu iona y s eps wi ness an inc ease in he numbe o
De ec o s. G adually in subsequen gene a ions AGoS changes and esul s in he eme gence
o a basin o a ac ion ha a ou s coope a ion. The ini ial inc ease in he numbe o
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De ec o s esul s om wo mo i es. Fi s one is ela ed o he ac o Coope a o s and
De ec o s in he ini ial con igu a ion o he mul ilaye a e andomly posi ioned in he ne wo k
making he clus e ing o nodes wi h he same s a egy ex emely imp obable. Wi h DPD being
played locally, an a guably di icul game o he p omo ion o coope a ion, he AGoS
becomes nega i e. Secondly, may be simply ha in he mul ilaye coope a ion is doomed. As
popula ion e ol e and Coope a o s is adop ed ia he in es men hey a e willing o apply, we
wi ness asso men o s a egies wi h he o ma ion o hubs o coope a ion.
Fo baseline s a egy and BA ne wo ks, AGoS eco e s he uns able ixed poin as
gene a ions e ol e. A ound he 10 h gene a ion, he ixed poin eme ges o le els o
coope a ion close o 1. As gene a ions un old, he ixed poin mo es o lowe le els o
coope a ion (dec easing he coo dina ion h eshold) un il s abilizing a a alue wi h li le
sensibili y o he numbe o laye s. A simila beha iou is depic ed on Ho and ne wo ks.
He e he ixed poin is s able, hus p omo ing a co-exis ence, and s a s eme ging wi h
le els o coope a ion close o 0. As gene a ions un old he ixed poin mo es o highe le els
o coope a ion un il i s abilizes.
Fo in es men pe laye c i e ia and BA ne wo ks, AGoS also eco e s om nega i e
alues o acqui e an uns able ixed poin ha ini ially also a ises close o ull coope a ion. The
di e ence is ha his poin mo es o lowe le els o coope a ion as e as gene a ions p og ess
and wi h g ea e numbe o laye s. Wi h in es men pe laye in Ho and ne wo ks and om
ou laye s onwa ds an AGoS cha ac e ized by a co-exis ence poin eme ges. Fo a gi en
numbe o laye s he co-exis ence oo mo es owa ds la ge le els o coope a ion o la e
gene a ions. Addi ionally, no only he di e ence in co-exis ence oo be ween he same
gene a ions sh inks as he numbe o laye s inc eases as he ixed poin mo es close o ull
coope a ion.
Fo in es men pe game c i e ia and BA ne wo ks, apa om i s gene a ions, all
subsequen ones ha e posi i e AGoS. As he numbe o laye s inc eases, AGoS magni udes
o he same gene a ions dec ease. A simila beha iou is obse ed on Ho and ne wo ks,
whe e he AGoS is nega i e o all gene a ions. As he numbe o laye s inc eases, he
magni ude o AGoS educes d as ically. Fo 8 laye s, AGoS beyond he 10 h gene a ion look
like whi e noise wi h minimum magni ude.
The simple quali a i e compa ison o successi e gene a ions o AGoS conce ning he same
in es men c i e ia and ne wo k combina ion may be misleading unless we ake in o accoun
hei ela i e magni udes. Fo ins ance, o one laye he AGoS magni ude o he i s
gene a ions is much highe han o subsequen ones. I o a gi en in es men c i e ia and
90
numbe o laye s combina ion all gene a ion dependen AGoS a e a e aged, we eco e he
AGoS p esen ed in igu e 22.
He e, we ha e ocused only in mul ilaye s buil om a single ype o ne wo k. Appendix
E add esses he case o a mul ilaye wi h he e ogeneous laye s: hal as Ho and, ano he hal
as BA.

91
5. CONCLUSIONS
In his hesis we ha e used me hods om E olu iona y Game Theo y o s udy he e olu ion
o coope a ion in mul ilaye s made up o dis inc and opologically independen ne wo ks o
a single ype, be i homogeneous o he e ogeneous. Game dynamics we e modelled a
mic oscopic agen le el ia he Fe mi-upda e dynamics and explo ed h ough compu e
simula ions. In each laye , indi iduals engaged in he simple Public Goods Games in he o m
o he Dis ibu ed P isone Dilemma.
In insic o Public Goods Games is a c i e ia on how much o in es in a game an indi idual
pa icipa es as a Coope a o . Th ee c i e ia we e explo ed. One scena io o uncons ained
esou ces, he baseline one, conside ed ha indi iduals con ibu ed a ixed amoun o 1 uni
pe game, i espec i e o he numbe o dis inc pee s hey may in e ac wi h. A second one
had in es men dis ibu ed pe laye . Tha is, indi iduals had o dis ibu e he same uni o
in es men equally h ough all laye s whe e he/she pa icipa ed as a Coope a o . Thi d c i e ia
o in es men was dis ibu ed pe game, meaning ha unde ha c i e ia indi iduals had o
spli equally a ixed in es men ac oss all he games hey pa icipa ed as Coope a o s on all
laye s.
Fo he baseline in es men c i e ia, we ha e shown ha i has li le sensibili y o a ia ions
in he numbe o laye s. Fo homogenous ne wo ks o Ho and ype, he pa ame e domain
whe e coope a ion is possible has a minimum enla gemen wi h he numbe o laye s
inc easing. Adding laye s jus inc eases he size o egula space, wi hou b eaking i s
symme y, as new laye s a e s a is ically iden ical o p e ious ones wi h no impac on he
in es men s al eady applied. I he ne wo ks a e he e ogeneous o BA ype, he ones ha be e
map social ne wo ks, a sligh deg ada ion in coope a ion le els is e en expe ienced when he
numbe o laye s inc eases wi h minimum change o he domain whe e coope a ion is iable.
Fo dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, as he numbe o laye s inc eases, we see he eme gence
o coope a ion o lowe le els o selec ion p essu e (

). In he case o in es men pe laye
and as he numbe o laye s inc eases, he p omo ion o coope a ion is mo e consis en in he
homogeneous case han in he e ogeneous one. Mo eo e , he luc ua ions o coope a ion le el
in he pa ame e domain a e smalle in he homogeneous case. Fo in es men pe game,
he e ogeneous ne wo ks a ou coope a ion o any numbe o laye s. Wi h homogeneous
ne wo ks, a highe numbe o laye s is equi ed o Coope a ion o succeed.
Simila o bo h dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia is ha as ei he he numbe o laye s
inc eases o he in ensi y o selec ion (

) dec eases, a opological and c i e ia ensla emen
92
eme ges, causing inal le el o coope a ion o coincide wi h he ini ial p opo ion o
Coope a o s, i espec i e o he alues enhancemen ac o (𝐹) en i onmen . In he pa ame e
space o he numbe o laye s e sus in ensi y o selec ion (

), a concep ual line wi h hese
pa ame e s a ying in he di ec a io can be aced such ha o any combina ion o hese
pa ame e s below he h eshold de ined by he line ensla emen ules.
Mo eo e , in he dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, as ime un olds laye s sa u a e becoming
ei he ALLC o ALLD o he e ogeneous ne wo ks and a laye pola iza ion is eached. Thus,
he ini ial p opo ion o Coope a o s e lec s in he p opo ion o laye s ha sa u a e as ALLC.
Fo homogeneous cases, we ind a mix o pola ized laye s and pola ized popula ions, i.e.,
laye s whe e bo h s a egies coexis . Howe e , as he numbe o laye s inc eases he numbe
o laye s wi h pola ized popula ions ades away un il comple e disappea ance. Because he
numbe o laye s is disc e e, when i inc eases also dec eases e o g ain o di e ence
be ween he p opo ion o laye s sa u a ing as ALLC and ini ial Coope a o concen a ion.
This laye pola iza ion is o no su p ise, as he inc easing numbe o laye s leads he
e olu iona y dynamics o con e ge o neu al d i ha ing wo abso bing s a es, ALLC o
ALLD, wi h complemen a y p obabili ies o being eached, he p obabili y assigned o o me
s a e esul ing om he le el o coope a ion he mul ilaye was ini ialized wi h.
By de ini ion o homogeneous ne wo ks coope a ion le els a ained wi h in es men
dis ibu ed pe game coincide wi h he ones ob ained wi h in es men dis ibu ed pe game
wi h an highe in ensi y o selec ion (

) ac o . This beha iou is also expe ienced wi h
he e ogeneous ne wo ks.
Ano he challenge a ge ed was o unde s and mul ilaye global dynamics and how hey
ela e wi h mic oscopic dynamics locally de ined a agen le el. To ackle his, we eso ed o
AGoS, a nume ically compu ed measu e ha is ne wo k dependen . Ini ially concei ed o a
single laye , i was he e ex ended o he case o mul ilaye ed social ne wo ks. The AGoS
measu es he balance o p obabili ies o inc ease and dec ease he numbe o Coope a o s by
one a a gi en s a egy con igu a ion.
Fi s ly, he single laye concep was gene alized o a mul ilaye esul ing in an a e aged
AGoS ac oss laye s. Wha a e aged AGoS ac oss laye s demons a es is ha o
homogeneous ne wo ks, ega dless o he in es men c i e ia, as he numbe o laye s
inc eases he magni ude o AGoS ends o ze o (i.e., o neu al selec ion). This end is e en
emphasized o dis ibu ed in es men , which explains why he p opo ion o Coope a o s
wi h which a mul ilaye is ini ialized is p ese ed. S ill o dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia,
93
AGoS also shows ha as he numbe o laye s inc eases, al hough wi h a magni ude ending
o ze o, AGoS can become posi i e wi h an o e all dynamics o a co-exis ence scena io.
Fo he e ogeneous ne wo ks, he magni ude o AGoS also ends o ze o as he numbe o
laye s inc eases. Fo baseline and in es men pe laye c i e ia, global dynamics is one o
coo dina ion. In he o me case he oo p opo ion o Coope a o s is insensible o he numbe
he laye s whe eas in la e case i mo es le wa ds ending o ze o. A signal o wha is o
come o in es men dis ibu ed by game wi h an highe numbe o laye s is al eady e i ied
o in es men dis ibu ed pe game wi h AGoS always posi i e and ending o ze o as he
numbe o laye s inc eases.
An immedia e akeaway om his hesis is ha wi h dis ibu ed in es men a ailable,
which can be ime o sha e among many social ne wo ks o in e es , in scena ios as he ones
explo ed along he s udy de eloped, when he numbe o laye s inc eases indi iduals end o
synch onize hei s a egies and coope a e (de ec ) in he same laye s.
Ha ing his hesis been mos ly heo e ical in cha ac e , wi h due humili y and compa isons
apa , he au ho eminds he anecdo ic Ha dy example. Ha dy was an English ma hema ician
and paci is who li ed du ing wo p e ious cen u ies. He claimed o ha e ne e done any hing
use ul du ing his li e. By use ul he mean applied, ha could be used by he a my. Because he
insis ed on only wo king on pu e and abs ac ma hema ics, he ne e d eamed o i , bu much
o his wo k was la e on applied in a ious b anches o science as e.g. popula ion gene ics.
5.1. FUTURE WORK
As o sugges ions o con inuing his wo k, a numbe o di ec ions can be an icipa ed. The
dependency o coope a ion le els on a e age ne wo k deg ee was no expe imen ed, because
al hough ying di e en ypes o ne wo ks, all ne wo k ins ances sha ed he same a e age
deg ee. When inc easing 〈𝑘〉 no signi ican changes in he esul s a e expec ed, al hough
acco ding o equa ion 15 in appendix C opological ensla emen may equi e an highe
numbe o laye s o eme ge as 𝜎𝐶2
2∝〈𝑘〉, whe e 𝜎𝐶2
2 accoun s o he a iance o an indi idual
payo om neighbou s in es men . In each mul ilaye expe imen ed all laye s had he same
a e age deg ee and ype o ne wo k, no asso i eness. I would be in e es ing o b eak his
symme y in h ee independen di ec ions: cease o ha e he same a e age deg ee ac oss all
laye s o he same mul ilaye , allow di e en ypes o ne wo ks in di e en laye s as i is
pe o med in appendix E and a y asso i eness. A majo impac is expec ed on calcula ing
AGoS in scena ios whe e symme y ac oss laye s is b oken. In e ms o cha ac e iza ion,
laye s sha e no mo e a numbe o indica o s o s a is ical dis ibu ions, e.g. 〈𝑘〉, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘),
94
asso i eness, e c., which ce ainly implies AGoS pe laye o di e . The challenge is now i
and how pa ial laye s AGoS could be combined and summa ized in a single one explaining
he e olu ion o coope a ion. i.e., i he e is a cohe en game played ac oss all laye s o in
opposi ion i di e en games a e played in di e en laye s such ha a summa y AGoS ends
up e lec ing an “a e age” game played nowhe e.
In e es ing o ind ou is also whe he asymme y be ween laye s in a mul ilaye can b eak
opological and c i e ia ensla emen .
A simple ex ension o Public Goods Games and o i s Dis ibu ed P isone Dilemma
e sion would be o add ess olun a y pa icipa ion, i.e., o allow each playe o adop a hi d
s a egy in each in e ac ion, he one o Lone . When an indi idual abs ains om playing by
deciding o be Lone , his/he pee in pai wise in e ac ion is compelled o also ac as Lone and
bo h playe s a e ewa ded by an amoun 𝜎, posi i e bu smalle han he ypical alue
co esponding o a coope a ion in e ac ion. Because a Lone is be e o han a non-Lone
playing agains a De ec o , al hough wi h a smalle ewa d han i playing agains a
Coope a o , Lone is an a ac i e s a egy o he isk a e se playe s.
Di e en se s o s ochas ic ules can be concei ed o an indi idual in a laye o become o
cease beha ing as a Lone . In he limi when 𝜎=0, whene e an indi idual ac s as a Lone
in a laye , i is as his/he ela ionships we e empo a ily e ased om he laye a leas du ing
he ime in e al he/she insis s on playing as Lone . An al e na i e o he game ha ing 3
indi idual s a egies, would be o playe s o adhe e o one o wo mixed s a egies, Lone
plus a base s a egy o Coope a ion o De ec ion. Game pa icipa ion would be p obabilis ic.
101
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Nonlinea Dynamics and Complexi y, 2, doi:10.1002/9783527628001.ch2.
T aulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). E olu ion o coope a ion by mul ile el selec ion.
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102
Appendix A. Algo i hm o Payo and AGoS Calcula ion
The nume ic op imiza ion conside ed in o de o make he simula ions less demanding on
CPU equi es mo e a iables (memo y) as a ade-o . The ele an se o a iables conside ed
o he op imiza ion o he simula ions’ du a ion is as ollows:
Va iable
Meaning
𝑛
-
Chosen node which s a egy is o be upda ed in…
𝑙𝑛
-
… laye 𝑙𝑛
F
-
Enhancemen ac o
M
-
Numbe o laye s
𝛽
-
In ensi y o selec ion
𝑁𝑙
-
Numbe o nodes in laye 𝑙 wi h 𝑁𝑙=𝑁
𝑆𝑖𝑙
-
S a egy o node 𝑖 in laye 𝑙
I can alue 𝐶 (Coope a o ) o 𝐷 (De ec o )
In es 𝑖𝑙
-
In es men o node 𝑖 in laye 𝑙 pe game
Payo 𝑖𝑙
-
Payo collec ed by node 𝑖 in laye 𝑙
Payo 𝑖
-
Accumula ed payo o node 𝑖 ac oss all laye s
Payo 𝑖=∑Payo 𝑖𝑙
𝑀
𝑙=1
Neigh1𝑖
𝑙
-
Se o nodes wi h di ec links o node 𝑖 in laye 𝑙
The dis ance be ween nodes 𝑖 and 𝑥 in laye 𝑙 wi h 𝑥∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ1𝑖
𝑙
alues 1.
Neigh2𝑖
𝑙
-
Se de ined as {𝑥:∃𝑗∈Neigh1𝑖
𝑙,𝑥∈𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ1𝑗
𝑙,𝑥≠𝑖,𝑥∉Neigh1𝑖
𝑙}, i
implies ha Neigh2𝑖
𝑙∩Neigh1𝑖
𝑙=∅.
The dis ance be ween nodes 𝑖 and 𝑥 in laye 𝑙 wi h 𝑥∈ 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ2𝑖
𝑙
alues 2.
𝑘𝑖𝑙
-
Numbe o neighbou s o node 𝑖 in laye 𝑙.
𝑘𝑖𝑙 equals he ca dinali y o Neigh1𝑖
𝑙 se .
103
AGoS𝑖𝑙
-
Con ibu ion o node 𝑖 o AGoS o laye 𝑙
𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑙=
{
1
𝑘𝑖𝑙∑1
1+𝑒−𝛽(Payo j
l−Payo 𝑖𝑙)
𝑗∈Neigh1𝑖
𝑙,𝑆𝑗𝑙=𝐶 ,𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑙=𝐷
−1
𝑘𝑖𝑙∑1
1+𝑒−𝛽(Payo j
l−Payo 𝑖𝑙)
𝑗∈Neigh1𝑖
𝑙,𝑆𝑗𝑙=𝐷 ,𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑙=𝐶
AGoS𝑙
-
AGoS in laye 𝑙
AGoS𝑙=1
𝑁𝑙∑AGoS𝑗𝑙
𝑁𝑙
𝑗=1
The AGoS a iables a e s o ed in an IEEE 754 double o ma wi h 8 by es, 52 bi s (plus 1
mo e implici bi ) o he signi ican digi s o a numbe in bina y o ma . This means a
p ecision o a leas 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔10(253))=15 decimal digi s, mo e han enough o
accommoda e he cumula i e e ec s o ounding e o s esul ing om he i e a ions o each
simula ion.
In each i e a ion o he s ochas ic p ocess modelling he e olu ion o coope a ion on a
mul ilaye wi h 𝑀 laye s o ne wo ks, a e ocal node 𝑛 in laye 𝑙𝑛 has been selec ed, pai wise
compa ison o i s payo wi h he one o i s neighbou wi h a dis inc s a egy in he same laye
may dic a e wi h a Fe mi-like p obabili y ha s a egy 𝑆𝑛𝑙𝑛 is o be upda ed. In case i is and
be o e i is, he ollowing s eps a e aken in o de o inc emen ally upda e indi idual and global
payo s and AGoS wi h minimum CPU consump ion:
1. A e e y laye , dele e (i) con ibu ion o node 𝑛 o AGoS o he laye , (ii) con ibu ion o
di ec neighbou s o node n o AGoS o he laye and con ibu ions o nodes a dis ance
1 om node 𝑛 o (iii) he pa ial AGoS o nodes a dis ance 2 o node 𝑛 and (i ) o he
AGoS o he laye :
Fo e e y 𝑙∈{1,…,𝑀} do
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙 ‐ AGoS𝑛𝑙 -- (i)
Fo e e y 𝑥∈Neigh1𝑛
𝑙 do
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙 ‐ AGoS𝑥𝑙 -- (ii)
Fo e e y 𝑦∈Neigh2𝑛
𝑙 do
IF 𝑆𝑥𝑙≠𝑆𝑦𝑙 THEN
aux ← con ibu ion o 𝐴𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑦𝑙 om node 𝑥 in laye 𝑙
104
AGoS𝑦𝑙←AGoS𝑦𝑙−aux -- (iii)
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙−aux -- (i )
END IF
2. Dele e con ibu ions o node 𝑛 o i s neighbou s’ payo s a (i) laye and (ii) mul ilaye
le el:
Se 𝐿𝑆={𝑙𝑛} o 𝐿𝑆={1,…,𝑀}, depending on in es men dis ibu ion c i e ia being
baseline o o he , espec i ely.
Fo e e y 𝑙∈𝐿𝑆 do
IF 𝑆𝑛𝑙==𝐶 THEN
Fo e e y 𝑥∈Neigh1𝑛
𝑙 do
aux ←𝐹2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑙
Payo 𝑥𝑙←Payo 𝑥𝑙−aux -- (i)
Payo 𝑥←Payo 𝑥−aux -- (ii)
END IF
3. Upda e ocal node 𝑛 s a egy in laye 𝑙𝑛
𝑆𝑛𝑙𝑛←𝑆𝑛𝑙𝑛==𝐶 ?𝐷: 𝐶
4
Wi h s a egy 𝑆𝑛𝑙𝑛 upda ed, ollowing s eps close cu en i e a ion o s ochas ic p ocess:
4. In case o dis ibu ed in es men , i.e. no baseline, upda e in es men In es 𝑛
𝑙 ac oss
all 𝑙 laye s.
5. Upda e con ibu ions o node 𝑛 o i s neighbou s’ payo s a (i) laye and (ii) mul ilaye
le el:
Se 𝐿𝑆={𝑙𝑛} o 𝐿𝑆={1,…,𝑀}, depending on in es men dis ibu ion c i e ia being
baseline o o he , espec i ely.
4
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ? 𝑣𝑎𝑙1∶ 𝑣𝑎𝑙2 alues 𝑣𝑎𝑙1 o 𝑣𝑎𝑙2 depending on Boolean condi ion 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 being
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 o 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, espec i ely.
105
Fo e e y 𝑙∈𝐿𝑆 do
IF 𝑆𝑛𝑙==𝐶 THEN
Fo e e y 𝑥∈Neigh1𝑛
𝑙 do
aux ←𝐹2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑙
Payo 𝑥𝑙←Payo 𝑥𝑙+aux -- (i)
Payo 𝑥←Payo 𝑥+aux -- (ii)
6. Calcula e new node 𝑛 payo s (i) pe laye and (ii) mul ilaye :
Payo 𝑛←0
Fo e e y 𝑙∈{1,…,𝑀} do
Payo 𝑛
𝑙←0
Fo e e y 𝑥∈Neigh𝑛
𝑙 do
Payo 𝑛
𝑙← Payo 𝑛
𝑙+(𝑆𝑥𝑙==𝐶 ? 𝐹2In es 𝑥𝑙∶ 0)
Payo 𝑛
𝑙← Payo 𝑛
𝑙+(𝑆𝑛𝑙==𝐶 ?( 𝐹2‐1)In es 𝑛
𝑙𝑘𝑛𝑙∶ 0) -- (i)
Payo 𝑛←∑Payo 𝑛
𝑙
𝑀
𝑙=1 -- (ii)
7. Upda e (i) node 𝑛 AGoS in e e y laye and impac i on (ii) AGoS o he laye :
Fo e e y 𝑙∈{1,…,𝑀} do
Calcula e 𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑆𝑛𝑙 -- (i)
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙 + AGoS𝑛𝑙 -- (ii)
8. A e e y laye , (i) calcula e AGoS o neighbou s o node 𝑛, (ii) impac i on he AGoS
o he laye , add con ibu ions o nodes a dis ance 1 om node 𝑛 (iii) o he pa ial
AGoS o nodes a dis ance 2 o node 𝑛 and (i ) o he AGoS o he laye :
Fo e e y 𝑙∈{1,…,𝑀} do
Fo e e y 𝑥∈Neigh1𝑛
𝑙 do
Calcula e 𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑆𝑥𝑙 -- (i)
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙 + AGoS𝑥𝑙 -- (ii)
Fo e e y 𝑦∈Neigh2𝑛
𝑙 do
IF 𝑆𝑥𝑙≠𝑆𝑦𝑙 THEN
106
aux ← con ibu ion o 𝐴𝐺𝑂𝑆𝑦𝑙 om node 𝑥 in laye 𝑙
AGoS𝑦𝑙←AGoS𝑦𝑙+aux -- (iii)
AGoS𝑙←AGoS𝑙+aux -- (i )
END IF
Model a iables a e eady o subsequen s ochas ic p ocess i e a ion.

107
Appendix B. Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion and O e lapping
Deg ee-deg ee co ela ion in a mul ilaye is only meaning ul o i s mul iplex sub ype wi h
he same se o nodes p esen in all laye s, no in e -laye links, and in case hese a e suppo ed
on he e ogeneous ne wo ks.
Pea son co ela ion index is used o es ima e he deg ee co ela ion be ween wo laye s. I
a ies be ween -1 (when indi iduals ha e he same deg ees bu in di e en ne wo k laye s),
passing by 0 (meaning laye ne wo ks wi h unco ela ed indi idual deg ees) o 1 (when
indi iduals ha e coinciding deg ees in bo h laye ne wo ks). A me hodology o co ela ion
uning was de eloped, based on a simula ed annealing me hod p oposed in (Nicosia & La o a,
2015). The s a ing poin is a se o wo laye s, second one eplica ed om i s one. Then
i e a i ely, one andomly selec s a pai o indi iduals, 𝑁1 and 𝑁2, in second laye and swi ches
hei names in ha laye . Implici ly, in second laye 𝑁1‘s neighbou s swap wi h 𝑁2‘s and ice-
e sa. I he indi idual swi ching mo es deg ee-deg ee co ela ion owa ds in ended a ge i
is accep ed; o he wise, i is accep ed condi ioned on a ce ain p obabili y. This allowed
de ia ion om he pa h owa ds a ge co ela ion is essen ial, in o de o a oid ge ing s uck
on local minima and o keep he pa ame e space o exploi a ion open. This logic is applied in
cascade o he 𝑀−1 consecu i e pai s o an M-laye s mul ilaye .
As in (Nicosia & La o a, 2015), a M-laye s mul ilaye ha ing a pa icula deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion means ha laye s 𝑙 and 𝑙+1, wha e e 𝑙 𝜖 {1,…,𝑀−1} ha e ha deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion. As co ela ion be ween laye s is non- ansi i e, he pai s o laye s {𝑙−1,𝑙} and
{𝑙,𝑙+1} ha ing he same co ela ion does no imply he same alue applies o {𝑙−1,𝑙+1}
pai o laye s. Addi ionally and due o he inexis ence o in e -laye links, he no ion o
consecu i e laye s is pu ely a bi a y, depends on labelling, as laye s a e s a is ically
Figu e B-1- Example o a Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion Ma ix
108
indis inguishable om each o he . I deg ee-deg ee co ela ion 𝑀𝑥𝑀 ma ix is o be plo ed
o a M-laye mul ilaye esul ing om he applica ion o his algo i hm, main diagonal alues
1 and diagonals nex o main one assume mul ilaye deg ee-deg ee co ela ion. The ma ix is
symme ic. Values o o he en ies a e no an icipa ed. An example o a co ela ion 𝑀𝑥𝑀
ma ix is depic ed in Figu e B-1.
O e lapping is a di e en concep om deg ee-deg ee co ela ion, al hough no
independen . O e lapping be ween wo laye s 𝛼 and 𝛼′ p o ide an indica o on how p obable
i is o an a bi a y pai o nodes o be linked in bo h laye s. I is de ined as
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝛼𝛼′= ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼′
𝑖<𝑗
∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼+ ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼′
𝑖<𝑗 − ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼′
𝑖<𝑗𝑖<𝑗
(1)
wi h
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼= {1,𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝛼
0,𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(2)
Al hough o e lap concep applies o mul ilaye s bo h wi h he e ogeneous ne wo ks as wi h
Ho and ne wo ks, o me case is he only one add essed because o i s inc eased ele ance
due o deg ee he e ogenei y. O e lapping be ween wo laye s was uned by copying andomly
links om one BA laye o he o he , un il eaching he p e ended numbe o eplica ed links.
Then, in he laye in cons uc ion new links a e added such ha (i) hey a e absen om
e e ence laye , (ii) each node needs o ha e a leas 𝑚 (=<𝑘>
2) connec ions and (iii)
p e e en ial a achmen p inciple is aken in o accoun when deciding on he nodes o be
connec ed nex by new links. The s eps ha e been conduc ed ensu ing ha ne wo ks emain
ully connec ed.
Deg ee-deg ee co ela ion and o e lapping a e no independen a iables, because one
canno be o ally con olled wi hou impac ing he o he , e.g. a pe ec 1 o e lapping implies
a deg ee-deg ee co ela ion o 1.
I laye s 𝛼 and 𝛼′ ha e no a single link in common connec ing he same pai o nodes,
o e lapping is null. I any pai o nodes linked in one laye is also linked in he o he ,
o e lapping is o al.
Along his appendix, he in luence o deg ee-deg ee co ela ion and o e lapping on
mul ilaye beha iou is aken in o accoun . He e we will conclude ha in gene al deg ee-
deg ee co ela ion e ains coope a ion and in pa icula o uncons ained (baseline) c i e ia
a ou s opology ensla emen , a phenomenon in which he sys em ge s insensi i e o sys em
109
pa ame e s as enhancemen ac o (𝐹) o in ensi y o selec ion (

) in he case o Public Goods
Games o alike, S o T in o iginal pai wise games as P isone ’s Dilemma. No ma e he alue
o his pa ame e , he le el o coope a ion achie ed coincides wi h he one he mul ilaye was
ini ialized wi h. O e lapping also leads o opology ensla emen because i implies deg ee-
deg ee co ela ion. Fo he cons ained case, opology ensla emen is also obse ed bu d i en
by a chain o mechanisms o di e en so desc ibed in appendix C.
In an a emp o shed ligh on deg ee-deg ee co ela ion in luence on coope a ion e olu ion,
a e age le el o coope a ion ac oss laye s was calcula ed as a unc ion o deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion and in ensi y o selec ion  o 8-laye s mul ilaye wi h BA ne wo ks and an
enhancemen ac o o 1.7, a alue o which coope a ion is iable o any in es men c i e ia.
The esul s disc imina ed by in es men dis ibu ion c i e ia a e p esen ed in igu e B-2.
Figu e B-2- A e age Le el o Coope a ion o Deg ee-Deg ee Co ela ion e sus In ensi y o Selec ion (𝛽).
Mul ilaye ha e 8 laye s, 1000 (𝑁) indi iduals pe laye , 〈k〉 equals o 4 and F alues 1.7 and BA ne wo ks. In
each laye , nodes we e andomly ini ialized wi h hal as Coope a o s.
The igu e highligh s wo ac s. The mos no o ious one is ha , apa om baseline c i e ia
o e y low in ensi y o selec ions, le el o coope a ion dec eases when deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion ge s s onge , a beha iou due o cumula i e payo . When deg ee-deg ee
co ela ion is maximum, he coope a ion le el o all c i e ia eaching he alue o 50%,
p ecisely he p opo ion o Coope a o s he mul ilaye was ini ialized wi h, is he second ac
o highligh in he igu e. This mul ilaye ine ia in changing ini ial le el o coope a ion had
al eady been no iced by (Kleinebe g & Helbing, 2018) o he baseline case.
The way a mul ilaye is cons uc ed, i ha ing a high deg ee-deg ee (Pea son) co ela ion
means ha he numbe o neighbou s any node has in any laye wi h a high p obabili y is
simila o he se o neighbou s he same node has ac oss all laye s in he mul ilaye . Thus,
odds o a hub in a laye being also a hub in ano he laye inc ease wi h deg ee-deg ee
110
co ela ion. Le us now conside a hub node and a high deg ee-deg ee co ela ion be ween he
laye s in he mul ilaye . Because o his co ela ion ac o , hubs a e aligned ac oss laye s. The
payo collec ed in laye s in which he node coope a es, because o i being cumula i e,
impac s all laye s. This means ha a hub can de ec in a laye 𝑙0 wi h a high payo collec ed
in o he laye s whe e he hub coope a es. The De ec o s a egy o his hub in laye 𝑙0 because
o i s high payo unc ions as a e e ence and ends o, i no o sa u a e he all laye as ALLD,
a leas o d y ou coope a ion in he neighbou hood. The ini ial s a egy o bigge nodes in a
laye , andomly de e mined, dic a es he di ec ion o sa u a ion, ALLC o ALLD, o he laye
o a leas he neighbou hood. Mo eo e , when deg ee-deg ee co ela ion is high, a node ends
o ha e he same neighbou s in all laye s, which means ha i i has k deg ee i ends o ha e
a o al o dis inc 𝑘 neighbou s ac oss all 𝑀 laye s o he mul ilaye .
Now le us conside a mul ilaye wi h maximum deg ee-deg ee co ela ion, in es men pe
laye c i e ia, an a bi a y ocal node and any one o i s neighbou s. These wo nodes will
sha e a link ac oss all laye s. I he neighbou is coope a i e in 𝑁𝐶 laye s, i will con ibu e o
ocal node payo wi h 𝐹
2𝑁𝐶 pe link in 𝑁𝐶links esul ing in an agg ega ed con ibu ion o 𝐹2. I
his neighbou now swi ches s a egy om coope a ion o de ec ion in one o he laye s i s
con ibu ion o ocal node payo will be upda ed o 𝐹
2(𝑁𝐶−1)(𝑁𝐶−1), i.e., in spi e o s a egy
upda e neighbou con ibu ion o ocal node payo was p ese ed, as long as he neighbou
kep coope a ing in a leas 1 laye , a condi ion wi h p obabili y ending o 1 as he numbe o
laye s ends o in ini y. This a ional is easily ex ended o ocal node change o s a egy and
he o he dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia. The bo om line is ha deg ee-deg ee co ela ion
ends o make indi iduals’ accumula ed payo s in a ian in ime. Addi ionally, ha ing
Coope a o s been andomly posi ioned, he chances o an indi idual A swi ching s a egy
unde in luence o a neighbou B in a laye is equal o chances o symme ical s a egy swi ch
be ween he same pai o indi iduals. This leads o he p ese a ion o ini ial le el o
coope a ion.
On he o he hand, o uncons ained baseline c i e ia, con ibu ions o a neighbou in
di e en laye s a e independen and an exclusi e unc ion o neighbou ’ s a egy in ha laye .
This sugges s baseline no o be so dependen on deg ee-deg ee co ela ion as igu e B-2
illus a es. Fo a ixed in ensi y o selec ion, he a ia ion o he le el o coope a ion e sus
deg ee-deg ee co ela ion eplica es indings in (Kleinebe g & Helbing, 2018). S ill o
baseline c i e ia and maximum deg ee-deg ee coope a ion, opological ensla emen de i es
om hub alignmen ac oss laye s, which p o ides hem a conside able s a egy ine ia,
117
I we conside equa ions 4 and 15, he co olla y ha ollows is ha in Ho and mul ilaye s
accumula ed payo a iance ends o ze o as he numbe o laye s inc ease. Expe imen al
e idences on i s momen s o accumula ed payo ac oss a Ho and mul ilaye a e depic ed
Figu e C-1- Payo s Dis ibu ion o Ho and Mul ilaye wi h In es men pe Game e sus Numbe o
Laye s. Ne wo ks a e buil wi h unco ela ed laye s wi h =1,〈𝑘〉=4,𝐹=1.7, 1000 nodes (𝑁) pe laye . .
Laye s we e ini ialized wi h hal nodes as Coope a o s andomly chosen. Resul s we e collec ed a e 100
gene a ions, one gene a ion being equal o numbe o laye s ies 1000 i e a ions.
Two ac s a e highligh ed in he igu e: payo a e age ends o 𝐹–1 and i s a ia ion o ze o as he numbe o
laye s inc ease. Al hough no p esen ed, he ex ension o his phenomenon o BA mul ilaye s was also no iced.
in igu e C-1.
Ha ing node payo a iance ending o ze o has an addi ional consequence when i comes
o a node o conside imi a ing a neighbou in a gi en laye wi h a di e en s a egy: he
a gumen o he exponen ial in Fe mi dis ibu ion ends o ze o, which allows i s exp ession
o be simpli ied o
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(SA SB)=1
1+ 𝑒−𝛽(𝜋𝐵− 𝜋𝐴)≅12+𝛽4(𝜋𝐵−𝜋𝐴)
(16)
meaning ha wi h equal p obabili y he s a egy o a node is main ained o upda ed.
The p obabili y o a node upda ing i s s a egy on a laye depends now only on i and one
o i s neighbou s andomly chosen ha ing di e en s a egies, which depends on he le el o
coope a ion on he laye . Dependency on nodes ela i e payo anishes as he numbe o
laye s inc eases.
Up o now homogeneous ne wo ks wi h in es men pe game c i e ia we e conside ed, bu
a gumen s a e ex ensible o in es men pe laye c i e ia as a mul ilaye wi h homogeneous

118
ne wo ks wi h deg ee 〈𝑘〉, 𝛽0 in ensi y o selec ion and in es men pe game c i e ia beha es
exac ly he same as i i had in es men pe laye and 𝛽0/〈𝑘〉 in ensi y o selec ion.
As all nodes end o ha e a simila accumula ed payo and all laye s look and beha e alike,
i.e., hey a e eplicas om he same s ochas ic model, each gene ic laye can be mapped o a
one dimension andom walk alike model wi h dynamic p obabili ies o mo ing ei he way o
s aying in he same spo . Figu e C-2 plo s samples o ime se ies on he e olu ion o he
numbe o Coope a o s o bo h he a e age numbe o Coope a o s ac oss a Ho and
mul ilaye and he numbe o Coope a o s in indi idual laye s.
Figu e C-2- Time Se ies o E olu ion o Coope a ion Le el in 16 Laye Ho and Mul ilaye wi h In es men
dis ibu ed pe Game. Ne wo ks a e buil wi h =1,〈k〉=4,F=1.7, 1000 nodes (𝑁) pe laye . Laye s we e
ini ialized wi h hal nodes as Coope a o s. On he igh side mul ilaye a e age numbe o Coope a o s is plo
o 5 di e en uns. On he igh side, o a single un, he e olu ion o he numbe o Coope a o s pe laye is
plo . Sa u a ion o some laye s is no iceable.
Once a mul ilaye is cha ac e ized a a pa icula poin in ime, i s e olu ion depends
exclusi ely on i s s a us a ha poin in ime being i ele an he pa h leading o ha s a us.
This ac makes he e olu ion o he mul ilaye sui able o be s udied as a Ma ko p ocess in
which he pas has no in luence on he u u e once he p esen is speci ied. Thus, in a Ma ko
p ocess x( )
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥(𝑡𝑛)

𝑥𝑛 | 𝑥(𝑡),𝑡

𝑡𝑛−1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥(𝑡𝑛)

𝑥𝑛 | 𝑥(𝑡𝑛−1))
(17)
𝑥(𝑡) is gene ically an a ay wi h one posi ion pe laye . A special so o Ma ko p ocess is
he Ma ko chain when he sys em can be desc ibed by a ini e o coun ably in ini e se o
s a es such ha he u u e e olu ion o he p ocess, once i is in a gi en s a e, depends only on
he p esen s a e and no on how i a i ed a ha s a e. A Ma ko chain is a s ochas ic model
ha can be desc ibed as a se o s a es, 𝑆 = {𝑠1,…,𝑠𝑛} and a se o e en s implying ansi ions
119
be ween s a es. The p ocess s a s in one o hese s a es and mo es successi ely om one s a e
o ano he wi h a p obabili y ha is an exclusi ely unc ion o he o me and la e s a es
i espec i ely o e en ual s a es isi ed be o e. Each mo e is called a s ep. I he chain is
cu en ly in s a e 𝑠𝑖, hen he p obabili y o mo ing o s a e 𝑠𝑗 is gi en by 𝑝𝑖𝑗. Na u ally, ∑𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑗
= 1. A single laye wi h N nodes can be modelled by a Ma ko chain whe e each s a e is
assigned a pa icula combina ion o s a egies ollowed by nodes. Fo a sys em wi h N nodes
and S s a egies he e a e po en ially 𝑁𝑆 di e en s a es. A mul ilaye wi h M laye s can also
be ep esen ed by a Ma ko chain, bu he numbe o s a es sky ocke s o 𝑁𝑆𝑀.
In o de o ackle his complexi y and wi h no loss o gene ali y, a single laye will be
add essed ins ead as ep esen a i e o he se o all mul ilaye laye s, as all laye s a e eplicas
om a single agen -le el dynamics e e ence. Mo eo e , a mean- ield app oxima ion will be
used in which he iden i y o he indi idual nodes ollowing a pa icula s a egy will no be
add essed, bu ins ead only he numbe o nodes ollowing each s a egy will be accoun ed.
Wi h mean ield app oxima ion, a scena io whe e he laye can be di ided by a on ie
such ha on each side o he line all nodes ha e he same s a egy in e ms o s a e
ep esen a ion canno be dis inguished om ano he one whe e nodes wi h di e en s a egies
a e all andomly mixed.
Wi h mean- ield ep esen a ion, because ep oduc ion is modelled ia an imi a ion p ocess,
a each s ep o he p ocess in he laye whe e imi a ion happens he numbe o Coope a o s is
al e ed by a mos 1 uni . This implies 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0 o |𝑖 –𝑗|>1.
A s a e i is called abso bing i 𝑝𝑖𝑗=𝛿𝑖𝑗, i.e., once s a e i is en e ed i is exi ed wi h p obabili y
ze o. ALLC and ALLD, i.e., s a e 1000 and s a e 0 will be abso bing s a es. Non-abso bing
s a es a e quali ied as ansien .
The g aphical ep esen a ion o he Ma ko chain de i ed om mean- ield e olu ion o a
single laye is as in igu e C-3. This Ma ko chain co esponds o he one desc ibing he
classical s ochas ic D unka d’s walk p ocess (o Gamble ’s Ruin) (G ins ead & Snell, 1997)
Figu e C-3- Ma ko Chain co esponding o D unka d’s Walk P ocess
120
wi h he ollowing di e ences: he p obabili y o p ese ing he s a e is no ze o (𝑝𝑖𝑖≠0) and
he p obabili ies o changing s a e depends on p esen s a e. The wo abso bing s a es map o
home and ba s a es in D unka d’s walk.
Co esponding Ma ko ansi ion ma ix as desc ibed in 2.1.3 o ini e popula ions, is
gi en by he ollowing exp essions:
1 , 𝑖=𝑗=0
1 , 𝑖=𝑗=𝑁
𝑁−𝑖
𝑁 ∗ 𝑖
𝑁−1 ∗ P obFe mi (Sj  Si) , 𝑗=𝑖+1 𝐴𝑁𝐷 0<𝑖<𝑁
𝑝𝑖𝑗= 𝑖𝑁 ∗ 𝑁−𝑖
𝑁−1 ∗ P obFe mi (Sj  Si) , 𝑗=𝑖−1 𝐴𝑁𝐷 0<𝑖<𝑁
1−p𝑖,𝑖−1−p𝑖,𝑖+1 , 0<𝑖<𝑁
0 , 𝑖=0 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑗>0
, 𝑖=𝑁 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑗<𝑁
, |𝑗−𝑖|>1
(18)
wi h 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗

𝑆𝑖) ep esen ing he Fe mi p obabili y o node i wi h s a egy 𝑆𝑖 copying
𝑆𝑗 s a egy om node j. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗

𝑆𝑖) is a unc ion o bo h node i and node j payo s.
As he numbe o laye s inc eases, all nodes end o sha e he same payo and
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖(𝑆𝑗

𝑆𝑖) end o 12. Le us ocus on he con en o 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1, he p obabili y o
inc easing he numbe o Coope a o s. Fi s ac o , 𝑁−𝑖
𝑁, e lec s he p obabili y o i s chosen
node being a De ec o . Second ac o , 𝑖
𝑁−1, accoun s o he p obabili y o , gi en ha a
De ec o has al eady been chosen, om N – 1 nodes o choose om, nex node o selec is 1
o i Coope a o s a ailable. Clea ly he e mean- ield app oach is ollowed, as he conc e e
unde lying ne wo k is no aken in o accoun . Now ha nodes selec ed a e sui able o a
s a egy imi a ion, all i is lacking is a a ou able p obabili y om Fe mi dis ibu ion.
Ma ko ansi ion ma ix mixes abso bing and ansien s a es. Fo an abso bing Ma ko
chain P and a e canonicaliza ion is pe o med as in 2.1.3, one ob ains he undamen al ma ix
N = ∑𝑄𝑘
+∞
𝑘=0 = (𝐼−𝑄)−1 o P. The en y 𝑛𝑖𝑗 o N gi es he expec ed numbe o imes ha
he p ocess eaches he ansien s a e 𝑠𝑗 i i is s a ed in he ansien s a e 𝑠𝑖. This implies
ha he expec ed numbe o s eps be o e he chain is abso bed, gi en ha he chain s a s in
121
s a e 𝑠𝑖, is gi en by 𝑡𝑖, he i- h elemen o column ec o , wi h 𝑡=𝑁𝑐, whe e c is a column
ec o all o whose en ies a e 1 (G ins ead & Snell, 1997).
The p obabili y ha Ma ko chain will e ol e o abso bing s a e 𝑠𝑗 s a ing om ansien
sa e 𝑠𝑖 is gi en by 𝑏𝑖𝑗 en y o ma ix B esul ing om 𝐵=𝑁𝑅.
In wha ollows, Ma ko chain is applied o a single mul ilaye a e age laye wi h 1000
nodes whose le el o coope a ion esul s om he a e age o Coope a o s ac oss all laye s.
Figu e C-4 plo s on i s le panel he heo e ical quasi-s a iona y dis ibu ion o he mean-
ield app oxima ion o single laye p e ending o ep esen a mul ilaye wi h in es men
dis ibu ed pe game and a numbe o laye s ending o in ini y. This quasi-s a iona y
dis ibu ion e lec s he p obabili y o each ansien s a e being isi ed un il he mul ilaye
sa u a es in any o he abso bing s a es. Conside ing all s a es equally p obable o mul ilaye
ini ializa ion and he e godici y o he Ma ko chain, wha is plo in le side panel is jus
∑𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖
∑𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑗 , whe e he denomina o is jus a no maliza ion ac o o ans o m he numbe o isi s
in a s a e in o a p obabili y. This co esponds o equally weigh each line o he undamen al
N ma ix, i.e., each possible s a ing s a e. The equal p obabili y o all ansien s a es is he
highligh ing esul .
Figu e C-4- Theo e ical esul s o a Mean-Field app oxima ion o a Laye wi h Nodes wi h equal Payo .
Quasi-s a iona y dis ibu ion, numbe o s eps un il eaching an abso bing s a e and p obabili y o eaching
each abso bing s a e a e plo o a mean- ield app oxima ion o a gene ic laye p e ending o ep esen a
mul ilaye wi h in es men dis ibu ed pe game and numbe o laye s ending o in ini y
Vec o , wi h ields calcula ed as 𝑡𝑖=∑𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑗 is depic ed in cen al panel. As expec ed, he
numbe o s eps inc eases u he away om abso bing s a e ini ial s a e is loca ed. Symme y
o he line esul s om p oblem symme y, 𝑝𝑖,𝑗=𝑝𝑁−𝑖,𝑁−𝑗.
122
Finally he igh panel depic s no malized bij o inal abso bing s a e j equal o 0 o 1000,
i.e., he p obabili y o he sys em ending up in each o he wo abso bing s a e as a unc ion o
s a ing s a e. Lines in g aph a e complemen a y because in an abso bing Ma ko chain
𝑄𝑛

0 as he numbe o s eps (n) inc eases, hus he p obabili y ha he p ocess will be
abso bed is 1, and 0 and 1000 a e he only possible abso bing s a es.
This quasi-s a iona y dis ibu ion uni o mi y o a gene ic laye implies an AGoS ending
o ze o which o ces a mul ilaye o p ese e he p opo ion o Coope a o s wi h which i was
ini ialized. On he o he hand, as ime un olds he na u al end is o indi idual laye s o
sa u a e ei he as ALLC o ALLD. Thus, he ini ial p opo ion o Coope a o s is e lec ed in
he p opo ion o laye s sa u a ed as ALLC.
This laye pola iza ion is o no su p ise, because his o e all mul ilaye D unka d’s walk
alike p ocess, ha ing abso bing s a es o ALLC o ALLD, is doomed o con e ge o one o
hem. In his s ochas ic p ocess, he p obabili y o con e gence o ALLC inal s a e equals he
p opo ion o ini ial Coope a o s wi h which he sys em was ini ialized, which jus i ies why
he ini ial p opo ion o Coope a o s is p ese ed and why quasi-s a iona y dis ibu ion o
s a es is uni o m.
In o de o compa e heo e ical and expe imen ally he in luence o ini ial Coope a o
p obabili y in mul ilaye e olu ion, a mul ilaye wi h 16 laye s o BA and Ho and ne wo ks
wi h in es men c i e ia dis ibu ed pe game was independen ly ini ialized wi h a a iable
concen a ion o Coope a o s. Usual enhancemen ac o s we e applied. The e alua ion was
pe o med bo h un il and a sa u a ion ime. The esul s a e depic ed in Figu e C-5.
Focusing on BA mul ilaye , un il sa u a ion, inal le el o coope a ion depends on ini ial
one wi h almos no dependency on enhancemen ac o . Would he numbe o laye s inc ease
and his dependency would comple ely ade away. Addi ionally, o ex eme ini ial
p obabili ies, a sha p ansi ion in inal le el o coope a ion is no iceable. Conside ing again
a single laye wi h equal payo s ep esen a i e o he mul ilaye , heo e ical alue o inal
le el o coope a ion esul s om plo ing 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑓|𝑁𝐶𝑖), wi h 𝑁𝐶𝑖 and 𝑁𝐶𝑓 ep esen ing,
ecpec i ely, ini ial and inal numbe o Coope a o s. Taking in o accoun ha gene ic 𝑛𝑖𝑗
en y om Ma ko chain undamen al N ma ix ep esen s he expec ed numbe o imes he
mul ilaye will be in s a e j , gi en ha i s a s in s a e i, one has
P ob(𝑁𝐶𝑓=𝑗|𝑁𝐶𝑖=i) = 𝑛𝑖𝑗
∑𝑛𝑖𝑥
𝑥
(19)

123
𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑓|𝑁𝐶𝑖=𝑖)=∑𝑗 𝑛𝑖𝑗
∑𝑛𝑖𝑥𝑥
𝑗
(20)
The heo e ical esul o 𝐸(𝑁𝐶𝑓|𝑁𝐶𝑖=𝑖) is p ecisely wha is plo on he op igh panel o
he igu e. The ma ching is pe ec pa icula ly o ex eme ini ial le els o coope a ion.
A sa u a ion ime he hea map is analogous apa om he ac ha inal le el o
coope a ion a ies linea ly wi h ini ial one. Agains his is as expec ed and al eady depic ed
in igh panel o igu e C-4. Wha happens o his BA mul ilaye as will be illus a ed in
appendix D when s udying i s AGoS is ha all laye s o he mul ilaye will sa u a e, some as
ALLC; o he s as ALLD. Mo eo e , because he naming o he laye s is a bi a y and laye s
a e independen , he same laye sa u a es ei he as ALLD o ALLC ac oss expe iences.
Figu e C-5- Topological and C i e ia Ensla emen in Mul ilaye s wi h 16 Laye s, In es men dis ibu ed pe
Game. Bo h BA and Ho and mul ilaye s ha e 1000 nodes (𝑁) and 〈k〉=4. Fo me one has =
0.05 and 〈k〉=4, la e one =1.0. Mul ilaye laye s a e independen and andomly ini ialized wi h a
numbe o Coope a o s aken om a disc e e andom a iable in he se 0 o 1000, inclusi e.
The p opo ion be ween he numbe o laye s in di e en condi ions will be such as dic a ed
by ini ial le el o coope a ion. Topology and in es men c i e ia ensla e he mul ilaye
because i s e olu ion canno be s ee ed by ac ing upon enhancemen ac o .
Reasoning on he basis o he Ma ko chain co esponding o a D unka d’s walk s ochas ic
p ocess, he single laye he mul ilaye is mapped o is doomed o end up as ei he ALLC
(𝑁𝐶𝑓=𝑁) o ALLD (𝑁𝐶𝑓=0), The p obabili y o ending up as ALLC is gi en by he ini ial
p opo ion o Coope a o s in he laye as om he igh panel om igu e C-4, i.e.,
124
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝐶𝑓=𝑁)=𝑁𝐶𝑖
𝑁
(21)
As he e a e only wo ou comes possible, ALLC o ALLD,
E(𝑁𝐶𝑓)=𝑁𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝐶𝑓=𝑁)+0𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝐶𝑓=0)=𝑁𝐶𝑖
(22)
which leads one o conclude ha inal le el o coope a ion equals ini ial one.
As in ac one has a mul ilaye ins ead o a single laye and as all laye s sa u a e, he ini ial
p opo ion o Coope a o popula ion in he mul ilaye dic a es he pe cen age o laye s ha
sa u a e as ALLC, i.e., he inal p opo ion as Coope a o s in he sys em as all he o he laye s
will sa u a e as ALLD.
The Ho and mul ilaye exhibi s he same ends as desc ibed o BA mul ilaye bu wi h
de ia ions o small ini ial le els o coope a ion, pa icula ly o small alues o enhancemen
ac o s. This de ia ion om he heo e ical expec a ions is no su p ising and will be
expe ienced in ollowing igu es whe e i will be explained. We e he numbe o laye s g ea e
o he in ensi y o selec ion lowe and he ag eemen be ween heo e ical and expe imen al
esul s would be be e .
Conside ing exclusi ely mul ilaye s wi h in es men pe game c i e ia, he lines e lec ing
he way he numbe o laye s, in ensi y o selec ion, ype o ne wo k o enhancemen ac o
modula e he inal le el o coope a ion e sus ini ial a e depic ed in Figu e C-6. The highe
Figu e C-6- Final Le el o Coope a ion as a Func ion o ini ial One. Each ne wo k has 1000 nodes (𝑁), 〈𝑘〉=
4. In es men is dis ibu ed pe game and laye s in he mul ilaye we e ini ialized wi h hal nodes as
Coope a o s.
125
he numbe o laye s o a ixed in ensi y o selec ion, he close expe imen al cu e i s
heo e ical one. Highe alues o in ensi y o selec ion equi e high numbe o le els o
expe imen al lines o be e i heo e ical ones. This makes sense because in he exponen ial
a gumen con olled o he Fe mi dis ibu ion con olling he p obabili y o s a egy imi a ion
an inc ease in he β alue is compensa ed by a lowe payo a iance esul ing om a highe
numbe o laye s and ice- e sa. Highe alues o enhancemen ac o s a e pa icula ly use ul
o low ini ial le el o coope a ion. Some hing also expec able as i is essen ial o he ew
Coope a o s o hold hei g ound.
Theo e ical and expe imen al lines sha e he same shape bu he de ia ion be ween hem is
highe o smalle ini ial le els o coope a ion. This is no su p ising because he heo e ical
model is based on he app oxima ion o a binomial dis ibu ion o a Poisson one, which is only
alid o g ea alues o

(=𝑁𝑝). Fo smalle alues o ini ial le el o coope a ion,
heo e ical model loses alidi y and so i is senseless o expec an exac ma ch be ween hese
lines.
Taking as a e e ence in es men dis ibu ion pe game c i e ia, o a gi en ype o ne wo k,
Ba a o Ho and, he numbe o laye s de e mines de a iance o accumula ed payo be ween
nodes, which dic a e he le el o opological and c i e ia ensla emen ..
Fo in es men dis ibu ed pe game, Figu e C-7 depic s he ac ha o a gi en numbe o
laye s, 16 in his pa icula case, a maximum in ensi y o selec ion can be iden i ied below
which mul ilaye e olu ion is s uck o ini ial condi ions and insensi i e o a ia ions in
enhancemen ac o . Fo Ho and ne wo ks, he igu e shows ha up o in ensi y ac o s aluing
1 and i espec i e o enhancemen ac o , a e age le el o coope a ion does no change om
ini ial alues. We e he mul ilaye ini ialized wi h a di e en alue and ha same alue would
Figu e C-7- Topological and C i e ia Ensla emen o 16-laye s Mul ilaye , 1000 nodes (𝑁) pe laye .
Mul ilaye s a e ini ialized wi h hal Coope a o s pe laye andom and independen ly selec ed.
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be p ese ed. Mo eo e , i hea maps co esponding o a di e en numbe o laye s a e
depic ed, i will be no iceable ha he wa e on o he colou code co esponding o he
ini ial le el o coope a ion wi h which he mul ilaye was ini ialized mo es igh wa ds as he
numbe o laye s inc ease.
Fo a dis ibu ed in es men c i e ia, he e ogeneous ne wo ks end o ha e a beha iou
simila o homogeneous one, bu equi ing mo e laye s o achie e he same beha iou wi h
he same in ensi y o selec ion. Fo a gi en ne wo k ype, in es men pe laye c i e ia ends
o expe ience he same beha iou as i s in es men pe laye s coun e pa , bu wi h a highe
numbe o laye s and/o lowe in ensi y o selec ion.
De ining ensla emen as he condi ion o inal le el o coope a ion in a mul ilaye wi h
in es men pe game c i e ia di e ing in less han 20% om he ini ial le el o 50% wi h
which a mul ilaye was ini ialized, wha e e he alue o enhancemen ac o 𝐹∈[1,2], Figu e
C-8 displays he domain o he numbe o laye s e sus in ensi y o selec ion 𝛽 whe e
ensla emen ules. We e he ensla emen c i e ia mo e demanding agains accep able
luc ua ion on he inal le el o coope a ion, o he same numbe o laye s a lowe in ensi y
o selec ion would be equi ed.
Figu e C-8 - Domain o Topological Ensla emen o In es men dis ibu ed pe Game. Shaded a eas
ep esen he locus o numbe o laye s l and in ensi y o selec ion 𝛽 pa ame e s such ha hea map ℎ𝑚𝑙(𝛽,𝐹)
displaying he le el o coope a ion achie ed in a mul ilaye wi h l laye s, ini ialized wi h hal nodes as
Coope a o s, in es men dis ibu ed pe game, in ensi y o selec ion 𝛽 and enhancemen ac o F, o a gi en
numbe o laye 𝛽=max
𝑥|ℎ𝑚𝑙(𝑥,𝐹)−0.5|<0.1,x∈[10−2,10],∀ 𝐹∈[1,2]
Node consis ency is ano he possible compa ison pe spec i e o con on a ion be ween
expe imen al and heo e ical esul s as depic ed in igu e C-9. Due o he ini e numbe o
laye s i mus be s essed ha expe imen al consis ency e ol es by quan a ha amoun o
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Appendix E. Mul ilaye s wi h di e en Types o Ne wo ks
In he main body o he documen , mul ilaye s we e conside ed o independen laye s
suppo ed on ne wo k ins ances o a single ype. He e we d op second cons ain: laye s a e
s ill independen bu need o mo e o sha e ne wo k ype. Figu e E-1 p esen s esul s collec ed
om a mul ilaye wi h hal laye s as Ho and, ano he hal as BA.
Figu e E-1- Mul ilaye wi h 8 laye s BA o Ho and s. Mixed Mul ilaye wi h 4 laye s Ho and plus 4 laye s
BA. Le el o coope a ion and AGoS o pu e 8-laye Ho and and BA mul ilaye a e compa ed wi h a mixed
mul ilaye wi h hal laye s wi h Ho and ne wo ks and he o he hal wi h BA ne wo ks. AGoS lines we e
calcula ed o in ensi y o selec ion 𝛽=1, enhancemen ac o 𝐹=1.6 and 1000 (𝑁) nodes pe laye .
Laye s we e independen ly ini ialized wi h hal indi iduals as Coope a o s o a numbe o Coope a o s gi en by
a andom a iable uni o mly dis ibu ed be ween 0 and 1000, inclusi e, depending on he le el o coope a ion
o AGoS being calcula ed, espec i ely.
Lines o single ne wo k ype mul ilaye s we e eco e ed om g aphics p e iously aced
on documen main body. Pu e BA mul ilaye s a e mo e coope a i e han Ho and ones. In
pa icula o enhancemen ac o 𝐹=1.6 and baseline c i e ia, Ho and only 8-laye
mul ilaye is de ec i e. Howe e , in he mixed scena io and due o con ibu ions o
accumula ed payo ecei ed om o some BA laye s coope a ion becomes easible. As a
gene al ule, he beha iou o he mixed mul ilaye is posi ioned somewhe e be ween
beha iou s o pu e ones.

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