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Institutional ownership and simultaneity of strategic financial decisions: an empirical analysis in the case of Pakistan Stock Exchange

Sadaf, Rabeea

Abstract

The traditional interpretation of corporate finance is characterized by ownership rights are widely distributed among individual stockholders, but can be managed by few managers and resulted in an agency problem. The primary objective of this research study is to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and firms’ strategic decisions. These strategic decisions include i.e. leverage, dividend and investment decisions. The examined data is used from 170 non-financial Pakistani listed firms, characterized by a large percentage of institutional investors, with a multiple equity stake in different firms across a wide field of industries. This study is also able to show two important novelties. Firstly, the fact that previous researchers have already concentrated on the impact of institutional ownership on individual strategic decisions, as dividend or leverage policies and several unanswered questions remain. Consequently, the impact of institutional ownership has explored collectively on various strategic decisions. Secondly, this study also recognizes the determination of strategic decisions by considering the endogeneity problem with a Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) method. Essentially, the effects of institutional ownership on firms’ leverage becomes more pronounced after including industry specific and time dummies in regression models. Based on the results, the case of increased institutional ownership of firms has a significant negative effect on leverage, and a positive effect on dividend decisions. Hence, institutional investors are seemed to prefer low leveraged and high dividend-paying firms. Moreover, this study has not able to find significant two-way relations between institutional ownership and investment decisions, so institutional investors rather focus on corporate governance and internal control of firms. Indeed, institutional investors should develop the efficiency of firms’ management to support more adequate corporate governance policies, and not only for emerging markets.

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172 2019, XXII, 1 Finance DOI: 10.15240/ ul/001/2019-1-012 In oduc ion The adi ional in e p e a ion o co po a e i nance is cha ac e ized by owne ship. Al hough, hei igh s a e widely dis ibu ed among indi idual s ockholde s, bu can be managed by ew manage s. Hence, con l ic o in e es is a isen among manage s and sha eholde s and his esul s in an agency p oblem (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). A numbe o empi ical s udies also con i med he owne ship concen a ion o i ms, especially hose domina ed by ew la ge owne s o block-holde s (La Po a e al., 1999). The concen a ed s uc u e o owne ship also con ibu es owa ds agency con l ic be ween block-holde s and mino i y sha eholde s. F om ano he pe spec i e, he block-holde s can bene i mino i y sha eholde s by hei ole in moni o ing manage s and also can be haza dous i hey s i e o achie e hei own p i a e goals (Shlei e & Vishny, 1997). The h ee main aspec s o owne ship, which ha e been widely discussed in he pas h ee decades, include concen a ed owne ship by block-holde s, amilies and o he g oups, manage ial owne ship, and ins i u ional owne ship. The hi d aspec has gained impo ance as sha eholding by ins i u ional in es o s has inc eased in he US om 17% in 1970 o nea ly 70% in he p e ious decade (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Meanwhile, in he case o Pakis an, nea ly 25% o he common s ock is owned by local and o eign ins i u ional in es o s (Eas e ly, 2001). Ins i u ional owne ship is de i ned in he li e a u e as he pe cen age o i m’s sha es owned by ins i u ional in es o s and i can also be de i ned as one minus pe cen age o sha es held by indi idual in es o s (Fi h e al., 2016). Consequen ly, ins i u ional in es o s play an e ec i e moni o ing ole in he in es ed i ms. Ini ially, ea ly esea ch mainly ocused on he analysis o he ela ionship be ween concen a ed owne ship and i m pe o mance (McConnell & Se aes, 1990; Duggal & Milla , 1999). La e on, he ela ionship be ween ins i u ional owne ship and di e en domains o co po a e go e nance ha e opened addi ional esea ch ho izon, i.e. Ka po e al. (1996), Johnson and G eening (1999), Mak and Li (2001). Ins i u ional in es o s ha e di e se p e e ences o he i ms in which hey in es . A numbe o s udies ca ied ou o de e mine he p e e ences o ins i u ional in es o s in e ms o i ms’ co po a e go e nance and o he policies. Bad ina h, Kale, and Ryan (1996) in es iga e he idea ha ins i u ional in es o s a o s ocks ha ha e highe ma ke liquidi y and lowe e u n ola ili y. O he s also con i med ha ins i u ional in es o s alue he s ocks o companies wi h supe io disclosu e (Bushee & Noe, 2000), hose ha would pay cash di idends o epu chase sha es (G ins ein & Michaely, 2005), and also hose demons a e be e manage ial pe o mance (Pa ino e al., 2003). Ne e heless, Cull and Xu (2005) ha e s essed he ole o ins i u ional in es o s in in es men decisions, G ins ein and Michaely (2005) claimed he e ec s o di idend policy decisions and o he s in le e age o capi al s uc u e decisions (Bokpin & A ko, 2009; Chung & Wang, 2014). Mos impo an ly, his s udy aims a de e mining he simul aneous e ec s o ins i u ional owne ship on i ms’ s a egic i nancial decisions. Thus, he in e dependence o i ms’ s a egic decisions se a p oblem o endogenei y, leading INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SIMULTANEITY OF STRATEGIC FINANCIAL DECISIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE Rabeea Sada , Judi Oláh, Józse Popp, Domicián Má é EM_1_2019.indd 172EM_1_2019.indd 172 8.3.2019 9:16:258.3.2019 9:16:25 173 1, XXII, 2019 Finance o a causal wo-way ela ionship be ween hem. Le e age o capi al s uc u e decisions a e a ec ed by di idend decisions and hese choices also ha e an in l uence on he le e age decisions o a i m (Al-Najja & Taylo , 2008). Howe e , s udies ha e conside ed he endogenei y be ween ins i u ional owne ship and payou policy (Chang, Kang, & Li, 2016), owne ship and i ms’ alue (A za & Nazi , 2015) and i ms’ pe o mance (Maquiei a, Espinosa, & Viei o, 2011), his phenomenon seems o be pa icula ly in e es ing in he case o he Pakis ani, whe e he le el o ins i u ional owne ship is high and conside able. The main pu pose o his s udy is o analyze ela ionships among ins i u ional owne ship and he i ms’ s a egic decisions ela ing o he le e age, he capi al s uc u e, di idend decisions and ela ed in es men decisions. This pape is o ganized as ollows. Sec ion II highligh s p e ious li e a u e and p oposes ou hypo heses. Sec ion III de ails he sample and esea ch design used o analysis. Sec ion IV includes he esul s o empi ical examina ion and he discussion o i s consequences. Sec ion V concludes and highligh s he impo ance o ins i u ional owne ship in i ms’ decision. 1. Li e a u e Re iew and Hypo hesis De elopmen The agency heo y sugges s ha op imal in es o s ha e a s ong in e es in moni o ing i ms’ managemen capi al s uc u e and owne ship s uc u e, which suppo i ms o minimize hei agency cos s (Jensen, 1986). Agency cos s a e a ibu ed o he a ise con l ic o in e es . Jensen and Meckling (1976) iden i i ed wo main ypes o con l ic s, i.e. con l ic s o in e es be ween he sha eholde s and manage s, and con l ic s be ween he sha eholde s and deb holde s. Keeping manage s’ absolu e in es men in i ms’ cons an , an inc ease in he a io o deb i nancing inc eases he manage s’ sha e o equi y and he e o e, i educes he loss om any con l ic be ween manage s and sha eholde s. Mo eo e , since he deb equi es he i m o pay ou cash as a cos o deb , his educes he amoun o ee-cash a ailable o manage s and in u n educes he con l ic o in e es . P e ious li e a u e on ins i u ional owne ship has p oposed hese solu ions in o de o gain bene i s by enhancing i ms’ alue (Shlei e & Vishny, 1997). Ne e heless, ins i u ional in es o s and deb can be subs i u ed one ano he as an al e na i e o moni o ing i ms. This hypo hesis is con i med by a numbe o empi ical s udies in he li e a u e (Li, Yue, & Zhao, 2009). Consis en ly, ag eeing wi h Al- Najja and Taylo (2008), we will p opose ha he ela ionship be ween ins i u ional owne ship and i ms’ le e age can be exp essed: H1: The deg ee o s ock owne ship by ou side ins i u ions is nega i ely ela ed o he le e age o he i ms. Since, Mille and Modigliani (1961) a gued ha di idend policy does no a ec he alue o he i m, di e en empi ical s udies ha e been conduc ed o in es iga e he di idend puzzle. T uong and Heaney (2007) also epo ed ha he i ms pay di idends and a e inclined o pay mo e di idends when hey ha e high le els o p o i abili y and low le els o in es men oppo uni ies. The classical agency heo y pe spec i e holds he iew ha i ms a e likely o sha e mo e o hei p o i s wi h in es o s when hey ace lowe moni o ing cos s (Jensen, 1986). I also holds ha he la ges sha eholde may educe agency cos s by educing he amoun o ee cash l ow o manage ial disc e ion by inc easing i ms’ payou s. Meanwhile, he li e a u e p o ides some e idence on he ela ionship be ween ins i u ional owne ship and he di idend decisions o i ms. Fi h e al. (2016) and Sho e al. (2002) con i med a posi i e co ela ion be ween ins i u ional sha eholding and he di idend payou s o i ms. G ins ein and Michaely (2005) ound a posi i e ela ionship be ween sha e epu chases and ins i u ional holdings. Acco ding o hei i ndings, i ms ha epu chase mo e sha es a ac mo e ins i u ional in es men s. Thei esul s also sugges ha ins i u ional in es o s p e e i ms ha epu chase sha es egula ly. Based on his discussion, ou second p oposi ion ega ding he ela ion be ween ins i u ional owne ship and di idend is he ollowing: H2: The pe cen age o s ock owne ship by ins i u ional in es o s is posi i ely ela ed o he di idend paymen o he i ms. Bushee (1998) demons a es ha he sho - e m ocus o many ins i u ional in es o s induces some i ms o educe R&D when ea nings a e expec ed o decline. On he basis o he in es men ho izon and p e e ences, ins i u ional in es o s a e classi i ed as ‘ ansien ins i u ions’, highligh ed manage s’ myopic beha io . The o he wo ypes o hese EM_1_2019.indd 173EM_1_2019.indd 173 8.3.2019 9:16:258.3.2019 9:16:25 174 2019, XXII, 1 Finance ins i u ions a e ‘dedica ed 1 and ‘quasi-indexe ’ ins i u ions. These ins i u ional in es o s ha e s able owne ship in i ms and a e less ocused on sho - e m ea nings. The ela ion be ween he in es men decisions o i ms and ins i u ional owne ship as p oposed in he li e a u e is no so s aigh o wa d. Howe e , in es men is one o he mos impo an aspec s h ough which ins i u ional owne s can a ec a i m. A posi i e ela ion be ween in es men and owne ship was con i med by Pindado and To e (2006), whe eas Richa dson (2006) epo s ha manage s o i ms wi h la ge ins i u ional owne ship a e less likely o o e in es su plus cash, due o he moni o ing go e nance ac i i ies o ins i u ions. Conside ing Bushee’s (1998) myopic in es o hypo hesis o be mo e ele an in he con ex o Pakis ani ins i u ional in es o s (in e ms o he sho - e m ho izon and lack o in o ma ion), he ela ionship is p oposed as, H3: The pe cen age o s ock owne ship by ins i u ional in es o s is nega i ely ela ed o he in es men o he i ms. Deb and di idend can subs i u e o complemen one ano he in educing agency cos s. These kinds o s a egies auxilia y well i con e gence o in e es is s ong (Roze , 1982). I he en enchmen hypo hesis o Fa inha (2002) is e ec i e hese decisions a e complemen . Belie ing on his, ou s udy p oposes a nega i e ela ion be ween le e age and di idends. H4: The le e age o he i m is nega i ely ela ed o he di idend. Some ea ly s udies examined how i ms’ op imum deb p e e ence a ec s in es men decisions. Smi h and Wa ne (1979) a gued ha deb can bound a i m’s abili y o employ an asse subs i u ion, while Be ko i ch and Kim (1990) discuss ha p ojec i nance and secu ed deb suppo o esol e in es men incen i e p oblems. Hackba h, Hennessy and Leland (2007) indica ed ha placing bank deb a he op o he i m’s p io i ies ully exploi s ax shield bene i s o in e es s. S udying in e ac ions be ween in es men s and i nancing decisions, hey examined he idea ha a dynamic ade-o be ween p io i y, capi al s uc u e and in es men incen i es yields impo an addi ional insigh s and u he empi ical p edic ions. Based on he li e a u e we assumed ha : H5: Le e age is nega i ely ela ed o i ms’ in es men decisions. Howe e , he in es men o i ms also a ec s hei di idend policy decisions. The ela ionships among he di idend and in es men decision policies a e e idenced om he heo e ical backg ound o Mille and Modigliani (1961). This heo y a gues ha in a pe ec capi al ma ke , op imal in es men decisions by a i m a e independen o how such decisions a e i nanced. This co e heo y has also an impo an ou come as in es men decisions should no be de e mined by di idends, and di idend decisions need no be a ec ed by in es men decisions. In his pe spec i e, Fama (1974) p o ided empi ical e idence o iolence o his heo em. Since hen, he e is no e idence o an exis ed ela ion be ween di idend and in es men decisions ha equi e ea ing hem ia simul aneous equa ions models (SEM). Fo hose i ms which ha e g ea in es men oppo uni ies, paymen o di idends mus be balanced wi h he long- e m goals o i ms (Mye s & Majlu , 1984). C u chley e al. (1999) ound a nega i e wo-way ela ionship be ween di idend and in es men decisions. An inc eased di idend can lead o educed unds a ailable o in es men and hence esul s in a dec eased di idend p obabili y o he u u e (Cye e al., 1996). Hence, we can also assume ha : H6: The di idend is nega i ely ela ed o he in es men decisions o i ms. Ou co esponding hypo hesis ega ding he ela ion among ins i u ional owne ship and le e age, di idend and in es men decisions a e summa ized in Fig. 1. 2. Sample and Resea ch Design The da a used o his s udy is comp ised o a sample aken om non- i nancial i ms lis ed on he Pakis an S ock Exchange (PSE). To al s a is ics o his s udy include all lis ed i ms in 33 di e en sec o s. A sample o 170 i ms belonging o eigh di e en sec o s we e conside ed o analysis be ween 1994 and 2014. The selec ion o he sample depends upon he a ailabili y o all he equi ed da a. Financial i ms, i ms wi h nega i e equi y and i ms whose ele an da a is incomple e o no a ailable a e excluded om his sample. Mo eo e , ou analyses a e based on annual equency o da a, in o de o align i nancial s a emen s esul s and ins i u ional owne ship a iables. In his s udy, a sec o al app oach is also used, ollowing King and San o (2008). EM_1_2019.indd 174EM_1_2019.indd 174 8.3.2019 9:16:268.3.2019 9:16:26 175 1, XXII, 2019 Finance The a iables ex ac ed om he Balance Shee Analysis (BSA) publica ion o he S a e Bank o Pakis an (SBP) (2018) include capi al s uc u e decisions cap u ed by he ollowing ac o s:  le e age (LEV), which measu ed by deb o equi y a io (Hassan & Bu , 2009),  di idend payou s (DPO), as he a io o di idend pe sha e o ea nings pe sha e (A za & Nazi , 2015),  in es men decisions (INV) measu ed by he a io o Change in Fixed Asse s o To al Asse s in place o R&D expendi u es (Jensen e al., 1992),  Re u n on Equi y (ROE), as he a io o ne income o sha eholde s’ equi y (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003),  size o i m (Size) equals wi h he na u al loga i hm o he book alue o o al asse s is used (Lin & Chang, 2011),  angibili y (TANG) o asse s is measu ed as he a io o i xed asse s o he o al asse s o i m (Liu e al., 2011),  Sales g ow h (Sales_GR) is calcula ed as he annual pe cen age change in sales o a company (Lin & Chang, 2011),  age o i m (Age) is de i ned as he log o numbe o yea s elapsed since a i m was lis ed (Roy, 2015),  ins i u ional owne ship (INST), as he pe cen age o sha es owned by ins i u ional in es o s o he o al numbe o sha es ou s anding (Michaely & Vincen , 2013). INST is aken om annual epo s o indi idual companies, epo ed unde he Code o Co po a e Go e nance o Pakis an (CCGP),  and he di idend decisions o i ms a e cap u ed by di idend yield (DY), as he a io o he di idend pe sha e o ma ke p ice pe sha e (B ad o d e al., 2013). In he me hod iden i i ed o his s udy, he e is a po en ial causali y o endogenous ela ionship among le e age decisions, di idend decisions and in es men decisions. A simple o dina y leas squa e (OLS) es ima ion o cap u e he ela ionship among hese a iables will c ea e biased and inconsis en es ima es, as gi en by (Demse z & Villalonga, 2001). Hence, he e is a need o explo e a mo e sophis ica ed econome ics echnique o analysis. The e a e di e en ways o add ess he issue o biased and inconsis en es ima es. One o hem is 2SLS, he o he s a e 3SLS and GMM. 3SLS has ad an ages o e 2SLS, as wi h he o me o cap u e c oss equa ion impac s o e o e ms and he sys em o equa ion is supposed o be co ela ed in 3SLS (Zellne & Theil, 1962). Fig. 1: The in e ela ion amewo k among ins i u ional owne ship and s a egic le e age, di idend and in es men decisions o i ms Sou ce: own based on he au ho ’s assump ions EM_1_2019.indd 175EM_1_2019.indd 175 8.3.2019 9:16:268.3.2019 9:16:26 176 2019, XXII, 1 Finance This s udy is based on he 3SLS me hodology in o de o analyze he simul aneous de e mina ion o i nancial decisions and hei possible wo-way causali y. 3SLS is always p e e ed in e m o he inhe en e i ciency o i s es ima es o e 2SLS (Kap eyn & Fiebig, 1981). 3SLS is he mos app op ia e echnique o his da a se i a sys em es ima o is conside ed a he han one equa ion. This me hod is designed o cap u e a ela ion whe e equa ions in a model ha e endogenous a iables as exogenous. Since some o he explana o y a iables a e endogenous a iables, he e o e ms o he equa ions a e co ela ed, which simply iola es he assump ions o O dina y Leas Squa e (Bal agi, 2008). In o de o analyze he impac o ins i u ional owne ship on a ious s a egic decisions o i ms, he ollowing eg ession models a e speci i ed as: (1) (2) (3) whe e le e age (LEV), di idend yield (DY) and in es men (INV) a e dependen a iables in hese equa ions, showing a possible causali y ( wo-way) ela ionship among hem, since hey also appea on he igh side o he equa ion as exogenous a iables. (e) ep esen s he e o e ms o he equa ions 1, 2 and 3, and hey a e also assumed o be co ela ed. ROE, Size, TANG, Sales_GR, Size and Age a e addi ional con ol a iables in hese equa ions, as o e ed Bokpin and A ko (2009); Chang e al., (2016). In o de o con i m he obus ness o ou esul s, he abo e equa ions a e speci i ed wi h some dummy a iables o cap u ing he c oss indus y-e ec s (T uong & Heaney, 2007). Indus y speci i c dummies a e combined wi h he o mal Code o Co po a e Go e nance o Pakis an in 2002, and all lis ed companies in Pakis an should ollow a ull ep esen a ion o he CCGP. Conside ing he ime e ec s, a ious yea dummies a e also added o accoun o he impac o ins i u ional owne ship and s a egic decisions o e ime. 3. Empi ical Analysis and Resul s Tab. A.1 epo s in Appendix he desc ip i e s a is ics o all a iables. This able epo s he mean o a e age alue, he s anda d e o o he mean, he median, he s anda d de ia ion, skewness and ku osis o 1,502 obse a ions. The mean o a e age alue o LEV is 1.69 wi h a s anda d de ia ion o 1.48. Le e age alue is highe and i shows a g ea e eliance o i ms lis ed in he PSE on ex e nal sou ces o i nancing, as epo ed ea lie by A za and Nazi (2015). Thus, he a e age alue o INV is .006%, wi h a s anda d de ia ion o .00046. The a e age ins i u ional owne ship in Pakis ani i ms is epo ed as 32.14% o o al sha es ou s anding wi h a s anda d e o o 0.63. Ne e heless, in o de o check he he e oscedas ici y, a ious Whi e es s a e applied. The esul s o hese es s a e epo ed in Tab. A.2 (Panel A) and he chi-squa e alues con i m he p esence o he e oscedas ici y in ou model. Panel B also he p obabili y o es s a is ics con i ms he p esence o se ial co ela ion. The co ela ion be ween he a iables (Tab. A.3) o he sample selec ed is analyzed using he Pea son co ela ion. The esul shows a posi i e co ela ion be ween ins i u ional owne ship and di idend yield. Thus, ins i u ional owne ship shows a sligh nega i e co ela ion wi h le e age, whe eas i seemed no co ela ion wi h in es men . The ollowing Tab. 1 epo s he co esponding esul s a e 3SLS analysis o each models. The ou comes lead o he ollowing implica ions. In model 1, he coe i cien o di idend payou s (DPO) a io (-0.711) is also nega i e and signi i can a one pe cen . This con i ms he simul aneous de e mina ion o di idend and le e age. Consequen ly, we also claimed ha i ms use le e age and di idend as al e na i e moni o ing de ices. In o he wo ds, i ms paying highe di idends i nd deb a less a ac i e sou ce o i nancing (Ogden & Wu, 2013). Mo eo e , i ms wi h highe i nancial cos s a e no eady o pay di idends. A highe i m le e age will lowe he po en ial di idend payou o sha eholde s (T uong & Heaney, 2007). The le e age o i ms (LEV) is nega i ely ela ed o ins i u ional owne ship and he esul EM_1_2019.indd 176EM_1_2019.indd 176 8.3.2019 9:16:268.3.2019 9:16:26 177 1, XXII, 2019 Finance is highly signi i can . This esul shows ha ins i u ional owne s, ega dless o hei ype, a e hesi an o in es subs an ial s akes in i ms ha a e highly le e aged. This nega i e and signi i can ela ionship also suppo s he a gumen ha ins i u ional owne s may ac as a subs i u e o he moni o ing ole o deb in he capi al s uc u e o i ms (Moh’d e al., 1998; Chung & Wang, 2014). In his pe spec i e, he eluc ance o ins i u ional owne s o in es in highly le e aged i ms may be due o hei in en ion o a oid isk (C u chley e al., 1999). The p o i abili y o a i m is also nega i ely ela ed o he i m’s le e age, and he coe i cien is signi i can a 95%. This esul is in line wi h he pecking o de heo y (Mye s & Majlu , 1984), sugges ing a nega i e ela ion due o he eliance o i ms’ in e nally gene a ed unds. Essen ially, i ms’ size has a posi i e ole in de e mining he le el o le e age. Consequen ly, bigge i ms a e mo e le e aged han smalle ones. The sales g ow h has posi i e and signi i can esul s, as claimed Al-Najja and Taylo (2008). These i ndings con adic agency heo y, suppo ing he nega i e ela ion be ween Va iables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3) Cons an 1.3430*** -0.00467 -0.0001 SE -0.3358 -0.0093 -0.0001 INV -0.0009 -0.0000 SE -0.0010 0.0000 LEV -0.00010 0.0000 SE -0.0002 0.0000 DY 0.0000 SE -0.0005 DPO -0.711*** -0.711*** 0.0744*** 0.0744*** SE -0.1402 -0.1402 -0.0039 -0.0039 INST -0.0041*** -0.0041*** 0.0008* 0.0008* -0.0003 SE -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 ROE -0.0154*** -0.0154*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** -0.0000 SE -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Size 0.1827*** 0.1827*** -.00006 -.0000 SE -0.0261 -0.0261 -0.0007 0.0000 SALES_GR 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** SE -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 TANG -0.4372*** -0.4372*** 0.0022 0.0001** 0.0001** SE -0.1808 -0.1808 -0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0001 Age -0.2489 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** SE -0.1857 -0.0051 -0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 Adj. R-squa ed 0.1030 0.3213 0.0580 Chi-Sq. 172.29*** 710.87*** 92.70*** Hausman Tes S a is ics: Chi-Sq.= 1.41, P ob.>Chi-Sq.= 0.9941 Sou ce: own based on (S a e Bank o Pakis an, 2018) and au ho ’s own calcula ions No e: *** deno es 1%, ** 5% and * 10% le el o signi i cance. SE is obus s anda d e o . Model 1, 2 and 3 co esponds o equa ions 1, 2 and 3 espec i ely. Tab. 1: Resul s o 3SLS Reg essions Based on Equa ion 1, 2 and 3 EM_1_2019.indd 177EM_1_2019.indd 177 8.3.2019 9:16:268.3.2019 9:16:26 178 2019, XXII, 1 Finance owne ship and g ow h due o ac ha g owing i ms end no o ans e hei weal h o c edi o s. Thus, angibili y has a nega i e and signi i can ela ionship wi h le e age. The nega i e ela ion can be a ibu ed o he p esence o ins i u ional o block-holde owne ship which esul s in close ies wi h lende s, hus educing he need o mo e colla e al (Deesomsak e al., 2004). The esul s o second models highligh ha he coe i cien o in es men (INV) and deb (LEV) wi h di idend is al hough nega i e, bu insigni i can in ou models. Thus, he coe i cien s o ins i u ional owne ship (INST) a e posi i ely and signi i can ly co ela ed wi h di idend yield (DY). The eason o inc eased di idend le els can be he ole o ins i u ional sha eholde o ing igh s o highe di idends o enhance manage ial moni o ing (Fa inha, 2002). Thus, one uni inc ease in p o i abili y a ios inc eased he le el o di idends. This suppo s ha mo e p o i able i ms wi h ce e is pa ibus highe le els o ins i u ional owne ship end o pay mo e di idends han he less ones (T uong & Heaney, 2007). Examining he signi i can con ol a iables, only Age shows a posi i e and subs an ial coe i cien a 1%. These i ndings consis en wi h he i ndings o Thana awee (2012) ega ding he i ms’ endency o paying inc eased di idends. Ne e heless, he ela ionship o ins i u ional owne ship (INST) and he i m’s in es men (INV), as sugges ed by he hi d model, is nega i e. Al hough he esul is s a is ically insigni i can , he nega i e coe i cien is in acco dance wi h he i ndings o Richa dson (2006). The sho e m ocus o ins i u ional in es o s may cons ain he manage o educe in es men (Bushee, 1998) o a oid misp icing caused by disappoin ed ins i u ional in es o s’ selling. The posi i e and signi i can ela ion be ween age and in es men a iables also p o ides suppo o he same p oposi ion. The coe i cien o angibili y is signi i can and posi i e, indica ing ha capi al-in ensi e i ms a e s ill in he p ocess o expansion. The same phenomenon is con i med by he signi i can and posi i e ela ionship be ween sales g ow h and in es men . The esul s indica e high sales g ow h equi es he i m o place mo e money in expansion o p ojec /p oduc ion acili ies. This consequence co esponds o he i ndings o Jensen e al. (1992). Howe e , he e is no e idence o simul anei y in di idend and in es men decisions o i ms, bu esul s a e seemed o consis en wi h he i ndings o Fama (1974). Tab. 2 demons a es he esul s o simul aneous equa ions whe e indus y speci i c dummies a e inco po a ed in o he model. The omi ed con ol dummy a iable ep esen s Enginee ing, which becomes a e e ence o all o he indus ies. All he epo ed esul s emain he same in e ms o hei sign and signi i cance, wi h some excep ions. The coe i cien o age in he i s le e age (LEV) model becomes signi i can a e he addi ion o dummies. In o he wo ds, one uni inc ease in age o i ms seemed o dec ease deb o equi y a io. The e o e, ageing i ms a e less le e ed in Pakis an. Thus, he nega i e impac o ins i u ional owne ship on i ms’ le e age becomes mo e p onounced a e including indus y speci i c dummies. O e all esul s a e consis en wi h bo h analyses, sugges ing ha he speci i ca ions o ou models a e obus . The explana o y in l uence o he models has also inc eased a e including indus y speci i c a iables. Va iables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3) Cons an 1.104*** -0.0180* -0.00006 SE -0.3623 -0.0101 -0.0001 LEV -0.00007 -0.0000 SE -0.0002 0.0000 INV -0.0006 0.0000 SE 0.0010 0.0000 DY -0.0005 SE -0.0006 Tab. 2: Resul s o 3SLS Reg essions wi h sec o al dummies (Pa 1) EM_1_2019.indd 178EM_1_2019.indd 178 8.3.2019 9:16:268.3.2019 9:16:26 179 1, XXII, 2019 Finance Va iables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3) DPO -0.5715*** -0.5715*** 0.0820*** 0.0820*** SE -0.1447 -0.1447 -0.0040 -0.0040 INST -0.0044*** -0.0044*** 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0000 SE -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ROE -0.0147*** -0.0147*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0000 SE -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Size 0.2043*** 0.2043*** -0.0000 -0.000005 SE -0.0286 -0.0286 -0.0008 0.0000 SALES_GR 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** SE -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TANG -0.4607** -.4607** 0.0002 0.0001*** 0.0001*** SE -0.1902 -0.1902 -0.0053 -0.0001 -0.0001 Age -0.3422* -0.3422* 0.0135** 0.0135** 0.0053* 0.0053* SE -0.1919 -0.1919 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0001 -0.0001 CHEM -0.1604 -.00431 0.0000 SE -0.1609 -0.0045 -0.0001 CONS -0.2422 -0.0018 -0.0001* -0.0001* SE -0.2012 -0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0001 PAPER 0.1432 0.0036 -0.000015 SE -0.2423 -0.0068 -0.0001 ENERGY 0.3315 0.0036 -0.0000 SE -0.2067 -0.0058 -0.0001 FOOD 0.5973*** 0.5973*** 0.0112** 0.01120** -0.0001** -0.0001** SE -0.1606 -0.1606 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0001 -0.0001 PERSONAL 0.3197** 0.3197** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** -0.0000 SE -0.1469 -0.1469 -0.0041 -0.0041 0.0000 MISC -0.6593*** -0.6593*** 0.0063 -0.0000 SE -0.2168 -0.2168 -0.0061 -0.0001 Adj. R-squa ed 0.1479 0.3486 0.0711 Chi-Sq. 260.66*** 803.53*** 112.85*** Hausman Tes S a is ics: Chi-Sq.= 1.31, P obabili y > Chi-Sq.=1.00 Sou ce: based on (S a e Bank o Pakis an, 2018) and au ho ’s calcula ions No es: *** deno es 1%, ** 5% and * 10% le el o signi i cance. SE is obus s anda d e o . Models co espond o he equa ions (1, 2 and 3) a e inco po a ing indus y dummies espec i ely. CHEM is chemical indus y; CONS is cons uc i- on and ma e ial indus y; PAPER is pape & boa d indus y; ENERG is uel and ene gy sec o ; FOOD is ood p oduce indus y; PERSONAL is pe sonal goods indus y and MISC is miscellaneous indus ies. Tab. 2: Resul s o 3SLS Reg essions wi h sec o al dummies (Pa 2) EM_1_2019.indd 179EM_1_2019.indd 179 8.3.2019 9:16:278.3.2019 9:16:27 180 2019, XXII, 1 Finance Essen ially, addi ional ime dummies a e added o cap u e he e ec s o pa icula yea s a ec s he di idend equa ion. As a esul , he size o i ms (Size), he sales g ow h (SALES_ GR) and angibili y (TANG), which we e p e iously insigni i can , a e subs an ial wi h he di idend model now, as epo ed in Tab. 3. Namely, i he sales g ow h is inc eased mo e di idends seemed o pay o s ockholde s. Howe e , i he e is one uni inc ease in size and angibili y o i ms less disbu semen a e pu chased o he owne s. These esul s a e simila wi h (Lin & Chang, 2011) i ndings. Gene ally, ou esul s in he case o LEV and INV ha e less changed and emained insigni i can in he second and hi d ables, sugges ing he obus ness o he esul s. Adjus ed R-squa ed alues o DY and INV ha e inc eased, as well. A he bo om o each epo ed ables a e he app op ia ed adjus ed R-squa ed and Chi-squa e alues. Mo eo e , addi ional Hausman es s a e also epo ed a each able ega ding 3SLS analysis. These s a is ics a e pe o med o analyze he expec ed di e ence be ween he coe i cien s using 2SLS and 3SLS me hods. The epo ed alues o hem a e 1.37, 1.39 and 0.69 espec i ely. These coe i cien s a e insigni i can in all models, and indica ing no signi i can di e ence be ween he wo models o pa icula se s o sys em (Bal agi, 2008). P e ious s udies (Chang e al., 2016) also con i med ha he p esence o ou lie s a ec s he o e all explana o y powe o he examined model. This 3SLS me hod applied on he ‘winso ized’ da ase o elimina e he e ec o ex eme alues esul s in inconsis ency (Wilson, 1993). A e emo ing hese ou lie s, he esul s ecen ly show imp o ed explana o y powe . Howe e , gene al conclusions a e gi en only i u he de e minan s will be aken in o conside a ion o de e mine hei e ec s on i ms’ s a egic decision-making. The e o e, he alidi y o ou esul s is limi ed by he bias caused by he exclusion o he omi ed a iables o ou models. Va iables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3) Cons an 0.7010* 0.0442*** -0.0006*** SE -0.3699 -0.0096 -0.0001 LEV 0.0001 -0.0000 SE -0.0002 0.0000 INV -0.0011 0.0000 SE -0.0010 0.0000 DY 0.0004 SE -0.0006 DPO -0.8026*** -0.8026*** 0.0759*** 0.0759*** SE -0.1401 -0.1401 -0.0036 -0.0036 INST -0.0049*** -0.0049*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000 SE -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ROE -0.0152*** -0.0152*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0000 SE -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Size 0.2131*** 0.2131*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0000 SE -0.0267 -0.0267 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0000 SALES_GR 0.0008 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** SE -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 TANG -0.610 -0.0097** -0.0097** 0.0001** 0.0001** SE -0.1819 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0001 -0.0001 Tab. 3: Resul s o 3SLS Reg essions wi h ime dummies (Pa 1) EM_1_2019.indd 180EM_1_2019.indd 180 8.3.2019 9:16:278.3.2019 9:16:27 187 1, XXII, 2019 Finance DY LEV INV INST ROE Size TANG S_GR Age DPO DY 1 LEV -0.21*** 1 INV -0.05* 0.055** 1 INST 0.062** -0.048* -0.013 1 ROE 0.380*** -0.23*** -0.019 -0.006 1 Size 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.094 0.15*** 0.20*** 1 TANG -0.171*** 0.047* 0.045* 0.009 -0.23*** 0.03 1 S_GR 0.063** 0.011 0.22*** 0.009 0.165*** 0.11 -0.022 1 Age 0.092*** -0.04 0.042 -0.014 0.094*** 0.036 -0.17*** 0.01 1 DPO 0.511*** -0.174 -0.029 .061** 0.310*** 0.15*** -0.23*** -0.003 0.02 1 Sou ce: own based on (S a e Bank o Pakis an, 2018) and au ho ’s own es ima ions No e: Co ela ion is signi i can * a 0.10 le el, ** a 0.05 le el, *** a 0.01 le el Tab. A.3: Co ela ion ma ix o he examined a iables EM_1_2019.indd 187EM_1_2019.indd 187 8.3.2019 9:16:288.3.2019 9:16:28 188 2019, XXII, 1 Finance Abs ac INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SIMULTANEITY OF STRATEGIC FINANCIAL DECISIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN STOCK EXCHANGE Rabeea Sada , Judi Oláh, Józse Popp, Domicián Má é The adi ional in e p e a ion o co po a e i nance is cha ac e ized by owne ship igh s a e widely dis ibu ed among indi idual s ockholde s, bu can be managed by ew manage s and esul ed in an agency p oblem. The p ima y objec i e o his esea ch s udy is o in es iga e he ela ionship be ween ins i u ional owne ship and i ms’ s a egic decisions. These s a egic decisions include i.e. le e age, di idend and in es men decisions. The examined da a is used om 170 non- i nancial Pakis ani lis ed i ms, cha ac e ized by a la ge pe cen age o ins i u ional in es o s, wi h a mul iple equi y s ake in di e en i ms ac oss a wide i eld o indus ies. This s udy is also able o show wo impo an no el ies. Fi s ly, he ac ha p e ious esea che s ha e al eady concen a ed on he impac o ins i u ional owne ship on indi idual s a egic decisions, as di idend o le e age policies and se e al unanswe ed ques ions emain. Consequen ly, he impac o ins i u ional owne ship has explo ed collec i ely on a ious s a egic decisions. Secondly, his s udy also ecognizes he de e mina ion o s a egic decisions by conside ing he endogenei y p oblem wi h a Th ee-S age Leas Squa e (3SLS) me hod. Essen ially, he e ec s o ins i u ional owne ship on i ms’ le e age becomes mo e p onounced a e including indus y speci i c and ime dummies in eg ession models. Based on he esul s, he case o inc eased ins i u ional owne ship o i ms has a signi i can nega i e e ec on le e age, and a posi i e e ec on di idend decisions. Hence, ins i u ional in es o s a e seemed o p e e low le e aged and high di idend-paying i ms. Mo eo e , his s udy has no able o i nd signi i can wo-way ela ions be ween ins i u ional owne ship and in es men decisions, so ins i u ional in es o s a he ocus on co po a e go e nance and in e nal con ol o i ms. Indeed, ins i u ional in es o s should de elop he e i ciency o i ms’ managemen o suppo mo e adequa e co po a e go e nance policies, and no only o eme ging ma ke s. Key Wo ds: S a egic decisions, endogenei y, ins i u ional owne ship, 3SLS. JEL Classi i ca ion: G31, G32, G11. DOI: 10.15240/ ul/001/2019-1-012 EM_1_2019.indd 188EM_1_2019.indd 188 8.3.2019 9:16:288.3.2019 9:16:28