Russia and the European security order revisited : from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpep21 European Politics and Society ISSN: 2374-5118 (Print) 2374-5126 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep21 Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war Tuomas Forsberg To cite this article: Tuomas Forsberg (2019) Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war, European Politics and Society, 20:2, 154-171, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 30 Nov 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 750 View Crossmark data Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war Tuomas Forsberg a,b a Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland; b Tampere University, Tampere, Finland ABSTRACT Russia’s role in the international order is often explained with reference to historical examples, analogies and longue durée trends. This article examines Russia’s role in, and visions of, the international order from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Cold War. The article also discusses the lessons, and perhaps also the wrong lessons, that the current Russian leadership and elite have drawn on the basis of past grand bargains. It concludes that in the course of history, there has been more variation than continuity in Russia’s policy towards the European security system and, moreover, that the post-Cold War security order in Europe was not imposed on Russia during the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. KEYWORDS Russia; international order; security order; European security 1. Introduction Russia’s role in and views on the international order is an old topic, but it has become relevant again in the context of the debates over the fate of the post-Cold War liberal international order. Since the Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s role in the European security system has been a particularly contested issue (see, e.g. Clunan, 2018; Hill, 2018; Jankovski, 2017; Kanet, 2018; Morozov, 2015; Radin & Reach, 2017; Romanova, 2018; Sakwa, 2017; Voskressenski, 2016). At the risk of oversimplification, one can distinguish between three positions in the ongoing debate: for some, Russia is a revolutionary or revisionist power intent upon destroying the present order; for others, it is an anti-reformist conservative force seeking to restore order; and for still others, it lies somewhere in between and seeks only minor adjustments (for an overview, see the introductory article by Götz and Merlen, 2018). Although assessments of Russia’s role in the European security order are politically sensitive, classifying states and their strategies in accordance with certain categories has been part and parcel of the study of International Relations from the beginning, and is also common in historical studies of Russian and Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, many scholars and pundits contend that history plays an essential role in today’s struggle over the © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. CONTACT Tuomas Forsberg tuomas.forsberg@helsinki.fiHelsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, PB 4 (Fabianinkatu 24), Helsinki FIN-00014, Finland EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 2019, VOL. 20, NO. 2, 154–171 https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 international order. The past provides us with many analogies for the present. Moreover, past experiences motivate states in their attempts to shape the international order, and some may also perceive perennial historical trends –particularly in Russia’s attitude towards the global order –which explain the Kremlin’s current behaviour (Kotkin, 2016; Rieber, 2007). Hence, it is important to examine the role played by Russia and its visions of the international order during past centuries. In revisiting such history, this article focuses on major peace conferences and summits where principles guiding the international order have been negotiated. Many generalisations concerning Russia’s world order policy can and have been made on the basis of history. Numerous observers argue that Russia’s approach to security governance represents a state-centric worldview and emphasises great-power management and multipolarity rather than liberal principles (see, e.g. Chebankova, 2017; Kobayashi, 2017; MacFarlane, 2003; Makarychev, 2009; Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2017). It is also widely understood that Russia wants to be part of the international society (Aalto, 2007). However, views differ on the degree to which Russia has promoted general principles, or just its narrow self-interests. The Russian view, as Putin (2013) has argued, is that Russia’s‘winning strength in critical junctures such as Vienna or Yalta has manifested in generosity and justice.’Others see Russia as merely being guided by parochial self-interest in these and similar situations. Some argue that tempting opportunities prompt Russia’s greed (Mastny, 1979, p. 7), while others believe that when Russia is recognised as a great power it tends to act more cooperatively (Tsygankov, 2012). Although Russia’s views on the international order and its attempts to shape it have been much discussed, there are several reasons for revisiting the issue. First, existing research is always anachronistic to a certain degree as new questions arise when new contrasts are presented. New narratives and myths start to live a life of their own if historical turning points and trends are not critically explored. Second, new material is emerging related to the post-Cold War era and hence the period merits much closer and systematic attention than has been possible thus far. Third, in light of the recent debates in social theory focusing on microfoundations (see, e.g. Kertzer, 2017), it is important to rethink the question of order from the perspective of agency, without which the impact of structural forces cannot be understood (Wendt, 1987). In this way, we can see how the creation and deterioration of order is related to diplomatic practice, interpretation and (mis)perception, rather than resulting simply from structural forces or rational choices based on national interests, however they are defined. In this article, I examine Russia’s role in the evolving European security order firstly from a historical perspective, beginning with some theoretical and conceptual notes. In the second section, I provide a macro-historical analysis of Russia’s role from the Napoleonic Wars to the Yalta Conference, while the third section deals more specifically with the formation of the post-Cold War order in Europe after the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The sources consist mainly of secondary research literature with regard to the earlier centuries, but I have also used material retrieved from the archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1989 to 1993 as far as the immediate post-Cold War era is concerned. Both the space constraints of this article and the challenge of studying each historical juncture in detail following the strict principles of critical historiography mean that the narrative presented here remains sketchy. The available evidence is sufficient, however, to demonstrate EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 155 that there has been significant variation in Russia’s overall strategy concerning international order. 2. Theoretical background and research design Russia’s role in the European security order needs to be discussed within a larger theoretical framework. Realists, liberals and constructivists differ in their views on how international order in general and the European security order in particular is created and recreated. Simply put, realists emphasise the role of power, liberals the preferences of key players and the overall framing of deals as win-win situations, and constructivists stress the role of shared beliefs and principles. The end of the Cold War is crucial here because realists see it simply as a power shift, liberals as the domestic political transformation of the Soviet Union, whereas constructivists insist that it depended on changing beliefs considering normative principles rather than coercion or trade-off. Shared beliefs do not necessarily lead to the best possible security order, however. Moreover, once accepted, beliefs start to become rather rigid and are not open to bargaining (see, e.g. Sarotte, 2009). With regard to changes in power relations, an important issue is the ability to conceive of power as a social construction too. In negotiations, power depends on perceptions and shared beliefs rather than directly on material conditions. Thus, psychological factors such as perceptions and emotions are regarded as a necessary layer here, without which the structural conditions would not have any explanatory power (see, e.g. Jervis, 2016). The theoretical perspectives also differ in terms of the overall historical evolution of international security orders. Realists believe that, in the long run, there is no qualitative improvement in the nature of international order. Development is more cyclical than linear (Clark, 1989). In contrast, liberals (and many constructivists too) believe that the overall evolution of international order has been, despite occasional setbacks, towards a more progressive system encompassing a wider and more just set of principles (Ikenberry, 2000). In relation to today’s problems, one should ask whether there has been a steady growth in liberal principles constituting the international order, not solely tied to the US leadership, and what kind of underlying deeper forces have driven the progress through the centuries and have now apparently ceased to have an effect. Are the current problems of the liberal order determined by political, economic, technological and cultural trends? Or can they be ascribed to more contingent variables, such as leaders, diverse domestic political factors and other ephemeral issues? At this juncture, we should also consider the role of historical memory in creating and accepting security orders. Security orders are usually created on the basis of past experiences, seeking to avoid the mistakes of the previous order, rather than being constructed from scratch. But the lessons learned are often more national than international. This is particularly relevant in the case of Russia, since historical lessons very strongly pervade current reasoning (see, e.g. Cox, 2014). For this reason, we need to look at the ‘history of lessons’along with lessons of history (Rasmussen, 2003). Russia has been both a maker as well as a taker of the rules upon which the international order is based. Realists would therefore assert that when Russia has been negotiating over or attempted to influence the European security order, the key has been its self-interest and its success has mainly been contingent upon its relative power position. 156 T. FORSBERG Yet self-interest is an elusive concept. The ‘self’can be defined as ‘the Kremlin’,‘the Russian state’or, more broadly, as covering the imperial ‘self’beyond the borders of the existing nation-state, perhaps even encompassing humanity as a whole. Interests, moreover, can be short-term and myopic or long-term and enlightened. Or, as Arnold Wolfers (1965, pp. 73–74) famously pointed out, states can define their key goals reflecting narrow self-centric aims (possession goals) or wider general visions (milieu goals). It is important to note here that the latter are not necessarily liberal and the former not necessarily realist. Finally, there are manifold ways of categorising state policies related to international order in the existing literature. Kalevi Holsti (1991, p. 348), for example, identifies three strategies for forging major peace settlements and postwar orders: domination, balance of power, and transformation of the system. Jeffrey Legro (2005, pp. 8–10) distinguishes between three great-power strategies for international order: revisionist, integrationist, and separatist. Brian Rathbun (2014)differentiates between a variety of diplomatic styles, ranging from coercive statecraft to more cooperative dialogue. In keeping with such conceptual categories, Russia’s role in, and perception of, the international order can be compared to other great powers. At the same time, it can also be analysed in terms of historical continuity and variation. The question thus is: When looking at Russia’s policy towards the European security order in the past as well as today, is it possible to discern any pattern on this basis? In the next section, I will examine Russia’s key objectives towards international security arrangements, institutions and principles at major historical junctures, addressing how narrowly or broadly they were defined and what kind of lessons Russians have drawn from these historical events. 3. Russia and the historical evolution of the European order Russia was not a party to the Westphalian peace treaties constituting the European state system nor the Peace of Utrecht after the Spanish succession wars. Instead, it fought first the Ingrian and then the Great Northern War against Sweden and participated in the three partitions of Poland with Prussia and Austria in the late eighteenth century. Subsequently, it became one of the key actors in the Vienna Congress system after the Napoleonic Wars. Similarly, Russia –or Soviet Russia –once again did not take part in the negotiations over the European security order after WWI, but re-entered the European security system in the 1920s and then played a key role in the formation of the post-WWII –that is, the Cold War – security order. It is interesting to revisit this history since it offers many clues for analysing the present situation. Although this has been done to some extent already (see Tsygankov, 2012), there are plenty of questions that can be asked anew. The objective of this article is not only to create an accurate factual account in light of the latest research literature, but also to look at Russian interpretations and the role they have played in the recent Russian debate over the European security order. The Napoleonic Wars provide a good jumping-offpoint. The Tilsit Peace Treaty of 1807 signed by Alexander I and Napoleon is an intriguing historical event, not least because it resembles the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and can also serve as a reference point for any present bilateral peace deals between Russia and Western powers. Russia initiated the peace talks because the French cavalry had reached the Prussian-Russian border in Tilsit (Sovetsk) and the Russians were not prepared to fight after they had been defeated by the French in the Battle of EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 157 Friedland (near today’s Kaliningrad). Although Alexander had already stymied plans for a far-reaching peace system in Europe based on enlightenment thinking, at Tilsit the primary object was an honourable peace for Russia (Rey, 2012, p. 154, 181). Alexander apprised Napoleon of the fact that an alliance between France and Russia would ‘ensure the happiness and tranquility of the world’(quoted in Cavendish, 2007). Napoleon concurred because he saw the opportunity to stabilise his dominant position in central Europe and isolate Britain. The peace talks between the emperors, famously conducted on a raft in the middle of the boundary river, led to a treaty in which Russia agreed to join the blockade aimed at destroying Britain’s commerce by closing its ports to British ships and neutral ships engaged in British trade. Alexander also pledged to wage war against Sweden and to force it to join the continental system. Although Alexander was relieved about the outcome of the summit, many Russians regarded France and the alliance with Napoleon with suspicion. Indeed, the Tilsit Treaty soon became unpopular in Russia. Although Russia succeeded in conquering Finland from Sweden, domestic pressure grew because of trade restrictions and the resulting economic losses. Two years after the treaty, Alexander opened Russian ports to neutral ships, as he started to believe that no treaty with Napoleon would last. This led Napoleon to declare war against Russia and invade it in June 1812 –against the advice of his generals. The rest is history. Although the Tilsit peace treaty was viewed as being tantamount to treason at the time, it is much more positively assessed in contemporary Russia. For example, Russian Academy of Sciences historian S. N. Iskyul (2015) wrote that Alexander I never wanted peace with France but signed the Tilsit treaties only to gather strength for a new war. The traditional view that the Continental Blockade caused an economic crisis for Russia has also been challenged recently (Tchoudinov, 2015). After Napoleon was defeated, Russia –or rather Alexander I –became the driving force in negotiating and creating a new European security order at the Congress of Vienna. His intentions are often depicted as admirable in Russian historiography: ‘He wished that all men could help each other like brothers, assisting one another in their mutual needs, and that free commerce could be the underlying bond of society’, but it was also said that he ‘lacked the necessary conviction and determination’(Zamoyski, 2008). Despite some liberal principles, the aim was conservative, namely to restore peace and establish a balance-of-power system in Europe, to prevent France from rising to a dominant position again, to contain nationalism and to manage emerging crises in concert with the other European powers (see, e.g. Kissinger, 1957; Kimerling Wirtschafter, 2015; Mitzen, 2013). Moreover, the congress discussed values based on the Christian faith, which were close to the heart of the Russian Tsar. Alexander’s initiatives led to the establishment of the Holy Alliance, a multilateral treaty between the leaders of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The Concert of Europe, by contrast, was a less ideologically driven alliance of the great powers –Austria, Prussia, Russia, the United Kingdom as well as France –which focused on international conference diplomacy to manage emerging crises. It is little wonder that the Congress of Vienna and the European great-power concert is very often seen as the epitome of a functioning European security system in Russia. As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2016) put it, ‘Russia became a saviour of the international system’at the Vienna congress, the formation of which ‘led to development of the continent without serious military conflicts for 40 years.’Sergey Karaganov (2015), one of the 158 T. FORSBERG leading foreign-policy pundits in Russia, has elevated the Vienna system as something worth emulating. He stresses that the main reason why the Congress of Vienna worked was that the postwar arrangement was relatively fair and did not humiliate France in defeat. Another prominent expert, Fyodor Lukyanov (2014), nostalgically believes that the nineteenth-century concert system bears something of a resemblance to the lost city of Atlantis. For him, the Ukraine crisis is ‘indicative that what is needed is precisely a genuine professional diplomacy in the spirit of the nineteenth century, a diplomacy that is familiar from textbooks but whose actual practice has been virtually forgotten.’ In these interpretations of history, too much weight may be given to the importance of the Congress of Vienna, however. After all, the settlement was ‘less carved in stone than might seem the case’(Vick, 2014, p. 333). Moreover, the congress system failed because memories of the war faded and national rivalries as well as the forces of nationalism and liberalism started to grow. The congress attempted to set up institutional cooperation but was based on ambiguities, and the institutional structure was flimsy. It was followed by a more informal concert system that did not aspire to be a governing body (Jarrett, 2014, pp. 363–369). Undeniably, the congress system was successful in managing many crises and preventing a major war between the great powers. On the other hand, it legitimised military measures against otherwise peaceful nationalist uprisings. Hence, the track record of the congress system is more mixed and not the unmitigated success story that many Russians politicians and pundits make it out to be. The Crimean War (1853–56), pitting an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain and Sardinia against Russia, was the first major conflict in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. From the Russian perspective, still often expressed today, the other powers wanted to weaken Russia and prevent it from expanding to the East and South. In Russia, the war is also seen as an outcome of a clash of civilisations because Russia’s right to protect the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire was at stake (Vakulova, 2016). Russian historians hold that the Paris Peace Treaty that ended the war destroyed the Vienna system, created an imbalance in Europe and generated opportunities for unpredictable political improvisation, which ultimately led to WWI (Sidorov, 2016). The terms of the peace after the Crimean War were harsh, but Russia was capable of negotiating some substantial changes in order to ‘save the dignity of the country’(Temperley, 1932, p. 401). The West was not unified: France was hoping for rapprochement with Russia whereas ‘Britain demonstrated her immutable enmity to Russia’(Baumgart, 1981, p. 203). Although the war is often seen by Western historians as a useful trigger for Alexander II’s modernisation efforts in Russia, contemporary Russian historians seldom emphasise Russia’s weakness. Quite the opposite, the war is seen not as a defeat but as a moral and religious victory in a conflict that was fought for a just and honourable cause against the West (Figes, 2010, p. 492). Moreover, parallels between the post-Crimean War context and the post-Cold War setting are often acknowledged. Foreign ministers Primakov, Ivanov and Lavrov have all regarded Gorchakov as a source of inspiration and a restorer of Russian great-power status by conducting a flexible foreign policy (Glasser, 2013; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002). It is also worth noting here that Gorchakov recognised wider interests. In fact, Russia was in the forefront of developing humanitarian law at the time, for example initiating the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868 renouncing the use of explosive bullets and later international peace conferences concerning disarmament, the laws of war and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Multatuli, 2017). EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 159 Russia was not part of the Versailles Peace Treaty which ended the First World War in 1919, although ‘the Russian question’was part of the discussions (Kennan, 1960/61). Lenin (1920) strongly condemned the treaty, not so much because Russian interests were ignored, but because ‘Germany cannot exist from the economic standpoint following the Peace of Versailles’that was imposed upon it. Although the goal of the Bolsheviks was world revolution, the Soviet Union subsequently became a champion of a collective security system in Europe (Haslam, 1984). The most famous figure advocating a treaty system geared towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts and disarmament was the diplomat and subsequent foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, who was instrumental in making the Soviet Union a party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The system, however, proved weak when German aggression grew. Still, from the Russian point of view, as Lavrov (2016) has argued, the policies of Great Britain and France were short-sighted and anti-Russian, so they too should be blamed.The fact that Russia was not a party to the Versailles Peace Treaty is seen as another shortcoming (Utkin, 2009). From the perspective of the present-day discussion in Russia, the lessons to be learnt from Versailles in 1919 are that the defeated should not be treated too harshly, and that Russia should not be excluded from the negotiating table. The security system created after the Second World War is another much-discussed historical precedent. The Congress of Yalta in February 1945 is the famous point of reference here –‘one of the most powerful in Russian historiography’(Sakwa, 2016, p. 13). Hosted by Joseph Stalin, the two other participants were US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The purpose was to discuss what shape the European security system should take, but the focus was really on the fate of Germany rather than that of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Union promised to join the war against Japan in the Pacific theatre, which was the main goal of the United States. Indeed, it is a frequent misconception that the parties aimed to divide Europe into spheres of influence. That did not happen. The British were not willing to agree to granting Stalin a free hand with regard to Poland, although discussions on how power would be shared in Eastern Europe had been held between the Soviets and the British earlier. While Churchill had already accepted the Curzon Line in principle, he still hoped that the Polish exile government in London would be somehow involved in determining the future of Poland (Harbutt, 2010, p. 286). Stalin insisted that the border changes in eastern Poland were non-negotiable and stressed that the Polish government should be amicable towards the Soviet Union. He nevertheless promised that free elections would be held in Poland after the war. The promise was not worth much as the Red Army had already occupied the country and much of Eastern Europe (Mastny, 1979). The ‘Yalta system’effectively emerged only after the war when the Western allies recognised the communist-led governments in the Eastern European states. The Yalta agreement duly appeared to be a classic trade-offbetween the parties. Yet historians have debated how good the trade-offwas from the Western point of view. Critics have pointed out that the Soviets would likely have joined the war against Japan in any case and, when they did so, as agreed at Yalta three months after the surrender of Germany, it was when the war was already over in practice. Moreover, if the promise of free elections was part of the deal, it was a promise that was not kept. There was, however, the collective aim of showing unity –‘a harmonious image of the meeting – though for very different reasons’: Roosevelt’s reasons were more ideological and 160 T. FORSBERG Stalin’s more pragmatic (Harbutt, 2010, p. 286). Yet the meeting was not devoid of shared moral principles: Stalin reiterated that the Soviet Union had suffered more than the other allies as a result of the war, and should therefore have a greater say in the peace negotiations, a sentiment with which the Western leaders largely concurred. The Yalta Conference is regarded as a success by many Russians today, as it created a lasting peace. If there is nostalgia for Vienna, there is a certain nostalgia for Yalta, too. Putin (2015) has regarded Yalta as an exemplar of building a coalition of anti-terrorist forces in today’s world in the same way as ‘the countries that defeated Nazism united in their efforts to lay solid foundations for the post-war world order.’At Valdai 2014, Putin (2014) said that ‘if there is a will, we can restore the effectiveness of the international and regional institutions system’. He contended that, we do not even need to build anything anew, from scratch; this is not a “greenfield”, especially since the institutions created after World War II are quite universal and can be given modern substance, adequate to manage the current situation. In a speech at the UN General Assembly in 2015, Putin (2015) argued that the UN must be consistent with the ‘natural transformation’of the world, but considered attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. For Lavrov (2016), the Cold War system was not perfect because it was based on rivalry, although it nevertheless guaranteed peace. In his view, the security order based on the division of spheres of interest between the blocks was sustainable, but as soon as the USSR collapsed, chaos emerged again in international politics. To sum up, no clear pattern of Russian thinking and policy regarding the international order is apparent other than the emphasis on its own great-power status. However, strategies and diplomatic styles have varied. Russia has displayed a more collective interest in terms of ‘milieu goals’, as was the case at the Congress of Vienna, as well as more narrowly defined self-interests in terms of ‘possession goals’, as at Yalta. Hence, the degree of collective interest does not directly depend upon Russia’s relative power position since in both cases Russia was near the peak of its relative power in the international system. When weak, Russia has sometimes focused on possession goals, as after the Crimean war in 1856, but it could also adopt a wider ‘milieu’perspective, for example when Gorbachev was engaged in negotiating the terms of the post-Cold War order, to which I will turn now. 4. The emergence of the post-cold war security order in Europe and Russia At the heart of contemporary debates about a new security order in Europe is the simple but important question: what went wrong with the post-Cold War order? There is a general understanding that the order created at the end of the Cold War has not worked perfectly, but there are deep disagreements concerning the roots and key factors leading to this failure, not to mention how to remedy the situation. Competing narratives have been created and recreated (Zellner, 2017). Historians are still getting up to speed on this era, partly because most of the key archives are still closed (and internet sources are scarce). Reasons for revisiting the era, particularly the years 1990–94 before the first round of NATO enlargement, are therefore abundant. From the Russian perspective, the immediate post-Cold War years represent an era of weakness that the Western powers exploited. The 1990s are painted in negative terms, EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 161 NATO, the main dividing line in Europe was not between Russia and the West but between the US and France. Western perceptions of Russia were ambivalent: while some of its actions were criticised, its many operations in the privileged sphere of interest in the area of the former Soviet Union other than the Baltic states were at least tolerated if not endorsed. Hence, the lesson of history is that one should be cautious about drawing any conclusive lessons from the past. Although historical myths may be conducive to cooperation as well as conflict, it is clear that views of Russian world order policy that are based on some transhistorical law-like driving forces are exaggerated and neglect the political context and the views and beliefs of the current leadership. Moreover, seeing the root causes of the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West in some historical developments and events in the relatively distant past is unpersuasive and potentially counterproductive, as it shifts attention away from those problems that can be addressed here and now. Acknowledgements Author would like to thank Elena Gorbacheva for research assistance and the editors, Elias Götz and Camille Merlen of this special issue as well as the reviewers for their helpful comments. 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