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Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

Abstract

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

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Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

Author: Caballé, Jordi; Panadés Martí, Judith
Publisher: Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Year: 2011
Source: https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/worpap/2011/hdl_2072_152045/87011.pdf
Tax E asion, Technology Shocks, and he Cyclicali y o
Go e nmen Re enues
Jo di Caballé
Uni e si a Au ònoma de Ba celona and MOVE
Judi h Panadés
Uni e si a Au ònoma de Ba celona and MOVE
Ma ch 7, 2011
Abs ac
This pape analyzes he beha io o he ax e enue o ou pu a io o e he busi-
ness cycle. In o de o eplica e he empi ical e idence, we de elop a simple model
combining he s anda d Ak g ow h model wi h he ax e asion phenomenon. When
indi iduals conceal pa o hei ue income om he ax au ho i y, hey ace he
isk o being audi ed and hence o paying he co esponding …ne. Unde he empi i-
cally plausible assump ions ha he in e empo al elas ici y o subs i u ion exhibi s
a su¢ cien ly small alue and ha p oduc i i y shocks a e se ially co ela ed, we
show ha he elas ici y o go e nmen e enue wi h espec o ou pu is la ge
han one, which ag ees wi h he empi ical e idence. This esul holds e en i he
ax sys em displays ‡a ax a es. We ex end he p e ious se up o gene a e la ge
…scal de…ci s when he economy expe iences a ecession.
JEL Classi…ca ion Numbe : H23, H26, O41
Keywo ds: Tax e asion, Technology shocks, G ow h
Financial suppo o bo h au ho s om he Spanish Minis y o Educa ion h ough g an ECO2009-
09847 and he Gene ali a o Ca alonia h ough g an SGR2009-00350 and, o he … s au ho om
he ICREA Academia p og am, is also g a e ully acknowledged.
Co espondence add ess: Jo di Caballe. Uni e si a Au ònoma de Ba celona. Depa amen
d’Economia i d’His ò ia Econòmica. Edi…ci B. 08193 Bella e a (Ba celona). Spain.
E-mail: jo [email protected]
1. In oduc ion
In his pape , we ollow he app oach in oduced by Kydland and P esco (1982) o
s udy he ole played by eal echnology shocks in d i ing business ‡uc ua ion. We will
ocus ou analysis on he esponse o go e nmen e enue o echnology shocks. The
beha io o go e nmen e enue o e he business cycle has ecei ed some a en ion in
he empi ical li e a u e o ecen yea s. I is well known ha economic ecessions end
o educe he ax e enue and his makes di¢ cul o go e nmen s o und hei exis ing
spending p og ams. Mo eo e , du ing expansion pe iods ax e enue inc eases and his
c ea es a new addi ional poli ical p essu e on he go e nmen o inc ease public spend-
ing. The e o e, he empi ical analysis o his ques ion ocuses on ob aining es ima es o
he income elas ici y o ax e enue in o de o …nd ou whe he ax e enues exhibi
a mo e han p opo ional esponse o ou pu ‡uc ua ions.1I is impo an o dis in-
guish be ween he long- un income elas ici y o ax e enue, which shows how e enues
will g ow o e ime as pe manen income g ows, and he sho - un income elas ici y
o ax e enue, which shows how much e enues will ‡uc ua e o e he business cycle.
Fo ins ance, Holcombe and Sobel (1997) es ima e bo h he sho - un pe sonal income
elas ici y o ax e enue and he sho - un pe sonal income elas ici y o he ax base
o U.S. s a es and …nd ha on a e age hey a e equal o 1.392 and 1.192 espec i ely.2
Hence, he a e age elas ici y es ima e sugges s ha a one pe cen inc ease in pe sonal
income should esul in a 1.4 pe cen inc ease in he ax e enue. Recen s udies by
Dye and Me iman (2004) and B uce e al. (2006) p o ide mo e accu a e es ima es
ha also suppo he idea ha he sho - un pe sonal income elas ici y o he ax base
ends o be la ge han one.
The main objec i e o his pape is o p o ide a heo e ical se up ha can be con-
sis en wi h hese empi ical …ndings. The s anda d Ak g ow h model wi h ‡a ax a es
p edic s ha he go e nmen e enue o ou pu a io emains cons an when a echnol-
ogy (o o al ac o p oduc i i y) shock akes place. Unde ‡a ax a es, a echnology
1See Dye (2004) o a e iew o his li e a u e.
2Resea che s dis inguish be ween wo ax measu es when es ima ing elas ici ies: he ax base o he
ax e enue. Tax e enue da a by he ype o ax is easily a ailable o se e al de eloped coun ies bu
hey can embed ax a e changes and his leads o a bias in he sho - un elas ici y es ima o .
1
shock a¤ec s symme ically ou pu and go e nmen e enue since go e nmen e enue
is a cons an p opo ion o ou pu . The e o e, he s anda d Ak g ow h model wi h ‡a
ax a es does no o¤e a plausible explana ion o he empi ical e idence as he alue
o he sho - un income elas ici y o ax e enue p edic ed by he model is equal o one.
The e a e se e al candida e explana ions o he high empi ical income elas ici y
o ax e enue. One ob ious explana ion consis s o dispensing wi h he assump ion
o cons an ma ginal ax a es and conside ing ins ead a p og essi e ax schedule on
income. Clea ly, as he a e age ax a es inc ease wi h income he go e nmen e enue
will inc ease mo e han he agg ega e income.
Ano he al e na i e explana ion o he high income elas ici y o go e nmen e -
enue elies on he beha io al esponses o income shocks. When he economy de e i-
o a es, indi iduals migh inc ease hei sa ings and educe consump ion, especially o
i ems like du able goods. Then, a e he economy s a s o eco e , hey migh make
some o he pu chases ha had p e iously been pu o¤ du ing he ecession. I he
go e nmen collec axes on consump ion, hen he p e ious beha io o consump ion
along he business esul s in a high elas ici y o e enue.
In his pape we p o ide an al e na i e mechanism gene a ing he desi ed pa e n
o cyclicali y o go e nmen e enue. This mechanism complemen s he p e ious ones
since elies exclusi ely on a di¤e en assump ion, namely, he exis ence o ax e asion
unde a ‡a ax a e on income. We will show ha e en his simple ax s uc u e is able
o gene a e an income elas ici y o ax e enue la ge han one unde se ially co ela ed
p oduc i i y shocks when he alue o he in e se o he in e empo al elas ici y o
subs i u ion (IES, hence o h) is la ge han one. O cou se, unde a p og essi e ax
sys em ou mechanism based on ax e asion will ein o ce he p e ious esul and, hus,
he go e nmen e enue will o e shoo e en mo e as a esponse o a p oduc i i y shock.
The same can be said i axes we e imposed on o he p ocyclical endogenous a iables
like consump ion. No e ha ou model displays an income elas ici y o go e nmen
e enue la ge han one e en o economies ha ing ax sys ems cha ac e ized by ‡a
ax a es.3
3In his espec , i should be men ioned ha du ing he las decade some coun ies made an impo -
an e o m o hei sys em o income axa ion. They eplaced hei p e ious p og essi e ax s uc u e
by a pu e ‡a ax a e. Fo ins ance, Russia, Se bia, I aq, Slo akia and Uk aine se a ‡a ax a e o
13%, 14%, 15%, 19% and 13%, espec i ely.
2
In o de o endow he s anda d Ak g ow h model wi h ax e asion, we assume ha
indi iduals ha e o choose in each pe iod he amoun o income hey wan o consume
and he amoun o income hey wan o e ade. When indi iduals conceal pa o hei
ue income om he ax au ho i y, hey ace he isk o being audi ed and hence o
paying he co esponding …ne. Bo h axes and …nes de e mine indi idual sa ing and
he a e o capi al accumula ion. Thus, wo ypes o shocks coexis in his model:
he agg ega e shock, which is gi en by changes in he o al ac o p oduc i i y o he
economy and he idiosync a ic shock, which is in oduced by means o he ax inspec ion
policy. The main esul o ou analysis says ha , when echnology shocks a e se ially
co ela ed, he alue o he IES ully de e mines he beha io o he go e nmen e enue
o GDP a io. In pa icula , when he in e se o IES is la ge han one, he go e nmen
e enue inc eases mo e han ou pu in he p esence o a posi i e echnology shock. In
his case, he elas ici y o ax e enue wi h espec o GDP is la ge han one, which is
consis en wi h he a o emen ioned empi ical egula i y. Mo eo e , when ei he he IES
is equal o one o echnology shocks a e no se ially co ela ed, he uni a y elas ici y o
ax e enue is eco e ed. The in ui ion o his esul lies in he ac ha , when shocks
a e se ially co ela ed, an inc ease in cu en o al ac o p oduc i i y means ha he
expec ed o al p oduc i i y and, hus, he expec ed e u n o in es men in he nex
pe iod will be highe . The e o e, sa ing will inc ease o dec ease depending on he
alue o he IES. Mo eo e , unde ax e asion, unde epo ing he ue income is also
a mechanism ha allows indi iduals o ans e p esen income o he u u e. This
means ha , i indi iduals decide o sa e mo e (less) as a esponse o a eal business
shock hey will also decide o e ade mo e (less) axes and his will esul in less (mo e)
e enues aised by he go e nmen .
In he nex sec ion we de elop he basic dynamic model o ax e asion. In Sec ion
3, we will discuss he implica ions o a echnology shock on he go e nmen e enue o
GDP a io. In sec ion 4, we ex end ou model o cope wi h he implica ions o he
budge de…ci s un by he go e nmen . Some …nal ema ks conclude he pape .
2. The Model
Le us conside a compe i i e economy in disc e e ime wi h a con inuum o ex-an e
iden ical indi iduals who a e uni o mly dis ibu ed on he in e al [0;1] :Each indi-
3
idual ihas access o a common echnology ep esen ed by he p oduc ion unc ion
yi; =A ki; whe e A >0is he andom o al ac o p oduc i i y (TFP), yi; is he
ou pu pe capi a o indi idual iand ki; is he capi al pe capi a o indi idual iin
pe iod .4We assume ha capi al ully dep ecia es a e one pe iod.
We assume ha he s ochas ic p ocess o s ic ly posi i e TFP shocks A g ollow
a loga i hmic au o eg essi e p ocess,
ln A +1 =ln A +u +1;(2.1)
whe e 2[0;1] and u +1 is i.i.d. and no mally dis ibu ed wi h ze o mean and a iance
2:No e ha he ealiza ion o TFP shocks a e he same o all indi iduals. The e o e,
p oduc ion is exposed o mac oeconomic (o non-idiosync a ic) TFP shocks.
Ou pu can be de o ed o ei he consump ion o in es men . A e p oduc ion has
aken place, each indi idual idecides bo h his consump ion ci; and he amoun xi; o
decla ed income, and hen pays he co esponding income ax a he a e 2(0;1) :I
he is inspec ed by he ax en o cemen agency, he o al amoun o un epo ed income
is disco e ed and he axpaye has o pay a penal y a he ‡a a e  > 1;which
is imposed on he amoun o e aded axes (as in Yi zhaki, 1974).5Inspec ion o a
pa icula indi idual is an e en ha occu s wi h p obabili y p2(0;1) :We also assume
ha p < 1in o de o ensu e posi i e ax e asion.
The amoun o ou pu emaining a e consump ion has aken place and axes and
(po en ial) penal ies ha e been paid cons i u es he capi al s ock ki; +1 ha is used
o p oduc ion in he nex pe iod. The e o e, he budge cons ain o an audi ed
indi idual is
A ki; xi;  (A ki; xi; ) = ci; +ki; +1;
whe eas he budge cons ain o a non-audi ed indi idual is
A ki; xi; =ci; +ki; +1:
We assume ha he amoun o axes collec ed by he ax agency is de o ed o
…nancing go e nmen spending ha en e s in o he ins an aneous u ili y o indi iduals
4See Rebelo (1991) o a model whe e he Ak p oduc ion unc ion a ises endogenously when physical
and human capi al a e pe ec subs i u es. In his case he capi al s ock kembodies bo h ypes o
capi al.
5I he penal y a e we e smalle han one, ax e asion would be encou aged by he ax au ho i y.
4

in an addi i e way. The e o e, he ma ginal a e o subs i u ion o p i a e consump ion
be ween wo a bi a y pe iods is no a¤ec ed by he le el o go e nmen spending. Since
consume s ake as gi en he pa h o go e nmen spending, he u ili y acc uing om his
spending can be supp essed om he consume s’objec i e unc ion. Indi iduals a e
assumed o maximize he ollowing expec ed discoun ed sum o ins an aneous u ili ies:
1
X
s=0
 E [U(ci; +s)] ;(2.2)
whe e 2(0;1) is he discoun ac o and E []is he condi ional expec a ion gi en he
in o ma ion a ailable a pe iod . We assume ha he ins an aneous u ili y unc ion is
isoelas ic,
U(ci; ) = (ci; )1
1;
whe e he pa ame e alue plays he usual double ole as he alue o he (cons an )
ela i e isk a e sion index and as he alue o he in e se o he IES.
The amoun o un epo ed income in pe iod o each indi idual iis i; =A ki; xi; :
Hence, we can use he p e ious budge cons ain s o w i e he s ochas ic law o mo ion
o capi al pe capi a as
ki; +1 =8
>
>
<
>
>
:
(1 )A ki; ci; (1)i; ;wi h p obabili y p;
(1 )A ki; ci; +i; ;wi h p obabili y (1 p);
o , equi alen ly,
ki; +1 = (1 )A ki; ci; +i; hi;(2.3)
whe e hiis a andom a iable wi h he ollowing p obabili y unc ion:
(hi) = 8
>
>
<
>
>
:
p o h= 1 ;
1p o h= 1;
(2.4)
o all i2[0;1] :Mo eo e , he a iables hia e independen ly dis ibu ed ac oss indi-
iduals. No e ha E(hi) = 1 p > 0as we ha e assumed ha p < 1. We de…ne he
ne ue income pe capi a as
ni; = (1 )A ki; :(2.5)
5
Then, using (2:3) we can w i e ni; +1 as
ni; +1 = (1 )A +1 (ni; ci; +i; hi):(2.6)
Taking ni; as he s a e a iable o indi idual iin pe iod , and ci; and i; as he
con ol a iables, he Bellman equa ion o he s ochas ic dynamic p oblem aced by
his indi idual in pe iod be o e knowing i he is going o be audi ed o no is
V(ni; ) = Max
ci; ; i; g((ci; )1
1+E [V(ni; +1)]);(2.7)
whe e ni; +1 sa is…es (2:6) :I is well known ha he alue unc ion o his p oblem
is he isoelas ic unc ion, V(ni; ) = D
1(ni; )1wi h D > 0(see Hakansson, 1970):
The e o e, using (2:6) and compu ing he condi ional expec a ion E [V(ni; +1)], he
op imiza ion p oblem aced by a axpaye wi h ini ial a e - ax ue income ni; becomes
Max
ci; ; i; g((ci; )1
1+E D
1[(1 )A +1 (ni; ci; +i; hi)]1);(2.8)
Di¤e en ia ing wi h espec o he con ol a iables ci; and i; ;we ob ain he ollowing
… s o de condi ions o he p e ious p oblem:
(ci; )=DE h((1 )A +1)1(ni; ci; +i; hi)i;(2.9)
and
E [(1 )A +1 (ni; ci; +i; hi)]hi= 0:(2.10)
Using he independency be ween A +1 and hiand he dis ibu ion o he andom a i-
able higi en in (2:4) ;condi ion (2:9) becomes
(ci; )=D(1 )1 (1 p) (ni; ci; +i; )+p(ni; ci; +(1 )i; );
(2.11)
wi h
 E h(A +1)1i;
while condi ion (2:10) becomes
(1 p) (ni; ci; +i; )=p(1) (ni; ci; +(1 )i; ):(2.12)
Sol ing o ci; and i; in he sys em composed o equa ions (2:11) and (2:12), we ob ain
ci; = ni; ;(2.13)
6
and
i; =
(ni; ci; );(2.14)
whe e
 =1
1 + D(1 )1 (1 p)(1 + )+p(1 (1))1= ;(2.15)
and
=1p
p(1) 1= 1
1+(1) 1p
p(1) 1= >0:(2.16)
Applying he en elope heo em, ha is, U0(ci; ) = V0(ni; );i mus hold ha
c
i; =Dn
i; :(2.17)
Subs i u ing (2:13) in (2:17) and using (2:15) we ob ain
D=1
1 + D(1 )1 (1 p) (1 + )+p(1 (1))1= :
The e o e, sol ing o Din he p e ious equa ion we ge
D="1
1((1 )1 H)1= #
;(2.18)
whe e
H= (1 p) (1 + )+p(1 (1)):
Subs i u ing (2:18) in o (2:15) ;and using (2:13), and (2:14) ;we ge he ollowing
consump ion and e asion policies:
ci; =h1(1 )1H 1=ini; ;(2.19)
and
i; =
(1 )1H 1= ni; :(2.20)
No e ha , when p = 1, we ha e ha = 0 and, hence, H= 1. The e o e, when
p = 1;indi iduals do no e ade axes, i; = 0 o all i2[0;1] :Mo eo e , unde his
ull en o cemen policy conduc ed by he ax agency, he op imal consump ion policy
is he one appea ing in absence o ax e asion,
ci; =h1(1 )1 1=i(1 )A ki; :
7
In o de o ob ain he alue o he agg ega e a e - ax ue income n +1 in equilib-
ium, which is gi en by (2:6) ;we compu e
n +1 =Z[0;1]
ni; +1di = (1 )A +1 "Z[0;1]
ni; di Z[0;1]
ci; di +Z[0;1]
i; hidi#
= (1 )A +1 "Z[0;1]
ni; di Z[0;1]
ci; di + Z[0;1]
i; di! Z[0;1]
hidi!#
= (1 )A +1 [n c +(1 p) ];
whe e he hi d equali y ollows om he independence be ween he a iables hiand
i; a he beginning o pe iod ; whe eas he las equali y comes om he law o la ge
numbe s o a con inuum o i.i.d. andom a iables, acco ding o which R[0;1] hidi =
E(hi)=1p; and om he de…ni ions o agg ega e consump ion c R[0;1] ci; di,
agg ega e e asion  R[0;1] i; di; and agg ega e a e - ax ue income n R[0;1] ni; di.
In consequence, as ollows om (2:19) and (2:20) ; he agg ega e alues o consump ion
and e aded income a e
c =1(1 )1H 1=
| {z }

n ;(2.21)
and
 =
(1 )1H 1= n =
(1  )n :(2.22)
In o de o analyze he e¤ec o a TFP shock on e aded income and on consump ion,
we mus compu e he alue o  :Gi en ha he andom a iable u +1 is no mal
and hus he echnology shock A +1 is log-no mal, he condi ional expec a ion  
E h(A +1)1iis equal o
 =A(1)
exp (1 )22
2:(2.23)
The nex sec ion discusses he e¤ec o a TFP shock on bo h he amoun o e aded
income and he go e nmen e enue o GDP a io.
3. E¤ec s o TFP shocks
In o de o analyze he e¤ec o a echnology shock on go e nmen e enue o ou pu
a io, we should … s compu e he e¤ec o an inc ease o he TFP alue A on he
e asion o income a io  =y :Since agg ega e ou pu sa is…es y =A k and he he
8
(4.3) ha
(1 + g )1=A1
[(1 )H]1= A(1)=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (1)22
2
so ha
E 1[1+g )]1=E 1A1

[(1 )H]1= A(1)=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (1)22
2
=A
1e2=2
[(1 )H]1= A(1)=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (1)22
2
=1
[(1 )H]1= A=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (13+2)2
2;(4.6)
whe e he second equali y comes om he ac ha
E 1A1
=A
1e2=2;
and he hi d comes om some s aigh o wa d simpli…ca ion.
The e o e, using (4.5) and (4.6), he amoun o go e nmen spending in da e is
G =y 1
E 1[1+g )]1=A 1k 1
E 1[1+g )]1
=A 1k 1[(1 )H]1= A=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (1 3+2)2
2
=A(+)=
1k 1[(1 )H]1= (1 + (1 p)) exp (1 3+2)2
2:
No e ha he go e nmen spending in depends on he alues o wo a iables known
a 1;namely, he capi al k 1and he he TFP shock A 1:
Conce ning he e¤ec i e go e nmen spending o GDP a io in pe iod , no e ha
G
y
=G
(1 + g )y 1
=
(1 + g )E 1[1+g )]1=
[(1 )H]1= A=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (13+2)2
2
A [(1 )H]1= A(1)=
1(1 + (1 p)) exp (1)22
2=A
1e2=2
A
;(4.7)
whe e he second equali y comes om (4.5) and he hi d om (4.3) and (4.6).
15

As we ha e shown in he p e ious sec ion, he go e nmen e enue o GDP a io can
‡uc ua e in each pe iod wi h he echnological shock A in he p esence o ax e asion
(i.e., when p < 1) e en i he ax a e emains cons an ac oss pe iods (see (4.9)).
Mo eo e , we ha e jus seen in his sec ion ha he go e nmen spending o ou pu
a io a also ‡uc ua es wi h he shock A as he amoun o go e nmen spending was
decided in pe iod 1:
Conce ning he …scal de…ci o GDP a io, we can compu e G R
y om (4:7) and
(4:9) :No e om (4:7) ha he go e nmen spending o GDP a io s ic ly dec eases
wi h he inno a ion shock in A :Howe e , he go e nmen e enue o ou pu a io
inc eases (dec eases) wi h he inno a ion shock in A i  > 1(<1) when  > 0;while
i does no a y wi h A i ei he = 0 o = 1:The e o e, we ge he ollowing esul :
P oposi ion 4.1. Fo a gi en alue o A 1; he go e nmen de…ci o ou pu a io
G R
y is dec easing in he alue A o TFP i 1and  > 0. Mo eo e , he same
esul holds o all  > 0when = 0.
P oo : No e ha , i 1and  > 0; hen he go e nmen e enue o ou pu a io
weakly inc eases wi h A and, since he go e nmen spending o GDP a io s ic ly
dec eases wi h A o a gi en alue o A 1; he esul immedia ely ollows. When
= 0; he go e nmen de…ci is dec easing since he go e nmen e enue o ou pu
a io is no a¤ec ed by changes in A ;while he go e nmen spending o ou pu a io
s ic ly dec eases wi h A o a gi en alue o A 1:
The p e ious esul ag ees wi h he empi ical e idence since ell us ha , unde he
empi ically ele an case wi h 1and  > 0;…scal de…ci s inc ease when he cu en
a e o g ow h is lowe han he expec ed one. No e in his espec ha , as we ha e
shown a he beginning o his sec ion, he de ia ion o he ac ual a e o g ow h in
pe iod and i s expec a ion a 1 o a gi en alue A 1in pe iod 1is ully
explained by he ealiza ion A o he TFP in pe iod : Howe e , o he empi ically
mos implausible case  < 1;i TFP shocks a e posi i ely co ela ed,  > 0; he o e all
e¤ec on he public de…ci o GDP a io is ambiguous. In his case he e enue o GDP
a io dec eases when he e is a posi i e shock on TFP, which coupled wi h he dec ease
in he go e nmen spending o GDP a io, gi es aise o an ambiguous e¤ec on he
go e nmen de…ci o ou pu a io.
16
Le us …nish his sec ion wi h some commen s abou he selec ion o he ax a e
when he amoun o go e nmen spending is chosen a pe iod in ad ance. No e ha we
ha e bee implici ly assuming in ou p e ious analysis ha he selec ion o ax a es is
subjec o less disc e ion han go e nmen spending, ha is, ha ax a es a e se o
longe pe iods han he amoun o go e nmen spending. In ac , we we e making he
ex eme assump ion ha he alue o he ax a e was exogenously gi en. One way o
a ionalize his assump ion and make i consis en wi h balanced budge in he long
un consis s o assuming ha he go e nmen (o he legisla i e body) chooses a da e
0, be o e obse ing any echnological shock, he ax a e in o de o minimiza ion o
he uncondi ional expec ed squa e o he go e nmen de…ci o ou pu a io. The e o e,
he objec i e o he go e nmen is o choose he ax a e in o de o minimize
EG R
y 2
This a ge is ully achie ed achie ed when
ER
y =EG
y ;
which acco ding o he go e nmen spending objec i e becomes
ER
y =: (4.8)
as, om he law o i e a ed expec a ions, E(G /y ) = E(E 1(G /y )) = . Combin-
ing (3:2) wi h (3:1) we ob ain he go e nmen e enue o GDP a io
R
y
=(1 p)[H(1 )]1= A(1)=
exp (1 )22
2!:(4.9)
The uncondi ional expec a ion (i.e., he expec a ion a he ini ial da e 0 be o e obse -
ing any ealiza ion o he TFP shock) o he p e ious go e nmen e enue o GDP a io
can be easily compu ed by aking in o accoun he ollowing uncondi ional expec a ion:
EA(1)=
= exp 2(1 )22
22(1 2)!:
Plugging he p e ious exp ession in he uncondi ional expec a ion o he a io (4:9) ;
we ge
ER
y =(1 p)[H(1 )]1= exp 2(1 )22
22(1 2)!exp (1 )22
2!
17
=(1 p)[H(1 )]1= exp (1 )22
21 + 2
(1 2)!:
I is immedia e o see ha he p e ious expec a ion is s ic ly inc easing in he ax
a e and ends o 1 as con e ges o 1 and o a nega i e numbe when app oaches 0.
The e e o e, he e exis s a unique alue o he ax a e sol ing he equa ion (4.8) o
2(0;1). This is he ax a e ha balances he go e nmen budge in (uncondi ional)
expec ed e ms and ha is kep cons an o all pe iods in ou analysis.
5. Final Rema ks
In his pape , we ha e shown ha , by in oducing ax e asion in he s anda d Ak
model g ow h wi h ‡a ax a es, i is possible o ob ain an elas ici y o ax e enue
wi h espec o ou pu la ge han one, which ag ees wi h he empi ical e idence.
The e o e, ax e asion o¤e s by i sel an explana ion o he high income elas ici y o
go e nmen e enue ha complemen s o he explana ions elying ei he on p og essi e
income axa ion o on axes imposed on p ocyclical a iables. we ha e ex ended he
model o accoun o he cyclical beha io o …scal de…ci s when go e nmen has a
a ge conce ning he alue o i s spending ela i e o GDP. we show ha , unde a
plausible pa ame e es ic ion, …scal de…ci s become la ge in ecessions.
We ha e used o ou analysis a e y simple model o capi al accumula ion whe e he
s a ic po olio choice model o ax e asion p esen ed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
has been ex ended o a dynamic se up.8In his amewo k, consume s’decisions abou
how much income hey wan o epo no only a¤ec hei p esen consump ion bu
also hei u u e consump ion. The e o e, he esponse o consume s o posi i e TFP
shocks a¤ec s bo h he ax e asion decision and go e nmen e enue. In his se up, we
ha e shown how he e¤ec o a posi i e echnology shock on he go e nmen e enue
o GDP a io is ully cha ac e ized by he alue o IES pa ame e when TFP shocks
a e se ially co ela ed. In pa icula when he IES exhibi s a su¢ cien ly small alue,
a posi i e echnology shock makes indi iduals o lowe mo e han p opo ionally hei
amoun o e aded income in o de o main ain a smoo h pa h o consump ion o e ime.
The e o e, he go e nmen e enue inc eases mo e han ou pu and in consequence he
income elas ici y o ax e enue becomes la ge han one.
8See Lin andYang (2001) o a simila con ex .
18
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20