Transition to Democracy -or Anschluss? The Two Germanies and Europe

TRANSITION TO1 DEMOCRACY -OR ANSCHLUg? THE TWO GERMANIES AND EUROPE Klaus von Beyme Institut fir Politische Wiseizschaft an der Universitat Heidelberg Abstract In thispa er, Klaw von Beyme discusses the causes and consequences uf the German un8cation process. in the frame uf transitions to democracy in exsocialist Europe. Firstjy, he shows that classical models of democratic transition auailable in olitical science are not suitable for the German case, bein necessay to ka1 with speczjc factors like cultural penetration uf the ~ederaT Republzc into the Denzocratic Republic, conditions or a transition were more favourable than in orhr socialzst regimes, and t d zs fact, at the same time, removed any possibility uf claimin a athird wayw to democratic socialism. FinalLy, the author goes on fi.om 6erman national context to international situation, analyzing upon wzch options world leaders gave at lastgreen light to unz$cation in its presentform. Resum En aquest article, Klaus von Beyme discuteix les causes i conse ütncies delprocés din;f;caciÓ aleman a, en el marc de la transició ca a la %mocrdcia de 1Europa ex-socialista. ZnPrimer lloc, ens mostra que e e s models cldssics de transició democrdtica disponzbles en citncia política no són aplicables al cas alemany, i, per tant, la necessitat de tractar actors es ecí zcs com aya la penetració cultural de la República Federal en ; a Repúb zca emocr2tzca, o la qüestió nacional. En segon lloc, von Beyme argumenta que a causa dáquesta especial situació de la República Democrdtzca, les condicions per a una transició democrdtica eren més favorables que en altres rt ims socialistes, i que, al mateix temps, a& allunyava qualsevolpossibilitat Apropu ar una ((tercera viar de social~sme democrdtic. En darrer lloc, 1 ihtorpassa &context nacional alemany a la situació internacional, per analitzar quines o cions forma actual. e portaren els líders mundials a donar carta blanca a la unzficdció en a seva En este articulo, Khw von Byme discute b causas y consecuencias delproceso de unzjcación alemana, en el marco de la transición hacia la democracia de la Europa ex-socialista. En primer lugar, muestra cómo 10s modelos clásicos Papers 39 (1972) (23-42) ccPapersn: Revista de Sociologia de transición democrútica diponibles en ciencia política no son aplicables al caso alemún, y ue es necesario watarfactores es ectjcos como son lapenetración cultural de la LKpÚblica Federal en la Repú t! lica Democrútica, o la cuestidn nacional. En se undo lugar, von Byme argumenta que, debido a esa especial situación de la $ública Democrútzca, i condiciones para una transiczón democra'tica eran mús favorables que en otros re ímenes socialistas, y que, al mismo Lm o, ell0 alqaba cualquierposibilidaf depropu ar una ((tercera viar e r de socia ismo democrútico. Por Últzmo, el autorpasa de contexto nacional alemún a la situación internacional, para analizar quk opciones llevaron a 10s lideres mundiales a dar carta blanca a la unificaczón en su firma actual. To analyse the German question in this transitory moment is risky in several respects. The German novelist Martin Walser who undenvent a metamorphosis from a fellow traveller of the Communists to a German nationalist put in bluntly: ((He who does not get bellow his intellectual level when talking about Germany has no intellectual level at all)). The topic has pitfalls everywhere: - it is highly connected with emotions whatever the view of the writer, - it is in flux, ccwords are outdated in your mouth)) as a cynic put it. The increasing number of actors who claim to have a say in the German unification process makes prognosis almost impossible. - Scientific analysis of this unique event lacks concepts. Transition to democracy in a highly penetrated system does not follow the established rules of this branch of knowledge. The transition to democracy in East Germany surprised the world in two respects as an event quite unexpected by experts: 1) The sudden collapse of the socialist regimes was anticipated not even by experts. The insights of former research on transition to democracy proved not to be applicable to the new cases. 2) Within this regime shift the East German case deviant in so far, as few had expected the rise of nationalism in Germany. Uriexpected too was the enormous speed in which all the major allies and former foes in Eastern Europe recognized the right of the Germans of self-determination on the question of unity. The only justified concern were the conditions for a new security system after the shakeup of the old one. Transition to Democracy -or AnschluG? 1 TRANSITION TO DEMlOCRACY In third world countries many scholars in the tradition of modernizdtion theo y developed a theoy ofjLnctionalprerequisites of democracy. A Hungarian ambassador recently mentioned in an international symposium that scholars in his country took it for granted that below the level of $ 6000 of gross domestic product per capita there were no chances to develop a stable democracy (Ende, 1989, p. 13). This conclusion is highly questionable because it ignores the proper political conditions, specially those within the European international system. The search for correlations between developmental stages and prospects of stable democracy are even more problematic in the case of the socialist countries than under Third World conditions for severa1 reasons: - Communist regimes imposed equalization and social and political Gleichschaltung. Thus the social lheterogeneity and fragmentation is less developed than in developing countries. The ancien régime has, so to speak, created some prerequisites of democracy which are lacking in developing countries. - Typologies of communist countries showed little correlation with the degree of repression in the respective country. The poorest country, Romania, and the richest countries; such as the GDR and Czechoslovakia were on top of the repression scale. - The degree of experience with democratic politics showed no correlation with development. Romania started only late, the GDR led the movement in its final stage. But th~e true forerunners were Poland and Hungary, countries in the middle of all developmental scales. Czechoslovakia started after the GDR, but than developed the ambition -as one of the rebelling students put it in front clf western camerasto finish in one week what the GDR did in two months in order to enter the Guinness book of records. It is noteworthy, however, that a whole group of countries, independent of its stage of development joined a peaceful revolution. Its foes in the spirit of the ancien régime spoke o,f a conservative revolution, in order to avoid the insult of a contre-revolution (Ende, 1989, p. 1). The main explanation is an international one: there were clear indicators that Moscow would not suppress the upheaval by renewing the Brezhnev doctrine. After the approach of functional prerequisites genetic and organizational explanations of democratization spread in the social sciences. Rustow (1970, p. 346) was one of the first to reintroduce more political variables against the ((Papers)): Revista de Sociologia sociological and economic explanations. He ended up, however, with genetic sequences of stages in the tradition of Brinton's (~Anatomy of Revolution)). The explanation was highly individualized and hardly any general theoretical conclusion was left. Recent approaches concentrating on actors and organizdtional theories seem to be more promising in explaining the peaceful revolutions of Eastern Europe. The main actor, the masses, were too weak to explain the success. Why did the security forces with the exception of Romania give in so quickly? The formation of masses via peacefil training by churches (Poland, GDR, CSSR) and reenforcement of the actors via international Wand other organizational variables are important conditions of success, but they do not suEce to explain why the establishment did not fight more fiercely. Adam Przeworski (1 986, p. 50) listed four reasons to explain why cracks begin to appear in authoritarian regimes and liberalization becomes possible: - The authoritarian regime has realized the+nctional conditions that led to its establishment. - The regime has lost its legitimacy. - ConJlicts in the ruling bloc, particularly in the military led to an appeal to outside groups for support by some factions. - Foreign pressure to put on a democratic face leads to compromises. The four propositions can be tested in the case of the collapse of communist regimes: 1) Socialist countries have hardly a finction, as many military dictatorships which were meant to prevent a state from drifting to the left (the case of Franco Spain), or a counterrevolution against socialist transformation such as in Chile. Only the collapse of the Greek colonels may be explained by this functional consideration. The GDR is a good deviant example: it had no temporary function but was founded for permanence. The nation was split to make possible a socialist state on German territory. The funcional argument must be reversed: as soon as the GDR gave up its bureaucratic socialism, it lost its function and raison d2tre. The slogan we are thepeople within a month was substituted by the motto we are onepeople. In the middle of the 1970s the author of this article still assumed that communism had a strong capacity for renewal of its ideology (von Beyme, 1982, p. 445). Reforms under Khrushchev and the early Brezhnev era made this plausible. In the last 20 years, however, bourgeois systems have shown much more capacity to adapt certain socialist political instruments (welfare Transition to Democracy -or AnschluB? policies, radical democratization, coherent planning), whereas socialist countries petrified and proved unable to adopt the achievements ofwestern democracy (legal state, pluralism, market forces). Only Gorbachev was able to organize such a development form above. After 5 years of half-hearted nieasures he carried out the decision to renounce the leading role of the party ,and to acknowledge a de facto multiparty system which exists already in some: republics. Gorbachev dated the loss of the lead of socialist ideology about 1973 when the oi1 crisis imposed radical changes in capitalist countries whereas socialist countries still exercized the mentality of ideological self-ringhtenousness. The GDR in her propaganda was more agressive and less capable of learning than most of the other regimes because of its shaky legitimacy in a divided nation. Every night the class enemy came to the living rooms of millions of GDR citizens, influences which the offical propaganda tried to counterbalance. This negative competition made the system still more uncapable of adapting to new needs. 2) A second hypothesis is that authoritarian regimes collapse when they loose legitimacy. Modern democracy system are legitimized mainly by four principles which they developed in a rather uniform historical sequence: - legal state - national state - democratic state - welfare state. a) The legal state was the only institution except of the national state which was developed in most of the East European countries which never experienced full democracy. The territory of the GDR was part of a German tradition to pay off demands of democracy with the minimal requirements of the legal state (Rechtsstaat), which still explains the legalism of the German political culture. Carter's campaign for emphasizing human rights was considered by many actors -even in the West-- as a kind of interference. But the process of the Helsinki conference which was considered in the first years a victory of Soviet diplomacy became an ideological boomerang. Increasingly the Soviet Union was accused for violating hurnan rights, increasingly oppositions claimed these rights. Especially in East Germany the violation of these rights was so visible because of the monstrosity ofthe wall. Though the GDR was milder in its repression than many other countries from Czechoslovakia down to Romania, the violation of rights was more severely felt because of permanent comparisons with the Western part of Germany. ccPapers)): Revista de Sociologia 6) The national state principle was violated in two respects: many socialist countries had losses of territory to the Soviet Union (in the Hungarian case to other neighbours but because of Soviet interference). The Brezhnev doctrine of limitedsovereignty, several times democstrated via armed interventions of the red army (GDR 1953, Hungary 1956, CSSR 1968) reminded the communist countries every day of the limits of national statehood under socialist conditions. The GDR was a special case of national underlegitimation. Kissinger ironically has called the Federal Republic an economy in search of higher purpose. For the GDR the bonmot could be reversed: the GDR had a high ideological goa1 but was an underdeveloped economy (compared to West Germany, and its former standards). The Federal Republic clung to the idea of national unity under the notion of a cultural nation. The class nation which the GDR had launched into the international debate, contained reifcations of the objectivist dejnition, whereas the Western notion of a nation would rather aim at the subjective side of an eveyday-plebiscite. The West German economy ccin search of a higher goal)) continued to speak for the whole of Germany. Sometimes with grotesque consequences. Already the name of the German state -literally translated ((Federal Republic Germany)) does not make sense in most other languages. This may have a late reward: the most likely narne of a unified Germany DEUTSCHE BUNDESREPUBLIK makes a difference only in German many other nations can keep the name they have used so far for the Western part of the country. The latent racism that the Federal Republic considered everybody of German tongue as a West German citizen, even in those parts of the former Empire which were considered as being lost for good is backfiring. This brought the Bonn regime into serious dificulties. When Gorbachev made possible the exodus of hundred thousands of German speaking Soviet citizens and encouraged his allies in Poland and elsewhere to do the same, the influx was hardly tolerable. Social unrest in the Federal Republic and the rise of the new right-wing extremists were a consequence. Bonn carne close to the latent desire to rebuild the wall from the other side, but it was prisoner of its ownpan-german constitutional mythology. No foreigner and hardly any German understood that the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court ruled in the case of the basic agreement with the GDR, in 1973 (BVerfGE 36, 1/26) recognizing a second German state, that the border -though being the most impermeable building since the Chinese wall and certainly less permeable than even the limes the Romans built in Britain and Germanywas said to have a legal quality not different from the boundaries between West German Laender. All this would have been political mythology without importance had not the majority of the East Germans used West Germany as a reference culture. Transition to Dernocracy -or Anschluf3? Most of the prominent East German literature -which was, maybe the most unique and autonomous pralduct of the GDR in the last 40 yearswas printed in the Federal Republic. One of the major advantages of unification for German literature will be that it looses on both sides of the former iron curtain its excessive preoccupation with la querelle allemande and its human dimension. If one reads Boll, ~Grass, Johnson or Walser to mention only some of the authors also known albroad, it becomes obvious that postwar German literature provincialized in a way similar to the captive nations of Eastern Europe in the 19th century. There was a predominance of two topics: love they had and the nation they had not. I expect that German culture will return to its former cosmopolitism in the tradition of Goethe, Heine or Thomas Mann and this would be a welcome byproduct of the unification process. A nation like others has no longer to reflect its precarious situation. Not only the two German cultures remainded closely related. Churches, trade unions and many other social institutions were kept apart by force, but preserved their organizational similarity. The GDR did not develop a national consciousness of her own --in spite of so much propaganda about the class nation. The West Germans in their majority had an identity feeling of their own, and the younger generation showed little interest in the East. But the public opinion polls were frequently misinterpreted. West German was -after Belgium, a bi-ethnic nationthe lowest low-scorer on all the scales of national pride. Unti1 the late 1980s about two thirds of the West Germans thought that reunification was impossible. But also two thirds were in favour of national unity if it proved to be possible in the future (von Beyme, 1986). In the light of these paradoxes those who are afraid of a new German nationalism get some comfort. The Germans have not changed their opinion very much: Even now, in wave oif enthusiasm only two thirds of the Germans are firmly in favour of reunification. c) A democratic state was the most important aim which triggered the peaceful revolution of 1989. H[ow was it possible that East Germany led the final stage of the process in the Eastern bloc? One explanation is that the church functioned as a training ground for peaceful resistence. The Lutheran church has an old etatist tradition arid unlike Calvinist denominations hardly any revolutionary traditions. The church trained people to peaceful resistence, but not to revolution. The SED establishment s,hortly after the turmoil blamed West German intefeerence for the revolution. This was hardly true in terms of direct support form the Bonn government. Interference occured in an indirect way, via TV. Western TVin the days of upheaval had a mobilizingfinction. The people was informed about the number of demonstrators last night and got news where ((Papers)): Revista de Sociologia and when the next rally was to take place. This reenforcement encouraged the people in a country without revolutionary tradition. Look at the history of West European democracies such as Britain, France or Italy. Shakespearean dramas of killing kings everywhere. In the German Empire one hardly finds a case even in the middle ages. Germans needed encouragement for deviant political behaviour. Even in the West, Germans are normal in many respects of participation, but still show slightly less tolerance towards unconventional behaviour. The regulation of language in the GDR in turmoil shows how little independent revolutionary thinking was involved. The new events and institutions were called with West German names. The revolution was a Wende-the expression for the change in government of 1982. When the Stdsiwas abolished something was to substitute it. They found no other word than the West German Verfa~sun~sschutz. Compared to the Soviet Union the revolution is played down. Gorbachev, however, emphasizes the revolution of perestroika in order to demonstrate continuity with Lenin's impetus after 1917. It does not prevent the perestroika leaders from accepting what a PCI-leader, Sergio Segre, recently advised to all communists: ((All of us should finally become revisionists)) (Die Zeit, 29. Dec. 1989, p. 2, col. 5). The events of Leipzig are called a revolution sometimes by its adversaries. Jürgen Kuczynski, the nestor of SED loyalists in the social sciences, dubbed it a conservative revolution. He quoted Mam, but the more familiar connotation is a quasi-fascist tradition of thought in the Weimar Republic (ibidem, p. 1, col. 3). The breakdown of the authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe according to Schmitter (1986, Vol. 1, p. 5) was facilitated by the subserviant role of the milita y with the exception of Greece. This argument has explanatory value also in the case of East Europe. Subordination of the military was a double one: two the national communist party and the Red Army within its bloc. The Brezhnev doctrine, oddly enough, undermined socialism though it was meant to protect it. The military of most socialist states was used to rely on the leading role of the Red Army. Once Moscow made it clear that they would not interfere, defense collapsed very quickly. It is not by chance that Romania is the only deviant case. Romania has emphasized its role independent on Moscow for 20 years and did not take part in the suppression of the Prague spring. Romania therefore relied on her own internal security system. Ceausescus main mistake was, however, that he created a counter-army in the Securitate. This competition of two armies encouraged large parts of the military to join the opposition in a critica1 moment of the rebellion. Democratic traditions had older roots in the GDR than in other socialist countries. Czechoslovakia had been considered more democratic than Germany before the Second World War, but it is difficult to compare. Czechos- Transition to Democracy -or AnschluB? lovakia was one of the main winners at the peace treaties in the suburbs of Paris, whereas c(Versai1lesn was considered as blatant injustice in Germany which did not strengthen the new system of the victors, e.g. democracy. But even without any democratic tradition the East Germans would have seen how well the other Germany fared with democracy. Western propaganda emphasized that market economy and true democracy are closely interrelated, and since most GDR citizens preferred the former they were also ready to buy the latter. Democracy as the form of government of the more succeeding part of the country had more legitimaqr even in East Germany than the socialist democracy as a disguise of party dictatorship. d) The welfdre state was the fourth concept to legitimize modern political systems when social conflicts aggravated in the 20th century. Socialist systems committed the error to pretend that the enshrine per se a social state and therefore do not need a social policy. From this rule the GDR was, however, again a certain exception. Iri 1965 Ulbricht's daughter wrote the first book defending social policy. The two German states already in the Adenauer era behaved like communicating tubes. Adenauer tried to compensate national legitimation of his rump statle by promoting welfare in order to immunize the West Germans against comn~unism. The other side had to act in the same direction in order to prove that socialism is superior and to prevent that the mass exodus continues which weakened the GDR unti1 the construction of the Berlin wall in 196 1. This was probably the most solid part of the legitimacy of the GDR. Unti1 recently many GDR citizens believed that the GDR had better achievements in the social sphere though they knew that the economy of the West was superior. 3) The third reason for the breakdown of dictatorship is dissent among the elites in a time of eroding ideological zeal. This erosion was not as strong as in Franco Spain (von Beyme, 1971, pp. 123ff.). But in a moment of crisis it worked in the same direction~. Parts of the middle level cadres of the party and some Lord Mayors of big cities such as Leipzig and Dresden, were no longer willing to use force against n~ass demonstrations. Some politicians like Hans Modrow (who becarne prime minister) or Berghofer (who stayed Lord Mayor of Dresden in spite of leavirig the party) were able to win the confidence as individual politicians, not via the party. The first suspended his party membership, the second gave it u~p altogether. The party as a whole missed its chance to reform itself. In Czechoslovakia event the old DuEek crew had little chance to play a major role. By senatorial courteoisy of President Havel DubEek was given the honorary but not very ccPapers)): Revista de Sociologia diculized in the international theory of state of being no state at all (Bodin) or a state ccmonstro similen (Pufendorff). The torchbearers of a raison dktat school of thought from Machiavelli to Boccalini looked at the Germans rather with pity: petty little communities with nice industrious people, fortunately so frequently drunk that nobody was able to try to abolish his neighbour's freedom. Surely this idyllic Germany is not imminent in the 21th century. But the risks of an economic giant remaining politically and in military matters a dwarf have to be considered. When the most eminent scholar in German history in the United States, Gordon Craig, was honoured at his 70th birthday, the president of Stanford University praised him as a man who made sense of German history though everybody agrees that German history does not make sense. There are, however, more experts who recognize that the onesided view from ccLuther to Hitler)) (and hopefully this will apply also to Russia with similar simplifications such as ccfrom Bakunin to Lenin))) is no good guidance for settling security problems in Europe. Craigs option in December 1989 for Germany was still a ccbig No)) and a ccsmall Ayz to unification (Zu grog fur Europa? 1989, p. 183). The main problem for experts on Germany is, however, that Germany has 20 million more inhabitants than the other bigger nations, though the Germans on both sides of the former iron curtain did their best by the lowest birthrates in the whole world to shrink back to a size which entitles them to one national state. They tried to undo the consequences of accelerated growth which caused Germany to overtake France in population figures in the 19th century. In the light of coming social problems it is likely that the Germans will make further efforts in the same direction. But do they have to wait unti1 a nation larger in size, such as Russia can be accepted as part of the European community? They would have to wait still quite a time. The loose talk about the ((European hous&) may apply to economic and military questions, but even Gorbachev faces reality that Europe in close integration for quite a time will not mean ccfiom Lisbon to Vladivostob, and not even De Gaulle's old vision c (fiom the Atlantic to the Urab, but c (fiom Brest to Bresa! e) Timetables of European unzjcation are in danger and cause a trade off between West European integration and German unification. In order to prevent Bonn from blocking the European integration concessions to German wishes in their national feelings had to be made. Mitterrand in one statement hinted to this predicament. Blamed for having made too many concessions to Kohl he said: (calors Monsieur Kohl est un patriote)). This was said with an undertone that Kohl as a personality for the first time became plausible to his French partner. Patriotism is an acceptable word to French ears. Transition to Democracy -or AnschluB? The discussion of the reasons European elites had for changing their mind on the German question makes it unlikely that the veto-solution will be pursued unless Gorbachev is toppled by a coup. The prospects for this worst case scenario fortunately are dim, since Gorbachev in February 1990 diversified his political support by renouncing the leading position of the party and ushering into a multi-party system. A kind of Gaullist semi-presidentialsystem might be the solution for a president who does not want to disband the Communist party altogether as Hungary and Poland or the GDR, nor wants to be dependent exclusively on the party majority. When Gavril Popov led the demonstration on the red square in February 1990 most of the speeches and the shouting of the masses amounted to ((Down the whole Central Committee -but Gorbachev can stay)). If Gorbachev listened carefully he will have discovered the advantages of this mixed solution for his own intentions. In a similar paradox Gorbachev seems to have discovered certain advantages in German unification. It will certainly be his scenario for the negociations to come to revive the ccspirit Rlapallo) without alienating the Western powers. 2) Neutrality of a unifiecl German state was Gorbachev's first choice. But quickly Western observers discovered that the Soviet policies in this respect were not simply a continuation of Stalin's initiatives of 1952 . The cccommon house in Europes and the Soviet search of a security system overarching the former two blocs were serious. That is why neutrality -opposed by all Western and Eastern neighbours of Germany for good reasons (after all the Weimar Reichswehr was ((neutral)) and cooperated with the Red Army)- was no goal per se for Gorbachev's German policy. Neutrality meets with opposition in Germany. It was unaccepted by the Christian Democrats. The Siocial Democrats in Germany paid lip service to the NATO but in a recent paper they saw neutrality of Germany as a ((goa/ in the long run)). Only the Green party was firmly in favour of neutrality -and this aroused new suspicions by the rest of the actors in and outside the country. For the time being neutrality is the least likely development. 3) Germany remains in the Western system but compromises are found for Soviet security interests. When Kohl came back from Moscow he celebrated himself as having got a free hand for unification. What are the conditions? asked every journalist in the interviews. No condition was the answer. But there were hints to two main bodies to be consulted who might some up with conditions: - thefour victors over Nazi German, - and the Helsinki successioln conference to be held by fall 1990. ccpapers*: Revista de Sociologia Genscher promoted the formula 2 (the German states) plus 4 (the victors): but without vae victis -e.g. gathering on German initiative and on German territory. The main minimal expectation will be that Germany solemnly declares that the borders of 1945 are sacrosanct. This was promised for the moment after the GDR elections producing a legitimized government anyway. The border question is largely overrated in its importance. It will be hard to ask the necessary material sacrifices from the West German population. But hardly anybody (expect a few refugee organizations) have an interest East of the Oder-Neisse. These areas have always played a minor role. Quite a few prejudices continued to despise them as ccunderdeveloped)) and not cccompletely)) German. (Born in Silesia the present author can dare to mention what hardly any West German would say in public). In the cultural sphere the loss of Breslau and Konigsberg certainly weighs less than the loss of Wilno and Lvov in Polish culture. The areas have been populated and rebuilt by Poles. Which German would claim to be in favour of pushing the multicultural society in the direction to start with integrating millions of Poles. The Polish problem will be a strain on German budgets and a reserve for German exploitation anyway. You can push Germany as far to the West as possible -the Poles follow westbound as a huge army of migrant workers and this tendency will grow as soon as they border directly with an established hard-currency country. Moreover no serious politician can ask the restauration of the Polish corridor which by its very oddity as a solution might have provoked a war even in a case that not a Hitler was available to push the issue. Oddly enough, the main victor, Stalin, created a new corridor. If Lithouania in the long run breaks away from the Soviet Union. Gorbachev inherits the corridor which separates a Russian speaking part of former East Prussian from the Slavic territory. Konigsberg's little revenge over Kaliningrad! For the time being there is only one problem with Poland Germany cannot settle. As a consequence of the most unequal treatment of the ccguest victors)) -France on De Gaulle's impertinant insistance got inthe Poles having suffered much more than France were kept out -now, they are again excluded from the formula 2 plus 4. Some actors might be ready to give in -but they are afraid that every country involved would ask to be present and the victors end up with a conference even bigger than the Helsinki succession meeting. The United States assured Gorbachev that they would not onesidedly try to benefit from Soviet dilemmas at this moment. The new proposal to reduce the troops to about 195 O00 gives the United States an advantage. They benefit already moreover, quite substantially by getting the Soviet to abandon the corner stone of the Soviet system, the GDR. The claim to keep Germany in the Nato is close to unconditional surrender policies. Baker in February Transition to Democracy -or Anschlug? 1990 launched a new proposa1 to keep Germany in the NATO only as apolitical member. In military matters even in the French solution is hardly acceptable to Moscow. Unfortunately recent riots in the Soviet Union prevented the leadership from offering a clear policy standpoint. It is touching to see how quickly the former ccnjet-foreign policyn transformed itself into the confusing picture of contradicting actors. In the morning Shevardnadze said only neutrality is a solution, in the evening Gorbachev hinted at more flexible options! Unprofessional dilettantism and ccad-hocism)) of Soviet policies in this moment are a certain danger in domestic as well as in foreign policies. Genscher's compromise of membership in the NATO, but no Western troup in East Germany, is hi:ghly artificial. Soviet troups can stay in East Germany. I think only to invite certain parts also into West German territory would be a substantial offer from the Western side. Whatever solution will be the outcome, it is unlikely that the four victors will follow Margaret Thatcher's self-defeating concept that all the Helsinkistates have to agree to a solution, and that even little Malta should have a right to veto. The Helsinkigroup should have not a negativefinction to veto but rather the positivefinction to create new institutionsfor a European security system. The West European countries were puzzled by the acceleration of German unification which happened for two reasons: - The exodus of the GDRp~puhtion did not stop: unification seems to be the only solution to prevent the GDR from bleeding out. - The internationalsituation did not exclude the attempt to roll bah the development by Moscow policy planners. OddIy enough the Community started to push the rapid Anschluflsolution via Art. 23 of the Basic Law in order to avoid the necessity of changes in the treaty of Rome. We should be aware of the fact that a similar acceleration is operating among the other Comecon countries. At the end of 1989 it was still feasable to envisage a loose confederation with newcomers such as Austria, the EFTA countries and the former Comecon states. By spring 1990 it became evident that the Community should not discriminate Austria which found its application in a condition worse than the former Moscow satellites, and that the Comecon countries accepted no solution without prospects for full membership at the earliest convenience. Western Europe is not completely prepared to cope with the exigencies of this new momentum of European integration from Brest to Brest -as Germany has not yet any c~onvincing plan for handling unification and its ((Papers)): Revista de Sociologia enormous monetary costs but both Europe and Germany are forced to muddle through. Economic integration will be more costly by this undue haste: but political integration of Europe especially the formation of a common foreign policy, contrary to many fears will get easier by this great ((salto mortale integrativa)) in a period of diminishing East West tensions. LITERATURE Beyme, Klaus von (1 982), Economics and Politics within Socialist Systems. A Comparatiue and DeuelopmentalApproach, New York, Praeger (German in 1975), Beyme, Klaus von (1986), ((National Consciousness and ,Nationalism: The Case of the Two Germanies)). Canadian Reuiew of Studies in Nationalism, No. 2, pp. 227-248. Beyme, Klaus von (1 971), Vom Faschismus zur Entwicklungsdiktatur. Machtelite und Opposition in Spanien, Miinchen, Piper. Craig, A. Gordon. aZu grog fur Europa? Der amerikanische Historiker Gordon A. Craig iiber ein wiedervereinigtes Deutschlandn, Der Spiegel4611989, pp. 183187. ((Ende des Kommunismus -und was nun? Zeit-Symposium)), Die Zeit, 29 Dec, 1989, pp. 1-14. Przeworski, Adam (1986), ((Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy)) in Guillermo O'Donnell et al. (eds.), TransitionsJtom Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, vol 3, pp. 337-363.