Federalism and cultural pluralism : the Canadian experience

Federalism and Cultural Pluralism: The Canadian Experience C. Lloyd BROWN-JOHN University of Windsor, Ontario Working Paper n.106 Barcelona 1995 INTRODUCTION Canada is now, and always has been, a culturally plural land. Long before Europeans arrived to colonise and settle the vast upper portion of the North American continent peoples of diverse cultures reamed the land. The names of great European explorers and adventurers washed upon the coastal shores of North America -the Genoese explorer John Cabot sailing under and English flag in 1497; Gaspar and Michael Cort-Real from Portugal in 1500; Alvaraez Fagundes of Portugal in 1521; John Rut from England in 1527; Estevan Gomez also of Portugal in 1524-25 and finally, Jacques Cartier for France in 1534 and 1535. The Corte-Real brothers were the first to explore the waters of Canada’s arctic and the first to sight those people who Europeans later called "Eskimo" or what today we more correctly call "Inu" or "Inuit". What the great 15th and 16th Century explorers could neither have known nor have understood is that while they looked upon the land as often barren and inhospitable there were, indeed, cultures and peoples who had inhabited that land for centuries. The territory which now comprises "Canada" encompassed no fewer than 12 linguistic groups, some sixty distinct tribal communities and literally hundreds of tribal bands1. What Europeans assumed to be primitive savages ("noble savages" if one believes Jean Jacques Rousseau!) were diverse peoples and cultures co-habiting in some form of regularised relationship their physical environment. Forms of governance existed and social orders prevailed. But, because they did not comply with the European view of "civilisation", the recent arrivals on the continent set about changing and often eliminating the host cultures. It is ironic today that the very process launched in the 16th Century by Europeans continues as new groups of "explorers" and "settlers" arrive in Canada. Today, however, the inhabitants are able to voice their concerns and they are often able to argue that existing cultures are in danger of being submerged by the arrival of new and foreign cultures. Canada’s original native inhabitants were not so able to resist the tidel-wave of cultural change and, in consequence, they were submerged and often disappeared. It is possible to imagine that 100 or more years form now the fundamental languages not only of Canada but of North America in general will be entirely different than they are today. Indeed, a vast influx of persons from Hong Kong into the west coast city of Vancouver already is altering the cultural environment of that community. In turn, however, such immigration from non-traditional sources has evoked a widespread reaction in Canada and has led to a recent re- definition of qualifications for immigrant status. Fear that existing cultures will be irrevocably altered and even submerged are substantial motivators for much of the debate which surrounds relationships between the two "founding" communities in Canada. CANADA´S FOUNDING COMMUNITIES It is an historic irony today that in the contemporary contest between the two founding European cultures in Canada that those who originally, were termed "Canadians" (as a mode of distinguising them from the 'conquering British' and who, when dignity once more began to flourish, called themselves "Canadiens") have chosen to pursue another identity "Quebecois". Of course, I shall argue, as many have before, that the two terms are not incompatible. After all, most of us are capable of simultaneously identifying with cultures and concomitant symbols of state at several levels. Thus, today, to be a fervant Quebecois need not be an assumption that one has also precluded being a fervant Canadian. As J.R.Miller (1975;63) has suggested, form Confederation in 1867 Canada never was intended to be anything else but a "political entity". Uniformity, "...would have proved impossible of attainment. The various [British] colonies, with their unique historical development, their different religious denominations, and their distinct nationalities, could not have been homogenized culturally as they were joined politically. The peculiarities of language, creed, and regional identity had to be maintained, for several good and compelling reasons". Miller adds: "Even if it were possible to assimilate all British North Americans, to what would your assimilate them?...Canadian unity was not purchased at the price of homogenization because the colonial politicians who produced it had no intention of creating problems for themselves by debating something as abstract and theoretical as the cultural basis of the new state". Yet, while political wagering and compromise characterised the confederal and/or federal settlement recorded in the original Canadian constitution of 1867 - The British North America Actissues of culture were deep and subtley pervasive. Canada’s two founding European cultures were French and British -the latter being a blend of English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish2. Historically these two cultures had entwined on many occasions from the days of Caesar and Romans to William the Conqueror in 1066 and Edward IV’s invasion of France in 14753 and, of course, the Seven Years War which led to the capture of New France by the British and its cession to the British Empire by the 1763 Treaty of Paris. A British Proclamation of 1763 which, among other things, limited the territorial size of New France -renamed Quebecin an attempt to assimilate the newly conquered peoples and encourage settlement by British immigrants largely failed in its intent. Consequently, in 1774 in a document known as The Quebec Act, the British restored French civil war, the seigneurial system and, established Catholicism (for the first time ever in a British territory) as a religion with acknowledged status. The right of the Church to collect the tithe was also ensured. I do not propose to enter into the debate over who dominated whom in late 18th and early 19th century Quebec4. What I do wish to suggest, however, is that rather imperceptibly and irrevocably the cultural identities of both francophone communities in Canada (Quebec and les acadiennes5) persisted - albeit that of Quebec with great presence. It is important to appreciate this persistence of the francophone cultural identity in Canada over the difficult century after the 1763 conquest6. The conquest had been tenuous and the 1774 Quebec Act was unashamedly an attempt to ensure that the French inhabitants of the newly acquired territory did not join the burgeoning revolt in American colonies. Whether the British flattered themselves with the belief that the inhabitants of the new colony remained passive during the American invasion due to enlightend colonial policy or, simply due to indifference is not certain. What is certain, however, is that for the next 70 years assimilation was the operational premise of British colonial governance. What is equally certain, however, is that les canadiennes learned the intricacies of the British constitution much more rapidly than the British had anticipated (Igartua, 1974). Employing British political institutions, les canadiennes (especially of the mercantile class), sought to expand their own control over laws and institutions in accordance with French law and tradition. In summary, the very nature of linguistic and cultural protections assured French speaking. Canadians, especially after the Constitution Act of 1791 when they participated in colonial government, ensured that la survivance of the francophone fact in North America would have a substantial political dimension. In a war with the Americans (1812-1814) many francophones rendered service to British in return for land grants. Their loyalty was demonstrated and there was no turning back as 1837 uprisings in both "Upper" (Ontario) and "Lower" (Quebec), in support of representative government, suggested. The francophone political fact was clearly in play in Canada after 1841 and The Act of Union7. Thus, in the 25 years thereafter, leading up to the 1867 federation of the four North American British colonies as "Canada", the imperative of cultural and linguistic survival had been converted into an effective political presence. The constitutional agreement of 1865 which led to the final British North America Act in 1867 was, for all practical purposes, a political conclusion among two diverse linguistic and religiously premised communities. Canada was a political compromise. It was not a country founded on high purpose and with stunning constitutional declarationsUnlike the Americans, the Canadian constitutional drafters produced an archaic document -premised upon theories of British constitutional practise already out-dated in 18678. The concept, therefore, that the 1867 federal relationship in Canada was a political compromise between two "founding" races holds considerable substance. That concept is extremely important in understanding events which have transpired in the 128 years since that political agreement. McRoberts and Postgate (1980;32) have observed: "For French Canada, the real benefit of Confederation [in 1867] was the provision of a range of powers, limited but sacrosanct, over its own affair...[Quebec became] a concrete political unit, protected by the Constitution, in which the French Canadian community could be clearly dominant and thus have a chance to survive on its own terms". But, they also note that: "French Canadians were relegated to the position of a permanent minority where their rights and powers were subject to the actions of the Anglo-Canadian majority". For French speaking Canadians, especially those in Quebec, the Canadian Constitution was a permanent political agreement whereby the minority francophone community would garner not only internal self-determination but assurances that their minority status -not only in Canada but continentallywould be protected9. Reflecting upon this, Alain Gagnon (1989;147) has noted that "the Canadian system has been successful, not so much in resolving conflict, as in managing it, and striking a flexible balance between the divergent views of the initial bargain". The Quebec’s fears that their language, religion and culture would be abused was borne out in the years after the 1867 'Confederation' (federal) agreement10. Since 1867, the dominant political issue in Canada has been the nature of the fundamental bargain between the two founding communities. Fears that the original bargain is threatened combined with some rather romantic notions about maturing "nationhood" provide much of the impetus for the contemporary debate over culture and politics in Canada. NOTES ON THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE Latent and overt separatism have been part of Quebec nationalism certainly for most of the 20th Century. Arguments have taken many forms but one overwhelming characteristic of much of the discussion has been a sense of romanticism tinged with fear of what some neo-nationalists describe as "cultural genocide". The romanticism of neo-nationalism in Quebec is premised upon assumptions both about the maturation of a people and the role independence would play in establishing the identity of those people. It is a style of nationalism characteristic of many other nationalist movements and it lends itself well to political manipulation, for like a religion, nationalism plays upon the sentiments often at the expense of reason and common sense. Sovereignty is seen as a natural process -"we can see the Quebec nation transform itself from a fragile bud to a superb flower opening up to the world" (Lagassé, 1992). An holistic perception of a collectivity, saved from assimilation, now moving forward with hightened political consciousness and a sense of "nation". For some of the extreme nationalists Quebec sits precariously perched on the brink of annihilation "maintenant ou jamais" screams the title of Pierre Bourgault’s (1990) challenge; "Gouverner ou disparaître" is the warning of one Pierre Valdeboncoeur (in 1976 he was also writing of genocide). Other neo-nationalists see Quebec as strong and far from disappearing (Latouche, 1990). Latouche even praises federalism but, like many fellow nationalists, common sense is adandoned once romanticism takes over. Latouche argues that only a true political state will permit Quebec society to extend to the apex of its potential as a fully pluralistic entity. The argument finds its most complete and fullest expression in a 1993 work by Fernand Dumont one of Quebec’s most respected scholars and former director of Le centre Québécois de recherche sur la culture11. Dumont argues his nationalism in terms of a "genesis" -a quasi-organic entity with a life entirely of its own. The "otherness" of "les anglais" contrasted to the emerging realisation of being "French", a passage from childhood to adolescence, a transition from homeland to country, a genesis from a people to a nation. For neo-nationalists such as Dumont, Quebec’s problem has been its historic inability to find its collective identity as a nation. It has reached several times for the elusive national identity and each time the collectivity has faltered. This, Dumont argues, is the "vocation" (p. 235) of a people who pursued their identity under the very eyes of the British Empire. Myths and legends built upon myths and legends in the neo-nationalist world. The 1774 Quebec Act is seen as clever victory for those with vision enough to see survival as the collective and immediate goal. The rebellion of 1837 is re-interpreted away from a struggle for responsible government to symbolise another act of defiance by the collectivity against the cultural oppressor. Constructing nationalist myths continues to this very day. A constitutional agreement by nine of ten provinces (not including Quebec) in 1981, takes on the myth of the "night of the long knives" or "the stab in the back". The myth conveniently overlooks the role -or lack, thereofplayed by Quebec’s the nationalist Premier René Levesque. While the Premier played cards in his hotel room the other government leaders concluded a deal. While Quebec’s Premier snuggled in bed the next morning, the other government leaders announced their deal. Another aspect of the contemporary debate in Quebec relates to a genuine fear that the identity of French speaking persons will be submerged as the nature of immigration changes. Quebec’s birthrate has fallen form 3.78 in 1951 to 1.43 in 1986. This constitutes one of the lowest birthrates in the world12 (Institut, 1989). A 1988 study commissioned by the Quebec Conseil de la langue française concluded that the proportion of total Canadian population who would inhabit Quebec would decline from 26.5% in 1981 to 24.1% by 2021. A fear of being culturally submerged, a fear now being voiced by English-speaking Canadians as larger numbers of non-European immigrants enter Canada, is much more acute in a province wherein minority status has always been a way of life13. The irony is that Quebec is now having enormous difficulties assimilating immigrants -much the same experience that "British" Canada, historically, had trying to assimilate French speaking inhabitants. In many respects the contemporary debate in Canada is constitutional in the first instance but, more fundamentally, it pertains very closely to the ongoing historic struggle for cultural survival in the territory generally described as Quebec14. As suggested above, the issue of cultural survival has never been submerged in so far as concerns the French speaking community of Canada. Fears now being expressed that the cultural onslaught is even more threatening reflect much of the contemporary debate generally in Canada over immigration and the impact upon traditional "Canadian" cultural values. A 1991 national consultative inquiry into Canada’s future (Citizen’s Forum, 1991; 85-87) found that Canadians were challenging concepts such as "multi-culturalism" as being divisive: Overwhelmingly, participants [in public consultation hearings] told us that reminding us of our different origins is less useful in building a united country than emphasizing the things we have in common... Participants queried the focus on citizens' origins and celebrating heritage cultures, rather than embracing a uniquely Canadian national character and celebrating our Canadian heritage... A great many participants see the funding of multi-culturalism programs as a concrete example of the way in which government is encouraging divisiveness through our diverse cultural origins, rather than fostering unity. The theme of cultural submersion is an omnipresent theme not only in Quebec but as well in English-speaking Canada. For French-speaking residents of Quebec, the lure of recourse to nationalism is its attractiveness as a defensive mode -a fortressagainst assimilation, multi-culturalism and eventual disappearance. For French culture to survive, the machinery of an identifiable political state must be in place. The argument linking cultural survival to political identity has been compelling these past few years. CULTURAL PLURALISM: DIVERSITY WITHIN UNITY -THE FEDERAL DILEMMA Table1 Viewed from a linguistic perspective among the top 20 countries of origin, roughly 125,000 immigrants were locations were English is a major spoken language while fewer than 20,000 immigrants arrived from locations where French is a major language -a ratio in excess of 6:1. Another 50,000, among the top 20 countries of origin are from locations where neither of Canada’s official languages is spoken although, unless an immigrant is a sponsored family member, some minimum linguistic skill in either official language is pre-requisite to immigration to Canada. Another consideration is the radical and religious mix of immigrants. Indeed, roughly 20% of the immigrants were from countries traditionally associated with European culture, caucasian race and Christian religions. Roughly 80% of the immigrants to Canada in 1993 were of non-traditional religions and most were also non-caucasian. These proportions have been roughly similar for the past 25 years. In the 1970’s the federal Government responded with funded programmes designed to promote multi-culturalism. School officials in major cities such as Vancouver and Toronto instituted "heritage" programmes whereby students could receive formal credit for certain types of studies in a heritage language of their preference. By 1990, for example, the Toronto suburb of North York offered heritage language credit courses in more than 54 languages. Various religious communities (e.g. Muslims, Sikhs) are seeking official recognition of their religious schools as part of the formal educational system. Finally, an additional source of tension emerges when one considers where immigrants from non-traditional Canadian sources choose to reside. Many, emerging from urban areas themselves, take residence in Canada’s principle urban centres (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Winnipeg). This accentuates an already well entrenched historic alienation of rural and smaller community residents from urban dwellers. Urban communities are perceived to be considerably more culturally diverse than outlying and rural communities and the sense "two cultural communities" -that of traditional values and cultures and that of the recent immigrantshas taken on implied currency. The perception that there is some coherence to the cultural onslaught of new arrivals in Canada is belied by the diversity of ethnicities, religions and languages each of which seeks both to preserve its unique qualities while simultaneously adding to the complex fabric of late 20th Century Canada. For the two "founding European cultures" (French and British) the same sense of cultural challenge is present. But, for those of the British cultural community -a community already diluted in cultural terms by over 100 years of immigration from non-British (but largely European sources, Ukraine, Poland, Iceland, Russia, Italy, Portugal, etc.)- a need to survive has never been a factor. As the dominant culture in Canada and, in North America, the British (English language) culture has never had to struggle.