Efficiency and quality in local government management : the case of Spanish local authorities

1 Documents de treball Efficiency and Quality in Local Government Management. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities María Teresa Balaguer-Coll, Diego Prior-Jiménez, José Manuel Vela-Bargues Document de treball núm. 2002/2 Departament d'economia de l'empresa 2  Maria Teresa Balaguer Coll, Diego Prior Jiménez, José Manuel Vela Bargues Coordinador documents de treball: Pere Ortín Ángel http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/document.htm e-mail: [email protected] Telèfon: 93 581451 Edita: Departament d'economia de l'empresa http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials Edifici B 08193-Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain Tel. 93 5811209 Fax 93 5812555 3 Febrer, 2002 Efficiency and Quality in Local Government Management. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities María Teresa Balaguer-Coll, Diego Prior-Jiménez, José Manuel Vela-Bargues Documents de treball núm. 2/2002 La serie documents de treball d'economia de l'empresa presenta los avances y resultados de investigaciones en curso que han sido presentadas y discutidas en este departamento, no obstante las opiniones son responsabilidad de los autores. El documento no debe ser reproducido total ni parcialmente sin el consentimiento del autor o autores. Dirigir los comentarios y sugerencias directamente al autor, cuya dirección aparece en la página siguiente. A Working Paper in the documents de treball d'economia de l'empresa series is intended as a mean whereby a faculty researcher's thoughts and findings may be communicated to interested readers for their comments. Nevertheless, the ideas put forwards are responsibility of the author. Accordingly a Working Paper should not be quoted nor the data referred to without the written consent of the author. Please, direct your comments and suggestions to the author, which address shows up in the next page. 4 EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT. THE CASE OF SPANISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES María Teresa Balaguer-Coll Departament de Finances i Comptabilitat Universitat Jaume I Diego Prior-Jiménez Departament de Economia de la Empresa Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona José Manuel Vela-Bargues Departament de Finances i Comptabilitat Universitat Jaume I ABSTRACT This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency. Keywords: Local government performance; Data Envelopment Analysis, Efficiency and Quality. JEL Classification: D60, H71, H72 5 1. INTRODUCTION In recent years, governments have become increasingly concerned about the need to manage their resources more efficiently, with the aim of reducing public expenditure without affecting the standard of the services they provide. In this article, we focus our analysis on local government management. Local governments play an important role in the provision of public services, and form a subsection that, over time, has taken on more responsibilities. This in turn has led to an accumulation of operations, and a consequent increase in expenditure and greater weight in the country’s economy. In the Spanish experience, following the approval of the 1978 Constitution, important changes have been experienced which have led to an increase in the responsibilities of state and local governments in the provision of public services. Table 1 in section 2.2 shows how local administration accounts for more than 6% of GNP and, excluding Social Security, absorbs 20% of public resources. The principal objective of this study is to analyse the levels of both efficiency and quality in these entities, and determine what financial, socio-economic and budgetary characteristics are shared by local governments with similar efficiency level values. In this way, we will be able to find out whether inefficiencies can be explained by external factors, and as such are beyond the control of the authorities, or whether they are due solely to bad management. It could also be the case that inefficiency is due to a combination of both aspects. As set out below (in section 2.3), the variables related to quality are categorical. As they are noncontinuous variables, and different from those representing inputs and outputs, a suitable procedure to deal with this type of variable had to be established. From the various available alternatives, we have followed the proposal set out by Banker and Morey (1987), as we consider it to be the most suited to the characteristics of our sample. The article is divided into four sections. Section 2 sets out the methodology used in the efficiency analysis, the sample of local authorities analysed, and the variables, the inputs used and the outputs obtained, which are defined. The third section analyses the results of the empirical analysis, while the final section presents the essential conclusions drawn from the study. 6 2. METHODOLOGY 2.1. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE DEA The choice of the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) model for the analysis of local government efficiency is due to its conceptual simplicity and its versatility as a work tool, both of which enable the elimination of many of the difficulties inherent in the study of public services. Amongst these difficulties, its multi-product nature and the fact that market prices do not exist are worthy of note. The DEA model is posed as a problem of linear programming that enables an efficiency analysis to be carried out, subject to a series of restrictions. Within the public sector, more often than not, outputs are either totally or partially set externally, and for this reason, it makes more sense to evaluate efficiency in terms of the minimisation of inputs. Therefore, the mathematical formulation of the DEA, in the version aimed at the control and reduction of inputs, can be expressed as follows: λθ θ , Min [1] 0 0 0.. ≥ ≥− ≥+− λ λθ λ Xx Y y as i i Where è represents the factor that weights the inputs of the evaluated unit, and its value measures the efficiency of unit ‘i’ subject to evaluation (Decision Making Unit, or DMU, is the term used in the literature on this subject). X and Y are defined as the input and output matrices which contain all the units (DMUs) to be evaluated, while xi and yi represent the DMU inputs and outputs subject to evaluation. Finally, ë is a weight vector which describes the importance of the DMUs considered to determine the virtual producer or reference unit which is used as a comparison in order to evaluate unit ‘i’. Programme [1] must be resolved the same number of times as there are units to be evaluated (once for each DMU). The DEA methodology defines a linear programme that compares each producer with the “best” producers which make up the “best practice frontier”. The key to the analysis consists of finding the best virtual DMU for each real DMU. The model sets out with two restrictions: the first ( y Yi ≥ λ ), forces the virtual DMU to 7 produce at least as many outputs as those obtained by the DMU under analysis. The second restriction ( 0 ≥ − λ θ Xxi) enables us to determine the lowest possible input consumption. By resolving the linear programming corresponding to each one of the units under study, we obtain a coefficient θ for each DMU. If θi is the same as the unit, the unit is defined as efficient,1 while in the remaining cases, i.e. when θi < 1, it indicates inefficient performance in relation to the units located at the frontier. The underlying technology in programme [1] shows constant returns to scale. In other words, there is no restriction that would impede the comparison of low (high) dimension units with other units of a superior (inferior) size. In this way, the vector º elements will show whether the best practice frontier is made up of smaller units (if º>1) or larger sized units (if º<1) than the evaluated DMU. More suitable technological assumptions can be introduced when the reference technology is defined. Thus, if we want the comparison to consider only units of a similar size to that of the evaluated DMU, we can introduce the assumption of the variable returns to scale. That only requires adding one further restriction to programme [1]: 1 1 = ∑ = I i λ[2] 2.2 SAMPLE SELECTION The relative size of the local public sector is set in table 1. It shows how local administration accounts for more than 6% of GNP and, excluding Social Security, absorbs 20% of public resources. Table 1. Spanish public sector composition (as percentage of GNP) Current resources 1995 Capital resources 1995 Current resources 1999 Capital resources 1999 Central Administration 19.51 0.58 19.47 0.40 Regional Administration 5.40 0.86 6.65 1.11 Local Administration 5.47 0.48 5.68 0.58 Social Security 18.02 0.17 17.60 0.18 Source: BADESPE DATABASE (Public Administration Accounts) Web page address: http://www.estadief.minhac.es/badespe/bancodedatos/capublicas.htm 8 In order to carry out the study, statistical information from the Valencian Audit Institution and the Ministry for Public Administration was used (the authorities analysed are taken from the Valencian Autonomous Community, an area of considerable industrial and service activity on the Mediterranean coast in the east of Spain). The outputs were obtained from information gathered in a survey of local infrastructure and equipment devised by the Ministry for Public Administration, while inputs came from the budget data of local authorities in the Valencian Community which presented information to the Valencian Audit Institution in the years under study (1992-95). The sample was thus made up of 258 municipalities. It is important to highlight the fact that when the data was selected, it was decided to use implemented expenditures and revenues (net charges recorded and net liabilities recorded) instead of forecasts, although in some cases, this was at the expense of being up-to-date due to publication delays. However, the use of budgeted data would have greatly distorted the conclusions, since it is well known that budgeted figures generally underestimate expenditure and overestimate revenues. 2.3 DEFINITION OF INPUT AND OUTPUT VARIABLES In output specifications we differentiate on the one hand, production variables and on the other, quality variables. The information available on the variable of the quality of services provided is of a categorical nature (the quality of the services offered is arranged in three classifications: good, normal or bad). It is quantified using the proposal set out by Banker and Morey (1986), which involves breaking down the quality variable into two categorical variables: d1 and d2. Thus, for one unit j, the values taken by d1 and d2 will be the following: dj1 = dj2 = 0, if the quality is bad. dj1 =1 and dj2 = 0, if the quality is normal. dj1 = dj2 = 1, if the quality is good. In terms of output production, the specification of variables has be representative of the essential services provided by local corporations. In the first place, with the aim of setting bounds on what essential services are, we refer to Municipal Law where we have found the minimal services required (table 2 contains these services depending on Council size and the related variable according to the availability of the data bases we have utilized). 1 The literature describes this situation as one of weak efficiency. A more robust definition, based on Pareto’s optimality concept, requires additional conditions. An excellent presentation of the various notions of efficiency can be found in Cooper, 9 Given the difficulty of quantifying public sector output, it is often essential to look for proxy variables. For this reason, and based on the work of De Borger and Kerstens (1996a, b), Taïrou (2000) and Vanden Eeckaut (1993), the number of inhabitants is chosen to reflect the basic administrative services provided to the local population. Table 2 Output indicators based on the minimum services provided Population bands Minimum services provided Output indicators - Public street lighting. - Number of lighting points - Cemetery - Total population - Waste collection - Waste collected - Street cleaning - Street infrastructure surface area - Supply of drinking water to households - Population, street infrastructure surface area - Access to population centres - Street infrastructure surface area - Surfacing of public roads - Street infrastructure surface area In all local authorities - Regulation of food and drink - Total population - Public parks - Surface area of public parks - Public library - Total population - Market - Total population In local authorities with populations of over 5.000, in addition - Treatment of collected waste - Waste collected - Civil protection - Total population - Provision of social services - Total population - Fire prevention and extinction - Street infrastructure surface area - Public sports facilities - Total population In local authorities with populations of over 20.000, in addition - Abattoir - Total population - Urban passenger transport service - Total population and total surface areaIn local authorities with populations of over 50.000, in addition - Protection of the environment - Total surface area The descriptive values of the outputs used are given below (Table 3). Table 3. Descriptive values of the variables Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Population 5556.344 8641.432 23 55457 Number of votes 1349.552 1760.333 11 8824 Number of lighting points 660.2578 1198.776 13 12600 Tons of waste 11253.57 61166.16 14.66 654500 Street infrastructure surface area 140432 205777.2 2230 1308007 Registered surface area of public parks 17937.11 32141.9 70 248147 Quality (dichotomous: d1) 0.9534 0.210 0 1 Quality (d2) 0.7325 0.4434 0 1 Seiford and Tone (2000). 16 a public entity, there is little sense in looking for solutions to these inefficiencies, since, unlike private companies, it is practically impossible to change the size of a town (Graph 3). GRAPH 1 GRAPH 2 PURE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 DEA 1 DEA 2 DEA 3 Mean efficiency <5,000 Inhab 5,000 a 20,000 Inhab >20,000 Inhab GLOBAL TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 DEA 1 DEA 2 DEA 3 Mean efficiency <5,000 Inhab 5,000 a 20,000 Inhab >20,000 Inhab 17 GRAPH 3 These results can be interpreted as follows. The optimum size corresponds to relatively small municipalities, since inefficiency of scale is lower in the under 5,000 population band. However, larger municipalities are nearer to the frontier. In other words, although they are not the optimum size, they have better and greater resources (qualified staff, better information technology resources etc.), which places them very close to their frontier in variable performance (Graph 4). GRAPH 4 BREAKDOWN OF EFFICIENCY BY POPULATION BANDS EFFICIENCY OF SCALE 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 DEA 1 DEA 2 DEA 3 Mean efficiency <5,000 Inhab 5,000 a 20,000 Inhab >20,000 Inhab Input X Output QCRS VRS < 5,000 inhabitants Between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. > 20,000 inhabitants IE PTI IE PTI IE PTI VRS: Varying Returns to Scale; CRS: Constant Returns to Scale IE: Inefficiency of Scale; PTP: Pure Technical Inefficiency 18 3.3. BUDGETARY STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY. ANALISIS OF THE OBSERVED RELATION We now attempt to analyse whether the entities display similar budgetary structures. Through this analysis, we are able to find out whether local authority managers should base the formulation and implementation of budgets on a particular model, or if on the contrary, the composition of the budget has insignificant bearing on whether the local authority is classified as efficient. To carry this out, we used Finger and Kreinin’s similarity index (1979). This index has been used in the field of international commerce, and when applied to the case in point, is represented by the following expression: [ ] { } S ab Min xaxb i i i ( ) ( ), ( ) * = ∑ 100 In our study, S(ab) measures the similarity between two entities "a" and "b" with regard to the budgetary structure of expenditures and revenues. Xi (a) and Xi (b) represent the percentages of item “i” in entities a and b respectively. S(ab) oscillates between 0 and 100, i.e., the closer S (ab) is to 100, the greater the similarity between the two entities will be. Hence, the two extreme cases would be the following: • S(ab)=100 when Xi(a)=Xi(b) for each item “i”, i.e., when the composition of the two entities is identical • S(ab)=0 when the composition of Xi(a) is totally different from that of Xi(b). This index, however, is limited in that it only allows for the comparison of similarity between two entities. Since our study sets out to calculate similarity between various entities, we attempt to get round this limitation by calculating a similarity index for each local authority with respect to the rest. By using the similarity indexes applied to the budget (expenditures and revenues), we analyse the behaviour that these indices on average presented from 1992 to 1995, together with dispersion. In order to find out whether the level of similarity is higher in entities classified as efficient, in all the defined output specifications two groups were differentiated: on the one hand, efficient 19 entities (with a result of 990 similarity indices) and on the other, all the entities (with 3,3.150 indices) –Table 7-. Table 7. Descriptive values of similarity indices Mean Std. Dev. Entities Nº of similarity indices Expenditures Revenues Expenditures Revenues Total 33,150 68.77 73.47 15.58 13.54 Efficient 990 67.54 65.74 17.68 16.74 In order to be able to interpret the results, we tested the null hypothesis of equal averages between the groups, against the alternative hypothesis of difference of averages. A nonparametric sign test was used to carry this out, the results of which indicate that at a significance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis of equal averages was not rejected. We can therefore conclude that significant differences do not exist between the budgetary structures of efficient local authorities and the rest of the local authorities. In other words, there is no specific budgetary structure which we could classify as efficient, and thus an explanation for these inefficiencies must be sought in other factors. 3.4. DETERMINING FACTORS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY LEVELS In order to analyse whether the explanation for the differences in efficiency levels between distinct entities was to be found in a series of socio-economic and financial variables, we applied the Tobit model. This technique has been employed by authors such as De Borger et al. (1994), Martin and Page (1983) and Rhodes and Southwick (1989), amongst others, and is used in cases in which the dependent variable is censored. In this study, the censored variable is that of the efficiency levels, which cannot be higher than the unit. For our purposes, standard Tobit model can be defined in the following way: 11 1 ,...,1, * ** '* ≥= <= =+= ii iii iii ysiy ysiyy niuxy β 20 Where i uare assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from N(0, 2 σ ). The latent variable * i yis not directly observable. Its observed counterpart is the efficiency index i y. For * i yless than 1 both i yand i x are observed while for 1 *≥ i y the i xare observed and the i yequal the limit value of 1. It is well-know that the Tobit estimates to any violation in the in the underlying assumptions. In our case, * i y represents efficiency levels (censored variable) and ' i x are the socioeconomic and financial variables. Specifically, the variables appearing in Table 8 are those taken as independent variables. Table 8. Socio-economic and financial variables ABREV. VARIABLE FV/SV TAX REVENUE Tax revenue / Number inhabitants FV GRANTS Grants / Number inhabitants FV FINAN.LIAB Financial liabilities (chapter 9 revenues) / Number inhabitants FV UNEMPLOYMENT % Unemployment / Legal population SV TOURISM Tourism index SV COMMERCIAL Level of commercial activity SV ECON. LEVEL. Economic level SV FV: Financial variables SV: Socio-economic variables The results obtained from the Tobit analysis appear in Table 9. Table 9. Determining factors of efficiency levels: Tobit Results DEA 1 (4 Inputs/ 5 Outputs) DEA 2 (4 Inputs/ 3 Outputs) DEA 3 (4 Inputs/ 6 Outputs) TAX REVENUE -0.679 (-0.885)* -0.110 (-5.557)* -0.056 (-2.048)** GRANTS -0.115 (-3.360)* -0.131 (-4.468)* -0.164 (-4.127)* FINAN. LIAB 0.147 (1.824) -0.111 (-1.715) 0.118 (1.243) UNEMPLOYMENT -0.746 (-0.539) -0.396 (-0.332) -0.382 (-0.231) TOURISM -0.077 (-1.275) -0.098 (-1.875) -0.743 (-1.006) COMMERCIAL 0.094 (2.110)** 0.159 (4.021)* 0.124 (2.121)** ECON LEVEL. -2.430 (-1.295) -1.467 (-0.920) -1.530 (-0.686) CONSTANT 120.29 (11.673)* 120.38 (13.757)* 126.04 (10.188)* The figures brackets are t statistics. (*) Significant at 1% (**) Significant at 5% 21 The results indicate that the socio-economic variables, such as unemployment, level of tourism, economic level2, do not significantly affect the level of efficiency in public administrations. Of all the socio-economic and financial variables included in this study, only the per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants and the level of commercial activity appear to have any bearing on efficiency levels (Table 10). 4. CONCLUSIONS This paper analyses the determining factors of local government efficiency levels, in an attempt to distinguish the factors which can be influenced by management decisions from those which are exogenous. In this vein, the results obtained indicate that there is a wide margin available to public managers for optimisation in the use of public resources, but that some of these inefficiencies are due to exogenous factors, such as entity size, per capita tax revenue, per capita grants and level of commercial activity. With regard to entity size, the optimum size is that of relatively small municipalities. However, those with the largest populations, despite not being the optimum size, have better and greater resources at their disposal, placing them very near their frontier in variable returns to scale. The per capita tax revenue and the level of per capita grants also affect efficiency levels. The results obtained indicate that entities with higher tax revenues and/or those receiving higher grants are the most inefficient in the management of their resources. The same results were obtained in studies carried out by De Borger et al. (1994, pp. 354) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a, pp. 168) into Belgian local authorities. It therefore seems reasonable to expect that a local authority with a high capacity for obtaining resources (through tax revenue and/or grants) would be less motivated to manage them adequately. In contrast, the level of commercial activity has a positive impact on efficiency levels. This can also be observed in the work of Giménez and Prior (2000) on Catalonian local authorities. The authors consider that local authorities with a higher level of commercial activity subject their local authority managers to greater pressure to administer the services provided in the most efficient way. 2 The Spanish Annual Commercial Report (Anuario Comercial de España) takes the municipal per capita disposable household income as the economic level indicator. 22 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY Banker, R.D. and Morey, R.C. (1986): "The use of categorical variables in Data Envelopment Analysis". Management Science, Vol, 32, nº 12, pp. 1613-1626. Cooper, W, Seiford, L. and Tone, K. (2000): Data Envelopment Análisis. A Comprehensive Text with Models, Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software, Kluwer Academic Publishers. De Borger, B., Kerstens, K., Moesen, W. and Vanneste, J. (1994): "Explaining differences in productive efficiency: An application to Belgian municipalities". Public Choice, Vol. 80, nº 3-4, pp. 339-358. De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K. (1996a): Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A comparative analysis of FDH, DEA and econometric approaches". Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 26, nº 2, pp. 145-160. ______ (1996b): "Radial and Nonradial Measurement of Technical Efficiency: An Empirical Illustration for Belgian Local Governments using an FDH Reference Technology". The Journal of Productivity Analysis, nº 6, pp.41-62. Finger, J.M. and Kreinin, M.E. (1979): “A measure of export similarity and its possible uses”. The Economic Journal, nº 89, December, pp. 905-911. Giménez, V.M. and Prior, D. (2000): "Evaluación frontera de la eficiencia en costes. Una aplicación a los ayuntamientos de Cataluña". XVI Jornadas de Economía Industrial, Madrid. Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (BOE nº 80, 3 de abril). Martin, J. and Page, J. (1983): "The impact of subsidies on X-efficiency in LDC industry: Theory and an empirical test". Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 55, nº 4, pp. 608-617. Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas (1995): Encuesta de Infraestructuras y Equipamientos Locales. M.A.P. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (1997): Budgeting For The Future. Paris. OECD Publications. Rogo, K. (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budgets Cycles”. American Economic Review, Vol. 80, pp. 21-36. Rhodes, E. and Southwick, L. (1989): "Comparison of university performance differences over time". Working Paper School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. Sindicatura de Comptes de la Generalitat Valenciana (1992-1996): Cuentas Generales de las Entidades Locales. Taïrou, A.A. (2000): "Does inefficiency explain financial vulnerability of French municipalities? International Conference on Accounting, Auditing & Management in Public Sector Reforms, EIASM, Zaragoza, pp. 589-599. Vanden Eeckaut, P., Tulkens, H. and Jamar, M. A (1993): "Cost efficiency in Belgian municipalities" in Fried, Lovell & Schimidt (eds.) The Measuring of Productive Efficiency. Techniques and Applications. 23 Issues: 95/1 Productividad del trabajo, eficiencia e hipótesis de convergencia en la industria textilconfección europea. Jordi López Sintas 95/2 El tamaño de la empresa y la remuneración de los máximos directivos. Pedro Ortín Ángel 95/3 Multiple-Sourcing and Specific Investments. Miguel A. García-Cestona 96/1 La estructura interna de puestos y salarios en la jerarquía empresarial. Pedro Ortín Ángel 96/2 Efficient Privatization Under Incomplete Contracts. Miguel A. García-Cestona, Vicente Salas-Fumás 96/3 Institutional Imprinting, Global Cultural Models, and Patterns of Organizational Learning: Evidence from Firms in the Middle-Range Countries. Mauro F. Guillén (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania). 96/4 The relationship between firm size and innovation activity: a double decision approach. Ester Martínez-Ros (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), José M. Labeaga (UNED & Universitat Pompeu Fabra). 96/5 An Approach to Asset-Liability Risk Control Through Asset-Liability Securities. Joan Montllor i Serrats, María-Antonia Tarrazón Rodón 97/1 Protección de los administradores ante el mercado de capitales: evidencia empírica en España. Rafael Crespí i Cladera 97/2 Determinants of Ownership Structure: A Panel Data Approach to the Spanish Case. Rafael Crespí i Cladera 97/3 The Spanish Law of Suspension of Payments: An Economic Analysis From. Empirical Evidence. Esteban van Hemmen Almazor 98/1 Board Turnover and Firm Performance in Spanish Companies. Carles Gispert i Pellicer 98/2 Libre competencia frente a regulación en la distribución de medicamentos: teoría y evidencia empírica para el caso español. Eva Jansson 98/3 Firm’s Current Performance and Innovative Behavior Are the Main Determinants of Salaries in Small-Medium Enterprises. Jordi López Sintas y Ester Martínez Ros 24 98/4 On The Determinants of Export Internalization: An Empirical Comparison Between Catalan and Spanish (Non-Catalan) Exporting Firms. Alex Rialp i Criado 98/5 Modelo de previsión y análisis del equilibrio financiero en la empresa. Antonio Amorós Mestres 99/1 Avaluació dinàmica de la productivitat dels hospitals i la seva descomposició en canvi tecnològic i canvi en eficiència tècnica. Magda Solà 99/2 Block Transfers: Implications for the Governance of Spanish Corporations. Rafael Crespí, and Carles Gispert 99/3 The Asymmetry of IBEX-35 Returns With TAR Models. Mª Dolores Márquez, and César Villazón 99/4 Sources and Implications of Asymmetric Competition: An Empirical Study. Pilar López Belbeze 99/5 El aprendizaje en los acuerdos de colaboración interempresarial.Josep Rialp i Criado 00/1 The Cost of Ownership in the Governance of Interfirm Collaborations. Josep Rialp i Criado, i Vicente Salas Fumás 00/2 Reasignación de recursos y resolución de contratos en el sistema concursal español. Stefan van Hemmen Alamazor 00/3 A Dynamic Analysis of Intrafirm Diffusion: The ATMs. Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez, Yolanda Polo 00/4 La Elección de los Socios: Razones para Cooperar con Centros de Investigación y con Proveedores y Clientes. Cristina Bayona, Teresa García, Emilio Huerta 00/5 Inefficient Banks or Inefficient Assets? Emili Tortosa-Ausina 01/1 Collaboration Strategies and Technological Innovation: A Contractual Perspective of the Relationship Between Firms and Technological CentersK. Alex Rial, Josep Rialp, Lluís Santamaria 01/2 Modelo para la Identificación de Grupos Estratégicos Basado en el Análisis Envolvente de Datos: Aplicación al Sector Bancario Español. Diego Prior, Jordi Surroca. 01/3 Seniority-Based Pay: Is It Used As a Motivation Device? Alberto Bayo-Moriones. 01/4 Calidad de Servicio en la Enseñanza Universitaria: Desarrollo y Validación de una Escala de Medida.. Joan-Lluís Capelleras, José Mª Veciana. 25 01/5 Enfoque Estructural vs Recursos y Capacidades: Un Estudio Empírico de los factores Clave de Éxito de las Agencias de Viajes en España. Fabiola López-Marín, José Mª Veciana. 01/6 Opción de Responsabilidad Limitada y Opción de Abandonar: Una Integración para el Análisis del Coste de Capital. Neus Orgaz. 01/7 Un Modelo de Predicción de la Insolvencia Empresarial Aplicado al Sector Textil y Confección de Barcelona (1994-1997). Antonio Somoza López. 01/8 La Gestión del Conocimiento en Pequeñas Empresas de Tecnología de la Información: Una Investigación Exploratoria. Laura E. Zapata Cantú. 01/9 Marco Institucional formal de Creación de Empresas en Catalunya: Oferta y demanda de Servicios de apoyo. David Urbano y José María Veciana 02/1 Access as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management.Pablo Arocena, Mikel Villanueva. 02/02 Efficiency and Quality in Local Government Management. The Case of Spanish Local Authorities. María Teresa Balaguer José Manuel Vela-Bargues-Coll, Diego PriorJiménez,