Coal transitions—part 1: a systematic map and review of case study learnings from regional, national, and local coal phase-out experiences [original]

Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 113003 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac1b58

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TOPICAL REVIEW

Coal transitions—part 1: a systematic map and review of case

study learnings from regional, national, and local coal phase-out

experiences

Francesca Diluiso1,∗, Paula Walk2, Niccol`

o Manych1,2, Nicola Cerutti1, Vladislav Chipiga1,

Annabelle Workman3, Ceren Ayas3, Ryna Yiyun Cui4, Diyang Cui4, Kaihui Song4,5,

Lucy A Banisch1, Nikolaj Moretti1, Max W Callaghan1,6, Leon Clarke4, Felix Creutzig1, Jéroˆme Hilaire1,7,

Frank Jotzo8, Matthias Kalkuhl1,9, William F Lamb1,6, Andreas Löschel10, Finn Müller-Hansen1,7,

Gregory F Nemet11, Pao-Yu Oei2,12, Benjamin K Sovacool13, Jan C Steckel1,7, Sebastian Thomas14,

John Wiseman3,15 and Jan C Minx1,6

1Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Torgauer Straße 12–15, EUREF Campus #19, 10829 Berlin,

Germany

2TU Berlin, Str. des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany

3Climate and Energy College, University of Melbourne, 187 Grattan Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia

4Center for Global Sustainability, University of Maryland, 3101 Van Munching Hall, College Park, MD 20742, United States of America

5Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20740, United States of America

6School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom

7Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Post Box 601203, 14412 Potsdam, Germany

8Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia

9Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany

10 Center for Applied Economic Research, University of Münster, Stadtgraben 9, 48143 Münster, Germany

11 University of Wisconsin-Madison, La Follette School of Public Affairs, 1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, United States of

America

12 Europa-Universität Flensburg, Center for Sustainable Energy Systems (ZNES), Munketoft 3b, 24937 Flensburg, Germany

13 Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School, BN1 9SL Brighton, United Kingdom

14 Sustainable Engineering Group, Curtin University, Kent Street, Bentley 6102 Western Australia

15 Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia

∗Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.

E-mail: [email protected]

Keywords: climate change mitigation, coal transitions, evidence synthesis, political economy, systematic map

Abstract

A rapid coal phase-out is needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, but is hindered by

serious challenges ranging from vested interests to the risks of social disruption. To understand

how to organize a global coal phase-out, it is crucial to go beyond cost-effective climate mitigation

scenarios and learn from the experience of previous coal transitions. Despite the relevance of the

topic, evidence remains fragmented throughout different research fields, and not easily accessible.

To address this gap, this paper provides a systematic map and comprehensive review of the

literature on historical coal transitions. We use computer-assisted systematic mapping and review

methods to chart and evaluate the available evidence on historical declines in coal production and

consumption. We extracted a dataset of 278 case studies from 194 publications, covering coal

transitions in 44 countries and ranging from the end of the 19th century until 2021. We find a

relatively recent and rapidly expanding body of literature reflecting the growing importance of an

early coal phase-out in scientific and political debates. Previous evidence has primarily focused on

the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, while other countries that experienced large

coal declines, like those in Eastern Europe, are strongly underrepresented. An increasing number of

studies, mostly published in the last 5 years, has been focusing on China. Most of the countries

successfully reducing coal dependency have undergone both demand-side and supply-side

Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 113003 F Diluiso et al

transitions. This supports the use of policy approaches targeting both demand and supply

to achieve a complete coal phase-out. From a political economy perspective, our dataset

highlights that most transitions are driven by rising production costs for coal, falling prices

for alternative energies, or local environmental concerns, especially regarding air pollution.

The main challenges for coal-dependent regions are structural change transformations, in

particular for industry and labor. Rising unemployment is the most largely documented

outcome in the sample. Policymakers at multiple levels are instrumental in facilitating coal

transitions. They rely mainly on regulatory instruments to foster the transitions and

compensation schemes or investment plans to deal with their transformative processes.

Even though many models suggest that coal phase-outs are among the low-hanging fruits

on the way to climate neutrality and meeting the international climate goals, our case

studies analysis highlights the intricate political economy at work that needs to be

addressed through well-designed and just policies.

1. Introduction

A rapid coal phase-out is a key step to achieve the

goal of keeping global warming well below 2 ◦C.

Several elements make the global energy transition

away from coal the main road to achieve climate

targets. Coal accounts for about a third of global

CO2emissions (Friedlingstein et al 2019), is the most

carbon intensive fossil fuel, has significant negat-

ive externalities on human health and environment,

and it is easier to replace than oil and gas (Luderer

et al 2018). Phasing out coal is thus becoming a pri-

ority on the agenda of many countries and polit-

ical debates increasingly focus on how coal exits

can be organized over the next few decades (Garg

and Steckel 2017). However, current national emis-

sion reduction commitments (nationally determined

contributions—NDCs) of major coal-producing and

-consuming countries fall short of the required ambi-

tion and do not include clear clauses for a coal

exit. A global coal phase-out remains the elephant

in the room of international climate negotiations

(Edenhofer 2015).

It is possible to identify four main arguments

as to why phasing out coal may prove, in prac-

tice, extremely challenging (figure 1). First, coal is

historically and even currently abundant, based on

established technologies, and relatively easy to handle

(Steckel et al 2020). Coal use also allows many devel-

oping countries, where electrification is still in pro-

gress, to access affordable and reliable electricity

(Kalkuhl et al 2019). Its relative accessibility and

distribution across the globe make it attractive for

many countries as the real societal costs of coal (i.a.

environmental degradation, air and water pollution,

forced relocations, and global heating) are not fully

internalized (Muller et al 2011, Cardoso 2015, Sova-

cool et al 2021). Environmental and health benefits

alone would outweigh the direct policy costs of a coal

phase-out (Rauner et al 2020). However, not tak-

ing all these societal costs into consideration, coal is

often falsely perceived as cheap. In addition, costs of

renewable energies are decreasing but are penalized

by high capital costs, especially in the Global South

(Schmidt 2014, Hirth and Steckel 2016). Alternatives

to coal have a higher capital intensity per Megawatt,

making them less attractive for low- and middle-

income countries (Steffen 2020). Finally, the major-

ity of the operating coal fleet is located in regu-

lated or semi-regulated markets and still benefits

fromdirect or indirect fossil fuel subsidies (Edenhofer

2015, Bodnar et al 2020). This creates an economic

and regulatory lock-in, decreasing the attractiveness

of alternative sources, even when competitive and

cheaper.

Second, 60% of all coal power plants, mostly

constructed in the Global South, are younger than

20 years. Coal-fired power plants require high ini-

tial capital costs, which have to be amortized along

the average life of the plant. These lifetimes can even

extend to half a century or more. Early retirement

would imply sunk investments for a large part of the

coal fleet, making coal plants stranded assets (Calde-

cott et al 2016).

Third, the coal industry is deeply rooted in the

culture and the economy of territories. Economic and

employment impacts from coal phase-out policies

are highly localized, making the phase-out a sensitive

issue in specific areas and for specific communities.

Local and national policymakers are therefore under

increasing pressure to guarantee a ‘just transition’

(Sartor 2018). This implies the management of short-

and medium-term costs of the phase-out through the

provision of an effective social security system, a shift

in the economicstructure of coal regions through well

designed investment plans, and the development of a

new collective territorial and cultural identity (Jabob

et al 2020b, Oei et al 2020, Pai et al 2020).

Fourth, the coal industry is a powerful economic

stakeholder with significant vested interests and lob-

bying power. The coal mining industry employs

about 7.3 million people worldwide, with a global

market size of $698bn per year (IBISWorld 2019).

Moreover, coal-dependent economies often share

Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 113003 F Diluiso et al

Figure 1. Four common arguments why phasing out coal is difficult.

an institutional design more susceptible to vested

interests and corruption (Lamb and Minx 2020).

Against this background, Paris-consistent mitig-

ation scenarios provided by Integrated Assessment

Models (IAMs) generally envisage a rapid and sub-

stantial decline of coal in the next 30 years (Rogelj

et al 2018, Cui et al 2019, Minx et al 2022). Even if

the trajectories arising from different scenarios and

different models are extremely heterogeneous, a con-

sensus is rising on the possibility of phasing out coal

fairly quickly and relatively easy compared to other

fossil fuels (Kriegler et al 2018). Although helpful

in translating mitigation targets into policy actions,

these scenarios cannot capture the full complexity of

coal phase-out dynamics and their political economy

aspects. These models usually adopt a cost-effective

approach that does not take into account the dis-

tinct patterns of constraints linked to coal depend-

ency. Politics often must face trade-offs in terms of

feasibility andease ofimplementation whichmaylead

to less cost-effective solutions. Even if not explicitly

introduced in the models, political economy con-

straints should be kept in mind while interpreting

policy scenarios. Another limitation of model-based

evidence comes from the fact that most of the mod-

els ignore climate damages as well as the potential co-

benefits of actions to limit warming, as, for example,

health and environmental benefits, that in the case

of a coal phase-out are extremely relevant. Other

issues include the limited geographical resolution of

IAMs, which generally model the global economy and

energy systemdividedinto tens ofregions, ratherthan

hundreds of countries. This lack of disaggregation

and granularity makes it hard to rescale the results to

the national or subnational level, while, as explained,

transitions away from coal impact, in particular, spe-

cific territories and communities with geographical

imbalances of losses and benefits constituting further

important challenges and barriers for the transition.

Finally, as a general remark, it is important to con-

sider that scenario projections are run under a wide

range of uncertainties, ranging from implementation

of climate actions, availability and costs of technolo-

gies, and socio-economic and lifestyle changes. The

degree to which emissions can be reduced in the

short-medium run ultimately depends on the polit-

ical willingness, the plurality of interests, and tech-

nology and demand patterns that are crucial in shap-

ing the opportunity costs of the phase-out. Therefore,

while evidence coming from IAMs suggests a rapid

coal phase-out, there is a potential wedge between

policy actions that are efficient and effective, as sug-

gested by models, and the ones that are feasible1.

Linking model-based scenarios and political eco-

nomy considerations is thus important for identify-

ing viable pathways to climate change mitigation. To

provide solution-oriented knowledge it is useful to

draw on historical evidence of previous coal trans-

itions, to understand common patterns and key les-

sons from countries that have already experienced

declines in coal production and/or consumption.

Despite the relevance of the topic, evidence remains

fragmented throughout different research fields, and

not easily accessible. Some recent works on coal trans-

itions have provided a series of case-studies evidence

on coal phase-outs in major coal-consuming eco-

nomies (Caldecott et al 2017, Sartor 2018). While

these have been important early efforts, the number

of countries and case studies considered is limited,

specifically selected, and the work is undertaken with

no employment of systematic methods for assessing

the literature. To address this gap, this paper provides

a systematic map and comprehensive review of the

literature on historical coal transitions, with a specific

1For a comprehensive assessment of scenario evidence on coal

transitions in mitigation scenarios consistent with the Paris Agree-

ment see part 2 of this review (Minx et al 2022).

Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 113003 F Diluiso et al

focus on the different political economy dimensions

associated with a sustained decline in coal produc-

tion or consumption. To the best of our knowledge,

this is the first attempt to systematically character-

ize the literature landscape on past coal transitions.

In the spirit of our systematic exercise, the paper

develops around the following main research ques-

tion: what evidence exists on previous coal transitions?

The goal is to retrieve the evidence available in Eng-

lish to (a) understand main transition patterns across

countries and identify knowledge gaps and know-

ledge clusters and (b) provide an overview of different

political economy aspects of the transitions that have

been mentioned by previous studies. To deal with the

vast amount of literature and the rapid expansion

of evidence across disciplines, we rely on computer-

assisted techniques and machine learning algorithms

to find, screen, and identify the relevant literature

(Haddaway et al 2020). We identified 194 publica-

tions from 42 713 search results using a supervised

active learning approach that trained a support vec-

tor machine model using 1–2 word ngrams from the

article abstracts2. From these publications we coded

278 studies, collecting information on type of trans-

ition experienced, drivers and barriers, outcomes,

and policy instruments. In the first part of the ana-

lysis we map the literature on historical episodes of

declines in coal production and consumption in dif-

ferent periods and locations to answer the following

question: what happened, where, and when? The aim

is to identify common trends and transition waves

across countries and periods and to detect know-

ledge clusters and knowledge gaps, by confronting

the literature landscape with data on coal production

and consumption. In the second part of the paper

we want to shed light on political economy aspects

and answer the following research questions: what

were the main drivers and barriers for past coal trans-

itions? What have been the main outcomes of previous

coal-phase outs? Which actors have been involved and

which policy instruments have been adopted to address

the transformative processes required by the trans-

ition? Answering these questions can provide useful

policy insights and contribute to the understanding

of how to manage the rapid coal phase-out needed

to address the challenges at hand of global climate

stability.

The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-

lows. Section 2provides an overview of the current

state and trends of coal production and consump-

tion; section 3describes the research design adop-

ted in the paper; sections 4and 5present the res-

ults of our systematic map of the literature; section 6

discusses the main findings and provides some con-

cluding remarks.

2For an overview of this approach and its replicability see O’Mara-

Eves et al (2015).

2. Coal production and consumption:

current trends and historical declines

Global coal production and consumption has

increased three-fold over the past 50 years (figure 2).

Coal is the second-largest energy source after oil,

accounting for 27% of primary energy consumption

(BP 2020), and is the primary source for electricity

generation (IEA 2020a). Despite a growing awareness

of climatechange, as well as progressive climate policy

in some nations, the fastest period of global coal

growth occurred in the early 2000s (figure 2). This

‘renaissance of coal’ was led by China, but also took

place in many rapidly growing economies (Steckel

et al 2015, Jiang and Guan 2016).

Nonetheless,most coalproductionand consump-

tion remains concentrated in a small number of coun-

tries. Looking at the distribution of coal production

we see that seven countries, namely China, Indone-

sia, the United States, Australia, India, the Russian

Federation, and South Africa account for almost 90%

of world production (figure 3). The consumption

of coal is similarly concentrated: China is the major

consumer, followed by India and the United States,

which, together with Japan, South Africa and the

Russian Federation, make up 80% of the total con-

sumption (figure 4)3. The strong demand for coal in

Asia favors the Pacific exporters: looking at the coal

trade balance, Australia and Indonesia account for

more than half of the total coal export, with China

being the major coal importer, followed by India (IEA

2020a).

Global growth in coal production and consump-

tion stabilized between 2010 and 2019 (figure 2).

This triggered much speculation on whether global

CO2emissions may have peaked around 2016, which

turned out to be premature when emissions started to

rise in subsequent years (Jackson et al 2016, Figueres

et al 2018, Peters et al 2020). The underlying trend

was strongly driven by coal dynamics, particularly in

China, which experienced a slowdown in economic

growth after 2010 and limited the investment in new

coal capacity (Friedlingstein et al 2019, Peters et al

2020).

Whether or not a peak in coal production and

consumption has been reached depends on a regional

outlook and balance of trends. Coal production and

consumption are following a declining trend in the

United States and in most of the European countries,

however this decrease is offset by a larger production

and consumption by Asian economies, in particular

Indonesia. Europe is rapidly reducing coal consump-

tion dependency. In 2015, the UK, formerly ‘king

coal’, was a frontrunner in announcing an explicit

3These six countries, together with the Republic of Korea, Indone-

sia, Germany, Vietnam, Poland, Australia, Turkey, and Kazakh-

stan (in order or consumption) account for 90% of global coal

consumption.

Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 113003 F Diluiso et al

Figure 2. Global coal production and consumption. Source of data: BP (2020). Production refers to commercial solid fuels only,

i.e. bituminous coal and anthracite (hard coal), and lignite and brown (sub-bituminous) coal, and other commercial solid fuels. It

includes coal produced for coal-to-liquids and coal-to-gas transformations.

Figure 3. Coal production worldwide. Panel (A) shows country coverage and national contributions to global coal production

(%). Panel (B) lists the countries that account for more than 90% of global coal production. Source of data: BP (2020).

Production refers to commercial solid fuels only, i.e. bituminous coal and anthracite (hard coal), and lignite and brown

(sub-bituminous) coal, and other commercial solid fuels. It includes coal produced for coal-to-liquids and coal-to-gas

transformations. NA values in panel A do not necessarily indicate 0 coal production, but missing data where BP has aggregated

smaller producers into an ‘other’ category where individual national values cannot be distinguished.

coal phase-out (Brauers et al 2020). Since then, 14

other European countries committed to phase-out

coal generation by 2030 (EMBER 2019). Exceptions

are Belgium, which managed to become coal-power-

free already in 2016, as well as Germany and Czech

Republic, which agreed on a phase-out by 2038 (even

if in Germany there is the possibility of bringing the

phase-out date forward to 2035).

The United States did not declare a phase-out

date but showed no plans to build new coal plants

either. The coal-fired capacity in the United States has

been declining since 2011, after many plants retired

or switched to other fuels and the utilization rate of

running plants was reduced (EIA 2020). Neverthe-

less, about 500 GW of new coal-fired power plants

are globally planned or already under construction,

foremost in Asia (Global Energy Monitor 2020).

The successful construction (and utilization) of these

capacities in China, India, and other Asian coun-

tries would counterbalance current and prospective

reductions of coal use in the United States and Europe

and fail climate targets.

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