A Biographical Perspective on Processes of Radicalisation [original]

Vol.:(0123456789)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-021-09498-z

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A Biographical Perspective onProcesses ofRadicalisation

JanaMeier1· NicoleBögelein2 · FrankNeubacher2

Accepted: 6 September 2021 /

Abstract

This article reconstructs four ideal types of biographical self-descriptions outlining radi-

calisation processes that are based on longitudinal biographical interviews conducted

with male (former) right-wing extremists. In the first self-description, the biographers

explain how they were born into radicalised families whose ideological norms and values

they adopted without question. The second self-description outlines how the biographers’

actions were guided by a longing for stability and community. Initially, ideology plays a

tangential role, with involvement in Kameradschaften and violence providing key momen-

tum. In the third self-description, biographers refer to their German heritage and glorify

National Socialism. They see themselves as guardians of the German Volk, and partly

resort to violence to defend this idea. The fourth self-description outlines engagement with

right-wing extremism as an outlet for frustrations with social discrimination. During our

analysis, we examine whether any of these ideal types also correspond to self-descriptions

given by Islamists, concluding that the latter do indeed describe their pathways into radi-

calisation in a similar manner.

Keywords Right-wing extremism· Narrative criminology· Biography· Qualitative

research· Empirical study

Introduction

Right-wing extremism poses an obvious risk to individuals, society and the democratic

order both in Germany and throughout Europe. Research that provides insights into pro-

cesses of radicalisation—that is, an engagement with right-wing extremist views and

violent acts—is thus necessary. The many violent crimes that have been committed by

right-wing extremists in Germany in recent years attest to the growing relevance of the

Kameradschaft translates as “comradeship” or “fellowship” and is a title often adopted by far-right

militant groups.

* Nicole Bögelein

nicole.boegelein@uni-koeln.de

1 Zentrum Technik und Gesellschaft (Center forTechnology andSociety), Technische Universität

Berlin, Kaiserin-Augusta-Allee 104, 10553Berlin, Germany

2 Institute ofCriminology, University ofCologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923Cologne,

Germany

Published online: 12 October 2021

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2022) 28:155–176

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phenomenon1 and indicate rising social tensions and polarisation (Zick, 2017, p. 16).2

Right-wing extremism goes beyond right-wing populism, the latter of which is based

on a distinction between “the people” and “the elite”, nativism and populism (Boehnke

& Thran, 2019). Although, as a phenomenon, right-wing extremism cannot be subject to

a single definition (much like Islamism; see Snow & Byrd, 2007), at its core lie central

components of extreme right-wing ideologies3: assumptions of inequality based on innate

characteristics or cultural features that overemphasise one’s belonging to a specific ethnic

group, xenophobic or racist attitudes and group-focused enmity whereby individuals “are

judged to be unequal and subjected to the hostile mindsets of denigration and exclusion

based on their chosen or assumed membership of a group” (Heitmeyer, 2005, p. 64). In

general, a key feature of extremism is the construction of a singular self-identity that is out-

wardly defended (Berger, 2018, p. 579). Furthermore, right-wing extremism is character-

ised by visions of an authoritarian and anti-democratic order and the promotion of violence

as a means to achieve this goal. Manifest right-wing extremism is expressed in politically

motivated criminal acts and in membership of far-right political parties, Kameradschaften

and subcultural groups (see Frank & Glaser, 2018; Pfahl-Traughber, 2006).

In this paper, we reconstruct ideal-typical biographical self-descriptions based on

respondents’ chosen self-portrayal. This enables us to understand latent elements and

motives behind certain actions. We take a narrative criminology approach, whereby analy-

sis is based on the stories told by offenders (see Presser, 2009). We investigate how the

radicalisation process unfolds from a biographical perspective. Narrative analysis looks

at the narrator’s life to see how extreme orientations create a sense of identity and guide

actions, thus allowing relevant patterns of orientation to be identified for the radicalisation

phase (see Frank & Glaser, 2018, p. 358). The fundamental assumption of biographical

analysis is that far-right behavioural and patterns of orientation develop throughout a life-

long process during which family histories as well as extra-familial and life experiences

interact (see Köttig, 2008). In line with a genuinely qualitative research logic, the recon-

structed self-descriptions emphasise those elements stated as relevant by the interviewees;

no external concepts are imposed. They lead to an empirically founded classification of

biographical self-descriptions of far-right radicalisation. During our analysis, we examine

whether applying these self-descriptions to research into Islamist radicalisation would be

constructive.

In the opening section of this paper, we define the term that underlies our analysis—rad-

icalisation—and provide an overview of existing research. We then go on to describe our

methodology and sample. As we present our findings, we discuss each of the four recon-

structed typical biographical self-descriptions in turn while simultaneously looking at their

1 Between 2000 and 2007, a group calling themselves Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Social-

ist Underground) committed numerous murders and bomb attacks. 2015/16 saw a peak in politically moti-

vated violent offences targeted at refugee accommodation centres. In October 2015, a right-wing extremist

stabbed a candidate running in the Cologne mayoral elections. In July 2016, a young right-wing extremist

killed eight in a politically motivated attack in Munich. In June 2019, a politician was shot dead by a right-

wing extremist in Kassel. In October of the same year, two were killed during an anti-Semitic attack in

Halle. And in February 2020, nine people were murdered during a racially motivated attack in Hanau.

2 See Kruglanski, Webber and Köhler (2019, pp. 8 et seq.) for an overview of the history of right-wing

extremism in post-war Germany and a description of currently active parties.

3 Elshimi (2015) demonstrates that there is generally a plurality of perspectives with regard to Islamism,

and this also applies to right-wing extremism.

4 All citations have been translated by Nivene Raafat and Lyam Bittar unless otherwise stated.

156 J. Meier et al.

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relevance for Islamism. Finally, we draw conclusions and set out the limitations of this

study as well as possible areas for further research.

The Term “Radicalisation” andSelected Current Research

We understand radicalisation processes as the process of turning to extremist attitudes.

Building on Kemmesies (2006), we pragmatically consider extremism to be the attempt to

change the social status quo, i.e. the free democratic order, using non-democratic, illegiti-

mate means, including violence (p. 11). In line with the general discourse (see McCauley

& Moskalenko, 2008), in this article we focus on the radicalisation of non-state individuals

and groups. Like McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, p. 416), we understand the process of

radicalisation as follows: “radicalization means change in belief, feelings, and behaviors in

directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of

the ingroup.”

Definitions of “radicalism” or “danger” are invariably political and linked to the inter-

ests of national security agencies. Jukschat and Leimbach (2019, p. 11) call the term “radi-

calisation” a “hegemonial paradigm” due to its normativity. Those who are “radicalised”

are drastically constructed as a socially problematic group (see Coppock & McGovern,

2014; Leimbach, 2019). Deradicalisation and exit programmes have their roots in neo-

liberal governmentality (see Elshimi, 2015; an overview of counterterrorism strategies is

offered by Hellmuth, 2015, pp. 86 et seq.). We are aware of these issues and so in this

study, we examine individuals who have been convicted of relevant criminal offences and

who have either thus been labelled “radical” or who self-identify as such; in any case, they

have already had to grapple with this label.

During the process of radicalisation, a range of factors take effect at multiple levels

(Bögelein etal., 2017; Borum, 2011a, b; Frindte etal., 2016; Kruglanski etal., 2019; Zick,

2017). These operate not just on the individual, i.e. micro level, but also on the societal

macro level (e.g. discrimination, injustice, conflict) as well as on the meso level, i.e. within

groups (sense of community, friend–enemy distinction, group processes) (Meier et al.,

2020; Frindte etal., 2016, p. 11).

What specific factors influence a person’s political radicalisation? Key influencing fac-

tors are perceived negative treatment by the police, a belief in law-abiding behaviour and

risk seeking (Baier etal., 2016). Frindte etal. (2016) suggest radicalisation is the result of

an inability to satisfactorily perform age-specific developmental tasks, such as belonging,

acceptance and emotional support. Radicalised scenes offer solutions as well as tangible

support to help deal with these developmental tasks. Social contacts, in particular, appear

relevant (see Möller & Schumacher, n.d.). Those who turn to radical scenes display a lack

of system integration (e.g. in terms of school) and consider themselves to be permanently

and systematically disadvantaged, although this may not objectively be the case. They

often lack communication skills, self-esteem and a capacity for empathy, and endorse mas-

culinist ideals. Right-wing extremists often foster certain traits of “hegemonic masculinity”

(Connell, 1995) shown through openly expressed attitudes and beliefs, e.g. heterosexual-

ity, starting a family, serving one’s people and nation, a military mindset, unwillingness to

compromise and toughness as well as acting as a leader and key decision-maker (Virchow,

2011, p. 42). Pfeiffer (2016) observes that individuals are especially likely to come into

contact with the far-right scene through family—with grandfathers, in particular, acting as

a “catalyst” (p. 458)—school or within music and sports communities, a context for which

157A Biographical Perspective on Processes of Radicalisation

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he coins the term “right-wing extremist experience” (Glaser & Pfeiffer, 2013). Music plays

a significant role in the dissemination and development of far-right culture (Shaffer, 2017).

An increased sense of patriotism is a risk factor for the restriction of certain groups’ reli-

gious rights (e.g. with regard to the construction of mosques) even among those who hold

democratic beliefs (Canan, 2017).

Kraus and Mathes (2010) examined similarities between offenders classified by the

police as right-wing extremist and other types of offenders. Offenders motivated by far-

right ideology more frequently committed violent crimes and there were considerable simi-

larities between this group and non-political violent offenders. At present, those suspected

of far-right violence are no longer typical young delinquents; a shift is taking place in the

age structure of suspected perpetrators of far-right violence. While in 2007, 51% of sus-

pects were juveniles and young adults, by 2017, this figure had sunk to just 7%, i.e. offend-

ers are getting older (Laube etal., 2019). Willems and Steigleder (2003) also refute the

theory that violent far-right offences can be considered typical adolescent acts, and instead,

based on the based on the combination of offender and victim and the motive, consider

them to be hate crimes.

Lützinger (2010) analysed the biographies of far-right extremists and identifies influ-

ences from explicitly ideological groups. Individuals interested in the ideology sometimes

actively contact such groups, seeking their protection. Existing groups can also become

radicalised. Furthermore, shared political interests can bring like-minded individuals

together, and, finally, individuals are targeted for recruitment by radicalised groups. Ado-

lescents who do not identify with far-right ideology tend to join more traditional groups,

such as sports clubs, compared to adolescents with far-right views (Möller & Schumacher,

n.d.; Becker, 2010). Carlsson etal. (2020) also emphasise the importance of groups. In

interviews with former extremists, they identified three basic conditions for radicalisation:

poor social controls, interaction with individuals close to ideological groups as well as

a stage of “meaning-making” and finding a sense of purpose within the group. Aligning

one’s identity with one’s relationship to the group increases the individual’s willingness to

engage in violence on its behalf. In their empirical study based on interviews with former

right-wing extremists, Kruglanski etal. (2019) found evidence to support their 3N model

of radicalisation, which is based on three essential elements: “needs” (of those becoming

radicalised), “narratives” (cultural narratives that set out how commitment to the move-

ment satisfies the aforementioned needs) and “networks” (that exert both an informative as

well as a normative influence). Snow and Byrd (2007) also explain, taking Islamism as an

example, how important the framing of a radicalised social movement is for mobilisation;

this must be diagnostic (what is going wrong?), prognostic (what needs to be done?) and

motivational (why am I doing it?).

In terms of the radicalisation process itself, studies demonstrate a range of processes at

work. Eckert (2013) identifies stages in which hostility towards those seen as foreign leads

to xenophobia and, ultimately, to far-right ideology. Feeling unsettled by the unfamiliar

leads to group consciousness and the exclusion of others who are considered to be “worth

less”. This then increases the perceived threat and, ultimately, innate characteristics are

accorded higher value while those without such features are seen as inferior. These moral

values finally become absolute, superseding all other loyalties. In a study of the far-right

skinhead scene, Möller and Schumacher (n.d.) were able to identify four patterns of radi-

calisation (see Möller & Schumacher, n.d.): “Witnessing interethnic competition”, “Belief

in the cultural hegemony of interpretations based on racial hierarchies”, “[Political] sup-

plementation of the partial integration of youth culture” and “Community rebellion”. Böge-

lein and Meier (2020) identified four typical paths into radicalisation. “Path dependency”

158 J. Meier et al.

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sees individuals led into radicalisation by their immediate social environment; there is no

political motivation. Then, there is a stage in which self-evident truths amalgamate into

convictions (“self-evident-turns-into-conviction”). While extremist ideology might be

present in their social environment, ego specifically seeks out contact to external radical

groups. In “allegiance”, the individual encounters the ideology through a group, with ego

initially looking for belonging rather than political affiliation. In “ideology”, no right-wing

extremist ideology is present in ego’s immediate social environment, which is why ego

actively seeks out far-right groups that share its convictions. Lastly, a study by Colvin and

Pisoiu (2018) demonstrated that far-right violent offenders invoke the values of their sub-

cultural scene and the fundamental values of the wider culture to justify their offences. In

contrast to non-political offenders, they make no secret of their objective to establish their

ideology as the wider societal norm, e.g. by using certain tropes—allusions to their under-

lying ideological beliefs—as a matter of course (e.g. disparaging terms for certain groups).

Data andMethodology

Biographical Research

In line with sociological biographical research, we understand “biographies” to be a social

construct that is neither inherently individual nor subjective, but refers to collective rules,

discourses and social frameworks. In its lived course and retrospective examination, biog-

raphy is always both an individual and a collective product (Rosenthal, 2014). Biographical

research analyses biographical constructions that individuals develop to interpret their own

life and to build on a blueprint that can guide their actions and life course. This research

also contributes to the process of gaining an understanding of the other, i.e. an understand-

ing of the lived process of becoming who we are now (Rosenthal, 2014). Our aim is to seek

out process structures within individual biographies as, like Schütze (1983, p. 284), we

proceed on the assumption

that there are elementary forms of these process structures which, in principle, are

present in all life courses – even if only marginally in some cases […] and that there

are systematic combinations of such elementary process structures that are socially

relevant as they offer certain predestined life trajectories.

Our understanding of biographies differs from prevention projects that work with former

extremists (for an overview, see Gansewig & Walsh, 2020) where biographers are attrib-

uted a natural, individual authenticity and the story itself is used to serve a certain purpose.

Our approach involves reconstructing how the narrator perceived an experience as it took

place and thus aims to reveal the structures that shaped the narrator’s course of action. Our

aim is not to ascertain the truthfulness of the account. Empirical social research, which is

always based on retrospection and thus subject to rationalisation, can never fulfil this aim.

The following analysis makes a valuable contribution to existing research by pinpointing

ideal-typical biographical self-descriptions established, in the tradition of reconstructive

research, via an analysis of individual narratives.

The biographies were collected during narrative interviews with individuals who are or

have engaged in right-wing extremism or Islamism. These interviews were analysed based

on Rosenthal’s (1995) interview analysis method: first, we analysed the biographical data/

159A Biographical Perspective on Processes of Radicalisation

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