Visions of the Smart Grid City
Discourses, Experimentation and the
Making of Urban Energy Futures
in Berlin, Germany
vorgelegt von
Dipl.-Ing.
Leslie Quitzow
an der Fakultät I – Geistes- und Bildungswissenschaften
der Technischen Universität Berlin
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktorin der Philosophie
- Dr. phil. –
genehmigte Dissertation
Promotionsausschuss:
Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Axel Gelfert
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Liudger Dienel
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Knie
Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 02. Juni 2022
Berlin 2022
Visions of the Smart Grid City
Discourses, Experimentation and the
Making of Urban Energy Futures
in Berlin, Germany
By Leslie Quitzow
Berlin, October 2022
i
Abstract
This dissertation examines the visions associated with urban smart grid technologies and how they are being
mediated through processes of urban experimentation in the city of Berlin, Germany. Smart grids - vaguely
defined as the combination of electricity infrastructures with information and communication technologies for
sensing, monitoring, controlling and managing electricity flows - combine the promise of low-carbon transitions
with that of high-tech development and economic growth, and are currently being tested and implemented in
various so-called “urban laboratories” in the city. Through an in-depth case study of smart grid experimentation
at three of these urban labs, this dissertation unveils what Berlin’s energy futures could look like, and how their
meanings are being discursively created by actor coalitions across the policy, research and business domains. In
doing so, this dissertation critically interrogates the role of imagined futures and of experimental governance in
processes of urban socio-technical change.
Conceptually, it is situated at the interface of urban studies, infrastructure studies, and science and technology
studies. I conceive of smart grids as socio-technical infrastructures and political processes that are deeply
entangled with the social, political, and cultural shaping of cities, and whose development is driven by visions
and imaginaries that nurture certain assumptions about desirable and attainable urban futures. Using discourse
analysis, I show how visions of urban smart grid futures are being promoted by relevant actors, discourses, and
experimental arrangements in the city, discussing underlying rationalities and techniques and highlighting certain
critical omissions.
My findings suggest that visions of Berlin’s smart grid futures are being co-produced by urban policy narratives
and corporate marketing strategies on the one hand and reinforced by research and implementation practices
on the other. Although these visions have successfully activated an actor coalition that is pioneering urban
change, they are also driven by techno-optimism, built on few peoples’ perspectives, lack critical negotiation,
and are strongly embedded in the economic opportunities associated with the logics of the smart – not the
sustainable - city. I draw five main conclusions from these findings. Smart grid policy and implementation
practices should a) understand smart technologies as a means not an end, b) more sincerely embrace the social,
c) invite more pluralistic perspectives, d) dare more radical utopias, and finally, e) be backed by stronger political
leadership.
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Table of Contents
List of figures ............................................................................................................................... vii
List of tables ................................................................................................................................. ix
1 Introduction and background ................................................................................................ 1
1.1 What are smart grids? ........................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Smart grids and urban energy transitions ............................................................................................. 2
1.3 Smart grids at urban labs ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Problem statement ................................................................................................................................ 6
2 Research questions ............................................................................................................... 7
3 Literature review .................................................................................................................. 8
3.1 Academic literature on smart grids ....................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Smart grids in social and urban studies research (empirical gap) ......................................................... 9
3.3 The smart city in social and urban studies research ............................................................................ 11
3.4 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................................. 12
4 Conceptual foundations ...................................................................................................... 13
4.1 What are infrastructures? ................................................................................................................... 13
4.2 The co-evolution of infrastructures and cities ..................................................................................... 15
4.3 The techno-politics of urban infrastructures........................................................................................ 18
4.4 The knowledge politics of urban infrastructures ................................................................................. 20
4.5 Infrastructures and imagined urban futures........................................................................................ 21
4.6 How do infrastructures change? .......................................................................................................... 22
4.7 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................................. 24
5 Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 25
5.1 The performative power of imagining the future ................................................................................ 25
5.2 Leitbilder as analytical concept ........................................................................................................... 27
5.3 Socio-technical imaginaries as analytical concept............................................................................... 30
5.4 Merging the two .................................................................................................................................. 32
5.5 Envisioning and steering the future of the city .................................................................................... 34
5.6 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................................. 38
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6 Research design and methods ............................................................................................. 39
6.1 Leitbilder, socio-technical imaginaries and discourse .......................................................................... 39
6.2 What is discourse? ............................................................................................................................... 40
6.3 Analyzing discourse ............................................................................................................................. 41
6.3.1 Merging two approaches to discourse analysis .............................................................................. 42
6.3.2 The importance of storylines .......................................................................................................... 43
6.3.3 Technical procedure ........................................................................................................................ 45
6.4 Case study design ................................................................................................................................ 46
6.5 Data collection ..................................................................................................................................... 47
6.5.1 Semi-structured expert interviews .................................................................................................. 48
6.5.2 Review of relevant documents ........................................................................................................ 50
6.6 Limitations and disclaimer ................................................................................................................... 56
7 Introduction to my case study of Berlin ............................................................................... 57
7.1 Berlin’s smart and low-carbon agendas .............................................................................................. 57
7.2 Berlin’s local Energiewende ................................................................................................................. 58
7.3 The contested politics of Berlin’s electricity grid .................................................................................. 61
7.4 Berlin’s future sites .............................................................................................................................. 62
7.4.1 Technology Park Adlershof .............................................................................................................. 63
7.4.2 EUREF Campus ................................................................................................................................ 66
7.4.3 TXL Urban Tech Republic ................................................................................................................. 68
7.4.4 Closing remarks ............................................................................................................................... 70
7.5 Smart grid experimentation at Berlin’s future sites ............................................................................. 71
7.5.1 Energienetz Adlershof at Technology Park Adlershof ..................................................................... 71
7.5.2 Research Campus Mobility2Grid at EUREF Campus ........................................................................ 74
7.5.3 Low-Exergy-Network ....................................................................................................................... 75
7.6 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................................. 76
8 Analyzing Berlin’s smart grid discourse ................................................................................ 77
8.1 Defining urban smart grids: between umbrella term and empty label ............................................... 77
8.1.1 Smart grids as wishlist of technical artefacts .................................................................................. 78
8.1.2 Smart grids as tools for coordinating people .................................................................................. 80
8.1.3 Smart grids as empty signifier ......................................................................................................... 82
8.1.4 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................................... 83
8.2 Framing urban smart grids: between technical solutions and social change-makers ......................... 83
8.2.1 Implement the Energiewende ......................................................................................................... 84
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8.2.2 Improve energy management ......................................................................................................... 85
8.2.3 Make the city “smart” and “green” ................................................................................................. 92
8.2.4 Boost the local economy ................................................................................................................. 93
8.2.5 Foster decentralization and prosumage ......................................................................................... 94
8.2.6 Concluding remarks ....................................................................................................................... 101
8.3 Classifying urban smart grids: between intelligent and unintelligible ............................................... 102
8.3.1 Intelligent optimizers .................................................................................................................... 102
8.3.2 Modern, exciting, innovative ........................................................................................................ 103
8.3.3 Inevitable and without alternative ................................................................................................ 104
8.3.4 Complex, challenging and expensive ............................................................................................ 105
8.4 Thoughts on risks and critical absences ............................................................................................. 106
8.5 Concluding remarks: dominant storylines of Berlin as a future smart grid city ................................. 109
9 The politics of experimental futuring with smart grid infrastructures in Berlin ..................... 111
9.1 Who is involved in Berlin’s smart grid experimentation and what are their roles? ........................... 112
9.1.1 The acting grid operator ................................................................................................................ 112
9.1.2 The ambiguous public administration ........................................................................................... 113
9.1.3 The new public utility company, Berlin Energie ............................................................................ 114
9.1.4 The scientific community .............................................................................................................. 115
9.1.5 Project development companies .................................................................................................. 116
9.1.6 ICT and electronics companies ...................................................................................................... 117
9.1.7 Civil society organizations (BUND, BürgerEnergieBerlin) .............................................................. 117
9.1.8 Concluding remarks: few powerless pioneers, many opportunists and an ambiguous
administration ............................................................................................................................................ 118
9.2 The politics of experimental “futuring” with smart grid infrastructures ........................................... 119
9.2.1 What is urban experimentation? .................................................................................................. 120
9.2.2 Berlin’s pilot projects as demonstrators of entrepreneurial smart grid futures ........................... 122
9.2.3 Berlin’s pilot projects as generators of social acceptance for smart grid futures ......................... 128
9.2.4 The future sites as tools for smart city marketing ........................................................................ 130
9.2.5 Visualizing Berlin’s smart grid constellation .................................................................................. 132
9.3 Concluding remarks: everybody wants smart grids, but nobody nobody is taking the lead ............. 135
9.3.1 Pilot projects as drivers ................................................................................................................. 135
9.3.2 Shared visions, questionable alliances .......................................................................................... 136
9.3.3 The long path from visions to socio-technical change .................................................................. 137
10 Conclusions and outlook ................................................................................................. 139
10.1 Treat smart technologies as a means not an end .............................................................................. 140
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10.2 Embrace the social ............................................................................................................................. 141
10.3 Invite more pluralistic visions of urban sustainability ........................................................................ 143
10.4 Dare more radical utopias ................................................................................................................. 145
10.5 Show stronger political leadership..................................................................................................... 148
11 References ..................................................................................................................... 151
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 163
Interview guideline (english) ........................................................................................................................... 163
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List of figures
Figure 1: Differences between electric grid systems © adapted from www.energie-macht-schule.de................. 5
Figure 2: Innovative Leitbilder develop into socio-technical imaginaries (own figure) ........................................ 34
Figure 3: Relating discourse to visions and socio-technical imaginaries (own figure) .......................................... 45
Figure 4: Location of Berlin’s future sites in the city © Zukunftsorte Berlin / WISTA Management GmbH ......... 63
Figure 5: Bird’s eye view of Technology Campus Adlershof 2019 © WISTA.Plan GmbH / picture: D. Laubner ... 64
Figure 6: Iconic wind channel tower from the 1930s fotographed at Adlershof in the late 1980s © WISTA
Management GmbH .............................................................................................................................................. 65
Figure 7: 3D rendering of building development plans at EUREF Campus within its urban surroundings 2018 ©
EUREF AG .............................................................................................................................................................. 66
Figure 8: Gasometer on EUREF Campus 2018 © Christian Kruppa / EUREF AG ................................................... 68
Figure 9: Bird’s eye view of Tegel airport © Geoportal Berlin / Digitale farbige Ortophotos 2011 (DOP20RGB) 68
Figure 10: 3D rendering of building plans at TXL © Tegel Projekt GmbH / Macina .............................................. 70
Figure 11: Schematic plan with different areas within Berlin TXL © Tegel Projekt GmbH ................................... 70
Figure 12: Location of the three future sites in the city of Berlin (own figure) .................................................... 71
Figure 13: Zentrum für Photonik und Optik © TU Berlin / Energienetz Adlershof ............................................... 72
Figure 14: Site plan with laboratory buildings and cooling network © Energienetz Adlershof ............................ 73
Figure 15: Schematic drawing of the smart grid project at Adlershof 2020 © WISTA Management GmbH ........ 74
Figure 16: Energy concept including smart grid system for TXL Urban Tech Republic © Tegel Projekt GmbH .... 76
Figure 17: Ice storage facility at ZPO © TU Berlin (left) and cooling network being connected to ZPO © Energienetz
Adlershof (right) .................................................................................................................................................. 123
Figure 18: Newly constructed cooling distribution system with information point © TU Berlin ....................... 124
Figure 19: Demonstration pavilion from the outside (left) and the inside (right) © Energienetz Adlershof ...... 124
Figure 20: Wind energy generation plant (left) @ Reiner Lemoine Institute, and electric vehicle charging stations
at EUREF Campus (right) © Esteve Franquesa .................................................................................................... 125
Figure 21: Photovoltaic roof and electric vehicle charging stations at EUREF Campus © InnoZ / Vipul Toprani 126
Figure 22: Interactive monitor (left) © Inno2Grid in M2G smart grid showroom (right) © InnoZ ..................... 126
Figure 23: EUREF Campus as event location © EUREF AG .................................................................................. 127
Figure 24: Office towers at EUREF Campus © EUREF AG ................................................................................... 128
Figure 25: Who and what is influencing Berlin's smart grid discourse? (own figure) ......................................... 134
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List of tables
Table 1: Overview of all interviews ....................................................................................................................... 49
Table 2: List of relevant documents ...................................................................................................................... 51
Table 3: Overview of data collected in relation to each spatial scale ................................................................... 55
Table 4: Overview of data collected in relation to each pilot project (sub-set out of total) ................................. 55
Table 5: Overview of data collected in relation to types of institutions ............................................................... 55
Table 6: Data collected in relation to each type of community ............................................................................ 56
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1 Introduction and background
This dissertation investigates how urban smart grid infrastructures are being envisioned and enacted in the city
of Berlin, Germany. The development of these novel technological infrastructures is accompanied by numerous
hopes and aspirations for the future, especially regarding the transformation of current unsustainable energy
systems. Although these visions circle around the future, they have the power to shape processes of urban socio-
technical change in the present. Visions of infrastructural futures have a long history of influencing urban
development, from the introduction of water and waste water systems in the sanitary city of the late 19th century
to the construction of expansive road networks in the Modern functionalist city of the early 20th century. Urban
infrastructures embody notions of a better tomorrow that are often closely related to ideas of what it means to
be modern, progressive or free today. They embody a society’s hopes and values on the one hand, and can carry
public messages about these hopes and values on the other. Oftentimes, which hopes and values are engineered
into urban infrastructures is defined by certain infrastructural elites, such as government agencies,
entrepreneurs, scientists, technology companies or NGOs that have the knowledge and the capabilities to
influence infrastructural development in the city. The development of urban infrastructures is therefore closely
attached to the power of these elites to translate their hopes, desires and fantasies in discursive and material
terms.
In the case of smart grids in Berlin, these hopes for better infrastructural futures are currently being mediated
through sites of urban experimentation, or so-called “urban laboratories” where actors from the business, policy,
and research domains interact to create infrastructural prototypes for broader replication and scaling. At these
sites, visions of infrastructural futures simultaneously serve as means and ends of city making. As actor coalitions
gather to develop, test and implement smart grids at these sites, their visions thus become important vehicles
of urban governance. To unpack the dominant rationalities underlying their visions and shed light on possible
absences and alternatives, I critically analyze how smart grid infrastructures are being discursively constructed
within and through Berlin’s urban laboratories. I use smart grid infrastructures as lens through which to analyze
the political processes of Berlin’s urban socio-technical “becoming”.
Firstly, I analyze how visions of smart grid futures are intertwined with visions of the smart city on the one hand
and of the sustainable city on the other. My research reveals the ambiguity of imagining smart grid futures as
low-carbon futures in the face of the more economically oriented politics of digitization. My research thus
highlights the tension between “smart” and “eco” city imaginaries and how visions of the “smart grid city”
produce and are at the same time being produced by this tension.
Secondly, my research engages with the ability of these visions to enact broader urban socio-technical change.
It thus relates academic debates on visions of the future to debates on urban sustainability transitions. It shows
that even a strong, politically backed vision might only translate into a relatively marginal phenomenon instead
of developing into a widely shared and practically embraced urban reality. On a more conceptual level, this
dissertation thus engages with the ability of visions, imaginaries and discourses to create the material and social
reality of the city.
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1.1 What are smart grids?
Although only vaguely defined, smart grids stand for the integration of information and communication
technologies (ICT) into electricity networks. Visions attached to smart grids circle around a variety of goals,
including low-carbon energy production through the integration of more (fluctuating) renewable energy sources,
higher energy efficiency through the real-time coordination of resource flows, higher supply security through
automatic grid reconfiguration, and more active consumer participation in energy markets (Covrig et al., 2014).
Moreover, city governments see the digital enhancement of electricity grids as an opportunity for increasing
economic competitiveness through high-tech infrastructural modernization and for attracting high-skilled, well-
paying jobs. The promise of pairing high-tech development and economic growth with environmental protection
has led to increasing investments into smart grid technological development by businesses and urban policy
makers, which are being tested and implemented in a multitude of cities across the country.
Smart grids are challenging the large socio-technical systems that comprise urban electricity grids as we know
them. Currently, electricity networks distribute stable loads uni-directionally from a small number of centralized
power plants to a large number of local consumers, are centrally managed and usually controlled by few large
network operators. By contrast, smart grids are conceived to accommodate fluctuating voltage profiles from
renewable energies, enable two-way generation and distribution to and from various decentralized sources, and
respond to customer specific demand. These features are enabled by an ‘energy information system’ (Bichler,
2012) or an ‘internet of energy’ (Karnouskos and Holanda, 2009; Weiler) that coordinates a complex web of
producers, consumers and – in the future also - storage units (including, for example, electric vehicles). Long-
term visions of the smart grid even include the integration of service sectors other than electricity, such as water,
gas, heating, cooling, waste management and mobility. The smart grid is therefore envisaged as a highly
communicative network that provides information in real-time, allows multi-lateral resource flows, reacts flexibly
to demand and is accessible for a multitude of new market players.
1.2 Smart grids and urban energy transitions
Most modern cities are fundamentally built on the exploitation of fossil fuels. With very few exceptions oil, coal,
gas and nuclear power have been the pillars of urban development in the Western world. The constant supply
of energy that sustains modern city life is secured by intricate infrastructure networks that have evolved over
the course of many decades and are deeply rooted not only in urban space but also in urban practices,
institutions, economies and governance arrangements. The transition to renewable energies is challenging the
nature of these infrastructure systems and with it the nature of the organization of urban life. While fossil fuels
are still the dominant sources of energy today, there is rising pressure to integrate increasing amounts of
renewable energies into urban electricity, heating and mobility systems.
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In Germany, urban smart grid activities have especially gained momentum since the country’s energy policy turn-
around in 2011. This policy package - commonly known as Energiewende1 - aims at phasing out nuclear power
and replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies by the mid-2000s. The rising awareness for the need to
transform urban energy systems and lower carbon emissions has put urban administrations under pressure to
rethink the ways in which energy and other resources are used, produced and circulated in cities. It has sparked
a competition between German cities to modernize their century-old energy infrastructure systems and
accommodate novel technologies such as solar panels on rooftops and façades, battery storage facilities in
private living rooms, or combined heat and power plants in tenement basements. All over the country, cities are
therefore competing for the best technological solutions to their emissions problem.
‘Smart’ electricity grids are seen as one of these solutions. They are hailed as indispensable means to achieve the
mass integration of renewable energies into urban energy systems and as promising pathways towards reducing
energy consumption and reaching carbon neutrality. For this reason, smart grid technologies are being practically
implemented and tested in the local settings of cities, where their advancement is becoming entangled with
other urban development policies and concerns. Apart from promising low-carbon development, these new
digital possibilities are also being embraced as opportunity to modernize and invest in century old urban
infrastructure systems. They are being promoted as tools that will enable environmental protection and at the
same time foster technological innovation and economic growth.
At the same time, smart grid technologies challenge the logics of the large technical infrastructure networks that
have carried the flows of electricity, heating, gas and other resources for nearly a century. In Germany, existing
electricity systems have been largely built following the logics of centralized management and public oversight
over service provision (Daseinsvorsorge). For decades, supply security and economic profitability have been their
guiding standards, as is laid out in the federal Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz). These existing
networked infrastructures are therefore strongly associated with principles of centralization, integration and
solidarity. Historically, electricity infrastructures have been understood as integrative and equalizing forces,
which surpass socio-economic, spatial and political boundaries by facilitating homogeneous service provision
across social groups, aligning standards and practices across regions, and catalyzing governmental cooperation
across service territories (Coutard and Rutherford, 2016). Until today, this “networked infrastructural ideal”
(Monstadt and Coutard, 2019) is built on the idea of spatial and organizational expansion and geared towards
maximizing supply (rather than, for example, interest in user practices or sensitivity to demand). In turn, the
“networked city” is commonly envisioned as a uniform, integrated and equitable (McFarlane and Rutherford,
2008: 370) space of collective infrastructural standards and practices.
1 The national policy framework known as Energiewende sets out Germany’s medium to long-term targets for the reduction
of energy use and green house gas emissions as well as the country’s goals for increasing energy efficiency. At the time of
writing, its main aims were a 50% reduction of primary energy use by 2050 (compared to 2008 levels) and an 80% reduction
of green house gas emissions by the same year (compared to 1990 levels). To reach these goals, the German government
aims at steadily increasing the share of renewables in overall final energy consumption to 60% by 2050. Special importance
is placed on increasing the share of renewably generated electricity consumption to 80% by the year 2050. These goals are
complemented by the decision to phase out nuclear energy production by 2022. See Quitzow et al. (2016).
4
Smart grid technologies are challenging this networked city ideal in a variety of ways. In the urban context, the
emerging technological possibilities associated with smart grids imply a number of significant transformations at
the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic levels. They reach far into the existing configurations of the
urban electricity sector, including its dominant technologies, actor constellations, market logics, regulatory
mechanisms, institutional structures, financial instruments and – not least - into the practices (and the privacy)
of users (Canzler and Knie, 2013). Among others, smart grids raise questions about the relationship between
centralized and decentralized structures of electricity production, consumption and management in the city. The
integration of small-scale decentralized production and consumption units (e.g. ‘smart homes’) points to the
development of a cellular structure of different-sized micro-grids and a possible fragmentation of services
(Bhave, 2015; Bichler, 2012). This might lead to distinct product markets and service territories, and possibly
result in spatial disparities. It is not yet clear which level of network decentralization is feasible in the city,
whether sub-networks will emerge, and if so, whether this will result in different levels of – for example - supply
security. Much will depend on how the network is regulated and managed. In order to synchronize supply and
demand and flexibly adapt prices, operations pertaining to the grid and operations pertaining to the market will
have to be orchestrated together. How and by whom they be managed is utterly unclear. What role will public
authorities play? What role might network operators play? While traditional distribution service operators
(DSOs) are responsible only for grid operations, their future role might include energy data and energy market
management (Bichler, 2012). Smart grid development also raises questions about the roles and responsibilities
of all stakeholders involved in urban electricity systems. This includes utility companies, network operators,
regulatory authorities, and also users. Through the emergence of smart grids, established players are being
confronted with a set of new actors that are claiming stakes in the sector, most notably the ICT industry but also
small-scale energy producers and (network) service providers. This shift requires new business models and new
corporate partnerships between highly unlike and hitherto unfamiliar actors. These shifts are also relevant for
private electricity users, who are being confronted with possibilities of ‘prosumage’, i.e. the production,
consumption and storage of electricity in small-scale household units (Canzler and Knie, 2013). The
transformation of the grid therefore not only entails major technological innovations, but also significant shifts
in the "commercial and political power structures" (Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012: 5) in the city. Currently, actor
constellations are being reshuffled, institutional arrangements reordered, power relations newly distributed and
the legal and regulatory framework overhauled. Given the messiness of the process, it is unclear, however, who
or what is driving the development of smart grids in cities and to what ends. Research on the underlying
processes of transformation is therefore timely.
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Figure 1: Differences between electric grid systems © adapted from www.energie-macht-schule.de
1.3 Smart grids at urban labs
The deployment of smart grid infrastructures is still in an early stage, and test versions have only been installed
in micro-scale pilot projects. Their roll-out, though keenly expected, has not yet happened. All over the country,
smart grids are being tested and implemented in so-called “urban laboratories”, where actors such as IT
companies, universities, and real estate developers collaborate to bring these infrastructural possibilities to
matter. In effect, urban energy and infrastructural transitions are being implemented within and through such
spatially delimited sites of urban experimentation (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Castán Broto and Bulkeley,
2013; Evans and Karvonen, 2014; Hoffman, 2011; McLean et al., 2015; Schulte-Römer, 2015), where they are no
longer the matter of politicians and urban administrations alone, but increasingly involve a diverse range of
stakeholders (Blanchet, 2015). These “urban labs” provide a space for articulating and negotiating technological
futures, as well as implementing and showcasing them to a broader public (Evans et al., 2016). By means of
technology trials, they facilitate new policies, actor coalitions, institutional arrangements, and cultures around
smart grids, and should therefore be understood as spaces not only for envisioning, but for governing and actively
creating the city (Bulkeley et al., 2019; Evans et al., 2016). As smart electricity grids and urbanism come together,
the city thus becomes a privileged site for energy experimentation while, at the same time, electricity becomes
central to processes of urban governance (Bulkeley et al., 2016a; McLean et al., 2015). Bulkeley and Castán Broto
argue that such "experiments are critical sites of urban climate politics" (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013: 368),
6
because they "are the means through which discourses and visions concerning the future of cities are rendered
practical, and governable." (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013: 367).
1.4 Problem statement
Although the broad dissemination of smart grid infrastructures suggests significant social and political
transformations to the urban fabric and urban life, academic discussions about smart grids are still dominated
by ICT and electrical engineering related concerns (see chapter 3 “Literature review”). Moreover, the political
implications of how smart grid related visions of urban futures are being produced and translated into material
reality in urban labs is hardly a matter of academic or of public debates. While there are broad debates about
how the smart city and the low-carbon paradigms are bringing techno-politics back to the fore at the expense of
“softer” urban problems, smart grids are largely exempt from these discussions.
To close this gap, this dissertation critically interrogates how smart grid infrastructures are being envisioned,
translated and contested in the context of these urban laboratories in the city of Berlin, Germany. It sets out to
uncover the visions underlying the development of smart grids in Berlin, and how they are being promoted by
relevant actors, discourses and experimental arrangements in urban laboratories. It asks: who is envisioning
smart grids in Berlin? What do different actors associate with smart grids? How do they relate smart grids to the
urban context? And how are smart grids being realized in urban space?
By answering these questions, this dissertation provides a snapshot of visions of smart grid futures in Berlin.
Instead of describing a process and a development over time, it paints a picture of how smart grids are being
imagined in Berlin at the time of writing. In doing so, it draws on existing literatures on imagined futures, on the
co-evolution of cities and socio-technical systems and on urban experimentation.
7
2 Research questions
This dissertation is interested in understanding how the future of urban energy production, consumption and
distribution is being envisioned, negotiated and formed through urban experimentation with smart grids in the
city of Berlin. I use smart grid infrastructures as lens through which to analyze the making of these energy-related
socio-technical futures. Moreover, I understand urban experimentation as key interface between imagined
futures and their material realization, and therefore as vital entry points for understanding the politics of urban
socio-technical “becoming”.
My overarching research question is:
How are urban futures being imagined, negotiated and formed through urban experimentation with
smart grid infrastructures in Berlin?
Subordinate research questions:
1. What kinds of smart grid futures are being imagined in Berlin?
a. How are urban smart grid futures being constructed in discourse?
b. What kinds of promises are being associated with smart grids in Berlin?
c. How do they relate to broader urban development paradigms, such as urban energy
transitions and smart cities?
2. What are the politics behind imagining urban smart grid futures in Berlin?
a. How and by whom are these urban futures being imagined (i.e. communicated, performed,
enacted)?
b. What are different actors’ roles?
3. How are imagined smart grid futures being mediated through processes of urban experimentation?
a. How are the design and practices of urban experimentation shaping Berlin’s imagined futures
(and not others)?
b. Which role do the pilot projects and the future sites play in this process?
c. And lastly, how is urban experimentation therefore contributing to broader urban socio-
technical change?
8
3 Literature review
Although smart grids are being largely implemented in cities, academic literature on smart grids is largely
dominated by ICT and electrical engineering related concerns. In the following chapter, I present an overview of
this literature, and then move on to discuss in more detail the smart grid related debates currently being
conducted in the social and urban studies communities. Finally, I show how my research contributes to these
debates, and the empirical gap it seeks to close.
3.1 Academic literature on smart grids
Academic debates on smart grids have developed within largely separate communities, where they have evolved
more or less independently of each other and have centered on very diverse aspects of this broad, all-
encompassing term. I identify three communities that are involved in the development of smart grids or smart
energy systems in cities, and who are only just starting to take note of each other, be it in the practical domain
of smart grid projects or in the abstract territory of academic literature. These are the “energy” community, the
“ICT” community, and the “urban development” community. I define the “energy” community as consisting of
people involved in energy systems engineering and management across different energy sectors and domains,
such as electricity, gas, heating, cooling, generation, distribution, and storage; the “ICT” community consists of
people involved with the technologies of everything “smart”, i.e. computational science and information
technology, including both hard- and software engineering; and last but not least, the “urban development”
community, which consists of all those concerned with the development of “the urban”. This includes city
government and administrations, urban planning practitioners, community organizers etc.
Notably, the urban development community is least involved in both practical implementation and academic
debate concerning smart grids. This is true even though smart grids are being implemented and tested in urban
experimental “urban labs” across Europe, where the scene is being set for a fundamental reconfiguration of
urban energy systems through the addition of a new, digital “layer”.
I traced these academic debates in a brief online search of academic data bases2, which included SAGE, Web of
Science, Taylor&Francis, dblp computer science bibliography, OLC-online contents, and The Collection of
Computer Science Bibliographies. I used various search terms and categories to extract the relevant literatures
from these platforms following an “energy”, an “ICT”, or an “urban planning” perspective. Community affiliation
was inferred from the place of publication, so that relevant content in the journal “Supercomputing”, for
example, was attributed to the ICT community, content in the journal “Energy & Environment” was attributed to
the energy community, and content in the journal “Urban Studies” was attributed to the urban planning
community.
This brief review suggests that the term “smart grid” first appeared in both energy and ICT related debates about
twenty years ago and started gaining popularity and importance about ten years later. While energy and ICT
2 The search was conducted in the year 2018.
9
related debates concerning smart grids were always interrelated, relevant urban studies debates developed
independently and still remain largely separate. This seems in great part due to the work of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which claims to be the largest technical professional organization in
the world, and which has a long history of providing both energy and ICT professionals a common platform for
continuous exchange and publications. Currently, IEEE’s members include computer scientists, software
developers, information technology professionals and many more apart from its electrical and electronics
engineering core (https://www.ieee.org/about/ieee-history.html). Their smart grids related activities are
bundled in a subdivision solely dedicated to this topic. As a result, by far the most publications concerning smart
grids currently available on the web originate in one way or another from the IEEE. Urban development debates
are largely absent from this platform.
From the very beginning, energy and ICT related debates concerning smart grids focused on the challenges of
integrating distributed components, especially renewable energy generation plants, storage units, electric
vehicles, and buildings, into a connected system. Primary concerns are with increasing system efficiency and
lowering costs. While debates in the energy community also include questions of innovation management,
institutional change, and policy (or market) design, the bulk of discussions in the ICT community circles around
technical questions such as sensing, automation, and control mechanisms. Until very recently, neither of these
communities showed much interest in the social aspects of smart grids or the specifics of smart grids in cities.
The urban studies community, on the other hand, is only just beginning to discuss smart grids at all. Moreover,
this small amount of available literature is vastly diverse in its content. In general, however, this literature clearly
favors the social and political dimensions of smart grids, addressing issues such as consumer practices,
acceptance, social and environmental justice, citizenship, equity, self-sufficiency, and low-carbon governance.
Although debates in the urban planning community are also generally in favor of smart grid development, it is
here that most critical engagement with the “hows” and “whys” of smart grid development is found. Among
others, this criticism questions current practices of urban experimentation, the market-driven roll-out of
metering technology, the disengagement of urban publics, and the limited ability of city governments to access
or deal with available (big) data. This critical, socio-political vantage point is currently missing in energy and ICT
focused debates. Given the distinctly urban nature of smart grid transformations, there is a need to engage in
research on smart grids in cities, and thus to inform those involved of the social and political caveats of smart
grid implementation. My research project addresses this challenge by linking smart grids to urban change.
3.2 Smart grids in social and urban studies research (empirical gap)
Skjolsvold et al. (2015) identify three areas of relevant social scientific inquiry into smart grids: firstly, imaginaries
and visions (Ballo, 2015; Köktürk and Tokuç, 2017; Skjølsvold and Lindkvist, 2015; Tricoire, 2015), secondly,
expectations towards users, such as consumer engagement (Gangale et al., 2017), participation (Throndsen and
Ryghaug, 2015), acceptance (Broman Toft et al., 2014; Geelen et al., 2013; Verbong et al., 2013) and
empowerment (Shaukat et al., 2018), and thirdly, system building and transformation (Erlinghagen and Markard,
2012). Other researchers have also examined questions of trust and confidence (Büscher and Sumpf, 2015;
10
Reuver et al., 2016) or of ownership of electricity infrastructures (Hall et al., 2019). My research focuses on the
study of visions and imaginaries associated with smart grids. This emerging body of research has approached
visions and imagined futures from a variety of angels, inquiring about their function in the smart grid innovation
process, their normative content, and the ways in which they relate to smart grid implementation processes.
Various scholars have criticized the dominance of positivist imaginaries that depict smart energy futures as more
sustainable, reliable, efficient, transparent, democratic and secure (Ballo, 2015; Palensky and Kupzog, 2013;
Skjølsvold et al., 2015; Wentland, 2016), while standing in the way of more comprehensive, critical public debates
(Luque-Ayala, 2014; Vesnic-Alujevic et al., 2016). Others have shown that smart grid imaginaries can be much
more nuanced and contested, especially in the policy domain (Hielscher and Sovacool, 2018). Researchers have
also shown that the production of smart grid imaginaries is often confined to certain communities of experts,
mostly within the context of bounded sites of experimentation (Ballo, 2015; Engels and Münch, 2015; McLean,
2013). These studies highlight that experts use visions to communicate largely positive views of energy system
automation, consumer engagement and security of supply to the general public, while hiding their concerns
about risks and uncertainties from view (Vesnic-Alujevic et al. 2016; Luque-Ayala 2014).
Moreover, research has shown that visions of smart grids can serve as medium of communication between
experts and regular citizens or households. Among others, it highlights how normative ideals inherent in these
visions are used to engage potential consumers and influence their practices in ‘smart grid compatible’ ways
(Ferrari and Lösch, 2017). At the same time, scholars have also argued that smart grid imaginaries can function
as common denominator between innovation actors, providing a point around which to gather and coordinate
actions (Engels and Münch, 2015; Lösch and Schneider, 2017).
As smart grid projects gain popularity and scale, social scientists have also pointed to the contradictions between
visions of smart grid technologies and the realities of their implementation. They have argued that the realities
of smart grid implementation have failed to live up to, or even undermined the promises originally associated
with them, for example regarding issues of social equity (Lovell, 2018). While experts tend to promote visions of
end-users as engaged, flexible, price-sensitive and tech-savvy, actual implementation reveals much less active
engagement (Bugden and Stedman, 2021; Schick and Gad, 2015). In a study of the US, Levenda et al. also show
that beyond a unifying national vision, different local or regional smart grid imaginaries can lead to different local
implementation politics and practices (Levenda et al., 2018). He also shows that, even though smart grid visions
may be differently translated in different localities, they can still embody similarly restrictive ideas of citizen
participation (Levenda, 2019).
Although the body of social studies research on smart grids has grown over the past years, most of these studies
have focused on national level concerns, leaving question of urban development largely out of view (Bulkeley et
al., 2016b; Levenda, 2016; McLean et al., 2015; Quitzow and Rohde, 2021). My research seeks to close this gap
by explicitly focusing on the relationship between smart grids, experimentation and socio-technical change at
the urban level.
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3.3 The smart city in social and urban studies research
In doing so, my research also contributes to research on the “actually existing” smart city (Shelton et al., 2015)
and how it relates to urban sustainability transitions. With the emergence of the smart city paradigm,
technological infrastructures are once again at the center of contemporary urbanism. More and more urban
planners, authorities, researchers and businesses are embracing ‘smartness’ as vision for overall urban
development. Notions of smart homes, smart mobility, smart economy, smart government, and smart energy
are being put forward as likely solution to a wide array of urban challenges, ranging from environmental
protection to democratic participation and urban renewal (Berlin Senate, 2015b; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015).
The smart cities trend is increasingly being criticized by urban studies scholars for its narrow focus on
technological development as the means (and ends) of urban change (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015). Numerous
scholars have criticized the rise of the global smart city imaginary as “empty rhetoric” masking neoliberal urban
governance agendas (Greenfield, 2013; Hollands, 2008; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; White, 2016; Wiig and
Wyly, 2016). These critics argue that urban governments and corporations are promoting positivist notions of
the “intelligent”, efficient, resilient and optimized city for purposes of marketing technological innovation rather
than addressing existing urban problems (Karvonen et al., 2019). These imaginaries tend to rationalize cities into
uniform and quantifiable systems, instead of engaging with the complexity and local specificity of urban issues
(Greenfield, 2013). Alberto Vanolo warns that smart city strategies are depoliticizing concepts within urban
policy-making by presenting supposedly ‘correct’ development pathways and thus avoiding discussions about
possible alternatives (Vanolo, 2014). Urban studies scholarship also argues that smart cities strategies are largely
built around the interests of private - mostly ICT - firms that reduce the role of citizens to passive and compliant
urban subjects, and follow the logics of entrepreneurial urban governance (Datta, 2015; Hollands, 2008, 2008;
Söderström et al., 2014; Vanolo, 2014). Among others, this view is based on the observation that international
companies such as Cisco, IBM, Hitachi and others have created specialized departments for smart city ‘solutions’
that are increasingly involved in public private partnerships with urban authorities all over the world. In effect,
there is increasing uneasiness in the critical urban studies community that “[ICT] companies are becoming the
urbanists of the future, and their ways of thinking are likely to provide a template for future urban development”
(Luque-Ayala, 2014: 168). In pursuit of primarily economic goals these “solutionist” imaginaries are often
complimented and sustained by scenarios of future crises that appeal to looming threats such as climate change
or fiscal austerity, and which serve to justify the need for technological interventions in the present (Caprotti,
2014b).
More recently, this literature has also critically interrogated the increasing convergence of the smart and low-
carbon urban imaginaries (Caprotti, 2014a; Evans et al., 2019; Haarstad, 2017; Haarstad and Wathne, 2019;
Martin et al., 2019). While some of these studies find that the so-called “smart-sustainability fix” is amplifying
ecological modernization agendas and forms of entrepreneurial urban governance (Martin et al., 2019), others
have found more nuanced, two-way relations. Haarstad and Wathne, for example, show that in their case studies
from the UK, Norway and Sweden, the smart city imaginary is actually inspiring local actors to pursue low-carbon
goals where they might otherwise not have, and that it is allowing them to do so through low-tech refurbishment
initiatives rather than high-tech innovation (Haarstad and Wathne, 2019). Their research forms part of a broader
12
effort to engage with the situated practices and material realities of the “actually existing smart city” in order to
understand how the global smart city imaginary is being locally translated into specific socio-technical
configurations, and how these are playing out in specific contexts, places and ways (Shelton et al., 2015). My
research speaks to this literature by asking how specific real-life instances of smart grid development relate to
smart city politics, urban energy politics, and experimental urbanism.
3.4 Concluding remarks
This section shows that academic literatures on smart grids are still dominated by contributions from the ICT and
the electrical engineering communities, and that research from the social and urban studies communities is
lacking. Moreover, it highlights that existing debates on the specific relationship between smart grids and visions
of the future leave an empirical gap concerning research on cities, which this research project fills. Finally, this
chapter has linked debates on smart grids with related debates on smart cities, urban experimentation, and
urban sustainability transitions which this research project also addresses.
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4 Conceptual foundations
I conceive of smart grids as socio-technical infrastructures and political processes that are deeply entangled with
the social, political and cultural shaping of cities (Hommels, 2005; Hughes, 1983), and whose development is
driven by visions and imaginaries that nurture certain assumptions about desirable and attainable urban futures.
This dissertation is situated at the interface of urban studies, infrastructure studies, and science and technology
studies. It draws on these three strands of scholarly literatures to understand what the development of smart
grids means for the future of urban electricity systems in Berlin.
In the following chapter, I review the literatures that have informed my conceptualization of smart grids, and
lead over to my research design.
4.1 What are infrastructures?
In order to understand the relationship between smart grids and urban energy systems, one must understand
the nature of networked technological infrastructures more generally. I draw my understanding of
infrastructures largely from the social studies of technology that have provided a solid foundation for the more
specific study of networked infrastructures in cities. First and foremost, this strand of research has shown that
the development of technology is closely connected to the human idea of progress and modernity. Technological
infrastructures introduce new possibilities and offer innovative ways of doing things. They satisfy our incessant
desire for improving what is and enhancing what will be in the future. Moreover, technologies are proof of our
human ability to overcome difficulties and to dominate our natural environment. At the same time, technologies
can be overwhelming and inspire fears, especially if they get out of hand. Usually, however, technologies are
taken for granted and live an invisible life that is – at best - forgotten. This is especially true for networked
technological infrastructures, such as public transportation, waste management or electricity systems. As long
as they run smoothly, we tend to forget that somewhere turbines are humming and engines are pumping to keep
our routine lives going. Infrastructures are more than mere artefacts; they are objects that enable relations
between other objects; they are technologies that enable other technologies to function, or "matter that enable
the movement of other matter" (Larkin, 2013: 329). As opposed to technological artefacts, technological
infrastructures work as systems and act as mediators. They are often buried underground or hidden behind walls.
What we see and use, such as a water faucet or a light switch, is usually only the tip of the infrastructural iceberg
that is in fact made up of pipes, treatment plants, dams, cables, substations, transformers and so on, the bulk of
which remains beyond our immediate perception or influence. So where does a technology end and an
infrastructure begin? Is the water faucet or the light switch part of the infrastructural system or not? And if so,
is the wash basin that holds the faucet, or the television that we switch on, and perhaps even the TV room that
we use to watch it, also part of this infrastructural system? And on the back end, is then the river that we obtain
our water from part of this system or the uranium that we use to generate nuclear power for electricity? These
are difficult conceptual questions that allow only fuzzy answers. Susan Leigh Star understands technological
infrastructures as "fundamentally relational concept" (Star, 1999: 380) rather than a fixed set of technical
14
elements. She reminds us that one person’s infrastructure might actually be another person’s obstacle, such as
a staircase for the elderly or the disabled (Star, 1999). Technological infrastructures, in her view, depend on a
person’s perspective. Her colleague Brian Larkin agrees that infrastructures are conceptually too complex for any
one overarching definition. Instead he suggests a pragmatic analytical approach: infrastructures, he proposes,
are defined and delimited by the focus of our research. In fact, he states that "discussing an infrastructure is a
categorical act. It is a moment of tearing into those heterogeneous networks to define which aspect of which
network is to be discussed and which parts will be ignored" (Larkin, 2013: 330). He adds that “our study of
infrastructure might thus center on built things, knowledge things, or people things” (Larkin, 2013: 329). I am
interested in “the knowledge things” and the “people things” relating to smart grid infrastructures, and will now
turn to the ways in which social scientists and urban studies scholars have understood technological
infrastructures in the past, and how they have grappled with them conceptually and methodologically.
In the social sciences, technologies are often conceptualized as a conglomerate of material artefacts, social
practices and knowledge (Degele, 2002). The physical things that we usually associate with technology, such as
cars, computers or power lines are only the “hard” technological artefacts that we see, touch and use. But
technologies also work in “softer”, subtler and much broader ways. More than anything, technologies invite us
to use them, and thus encourage practices. They enable us to move from one place to another, to do office work,
or to plug in a radio and listen to music. The more quotidian and commonplace these practices become, the more
deeply they affect our social and cultural lives. Technologies such as the computer, for example, have deeply
influenced our perception of what it means to work, just like the invention of airplanes has affected the kinds of
vacations we might plan. On an even more general level, the ubiquitous availability of electricity has changed the
way we think about almost anything we do, from the way we eat our bread in the morning (toasted) to the way
we travel to work (by subway) to where we indulge in a good story (at the cinema) and the way we initiate
bedtime (by switching the lights off). The way we live and the way we think about our everyday routines have
profoundly changed due to the invention and diffusion of electricity. Technologies are therefore not only material
or functional, but deeply social and deeply cultural as well. Of course, the practices and meanings associated
with specific technologies diverge between different groups, and can change as societies evolve. In Germany, for
example, nuclear power plants were long understood as highly progressive engineering accomplishments, and
efficient and safe ways to produce electricity for large groups of people. With the tragic accidents of Chernobyl
and Fukushima and the looming threat of climate change, the perception of nuclear energy technologies has
changed. What was once hailed as one of civilization’s greatest technical achievements is now increasingly being
criticized as near-sighted, expensive and potentially uncontrollable peril. This means that technologies the way
we view technologies is not static, but in constant evolutionary flux. Lastly, technologies are deeply intertwined
with the knowledge required to make them work. They need to be constructed, and they need to function, or
else technologies are useless. Although we might use technologies and infrastructures on an everyday basis, we
usually comprehend only the smallest fraction of how and why they actually do what they do. This profounder
knowledge is mostly reserved for scientists, engineers or bureaucrats who are involved in the construction,
operation or management of technological systems. For the majority of users, comprehension of technological
infrastructures ends behind the plug or the light switch. Social scientists have especially contributed to critically
15
unraveling the role of scientists and engineers in the development of infrastructures and what this can mean for
a society (more on this in part 4.3 “The techno-politics of urban infrastructures”). Finally, technologies are closely
bound up with our imagination of the future. They evoke hopes, fantasies and desires, and represent our
aspirations for the future. Because technologies are usually developed to solve problems, they let us imagine a
world without these problems. They inspire us to think of the world as a “better” place. Through technologies,
people have imagined a world without diseases, without disaster, and even without death. Technologies, in this
sense, represent our incessant pursuit of modernity and progress. Yet, technologies have always also inspired
fears. These fears are so perpetual and so thrilling that they make up a whole literary genre – namely science
fiction. Ever since people have invented technologies for a “better” world, they have also had this nagging fear
of losing control over their own machines and becoming overpowered and subordinated. Thousands of science
fiction thrillers tell stories of how machines have seized domination over the human race and the planet. But
these are, of course, only the most extreme expressions of technological fears.
Overall, the social sciences have shown that the study of technological infrastructures can provide a fruitful
avenue for understanding social worlds. They explicitly aim at unravelling and problematizing the – often
obscured – relationship between the technological and the social. Research can take various different
perspectives on this relationship. It can focus on the materiality and functions of technological infrastructures
and how they relate to our cultural and political lives; it can also focus on the way technology is bound up with
the production of (scientific) knowledge and how this knowledge is used for the sake of broader societal
development; and finally, it can investigate the future-oriented hopes, desires and fantasies involved in the
making of technologies. For the sake of this inquiry, I shall focus on the visions surrounding smart grid
infrastructures, and how they relate to the future of energy in the city.
The following sections provide a more detailed overview of how the social studies of technology have
conceptualized technological infrastructures and how these perspectives have influenced urban studies scholars
to think about cities. It begins by reiterating the socially constructed nature of technological systems and their
co-evolutionary relationship with cities. It then goes on to describe the political nature of this co-constitutive
process, in order to conclude with various concepts that have been used to explain the emergence and change
of socio-technical infrastructure systems.
In the next chapter, I lay out how the analytical concepts of socio-technical imaginaries and of technological
“Leitbilder” relate to the co-evolution of cities and infrastructures, and introduces them as theoretical
foundations of this dissertation.
4.2 The co-evolution of infrastructures and cities
Scholars from the social studies of technological systems have conceptualized large networked infrastructures in
more than just technological terms. Rather than viewing infrastructures as mere physical artifacts, they have
been conceived as socially configured and socially embedded systems that are “both socially constructed and
society shaping” (Mayntz and Hughes, 1988: 51). These studies have shown that large infrastructure networks
16
are shaped, reproduced and maintained by an intricate web of societal forces including politics and public policy,
supply and demand, cultural and behavioral norms, expert knowledge and institutions (Hommels, 2005; Mayntz
and Hughes, 1988; Star, 1999; Summerton, 1994a). These studies have also shown that the large networked
infrastructure systems that sustain modern city life, such as water, electricity, communication and gas networks,
are exceptionally stable, long-lived, and resistant socio-technical systems (Hughes, 1987). In his seminal study on
electricity generation systems, Thomas Hughes explains how the interplay of social and material forces
accompanies the evolution of large infrastructure networks, creating strong path dependencies that render these
systems obdurate (Hughes, 1983). Over time, large capital investments are made, physical infrastructures are
built, institutions are created, laws and regulations are passed, and people’s behavior adapts, creating a
functioning whole that is increasingly resistant to change. In this conception, the development of networked
infrastructure systems depends not only on technological innovation and physical artefacts, but to an equal
extent on the development of expert knowledge, rules and regulatory frameworks, political support and cultural
norms that reinforce and maintain the system over time.
Building on this understanding, urban studies scholars have shown how the development of technological
systems closely relates to the development of cities (Coutard and Guy, 2007; Graham, 2000a; Melosi, 2000; Tarr
and Dupuy, 1988). They have shown how the construction of pipelines, wires and road networks is deeply
intertwined with the complex spatial, social, economic and political shaping of cities. In particular, historians have
shown that networked infrastructures are associated with the speed and complexity of modern urban life. The
expansion of electric power systems, for example, was among the major drivers of late 19th and early 20th century
urban development in Europe and the US. It brought permanent lighting into private homes and warehouses,
powered public tram systems and enabled telephone communication, thus radically altering the scope and
dynamics of urban everyday life (Bakke, 2017). In US cities, the introduction of networked gas and electricity
systems during this time period went hand in hand with a new understanding of urban domestic comfort and
changing family practices, enabled by central heating systems and modern household appliances (Rose, 1988).
Among others, access to washing machines and vacuum cleaners increased general standards of cleanliness.
These early days of urbanization were also closely intertwined with the introduction of water and waste water
networks, which gave birth to modern notions of environmental and public health (Melosi, 2000; Tarr and Dupuy,
1988)). In his seminal study on urban water and sewerage infrastructures, Martin Melosi describes how the
deployment of sanitary infrastructures in late 19th century America led to new hygienic standards and norms not
only in urban homes but also in urban public spaces, giving rise to what he calls the modern “sanitary city”
(Melosi, 2000). In Europe, the city of Berlin epitomized the modern “electric city”, becoming widely known as
“Elektropolis” (Dame, 2011) for its highly advanced electrification program. Here, the establishment of electric
power systems paved the way for an inner-city public transportation network as well as for a flourishing nightlife
with cinemas, theaters and bars. Electrification was therefore closely related to the city’s growing importance as
the continent’s intellectual and cultural hub. It also consolidated the increasing political influence and economic
strength of growing companies such as Siemens and AEG that brought modern methods of mass production and
management to the city (Dame, 2011). These historical accounts show how intricately the development of
networked infrastructures was interwoven with the development of modern cities as we know them today,
17
deeply shaping their spatial patterns, systems of production and management, and social standards of – inter
alia - comfort and hygiene.
More than anything, the networked city and the physical infrastructures it relies on can be understood as
materialized expressions of modernity and progress. They have enabled the constant movement of goods,
people, energy, water, data and information across time and space. These constant flows and complex
circulations within and through cities have fundamentally influenced the speed, rhythms and scope of modern
city life. Pedestrian rhythms have been replaced by the velocity of trains and automobiles, and the rhythms of
personal conversation have been replaced by the pace and range of instant messaging to unknown worldwide
audiences. Moreover, networked infrastructures have also increased the exchange of goods, people and services
between cities, creating intricate connections between (formerly) distant geographies. Due to
telecommunications networks, road systems and international pipelines, cities are now as closely connected to
their immediate hinterlands as they are linked to the global economy. Because of networked infrastructures,
cities no longer function independently, but are involved in complex relations of constant communication and
exchange. In this sense, networked infrastructures are at once the “connective tissue and circulatory systems”
of cities (Edwards, 2003). They form an “urban metabolism” that enables continuous cycles of intake and output,
for example of energy, water and goods on the one hand, and waste on the other (Heynen et al., 2006). In this
metabolism, networked infrastructures can be viewed as “mediators between ‘nature’ and the production of the
‘city’” (Graham, 2000b: 114). They enable incessant circulations across time and space, powering what we know
as modern city life.
The rise of the network city also gave birth to what is known as the “modern infrastructural ideal” (Coutard and
Rutherford, 2016). It introduced a whole new way of organizing urban service provision, which largely prevails
to this day. With their growing proliferation, services such as electricity and heating were increasingly centralized
and managed by state-owned firms or municipal agencies. This went hand in hand with the creation of novel
urban institutions such as public utility companies and network operators. Networked infrastructures therefore
gave birth to modern notions of infrastructure services as (quasi) public goods that need to be centrally managed
and accessible for everyone. What had once been each individual’s responsibility (such as access to lighting or
drinking water) became a universal claim. What had begun as the privilege of only few exceptionally wealthy
families became the common standard for all. Household connections to the public networks for electricity, gas,
water, and sewerage evolved into standard household commodities. Slowly but surely, ubiquitous network
coverage, centrally managed supply services and equal access for all became the modern urban “infrastructural
ideals” (Monstadt and Coutard, 2019). The introduction of urban infrastructures thus ended the era of the pre-
industrial, disconnected “pedestrian city” and gave rise to the modern “networked city” of our times (Coutard
and Rutherford, 2016).
The mutually constitutive relationship between infrastructure systems and modern urban development has been
the focus of myriad of scholarly investigations. Recently, this literature has focused on the complex relationships
between (renewable) energy infrastructures and the transition to “sustainable” cities. With increasing awareness
for the challenges of climate change, more and more scholars have systematically investigated how energy
18
infrastructures are tied into the making and unmaking of urban energy practices, politics, economies and
ecologies (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). In particular these scholars have shown how energy transitions occur
through urban processes and urban change, and how at the same time, the urban condition is constantly being
reconfigured by energy (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014). The same is true for emerging digital infrastructures and
the development of “smart” cities. As more and more urban functions and processes are digitized, cities are
changing their modes of communication, transport, production and trade. Scholars have argued that novel
information and communication technologies might be compromising the modern infrastructural ideal,
suggesting that “the network ideology that supports this ideal may be waning” (Coutard and Rutherford, 2016:
1). Others, by contrast, see the dawning of a hyper-connected urban world of highly interdependent, hybrid
urban infrastructures (Monstadt and Coutard, 2019). Yet others are concerned about the implications of
ubiquitous sensors and control mechanisms for issues of privacy and equality (Luque et al., 2014; Luque-Ayala
and Marvin, 2020).
This passage has underlined the mutually constitutive relationship between infrastructures and urbanization. It
has explained that networked urban infrastructures are understood as socio-technical systems that shape and
are themselves shaped by cities. This passage has also highlighted how the development of large infrastructure
systems has co-evolved with the “networked city” and “networked infrastructural ideal”, which have dominated
urban development discourses for over a century and are now being challenged by smart grids. Moreover, it has
explained how the complicated back and forth between technological development and specific spatial, political,
economic and cultural environments enable cities and their infrastructural networks to evolve in a co-
constitutive process of constant reconfiguration and change.
4.3 The techno-politics of urban infrastructures
Both social and urban studies researchers have emphasized the inherently political nature of the mutually
constitutive process of infrastructure and urban development (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Mayntz and Hughes,
1988; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Monstadt, 2007). This section discusses the ways in which researchers
have explored the politics of infrastructure and relates their insights to the making of smart grids. Understanding
the political nature of infrastructures is fundamental to understanding how smart grids - even in their current
stage of early emergence - are not only the result of urban politics but can indeed be understood as processes of
urban politics themselves.
Sociologists of technology have argued that technologies often serve as “politics by other means” (Winner, 1980),
or as programs of social ordering that are pursued by powerful elites in the guise of technological progress or
modernization. Technologies in this reading are the means through which governmental politics come to matter
(Barry, 2007). A rich body of urban studies literature has likewise built on these insights to disclose the diverse
social, material and discursive power mechanisms attached to the development of urban infrastructures (see for
example McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2006). Apart from their technical functions,
many studies have shown that urban infrastructures can serve outright political purposes and have power-
related effects. In their seminal study of “networked infrastructures, technological mobility and the urban
19
condition”, Graham and Marvin show that instead of serving their “integrated infrastructural ideal”, the
privatization of networked infrastructures has resulted in social segregation and “urban splintering” in
metropolitan areas across the world (Graham and Marvin, 2001). They describe how access to urban
infrastructures is often reserved for the financial elites, while poorer parts of society are bypassed and thus
socially and spatially marginalized. In particular, they argue that the liberalization and privatization of urban
infrastructures has led to the development of “premium networked spaces” (Graham, 2000a) for a privileged
few that enjoy customized, high performance services, while the majority of urban citizens rely on dilapidated,
century-old pipes and road systems. Instead of viewing infrastructures as material expressions of the welfare
state and its ideals of social equity and cohesion, they have contributed to a more critical understanding of
material infrastructures as potential sources of inequality and urban fragmentation.
In this sense, infrastructures can indeed be viewed as tools of urban governance. They can be “a powerful means
of controlling and disciplining” urban citizens to the terms and conditions of those in hegemonic social positions
(McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 366). Academic studies reveal how dominant social groups use the design and
underlying logics of management surrounding technological infrastructures as means of reinforcing political
hierarchies and controlling the everyday lives of urban citizens (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Schnitzler,
2008). Critical urban studies research has therefore contributed to an understanding of infrastructures as
hegemonic practices of authority and control. These material politics are often hidden in the bureaucratic
management of technological infrastructures, which lie largely outside the realm of public visibility or debate
(Barry, 2007: 292–293). Instead, they are enforced through administrative techniques such as regulatory
standards or norms of distribution, which often revolve around legal forms, payment procedures, activation
codes or the like. Typically, these techniques are associated with (seemingly value-free) notions of pragmatism
and efficiency rather than interest driven political steering. Sociologist Michel Foucault (2010) takes this notion
a step further when he argues that these techno-administrative techniques can become so entangled with
political rationalities and taken-for-granted user practices that they evolve into what he has coined an “apparatus
of governmentality” (Foucault, 2010). Foucault argues that the normalization of infrastructural processes into
everyday routines and cultural practices subtly steers the consciousness and actions of users (i.e. their “conduct”)
towards rationality, effectiveness and productivity, turning them simultaneously into objects and – subconscious
- subjects of a machinery of (neoliberal economic and) political control.
Yet social and urban research has also argued that the politics of infrastructure don’t rest in the hands of states
or markets alone but are instead shared sites of negotiation and contestation that can involve a vast array of
actors – from national governments to urban institutions, all the way to businesses, civil society organizations
and users (Moss, 2014). In their book “Infrastructural Lives” Stephen Graham and Colin McFarlane specifically
venture into the realms of the urban “infrastructural experience” in order to capture the manifold ways in which
regular people understand, use, contest and thus shape the production and management of urban
infrastructures and – in turn – of cities (Graham and McFarlane, 2015). They argue that infrastructures can
actually be important catalysts of political agency and negotiation. Other researchers have highlighted just how
complex these political negotiations can be. In his study of the international Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
Andrew Barry reveals how infrastructures can in fact become the issue of intense political disputes and long-
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term controversies, revealing how dynamic these processes of material politics are (Barry, 2013). Barry argues
that the politics of large infrastructural projects comprise such a vast and complex web of relations and processes
that they are hardly predictable or controllable. Instead of viewing them as purely hegemonic political programs,
he points to the large variety of interests and power relations at play in the making of large infrastructural
systems, and at the uncertainty of their development outcome.
My approach to urban infrastructures is likewise grounded in a firmly social constructivist ontology, and I
therefore share this understanding of infrastructures as messy and contingent political processes (Rutherford
and Jaglin, 2015: 173) rather than as products of systemic neoliberal orders or straightforward unilateral steering.
4.4 The knowledge politics of urban infrastructures
In the preceding passages, I have mostly engaged with the political nature of existing infrastructures, i.e.
infrastructures that have already been built. Yet an important line of STS scholarship has shown that the politics
of infrastructure can begin in the creative processes that precede technological maturity, namely in the seemingly
far removed realms of techno-scientific knowledge production. Especially in today’s knowledge-based
economies, technological infrastructures increasingly emerge from processes of scientific research and
development. Understanding the politics of techno-scientific knowledge production is therefore fundamental to
understanding the politics of urban infrastructures, especially while they are still “in the making” – such as smart
grids.
The notion that infrastructures have politics is firmly grounded in the notion that processes of techno-scientific
knowledge production, which often accompany the development of technological infrastructures, are socially
constructed and therefore have politics, too. It assumes that scientific knowledge is itself relative and very much
shaped by the specific social and political contexts of its making (Latour, 1993). In his famous study on Louis
Pasteur, Bruno Latour shows that processes of scientific knowledge production are not objective truth-seeking
endeavors that take place within value-free laboratory environments, but are in fact context specific and interest
driven, deeply social processes (Latour, 1993). Building on this conceptualization of scientific knowledge as
socially constructed, Latour and many others have shown that techno-scientific achievements are not the
“neutral” outcome of seemingly objective research processes, but in fact the result of processes of negotiation
that take place within social environments that are structured by value systems and influenced by power
relations (Jasanoff, 2004; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour, 1987). Technologies and technological infrastructures can
therefore be understood as material translations of the social values, norms and orders advanced by those
involved in their making. Among others, feminist STS scholarship has built on these insights to show how male
dominance can be established and reinforced through technological systems at the cost of less powerful women
(Wajcman, 2010). These scholars have argued that the norms and values of - mostly male – technicians and
engineers are “inscribed” into technological infrastructures without regard for their effect on or usability for
women. For example, Yolanda Strengers has argued that smart grid infrastructures are currently being designed
for a narrowly envisaged “Resource Man” who is interested in his own energy data, able to understand it, keen
on managing it, sensitive to energy costs, and rational in his decisions (Strengers, 2014). She criticizes that this
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might not reflect the diversity and heterogeneity of current or future energy users. Similarly, urban studies
researchers have criticized the growing influence of private ICT companies on the development of urban services
of all kinds. They argue that in effect, smart city technologies are imposing neoliberal logics of individual profit
maximization instead of collective well-being onto urban societies (Whitehead, 2013; Wiig and Wyly, 2016).
These materialized norms or “frozen” expressions of societal interests are often obscured by the seeming
objectivity of research driven innovation, and shielded from public criticism by the seclusion of the scientific lab.
Among others, it is the job of social scientists to uncover these “black boxes” and make them available for public
debate (Degele, 2002).
4.5 Infrastructures and imagined urban futures
The politics of infrastructural development can also be hidden in much subtler layers of abstract imaginaries,
meanings and ideas. Urban infrastructure systems are therefore not only technical or even socio-technical in
Hughes’ sense of the term, but also connected to much more abstract ideas, dreams, fantasies or ideologies of a
better life and a better future. They are “intimately caught up with the sense of shaping modern society and
realizing the future” (Larkin, 2013: 332). In his essay on “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure”, Brian Larkin
puts it this way: “roads and railways are not just technical objects then but also operate on the level of fantasy
and desire. They encode the dreams of individuals and societies and are the vehicles whereby those fantasies
are transmitted and made emotionally real (Larkin, 2013: 333). Infrastructures thus embody a society’s hopes
and aspirations; they are investments into a visual and conceptual representation of what a society thinks of
itself and what it wants others to think of it.
Technological infrastructures can also carry urban imaginaries, such as that of the sanitary city, the modern
functionalist city, the sustainable or – more recently - the smart city. These urban imaginaries are often built
around conceptions of technological and societal progress, and carry collective notions of what it means to be
modern. For example, the introduction of water, waste water and refuse disposal systems in the sanitary city
promoted the idea of a hygienic, clean and environmentally healthy society (Melosi, 2000). Likewise, the modern
functionalist city of mid-20th century Europe stood for the freedom of car enabled mobility and of a new
conception of leisure. Both were enabled by new technological possibilities, and by new ideas about what it
meant to be free, progressive and modern at the time. Similarly, today’s smart and sustainable city ideals are
built on visions of livable, environmentally friendly and yet competitive and economically thriving cities.
Infrastructures thus embody a society’s hopes and values on the one hand, and can carry public messages about
these hopes and values on the other. This can take on qualities of technological “fetishism” (Kaika and
Swyngedouw, 2000; Larkin, 2013). Kaika and Swingedouw go as far as to say that the construction of networked
urban infrastructures in 19th century Europe “turned the city into a theatre of accumulation and economic
growth”, and call these infrastructures nothing less than “iconic embodiments of and shrines to a technologically
scripted image and practice of progress” (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000: 121). These examples show that
infrastructures can indeed serve highly representational purposes, pursuing emotional effects rather than
technical functions.
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Oftentimes, which hopes and values are engineered into urban infrastructures is defined by certain
infrastructural elites, such as government agencies, entrepreneurs, scientists, technology companies or NGOs
that have the knowledge and the capabilities to influence infrastructural development in a city. The development
of urban infrastructures is therefore closely attached to the power of these elites to translate their hopes, desires
and fantasies in material and discursive terms. As McFarlane and Rutherford put it: “what is often at stake here
is not simply the provision of infrastructure, but the conceptualization of the city” (McFarlane and Rutherford,
2008: 366).
4.6 How do infrastructures change?
In the last passages, I have reviewed various traditions of social and urban studies research on technological
infrastructures, which show that these large networked systems are at the same time social, material, and
imaginary and that they are constantly evolving in highly political processes of permanent adaptation and
change. I have shown that these processes are often triggered by scientific innovations, which offer new technical
possibilities and inspire multiple actors to envision new possible futures. In exploring the co-evolutionary
relationship between infrastructures and cities, I have mostly engaged with infrastructures as existing parts of
the urban fabric.
Yet, smart grids are an infrastructure that is still “in the making”. In Berlin (and in Germany) smart grids are still
being developed and have only materialized under the special conditions of few experimental sites. To
understand smart grid infrastructures, it is therefore important to understand how infrastructures emerge in the
first place; and – once emerged – how they develop and change, and finally, how this change can be governed.
In his original model, Hughes explains infrastructural change as a sequence of phases, each characterized by a
certain degree of technical maturity, a distinct set of actors and a typical development dynamic, which is
significantly influenced by the capabilities and interests of each phase’s most influential system builders (Hughes,
1983: 14). According to Hughes’ model, new systems emerge in an initial phase of “invention and development”,
are then reproduced in other regions and societies in a phase of system “transfer”, and finally established in a
phase of “system growth” (Hughes, 1983: 14–15). Another fundamental concept of Hughes’ model is that of
system “momentum”. According to his analogy, large technological systems acquire “mass, velocity and
direction” as they grow and are therefore increasingly marked by inertia (Hughes, 1983: 15). Mass is created
through the accumulation of machines, devices and structures, in which large capital investments have been
made, and through the involvement of professionals such as government agencies, professional societies and
educational institutions. Once large technical systems have reached a critical mass, their growth accelerates and
acquires velocity. At the same time, it is directed towards certain goals or guided by a vision. With time, this
overall momentum becomes increasingly resistant to change and renders the system obdurate. From his
historical perspective, Hughes’ theory thus explains the evolution of large technical systems as linear processes
of growth, which create path dependencies and lead to system “lock-in”. It stops short of explaining how
“mature” infrastructure systems undergo change, much less how this change might be actively initiated or
steered.
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Building on Hughes’ conceptual foundations, different theories of socio-technical change have emerged and
influenced the study of urban development. These theories explain how large socio-technical systems can be
altered despite their seeming stability and permanence. Among others, they have explored how large technical
systems are reconfigured, for example through geographical expansion, functional recombination, or political
reorganization (Summerton, 1994b). They have also investigated how infrastructure systems go through phases
of contestation, stagnation and finally decline (Hess and Sovacool, 2020), or how they are assembled, re-
assembled and translated through actor-networks, especially at the micro-level (Callon, 1984).
Most prominently, though, scholars from the tradition of innovation studies have introduced the notion of
dominant infrastructural “regimes” that are disrupted by innovative “niches”. Using this multi-level perspective,
they have investigated how path dependencies sustaining dominant regimes are overcome and how change
occurs in large infrastructure systems through the development of technological “niches” (Geels and Schot,
2007). This body of work has provided insights into the potential of experimental niches to introduce
technological innovations and make them fit for mainstream markets. It suggests that broader socio-technical
change can be actively initiated and steered if innovative niches are strategically managed (Schot and Geels,
2008). The idea of strategic niche management is based on the premise that technological selection processes
or the development of technological variations can be influenced in an environment that is sheltered from
mainstream competition, i.e. in "technological niches" (Schot and Geels, 2008: 539). Schot and Geels define
technological niches as “protected spaces that allow the experimentation with the co-evolution of technology,
user practices, and regulatory structures” (Schot and Geels, 2008: 537). Yet this literature also acknowledges that
“niche innovations are rarely able to bring about regime transformation without the help of broader forces and
processes” (Schot and Geels, 2008: 545). These broader forces and processes have been conceptualized as the
“landscapes” within which niches and regimes are embedded and operate (Geels and Schot, 2007).
Like strategic niche management, the transition management approach also builds on the multi-level
perspective. It offers a framework for how to initiate and govern socio-technical transitions at the micro-level as
means of transforming dominant regime structures. While strategic niche management is built at least in part on
test-bed approaches from the business world, transition management is more strongly grounded in social theory
and governance studies. Coming from a governance perspective, transition management aims to tackle the
complex governance challenges posed by wicked societal problems such as sustainability and climate change. It
embraces complexity and uncertainty as opportunities to engage in reflexive processes of searching, learning
and experimenting that can only induce change if they are based on broad social participation (Rotmans and
Loorbach, 2008). The transition management approach encourages the establishment of so-called “transition
arenas” to develop visions of sustainable transition pathways, and to experiment with possible ways to get there,
and then finally to reflect and adjust these processes (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008).
Both strategic niche management and transition management emphasize that niche experiments or
demonstration projects can successfully enable socio-technical innovations if they encourage the development
of visions, the establishment of strong social networks, and effective learning processes within and beyond their
borders (Schot and Geels, 2008) (Rotmans and Loorbach 2008, p. 20).
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In spite of its wide acclaim, the multi-level perspective has also been criticized especially by urban studies
scholars for neglecting the spatial and political aspects of socio-technical change. These scholars have pointed to
the importance of recognizing that socio-technical change is always embedded in specific local contexts and
relations, and that these relations are subject to the specific power dynamics exerted by individuals and
institutions (Bulkeley et al., 2011; Coenen and Truffer, 2012; Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Smith and Stirling, 2008).
Nevertheless, the multi-level perspective has inspired a critical research agenda that engages with the idea of
urban experimentation or “urban labs” as means of studying, understanding and trialing socio-technical
innovations on the one hand, and as means of governing urban infrastructural change on the other (Evans, Joshua
2016). This ongoing scholarly debate points to the importance of experimental sites as contemporary arenas of
urban politics and highlights the necessity to keep a critical eye on them for this reason. In an era of “demo-ing
unto death” (Halpern and Günel, 2017), the investigation of these experimental sites is paramount to
understanding the direction that urban infrastructural transitions are taking, the effects they might have on the
roles and practices of different social groups in a future urban energy system, and what this might mean for the
future of energy in the city more generally.
4.7 Concluding remarks
What this chapter has shown is that the development of infrastructures, from the very first budding of a vague
idea to the mastery and realization of all technological intricacies, are guided by the goals and value systems of
those involved in their making. It has established that social values and political orders are necessarily engineered
into technological systems by those who develop, design and manage them (Knie and Hard, 1993), and has thus
drawn attention to the (political) work of scientists, engineers or bureaucrats who are often at the forefront of
techno-scientific development. Moreover, this section has discussed the varied ways in which urban
infrastructures are political and how urban politics can be implemented through infrastructures (in physical,
managerial, or knowledge-related ways). Moreover, it has shown that these politics are often not explicit but
hidden in the decisions made long before an infrastructural technology actually comes to matter. They can also
be obscured by the – mostly positive – images or visions that infrastructures convey. The politics of
infrastructures can therefore be exerted not only through their material qualities, but also through much subtler
discursive attributions that evoke abstract idea(l)s and imaginaries. Currently, these imaginaries are often being
developed in urban laboratories.
Understanding who is involved in imagining and making infrastructures in these labs can be a key to
understanding – and revealing – the power of certain groups over others, the value systems that these groups
are seeking to introduce or perpetuate, and the way in which they are utilizing infrastructures as political
vehicles. Uncovering and problematizing these political workings and critically assessing possible alternatives is
among the goals of this dissertation.
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5 Theoretical framework
I use smart grid infrastructures as lens through which to analyze the making of Berlin’s urban energy futures. In
particular, I analyze the visions associated with smart grids as part of this political process of urban socio-technical
“becoming”.
In the previous chapter, I laid out the conceptual foundations of my research questions and approach. I explained
why infrastructures lend themselves as analytical lenses through which to trace broader urban socio-technical
transitions. Moreover, I explained how processes of infrastructural development are political in material and
knowledge related ways, and what role visions play in this development process. I thus illustrated why the
analysis of visions surrounding smart grid infrastructures in Berlin provides a fruitful avenue for critically
interrogating the current making of Berlin’s energy futures.
The following section now discusses the theoretical framework that guided my research design. This chapter
discusses how I used the concepts of socio-technical imaginaries and of technological Leitbilder to analyze how
visions of smart grid infrastructures are influencing Berlin’s energy transition process, and what is political about
these visions.
I begin this section by reviewing literatures from STS and urban studies, which illustrate the performativity of
visions and imaginaries, i.e. the ways in which visions of the future impact reality in the present. I then move on
to discuss how visions have been discussed in the urban planning community, and how they are currently being
discussed in certain research communities as potential tools for guiding (urban) sustainability transitions. Finally,
I explain in more detail the two concepts of socio-technical imaginaries and Leitbilder, and explain how I merged
the two to guide my own research design.
5.1 The performative power of imagining the future
Social science research has shown that technological expectations act as important drivers of techno-scientific
change, exerting a strong influence on technological development in the present (Borup et al., 2006; Dierkes et
al., 1992; Ferrari and Lösch, 2017; Jasanoff, 2015). Expectations inspire activity, mobilize resources and translate
into obdurate material artefacts. Visions of technological possibilities are therefore not only future-oriented
abstractions, but in fact highly “performative” in their concrete manifestations in the present (Borup et al., 2006).
Visions of future technological infrastructures must therefore be viewed not only as fundamental in guiding
innovation processes but also in producing material outcomes and ‘making’ the fabric of the city. Analyzing the
content and production of visions is therefore a means of unravelling (political) processes of city making. I seek
to understand how the future of energy is currently being “made” in Berlin by analyzing the visions surrounding
emerging smart grid infrastructures in the city today.
Research from the sociology of expectations and STS has shown that visions and imagined futures have an
immediate effect on the present. Among others, the performative quality of imagined futures lies in their
capacity to attract the interest of stakeholders and to enable cooperation between them. As Dierkes et al. (1992)
show in their work on technological Leitbilder, guiding visions of technological progress have the power to attract
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stakeholders from various expert domains and to bridge communication between them (Dierkes et al., 1992). In
the uncertain environment of technological development, visions provide a point of reference around which
various stakeholders can gather, providing collective orientation and enabling cooperation in the present (Ferrari
and Lösch, 2017). Dierkes et al. (1992) emphasize that guiding visions serve to mediate between different
cultures of knowledge production, and to open up pathways for novel ways of thinking and collectively creating.
In the case of smart grids, these stakeholders come from such diverse domains as energy, mobility, heating,
urban development and ICT. Social science research has shown that visions of smart grids indeed function as
common denominator between these various fields of expertise, providing a point around which innovation
actors can focus and coordinate actions (Lösch et al., 2019). In (mostly German) urban planning literature, the
term Leitbild is also associated with guiding visions for socio-spatial development. Here, the concept has been
appreciated for its potential as means to build consensus through democratic discussion and participatory
planning processes on the one hand, but also criticized as tool for expert-driven, hierarchical and top-down city
planning on the other (Kuder, 2001). In both cases, the Leitbild concept describes how visions help coordinate
action between those involved in a technological or urban development process.
Future-oriented visions can also develop a normative force that draws circles far beyond those involved in the
innovation process. If collectively shared and sufficiently stabilized over space and time, visions of techno-
scientific futures can influence innovation processes far beyond the micro-scale of research groups or pioneer
alliances (Borup et al., 2006). In their work on socio-technical imaginaries, Jasanoff and Kim (2015) argue that
once certain claims about the future are sufficiently wide spread, they develop into "collectively held,
institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings
of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology"
(Jasanoff and Kim, 2015: 4). They show that these imaginaries can gain the power to steer national level policy
decisions, guide research programs or direct global financial investments. Jasanoff and Kim are especially
concerned with the political dimension of this techno-scientific imagining. In their view, imaginaries produce
simplified and standardized understandings of the complex social-political orders inherent in technological
development, and can mask the political interests and power constellations that drive the development of
technological systems. They show that socio-technical imaginaries act as somewhat fuzzy, implicit, broadly
accepted and culturally embedded understandings of the ‘good life’ or the ‘good future’ that promote mostly
positivist, seemingly value-neutral, apolitical notions of modernity and progress (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). Whose
visions take root in the collective imagination and how this influences what people consider to be ‘modern’,
‘progressive’ and ‘up-to-date’ as opposed to ‘backwards’ or ‘forgotten’ then becomes a highly political issue.
As Jasanoff, Kim and others have shown, future imaginaries only develop this kind of normative force if they are
communicated and reinforced through narratives, images, material representations or (public) performances
that make them “stick” until they are shared collectively (Hajer and Pelzer, 2018; Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). Dierkes
et al. (1992) underline this by showing that collective claims about the future only stabilize if they are somehow
“felt” and experienced in the real world (Dierkes et al., 1992). Visions therefore depend on continuous repetition
and real-life enactments as means of perpetuation and diffusion. At the same time, Van Lente (2012) argues that
a cycle of continuous reinforcement can also result in a paradoxical dynamic, such that “a compelling
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constellation of promising claims […] enforces action in a way that perhaps none of the companies or researchers
themselves would have chosen. Participants will reason in terms of ‘not missing the boat, but the ‘boat’ only
exists due to the collective decision not to miss it” (van Lente, 2012: 773). The irrationality and contingency of
this process resonates with what the social studies of infrastructural development have called technological
“fetishism” (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000; Larkin, 2013). As Brian Larkin (2013) argues, technological
infrastructures are far from purely rational in an economic or even a technical sense, but “emerge out of and
store within them forms of desire and fantasy and can take on fetish-like aspects that sometimes can be wholly
autonomous from their technical function” (Larkin, 2013: 329). Current calls for creating hyper-connected cities
through an ‘internet of everything’ have arguably taken on certain qualities of fetishism. Imagined technological
futures therefore carry much more than the relatively mundane promise of solving an engineering problem, but
are intermingled with emotions of awe and hope that can be highly seductive.
In sum, STS and urban studies scholarship has shown that imagined futures can strongly influence actual
developments in the present. It has also shown that the performative power of imagined futures is based on
their reinforcement through communication and material representation or enactment. Lastly, research has
revealed that the performative power of imagined future infrastructures often enfolds in highly irrational, self-
fulfilling dynamics. In relation to smart grids, this section thus provides the basis for understanding that visions
and ideas of possible future energy systems that are currently associated with smart grids need to be understood
as important precursors of the urban energy systems we might actually encounter in the cities of tomorrow.
5.2 Leitbilder as analytical concept
I base my own analysis on two concepts from the social studies of science and technology, which I introduce in
detail in the following sections.
The Leitbild concept developed by Meinolf Dierkes and colleagues in the early 1990s provides a framework for
analyzing how guiding visions develop and operate in processes of techno-scientific innovation. The concept
understands Leitbilder as “frameworks that guide perception, thinking, decision-making and action” (Dierkes et
al., 1992: 11)3. Similar to ideals (and unlike more concrete goals), Leitbilder provide long-term objectives and
stand for aspirations that can only ever partially be reached (Dierkes et al., 1992: 16). The concept was borne
out of a certain techno-skepticism, and originally aimed at finding ways of anticipating and avoiding dangerous
technological developments and instead steering them for the common good (Dierkes et al., 1992: 10). It starts
by assuming that Leitbilder have a strong influence on techno-scientific development trajectories, and that they
can be strategically adapted.
Dierkes’ Leitbild concept primarily offers a framework for understanding socio-technical innovation processes at
the micro-level of research groups or other small innovation systems. It situates Leitbilder at the level of
interpersonal discourse (i.e. communication via language and symbols), merging ideas from the sociology of
science and technology with ideas from psychology and communication studies. According to Dierkes et al.
3 All quotes of statements originally made in the German language have been translated by the author.
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(1992), techno-scientific innovations emerge through the “interference” between different (scientific)
knowledge cultures that are themselves in a constant process of development and change. New techno-scientific
knowledge emerges, is selected, consolidates, and becomes commercially successful not because different
knowledge cultures split or merge, but because they “interfere” with each other and create newness (Dierkes
et al., 1992: 32–33). Leitbilder synchronize this process of interference, and thus enable techno-scientific
innovations to flourish.
Dierkes et al. (1992) attribute the ability of Leitbilder to accomplish this synchronization process to two main
features, namely their “guiding function” and their “image function” (Dierkes et al., 1992: 43–58). According to
the authors, Leitbilder bundle and align innovation actors’ hopes and dreams for the future, and thus provide
collective and individual orientation (guiding function). They provide a common corridor of possibility that gives
direction to innovation actors’ thoughts and activities. Secondly, Leitbilder conjure images that activate the
imagination beyond existing lines of thought, mobilize emotions of interest and appeal, and finally stabilize
interpersonal relations (image function). Leitbilder therefore excite, animate and produce an attractive “buzz”
around which people tend to gather. Building on Dierkes’ ideas, Ferrari and Lösch (2017) provide a concise
summary of how guiding visions operate:
• “Visions serve as an interface which allows translations between present constellations and
the future and thus open up imaginative and practical possibilities.
• Visions work as communication media between different actors and discourses to which all
the involved or addressed actors can refer, even if they have very different interests and
perspectives.
• Visions can serve in different discursive and other practical constellations as means that
enable coordination, because they are a reference point to guide different and
heterogeneous activities.
• Visions motivate because they develop a normative force; the envisioned and proposed
emerging innovations are presented as the best and most feasible solution to current and/or
future problems or challenges” (Ferrari and Lösch, 2017: 78–79).
As analytical framework, these categories help guide research on how Leitbilder function and why they spread.
They offer an entry point for understanding what happens when a new, potentially disruptive idea is born, and
how it becomes more and more accepted. Importantly, Dierkes et al. show that – in order to unfold their
synchronizing capacity - Leitbilder need to be concrete enough to provide a collective reference point, but fuzzy
and flexible enough to allow various interpretations. As opposed to goals, Leitbilder are thus necessarily
unspecific.
Dierkes et al. (1992) situate their Leitbild concept at the beginning of longer processes of socio-technical
development. They understand socio-technical trajectories as “evolutionary” processes that develop in phases
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of generation, selection, consolidation and commercialization. Leitbilder unfold their synchronizing capacity
during the initial generation phase of techno-scientific innovation. Interestingly, Dierkes et al. (1992) argue that
Leitbilder develop based on ideas rather than based on existing problems. In fact, they argue that Leibilder (can)
develop entirely independently of the existence of a problem. This is interesting, because it resonates with some
of the critique that has been voiced against the smart technology paradigm.
Moreover, Dierkes et al. (1992) explain that techno-scientific Leitbilder develop in phases: First, an idea with the
potential for a Leitbild is born. It must be understandable beyond a circle of experts. Second, the Leitbild gains
popularity through consensus building. During this phase, the Leitbild must connect with its (technical) artefact
and must become known beyond a certain circle of experts. Third, a Leitbild establishes when vague ideas are
increasingly “fleshed out”, when specific organizational forms, symbols and rituals are developed, and people
start looking back at the history, myths and strongest drivers of the guiding vision. And lastly, after this phase of
establishment, a Leitbild is either conserved, reoriented or it dies, because it stops facilitating innovative ideas.
Instead of initiating new processes, the Leitbild increasingly legitimates existing processes and becomes
“obdurate”. These phases of Leitbild production mirror broader phases of socio-technical development. In fact,
they describe how Leitbilder and socio-technical systems co-evolve in an iterative process of discursive and
material development.
Finally, Dierkes et al. (1992) argue that different socio-technical systems develop in different, unique and
complex ways. On the basis of three examples – the Diesel motor, the typewriter, and the telephone – they show
that each system develops within different pathways and on the basis of different conditions. They conclude that
there can be no such thing as an overarching theory of socio-technical development. Instead specific
technologies need to be researched and understood in their specific trajectories.
In sum, Dierkes et al’s (1992) concept helps understand how guiding visions influence processes of socio-
technical development, especially in the early phases of techno-scientific innovation. It provides a framework for
analyzing how Leitbilder evolve out of existing knowledge cultures, and how they assist at creating new ones. In
doing so, the concept explicitly aims at highlighting potential entry points for steering techno-scientific
development. By dissecting the ways in which Leitbilder function, Dierkes et al. seek to provide a foundation for
actively influencing these guiding visions, and thus for directing socio-technical change.
The concept does not, however, offer a framework for investigating the politics of these guiding visions in a
broader societal context. The motivations, interests and political power of different innovation actors remain
outside of the analytical focus. The Leitbild concept can thus assist in answering questions such as “how are
techno-scientific innovations born and how do they develop?”, but it doesn’t offer much guidance for answering
questions such as “whose interests do certain innovations serve, and what do they say about societal norms and
power relations?” The Leitbild concept is therefore a useful tool for analyzing the creative processes of forming
and establishing an innovative idea, but less useful for analyzing the politics inherent in these processes. Even
though Dierkes et al are interested in using Leitbilder as political steering instruments, they stop short of offering
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a framework for investigating how Leitbilder serve political or economic purposes. For this reason, I recur to a
second analytical concept, which is more focused on uncovering the politics of techno-scientific imagining.
5.3 Socio-technical imaginaries as analytical concept
The concept of socio-technical imaginaries developed by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim offers a suitable
addition to the Leitbild concept. It is likewise grounded on a sociology of science and technology tradition but
influenced by ideas from political and cultural theory (rather than psychology and communication). The concept
of socio-technical imaginaries explicitly aims at uncovering the politics of imagining techno-scientific futures.
While the Leitbild concept is primarily interested in how guiding visions influence creative processes of
collaboration and innovation, the concept of socio-technical imaginaries is primarily interested in what they tell
us about the socio-politics of the present. It assumes that techno-scientific envisioning is a deeply political act,
and provides a conceptual foundation for analyzing these “politics of the future”. In particular, the concept of
socio-technical imaginaries opens pathways for investigating the often fuzzy and unarticulated notions of social
life and social order inherent in visions of the future, and for relating them to the present.
According to Jasanoff and Kim, socio-technical imaginaries are "collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and
publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and
social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology" (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015:
4). Like Dierkes, Jasanoff and Kim understand technology as material embodiments of (scientific) knowledge. Yet
arguably unlike Dierkes, they view technology not as strictly path dependent, but rather as continually co-
produced with the organization of social life. Jasanoff and Kim are explicitly interested in the politics of this co-
constitutive process. Their concept thus offers an entry point for analyzing how societal orders are (re-)produced
through political processes of envisioning the future. As the subtitle of their book concisely summarizes, their
concept uncovers the linkages between “socio-technical imaginaries and the fabrication of power” (Jasanoff and
Kim, 2015).
In their original definition, Jasanoff and Kim associate these political processes with the governmental power of
nation states: “socio-technical imaginaries as we define them are associated with active exercises of state power,
such as the selection of development priorities, the allocation of funds, the investment in material
infrastructures, and the acceptance or suppression of political dissent” (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009: 123). In later
adjustments to this definition, however, they concede that socio-technical imaginaries can be found at other
spatial scales and institutional levels such as cities, regions, community organizations, or social groups. Their
concept thus helps “to investigate how, through the imaginative work of varied social actors, science and
technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of the collective good, at expanding
scales of governance, from communities to nation-states to the planet” (Jasanoff, 2015: 11). Nevertheless, much
of the research presented in their edited volume(s) focuses on national level imaginaries and national level
politics. Jasanoff and Kim’s work thus primarily asks "how national science and technology projects encode and
reinforce particular conceptions of what a nation stands for" (McNeil et al., 2016: 448). Taking this as my basis
and starting point, I ask how urban science and technology projects encode and reinforce what a city stands for.
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Like Dierkes et al. (1992), Jasanoff and Kim (2009, 2015) underline the importance of public performances for
the reiteration and reinforcement of socio-technical imaginaries. They explicitly dwell on the function of creating
“authoritative representations” that reinforce imaginations of what a society deems good and bad, right and
wrong, desirable or not. For example, they argue that the opening of the Olympic Games in London in 2012
“blended together memory, technology, the monarchy, and popular culture in a performance designed to play
to every register of Britain’s happiest imaginations of itself” (Jasanoff, 2015: 10). According to Jasanoff and Kim,
such spectacles serve to display and (re-)enact the collective imaginary of what a nation believes in, what it
values, and what it strives for. In this sense, public demonstrations of physical technologies attain
representational functions. Indeed, Jasanoff and Kim explicitly relate their idea of performance to practices of
scientific experimentation. In fact, they understand scientific experimentation as a mixture of knowledge
performance and political performance, granting those involved a role and function as political citizens, rather
than mere experimental subjects (Jasanoff, 2015: 11). This is important, because it attributes them with political
responsibility one the one hand, and with the potential for political shaping on the other. Jasanoff and Kim
therefore concede that public performance and experimentation can have an emancipatory role, especially if it
holds authorities publicly accountable. At the same time, they also acknowledge that performance and
experimentation are likely to reinforce existing categories, especially if their political potential is obscured. They
conclude that whether and how performance and experimentation reinforce or challenge societal standards can
only be answered empirically. Their concept thus serves as entry point for this kind of empirical analysis,
especially because theorizing on imaginaries has largely neglected the importance of practices of performing to
date (Jasanoff, 2015: 10).
The concept of socio-technical imaginaries is also very explicit about the relationship between imaginations of
progress and potential fears. Jasanoff states that while socio-technical imaginaries tend to be "grounded in
positive visions of social progress", these are necessarily correlated with fears, for example of the "failure to
innovate" (Jasanoff, 2015: 4–5). Socio-technical imaginaries can therefore be tales of modernization and
progress, but they can also be based on tales of fear and (of waging off) catastrophe. According to Jasanoff and
Kim, these fears are likewise perpetuated through performances, which serve as performances of the dystopias
that imaginaries entail.
Ontologically, Jasanoff and Kim explicitly position themselves in the social constructivist tradition. Their idea of
socio-technical imaginaries is thus based on the notion that humans are the ones who imagine and also the ones
who produce power relations. This stands in explicit contrast to other important lines of thought that have been
borne out of STS, which understand the social world as constructed through the agency of people and things, for
example technologies. These lines of thought, perhaps most prominently represented by actor-network-theory
(Callon, 1984) and cyborg feminism (Haraway, 2013) have been widely acclaimed for ending the binary thinking
in terms of human/non-human, science/society, nature/culture, subject/object. Yet Jasanoff and Kim criticize
that the engagement with actor networks neglects issues of power imbalances. Instead, they return to co-
production as theoretical framework for understanding modern societal orders. In their view “work in the co-
productionist vein sensitizes us to the ways in which elements of human subjectivity and agency get bound up
with technoscientific advances through adjustments in identities, institutions and discourses that accompany
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representations of things” (Jasanoff, 2015: 14). Put differently, the idea of socio-technical imaginaries is founded
on the assumption that science, technology and society are co-produced in a constant iterative process of
imagining, representing and changing. Importantly, technical infrastructures and cities are part of this constant
process of mutual configuration.
In conclusion, socio-technical imaginaries are socially constructed, politically charged and collectively shared
ideas of “the good life” and “the good future”, which are perpetuated inter alia through (public) performances
and experimentation, and which are often accompanied by fears. In turn, this delineates the many things that
imaginaries are not (Jasanoff, 2015: 20–21). According to Jasanoff and Kim, these include:
Vanguard visions (Hilgartner, 2015), which are ascribed to individuals, whereas socio-technical
imaginaries are communally adopted or collectively shared (Jasanoff, 2015: 4);
Ideas or fashions, which are less durable than socio-technical imaginaries;
Master narratives and ideologies, which are more stationary, and less inviting to change than are socio-
technical imaginaries. They are “not as welcoming of invention or prescriptive of new goals to be
achieved” (Jasanoff, 2015: 20). I would add that master narratives and ideologies are not necessarily
enmeshed with techno-scientific development, either;
Goals and policies, which are much more concrete and specific than are socio-technical imaginaries;
And finally, discourses, which are collective and systemic (Hajer, 2006), but mostly focused on language
rather than action, performance or materialization in technical artefacts.
In addition, I would say that utopias, which have often been inspired especially in relation to cities, describe
futures that are less feasible, less attainable, and much farther removed from present reality than are socio-
technical imaginaries (Levitas, 2010: 2).
5.4 Merging the two
I dwell on these distinctions, because they are the only straightforward guidance that Jasanoff and Kim offer to
produce conceptual clarity. Unlike Dierkes’ Leitbilder, the concept of socio-technical imaginaries provides less of
an analytical framework than broad conceptual orientation. Among others, socio-technical imaginaries can be
understood as fixed notions or processes; as advancing change or sustaining established orders; as universally
accepted or as culturally particular; as long-lived and durable or temporally situated; as ubiquitous or diverse
and competing (Jasanoff, 2015: 19). This fuzziness presents an obstacle and an opportunity at the same time: it
leaves the researcher without a clear manual for structuring her analysis; yet it offers an overarching umbrella
for many different research questions and approaches. In the end, it leaves the researcher with less guidance,
but more variety, more freedom, and more responsibility. Dealing with this ambiguity requires me to explicitly
point out how I understand the concept and how it serves my purpose.
Firstly, I understand the concept as framework for analyzing the stable and long-lived, collectively embodied
truths that a society lives by. Although Jasanoff and Kim repeatedly relate socio-technical imaginaries to socio-
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technical change, or even innovation, my understanding is that socio-technical imaginaries primarily preserve
established values, norms and orders rather than changing them. Jasanoff and Kim offer more than one possible
interpretation or analytical vantage point when they state that:
"imaginaries operate as both glue and solvent, able [...] to preserve continuity across the sharpest
ruptures of innovation or, in reverse, to upend firm worlds and make them anew". (Jasanoff, 2015: 29)
Yet in a different passage they concede that:
“An imaginary is […] a continually articulated awareness of order in social life and a resulting
commitment to that order’s coherence and continuity” (Jasanoff, 2015: 26).
For my research, I stick to the latter definition. In my understanding of the concept, socio-technical imaginaries
prescribe change only within the limited boundaries of the well-known. They point to newness only as means to
perpetuate the existing, accepted, customary order of things. It is precisely due to this strong underlying
tendency to preserve the familiar, that socio-technical imaginaries aren’t found at the fringes of society but
trickle down into the common and the everyday. It is also the reason why they are not the product of pioneers,
but “the product of […] a shared cultural property” (Jasanoff, 2015: 21). Hence, I don’t associate socio-technical
imaginaries with innovation, but instead with the long-lasting, seemingly apolitical notions, which are so deeply
engrained in the socio-cultural context of a community that they go mostly unquestioned.
This understanding differs from the way Leitbilder have been conceptualized. In contrast to socio-technical
imaginaries, Leitbilder have a connotation of embracing the new, of pushing boundaries, and of explicitly
challenging engrained knowledge cultures. While socio-technical imaginaries are strengthened and perpetuated
by authoritative institutions, Leitbilder can develop at the fringes of society and be shared by only a few. I
therefore understand guiding visions or Leitbilder as ideas that can be unique and challenging to existing norms
and commonly shared expectations of desirable futures. Socio-technical imaginaries, by contrast, represent
those much more broadly shared, broadly accepted, and commonly evoked notions of desirable, sensible and
attainable futures. In short, Leitbilder can be unique and revolutionary, whereas sociotechnical imaginaries by
definition are relatively commonsense and conservative. Over time, of course, Leitbilder can develop into socio-
technical imaginaries (see Figure 2 on next page).
To conclude, I understand socio-technical imaginaries as somewhat fuzzy, implicit, broadly accepted and
culturally embedded understandings of certain sociopolitical, socio-technical orders. These collectively
internalized and uncritically perpetuated visions of the good life can be reproduced, or they can be challenged
by techno-scientific innovations.
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Figure 2: Innovative Leitbilder develop into socio-technical imaginaries (own figure)
5.5 Envisioning and steering the future of the city
Recently, the assessment of visions and imaginaries has gained increasing attention in social science research on
urban energy and sustainability transitions. This rising interest is driven by a perceived necessity to actively create
and steer visions as means to accelerate change. Social scientists are therefore increasingly understanding visions
as useful instruments of active political world-making. Similar understandings have a long tradition in the urban
planning profession, where the steering qualities of visions have not only been strategically used but also
theoretically questioned. Because my research is especially interested in the impact of visions and imaginaries
on the city, I use the following section to discuss the relevance of these debates for my research.
Envisioning the future resonates strongly with some of the guiding principles of urban planning theory. The
practice of planning as deliberative process emphasizes the necessity of “motivating visions”, “diagrams of
possibility”, or “Leitbilder” (Fainstein and DeFilippis, 2016). Here, the act of visioning has always served the
purpose of steering. Unlike visions in techno-scientific processes, visions in urban planning have a long history of
being consciously created as means to direct and to govern change. They have therefore been understood as
processes, rather than only as future states to be strived for. The debate about guiding visions or Leitbilder in
Policy
narratives
performances
material
implementations
innovative
Leitbild
Socio-technical imaginary
35
urban planning provides a valuable backdrop for reflections about how visions of smart grids are currently being
developed in Berlin, and what this means for the future of energy in the city. In the following section, I therefore
briefly summarize this debate and the influence it has had on the research and practice of urban planning. I then
relate this debate to the scholarly discussion that is currently blossoming in the social sciences around the use of
visions for steering sustainability transitions. Together, these discussions inform my own stance toward the use
of visions as tools for future-making.
Since the mid-20th century, the planning profession and the role of visions in the planning process have gone
through various phases of criticism and change. In Germany, the debate about guiding visions or Leitbilder of
urban planning first emerged with the Modernist ideal of a functionalist city. In the early years after WWII, the
term was associated with a hierarchically structured, expert-driven planning process in which planners were the
ones to develop guiding visions for urban development. In the 1960s and 70s, this understanding was increasingly
criticized, and guiding visions were associated with the enforcement of the political interests of individual
charismatic leaders rather than the democratically legitimated process of collective city-making (Kuder, 2001).
Urban planning visions were increasingly viewed as “subjective and superficial ideas that serve as uncritical
steering mechanisms guided by notions of power and hegemony, which seek to adapt spatial structures to
societal developments in the sense of dominant power relations” (Kuder, 2001: 17). They were increasingly
criticized for simplifying complex urban development issues, and for masking the political interests behind these
complex processes by operating in the name of a universal common good, and thus foreclosing any open
discussion about values.
Starting in the 1970s and 80s, the urban planning profession has increasingly doubted the function and
performance of visions as tools for normative guidance. Instead, visions are increasingly understood as processes
of negotiating and learning, as communicative instruments, and as parts of participative and democratic planning
processes. They are understood as the aggregated visions of desirable spatial and societal futures, which emerge
out of complex negotiation and coordination processes, and are derived from the myriad subjective, individual
paradigms of those involved. In this view, visions are not only guides for the future, but also tools to negotiate
and articulate different interests (Shipley, 2000). Since this time, urban planning visions are therefore increasingly
regarded as discursive development processes and participatory tools, i.e. as processes of visioning (Shipley and
Newkirk, 1999).
The debate about visions and visioning in urban planning has been accompanied by a debate about the planning
profession. Planning professionals started focusing on methods, instruments and processes of urban
development, putting more emphasis on collective interests, and specific justifiable planning goals. With time,
the planning profession has evolved into a management profession, and the process of finding guiding visions is
increasingly understood as a cooperative and participatory process. Today, urban planning professionals are no
longer regarded as the sole proprietors or interpreters of expert knowledge about cities, but instead as
facilitators, managers and negotiators of multiple knowledges between diverse stakeholders in a collaborative
city-making process. Visions, in this process, are more than distant ideals or fixed goals to strive for, but processes
of collaborative imagining.
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More recently, the development of guiding visions in urban planning has also been viewed as a contingent
process that can emerge out of the complex, wholly unstrategic and unplanned contexts of broader societal
change. In more recent urban planning history, guiding visions are therefore understood as closely related to the
societal contexts in which they emerge, and thus themselves regarded as subjects to constant evolution and
change (Shipley and Michela, 2006). In consequence, visions and visioning can have different functions
depending on whether they are embedded in an authoritarian, hierarchical planning and governance system or
in a more cooperative, democratic governance system.
Contemporary forms of cooperative planning involve top-down steering as well as cooperation and consensus
building. These are attained through problem-oriented participatory processes that mediate long-term
objectives and short-term interests. The formulation of objectives is neither incremental nor comprehensive –
neither fully “top-down” nor fully “bottom-up”. Instead, it relies on open communication processes that aim at
discursively and democratically agreeing on common guiding visions on the one hand, and small-scale, short-
term problem-solving activities on the other (Kuder, 2001). Visions in urban planning can thus be defined as
“concrete representations of complex and idealized goals, motivations, forms of communication and
forms of cooperation, that are collectively developed in a discursive process and are based on
common values. They serve as tools for defining more specific goals and for facilitating the making of
decisions needed to pursue the desirable futures they describe” (Kuder, 2001: 57).
In short, Leitbilder are deeply enmeshed with the planning theories and practices of their times, and the planning
professional plays the role of “visionary intermediary within a dynamic urban network” (Kuder, 2001: 90). At the
same time, this increasing process-orientation has been lamented by certain planning theorists, who see the
creativity of far-reaching utopian thought as one of the profession’s strengths (Myers and Kitsuse, 2000).
Planning, in these theorists’ view, is best when it engages in “persuasive storytelling” (Throgmorton, 1992). In
other words, there exists an unresolved tension between understanding guiding visions as top-down steering
instruments or as bottom-up processes of participatory planning.
Similar discussions have started to take hold in the energy and sustainability research community. Scholars in the
field of sustainability studies are increasingly engaging with the potential of visions and visioneering as strategic
tools of future-making, and as means to facilitate change. The rising interest in strategic visioneering is driven by
a perceived urgency to enact fundamental societal transformations in the face of the looming threats of climate
change. It is aimed at understanding how to actively initiate, steer and govern broad sustainability transitions.
These discussions circle around various terms, including ‘envisioning’, ‘imagining’, ‘storytelling’, ‘narrating’,
‘framing’ and ‘staging’. Moreover, they circle around two diverging standpoints: those who understand visions
as potential means to accelerate broad societal change, and those who understand them as potential tools for
collectively and democratically working towards shared societal futures.
A growing number of social science scholars argue that visions of the future should be used as tools to attract
attention, communicate ideas, coordinate different stakeholders, and strategically influence people. These
scholars argue that strategic narratives are necessary to close the gap between climate knowledge and climate
action (Bushell et al., 2017). In this view, politics needs to shift its focus from informing about sustainability
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transitions to shaping them. For this purpose, the role of scientific knowledge needs to change from predicting
probable futures to designing the pathway towards them in processes of “strategic futuring” (Hajer and Pelzer,
2018). In Hajer’s view, a successful energy politics needs to be measured against its capacity to gather people
behind a compelling imaginary (Hajer and Pelzer, 2018: 222). Energy and climate politics, in Hajer's view, need
to be understood as a “set of staged performances” that strategically utilize and spread narratives of desirable
renewable energy futures. Among others, Hajer argues that narratives can and should be strengthened by
staging, enacting or performing them. In his view, politics should be analyzed as a “‘sequence of staged
performances’ through which particular imaginaries loose or gain in influence (Hajer and Pelzer, 2018: 224).
Similarly, Bushell et al. (2017) argue for constructing a “coherent strategic narrative” in relation to climate
change, which will persuade people and enable coordinated action (Bushell et al., 2017: 39). They understand
strategic narratives as political tools to communicate policy goals and convince audiences (Bushell et al., 2017).
While scholars such as Hajer and Bushell argue on the basis of urgency and leadership, others argue on the basis
of plurality, democracy and ownership. These scholars contend that the futures evoked through practices of
collective and participatory imagining should follow no singular goal or pathway, but must reconcile various
interests, desires, hopes, experiences and perspectives. This strand of literature is also interested in narratives
and the visions they portray, but more focused on the collective process of producing these narratives than on
their content. For example, Paul Graham Raven states that “[storytelling] has the potential to open up discussion
around energy futures, turning the discourse away from its current technocratic paradigm and towards a more
inclusive, participatory process in which citizens can recognize their own experiences and perspectives” (Raven,
2017a: 165). Like Raven, various scholars find value in collective storytelling and its potential to gather the
“everyday wisdom of ordinary people” (Moezzi et al., 2017: 3). They argue that collective storytelling can open
up avenues for creative action that would otherwise remain unexplored. These authors explicitly seek to mobilize
non-scientific formats of imagining future worlds, such as science fiction or folklore as means to engage non-
scientific audiences and generate collective interest, meaning and action (Moezzi et al., 2017; Raven, 2017b).
Others explicitly criticize the way energy interventions are frequently imagined and framed over the top of local
communities’ heads, leaving little room for expressing their own energy needs and aspirations (Cloke et al., 2017;
Tidwell and Tidwell, 2018). In sum, this line of scholarship sees the need to engage more ordinary people in
processes of collectively imagining energy and climate futures, and thus enabling collective ownership and
creative problem solving. They argue that opening processes of future-making beyond the realm of policy makers
and experts can facilitate broadly accepted change.
This discussion shows us that – like in urban planning - theorizing on imagined futures in the sustainability
sciences also circles around a tension between getting people on board by strategically influencing or by involving
them. It also shows us that visions and imaginaries and the stories or narratives that promote them can indeed
be attractive political instruments.
Yet most researchers agree that these narratives can be “constructed, planned and promoted”, but they cannot
be fully controlled. Instead, they are “appropriated, interpreted, retold or rejected” by their multiple audiences
(Bushell et al., 2017: 42). This means that any vision and any narrative, no matter how strategically invoked, is
38
open to negotiation. Dierkes makes a similar assessment when he speaks of the possibility of creating Leitbilder
to steer technological development. In his view, the possibility of gathering everyone around a common Leitbild
rapidly decreases as technological systems gain complexity and the number of involved actors and individual
interests rises. Even Bushell et al therefore concede that strategic narratives “should be developed dynamically,
with influencers and audiences, in a strategic dialog” (Bushell et al., 2017: 47).
5.6 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, I understand acts of futuring as political tools and processes for discursively and cooperatively
steering urban (socio-technical) development. It is important to note that, in turn, processes of futuring deserve
as much empirical attention as the futures they evoke. The kinds of futures we envision is politically as interesting
as how these futures are produced.
In this section, I reviewed the concepts of techno-scientific Leitbilder and of socio-technical imaginaries, and
related them to discussions on their usefulness as political instruments for steering urban socio-technical
transitions. First, I established that visions and imaginaries have a performative power to shape reality in the
present, and that they are therefore highly political. I then argued that Leitbilder develop at the fringes of society
and promote techno-scientific innovation while socio-technical imaginaries represent those broadly accepted
cultural norms that are perpetuated at scale. Finally, I related the two concepts to discussions about strategically
utilizing visions and imaginaries of the future as political instruments to steer processes of urban socio-technical
change. Here, I argued that acts of futuring are political both in their contents and their production processes,
and that uncovering these politics requires empirical inquiry.
In relation to smart grid infrastructures, I therefore ask:
a) What kinds of futures are smart grids conveying and what might this mean for the shaping of Berlin’s
future electricity system?
b) How and by whom are these visions being produced?
c) What role are visions of smart grids currently playing in Berlin’s energy system transition?
In the following chapter, I explain how I translated these thoughts and questions into a plausible research design
and research methodology.
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6 Research design and methods
Knowledge of smart grids in Berlin is confined to a relatively small community of experts, institutions and
organizations. This became relatively clear as I started collecting data in an inductive, explorative way, searching
the web for documents and conducting first interviews with key stakeholders, whom I found by attending
conferences and city sponsored dialog events on the topic. Each document and each interview led to further
documents and further interview contacts. Once I had a relatively good overview over the field, I stepped back
and reviewed what kinds of sources I was missing and expanded my research design accordingly. I also
interpreted my data as I went along, continuously elaborating assumptions about the content, processes and
effects surrounding the smart grid futures I was encountering and adjusting my research questions in the process.
There is an element of Grounded Theory to my investigation in that I conducted interviews and collected
documents until the storylines I encountered started repeating themselves and thus reaching the “point of
saturation” (Strauss, 1987). In sum, I proceeded in a continuous loop from exploring my research field,
interpreting my findings, adjusting my research questions and research design, and returning to the field.
My research was informed by existing literature on the topic(s), including policy documents, research papers and
news articles. In many of these documents, smart grids are still primarily portrayed as technical or economic
issues, and also as primarily national level concerns. Understanding what they mean for the social dimensions of
energy futures at the urban level therefore drove my research interest. Concerns that accompanied me as I
entered the research field circled around questions such as: what are visions of smart grid futures
problematizing? Are these problems regarded as technical or social? What are these imagined futures possibly
ignoring? How is this reflected in negotiation processes? Who is involved in the formulation of these visions of
the future and who isn’t? Who has influence and who doesn’t? And lastly, how is this reflected in smart grid
implementation?
6.1 Leitbilder, socio-technical imaginaries and discourse
Leitbilder of socio-technical innovation and imaginaries of socio-technical futures come alive in discourse. They
are articulated in oral conversations, described in written texts, represented in images or films, performed in
theatrical acts, or concretized in material artefacts. These expressions can involve formal communications such
as academic literature, corporate advertisements or political speeches, but also more popular, informal genres
such as science fiction or blogs. Yet discourse is more than just the sum of these forms of expression; it is a way
of collective reasoning and acting. As Sovacool and Hess (2017) summarize, “the term ‘discourse’ means a
‘historically emergent collection of objects, concepts, and practices’ that ‘mutually constitute’ each other to
cohere into stable meaning-systems” (Sovacool and Hess, 2017: 714). Much like Leitbilder or socio-technical
imaginaries, discourse is therefore performative; it constitutes abstract social meaning-systems and, in doing so,
creates concrete social realities. According to Jasanoff (2021), the analysis of discourse is therefore a valuable
qualitative research method for understanding socio-technical imaginaries4. The following section explains
4 http://sts.hks.harvard.edu/research/platforms/imaginaries/ii.methods/methodological-pointers/
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different understandings of discourse, why its analysis can help disentangle both the content and development
of socio-technical imaginaries, and how I operationalize it to serve the purpose of my specific research interest.
6.2 What is discourse?
I understand discourse as an action-oriented social practice (Wetherell and Potter, 1988). This means that it is
not a neutral transmitter of information about the social world, but an integral part of the social world, and
intimately bound up in its making. In this understanding, discourse is a collective means of making sense of the
world, of understanding histories, of making judgements, and of acting upon these judgements. It thus serves
not merely to formulate worldviews or express cultural mindsets, but actively creates them5. Because discourse
theory has its origins in linguistics and semiotics, it is important to distinguish between pure understandings of
discourse as “actual language”, i.e. “talks and text” and broader socio-cultural understandings of discourse as “a
form of social action taking place in context” (Tenorio, 2011: 185). This distinction is important, because it
influences both the focus of analysis and the choice of methods. In my research, I work with the latter.
Discourse theory has evolved in the context of various academic disciplines including linguistics, philosophy,
history, psychology, political science and sociology. Even within social scientific research, definitions of discourse
- and hence modes of examining it - vary. What they have in common, though, is an understanding of discourse
as constituent of meaning and performative of human activities and institutions. Discourse “reflects, shapes and
enables social reality” (Tenorio, 2011: 187). This rests on the slightly paradoxical understanding that we shape
discourse as much as discourse shapes us. In philosophical terms “discourse is thus a representation of what we
want the world to be like, rather than a representation of how the world is” (Carver, 2002: 51). Ultimately, the
world can therefore only be what it is represented to be in discourse. It follows that there is no such thing as a
world outside discourse. Only what is expressed is (Carver, 2002). In this radically social constructivist
understanding discourse is therefore more than a story, a narrative, a controversial discussion or a deliberation;
it comprises all forms of human expression, including language, objects and action.
For critical social theorists discourse is therefore a highly political practice. Michel Foucault defines discourse as
“set of practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 2013: 54). In his view,
discourse is especially intertwined with the social systems of knowledge production and thus involved in shaping
what a society collectively accepts as the “truth”. It is a means of categorizing into “true” and “false”, “right” and
“wrong”, “moral” and “immoral”, or “reasonable” and “mad”. By (re)producing such “truths” discourse can, for
example, influence societal conventions for identifying and treating “madness”. The way we understand and
qualify (or disqualify) certain societal issues through discourse forms the basis for the laws we pass, the
institutions we create (e.g., insane asylums), and the social orders we adhere to. Foucault’s understanding of
discourse as political action thus links it to the very physical world of institutions, people and power.
As a political practice, discourse is also a craft. Wetherell and Potter (1988) stress that discourse is intentionally
created to convince audiences and thus follows certain underlying orders. Foucault underlines this by asserting
5 http://www.tesl-ej.org/wordpress/issues/volume12/ej45/ej45r3/?wscr=
41
that discourse is structured by conventions, or what he calls “discursive practices” (Hook, 2001: 522). Maarten
Hajer (2005) calls this the “situational logics of language-in-use” (Hajer and Versteg, 2005: 175). These discursive
conventions constitute the rules, systems and procedures that govern discursive events. According to Foucault,
these rules, systems and procedures are “constituted by and ensure the reproduction of the social system,
through forms of selection, exclusion and domination” (Hook, 2001: 522). In other words, Foucault asserts that
discourse operates to maintain the social orders that it is rooted in. As Hook summarizes, Foucault emphasizes
that discourse can limit thinking rather than inspire it, constraining and restricting it to the constant reproduction
of status quo rather than providing a space for exploring new horizons. For him, discourse is deeply saturated
with “relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics” (Hook, 2001: 529). According to Foucault, these
forces are embedded in “highly specific and idiosyncratic matrix of historical and socio-political circumstances,
which give rise to, and are part of, the order of discourse” (Hook, 2001: 525). They are thus confined to the
boundaries of existing societal standards and institutional arrangements. At the same time, Hook states that
“discourse is both that which constrains and enables writing, speaking, thinking. What [Foucault] terms
'discursive practices' work in both inhibiting and productive ways, implying a play of prescriptions that designate
both exclusions and choices” (Hook, 2001: 523). This dialectic is perhaps best highlighted by the existence of
parallel and in part incompatible discursive universes within one and the same society, such as feminist discourse,
black empowerment discourse, white supremacist discourse, natural scientific discourse, social scientific
discourse or – in my case – smart grid discourse.
This dialectic of discourse as inhibiting and productive, as inherently restrictive and visionary has made it valuable
for research in policy and planning. It builds on the notion that “discourses can be appropriated or colonized, and
put into practice by enacting, inculcating or materializing them” (Tenorio, 2011: 186). This can be done by interest
groups that form so-called “discourse coalitions” (Hajer, 1993) to promote certain worldviews and influence
policy-making in their favor. Especially in times of uncertainty, these coalitions will compete for the prevalence
of their worldviews and political convictions by means of discourse. Hajer (1993) calls this the “mobilization of
bias” (Hajer, 1993: 45). The arguments that these coalitions bring forward in favor of or in opposition to certain
issues will draw on different discourses at a time. In the case of smart grids, for example, they might combine
elements of engineering discourse (how do smart grids work?), economic discourse (what are the costs and
benefits to society?), climate discourse (what are smart grids good for?), as well as political considerations (do
we want to commit ourselves to this specific solution?) (Hajer, 1993). Different discursive elements are then
combined to present a coherent storyline. Politics, in this view, is a “process in which different actors from various
backgrounds form specific coalitions around specific story lines” (Hajer, 1993: 47). The discourses they produce
often work to conceal the complexity of a problem and mask or obscure underlying meanings, interests or
intentions.
6.3 Analyzing discourse
Discourse analysis aims at revealing these hidden meanings and intentions, i.e. the (hidden) politics of discourse.
In Hajer’s words, discourse analysis aims at “identifying new sites of politics and analyzing the political dynamics
42
therein" (Hajer and Versteg, 2005: 175). More broadly stated, discourse analysis aims at “deconstructing
thoughts and language” (Sovacool and Hess, 2017: 715) or at unraveling the tacit and uncodified “rules,
structures and relations” inherent in thoughts and language (Keller, 2013: 2). It does this to understand how
discourse is constructed to “make things happen” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 3). In doing so, discourse analysis
can lay its focus either on diagnosing or on critiquing certain societal orders. While Foucault is interested in
unraveling “relations of power, not relations of meaning” (Hook, 2001: 529) others put more emphasis on
meaning. Analysis focusing on issues of power typically “raises awareness concerning the strategies used in
establishing, maintaining and reproducing (a)symmetrical relations of power as enacted by means of discourse”
(Tenorio, 2011: 184). In the words of Carver “discourse analysis does not look for truth but rather at who claims
to have truth, and at how these claims are justified in terms of expressed and implicit narratives of authority”
(Carver, 2002: 52), or in how discourses legitimize action. In the words of Carver “discourse analysis does not
look for truth but rather at who claims to have truth, and at how these claims are justified in terms of expressed
and implicit narratives of authority” (Carver, 2002: 52).
6.3.1 Merging two approaches to discourse analysis
To work with discourse, I merged Reiner Keller’s “sociology of knowledge approach” to discourse analysis (SKAD)
with the “discourse coalition” approach of political scientist Maarten Hajer. I used the sociology of knowledge
approach primarily to examine the meanings inherent in smart grid imaginaries in Berlin (i.e. for ‘diagnosis’), and
the discourse coalition approach to examine the politics of their becoming (i.e. for ‘critique’).
Both approaches fit my research questions and theoretical vantage point because they understand discourses as
political practices that create social reality. They understand social realities as socially constructed in a constant,
dialectical process of objective and subjective, individual and collective sense making through discourse (Keller
and Truschkat, 2013). The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse emphasizes the importance of practices,
materialities and infrastructures as integral parts of these sense-making processes, and thus as objects of
analysis. It therefore conceives discourse not only as embedded in consciousness, but as thoroughly intertwined
with the physical realm of ‘world-making’ and thus inextricably linked to the realization of material
infrastructures.
The infrastructures addressed by the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse include statements or
utterances, for example in texts, brochures, web animations, or interviews. They also include the technical
"infrastructures of implementation" that emerge out of discursive problematizations, and which mediate
between discourse and practice (Keller, 2011: 56). For this reason, the sociology of knowledge approach to
discourse involves not just textual analysis, but also an observation of real-world infrastructural manifestations,
which link "statements, practices, actors, organizational arrangements, and objects" with each other in broader
socio-spatial processes (Keller, 2011: 56). Most importantly, however, the sociology of knowledge approach to
discourse assumes that discourse is the place where "creativity, interpretation, fantasy, imagination and desire
come to the fore" (Keller and Truschkat, 2013: 35). This approach thus facilitates insights into the connections
43
between narrative and material forms of future-making and how these are related to experimental pilot projects
on the one hand and broader urban development plans on the other.
6.3.2 The importance of storylines
Both Hajer and Keller identify storylines as central to the analysis of discourse. While Keller’s approach focuses
on the meanings conveyed by these storylines, Hajer’s approach focuses on the (political) practices that create
them. By combining their two approaches, my analysis focuses on both. In Keller’s view, storylines emerge by
relating the definitions, frames, and classifications of a discourse (Keller, 2011: 63). Keller defines frames as
collective products of a societal knowledge repertoire. Frames are the typical qualities associated with a certain
phenomenon in discourse, for example the “flexibility” of smart grid systems. Classifications qualify the content
of a discourse, for example by classifying smart grids as desirable versus threatening. According to Keller, material
realizations are especially important in the process of institutionalizing certain qualifications. Moreover,
discourses can structure phenomena by emphasizing certain elements or dimensions of them, while leaving out
others. The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse aims to unravel these phenomenological structurings.
And lastly, discourses contain narrative structures that come to the fore when frames, classifications and
phenomenological structures are related to each other and form a storyline. To understand these connections, I
asked questions such as: what is this source’s message? What are this message’s core elements? Which words
are being repeated? How do these words differ compared to other messages in the same discourse? Which
arguments, categories, or classifications does this message contain? Which institutions/organizations are being
introduced as relevant? Which subject positions are being introduced?
Hajer’s discourse coalition approach likewise puts great emphasis on storylines. According to Hajer (2006),
storylines help structure communication between people from various backgrounds and with different
understandings of a certain problem. Especially in the case of complex problems that require various forms of
expertise, Hajer contends that "even experts draw on storylines to convey meaning", and then adds that
"storylines are the medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain
social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements" (Hajer, 2006: 71). Storylines, in
Hajer’s view, must therefore be a central focus of discourse analytical work.
Moreover, Hajer links the use of storylines to acts of political coalition building. He assumes that discourses
cannot be understood "outside the practices in which they are uttered"; instead, he states that discourse is
inseparably linked to the "practices in which it is produced, reproduced and transformed". To Hajer, discourse
coalitions emerge as the result of "practices in the context of which actors employ storylines" (Hajer, 2006: 70).
He explains that even though many terms commonly used in communication mean different things to different
people, this can actually work in favor of political coalition building. He goes as far as to say that "people, that
can be proven not to fully understand one another, nevertheless together produce meaningful political
interventions" (Hajer, 2006: 69). This resonates with the way Dierkes understands the functioning of Leitbilder,
which trigger different associations with different people, and are yet the focal point for mutual coordination
and collaboration. While Dierkes emphasizes the power of the 'image', Hajer emphasizes the power of 'storylines'
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(Hajer, 2006: 69). He further points out that the forming of discourse coalitions is not necessarily a conscious act,
but that these coalitions can emerge between actors or groups that are otherwise distant and unrelated. “A
discourse coalition can then be defined as the ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these
storylines, and the practices through which these storylines get expressed" (Hajer, 2006: 71). Nevertheless,
Hajer’s discourse coalition approach helps analyze the strategic actions that people take to position a discourse,
and to illuminate how different actors and organizational practices reproduce this discourse without necessarily
orchestrating or coordinating their actions or without necessarily sharing deep values (Hajer, 1993: 48).
For this purpose, Hajer (1993) defines the two concepts of discourse structuration and discourse
institutionalization. He states that “discourse structuration occurs when a discourse starts to dominate the way
a society conceptualizes the world” (Hajer, 1993: 46). When a discourse is structurated, this means that it is
widely shared, widely accepted, and largely uncontested. It means that a certain storyline has gained popularity
to the point where alternative storylines are muted. After structuration, discourses can deepen in terms of their
material translation and institutional manifestation. As Hajer (2006) puts it: “If a discourse is successful—that is
to say, if many people use it to conceptualize the world—it will solidify into an institution, sometimes as
organizational practices, sometimes as traditional ways of reasoning. This process is called discourse
institutionalization” (Hajer, 1993: 46). Tying this back to the development of infrastructures, discourse
institutionalization means that an innovative idea has traveled from the heads and the conversations of few
experts and evolved into the dominant form of organizing a socio-technical system. Both discourse structuration
and institutionalization occur due to the strategic actions of people and their discursive alliances. To understand
these strategic actions, and how they influenced Berlin’s smart grid discourse, I asked questions such as: Which
actors and institutions are imagining what kinds of urban smart grid futures in Berlin? How are they influencing
the emergence of dominant storylines? Which contested storylines exist? Where and how are these storylines
being voiced?
45
Figure 3: Relating discourse to visions and socio-technical imaginaries (own figure)
Both the sociology of knowledge and the discourse coalitions approach work with the concept of storylines as
fundamental for understanding the meanings and politics of discourse. I used the sociology of knowledge
approach to analyze the storylines that became apparent in the smart grid discourse that I encountered, and I
used the discourse coalition approach to analyze the actors that uttered these storylines, and the practices that
conformed to them (Hajer, 1993: 47). To me, these storylines are Berlin’s imagined smart grid futures.
Both approaches are also sensible to the socio-institutional context of discourse. In other words, they examine
who, how, where and for whom discursive events take place. Sensitivity to the situatedness of discursive events
means awareness of the social relations, institutional settings, and important events that characterize the
discursive setting or situation (Keller and Truschkat, 2013: 52). In my case, this socio-institutional context consists
of the pilot projects at Berlin’s future sites and the political-administrative rationale that backs them.
6.3.3 Technical procedure
To conduct my analysis, I transcribed all interviews and uploaded all documents to MAXQDA for systematic
coding. I identified dominant frames associated with smart grid futures (such as “flexibility” or “demand-side
management”), how they were being classified (for example as “modern”, “green” or “intelligent”), and the way
they were defining smart grids as a phenomenon (for example as “economic opportunity” rather than “critical
privacy issue”). These findings led me to identify dominant storylines, which I call Berlin’s imagined smart grid
futures.
46
Moreover, I analyzed how places, times and actors were involved in the formation of these storylines. I identified
the role of urban places (most notably Berlin’s future sites) for the formation of certain storylines, when and how
these storylines were disseminated (for example at events or through advertisements), and which actor networks
were involved in their promotion (for example research institutions).
6.4 Case study design
I conducted a single case study of imagined smart grid futures in the city of Berlin, Germany. The case study
aimed at revealing how the city’s energy future is being imagined and reconfigured through the development of
smart grids in policy and implementation circles. I unraveled these imagined energy futures by analyzing
discourses and practices of smart grid development in the city of Berlin over the course of two years (2016 -
2018).
My research involved three major units of analysis: the city level, three urban development sites, and three smart
grid pilot projects, which are being implemented at these sites.
I selected these three pilot projects, because they are typical for the way smart grids are currently being
developed and implemented in many cities across Germany: they follow a logic of on-site “learning by doing”,
which means that smart grid infrastructures are being developed, tested and publicly demonstrated in openly
accessible urban environments instead of secluded laboratories. This resonates with a recent trend in urban
development, which builds on experimentation with infrastructures in the real-life context of “urban
laboratories” (Bulkeley et al., 2019). My three pilot projects therefore relate not only to questions of techno-
scientific innovation, but also to questions of urban change. In addition, all three pilot projects are being
implemented within the context of larger urban development sites with exceptional meaning for the city of
Berlin. In this regard, they can all be considered “projects within projects”, which are closely related to Berlin’s
broader urban development plans. The selected pilots are therefore especially relevant for understanding the
interlinkages between experimental “futuring” with smart grids and broader questions of urban change.
Despite their similarities, the pilot projects also present numerous differences, for example regarding project
size, set-up, funding, and management. Because I am interested in understanding how experimentation with
smart grids - regardless of its various guises and modes - is tied into the making of urban futures, these
differences do not impede the research design. On the contrary, they show that in spite of these differences, my
project-level analyses render similar results. In spite of very different project characteristics, they reveal similar
dynamics regarding the role of imagined futures for techno-scientific innovation, for urban energy in Berlin, and
for the politics of urban experimentation.
I chose a qualitative case study approach, because I am interested in understanding how my case relates to
existing (theoretical) work on the shaping of cities through imagined futures, especially in the context of
infrastructural experimentation. I was less interested in the representativeness of my findings. Instead, I was
interested in reconstructing and interpreting the mechanisms at work in my specific case. My case study thus
lends itself to generalizations about the role of imagined futures in processes of urban socio-technical change. It
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does not, however, lend itself to statistically representative generalizations, as case studies never do (Yin, 2009:
38). More precisely, my case study provides evidence of how experimental futuring with smart grids is shaping
the city of Berlin. It does not, however, allow conclusions about how experimental futuring with smart grids is
shaping other German cities. Relating my findings to other cities, in which experimental infrastructuring with
smart grids is also taking place, must be done in another research project. Nevertheless, my research provides
potentially important lessons for other cities, other experimental sites and other smart grid projects. For
example, my research provides knowledge about what to be aware of, and possibly even how to proceed in
similar cases to attain better urban futures for all.
I complemented my project-level analysis with an analysis of imagined futures at the city-level. This analysis
connects my individual pilots with their broader urban environment, linking imagined futures of smart grids with
imagined futures of Berlin as a smart and a low-carbon city, and linking the politics of imagining the future to the
politics of urban experimentation.
To structure my case study, I investigated three spatial levels:
a) Each smart grid project as a whole, including selected institutions, companies or individuals
involved;
b) The three so-called future sites (Zukunftsorte), which host these smart grid projects;
c) Berlin’s political administration as well as relevant institutions and companies working in the field
of smart grids in Berlin, but not necessarily linked to the future sites, such as the newly founded
public utility (BerlinEnergie).
In each of my pilot sites, I investigated the imagined futures associated with smart grid infrastructures in the
city. In my study of the broader urban context, I investigated the relation between these imagined futures and
other imagined futures, such as the smart city and the low-carbon city. I also investigated how these futures
were being promoted as part of the future sites’ broader urban development narratives.
Robert K. Yin defines a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between context and phenomenon are not
clearly evident (Yin, 2009: 18). I chose to work with a single case study, because the way urban futures are being
imagined in the context of urban smart grid experimentation is certainly contemporary, and how these
experimental sites are intertwined with their broader urban context is less clear. Other research designs, such as
a survey or an experiment, would not have been able to capture my research phenomenon with the same depth.
6.5 Data collection
I collected data over the course of two years (2016 - 2018) using a mixed methods approach, which was based
on expert interviews on the one hand and a review of relevant documents on the other. I collected data at the
city level on the one hand, and at three sites of urban experimentation on the other. This way, I was able to trace
how important stakeholders such as the administration and the electric grid operator are currently imagining
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urban smart grid futures, and at the same time understand how smart grids futures are being imagined by those
actually implementing pilot versions of them on the ground.
My interviews therefore spanned experts from the three experimental project sites as well as key stakeholders
from Berlin’s energy sector, including representatives of city administration, the electric grid operator, the newly
founded public utility, civil society organizations, the local energy agency, and mulit-national electronics and
technology companies.
6.5.1 Semi-structured expert interviews
I conducted a total of 16 interviews with experts from 13 institutions. All interviews followed a semi-structured
approach: the questions were based on pre-conceived guidelines (see appendix 12.1 “Interview guideline”), and
the interviews were conducted as conversations. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. All interviews
were audio-recorded and then transcribed into print. They covered six broad areas of interest, including – but
not limited to – the specific questions listed below:
a) Definition of smart grids
How do you define smart grids? What do smart grids do? What are they good for?
b) Urban smart grid ideal
How would an ideal smart grid work in the city of Berlin and at [EUREF/Adlershof/TXL]?
c) Urban effects
Who would use smart grids? What would change for households, SMEs, neighborhoods or communities
if we had an ideal smart grid in Berlin? What kinds of spatial and/or environmental effects do you
associate with smart grids?
d) Material implementation
How is your institution involved in implementing smart grids in Berlin? How is implementation
advancing in Berlin? What obstacles are you encountering? How do these relate to the city of Berlin?
How and by whom could smart grid implementation be supported in Berlin?
e) Risks
What kinds of risks do you associate with smart grids?
f) Alternatives
What alternatives to smart grids can you think of?
I define experts as people who have special knowledge of the social context that I am researching (Gläser und
Laudel, p. 12). In my case, this means that they are either experts for the smart grid pilot projects, for Berlin’s
future sites or for the city as a whole. Moreover, the development of urban smart grids relates to three different
communities, including ICT, energy and urban development. To capture viewpoints and experiences from all
three domains, I made sure that my selection of interviewees included members of each of these communities.
49
I conducted a total of eight interviews relating to the smart grid pilot projects, and eight relating to the city of
Berlin. Out of the eight interviews conducted with experts from the pilot projects, one related to TXL, two related
to Adlershof and five to EUREF. The number of interviews I was able to conduct in relation to my three pilot
projects varied due different project sizes and varying degrees of implementation. TXL, for example, has not yet
been put into practice, and is therefore better understood via documents. The pilot project at Adlershof involves
fewer people than the one at EUREF, which means that I had fewer contacts. Moreover, my situation as
researcher gave me better access to EUREF than to the other two pilot projects (see section 6.7 “My role as
researcher”).
For an overview of my interviews, including the year they were conducted, the names and types of institutions
covered, and their relation to my case study, see Table 1. For overviews of the number of interviews I conducted
with relation to each pilot project, type of institutions and level of analysis, see Tables 3-6.
Table 1: Overview of all interviews
Year of
interview
Name of institution
Type of
institution
Type of
community
Spatial scale
Relation to
case study
2017
Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned
urban development
company
urban
development
future site &
smart grid pilot
project
TXL
2018
SenWEB
city government /
administration
urban
development
city
Berlin
2018
BerlinEnergie
Public utility company
energy
city
Berlin
2018
BUND
civil society organization
energy
city
Berlin
2016
BürgerEnergieBerlin
civil society organization
energy
city
Berlin
2018
StromnetzBerlin
private grid operator
energy
city
Berlin
2018
StromnetzBerlin
private grid operator
energy
city
Berlin
2018
Siemens
private electronics
company
ICT
future site &
smart grid pilot
project
Adlershof
2018
Cisco
private ICT company
ICT
city
Berlin
2017
Energy Eurasia GmbH
private energy
consultancy
energy
future site
Berlin
2016
EUREF AG
private project
development company
urban
development
future site
EUREF
2016
Inno2grid
private energy
consultancy
ICT
future site &
smart grid pilot
project
EUREF
2016
Inno2grid
private energy
consultancy
ICT
smart grid pilot
project
EUREF
50
2018
SenseLab
research
ICT
future site &
smart grid pilot
project
Adlershof
2017
WZB
research
urban
development
future site &
smart grid pilot
project
EUREF
2017
SenseLab
research
ICT
smart grid pilot
project
EUREF
6.5.2 Review of relevant documents
I complemented the data from my interviews with data from relevant documents, such as laws and policies,
project reports, conference presentations, company websites, information brochures, press releases,
advertisements, master plans, strategy papers, and conceptual guidelines. I reviewed a total of 54 documents
relating to the different levels of my case study design, namely the smart grid pilot projects, the future sites and
the city. All documents were published between 2012 and 2018. I analyzed only the written content of these
documents (not images).
I reviewed a total of 17 documents relating to the three smart grid pilot projects, 16 documents relating to
Berlin’s future sites, and 21 documents relating to the broader city. Out of the 13 documents relating to the pilot
projects, five related to EUREF, four to TXL, and four to Adlershof. For an overview of all documents that I
reviewed, see Table 2 (next page).
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Table 2: List of relevant documents
Year of
publication
Document name
Type of
document
Publishing institution Type of institution
Type of
community
Spatial scale
Relation to
case study
2012 Studie Zukunftsorte Berlin report
Technologiestiftung
Berlin
public urban development agency
urban
development
future site Berlin
2012 Mobility2Grid project proposal
project
proposal
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium
urban
development
smart grid
project
EUREF
2013
Berlin Adlershof - Stadt für Wissenschaft,
Wirtschaft und Medien
information
brochure
SenStadtUm city government / administration
urban
development
future site Adlershof
2013 Masterplan Berlin TXL
project
masterplan
SenStadtUm city government / administration
urban
development
future site TXL
2013
Volksbegehren über die
Rekommunalisierung der Berliner
Energieversorgung
draft law Berliner Energietisch civil society organization energy city Berlin
2014
Smart City Berlin - Urbane Technologien
für Metropolen
report
Technologiestiftung
Berlin
public urban development agency ICT city Berlin
2014
Machbarkeitsstudie Klimaneutrales
Berlin 2050
policy report
Project consortium
(PIK)
research consortium energy city Berlin
2015 Smart City Berlin
policy
document
SenStadtUm city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2015 Stadtentwicklungskonzept 2030
policy
document
SenStadtUm city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2015
Abschlussbericht der Enquete-
Kommission "Neue Energie für Berlin"
policy report Enquete Kommission public urban development agency energy city Berlin
2015 TXL Brochure brochure Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2015 Energienetz Berlin Adlershof presentation
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium energy
smart grid
project
Adlershof
Year of
publication
Document name
Type of
document
Publishing institution Type of institution
Type of
community
Spatial scale
Relation to
case study
2016 Berliner Koalitionsvertrag 2016 - 2021
policy
document
City government city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2016 Energiewendegesetz Berlin law SenJustVA city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
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2016 Berlin Strategie 2.0
policy
document
SenStadtUm city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2016 Poster "Digitale Räume" poster
Project consortium
(sub-group)
research consortium ICT
smart grid
project
EUREF
2016 Poster "Akzeptanz und Partizipation" poster
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium
urban
development
smart grid
project
EUREF
2017 Änderung Energiewendegesetz Berlin law SenJustVA city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2017 TXL Eine Republik in Berlin interview
AusserGewöhlich
Berlin
news agency Independent future site TXL
2017
Masterplan Energietechnik Berlin-
Brandenburg
urban
masterplan
Clustermanagement
Energietechnik B-B
public urban development agency energy city Berlin
2017 Vernetzte Energie im Quartier report
Technologiestiftung
Berlin
public urban development agency energy city Berlin
2017
Poster "Beitrag eines Eisspeichers in
einem Smart grid"
poster TU Berlin research consortium energy
smart grid
project
Adlershof
2017 Poster "Smart Grid Infrastrukturen" poster
Project consortium
(sub-group)
research consortium ICT
smart grid
project
EUREF
2017 "Forschungscampus Mobility2grid" brochure
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium
urban
development
smart grid
project
EUREF
2018 Umsetzungkonzept Bek 2030
policy
document
SenUVK city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2018
Masterplan Industriestadt Berlin 2018 -
2021
urban
masterplan
SenWEB city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2018 Digitale Technologien SenWEB city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
Year of
publication
Document name
Type of
document
Publishing institution Type of institution
Type of
community
Spatial scale
Relation to
case study
2018 Digitale Agenda Website SenWEB city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
2018 CityLab document H2rund civil society organization
urban
development
city Berlin
2018
Science at Work
advertisement
Tagesspiegel
news agency
Independent
future site
Adlershof
2018 Website
company
website
EUREF AG
private project development
company
urban
development
future site EUREF
53
2018 TXL Urban Technologies: Energy project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development comp.
urban
development
smart grid
project
TXL
2018 TXL Facts and Figures project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018 TXL Event locations project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018 TXL Real estate overview project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018 Berlin TXL - The Urban Tech Republic brochure Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018 It's all about the smart city, stupid press release Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018
Philipp Boutellier als smart city leader
ausgezeichnet
press release Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2018 Energiekonzept 2018 project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
smart grid
project
TXL
2018 Low-Ex-Net News press release Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
smart grid
project
TXL
2018 TXL Urban Technologies project website Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
smart grid
project
TXL
2018 Smart Grid Allianz Adlershof project website
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium energy
smart grid
project
Adlershof
Year of
publication
Document name
Type of
document
Publishing institution Type of institution
Type of
community
Spatial scale
Relation to
case study
2018 Energienetze project website
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium energy
smart grid
project
Adlershof
2019 Lagebericht 2019 report Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2019 Energienetz Berlin Adlershof
Project consortium
(TU Berlin/Siemens)
research consortium energy
smart grid
project
Adlershof
2020
Masterplan Solarcity Berlin:
Monitoringbericht 2020
report SenWEB city government / administration energy city Berlin
2020
Berlin Adlershof – Transformations-raum
für die Energie der Zukunft
document
WISTA Management
GmbH
public urban development agency
urban
development
future site Adlershof
2020
Website
project website
Berlin Energie
public utility company
energy
city
Berlin
54
2020 Brochure "Zukunftsorte" brochure Tegel Projekt GmbH
publicly commissioned urban
development company
urban
development
future site TXL
2020
Standardisierte Leistungserfassung -
Monitoringreport 2020 und Monitoring-
Gesamtbericht
report Project consortium
(TU Berlin) research consortium urban
development
smart grid
project EUREF
2020
Mobility2Grid - Sektkorenübergreifende
Energie- und Verkehrswende
monograph
Project consortium
(TU Berlin)
research consortium
urban
development
smart grid
project
EUREF
2020
Beratungskonzept: Energie- und
Verkehrswende zusammendenken -
Akzeptanz und Partizipation in
Reallaboren gesellschaftlicher
Transformation
report Project consurtium
(sub-group) research consortium urban
development
smart grid
project EUREF
2021 Website "Zukunftsorte" Website SenWEB city government / administration
urban
development
city Berlin
- Smart City Berlin: The Future Starts Here presentation
Berlin Partner for
Business and
Technology
public urban development agency urban
development city Berlin
55
The following tables give an overview of the complete data I collected - including documents and interviews -
and relates them to the different spatial levels, pilot projects, types of institutions and type of communities that
were covered.
Table 3: Overview of data collected in relation to each spatial scale
Spatial scale
Number of documents
per spatial scale
Number of interviews per
spatial scale
Sum of documents and
interviews
City
21
7
28
Future sites
16
2
18
Future sites & pilot
projects
0
5
5
Smart grid pilot projects
17
2
19
Total
54
16
70
Table 4: Overview of data collected in relation to each pilot project (sub-set out of total)
Site hosting pilot project
Number of documents
Number of interviews
Sum of documents and
interviews
Adlershof
8
2
10
EUREF
9
5
14
TXL
15
1
16
Total
32
8
40
Table 5: Overview of data collected in relation to types of institutions
Type of institution
Number of
documents
Number of
interviews
Sum of documents and
interviews
City government / administration
14
2
16
Civil society organization
2
2
4
Grid operating company
0
2
2
Publicly owned or commissioned project
development company
21
1
22
Privately owned project development
company
1
1
2
Research institution
14
3
17
Energy start-up
0
3
3
ICT/electronics company
0
2
2
Newspaper
2
0
2
Total
54
16
70
56
Table 6: Data collected in relation to each type of community
Type of community
Number of documents
per community
Number of interviews per
community
Sum of documents and
interviews
Energy
12
6
18
ICT
3
6
9
Urban development
37
4
41
None of the above
2
0
2
Total
54
16
70
6.6 Limitations and disclaimer
Because knowledge of smart grids in Berlin is currently still confined to a relatively small community of mostly
engineers and researchers, the discourses that I chose to examine in this project are limited to those produced
in expert circles. I chose to focus on expert discourses, because I am interested in the discourse – and the future
imaginaries - that dominates the current processes of production, consolidation and institutionalization of urban
smart grids. Although it would certainly be worthwhile to explore the ways in which ordinary citizens make sense
of smart grids in the(ir) city, this would serve a different research interest.
Moreover, my study is limited to the discourse produced by relevant social actors and institutions located in
Berlin. This doesn’t mean that everything they do or think about in relation to smart grids is necessarily limited
to or even focused on Berlin. But it does mean that they are based in the city, know the city, potentially view or
even use the city as testbed, and – as experts – are involved in the city’s smart grid discourse.
It is also worth mentioning that discourse analysis as methodological tool has been criticized for focusing
excessively on meaning - or what I have called “diagnosis” - rather than constructive critique (Hook, 2001: 529).
I address this by engaging with the discourse coalition approach, i.e. identifying the actors and alliances involved
in creating and perpetuating smart grid discourses, and thus opening the view for questions of power. This way,
I seek to open the view for possibilities of politically engaging with this power.
Throughout the duration of my data collection, I was employed as researcher within the Science Policy Research
Unit at WZB Berlin Social Science Center. During this time, my office was located on the premises of the EUREF
Campus, one of the three future sites I researched as part of my case study. Moreover, my employing institution
and numerous of my colleagues were (and still are) active members of the “Mobility2Grid” research consortium,
which is responsible for the micro-smart grid pilot project located at EUREF. In fact, the current head of my
research group - and long-time dissertation mentor - was among the initiators of this pilot project and is a
member of the consortium’s board of directors.
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7 Introduction to my case study of Berlin
In the preceding chapters, I reviewed relevant social and urban studies literature on smart grids, related them to
my theoretical framework and presented my research design and methodology. I now proceed to introduce my
case study. I start by providing an overview of Berlin’s current political landscape, especially the city’s energy and
(smart) urban development policies. I then zoom into the latest developments in the contested politics of Berlin’s
electricity grid. Finally, I describe the three so-called “future sites” - EUREF Campus, Technology Park Adlershof
and TXL Urban Tech Republic - which host the three smart grid pilot projects that I investigated and formed the
entry points for my analysis. This chapter thus provides a backdrop for the presentation and discussion of my
results, which follow in the next chapter.
7.1 Berlin’s smart and low-carbon agendas
With the rising proliferation of smart, low-carbon urban agendas, the development of technological
infrastructures is once again at the center of contemporary urbanism. City governments, researchers and
businesses across Germany are putting a strong focus on technological innovations to confront the looming
challenges of climate change and to tackle urban energy transitions.
In line with this, Germany’s capital city of Berlin has set ambitious goals for becoming a leading “smart” and
leading “green” European metropolis. In doing so, the city is attempting to position itself as frontrunner in the
advancement of Germany’s Energiewende and global competitor in the field of digital industries. These
aspirations are based, among others, on the city’s growing self-confidence as Germany’s start-up capital, spurred
not least by its success at attracting increasing numbers of young, creative tech entrepreneurs each year. At the
same time, the city’s economy is fragile compared to other states in the country: even though Berlin’s urban
economy has continuously grown since 2005, the city’s unemployment rate remains high, and its average income
is lower than in the rest of Germany (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 50). After a long phase of economic stagnation
following the city’s reunification, the prospect of developing leadership in a growing industrial field is being
embraced by the city government as an opportunity to secure competitive, well-paying jobs.
‘Digitizing’ and ‘greening’ the local economy are therefore among the top priorities of Berlin’s government.
Numerous strategies and pieces of legislation back these priorities. In 2013, the government passed a Smart City
Strategy (Berlin Senate, 2015b) that details how it aims to support the equipment of numerous areas of urban
life with digitized technologies in the course of the coming years. This strategy has since been complemented by
a less formalized digital agenda, which outlines the city’s approach to confronting the so-called digitization
challenge6. In 2014 and 2015, the city administration also commissioned two studies called Climate-Neutral
Berlin 2050 (Reusswig et al., 2014) and New Energy for Berlin (Enquête-Kommission, 2015), which were
translated between 2016 and 2018 into a binding local Energy Transitions Law (Berlin Senate, 2016b) and related
Energy and Climate Protection Program 2030 (Berlin Senate, 2016c). These programs and strategies all
emphasize the necessity of digitizing the city’s electric grid infrastructure.
6 available at: https://www.berlin.de/sen/energie/digitalisierung/
58
Digitization and sustainability are viewed as key means for providing an innovative and ‘ecologically responsible’
economic future for the city (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 53). Both digital technologies and new energy technologies
are regarded as motors for innovation and economic growth. The local government aims at turning Berlin into a
thriving and competitive industrial hub for new digital and new energy (and energy-efficiency) technologies that
will create well-paying jobs and generate added value in the city (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 52).
Experimentation with knowledge intensive technologies and services is one of the government’s primary tools
for reaching these goals. The city aims to become a “testbed” for “intelligent” and “sustainable” technologies,
which it seeks to promote in pilot projects (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 52). For this reason, the Berlin Senate has
designated a total of eleven so-called “future sites”, which are aimed at trialing and exhibiting the city’s urban
development ambitions. The government seeks to support pilot projects for developing, testing and publicly
demonstrating novel (energy) technologies at these sites. It envisions coalitions between university born start-
ups, scientific laboratories and business incubators to collaborate at these future sites (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 53),
and seeks to support the future sites by elaborating a strategic concept for their development, fostering mutual
exchange, and helping them build their individual profiles (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 56). Smart grids are being tested
and developed at these future sites.
7.2 Berlin’s local Energiewende
In Berlin, as in many other cities across Germany, political interest and engagement in local energy issues has
gained momentum since the country’s decision to transform its energy system under the Energiewende
framework. By passing the Energy Transition Law (Energiewendegesetz) and related Energy and Climate
Protection Program (Berliner Energie- und Klimaschutzprogramm 2030), Berlin was among the first federal states
to pass binding climate protection legislation. The current Senate government calls both the Energy Transition
Law and the study New Energy for Berlin, which it is based on, the “guiding threads” (Leitschnur) of its energy
politics (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 61). Until today, only eight out of Germany’s sixteen states have passed similar
laws, and a national law is still being negotiated. Moreover, Berlin was the first federal state to set a legal deadline
for ending coal-fired power generation. In 2019, the urgency of the government’s ambitions was further
underlined by its decision to officially proclaim a state of climate emergency (Klimanotstand). These measures
have all been passed by Senate governments headed by the Social Democratic Party. Since 2014, the city is
governed by a coalition between the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Green Party. The current Senate’s
overarching goal is to reach climate-neutrality by the year 2045. For this purpose, it has set ambitious CO2
reduction targets for various sectors, including households, transport, industry, businesses, energy, and buildings
(Berlin Senate, 2016c). Moreover, it has passed programs to incentivize action towards these goals, such as the
“Masterplan Solar City” (2020) aimed at covering Berlin’s rooftops with solar panels.
Although the city’s overall CO2 emissions have slowly but steadily decreased compared to the baseline year 1990,
major efforts are still needed in all sectors. Among others, the city lags behind its energy related goals, i.e. the
transition from fossil-fuel based energy production and consumption to renewable based production and
consumption. Currently, the city is still mainly powered by nine fossil-fuel based energy generation plants, three
59
of which are coal-fired, three are natural gas-fired, two are based on oil, and one is based on the incineration of
municipal waste (Bundesnetzagentur, 2020a). In 2017, Berlin’s coal-exit was initiated when the city’s last lignite-
fired power plant (Braunkohlekraftwerk) was shut down and converted into a gas-fired power plant. By 2030 the
same is expected for the three remaining hard-coal fired power plants (Steinkohlekraftwerke). Yet, while the
city’s coal-exit plans seem to be underway, its ambitions to expand renewable energy generation have largely
failed: to this day, only about 2% of the city’s energy are produced from wind, solar or biomass plants
(Statistisches Bundesamt, Stand 2019). Similarly, its Masterplan Solar City, a program that aims to cover 25% of
Berlin’s energy consumption via solar energy by the year 2050 has rendered only meager results. By 2019, only
0,109 MWp out of the necessary 4.400 MWp had actually been installed (Berlin Senate, 2020). The same is true
for the city’s goal to install 1000 electric vehicle loading stations by 2018. By 2020, only 612 loading stations has
been installed (Bundesnetzagentur, 2020b). In sum, the city of Berlin has set ambitious political targets for
transforming its energy economy and is now struggling to reach them.
Especially in the German context, notions of decentralization and prosumage have gained widespread attention
since the country’s Energiewende policies have made small-scale renewable energy generation hugely popular
throughout the country. Since the government’s policy turn-around in 2011, distributed renewable electricity
generation has experienced a steep increase from approx. 0.9 million in 2010 to 1.9 million units in 2020 (BDEW,
2020). Homeowners and small energy cooperatives throughout the country have invested huge amounts of
private capital into solar panels and wind energy generation plants, and thus demonstrated their willingness and
potential to contribute to Germany’s clean energy transition. The distribution of (renewable) energy generation
between many private households instead of few large electricity companies is viewed as one of the
Energiewende policies’ major achievements and reason for its continuous popular backing. In the German
context, decentralization and prosumage are therefore commonly viewed as backbones of the country’s future
energy system (Agora Energiewende, 2017).
In this same vein, the Berlin government has committed to transforming the city’s energy supply system into a
“completely decentralized” and renewable energy system (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 63). This endeavor is backed by
an independent energy commission that recommends the continuous integration of “decentralized supply” into
Berlin’s grid structure (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 16), and the city’s Energy and Climate Protection Program,
which promotes the use of “decentralized facilities of energy production” in a “smart, decentralized energy
market” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 14, 28). Among other things, these urban policy documents promote
decentralized energy production and trading on the basis of what they call “micro-prosumage”
(Kleinstprosumer). To this end, Berlin’s municipal government has launched a “Masterplan solar city” that aims
to make rooftops and façades available for the generation of renewable electricity, and which has been
complemented by instruments to facilitate so-called “landlord-to-tenant” electricity supply (Mieterstrom).
Yet distributed energy generation and prosumage are still marginal phenomena in the city. In Berlin - as in other
German cities - this is in large part due to the high proportion of tenants (as opposed to home owners) without
access to rooftops for installing solar panels. In 2018, only approx. 17 % of Berlin’s inhabitants owned their
homes, while the majority were tenants (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2019). Berlin’s Masterplan Solar
60
City therefore targets rooftops on public buildings as a first step towards more urban renewable energy
generation. Moreover, the regulation guiding Germany’s liberalized and “unbundled” electricity market prohibits
combined electricity production and trading and has thus kept private building owners from potentially selling
rooftop solar electricity to their tenants. This obstacle was removed with the federal “Landlord-to-Tenant
Electricity Supply Act” (Mieterstromgesetz), which was passed in 2017 with the specific goal of turning urban
rooftop owners into actors on the electricity market and agents of Germany’s urban Energiewende. Yet in Berlin,
this Act has not had the sweeping effect initially expected. Instead of reaching small-scale private building
owners, it has mostly spurred the initiative of few large housing companies. Despite the Solar City Masterplan
and the Landlord-to-Tenant Electricity Supply Act, in 2020 only 12 % of newly built rooftop area in Berlin were
being used for solar electricity generation (Wolf, 2021). All in all, the amount of renewable electricity being
generated within the city of Berlin in 2018 amounted to approximately 5 % of the city’s total electricity generation
(Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien, 2021). In terms of distributed storage, the city faces a similar picture. The
Berlin government has set out to integrate the extensive existing electricity, gas and district heating networks,
and connect them to prosumage households (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 14). It envisages electricity storage as
decentralized component of a smart energy management system that increases grid stability and fosters small-
scale prosumage (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 14). Among others, it seeks to develop the use of power-to-heat and
power-to-gas technologies for converting locally produced (excess) electricity into heating and gas, and thus
increasing energy-efficiency and fostering local consumption (Eigenverbrauch). In addition, the government has
set out to expand the small-scale use of combined heat and power plants (CHP) in private homes and rental
complexes. Taken together, these measures all represent a strong effort towards realizing ideas of
decentralization and prosumage in the city. The Berlin government is seeking to involve its citizens in the creation
of a participatory, inclusive, and distributed future energy system. Nevertheless, in terms of implemented
capacities, the small-scale decentralized production, consumption and storage of renewable electricity is not yet
a relevant building block of Berlin’s urban Energiewende.
Not surprisingly, the Berlin Senate is constantly reminded of its shortcomings by a vibrant local NGO community.
This community includes alliances such as “Kohleausstieg Berlin” and “Berliner Energietisch”, the cooperative
“BürgerEnergieBerlin”, the Berlin chapter of “Friends of the Earth Germany” and many more. A number of these
NGOs have established themselves as respected experts and political players who are regularly consulted by the
government on energy and climate issues. For example, two out of ten seats in the independent “Climate
Protection Council” (Klimaschutzrat), which the Senate established in 2016, are reserved for representatives of
civil society organizations and currently held by “BürgerEnergieBerlin” and “Friends of the Earth Berlin”. Together
with representatives of the city’s most important utility companies, research institutions, housing corporations,
the local Energy Agency and the local Chamber of Commerce, they regularly advise the Berlin Senate on energy
and climate policies.
In the past few years, civil society organizations have also gained significant influence on the politics of Berlin’s
electricity grid. Since 2014, “Berliner Energietisch” and “BürgerEnergieBerlin” have effectively led campaigns to
end private ownership of the grid and to reinstate a public grid operating company. In doing so, these two citizen-
61
led initiatives have effectively put Berlin’s electric grid back on the political agenda, and all but uprooted the
city’s decade-old infrastructure-related liberal market paradigm.
7.3 The contested politics of Berlin’s electricity grid
Berlin’s electricity grid is one of the largest distribution grids in the country. It covers an area of almost 900 km²
with approximately 35.000 km of electric lines serving about 2.3 million households (Stromnetz Berlin GmbH,
2020). The grid is owned by the Swedish multi-national power company Vattenfall GmbH, which also holds the
public concession to operate it. Vattenfall’s subsidiary company, Stromnetz Berlin, is responsible for grid
operation.
Until the late 1990s, Berlin’s energy infrastructure belonged to the city-owned utility company Bewag. During
the 1990s, however, the liberalization of Germany’s energy market led to a wave of privatizations. The city’s
power plants and energy networks, including its electricity grid, district heating grid and gas network were sold
to private companies. In 2001, Berlin’s electricity and district heating grids were taken over by Vattenfall7. In
addition to this, the company also owns and operates the city’s nine major energy generation plants.
While the privatization of Berlin’s public energy infrastructure and utilities went largely unnoticed in the 1990s,
the same issue is highly disputed today. Most notably, two widely supported citizen-led initiatives – “Berliner
Energietisch” and “BürgerEnergieBerlin” - have challenged the status quo by campaigning to buy back the
electricity grid from its current owner Vattenfall. These initiatives have put not only Vattenfall, but also the Berlin
Senate under considerable pressure, and have sparked public awareness for an otherwise ‘invisible’ issue.
Two events stand out: Shortly before Vattenfall’s concession to operate the grid expired in 2014, “Berliner
Energietisch” initiated a popular referendum aimed at forcing the Berlin Senate to reinstate public ownership of
the city’s energy infrastructure, including its distribution grids. The referendum was inspired by a similar initiative
in Hamburg, which had successfully driven the city’s authorities to establish a public grid operating company and
buy back the electricity grid in 2009. While the referendum in Berlin failed (due insufficient voter turn-out), it put
energy infrastructure back on the city’s political agenda. The referendum provoked a heated debate within
Berlin’s political landscape, mobilizing wide civil society support and broad media coverage. This level of public
attention helped another major citizen-led initiative - “BürgerEnergieBerlin” - to gain momentum. By 2016, this
community-based energy cooperative had attracted enough members and mobilized enough financial capital to
put forward an official bid in the city’s call for tenders for the grid concession. Meanwhile, it had also convinced
the Berlin Senate to support its initiative and create a public utility company (Stadtwerk) that partnered with
BürgerEnergieBerlin in their official bid. After four years of legal quarrels with Vattenfall, BürgerEnergieBerlin
finally reached its goal in March 2019: together with the city-owned utility, BürgerEnergieBerlin was finally
awarded the concession to operate the city’s electricity grid. However, Vattenfall again took legal action against
this decision. Only in late 2020, Vattenfall finally conceded to sell the grid to the public authorities, and the deal
was finally sealed in mid-2021.
7 https://www.berlinenergie.de/ konzessionsverfahren/gas-und-stromgeschichte
62
Berlin’s electricity grid is therefore currently at the forefront of political debates, not only over infrastructure,
but – as Beveridge and Naumann argue – over "promoting new urban futures" (Beveridge and Naumann, 2016).
Berlin’s electricity grid has become a highly politicized, highly disputed issue, "with discourses of both radical and
reformist change apparent, and the current and future roles of the state, civil society and private sector heavily
contested" (Beveridge and Naumann, 2016).
Although smart grids are not among the top priorities of these citizen-led initiatives, they are being developed
within a highly politicized context, which exposes some of the most radical visions and controversial positions
regarding the ways in which energy could and should be governed, traded, used and managed in the city.
7.4 Berlin’s future sites
Since 2012, Berlin’s urban administration has designated a total of eleven so-called “future sites” (Zukunftsorte)
for pioneering and showcasing different kinds of novel digital technologies (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 55). These are:
Technology Park Adlershof, Biotech-Campus Berlin-Buch, Campus Charlottenburg/City West, Clean Tech
Business Park Berlin-Marzahn, Berlin Eastside, EUREF-Campus Schöneberg, Humboldthain, Schöneweide, IGZ
Fabeckstraße, the site of Tegel airport for Urban Tech and the site of Tempelhof airport for the creative industry.
At least three of these sites are dedicated – among other things - to the development of smart grids. These are
the the Technology Park Adlershof, the EUREF Campus and the TXL Urban Tech Republic.
Berlin’s future sites form part of the city’s technology and innovation politics and are explicitly aimed at attracting
high-tech businesses and a qualified international workforce to the city8. Their main goal is to strengthen the
knowledge economy by attracting science-based industries and technologies, and “turning knowledge into jobs”
(TSB Technologiestiftung Berlin, 2012). Among others, the future sites are supposed to provide spaces for
creating personal networks between tech-oriented businesses and tech-oriented research institutions through
physical proximity. The future sites are therefore a strategic instrument devised to forge connections between
Berlin’s well-established scientific institutions and the corporate-industrial world to incentivize regional
economic growth.
For this reason, Berlin’s future sites fall under the responsibility of the Senate Department for the Economy,
Energy and Businesses (SenWEB), where they are part of the Economic Division, together with programs
concerning electric mobility and the smart city. In 2017, SenWEB launched the future sites’ joint managing office,
which is funded by a program for the “improvement of the regional economic structure (GRW)”9 and run by city-
owned project development company WISTA Management GmbH. It is the office’s explicit mandate to solidify
the future sites as a brand, and thus to increase Berlin’s visibility and competitiveness as a knowledge based
economic hub in regional, national and international markets10. WISTA acts as mediator between the interested
8 https://www.berlin.de/sen/wirtschaft/wirtschaft/technologiezentren-zukunftsorte-smart-
city/zukunftsorte/artikel.109346.php
9 https://www.berlin.de/sen/wirtschaft/wirtschaft/technologiezentren-zukunftsorte-smart-
city/zukunftsorte/artikel.109346.php
10 https://www.berlin.de/sen/wirtschaft/wirtschaft/technologiezentren-zukunftsorte-smart-
city/zukunftsorte/artikel.109346.php
63
public and the future sites. Among others, it promotes the future sites via a website that bundles information,
provides news, and advertises location specific events. Their common branding creates a joint platform and entry
point mostly for external parties.
Figure 4: Location of Berlin’s future sites in the city © Zukunftsorte Berlin / WISTA Management GmbH
On the ground, however, the future sites are marked by many differences, including their size, historical
backgrounds, goals, sets of actors and institutional set-ups. Although the Senate has provided an institutional
umbrella, the future sites each work independently, with hardly any institutionalized ties or overlaps.
The most fundamental difference between the three future sites in this analysis is their state of actualization:
while the development of Technology Park Adlershof and EUREF Campus is well underway, activities at TXL Urban
Tech Republic have been stalled due to problems with the project site – the city’s former airport. Instead of being
replaced in 2012 as originally planned, the airport remained in use until the fall of 2020 and TXL Urban Tech
Republic continued in a state of seemingly never-ending expectation: always at the brink of realization, but never
implemented. The material gathered in relation to this site is therefore informed by plans and aspirations rather
than the details of actualization.
7.4.1 Technology Park Adlershof
Technology Park Adlershof is the oldest and most developed of Berlin’s future sites, and therefore viewed by the
government as role model for the development of all other future sites (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 90). Unlike EUREF
and TXL, the site has a long history of hosting research, military, technology, and media related institutions.
Currently, Technology Park Adlershof hosts a high-profile mix of research institutions and businesses, including
more than 1.000 companies, more than 20.000 employees, and up to 7.000 students (Tagesspiegel, 2018). It
covers an area of 420 ha and is likewise managed by WISTA Management GmbH.
64
Figure 5: Bird’s eye view of Technology Campus Adlershof 2019 © WISTA.Plan GmbH / picture: D. Laubner
Its tradition as a site for pioneering research and technical innovation began with the rise of the aircraft industry
in the early 20th century. Its proximity to a small airport attracted aircraft production companies and laid the
foundation for what is today known as the German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und
Raumfahrt, DLR), a research and development institution, which was founded in 1912. During the first and
second World Wars, Adlershof developed into an important site for researching and producing military aircrafts.
At the height of the Nazi regime, more than 2.000 people, including forced laborers, worked in this field at
Adlershof11. After WWII, the site belonged to East-Berlin and was redeveloped into a space for the German
Democratic Republic’s (GDR) leading scientific research and media institutions. Numerous institutions belonging
to the country’s National Academy of Sciences settled in Adlershof, creating a hub for research in the natural
sciences and engineering technologies. Apart from this, the site also hosted the country’s national television
agency and a regiment of guards belonging to the Ministry of National Security (Stasi). In short, Adlershof became
a center for official, state-owned institutions of high public importance and rank.
11 https://www.adlershof.de/kiez/geschichte
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Figure 6: Iconic wind channel tower from the 1930s fotographed at Adlershof in the late 1980s © WISTA
Management GmbH
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and Germany’s reunification, most of these institutions were shut down and the
site came to a standstill. Although the newly united city government quickly decided to redevelop Adlershof into
a scientific and technology focused business area, it wasn’t until 2003 that these developments actually
materialized. The establishment of the Technology Park formed part of the government’s strategy to support the
area’s overall development.
Over the past almost 20 years, Adlershof has enjoyed the status of a formally designated urban development
zone under the city’s overarching goal of becoming a “city for research and businesses” (Stadt für Wissenschaft
und Wirtschaft). During this time, Adlershof has steadily and successfully attracted numerous businesses and
research institutions. Today, it is the largest and most renowned of Berlin’s future sites. According to its
management, Technology Park Adlershof is also the “largest science and technology park in Germany”, boasting
more than 550 businesses and research institutions mostly from the natural and engineering sciences as well as
various faculties of Berlin’s Humboldt University and over 1.000 residential housing units, which connect it to the
adjacent neighborhoods12.
Unlike TXL Urban Tech Republic and EUREF Campus, Technology Park Adlershof is a large and well-established
urban development site with a long history in science and technology-based research.
12 https://www.adlershof.de/adlershof-in-zahlen/
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7.4.2 EUREF Campus
Figure 7: 3D rendering of building development plans at EUREF Campus within its urban surroundings 2018 ©
EUREF AG
EUREF Campus is much smaller and much younger than Technology Park Adlershof. Launched in 2008, the
campus covers an area of about 5.5 ha and currently hosts the offices of approximately 150 companies that
employ a total of 1.500 people.
EUREF stands for “European Energy Forum”, which links the site to its energy related history. The campus is
located on the premises of the city’s former gas utility and is dominated architecturally by the skeleton of a huge
industrial gas tank, which served as one of the city’s most modern gas production and storage plants in the late
19th century. To this day, the site is well-known throughout the city for this landmark gas tank monument
(Gasometer), which forms part of the neighborhood identity. During the Cold War, the tank was used as gas
reservoir for West Berlin, but then shut down after reunification in 1995.
In 2008, after an almost ten-year period of vacancy, the site was purchased by a private developer under the
city’s strict condition to redevelop it into a “lighthouse” for sustainability related research, teaching and
businesses. Since then, the site has evolved from a vacant lot into a bustling research and business center fully
equipped with high-rise buildings, restaurants, event locations, visitor’s service and beach volleyball court. The
project development company, EUREF AG, has gradually refurbished three turn-of-the-century industrial
buildings and constructed an additional eight new office towers. Among others, the site now provides office
space for businesses especially from the energy, the mobility and the electronics sectors. These include various
mobility start-ups working e.g. on electric vehicle loading schemes as well as tech giants such as Cisco and
Schneider Electric. Moreover, the site hosts a number of sustainability-oriented research institutions, such as the
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Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change and sections of TU Berlin. These research
institutions offer post-graduate programs on sustainability related topics and regularly host scientific
conferences on site. One of the founding ideas has been to foster collaboration and exchange between green-
tech businesses and related research institutions.
In this same spirit, the site also hosts an “Infralab”, a self-proclaimed co-working and co-creation project initiated
by five of Berlin’s large infrastructure companies. Together they are responsible for waste management (Berliner
Stadtreinigung, BSR), public transportation (Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe, BVG), energy provision (Vattenfall), water
and sewerage management (Berliner Wasserbetriebe), electric grid operation (Stromnetz Berlin) and gas
provision and distribution (GASAG). In face of increasing transformative pressures on these large infrastructure
companies, they created the Infralab to engage in mutual exchange and experimentation with new ideas for
cooperation and collaboration towards what they vaguely call a “sustainable city”13.
From the start, the project developer has built on these kinds of initiatives to promote EUREF Campus as “real-
life laboratory” for the “energy revolution”14, and encouraged the installation of technical artefacts for the
interested public to see and visit. These artefacts include a roof-top solar PV plant, a biogas based combined heat
and power plant, and various small wind energy generation plants. They also include different types of electric
vehicle charging stations that can be accessed by the public to park and load vehicles which are part of a city-
wide car sharing scheme. Other physical technologies being tested on campus include an inductive electric
vehicle loading station and a top-loading station for electric busses. Most prominently, though, a self-driving
passenger mini-bus was publicly tested and exhibited for a period of approximately two years, which attracted
media attention well beyond the the campus’ borders.
This kind of attention is welcomed and accommodated by the project management firm, EUREF AG, which
regularly organizes guided tours to explain the campus history, present the LEED-certified architecture and
demonstrate the various energy and other technologies scattered across campus. These tours are frequently
booked by delegations of interested students, researchers, politicians and business people from across the world.
They also involve a showroom, the so-called “zeeMobase”, or “zero-emission energy and mobility base”, which
is run by the smart grid research consortium on campus, and equipped with screens, explanation videos and an
interactive table-top to help explain all questions surrounding the micro-smart-grid system on campus. Apart
from offering these tours, campus management has also attracted high profile events to EUREF Campus, such as
international political summits and political party congresses. These events regularly attract political celebrities
of national import, such as federal ministers or even the chancellor, as well as internationally renowned scientists
and business people. Overall, the campus nurtures a feel-good atmosphere by mixing a combination of scientific
intelligence, entrepreneurial inspiration, tasteful design and unapologetic wealth.
Although EUREF Campus is promoted as an inviting, hospitable place including hotel rooms and publicly
accessible restaurants, its gated entrance and expensive high-rise architecture give it an aura of exclusivity. This
13 https://infralab.berlin/about
14 https://euref.de/en/welcome/
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is in part due to its industrial heritage and surrounding train tracks, which have traditionally separated EUREF
Campus from is nearby residential neighborhoods. It is arguably also because the site is fenced in and the entry
is vigilated by a concierge. This has led to resentment from neighboring citizens who formed various civil
initiatives against the owner’s construction plans, but remained unsuccessful.
Figure 8: Gasometer on EUREF Campus 2018 © Christian Kruppa / EUREF AG
7.4.3 TXL Urban Tech Republic
Figure 9: Bird’s eye view of Tegel airport © Geoportal Berlin / Digitale farbige Ortophotos 2011 (DOP20RGB)
Berlin TXL is a designated redevelopment area that was occupied by Berlin’s Tegel airport until the fall of 2020.
Although Berlin TXL was originally supposed to kick-off in 2012, the site was only handed over to its managing
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company, Tegel Projekt GmbH, in mid-2021. Construction and refurbishment are now set to begin in 2022. Due
to this delay, it is the only one of the three future sites that hasn’t entered the implementation phase. All
envisaged technologies, including the site’s ambitious plans for a smart grid, currently exist only in claims and on
plans.
Berlin TXL occupies the premises of former West-Berlin’s international airport, which operated from 1975 to
2020. First ideas for closing the airport and redeveloping its premises were voiced shortly after Berlin became
the capital city of a reunified Germany in 1990. They were founded on the Senate’s plan to replace its two
existing, small international airports with the construction of one big new one, the now infamous BER. Although
originally designated to open its gates in 2011, mismanagement heavily delayed the construction of this new
airport, and the first airplane only took off from BER almost a full decade later, namely in November 2020.
Meanwhile, between 2009 and 2012, the city launched a series of workshops with six international planning
teams to develop a masterplan for Tegel airport’s reuse. The masterplan passed the Senate in 2013. It included
plans for an industrial park called Urban Tech Republic and an adjacent landscape park. In 2016, due to rising
pressure on Berlin’s housing market, plans for a residential neighborhood called Schumacher Quartier were
added. In 2011, shortly before BER was supposed to be inaugurated, the Senate commissioned Tegel Projekt
GmbH to manage all three areas, including TXL Urban Tech Republic, the landscape park and the residential area.
Today, the entire redevelopment area of Berlin TXL comprises approximately 220 hectares for the industrial park
called Urban Tech Republic, approximately 50 hectares for the residential Schumacher Quartier, and another 200
hectares of green space for the landscape park. Overall, it is therefore the largest of the three future sites. Within
Berlin TXL, the masterplan envisages TXL Urban Tech Republic as a high-tech industrial park for research
institutions and industrial firms in the field of so-called “future technologies”. TXL Urban Tech Republic is
supposed to provide space for approximately 1.000 private businesses, more than 17.000 employees and 5.000
students15. Many of the technologies potentially developed at TXL Urban Tech Republic are supposed to be
implemented and used in the neighboring Schumacher Quartier.
During the twelve-year run-up to project implementation, plans for redeveloping Tegel airport were broadly
debated in public, and once even seriously challenged. In 2017, a civil society initiative backed by the Liberal
Democratic Party launched a city-wide referendum demanding Tegel’s preservation as an airport. Although the
majority of Berliners indeed voted to maintain Tegel airport in this referendum, the Senate decided to go forward
with its redevelopment plans in 2018. Since then, opposition to these plans has dwindled and the airport was
closed without further incidents. Today, it is arguably Berlin’s most prestigious urban development project, and
is seen as a city-wide development opportunity to generate jobs and positively affect the entire region (Coalition
agreement, p. 90).
15 https://stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/staedtebau/projekte/tegel/de/anlass.shtml
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Figure 10: 3D rendering of building plans at TXL © Tegel Projekt GmbH / Macina
Figure 11: Schematic plan with different areas within Berlin TXL © Tegel Projekt GmbH
7.4.4 Closing remarks
Despite their differences, all three of these future sites are being marketed as “living urban laboratory” (TXL),
“experimental hub” (TXL)16, “real-world laboratory” (EUREF)17 or innovation spaces (Masterplan Industriestadt,
p.35). To this end, they all involve actors from the scientific community, private technology companies and
government related actors. The smart grid pilot projects, in turn, provide the actual experimental activity.
16 https://www.arup.com/projects/the-urban-tech-republic
17 https://zukunftsorte.berlin/en/zukunftsorte/euref-campus-berlin/
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7.5 Smart grid experimentation at Berlin’s future sites
All three of these future sites involve projects to develop, test and practically implement pilot versions of smart
grid technologies under ‘real-life’ conditions. While at TXL Urban Tech Republic, these projects are still in the
planning stage, at EUREF Campus and Technology Park Adlershof, different stakeholders have been collaborating
to implement smart grid pilots since 2011 and 2014 respectively. These pilot projects have thus become
important spaces for negotiation and exchange, providing those involved with an opportunity not only for
envisioning but also for making the urban smart grid in Berlin.
Figure 12: Location of the three future sites in the city of Berlin (own figure)
Two of the smart grid projects being pursued in these sites are headed by research consortia (at EUREF and
Adlershof) and a third is headed by a publicly funded company commissioned by the city (TXL Urban Tech
Republic). All three pilot projects are pursuing the connection between renewable electricity production, flexible
electricity consumption and small-scale decentralized electricity storage. They circle around questions of micro-
scale energy management and control and aim at finding smart grid solutions for replication in the broader
context of the city of Berlin.
7.5.1 Energienetz Adlershof at Technology Park Adlershof
The smallest of the three smart grid projects is being implemented at Technology Park Adlershof and is called
Energienetz Adlershof. It involves four partners, including two research institutions, an electronics firm, and the
Technology Park’s operating company, WISTA Management GmbH. Here, smart grid technologies are being used
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to automate an existing cooling network and connect it with a solar PV plant, and aquifer and a low-temperature
storage facility (Eisspeicher). The smart grid project primarily aims at decreasing the energy related emissions
and increasing the energy efficiency of an existing cooling process at the building level, and then expanding this
knowledge to the neighborhood level. It focuses on integrating electricity, heating and cooling, because
Technology Park Adlershof hosts numerous laboratory buildings with extraordinary cooling energy demand and
extraordinary waste heat related energy losses.
Energienetz Adlershof was funded by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) for an initial
phase of four years from 2014 to 2018 and was extended for a second three-year project phase from 2018 to
2021. In its first phase, the project’s goal was to create a renewably powered, energy-efficient cooling network
for a research laboratory complex. It aimed at reducing the enormous amounts of cooling energy needed to
operate the laboratory processes and maintain the laboratory buildings. Its primary objective was to reduce the
lab’s energy related emissions and energy related costs. To this end, the project introduced an energy
management system that coordinates renewable electricity generation from a solar PV plant with an aquifer for
geothermal cooling, a brine-based cooling network, an ice repository as low-temperature storage facility
(Eisspeicher), and the highly heat sensitive laboratory complex. The second project phase is dedicated to
monitoring and optimizing this system.
Figure 13: Zentrum für Photonik und Optik © TU Berlin / Energienetz Adlershof
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Figure 14: Site plan with laboratory buildings and cooling network © Energienetz Adlershof
In doing so, the project addresses an issue that is relevant for many other labs and businesses in the area, whose
cooling energy demand accounts for a substantial portion of total energy demand across campus (Bschorer et
al., 2019). The Energienetz project therefore forms part of a greater effort to introduce an instrument for energy
related urban development planning (Energieleitplanung) across the broader Technology Park Adlershof. With
the help of small-scale model projects like this one, the campus facility management company seeks to reduce
the overall campus’s primary energy demand by 30% (www.energienetz-berlin-adlerhof-de). Unlike EUREF, the
Adlershof campus therefore hosts various smart grid projects that deal with diverse issues such as electric
mobility (FlexNET4E-mobility), power-to-x technologies (P2X@BerlinAdlershof), and low-temperature heating
networks (Wohnen am Campus in Adlershof). To bring them together, the Energienetz Adlershof project
consortium heads a so-called Smart Grid Alliance aimed at integrating more and more campus facilities and
businesses into a smart grid system. As head of this alliance, the project seeks to replicate and scale its results
throughout campus and across the city. Despite its efforts to generate publicity via the Smart Grid Alliance, the
project has little visibility across the wider Technology Park, because it represents only a fraction of the many
other research projects and tech innovations currently being developed and tested in businesses or research
institutions on site. Energienetz Adlershof therefore has little impact on the campus’ overall development or its
outside image.
The relatively small project consortium is headed by Berlin Technical University and involves two teams of
researchers from the engineering and the social sciences that collaborate with an IT company, an engineering
firm, and the campus facility management company, WISTA Management GmbH.
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Figure 15: Schematic drawing of the smart grid project at Adlershof 2020 © WISTA Management GmbH
7.5.2 Research Campus Mobility2Grid at EUREF Campus
The largest of the three smart grid initiatives is the research driven smart grid project at EUREF Campus, which
involves more than thirty partners from private firms including the local network operator, utilities, large
electronics companies, and small energy related start-ups. It focuses on connecting solar PV panels, battery
storage facilities and electric vehicles, and aims at linking renewable urban energy production and electrically
powered traffic.
The Mobility2Grid project was launched in 2011. One of its central aims is to integrate an electric vehicle fleet
into a (renewable) energy cycle and thus to test the capacity of electric vehicles as flexible energy storage. The
establishment of a campus “micro-smart-grid” lies at the heart of the project. The micro-smart grid aims to
connect a renewable energy generation plant with a fleet of electric vehicles, which relieve the overarching grid
of excess energy by storing it in its batteries and stabilize the overarching grid by feeding electricity back into it
when needed.
The Mobility2Grid project consortium comprises a total of 36 institutions and is headed by Berlin Technical
University. Its six project teams involve researchers from the engineering and the social sciences, large
international IT, energy and automobile companies, small energy and e-mobility start-ups, the grid operator, the
national railway company, and the project development firm that owns the project site, EUREF AG. The project
is funded by the Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), and was recently awarded a third – and last - five-
year project phase. This last project phase is due to begin in January 2022.
The project consortium has set out to contribute to a combined “energy and mobility transition” that will
“radically transform” the structure of the electric grid into an “increasingly decentralized” system (Mobility2grid
Antrag, p. 4) by developing, testing and implementing a micro-smart grid at EUREF Campus. To this end, the
Mobility2Grid project involves a solar PV plant, which is connected to approximately 15 vehicle charging stations,
a battery storage facility and a small refurbished garage that has been turned into office spaces. An automated
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energy management system equipped with sensors and control mechanisms senses how much electricity is being
produced in the PV plant, how much is being used by the office space, how many vehicles are connected to the
charging stations, and how full the batteries in the storage facility are at any moment in time. It then directs
electric loads according to a predefined algorithm, i.e. according to demand. All loads and flows being directed
through this micro-smart grid system are constantly visualized in a showroom, so that visitors can view and relate
to the project. The loading stations are also associated with an electric-car-sharing fleet, which operates
throughout the city and is accessible to the broader public. This way, the idea to integrate electric vehicles into
a smart grid and use them as renewable energy storage is supposed to gain public visibility and acceptance
beyond the campus (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012). The project explicitly targets urban areas and seeks to
multiply and up-scale its results throughout Berlin and other cities.
7.5.3 Low-Exergy-Network
Plans for the smart grid at TXL Urban Tech Republic circle around combining a variety of technologies, including
a heating and cooling network, a geothermal plant, vehicle-to-grid technologies, and automated building
management systems. They are aimed at increasing the share of renewable energies used for powering on-site
processes, and at ensuring their maximum energy efficiency.
Both the Urban Tech Republic and the Schumacher neighborhood are supposed to be serviced by a smart grid
system that primarily circles around heating and cooling provision, and is combined with renewable energy
production and storage in a so-called “Low-Exergy-Network” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2018b). The network is
supposed to connect various on-campus renewable energy sources, including surplus heat from industrial
processes, geothermal energy, solar thermal energy, solar electricity, a biogas powered CHP plant and electric
vehicles. At its core, a so-called “Smart Grid Platform”, an openly accessible digital information hub, is supposed
to serve as local market place for heating and cooling energy (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2018b). Prosumage at TXL
therefore also encompasses small-scale energy trading and direct peer-to-peer interaction.
Unlike the pilot projects at Adlershof and EUREF, the ideas for TXL’s smart grid systems are being developed by
a city-owned project development company, Tegel Projekt GmbH, rather than research consortia. The company
was created by the Berlin Senate in 2011 as a subsidiary of the campus facility management company that
operates at Adlershof. At TXL, smart grid implementation is therefore not a matter of research but has been
commissioned to private firms on the basis of public calls for tenders. Even though the TXL project site is still not
accessible, concessions for configuring the smart grid platform and operating the Low-Exergy Network were
awarded to private firms in 2016 and 2018 respectively.
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Figure 16: Energy concept including smart grid system for TXL Urban Tech Republic © Tegel Projekt GmbH
7.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I provided a detailed illustration of my case study, including descriptions of all three levels of my
analysis: the city of Berlin, the ‘future sites’ and the smart grid pilot projects. Starting with an introduction to the
city level, I highlighted relevant energy and urban development policies that frame the development of smart
grids in Berlin, and discussed the political contestations surrounding the ownership of Berlin’s electric grid. I then
presented the three ‘future sites’ that formed part of my investigation, and thus illustrated the kinds of urban
spaces and development plans that Berlin’s smart grid projects are embedded in. Lastly, I described how smart
grids are being (differently) developed, tested and showcased in the context of three specific pilot projects. In
doing so, I also gave an overview of similarities and differences between the future sites and between the three
smart grid pilot projects. In summary, this chapter provides an illustration of the case study that formed the basis
for my examination. In the following chapter, I move on to show the findings resulting from my in-depth case
study analysis.
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8 Analyzing Berlin’s smart grid discourse
In this chapter, I discuss the discourse of Berlin’s smart grid futures as I encountered it at the three levels of my
analysis. In doing so, I show which visions are being associated with smart grids and which meanings are
attributed to these visions (for a reflection on how discourse relates to visions see chapter 6 “Research design
and method”). As I laid out in my research design, I base my analysis on the sociology of knowledge approach to
discourse (Keller, 2011). Based on Keller (2013), I structure my account by first revealing how different actors
define smart grids as a phenomenon (i.e. what are smart grids portrayed to be); I then show the dominant frames
that different actors associate with smart grids in Berlin (i.e. what do smart grids do); and finally, I present how
they classify these phenomena and their associated qualities (i.e. are smart grids good, bad, interesting etc.).
Together, the definitions, frames and classifications create dominant storylines that produce Berlin’s imagined
smart grid futures. These storylines reveal the different underlying worldviews that different groups of actors
associate with urban smart grid futures, exposing the different value systems and convictions that these actors
embrace. In short, these storylines convey the meanings behind Berlin’s imagined smart grid futures.
I cluster my findings according to actors on the one hand and levels of analysis on the other. This way, I show
how certain actor coalitions have formed around dominant storylines, and how they are (re-)inforcing these
storylines across spatial levels despite their diverse interests and agendas.
It is important to note that the dominant storylines outlining Berlin’s imagined smart grid futures are nourished
not only by the discourse on smart grids, but also by adjacent discourses for example on the smart city, urban
energy transitions and urban experimentation. These adjacent discourses are relevant to my topic, but I do not
claim to have analyzed them in full. Instead, these adjacent discourses contribute to the dominant storylines that
are being promoted in relation to smart grids in Berlin, for example through overlaps or contradictions,
consistencies or inconsistencies, additions or omissions.
8.1 Defining urban smart grids: between umbrella term and empty label
The way actors in the Berlin smart grid community define smart grids sheds light on what they mean when they
use the term. Especially in a transdisciplinary context, understanding different actors’ definitions of smart grids
can help understand their arguments or positions. Are smart grids predominantly understood as energy
technologies or as information and communication technologies? Are they chiefly characterized as technologies
or as services? Are they portrayed as means for coordinating infrastructures or coordinating people? Answering
these questions can give insights into what actors mean when they refer to smart grids and thus reveal their
values, convictions and priorities when it comes to imagining the future smart grid city.
The term ‘smart grids’ is essentially vague, and therefore interpreted differently by different actors. In Berlin, the
technologies associated with smart grids vary considerably. Although all actors in my analysis associate smart
grids with ICT, they also associate them with myriad other technologies, services and qualities. The most
dominant associations are with renewable electricity, sector-coupling, electric mobility, heating, cooling, data
management, steering technologies and technologies for coordinating infrastructures and coordinating people.
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Moreover, notable differences exist between actors who say that smart grids have been successfully
implemented in Berlin and those who say they have not. The ambiguity of the term and the controversy over the
physical existence of smart grids in Berlin raises questions about smart grids as subjects and objects of
communication: If nobody can agree on a definition, what is the value of their communication? And if nobody
can say if a smart grid exists, how does their communication relate to the real world?
8.1.1 Smart grids as wishlist of technical artefacts
In Berlin, smart grids are associated with a variety of different technologies and artefacts. Not surprisingly, most
actors identify their own area of technical expertise as central to the definition of smart grids. As a result, the
network operator defines smart grids primarily as grid technology, energy companies define them as energy
technology, mobility researchers define them as electric mobility technology and electronics companies define
them as data and electronics technology. Although these definitions all overlap, they emphasize different
qualities and thus point to different interests and future imaginaries that are being associated with smart grids
in the city.
The network operator primarily describes smart grids in terms of their basic hardware, i.e. wires, cables and data
protocols. In an interview, a representative defines smart grids as “primary technologies or the so-called
hardware, such as cables and grid stations […] and the secondary technologies or steering and control
technologies, that use data and information and impulses to steer the electric grid” (Interview, grid operator I
2018). This very practical understanding of smart grids is stripped of any higher-level concerns, such as energy
transitions or the like. Instead, the network operator has a functional interest in smart grids as instruments to
ease network operation and ensure stable electricity flows. It views smart grids as possibility to attain more
energy information, especially in the low-voltage network, and thus enable more efficient control, but not
primarily as means to integrate renewables (personal interview, grid operator II, 2018). In another interview, a
different representative of the network operator associates smart grids mostly with the absence of grid-related
problems: “If you aren’t hearing or seeing or thinking about the grid, then it’s smart” (personal interview, grid
operator II, 2018). Put differently, if operations are smooth and electricity flows are stable then the grid is smart.
For the private network operating company, Stromnetz Berlin, smart grids are therefore mostly about improving
its own job of grid operation, which it narrowly understands as enabling smooth and steady electricity flows. The
public utility company, Berlin Energie, conveys a similarly pragmatic understanding of smart grids as technical
infrastructures. On its website and in interviews, Berlin Energie associates smart grids primarily with the
possibility of physically combining cables and pipelines and integrating their management into one overarching
maintenance system. In the company’s communications, these visions pertain to the gas, electricity and heating
networks, and are explicitly about the infrastructural hardware. Its main interest, like Stromnetz Berlin’s, seems
to be in perfectioning smooth and efficient operations rather than in developing a new energy system.
For energy start-ups and researchers involved in implementing smart grids at Berlin’s future sites, by contrast,
smart grids are primarily about new kinds of energy generation and energy storage technologies. For them, smart
grids are mostly about the addition and integration of novel energy-related technologies and services into the
existing grid system. The research consortia at Adlershof and EUREF Campus primarily understand smart grids as
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bridging technology between renewable electricity production and cooling or mobility technologies respectively.
Perhaps not surprisingly, for those researchers interested in questions of electric vehicles, smart grids are very
much about mobility technologies, whereas for those interested in heating and cooling, they are very much about
heating and cooling technologies. For a leading employee of an energy start-up at EUREF, smart grids consist of
“wind power plants, solar power plants, cables, cars, loading stations, transformers, low voltage system, medium
voltage system, steering elements, software, supercap“ (personal interview, energy start-up, EUREF, 2016). This
definition clearly extends beyond the definition offered by the network operator and the public utility company;
it extends beyond technologies needed to steer the grid and includes new energy and mobility related
technologies that are connected to it. As a researcher at EUREF states: “A smart, decentralized grid tries to bring
key sectors such as energy, heating and mobility supply to 100% renewables” (personal interview, researcher,
EUREF, 2017). For energy start-ups and researchers at EUREF, smart grids are thus mostly about integrating
mobility with energy (personal interview, researcher, EUREF, 2016), and their underlying interest isn’t primarily
to guarantee smooth flows, but to integrate renewables, and to do so by integrating end users (M2G Antrag, p.
47). Similarly, for those researchers working on questions of heating and cooling, smart grids are strongly about
integrating heating and cooling technologies. A researcher at Adlershof defines smart grids as “more than an
intelligent electricity network; they are an extended intelligent electricity network, combined with other media,
energy media, such as heating and cooling” (personal interview, reseacher Adlershof, 2018). The understanding
of smart grids as portrayed by energy start-ups and researchers goes way beyond smoothly operating the grid.
Unlike the network operator or the public utility company, researchers currently involved in smart grid
implementation focus on extending and overhauling what is currently understood as “the grid”. For them, smart
grids are not about making operations smoother, but arguably about radically changing the networked electricity
system as we know it today.
Not surprisingly, for software engineers and electronics companies, smart grids are mostly about data and
electronics. For them, smart grids are primarily an automation solution (interview, electronics company,
Adlershof, 2018) and a data project (personal interview, electronics company, EUREF, 2018). Unlike any other
actors, software engineers and electronics companies also define smart grids in terms of their very specific
technological intricacies. As one software engineer specifies:
“the grid is only smart if it involves anticipatory logics in the energy system. It is not yet smart when
algorithms make the system automatically react to certain triggers, such as a certain threshold of solar
energy that is currently being produced. It becomes smart when it starts anticipating these thresholds”
(personal interview, researcher II, EUREF, 2017).
According to this definition, smart grids are essentially a combination of sensors and automatic control
mechanisms that are equipped with artificial intelligence, and that react not only to real-time information but
learn to anticipate this information and react to it in advance. For this software engineer, smart grids therefore
go along with entirely new energy-related logics and new IT-related questions. Of course, ICT companies view
these new logics as opportunity to develop new markets to sell their products. They are interested in developing
“off-the-shelf software” (personal interview, electronics company, Adlershof), at bringing their “solutions,
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components, products to the table” (personal interview, electronics company, EUREF, 2016), at “introducing
digital added-value processes” (personal interview, electronics company, 2018) and selling “standardized
products” (personal interview, electronics company, 2018). One representative openly admits:
“Our main interest is what do energy producers, network operators, metering stations need? Those
are the companies to which we then sell our products” (personal interview, electronics company,
2018).
In sum, software engineers and electronics companies define smart grids very much in light of the products they
want to sell. Consequently, they view smart grids as an engineering feat and a marketing tool rather than an
energy system revolution.
Project managers at EUREF and TXL might ultimately mean the same things but have a completely different focus
when they speak of smart grids. They define smart grids primarily as integrated facility management
technologies, i.e. as technologies for automatically controlling lighting, heating and cooling energy demand
within buildings. Although this might inherently entail the forecasting technologies mentioned by the ICT
companies and the software engineers, project managers clearly focus on the building services rather than the
IT. Their concern is with blinds, valves, heaters and air conditioners rather than algorithms.
To conclude, smart grids signify different technologies for different actors. Some view them mostly as hardware,
others as software, still others emphasize services such as lighting, heating, cooling, or mobility. This bandwidth
of understandings shows that the term “smart grids”, even in purely technical terms, is essentially vague. It also
shows that, even though definitions overlap, the emphasis and the priorities that different actors attach to smart
grids vary considerably.
8.1.2 Smart grids as tools for coordinating people
Even though most actors in this analysis predominantly define smart grids in technical terms, some also explicitly
depict smart grids as social and political phenomena. They view smart grids as various complex combinations of
services and people. This view does not stand in opposition to their dominant technical understanding of smart
grids but accompanies it as a side thought or subordinate concern. It is voiced mostly by actors involved in smart
grid implementation at the pilot projects.
Although the technical understanding clearly dominates in the city administration’s documents and programs,
they also speak of networks that will “connect energy consumers and producers” (Smart City Strategy, p. 31),
and a representative of the city administration defines smart grids as “coordination of actors within the grid”
(personal interview, SenWEB, 2018). The same representative is certain that a smart grid will require “many
actors” (personal interview, SenWEB, 2018). This definition emphasizes the importance of actors – not
technologies - in the grid system. It thus acknowledges the necessity of coordinating people as much as of
coordinating resource flows.
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Various actors, especially those involved in smart grid implementation at the future sites, display a sensitivity
toward the social and the political dimensions of smart grids. In the pilot project at EUREF Campus, smart grids
are called a “complex coordination feat” (M2G-Antrag, p. 16). A researcher at EUREF even calls smart grids a
“discourse community” (personal interview, researcher, EUREF, 2017), and a project manager calls them tools
for “social and technical communication” (personal interview, project management, EUREF, 2016). This shows
that in the context of project implementation, some actors understand smart grids not merely as technical
artefacts but also as tools for inter-personal communication and as networks for coordinating people. These
actors acknowledge the potential of the term “smart grids” to bring people and projects together, even calling it
a “programmatic umbrella” (personal interview, researcher, EUREF, 2017). Yet, some actors involved in the pilot
projects also show a heightened awareness for the politics that work as barriers or obstacles to smart grid
implementation. This becomes clear in a statement by another researcher at EUREF Campus who calls smart
grids a “multi-faceted set not only of technological but also of political integration problems that need to be
solved” (personal interview, researcher II, EUREF, 2017). This points to an awareness for questions of interests
and power inherent in smart grids. It is mirrored by a project manager at TXL who calls smart grids “a legal
headache” (personal interview, project manager TXL, 2017).
Still others involved in smart grid implementation emphasize the need for trained personnel to make smart grids
work. Especially software engineers and electronics companies point to the importance of knowing how to
handle and maintain smart grids as a social prerequisite for their implementation. They are acutely aware of the
necessity to train industrial mechanics and janitors, for example (personal interview, electronics company II,
2018, and energy start-up EUREF, 2016), and of the amount of time this can take.
The network operator sees this the same way. As a representative of Stromnetz Berlin states:
“the smart grid [….] doesn’t only work because of the technology, but also because of the people that
assemble and operate the technology; and because of the people that invent it, […] and that plan it”
(personal interview, network operator II, 2018).
As these quotes show, actors involved in the day-to-day handling of grids, valves or algorithms are keenly aware
of the need to train and capacitate people to make these technologies work. They are thus highly conscious of
the social nature of smart grids. Actors that are involved in the pilot projects for other reasons and in other roles,
for example as researchers motivated by an energy ideal, are more aware of the political and regulatory
landscape that smart grids are embedded in. Their understanding of smart grids is thus more political and more
systemic.
To conclude, several actors in Berlin communicate a (vague) notion of smart grids as social and/or political
phenomena and thus convey a certain awareness for the social and political dynamics inherent in these
technological infrastructures. However, this awareness does not dominate the discourse but is instead enmeshed
in a dominant definition of smart grids as technical artefacts.
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8.1.3 Smart grids as empty signifier
At the same time, some of these same actors portray smart grids as little more than a marketing slogan or even
a hoax. One civil society organization calls smart grids a “hype” and a “battle cry” (Interview, BUND 2018), and
an energy start-up states that “everybody likes them, but nobody knows what they are” (interview energy start-
up, EUREF, 2016). Even the network operator notes that “’smart’ is such an amorphous term” (personal
interview, network operator II, 2018). Still others mockingly ask “is it something to eat? What does it look like?
Is it a monitor? What is it?” (Interview project manager, EUREF, 2016). Even those involved in the pilot projects
are cautious about defining smart grids. One interviewee states that “there is no such thing as a smart grid […],
only different degrees of an ever more decentralized and intelligent network” (Interview, energy start-up, EUREF,
2016). This understanding shows that smart grids as a phenomenon are also associated with uncertainty and
even defiance.
While most actors involved in the pilot projects display engaged enthusiasm when asked to define smart grids,
EUREF Campus management stands out as exceptionally doubtful: “I’m afraid that smart grids, or intelligent
facility management or sustainable buildings, or all of these anglicisms, that everyone understands them
differently” (personal interview, project manager, EUREF, 2016). The same project manager doubts that the real-
time visualization of electricity flows to and from the solar paneled rooftop, the battery park, the EV-loading
stations and the electric vehicles at EUREF is even real: “Currently nothing is being measured […] that’s a film
playing […] those aren’t real-time data, come on!” (personal interview, project manager, EUREF, 2016), and adds:
“You know, lots of people here are full of hot air” (personal interview, project management, EUREF, 2016). Even
though this is a unique perspective, it is worth mentioning, because it confirms the NGO representative’s notion
of smart grids as a hype or a battle cry. Although this project manager seems utterly unimpressed by how smart
grid implementation is advancing, he embraces the show: “I really couldn’t care less if that’s a film playing down
there or if that’s really electricity” (personal interview, project management, EUREF, 2016). This manager’s
position shows that smart grids can be understood as hollow but useful marketing tool.
There is also considerable disagreement about whether smart grids physically exist in Berlin or not, i.e. whether
the pilot projects have successfully built a material infrastructure or only a virtual simulation. Actors involved in
smart grid implementation at the future sites are skeptical. Neither researchers nor project managers see
implementation at an advanced stage. A project manager at EUREF is quite clear about this: “I don’t think we
have a smart grid yet, and there is no smart grid anywhere in Berlin”, adding that “those technical components
take place on power point presentations” (Interview project manager EUREF, 2016). A leading researcher in the
Mobility2Grid project confirms that the research consortium has “experimentally plugged some things together,
and then plugged them back apart, but there is no closed, truly decentralized smart grid” and then adds: “what
we have here is more of a demonstration facility, […] but we don’t have a productive smart grid” (personal
interview, researcher, EUREF, 2017). The same researcher, however, is certain that a veritable micro-smart-grid
was operating on campus in the years from 2012-2013 (personal interview, researcher, EUREF, 2017).
Public administration, by contrast, is cautiously optimistic about the degree of smart grid implementation in
Berlin:
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“at the ten future sites, let’s pick Adlershof as an example, [the project management company] has
already implemented a lot of intelligent things. They might not fit our target image of smart grids, but
they contain many components of what that will need” (personal interview, SenWEB, 2018).
Public administration is therefore optimistic that smart grid implementation is underway, if not at its final stage.
At the same time, its representative doubts if the integration of smart grids into existing – not newly planned -
neighborhoods will ever succeed, stating that “the question is whether smart grids will ever be implemented into
existing buildings and neighborhoods. I’m still skeptical” (personal interview, SenWEB, 2018).
8.1.4 Concluding remarks
In the end, most actors in this analysis understand smart grids primarily as technical artefacts that circle around
their own primary research, business or marketing interests. Their engagement with smart grids is driven by
different positions and priorities, which make them attach different meanings to the term. These differences
don’t, however, result in open conflict. None of the actors insist on their specific definition or their specific focus.
The only real controversy that exists over smart grids in Berlin seems to boil down to personal animosities
between a project manager and a research consortium at EUREF. Instead, communication via project documents,
urban programs, advertisements, and personal interviews conveys a vagueness and general openness regarding
the meaning of the term. Having a vague notion of what smart grids are or could be is clearly enough for all actors
to engage. In this sense, smart grids can be viewed as abstract aspirations or reference points rather than as
concrete goals. They seem to have a guiding function that mobilizes people’s interests and ambitions yet is
flexible enough to allow various interpretations. In this sense, smart grids can be understood as a Leitbild (Dierkes
et al., 1992).
At the same time, my analysis shows that the vagueness of the term also evokes a certain skepticism towards
the existence of smart grids on the ground. While the vague notion of smart grids is able to move people in a
common direction, it also leaves room for interpreting what has been achieved in terms of material
infrastructures and what hasn’t. In effect, the vagueness of the term creates a broad range of expectations that
complicates the definition of success.
8.2 Framing urban smart grids: between technical solutions and social change-makers
The discursive frames used to describe smart grids reveal what kinds of things smart grids are supposed to do
and what kinds of problems smart grids are supposed to solve. In Berlin, smart grids are being framed first and
foremost as technical solutions. A broad coalition of actors across all three levels of my analysis is framing smart
grids primarily as technical devices for a) implementing the Energiewende, b) improving energy management, c)
introducing smart and high-tech innovations, d) boosting the local economy, and e) fostering decentralization
and prosumage. These dominant frames have implications for the storylines that emerge out of the overall
discourse, because firstly, they emphasize the technical - not the social - components of smart grids, and because
secondly, they relate smart grids to certain technical problems and not others (for example energy management
but not cyber security). Although the frames being promoted by the dominant actor coalition are relatively
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coherent across all levels of my analysis, scrutiny also reveals subtle underlying differences. Among others, the
technical framing of smart grids is accompanied by a discursive ambiguity towards questions of power and
influence, decentralization and prosumage. Even though power and influence arguably play an important role in
the deployment of smart grids in cities, their technical framing is – surprisingly - drowning out these issues.
8.2.1 Implement the Energiewende
Smart grids are being framed first and foremost as technological innovations that will help to implement Berlin’s
energy transition and lead the way into a post-fossil, low-carbon urban future. Most actors therefore promote
smart grids as sustainable and resource efficient, i.e. as ‘green’ technologies, and as tools for integrating (more)
renewable energies into the electricity system. This is especially true for public administration and researchers
involved in project implementation.
The Berlin Senate and related government agencies view smart grids as prerequisite for balancing the volatile
electricity flows from renewable energy sources, and thus as a necessary condition for increasing the amount of
renewable energies in the system (Clustermanagement Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2017: 23). In its
Energy Transition Law, the Senate has clearly committed to expanding the amount of renewable energies
produced within the city boundaries (Berlin Senate, 2016b). Although the term “smart grids” does not feature
prominently in any of its programs or documents, these documents nevertheless relate smart grids directly with
the Senate’s goals of reducing CO2-emissions, reducing energy consumption, and increasing the amount of
renewable energies in the city (Berlin Senate, 2015b; Clustermanagement Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg,
2017). The joint Masterplan for Energy Technologies in Berlin and Brandenburg therefore calls smart grids a
“systemic solution to key questions of the Energiewende” (Clustermanagement Energietechnik Berlin-
Brandenburg, 2017: 22).
A similar framing is also deeply rooted among actors involved in the pilot projects. Researchers, engineers and
business people working at Berlin’s pilot projects tend to be highly motivated to “make the Energiewende work”
(personal interviews with researchers at Adlershof, EUREF and TXL). Members of the research consortium at
EUREF classify smart grids as “sustainable concepts” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 48), as “ecologically
effective” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 64), and as “energetically sustainable solutions” (personal
interview, researcher II, EUREF, 2017). Similar to the city authorities, they directly link these goals to the
implementation of smart grids. As one researcher states “the reason we need a smart grid is because we want
to transition to more and more renewables” (personal interview, researcher Adlershof, 2018). They are
motivated by a strong belief in the necessity of integrating more renewables into the city’s energy system, and
by the prospect of contributing to global climate protection. The Mobility2Grid research consortium promotes
smart grids as nothing less than a “future project” that will help attain the “CO2-neutral, energy-efficient and
climate adapted city” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 7). Similarly, a project manager at TXL emphasizes
that smart grids are “very, very important building blocks on the way to the Energiewende” and introduces a
note of competition when adding that smart grids “could of course [….] propel us to the very top very quickly in
terms of climate protection” (personal interview, project manager, TXL, 2017). An advertisement for TXL Urban
Tech Republic uses heroic language to affirm that “the success of the energy revolution” will depend on
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intelligent infrastructures (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2016). For the consortia involved in smart grid implementation,
smart grids therefore carry meaning far beyond the mere technology, but also in terms of idealism, climate
responsibility, future-orientation and change-making.
The network operator, Stromnetz Berlin, frames smart grids in much less idealistic, more prosaic terms. Both
representatives interviewed for this analysis understand smart grids merely as means to make more efficient use
of (renewable) energy sources (personal interviews, Stromnetz Berlin I & II, 2018). They therefore understand
smart grids primarily as an efficiency technology, rather than an Energiewende technology. The grid operator
portrays smart grids as ‘business as usual’ rather than an innovation, when it states that “the grid is already
smart” (personal interview I, Stromnetz Berlin).
To conclude, the city authorities frame smart grids as fundamental prerequisites for the implementation of
Berlin’s Energiewende. They understand smart grids primarily as infrastructural enabler of renewables
integration, and thus as basis for the achievement of the city’s climate goals. This framing resonates with the
deeply idealistic sentiment conveyed by the actors involved in smart grid implementation at the pilot projects.
Together, this framing drowns out the conventional, routine type framing of smart grids as promoted by the
network operator.
8.2.2 Improve energy management
More concretely, smart grids are being framed as technical tools for improving energy management. A broad
coalition of actors portrays smart grids as technical tools to increase the availability of energy-related data and
enable more flexible load management through the introduction of automatic control mechanisms. Except for
the incumbent network operator, actors at all levels of my analysis agree that urban energy loads will need to be
managed more flexibly in the future, i.e. that loads will have to be shifted at shorter intervals and coordinated
more accurately with demand. They also agree that more accurate load management will require timelier and
more accurate data on available energy resources, existing energy demand, possibilities of storage, and
capacities for distribution. A broad coalition of actors is thus framing smart grids as technical tools for enabling
increased system flexibility, gathering increased energy data and facilitating increased energy control. To most
actors, the dominant problem being addressed by this framing is the fluctuating nature of renewable energy
supply. Yet, certain actors also use this framing to address other problems. Most prominently, the Berlin Senate
uses this framing to address the wasteful energy related behavior of households, and ICT corporations address a
lack of overall “digitization”. In sum, framing smart grids as enablers of system flexibility foregrounds notions of
clean and efficient energy use, but also invites more economically grounded interests and rationalities to flourish.
8.2.2.1 Increase system flexibility
The Berlin Senate primarily portrays system flexibility as a technical tool for introducing more renewable energies
into the system. It strongly supports “options for flexibilizing energy supply” (Berlin Senate, 2016b: 8) as part of
its goal to “establish a climate-sensitive energy generation and supply system” (Berlin Senate, 2016b: 8).
Similarly, the Enquete Report that it commissioned advises a “flexibly steerable, networked supply system with
low consumption rates and alternative energy sources” (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 18). The government thus
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clearly connects system flexibility with renewable energies. It makes clear that smart grids are needed to “better
steer energy demand according to the fluctuating supply of renewable wind and solar electricity” (Berlin Senate,
2016c: 28). In their energy related policies and programs, Berlin’s urban authorities are thus framing smart grids
as “an important energy political contribution” (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 37). The Berlin Senate views part of
this energy political contribution as the private responsibility of households. The government’s policies and
programs strongly associate flexible energy management with people’s energy behavior: “It is necessary that
end users and producers be willing and able to make appropriate, intelligent appliances […] accessible for
centralized load management” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 28). The Senate’s policies and programs promote better
energy data as a prerequisite for increasing the energy-efficient behavior of private energy users. To a certain
extent, the government thus frames smart grids as an instrument for capacitating users and incentivizing
behavioral change (see also section 8.2.5. “Foster decentralization and prosumage”). To the city government,
smart grids are thus also directly related to the notion of smart homes.
For corporate and corporate related urban actors, such as Siemens, Schneider Electric and the Technology
Foundation, flexible energy management is part of an economic agenda. While the Senate portrays system
flexibility as a technical tool for achieving Berlin’s urban energy transition, the public Technology Foundation, for
example, views system flexibility as a goal in itself: “intelligent grids and optimized management of supply and
demand [….] will yield enormous innovations, and investments will open up future markets” (Erbstößer and
Müller, 2017: 15). For this publicly funded foundation, increasing system flexibility is thus not a means for
integrating more renewable energies, but a means for fostering technological innovation and economic growth.
This mirrors the logics that large electronics companies are also adopting regarding flexible load management.
For these companies, smart grids are a “means of implementing better automation and control mechanisms”
(Interview electronics company, Adlershof, 2018), i.e. a means of selling their products. For these companies,
system flexibility is primarily a way to address the “smart city idea” (Interview, electronics company, EUREF,
2016) not the Energiewende. Corporate and corporate related actors are thus framing smart grids as flexible
energy management tools to promote their own sensing and automation products.
For the network operator, flexible energy management is primarily viewed as way to improve the quality of its
supply services. Smart grids are about “intelligently reacting to user demand” (Interview I, network operator,
2018), making services smoother and more efficient. For the operating company, these users are not necessarily
households, but commercial customers with higher levels of energy demand: “We should start with the large
loads [….] Once we control those, we’ve won a lot [….] but individual washing machines, that’s still far far in the
future” (Interview I, network operator, 2018). For the grid operating company, better access to information
about energy usage at the household level is primarily a question of improving supply services, not of saving
energy (Interview II, network operator, 2018). For Stromnetz Berlin, more energy related data is mostly an issue
of precisely locating potential disturbances and reacting more quickly to power outages. Currently, the company
relies on customers’ phone calls to locate the sources of power cuts. It therefore associates the possibility of
automatically receiving energy data at the household level with the possibility of reducing its current “blindness”
(Interview network operator, 2018). Unlike the Berlin Senate, it views households not primarily as active energy
managers, but rather as providers of energy data.
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Likewise, the smart grid pilot projects currently being pursued at Berlin’s future sites are not focused on
households at all. Households are not involved in any of the investigated projects and therefore not the focus of
any scientist’s active research interest. Instead, all three pilot projects focus on the connections between
technologies typically found outside of households, such as renewable energy generation plants, electric vehicle
fleets (at EUREF), an ice storage facility (at Adlershof) or multi-functional streetlamps (at EUREF and TXL). The
projects focus on understanding the technicalities of sensing and automatically controlling energy flows, on
programming algorithms according to different optimization parameters, and on monitoring their effectiveness.
Although these algorithms are related to certain patterns of social activity (for example patterns of mobility),
they are not related to patterns of household life. Even though the Berlin Senate stresses the integral role of
urban households in the future smart grid system, the research consortia are framing smart grids as high-tech
tools far removed from the everyday homes of people.
Questions of energy data, management and control are also questions of power and influence. Whoever has
access to energy data and whoever programs energy distribution mechanisms controls critical societal functions,
such as industrial production or traffic. Yet interestingly, questions of who should gather energy data or who
should manage the steering mechanisms do not feature prominently in Berlin’s smart grid discourse; they are at
most secondary. Most actors express only vague notions of who could or should potentially control energy data
and manage energy flows. Should private energy users administer their own energy data and flexibly adjust their
activities based on financial incentives? Or should the network operator administer private energy data and
remotely control users’ appliances according to system needs? Or should intermediate aggregators oversee the
combined energy data of clusters of end users and flexibly trade incoming and outgoing loads according to
system demand? Questions like these could have far reaching implications for the architecture of the urban
electric grid system, yet they hardly feature in the smart grid discourse in Berlin. Instead, different urban actors
portray different views of who should control energy data and flows in the future smart grid city.
Public administration is torn between framing the issue of control as an open question: „Does every household
get to decide if they want to steer their energy flexibly […], or do we permit the network operator or the operator
of a district heating system to do this for every single apartment?” (Interview public admin, 2018). The city
authorities also ask: “to what extent should [customer installations] benefit the public grid? I think no one wants
to give up too much of their authority, or acquire more authority […] That’s a challenge and a discussion that we
need to have: who will have what kinds of access rights and how far do they go?” (Interview public
administration, 2018). Yet, in other documents and contexts, Berlin’s public administration also frames the issue
of energy control as household responsibility (Berlin Senate, 2016c), or as the network operator’s responsibility
(Berlin Senate, 2016c; Enquête-Kommission, 2015), or even as the grid’s very own responsibility: “an intelligent
grid will […] connect, […] assess, […] and react” (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 31). In short, Berlin’s public authorities
promote a blurred picture of who should control energy data and manage flows in the future smart grid city.
Software engineers at the pilot projects, by contrast, have a much clearer understanding of their influential role
in the smart grid system: “We set the parameters”, says a researcher at EUREF (Interview researcher II EUREF,
2017). “The software decides”, says another (Interview, researcher Adlershof, 2018). Researchers in the field of
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electronics and software engineering are aware that the decisions they make and the priorities they set are at
the core of the grid’s “smartness”. Yet understanding, not steering, is their primary motivation and concern.
Only the network operator leaves no doubt about its ambitions as load manager: „Of course […] we need the
possibility to intervene when large loads are being shifted back and forth“ (Interview II, network operator, 2018).
“We have a control center that controls the entire grid. It has been doing so for many decades” (Interview I,
network operator, 2018). For the grid operating company, load management belongs to the core responsibilities
that it doesn’t want to give up.
Overall, a dominant actor coalition is framing smart grids as technical enablers of flexible energy management
and automatic control. While government documents and strategies emphasize the role of households, neither
the network operator nor researchers at the pilot projects share this emphasis. Moreover, key social questions
surrounding the technical abilities of smart grids remain obscure: who will oversee energy data, who will manage
energy loads, and who will exercise control over whom or what? The omission of these key social questions in
Berlin’s smart grid discourse, and the lack of open controversy about them points to an overall (regulatory)
uncertainty over the costs and benefits of these issues.
8.2.2.2 Enable sector-coupling
Another important framing describes smart grids as technical tools for coordinating different infrastructural
sectors. This concept called “sector-coupling” is promoted across all levels of my analysis, and spans various
infrastructures including electricity, gas, heating, cooling, and (electric) mobility. The term sector-coupling
describes the idea of using (renewable) electricity to power different infrastructural sectors, and in turn using
these various sectors to store excess electricity when needed. In this sense, sector coupling can be viewed as a
technical prerequisite to system flexibility: whenever excess electricity is available, it is flexibly converted into
gas, chemicals, heating, cooling or battery loads according to demand, and then flexibly converted back into
electricity when needed. The dominant problem being addressed by this framing is one of energy and cost-
efficiency. For most actors in my analysis, sector-coupling is a way of maximizing the use of (renewable) energy
resources and minimizing energy waste. However, actors at the city level, most notably the Senate and the newly
founded public utility company, as well as electronics companies also view sector-coupling as tool for saving
money and time. This framing also portrays smart grids as infrastructural mediators. They are depicted as
connecting devices, as add-ons or as secondary layers between utility sectors. Due to this cross-sectoral framing,
the ideas associated with smart grids are so broad that they are compatible with many different actors and
agendas.
Berlin’s city authorities primarily depict sector-coupling as a tool to implement the Energiewende. Especially in
its energy policies, the government depicts sector-coupling as way to save energy and integrate renewable
energies into the system, mainly by bridging the electricity and the heating sectors (Berlin Senate, 2016b, 2016c;
Enquête-Kommission, 2015). Among others, the Senate aims to integrate power-to-heat facilities, combined
heat-and-power generation facilities, and heating storage facilities into the grid (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 23)and is
undertaking concrete measures to reach these goals. In other government documents, such as the coalition
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agreement and the Smart City Strategy, the Senate also associates sector-coupling with the mobility sector
(Berlin Senate, 2015b, 2016a). In this case, however, it portrays sector-coupling as a desirable yet vague
possibility. In both instances, Berlin’s city government primarily presents sector-coupling as way of dealing with
(fluctuating) renewable electricity supply, and of increasing electricity and heating-related energy-efficiency. But
the Senate is also interested in sector-coupling for more mundane issues of saving money. Considering the city’s
large and well-developed gas and district heating networks, the Senate also views sector-coupling as means of
increasing the time and cost-effectiveness of managing these networks (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 40). It views
integrated network management as potential tool for synergizing operational processes, for example customer
care, service provision, and construction management and thus saving costs. In other words, the Senate sees
sector-coupling not only as facilitator of urban energy transitions, but as a possibility to save money and time.
The new public utility company, Berlin Energie, largely echoes this position. In its mission statement, the
company emphasizes the benefits of sector-coupling primarily in terms of convenience, cost-effectiveness and
security of supply. For Berlin Energie, sector-coupling is first and foremost about offering a “combined network
connection” or a “one-stop networked infrastructure”18 that integrates electricity, gas and heating networks into
one combined system. It propagates this mainly for reasons of convenience, invoking personal convenience on
the one hand: “Berliners will have one contact person, one appointment, one hole drilled into their wall for the
connection, and one bill”19, and urban convenience on the other: “these measures will […] not only save costs
but reduce traffic impairments: if the road is opened only once and not repeatedly”20. Although the company
also associates smart grids and sector-coupling with the city’s climate and Energiewende related goals, it
foregrounds questions of convenience and cost-effectiveness, calling cost-effectiveness a “fundamental building
block for the success of the Energiewende”21. The company’s commitment to sector-coupling is thus based
primarily on values related to money, time and efficient management rather than the Energiewende. An
interviewee highlights this position: ”one asset management, one service management and one thinking and
doing, one failure management all the way to one combined service technician” (Interview, BerlinEnergie, 2018).
In line with this, the company describes itself as “combined network operator” that will operate the city’s
infrastructure “efficiently and reliably” (www.berlinenergie.de/ueber-uns/kombinationsnetzanschluss/).
Moreover, it argues for combining infrastructural sectors for reasons of supply security. The same interviewee
underlines the necessity of creating a “cross-sectoral security landscape” (Interview, Berlin Energie, 2018). In
sum, the city-owned company Berlin Energie understands smart grids and sector-coupling not primarily as
instruments to achieve a sustainable urban energy transition, but rather as means to achieve an economically
viable, secure and efficient energy supply.
Similarly, large electronics companies don’t promote sector-coupling primarily as means to foster sustainability,
but rather as means to foster “smartness” in technological and economic terms. Not surprisingly, these
companies consider sector-coupling as new opportunity to place their “smart” sensing and automation
18 www.berlinenergie.de/ueber-uns/kombinationsnetzanschluss/
19 www.berlinenergie.de/ueber-uns/kombinationsnetzanschluss/
20 www.berlinenergie.de/ueber-uns/kombinationsnetzanschluss/
21 www.berlinenergie.de/ueber-uns/leitbild/
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technologies and to create added value. They therefore perceive sector-coupling as an important issue but
associate it with the smart city and smart technologies rather than the sustainable city. An interviewee confirms
this emphasis: “what belongs into this smart city issue? That’s energy, that’s mobility, that’s water, i.e. waste
water [...], possibly surveillance by cameras or traffic management systems. Then, as fifth sector, that’s buildings
[….] and underneath these five sectors there’s always the issue of integration, communication, that needs to be
embedded” (Interview, electronics company, 2016). As this quote illustrates, this employee highlights the
technological aspects of sector-coupling, not their underlying purposes. In its blog, the same company describes
how it advises clients on “sector-coupling and digital services”22, thus emphasizing the digital aspect of sector-
coupling over sustainability. Likewise, in its brochure, this electronics company subsumes smart grids and sector-
coupling under the heading “comprehensive digitization” (Schneider Electric brochure, p. 5). In an infomercial
on its website, another large electronics company emphasizes the economic benefits of sector-coupling: “sector-
coupling enables the integration of renewables in decentralized energy systems; sector-coupling takes care of
profitability, and opens new business segments not only for energy providers; sector-coupling facilitates
surprising synergies and new opportunities for added value, and for attracting and retaining customers”23. In
sum, large electronics companies see a business opportunity in the integration of infrastructural sectors, and
thus foster sector-coupling primarily for economic reasons.
This is different at the pilot projects, where intrinsically motivated researchers are mostly interested in smart
grids and sector-coupling for the sake of making urban energy (and mobility) transitions work. At EUREF Campus,
a leading researcher affirms that “a smart grid […] aims at moving the essential sectors such as energy, heating
and mobility supply towards 100% renewables” (Interview, researcher, EUREF 2017). Here, the primary
motivation is to integrate renewables and foster a clean energy system. At TXL, smart grids and sector-coupling
are about creating an “all electric” future. As one of the TXL project’s leading actors states “if our project was 10,
15 or 20 years further down the road, then we would do everything electrically. Because electricity would be
renewable, and we would be able to store it, we would use electricity for heating, cooling, producing, driving,
everything” (Interview, TXL 2017).
In sum, actors at the city level, such as the city government and the newly established public utility company
(Berlin Energie), are promoting smart grids and sector coupling for very different reasons. While the government
primarily focuses on achieving the Energiewende, Berlin Energie is mostly interested in an economically viable,
secure and efficient energy supply. Similary, the incumbent network operator, Stromnetz Berlin, has little to say
about sector-coupling at all. At the pilot level, similar differences prevail. While researchers are driven by an
interest in urban energy transitions and 100% renewables, private electronics companies seek to sell their
products.
8.2.2.3 Maintain stability, security and comfort
Thirdly, smart grids are being framed as important guarantors of stable electricity loads and secure electricity
supply, and thus as guarantors of the city’s energy related status quo. Like system flexibility, this framing is
22 https://blog.se.com/de/smart-cities-vernetzte-staedte/2019/01/29/inno2grid/
23 https://new.siemens.com/global/de/branchen/stadtwerke-und-verteilnetzbetreiber/geschaeftsmodelle.html
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related to the introduction of renewable electricity into the system. It paints smart grids as technical solutions
to the volatility of renewable electricity flows, i.e. to the uncertainty of the time and amount of their generation.
The underlying problems being addressed by this framing are potential supply interruptions that could result
from insufficient generation (for example on a dark and calm day) and potential power outages that could result
from inadequate voltage levels (above or below 50Hertz). Because neither load stability nor security of supply
are problems in Berlin’s current electricity system, this framing is also built on the fear of losing a cherished
certainty. The city’s current standards are indeed high: based on the network operator’s data, Berliners only
experience a network related power outage once every five years, and in these rare instances, they remain
without power for an average duration of only 48 minutes24. Although this is higher than the German average of
approximately 15 minutes of power outages per year25, it is still significantly lower than the average length of
power outages in other countries, for example the U.S. In California, for example, the length of power outages
has averaged 133 minutes per year over the past 12 years26. The relative steadiness and reliability of current
electricity flows in Berlin have arguably rendered the city’s energy supply infrastructure “invisible”, creating a
sense of comfort, confidence and safety that neither the city authorities nor any other of the city’s smart grid
related actors are willing to challenge. All actors in this analysis therefore promote the maintenance of steady
and reliable electricity flows as indispensable to the city’s future electricity system.
In various policies and programs, Berlin’s city authorities draw a direct line between integrating more renewable
energies into the system, needing to maintain system stability, reliability, and supply security and needing smart
grids. They consistently argue that the "networks of the future (electricity, heating, gas) must [...] facilitate a
stable, secure and reliable energy supply that is based in large parts on renewable energies" (Clustermanagement
Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2017: 23). In light of the unreliable renewable energy supply, the city
authorities argue for smart grids as guarantors of network stability and security of supply (Berlin Senate, 2015b:
32). They even state that “because electricity supply is every modern society’s Achilles heal, [network stability]
must be given exceptional attention” (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 33). These formulations leave no room for doubt
about the need to maintain the system’s current high supply standards. Without discussing or explaining this
assumption, Berlin’s authorities make its high standards of supply security appear as an undisputed necessity
and smart grids as only way to get there.
Private actors fill this gap by directly connecting notions of system stability with notions of personal comfort. The
network operator states this in simple terms: “you shouldn’t see it, you shouldn’t hear it, that would be best;
you should simply not be aware of it [….] When you press the button, the light should go on, that should be the
feeling” (interview, network operator II, 2018). As this quote shows, the network operator argues from a service-
oriented position, in which supply interruptions need to be avoided, because they pose an inconvenience to the
customer. For the network operator, not the integration of renewables, but customer satisfaction are presented
as top priority. A similar argument prevails at TXL Urban Tech Republic, where maintaining network stability
while also maintaining peoples’ comfort levels are presented as the main goals to be achieved with smart grids
24 https://www.stromnetz.berlin/uber-uns/zahlen-daten-fakten
25 Owen calculation based on https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/average-power-outage-time-germany-decline-
renewables-share-grows
26 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1078447/average-blackouts-duration-by-state/
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(Interview, TXL 2017). The argument that is being tapped into here is like frequent arguments about energy-
efficiency: smart grids are painted as technical tools that will correct expected deficiencies while maintaining
current comfort levels.
Various actors also associate system stability with the idea of creating different levels of (interlinked) micro-grids
in the city. The city administration, for example, argues that micro-grids increase system “resilience” (Enquête-
Kommission, 2015: 155). Project managers and ICT companies similarly argue that micro-grids could establish
“redundancies” or “fallback options” within an urban electricity system to offset possible interruptions
(Interview, ICT company 2016). A researcher at EUREF views this as an interesting challenge: “because we
implement more capacities and each component has a probability of failure, and we must include redundancies.
I don’t see that as a danger, but definitely as a challenge” (interview, researcher II, EUREF, 2017). Yet, not all
actors view micro-grids as a stabilizing mechanism. For Berlin Energie, for example, micro-grids pose a security
risk, not a security asset (Interview, Berlin Energie, year 2018).
In sum, Berlin’s city and pilot level actors argue for smart grids as means of maintaining high levels of supply
security and high levels of comfort. While some actors at both the city level and the pilot sites also build on this
argument to promote micro-grids, others view micro-grids as problem for system stability. None of Berlin’s smart
grid related actors question the need for these high levels of stability, supply security or comfort. Arguments for
smart grids are therefore based on the implicit assumption that the comfort and constant availability and
dependability of electricity flows, i.e. the smooth ‘invisibility’ of electricity infrastructures are non-negotiable.
This gives smart grids a touch of a necessity.
8.2.3 Make the city “smart” and “green”
Beyond these strictly energy related framings, smart grids are also being framed as broader smart-eco city
“solutions”. Though Berlin’s urban and energy policies primarily depict smart grid technologies as a prerequisite
for achieving Berlin’s local Energiewende, this expectation goes hand in hand with an increasing overall reliance
on technological development to solve urban environmental problems. In Berlin, visions of low-carbon urban
futures are becoming increasingly interwoven with ‘smart’ technological progress, merging notions of
environmental consciousness with notions of high-tech development and digital sophistication.
Among others, the current city government’s energy policies aim to help advance the city’s Smart City Strategy
and turn Berlin into a “Smart Energy City” (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 64). The Smart City Strategy, in turn, describes
the development of “intelligent” supply infrastructures as its “backbone” (Berlin Senate, 2015b). It is therefore
unclear whether smart grids are being pursued as means to achieve a smart city, or the smart city is being
pursued as means to achieve smart grids.
Similarly, a report commissioned by the urban administration in 2015 entitled “New Energy for Berlin” states
that Berlin should introduce smart grids “so it can become a Smart City that contributes to the Energiewende”
(Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 80). The “smartification” of electricity grids is therefore not only being justified with
energy-related goals, but with the vague and overarching aim of digitizing urban life in general. The Masterplan
Energy Technology Berlin-Brandenburg (2015) further underlines this by stating that “energy is part of an
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interconnected smart city and region” (Clustermanagement Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2017). This
shows how closely imaginaries of resource-efficiency and sustainability are being linked with notions of
digitization and vice versa. The interface between energy and ICTs is regarded as a natural and inevitable process
that goes hand in hand with the increasing digitization of everyday life. By linking the smart city to local energy
transitions, smart technological solutions are being depicted not only as healthy and clean, but also as part of a
response to the pressing global challenge of climate change and thus as a seeming moral imperative.
Concomitantly, urban development discourses are systematically linking imaginaries of the smart city to notions
of climate-friendliness and sustainability, describing the smart city of Berlin as “resource-efficient” (Erbstößer
and Müller, 2017), “post-fossil” (Berlin Senate, 2015a), ‘”ecologically modernized”, and “green” (Berlin Senate,
2016a). In Berlin’s local policies, low-carbon transitions are therefore imagined to be inherently “smart”, and
smart cities are imagined to be “low-carbon”.
The seemingly inevitable connection between technology and environmental protection is being strengthened
by the way smart grids are depicted at the city’s future sites. TXL Urban Tech Republic, for example, advertises
that “we need new solutions for mobility, for energy, and for resources. And we need new materials and
intelligent systems to make these solutions possible. We need Urban Technologies. Technologies for the cities of
tomorrow” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2015: 5). According to this advertisement, there seem to be no alternative
‘solutions’ to technological advancement. Moreover, these technologies are claimed to be “what will keep alive
the growing metropolitan centers of the 21st century” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2018a), and thus depicted as
fundamental prerequisite for the sake of pure survival. The same is true for the EUREF Campus, which claims to
bridge solutions not only for the “intelligent transformation of the energy sector” (Technische Universität Berlin,
2012), but also for the intelligent city:
„We are discussing the global context, how to design the future intelligent city? […] and [for me] a
smart grid is part of that (Interview, EUREF Campus_2017).
Here, too, smart grids are depicted as “intelligent” and necessary means of urban environmental protection.
8.2.4 Boost the local economy
Berlin’s city administration also depicts smart grids as an attractive opportunity for boosting the low-carbon
economy, evoking visions of a thriving and industrialized, yet post-fossil urban future (Berlin Senate, 2015a). The
current government underlines this by stating that "a smart city, an intelligent city, is able to increase growth
while decreasing resource-use" (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 51). Among others, smart grids are envisaged to "increase
industrial value generation, expand technological expertise, create new jobs and increase urban quality of life"
(Berlin Senate, 2015b: 28). These promises are built to a large degree on Berlin’s existing strengths in the fields
of research and digital industries. Apart from hosting numerous renowned research institutions, Berlin has
become Germany’s leading hub for the (digital) start-up scene (Kollman et al., 2019). The urban administration
therefore views smart grid technologies as way to combine the city’s socio-economic capital with its energy
transformation goals, and for leading it into a ‘green’ economy:
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"The Energiewende offers Berlin's businesses unique opportunities on the future markets of a
resource-efficient economy based on renewable energies. The extension and advancement of an
intelligent electricity grid, smart grid, are important technological challenges that Berlin is especially
suited for due to its combination of scientific research and industry" (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 26).
The city’s future sites advertise the same combination. At EUREF, the project development company states that
“we all benefit from this topic; we benefit, the companies benefit, and the idea behind it does too” (Personal
interview, project development company, 2016). And then adds:
“I want to prove that what we are doing here is not more expensive than what we have now. The
Energiewende will only succeed if customers don’t end up paying more. Maybe even pay less [….]. I
think that this is a commercial project that we are doing here” (Personal interview, project
development company, 2016).
Smart grids are therefore depicted as economic opportunity that will help the Energiewende, not the other way
around. Similarly, large ICT and electronics companies involved in Berlin’s future sites are primarily driven by the
opportunity for expanding into an emerging market:
“Suddenly the grid becomes a huge data project, and that makes it interesting for us. […] Wherever
data packages are transmitted based on internet protocols, independent of whether it’s video live
streams or stock market data or private emails, we don’t really care what it is, as long as it’s a lot. That
pretty much sums up our interests” (Personal interview, ICT/electronics company, 2017).
Not surprisingly, large ICT companies are participating in Berlin’s future sites primarily because they see a chance
to increase their specialized knowledge and turn it into standardized products that can be transferred to multiple
systems and situations. They are especially interested in devising ‘cookie-cutter’ solutions and developing them
into mass-products (Personal interviews, ICT/electronics companies, 2016 & 2017).
The way smart grids are being portrayed in the city’s documents and programs and also at the future sties shows
how deeply interwoven notions of energy transitions and low-carbon futures are with economic interests. This
raises questions about the interests and priorities at work in promoting smart grids for the city. In particular, it
raises questions about the environmental claims around smart grids and about the fine line between exploiting
existing synergies and creating a ‘green’ image for the city.
8.2.5 Foster decentralization and prosumage
Lastly, a dominant framing portrays smart grids as enablers of a decentralized energy system based on wide-
spread prosumage. This framing presents smart grids as the technical solutions to a problem of reorganizing
energy across urban space and of redistributing energy-related roles and responsibilities within this space. Yet,
this framing is ambiguous. While policy documents, research proposals, company websites, and public
communications associate decentralization and prosumage with notions of autonomy and empowerment, most
experts involved in urban smart grid implementation paint a different picture. My analysis reveals a certain
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disconnect between how smart grids are being promoted in official communications and how they are being
experienced in implementation circles. It shows that what decentralization and prosumage actually mean for
different actors and within different contexts in the city of Berlin varies substantially.
While in public communications and appearances, the local government promotes an imaginary of close-to-
home, citizen-empowering, smart low-carbon urban futures, other important actors in Berlin’s smart grid
community portray a more nuanced and differentiated picture. These actors include incumbents and start-ups,
researchers and businesspeople, municipal administration and NGOs. Instead of framing households as
intrinsically motivated, powerful backbones of Berlin’s urban Energiewende, they see them as unnecessary,
disinterested and disempowered energy users.
8.2.5.1 Households between empowered prosumers and disinterested users
The local government’s framing of smart grid enabled prosumage is connected to the widespread idea of
decentralized or distributed energy responsibility either within individual households or neighborhood size
micro-grid communities. Berlin’s city government frames the urban Energiewende and local smart grid systems
as highly participatory, with an active role for citizens in energy markets that work to their benefit in a variety of
ways. By and large, the local government portrays decentralized prosumage as opportunity to save money and
energy, actively manage energy, to be more informed about and aware of energy, and to become increasingly
free to choose between various energy sources. Berlin’s Energy and Climate Protection Program (BEK 2030), for
example, builds on prosumers as “active agents of the Energiewende” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 64). Among other
things, it aims at “strengthening the role of micro-prosumers in the electric grid” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 28). The
same is true for the independent commission’s “New Energy for Berlin” report. As active members of the energy
system, this report refers to prosumage households as "grid participants" (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 37).
These active grid participants are envisioned as highly flexible market actors that take on alternating roles as
electricity producers, consumers and suppliers. To strengthen their role as electricity suppliers and system
stabilizers, the Berlin Energy and Climate Protection Program (BEK) encourages local grid participants to make
their “intelligent” household appliances accessible for centralized load management (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 28).
Prosumage households are therefore not only envisioned to benefit themselves, but also to take over
responsibility for stabilizing the grid and benefitting the system. The local government seeks to increase their
“ability and willingness” to perform grid stabilizing duties (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 28), and to adapt their electricity
consumption to the volatility of renewable energies (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 17). Among other things, it
points to the possible integration of private refrigerators, washing machines or other relevant electric appliances
into an ICT enabled energy information system:
“The digitization of networks and appliances offers substantial potential for increasing the energy-
efficiency of private households. Combining smart home solutions with informative energy billing can
provide pathways for substantially increasing energy-efficient behavior” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 136).
According to this document, smart grids and related energy information systems will empower private
households to act responsibly and control their energy consumption. Even regular households that don’t (or
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can’t) act as prosumers or grid participants are portrayed as potentially interested, flexible and actively engaged
in managing their electricity consumption. In its Smart City Strategy the city government underlines that the
information made available through smart grids (and meters) will motivate and enable these households to adapt
their electricity consumption according to system needs (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 31). By providing information
about peaks in the overall energy system and about individual consumption patterns, the government assumes
that households will increase their system awareness and adapt their consumption behavior:
“In the next two decades, Berlin needs to install smart energy infrastructures in all areas of urban
consumption (housing, transportation, economy, administration, leisure etc.), which will enable
consumers to increase their energy-efficiency on the basis of transparency and controllability”
(Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 16).
The government expects that households have an inherent interest in flexibly adapting their routines to reduce
electricity consumption either for reasons of climate protection or for financial benefits. In fact, the city’s climate
protection program presumes that the main obstacle to this kind of flexible energy management is currently a
lack of financial incentives, not a lack of inherent motivation (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 28). The local government’s
idea of intrinsically motivated, flexible, and environmentally conscious prosumage households is reinforced
through the public communications surrounding Berlin’s future sites. This is especially true for TXL, which hardly
exists outside the realm of communications. As the director of TXL’s project management company states in a
public interview:
“In the end it’s all about people. It only becomes interesting with people! […] The users should have a
say in what happens here” (AusserGewöhnlich Berlin, 2017).
This notion of a participatory urban energy future is underlined by the term Urban Tech Republic, which was
chosen as a provocative, fun and slightly tongue-in-cheek way of emphasizing the importance of citizen
engagement at TXL (AusserGewöhnlich Berlin, 2017). The term republic also stands for autonomy and
democracy, i.e. for the notion of an independent and self-organized future energy system, in which free and
informed energy citizens contribute their share to a functioning overall energy community. It rings of well-
behaved debate, of compromise, and of individual service to the higher common good. This framing gives the
impression that becoming a prosumage household is not a matter of individual preferences but of moral
obligation. It obviously speaks to a certain class of energy households. As a leading employee of Tegel Projekt
GmbH confirms when asked about the kinds of people that might become part of the TXL campus: “I believe in
self-selection” (personal interview TXL, 2017). At the same time, this leading employee reveals an underlying
concern about attracting these potential prosumers:
„And of course, we will try to work towards attracting […] the right people, that fit into the Urban Tech
idea, […] that are intrinsically motivated and maybe interested in connecting and taking part in such a
higher-level energy production; and maybe even becoming a driver in the whole thing” (personal
interview TXL, 2017).
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Here, the possibility of actively engaged prosumage households seems less certain. Instead, it sounds like work
needs to be done to attract a rare species of specialized energy clients rather than relying on the intrinsic
motivation of regular urban households. It shows that participation and inclusion in energy issues might not be
as simple and attractive as promoted in the smart grid discourse, and that urban households willing and able to
engage in prosumage activities might actually be hard to find.
In fact, the notion of flexible, intrinsically motivated and active prosumage households is not mirrored by many
other actors in Berlin, especially not by those involved in smart grid development and testing. Their notion of
decentralization and prosumage is not one of inclusion, participation or empowerment, but rather one of
disillusionment and convenience. There is a gap between the visions being promoted by policy documents,
research proposals, company websites, and public communications and the visions actually fostered by the
experts involved in the urban smart grid community themselves. While participation and empowerment feature
prominently in the vision of decentralization and urban prosumage that is being advanced in public, these notions
are much more brittle and doubtful on the individual expert level. Many even doubt the system relevance of
household prosumage altogether. Two participants in the research project at Adlershof call into question the
benefits of household prosumage for the energy system:
“In the beginning that might be exciting, but in the end […] that’s just fooling around a little, and the
practical advantage is really marginal. And that’s why […] in private households, I’m not convinced”
(personal interview, businessperson at Adlershof, 2018).
A colleague shares this skepticism: “Smart grids in households, of course that’s imaginable; the only
question is how high their potential really is” (personal interview, researcher at Adlershof, 2018). The
same person continues:
“After I open the refrigerator, it has to keep on cooling, otherwise my sausage could get warm, and I
wouldn’t want that to happen [….] the washing machine, I’m also skeptical about that. I mean, to have
the laundry lying half wet in the machine for eight hours, nobody wants that” (personal interview
researcher at Adlershof, 2018).
These actors don’t view private households as actively engaged citizens that are driven by an inherent climate-
consciousness or an interest in saving energy, but simply as driven by their everyday routines and by
convenience. They view future energy households as relatively disinterested in energy issues, and more
concerned about their comfort than their efficiency. Prosumage households, in their view, are not eager to take
part in Berlin’s urban Energiewende, but rather concerned with maintaining their everyday routines. This
assessment is shared by a representative of the local network operator who is also involved in the EUREF project.
This person is highly skeptical of peoples’ willingness to change their energy related behavior:
“The German mentality simply isn’t like that. You know, in Italy, they use so-called breakers, like an
extra fuse; they tell them they can’t use the washing machine and the water boiler and the stove and
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the dishwasher at the same time; they cut the power off, the fuse breaks and that’s it. To give up your
comfort like that would never be possible in Germany” (personal interview, Stromnetz Berlin, 2018).
In this expert’s view, future energy households are even highly inflexible: “society’s inertia is extremely high […]
that’s why I wouldn’t say that once we have a smart grid, everyday life will change” (personal interview Stromnetz
Berlin, 2018). Contrary to the overarching imaginary of smart grids as technological basis for “openness,
participation and connectivity”27, which is being promoted on the company’s website, this representative of the
network operator nourishes a vision of Berlin’s future energy households as passive and disinterested rather
than open, passionate and engaged. There is an obvious discrepancy between what is being publicly promoted
and what Berlin’s experts actually portray. An employee of an energy start-up at EUREF speaks of a similar
experience:
“[Smart grids] need to be turned into products. And that’s the hardest part, you see? How do you sell
a smart grid? There is no such thing as a micro-smart grid, and there aren’t any customers either.
Nobody says ‘hey, I’d like to buy a smart grid’” (personal interview, energy start-up EUREF, 2016).
Instead of encountering ready customers, this person has obviously encountered frustration. For a
representative of the Senate Department of Economics, Energy and Public Enterprises (SenWEB), the role of
households seems at most uncertain. When interviewed, a Senate Department representative states that „some
people will [install smart grid systems], because they are either a) technologically interested or b)
environmentally conscious or both [….] But a large portion of society certainly won’t do it“ (personal interview
SenWEB, 2018). A representative of the Berlin section of Friends of the Earth Germany shares this opinion:
„If you break it down to the household level there’s always this thing with the controllable
refrigerator, and I don’t buy it” (personal interview BUND, 2018).
In sum, my analysis shows that despite an overall agreement about the necessity of advancing smart grid systems
in Berlin, the visions portraying the role of urban households in these systems remains varied and in part
contested. The framing of participation and empowerment on the one hand and that of disinterest and
incapability on the other reveal a disconnect not only between political and other actors, but also between
abstract political programs and the reality of implementation.
8.2.5.2 Neighborhoods between self-sufficiency and collaboration
Although decentralization and prosumage feature prominently in visions of smart grids, there is vagueness and
unclarity about the degree of decentralization and hence the scale of prosumage. Like the term “smart grids”,
the term “decentralization” has become a buzzword in the German Energiewende discourse. Apart from
prosumage households, another dominant vision in this discussion sees a new role for prosumage
neighborhoods. This narrative circles around smart grids as tools for creating self-sufficient neighborhoods that
are largely autonomous of energy utilities and large-scale networked infrastructures. These prosumage
27 https://www.stromnetz.berlin/fur-berlin/smart-city
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neighborhoods are often portrayed as locally delimited, small-scale energy cells that defy the “old” system order,
and stand for a new distribution of responsibilities and power in the energy system. This narrative evokes notions
of ownership and self-determination, in which urban neighborhoods stand for themselves and form largely
autonomous energy “islands”. At the same time, smart grids are being portrayed as highly complex and
integrative systems that create and require extreme interdependencies, not only within neighborhoods, but
within a city-wide “network of networks” (personal interview energy start-up EUREF, 2016). In the neighborhood
context this narrative rings not of autonomy and empowerment but of control and (inter-)dependence. These
two arguably contradictory narratives are both being promoted to foster the development of smart grids and
make them attractive for cities.
In Germany, the narrative of small-scale energy cells is being promoted by institutions from the federal to the
local level. In 2015, the German national association of electronics (VDE) published a report called “The Cellular
Approach”, which describes a future energy system based on self-sufficient energy “cells” – or micro-smart grid
systems (Benz et al., 2015). These are envisioned at various scales and can consist of individual households,
streets, neighborhoods, towns, or entire cities (Benz et al., 2015: 29). Small-scale energy neighborhoods are also
envisioned by the think tank Agora Energiewende, which concludes that decentralization fosters identification
with local or regional electricity “products”, and local prosumage is based on a wide-spread “do-it-yourself”
mentality (Agora Energiewende, 2017: 142).
In the city, the idea of energy cells is built on a narrative that describes neighborhood-sized units that function
as zones for producing, using, trading and storing electricity independently. Within these zones, smart grids make
sure that renewable energy production and demand are synchronized, while local storage units ensure that
surplus energy is kept in the neighborhood system, and peer-to-peer transactions ensure that energy is traded
within a local market. These narratives build on dedicated prosumage households, and on small-scale energy
infrastructures such as solar panels, CHP plants, battery storage facilities etc. at the neighborhood level. All in all,
the neighborhood scale as inherently urban unit is evoked as independent energy management zone. These
energy neighborhoods are viewed as key for reaching Berlin’s energy and climate goals, and micro-smart grid
systems are viewed as catalyst for private investments into infrastructures and private commitment to
prosumage (Erbstößer and Müller, 2017: 9–11). To underline the importance of neighborhoods for the urban
Energiewende, the local technology foundation has hosted a workshop series called “networked energy within
neighborhoods” since 2016 (Vernetzte Energie im Quartier). Among others, it views micro-smart grid
neighborhoods as important future market places for peer-to-peer energy trading (Erbstößer and Müller, 2017:
11). The city administration envisions future smart grid neighborhoods as networked islands, especially in newly
built areas of the city (personal interview SenWEB, 2018). The Enquête-Commission seeks to build on existing
neighborhood structures and envisions the parallel refurbishment of buildings and the establishment of micro-
smart grids therein. It envisions energetically refurbished micro-smart grid neighborhoods, in which various
neighboring buildings are combined to form virtual power plants (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 79). Local smart
grids are viewed as indispensable for the use of surplus electricity and the combination of sectors (Enquête-
Kommission, 2015: 153).
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The idea of independence, empowerment and self-sufficiency is influenced by the country’s surge of (mostly
non-urban) energy cooperatives that have brought new voices into the energy discourse and distributed
responsibility away from large energy companies. These narratives of independence and self-determination are
being conjured in clear contrast to the one-size-fits-all national monopolies that prevailed in the “old” energy
system.
EUREF, TXL and Adlershof all emphasize the idea of increasing neighborhood-scale energy independence. The
smart grid project at EUREF, for example, is based on visions of a “polycentric” future energy system enabled by
a smart and highly complex electricity grid (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 4). This idea of “polycentricity”
is strongly connected to the idea of independence of the overarching grid. As a leading researcher at EUREF
states in an interview:
“We imagine a densely built industrial neighborhood that organizes 100% of its own energy on-site on
the basis of renewables - wind, solar – and even in the areas of electricity, heating and transport”
(personal interview, researcher EUREF, 2017).
„of course [EUREF] also stands as a symbol for urban development, that can pick up this
decentralization idea, and maybe the city as a whole can reinvent decentralized facilities” [personal
interview, researcher EUREF 2017).
Berlin’s future sites are promoting an imaginary of largely independent energy neighborhoods that is supposed
to be reproduced throughout other neighborhoods in the city. Here, micro-smart grid systems are being
developed with the explicit goal of managing energy outside the overarching network, and of creating largely
independent micro-smart grid solutions for replicating and scaling.
“If I operate a photovoltaic plant, for example, I imagine that a smart grid could help me increase my
own consumption and make me a little more self-sufficient” (Personal interview researcher Adlershof,
2018).
On the other hand, a contrasting narrative evokes notions of smart grids as vehicles for collaboration and sharing.
According to this narrative, smart grids are instead technologies for building collaborative communities.
“The users are supposed to participate. They are supposed to contribute, and we hope to create a
form of community that helps us move forward” (AusserGewöhnlich Berlin, 2017).
Among others, this narrative portrays smart grids as potential pillars for the creation of virtual power plants, i.e.
interconnected energy generation, storage and distribution systems that rely on flexible trading within a
(neighborhood) network. Instead of fostering independence of the grid, virtual power plants are designed to
balance the grid. The Berlin Senate therefore also speaks of neighborhoods as “services to the grid” (Enquête-
Kommission, 2015: 69). According to this narrative, smart grid neighborhoods play an important role in levelling
peak loads and stabilizing the overarching grid not least by allowing external steering mechanisms to manage
flows into and out of their networks, and thus reducing independence instead of increasing it. The Berlin Senate
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speaks of creating “synergy effects” (Berlin Senate, 2016c: 35). This narrative of integration and aggregation
stands in direct contrast to the idea of energy independence or even autarky. A leading representative of the TXL
project even sketches his vision of a neighborhood “sharing economy”, in which neighbors not only sell, but
donate or give away their excess electricity (personal interview, TXL 2017). Smart grid neighborhoods, in this
view, stand for a new and attractive form of community building (personal interview, TXL, 2017).
In sum, Berlin’s smart grid discourse is comprised of two at best complementary narratives that highlight the
independence and self-sufficiency of future energy neighborhoods on the one hand, and their integration and
subservience to the surrounding city on the other. Decentralization and prosumage feature in both narratives,
yet their qualities and social implications greatly vary.
8.2.6 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, smart grids are being dominantly framed as technical tools to a) implement the Energiewende, b)
improve energy management, c) introduce high-tech innovations, d) boost the local economy, and e) foster
decentralization and prosumage. These framings show that smart grids are universally being framed as solutions,
but to different underlying problems.
It also shows that the social challenges relating to decentralization and prosumage play a subordinate role within
the dominant techno-ecological framings of smart grids. Moreover, my analysis reveals that the visions of social
orders underlying a seemingly uniform, uncontested smart grid imaginary are actually diverse and in part
contradictory. Underneath the surface, diverging notions of decentralization and prosumage are circulating and
arguably competing for prevalence in the implementation of Berlin’s energy future. These different storylines
promote smart grids as vehicles for participative and community-centered energy transitions on the one hand,
and independence and self-sufficiency-oriented energy futures on the other. While the first storyline focuses on
empowering households and neighborhood communities to become conscious market actors in the city’s energy
system, the second storyline understands households as liabilities and neighborhoods as self-contained islands
or disconnected hubs. There is little overlap between the two. Interestingly, these contradictory storylines don’t
follow the lines of actor coalitions, but run right through institutions, projects and even documents. This reveals
an inconsistency and uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of households and urban neighborhoods in
future electricity systems.
I conclude that the term “smart grid” is still primarily associated with technical possibilities rather than social
change. While the term “smart grid” unequivocally conjures positive, hopeful yet vague visions of a low-carbon
electricity regime, there is little agreement about how to design this socio-technical system. While the technical
possibilities inherent in smart grids are clear to all actors involved, their social implications are much more
ambiguous. Smart grids are primarily viewed as technical innovations that are associated with widely shared
technical goals (such as the integration of renewable energies into the electricity system), while the necessary
social changes remain secondary and are thus left to follow.
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8.3 Classifying urban smart grids: between intelligent and unintelligible
The way different actors classify smart grids uncovers the kinds of qualities and emotions they associate with
smart grids in the city. Are they predominantly communicating excitement and hope? Or are they mostly
communicating fear and insecurity? Are certain actors leaning strongly in one of these directions or are they
carefully weighing advantages and disadvantages? Answering these questions can point to the value systems and
possible interests that underlie different actors and positions. It can further reveal possible voids and highlight
the absence of certain voices or positions in a discourse.
At all levels of my analysis, smart grids are predominantly being classified in positive, forward-looking terms. First
and foremost, smart grids are being classified as sustainable, intelligent, enabling, modern, and exciting. Next to
this dominant position, few voices also classify smart grids as highly complex, challenging and problematic.
8.3.1 Intelligent optimizers
Whether at the level of the city authorities or among researchers and electronics companies at Berlin’s future
sites, all actors in this analysis consistently associate smart grids with intelligence, using the term interchangeably
with the term ‘smart’. In its laws, masterplans, strategies and reports, the city authorities speak of “intelligent
networks” (Berlin Senate, 2015b, 2016b; Enquête-Kommission, 2015; Erbstößer and Müller, 2017), “intelligent
meters” (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 37), “intelligent measuring systems“ (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 38),
“intelligent coupling“ (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 155), “intelligent design“ (Clustermanagement
Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2017: 23), “intelligent steering“ (Erbstößer and Müller, 2017: 11) or
“intelligent load management“ (TSB Technologiestiftung Berlin, 2012: 14). Researchers at Adlershof speak of
“intelligent storage technologies” (personal interview, researcher Adlershof I, 2018) and of making the grid
“reasonable” by “adding intelligence” (personal interview, electronics company Adlershof, 2018). Researchers at
EUREF describe their objective as finding “intelligent solutions” (Forschungscampus Mobility2Grid, 2017). At TXL,
the notion of intelligence is broadened to encompass not only the grid but the entire city. An advertisement for
TXL Urban Tech Republic asks, “how can a city using smart technology and networking become an intelligent
energy sponge?” Here, the intelligence attributed to the grid is linked to the intelligence of the entire city. In
these diverse statements and analogies, smart grids are thus likened to humans in their ability to understand,
interpret and react to external impulses.
Yet ‘intelligence’ as a metaphor focuses on how smart grids are supposed to perform rather than what they do
or how they do it. Highlighting ‘intelligence’ or ‘smartness’ emphasizes the characteristics of the technology in
terms of speed or accuracy instead of bringing attention to its function or purpose (Boucher, 2021). In the case
of smart grids, this is in part mirrored by the multiplicity and resulting vagueness of the existing definitions. While
most actors agree that the grid needs to become more ‘intelligent’, there is little agreement about how grid
intelligence works (i.e. how programming is done) and what grid intelligence is for (e.g. to save money, to save
CO2, to showcase electric mobility, to sell products etc.). The use of the term ‘intelligence’ therefore sustains an
ambiguity about what smart grids are doing and why, and instead perpetuates a non-specific, hazy image.
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Moreover, the attribution of human qualities such as ‘intelligence’ or ‘smartness’ to a technology insinuates
competition between humans and technologies instead of emphasizing their necessary cooperation (Boucher,
2021). It creates a sense that technical ‘knowledge’ and technical ‘ability’ are comparable to human knowledge
and human ability. This, in turn, fosters the impression that technical ‘intelligence’ exists outside of and
independently of humans. To an extent, this fuels the notion that ‘smart’ technologies could one day ‘out-smart’
people. More importantly, however, this notion tends to sideline the fact that human beings are still responsible
for programming and operating smart technologies. It eludes the fact that even an allegedly ‘intelligent’
technology will always be run by people. The notions of ‘intelligence’ or ‘smartness’ are thus fundamentally
misleading. They suppress a precise conception of human involvement in the grid’s ‘smartness’, and how
heterogeneous this ‘smartness’ can therefore be. Instead, the notion of ‘smartness’ suggests universality, and
brushes over the multifaceted ways that ‘smartness’ can be implemented, and the multitude of purposes that
‘smartness’ can serve. In sum, it black boxes the human act of programming, including the skills and intentions
that programming involves. In doings to, it thus masks the idea that humans are responsible for how a ‘smart’
technology works and should be held accountable for its potential failings.
This black boxing is underscored by an equally vague, complementary notion of system ‘optimization’. While
most actors agree that system ‘intelligence’ serves system ‘optimization’, there is no clear-cut definition of what
an optimized system entails. What optimization means remains open to interpretation and therefore obscure.
While for most actors, system optimization is about maximizing energy-efficiency, i.e. about balancing out energy
supply with demand, for others, it is about maximizing the utilization of renewable energy supply, i.e. prioritizing
renewable energies over others. For still others, system optimization is about minimizing energy costs or
maximizing system stability (Enquête-Kommission, 2015). All these cases assume different logics of optimization
and can revolve around different types of energy (e.g. electricity, gas), different supply technologies (e.g. wind,
solar), different storage technologies (ice storage facility, lithium ion batteries), and finally different use cases
(e.g. for heating, cooling, vehicle charging). In spite of this diversity of meanings and interpretations, the term
insinuates the existence of one single, non-disputable ‘optimum’. This rings of one scientifically rational target
that can be measured in numbers and compared. Instead of inviting a differentiated conversation, this also reads
as if ‘optimization’ were a goal that can either be attained or missed. It reads as if there was one ‘optimal’ state
and as if everything else were a failure. This all-or-nothing, one-or-zero type association leaves little room for
nuance and complementarity. Although both ‘intelligence’ and ‘optimization’ are essentially blurry and
ambiguous terms, they promote a sense of straight-forward rationality that forecloses any detailed exchange.
8.3.2 Modern, exciting, innovative
At the same time, smart grids are not only regarded in rational and scientific terms, but also as exciting and
desirable, modern infrastructural ‘must-haves’ for the city of the future. They are painted as little less than the
dawning of a new world (interview, Berlin Energie, 2018) and a “compelling challenge” (interview, project
manager EUREF, 2016) for “modern energy integration” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 48), which are
rated to be “extremely important” (interview, project manager TXL, 2017) for the “energy supply of the future”
(Erbstößer and Müller, 2017: 15).
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Researchers and engineers mostly classify smart grids as exciting collaborative challenge and interesting
opportunity for techno-scientific experimentation. Most engineers involved in smart grid development at the
city’s future sites are driven by a sense of being at the cutting edge of research and development and by an
interest in advancing and exploiting the full potential of existing technological possibilities (personal interviews
with researchers at Adlershof, EUREF and TXL). Moreover, they view their work as exciting possibility to build an
attractive, interesting, modern, and highly functional technology, thinking only marginally about risks or social
consequences (personal interviews, researchers at Adlershof and EUREF). Among other things, they view smart
grid technologies as “stylish” (personal interview, public service provider, 2018), “sexy” (personal interview,
project development company at TXL, 2017), “progressive” (personal interview, researcher at EUREF, 2017) and
“cool” (personal interview, researcher at Adlershof, 2017). These attributes stand in stark contrast for example
to questions of costs, which they perceive as mundane and reactionary (“ewig gestrig”) (personal interview, ICT
entrepreneur at EUREF, 2016).
While the city government is well aware of costs, it too regards smart grids as a “sexy” technology that small and
medium sized enterprises need to be convinced of (personal interview, Berlin Senate Department for Economics,
Energy and Public Enterprises, 2018). Most engineers and researchers involved in Berlin’s future sites view smart
grids as a personal opportunity for creating something new, and the Energiewende thus takes on a quality of
being ‘the next big thing’ in technological advancement.
8.3.3 Inevitable and without alternative
These optimistic, forward-looking notions are also built around a number of fears. They convey a strong sense of
urgency and inevitability that depict smart grids as progressive technologies that are not only necessary for the
sake of the Energiewende, but to win a global race for economic competitiveness. This undertone of urgency and
inevitability also promotes the notion that smart grids are without alternative.
Berlin’s Digital Agenda, for example, describes digital technologies as Berlin’s “only chance” at securing its
economic competitiveness. There is a sense that Berlin needs to ‘catch up’ both in environmental and in
technological terms (personal interviews, project development company at TXL and public energy agency). This
is echoed by experts from Berlin’s future sites:
„New York is ahead; Amsterdam, Copenhagen are also ahead of Berlin in many points. They have a
more flexible administration, that isn’t so stuck in the 80’s and 90’s as it is here. [Their administration]
isn’t as ideological, more pragmatic” (Interview, TXL Urban Tech Republic, 2017).
Urban policy makers, researchers and businesses alike are conveying a sense that digitization is coming, and that
Berlin can either keep up with the pace of technological development or lose in the run for global
competitiveness. Asked about possible alternatives, an expert from the city’s network operator responds:
“Adobe huts. Then we won’t need electricity, we won’t need hot water; it’ll be one cold shower a
week [….] Of course, then we’ll use much less energy per person, but I don’t know if that’s really the
path Germany wants to take” (personal interview, network operator, 2018).
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Smart grids, in this expert’s view, are needed to avoid regression, underdevelopment, and cold. The city of Berlin,
in this reading, has to make a choice between being a pioneer or a loser, a world class competitor or a poor
house. There seems to be no middle ground and no time for considering possible risks or alternatives.
Only one interview partner in Berlin, notably from an environmental NGO, actually imagined possible
alternatives, asking:
“What is the goal of smart grids? If the goal of smart grids is, let’s say, climate protection, which is
actually our overarching goal; and climate protection in terms of energy use means avoidance,
efficiency, and the rest renewable; then I think there are a lot of good alternatives. You don’t need the
intelligent house; it’s a question of habits and how to address habits” (Personal interview, 2018).
Although smart grid technologies are (to some extent) necessary for integrating renewables at scale, contrary to
dominant smart and low-carbon imaginaries, the growing reliance on digitized technologies is significantly
increasing overall electricity consumption and resource use, and therefore counteracting long-term
environmental objectives (Lange and Santarius, 2018: 146). The resource intensity of smart grids (first and
foremost for servers, but possibly also for attached batteries or the like) has yet to be researched. To date, there
is no data measuring the trade-off between resource savings and resource use directly related to smart grids.
Moreover, it is well known that energy efficiency technologies tend to generate a “rebound-effect” that
threatens to cancel out any resource savings due to increased usage (Lange and Santarius, 2018). Data on the
rebound effect of smart grids is also lacking.
8.3.4 Complex, challenging and expensive
Finally, a small minority of actors in Berlin also conveys a sense that smart grids are not just a thrilling prospect,
but rather a difficult and demanding endeavor that faces numerous obstacles. They classify smart grids as
complex, challenging and - most of all - expensive.
The complexity of smart grid infrastructures and resulting difficulties are especially palpable among actors
involved in the pilot projects. Even in its proposal, the research consortium at EUREF states that “the future
electricity grid will be more complex than ever before (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 4), and that
developing it will be a “scientific, technical and social challenge” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 4). A
representative at TXL seems to be utterly overwhelmed by this same prospect:
“If we want to build a smart grid steering system that does everything we want it to do, then the
degree of complexity will quickly reach a point that is virtually uncontrollable” (interview, project
manager TXL, 2017).
The same project manager humbly calls solving this complex problem an “art” (interview, project manager TXL,
2017). Both researchers and project managers seem to confront the complexity of smart grid systems as welcome
challenge and interesting opportunity to put their research and development skills to the test. But even though
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most actors are well aware of the challenges involved in developing, implementing and testing smart grids, these
challenges play only a minor role in the city-wide smart grid discourse.
The same is true for costs, which also play a subordinate role in the discourse, but are especially relevant for a
specific group of actors, namely those involved not only in developing smart grids as researchers, but in
marketing and doing business with smart grids as entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, those interested in selling
smart grids and those faced with potentially investing in smart grids have opposing views on this issue. A
representative of an energy start-up aimed at selling its expertise in micro-smart-grid systems is especially
worried about costs as barriers to rolling out smart grids in the city: “people want to have them, but they don’t
want to pay for them” (interview, energy start-up EUREF, 2016). This concern is mirrored by the network
operator, Stromnetz Berlin, that simply dismisses the idea of smart grids as “quite expensive” and warns that
“we need to watch out that it doesn’t become too expensive” (interview, Stromnetz Berlin II, 2018). Although
these two actors share a concern about costs, this concern arises out of very different motivations. While the
start-up is eager to launch its new product and establish its new business model, the network operator is mostly
concerned with holding on to its existing product and sustaining its current business model. A leading
representative of Stromnetz Berlin therefore dismisses various of its own company’s efforts in relation to
‘smartness’ as “not necessary [….] to operate the grid” and then adds, “but we do it anyway, because we believe
that we can’t completely shut our eyes to this new development” (interview, grid operator I, 2018). This shows
that while costs might pose a critical concern in relation to smart grid implementation for incumbents and
newcomers alike, the concern comes from different directions. While the start-up complains that incentives to
invest are lacking, the network operator complains that the pressure to invest is increasing.
More fundamental concerns about the resource-intensity and thus the environmental impact of smart grids are
similarly marginal in Berlin’s discourse. These concerns are being voiced only by environmental non-profit
organizations, and only in interviews (not in any published documents). As mentioned above, they question the
trade-off between the energy use required to store and manage increased data quantities and the energy savings
gained through more efficient energy load management.
8.4 Thoughts on risks and critical absences
In conclusion, most actors in Berlin frame smart grids in positive, attractive, even urgent terms. Due to the
challenges of implementation, some actors also classify smart grids as difficult or complex, but still as clearly
desirable. The uniformity and dominance of this discourse leaves three important question marks: What about
risks? What about opposition? And what about alternatives?
While Berlin’s smart grid discourse is firmly grounded on certain fears, other risks are strikingly absent. The
dangers that are communicated, such as insufficient grid stability or lack of supply security or even the inherent
possibility of unsustainable futures, only serve to stabilize the dominant discourse. They imply that the risk lies
not in implementing smart grids, but in failing to do so. Yet other risks play a subordinate, almost negligible role.
Berlin’s smart grid discourse therefore exhibits several critical absences. It currently doesn’t address the risks or
potential problems that smart grids might entail, leaves little room for controversial discussion, and hence
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involves no real opposition. In the end, this leaves visions of Berlin’s smart grid future seemingly without
alternative.
A range of questions comes to mind in relation to digitization, from questions of data privacy and data
sovereignty to cyber crime. None of these play a notable role in Berlin’s smart grid discourse. Nor do the more
specifically smart grid related questions of resource-use or such delicate regulatory issues as steering permission.
None of these questions are prominent in the Senate’s documents or strategies, they play an insignificant role in
the pilot projects’ research design and they are only mentioned by interviewees upon explicit request. Of the
few risks that do play a minor role in the discourse, data security is most prominently, albeit ambiguously
discussed. The Berlin Senate is quite clear on this issue, especially in its New Energy for Berlin report, where it
states:
„Due to the collection of personalized data involved, the responsible handling of network data must be
ensured, and the protection of personal privacy must be guaranteed” (Enquête-Kommission, 2015:
135).
In this document, the Senate shows an awareness for the need to protect the data of the city’s energy users. In
its Smart City Strategy, the Senate adds that “without an integrated security and data privacy concept across all
levels, smart grids will be subject to significant operational hazards and acceptance related risks” (Berlin Senate,
2015b: 33). Here, data security is no longer framed as a privacy problem, but as problem for system operation
and acceptance. Indeed, of all smart grid related Senate documents, the Smart City Strategy is most outspoken
and concrete about the existence of data security issues. It urges that
“equipping IT-security in the best possible way both staff-wise and material-wise must be a matter of
course and the starting point of every smart city project. Pursuing the horizontal conjunction of
different sub-systems (for example mobility and energy in vehicle-to-grid contexts) can only be of
added value economically and for individuals under this fundamental principle” (Berlin Senate, 2015b:
34).
This strong position is part of the smart city discourse, but is only marginal in direct relation to smart grids. In a
third document, the Senate also attributes data security a “key role in securing a sustainable and economically
viable energy supply” (Clustermanagement Energietechnik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2017: 33). However, these kinds
of strong statements are not echoed by similar publications or projects directly relating to smart grids. In the
Senate’s view, data security is therefore also necessary to keep energy supply cheap and running. Its standpoint
on data security is therefore slightly ambiguous. The same is true for that of researchers at the city’s future sites.
Various researchers at Adlershof and a project manager at TXL express a certain concern about data security
when directly asked about risks related to smart grids in interviews (interviews, researcher Adlershof, 2018;
project manager, TXL 2017). At the same time, none of the three pilot projects explicitly tackle questions of data
security. Positions on data security are therefore mostly individual and intuitive rather than research based. They
range from seeing data security as an important prerequisite for the social acceptance of smart grids (interview,
researcher Adlershof, 2018) to seeing it as the users’ responsibility (interview, project manager TXL, 2017).
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A representative of an environmental NGO doubts the truthfulness of these concerns. She believes that data
gathering at the household level is, in fact, “mainly driven by the wish to scan people” (interview, environmental
NGO, 2018). This representative of an environmental NGO is obviously skeptical that data security at the
household level is even considered an objective of smart grids; or if their objective might really be data collection
instead of protection.
Even this small overview of in part contrary perspectives shows that data security is indeed an issue that most
actors are thinking about in relation to smart grids in Berlin. Yet, their standpoints largely remain at the level of
secondary, often uncommunicated and ambiguous thoughts. They are only mentioned in passing in the Senate’s
documents, they are not highlighted at the pilot projects, and therefore they are not openly - let alone
controversially - discussed within or beyond Berlin’s smart grid community.
Other data related issues, such as data integrity, data authenticity or cybercrime have even less representation
in the discourse. They are marginally mentioned in the city’s documents but are not being investigated,
developed or tested as part of any of the pilot projects. The city’s Smart City Strategy dedicates two of its thirty-
six pages to general security issues. In relation to smart grids, it states that “data integrity, data authenticity and
the availability of data in times of crisis are essential security aspects” (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 33). It does not,
however, follow up on what these terms mean or what kinds of security issues they pose. Consequently, it does
not elaborate on how these issues are supposed to be confronted. According to the glossary of the Computer
Security Resource Center of the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, data integrity is defined as
“the property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner. Data integrity covers data in storage,
during processing, and while in transit”28. Data integrity can therefore be understood as the opposite of data
corruption. In the case of smart grids, this would refer to the integrity of data on available energy production,
related energy prices and energy usage at any given time. Without data integrity, i.e. with false or inaccurate
information, smart grids might lose much of their functionality, and thus their efficiency and environmentally
related appeal. If this were the case, then ensuring data integrity in a smart grid system would seem like a
fundamental matter. The same is true for data authenticity, which is defined as a sub-category of data integrity
and means that the data in question originates from its purported source29. Without accurate and truthful
information on the origin of data, i.e. where energy is being produced and where it is being consumed, smart
grids would lose their ability to synchronize flows and thus lose one of their primary functions. Given the
importance of data related risks to the smooth and effective functioning of smart grids, the superficiality of
Berlin’s discourse on these issues is striking. Cyber crime is similarly absent from this discourse. Although it is
likewise mentioned in the Senate’s documents, it is hardly mentioned in interviews and clearly not a priority for
researchers. In its Smart City Strategy, the governmental authorities at least mention that
“in Berlin and elsewhere, modern urban society is increasingly dependent on its infrastructures.
Electricity shortages of only a few hours could fundamentally call the operability of existing systems into
question. Cyber attacks are on the rise all over the world” (Berlin Senate, 2015b: 33).
28 https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/data_integrity
29 https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authenticity
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The Senate is therefore aware of the rising risk of cyber crime. Yet, judging by the attention this issue receives in
its overall communication about smart grids, the Senate doesn’t treat this risk as equally important as the
benefits of smart grids. Moreover, protection against cyber crime is not part of any of the pilot projects. Overall,
this results in a one-sided picture of the future that smart grids might bring.
The marginal presence of ICT-related risks in Berlin’s smart grid discourse does not mean that these risks do not
exist. As my analysis has shown, it doesn’t even mean that the actors involved in Berlin’s smart grid community
aren’t aware of the risks that exist. In fact, risks play a much larger role in the smart grid discourse at the federal
level. Among others, the German Energy Agency (dena) and the Federal Agency for Information Security (BSI)
have issued detailed publications on ICT-related risks and security issues pertaining to the digitization of the
Energiewende, which focus specifically on smart grids (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
2021; Limbacher and Richard, 2018). Berlin’s public energy agency (BENA), by contrast, has not. This means that
most participants in Berlin’s smart grid discourse are choosing to prioritize benefits, potentials and hopes over
risks, insecurities and possible dangers. They are thus painting an unbalanced picture of Berlin’s smart grid future,
coloring it in positive, attractive terms while leaving out the less appealing, perhaps more controversial or even
frightening nuances. In effect, this has led to a one-sided and undisputed idea of Berlin as a future smart grid
city. It has generated no opposition and seems to leave no alternatives.
8.5 Concluding remarks: dominant storylines of Berlin as a future smart grid city
The way smart grids are being collectively defined, framed and classified by the actors promoting Berlin’s smart
grid discourse gives rise to a set of dominant, overarching storylines that are promoting techno-optimistic visions
of urban smart grid futures while ignoring certain risks and also ignoring alternatives. These storylines depict
smart grid technologies as environmental necessity and collaborative challenge that will advance urban energy
communication, transparency, flexibility, stability, and intelligence. Moreover, Berlin’s smart grid storylines are
depicting the city as a clean, convenient, collaborative, socially agreeable, innovative and economically thriving
future metropolis.
More precisely, these dominant storylines are promoting smart grids as a) environmental necessity for advancing
Berlin’s local Energiewende, b) high-tech innovation for improving energy management while maintaining
current comfort-levels, c) economic imperative to secure Berlin’s future as a thriving metropolis, d) facilitators
of energy empowerment and public participation, and finally as e) exciting experimental challenge to modernize
the city’s infrastructure. According to these dominant storylines, smart grids are not only cutting edge and
attractive, but also in the public’s environmental and economic interest. Moreover, they are urgently needed to
secure Berlin’s competitive advantage in the global race for high-skilled, high-tech jobs. These techno-positivist
storylines elevate smart grids to nothing less than a moral imperative. They are deeply rooted in a belief that
technological innovation can and will bring about desired social and environmental change (Sand and Schneider,
2017).
Yet, these positivist storylines come at the cost of a more nuanced, differentiated debate about the specific use
cases for smart grids, possible side effects and conceivable alternatives. Among others, the discourse hardly
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distinguishes between infrastructural worlds for example of heating and mobility, and their very different cultural
practices, institutional structures or governance arrangements. It doesn’t distinguish between the steps needed
to change either one or the other. Neither does it dwell on the logics inherent in the design of smart grid related
algorithms. The vagueness of the discourse keeps data and steering related issues largely black boxed. The same
is true for risks and possible alternatives. Berlin’s smart grid storylines don’t capture the potential risks built into
the digitization of this critical urban infrastructure, for example in relation to data privacy or cyber crime. In
consequence, the overarching smart grid storylines are confronted with little critique and are not competing with
any alternative storylines.
Overall, smart grid technologies evoke a fuzzy but enticing vision of urban futures that merges technological
optimism with fantasies of economic achievement and environmental health. Among others, this fuzzy vision of
a future smart grid city promotes a modern, eco-progressive “Zeitgeist” that blurs the lines between the means
and ends of “smart”: does Berlin need to advance the smart city to advance its smart grid? Or does it need a
smart grid to become a smart city?
In this chapter, I scrutinized the discourse surrounding smart grids in Berlin using Reiner Keller’s sociology of
knowledge framework of discourse analysis. This approach enabled me to unravel the various definitions, frames
and classifications that Berlin’s smart grid discourse is bringing to the fore and to distill the dominant storylines
that this discourse is promoting. In doing so, I showed the content and the meanings being attributed to smart
grids in Berlin.
In the chapter that follows, I proceed to analyze the politics inherent in Berlin’s smart grid discourse. As
elaborated in chapter 6, I do so using Hajer’s concepts of discourse coalitions (see chapter 6 “Research design
and methods”). This second analytical approach enables me to focus on the processes of discourse production,
the formation of actor coalitions and the questions of power that underlie them.
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9 The politics of experimental futuring with smart grid
infrastructures in Berlin
In the previous chapter I outlined the meanings and dominant storylines that are being promoted by Berlin’s
smart grid discourse. In this chapter, I reflect on the alliances that have formed around these storylines in the
city and the social (power) relations at play in the process. I show which different actors have gathered around
smart grids in the city, and how they have promoted Berlin’s dominant smart grid storylines, for example through
collaboration within the pilot projects or by advertising the city’s future sites. In short, this chapter analyzes the
politics inherent in Berlin’s smart grid discourse.
As outlined in my research design, I base this analysis on Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993),
which allows me to unravel the politics inherent in the production of Berlin’s dominant smart grid storylines (for
a detailed overview, see chapter 6.3 “Analyzing discourse”). Hajer defines discourse coalitions as "the ensemble
of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these storylines, and the practices through which these storylines get
expressed" (Hajer, 2006: 71). The concept of discourse coalitions enables the analysis of the relations between
the actors that are producing Berlin’s smart grid storylines and the ways they interact (or not) at the pilot
projects, the future sites or at other sites of discursive production in the city. I begin by introducing the main
actors involved in creating and maintaining the discourse and then show how they do this through research and
implementation activities at the pilot projects, through strategies for marketing the future sites and through
urban development policies and programs supported by Berlin’s city government and administration. To apply
Hajer’s concept, I asked questions such as: What are the sites of argumentative exchange, i.e. where are
arguments being voiced and where are discussions taking place? What are key incidents in the debate? What is
the sequence of events? (Hajer, 2006). By answering these questions, the concept of discourse coalitions helped
me unveil the “tactics” or power politics behind discourse production, especially when opposing parties are
struggling to dominate a discourse. Yet unlike the discourses analyzed in much of Hajer’s work, Berlin’s smart
grid discourse is not openly controversial. My findings reveal that – at least on the surface – smart grids are being
promoted by one strong discourse coalition that largely agrees on the same storylines.
Based on Hajer’s conceptual categories (Hajer, 2006), I conclude that Berlin’s urban smart grid discourse can be
viewed as structurated (i.e. the same storylines are shared by many), but it is not yet institutionalized (i.e. the
discourse has not entered the lived reality of institutions or homes). On the implementation level, this is mirrored
by the fact that smart grid technologies have not surpassed the experimental stage, let alone reached the
broader urban mainstream in Berlin.
In the chapter that follows, I discuss why Berlin’s smart grid discourse hasn’t moved beyond structuration by
unraveling the qualities and limitations of smart grids as Leitbilder and imaginaries, and their potential as means
of activating urban socio-technical change.
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9.1 Who is involved in Berlin’s smart grid experimentation and what are their roles?
This section introduces the actors involved in Berlin’s smart grid experiments at all three levels of my analysis. It
discusses how different actors are involved in producing, reproducing and transforming Berlin’s imagined smart
grid futures. This section thus primarily aims at laying out and illustrating the communications, activities and
positionings of Berlin’s smart grid community.
The following institutions are involved in smart grid experimentation in Berlin and thus actively involved in
creating Berlin’s smart grid discourse. They can be divided into seven categories: the acting grid operator, city
government and administration, the new public utility company, the scientific community, project developers,
ICT companies, and NGOs (see chapter 6.5 “Data collection”). National institutions, such as the German
Association of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Information Technology (Verband der Elektrotechnik,
Elektronik, Informationstechnik – VDE), the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur - BNetzA) or the
Institute for Applied Ecology (Öko-Institut) play an important role in Germany’s national smart grid discourse
(similar to the IEEE internationally), but are not as closely linked to the smart grid discourse pertaining specifically
to the city of Berlin. For this project, national level discourses are treated as context, rather than part of the
investigation.
9.1.1 The acting grid operator
The city’s long-term grid operating company, Stromnetz Berlin, is in a powerful position to negotiate or even
instigate changes to the “smartness” of Berlin’s electricity grid. As incumbent, however, Stromnetz Berlin is
contributing to Berlin’s Energiewende and its smart grid discourse in ambiguous ways. It is primarily committed
to guaranteeing steady and reliable energy supply for its customers. It views itself as centralized controller that
is dedicated to keeping the city “alive” by keeping energy supply secure and flowing (Interview, Stromnetz Berlin
2018). First and foremost, it is committed to an ethics of keeping the city functional and running. Instead of
clearly positioning itself towards Berlin’s Energiewende, the grid operator views its own role as neutral platform
that is neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ the integration of renewable energies. As a leading representative states: „we
are a platform, a conductor, we are not per se environmentally friendly or unfriendly” (Interview, Stromnetz
Berlin, 2018).
The grid operator takes the same ambiguous position towards smart grids. Even though Stromnetz Berlin
advertises smart grids as “electricity grids of the future”30, the company does not consider smart grids necessary
for operating electricity flows, but rather as “add-ons” that are being pushed by outside market forces. For
Stromnetz Berlin the term “smart grid” describes an electricity grid that is equipped with digital control
mechanisms on all voltage levels, and which therefore has the capacity to react intelligently to user demands. In
the grid operator’s view, both is already the case (Interview, Stromnetz Berlin 2018). For Stromnetz Berlin, the
electricity grid is already “smart”, and initiatives to integrate more ICT present an unnecessary effort and an
unwelcome disturbance to the company’s operations. These micro-smart-grid initiatives start where the
company’s responsibility ends, namely behind the meter. On its website, it simply calls micro-smart-grids
30 https://www.stromnetz.berlin/technik-und-innovationen/smart-grid
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customer installations31. This shows that in spite of its powerful position, the Stromnetz Berlin currently displays
little interest in changing how the grid is technically equipped or by whom it is managed.
At the same time, the company is cautiously and strategically on guard for anything happening through “outside
market forces” (Interview, Stromnetz Berlin 2018). In the past years, the grid operator has come under increased
pressure not only to back down from grid operation, but to innovate its technologies and its business model in
favor of more “smartness”. It has been confronted with a growing political commitment to integrating renewable
energies and electric vehicles into Berlin’s electricity system and thus to adapt to the idea of making the grid
“smart”. Among others, the grid operator has reacted to these pressures by becoming part of at least one of
Berlin’s pilot projects and publicly facing up to discussions about its role and responsibilities. As business partner
of the Mobility2Grid project, the company is claiming an active role in Berlin’s smart grid research and
development process, and is regularly represented at project conferences and other public events on campus.
Stromnetz Berlin is thus actively involved in crafting Berlin’s smart grid discourse. At the same time, a
representative of Stromnetz Berlin admits to its passive role in Berlin’s smart grid process: “Innovation
management in my unit is driven by external influences” (interview, Stromnetz Berlin 2018).
Most importantly, however, Stromnetz Berlin spent many years actively opposing the city’s attempt to regain
public ownership of the grid. Since 2014, the company continuously resisted every step of of the Senate’s bidding
process. Only in 2021, after seven years of stalling, the company stepped back from the tendering process, thus
clearing the way for public grid ownership and operation. At the time of writing, the grid is still in the company’s
hands. Although Stromnetz’s long resistance was only marginally related to the question of making the grid
smart, it shows how strongly Stromnetz Berlin is clinging to its long-term position as incumbent grid operator
and its reluctance to reinvent or renegotiate its role within Berlin’s energy system.
9.1.2 The ambiguous public administration
Berlin’s public authorities are historically divided into district and city governments. Questions of authority and
responsibility are therefore often complicated. At the administrative level, the responsibility for supporting the
development of Berlin’s local smart grid infrastructures lies mostly with the Senate Department for the Economy,
Energy and Businesses (SenWEB). SenWEB is not only responsible for all city-wide issues relating to renewable
energies, the energy industry, and digital infrastructures, but also for the development of Berlin’s future sites.
While in theory all issues relating to climate protection and climate change adaption fall under another Senate
Department’s authority – the Department for the Environment, Transport and Climate Protection (SenUVK) –
SenWEB effectively concentrates many relevant responsibilities. Even though the Senate Department for the
Environment oversees the implementation of Berlin’s Energy and Climate Protection Program (BEK 2030), the
Senate Department for the Economy is responsible for its most important component, namely energy. Energy
and climate issues have only been separated administratively since 2016, when the current city government took
office. Since then, both SenUVK and SenWEB have been headed by Senators from the Green Party. Under their
leadership, climate protection and Berlin’s urban energy transition have become high priorities on the
31 https://www.stromnetz.berlin/einspeisen/micro-grids
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government’s agenda. Yet, through the administrative separation of energy and climate issues, energy has
arguably been viewed more through an economic than an environmental lens. While SenWEB is truly dedicated
to transforming the city’s energy infrastructures, it is likewise devoted to helping the city profit from its urban
Energiewende.
As a cross-sectional topic, smart grids are not assigned to any specific division within the Senate Department,
which means that there is no designated contact person for smart grid issues in the entire administration.
Instead, smart grid related issues are broadly assigned to SenWEB’s division for Energy, Digitization and
Innovation. Actors involved in smart grid implementation criticize the absence of a clear responsibility, and – as
a consequence – the borders of the administration’s “responsibility silos” (interview, energy start-up, EUREF,
2016). A representative of an energy start-up at EUREF Campus explicitly complains that “you can’t be in a dialog
with the city […] that’s the reality. You can’t talk to the city. With this city absolutely not, it doesn’t work, the city
consists of 1000 different [….] Okay, of course, we’re in a discourse […] we participate everywhere, we are invited
everywhere, we lecture everywhere […] but you can’t talk to the city […] No, that doesn’t work. That’s not a
dialog partner in this development” (interview, energy start-up EUREF, 2016).
Instead of actively participating in smart grid implementation at the pilot projects, SenWEB views its role mostly
in identifying and supporting meta-level “lighthouse” projects, for example as part of the future sites. Among
others, it does this by hosting the managing office for all 11 of Berlin’s future sites, where it concentrates all
relevant publicity and marketing activities. The administration has also outsourced direct management of the
future sites in this analysis to the project management companies WISTA Management and Tegel Projekt GmbH,
and is therefore far removed from concrete smart grid developments in the city. Actors actively participating in
existing “lighthouse” projects, such as the pilot project at EUREF Campus, thus tend to view the administration
as a disinterested, uninformed obstacle to smart grid development in the city.
9.1.3 The new public utility company, Berlin Energie
The new public utility company, Berlin Energie, was founded in 2012 for the sole purpose of regaining the
concession to operate the city’s gas and electricity networks. In 2013, the state-owned company joined forces
with the citizen-led cooperative, BürgerEnergieBerlin, and submitted a bid in the tendering process. In 2014, this
public-private consortium won the bid for tenders. However, the current concession holder, Vattenfall, appealed
against the decision in court, stalling the process for a period of over seven years. Only in 2021, Vattenfall
unexpectedly withdrew its appeal and backed down from the tendering process. In effect, Berlin Energie has
been waiting to take over grid management for almost a decade.
In the meantime, the small state-owned company has taken on a role as advocate for transforming Berlin’s
energy system, especially regarding combining the city’s electricity, gas, and district heating grids. According to
its website, Berlin Energie is dedicated to making these grids smart, and transparently managing all data collected
in the process. The company’s managing director campaigns for these goals at public events, such as the Berlin
Energy Days (Berliner Energietage) or at open houses (Tage der offenen Tür).
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The company is not actively involved in any of the three smart grid pilot projects in this investigation. Yet, as my
interviewee confirms, the company envisages the large-scale implementation of power-to-gas and power-to-
heat infrastructures in Berlin in the future. The same interviewee is convinced that the grid operator could and
should be allowed to control both energy production and distribution, i.e. BerlinEnergie argues for rebundling
the electric grid system. Overall, as long as grid operation remained firmly in Vattenfall’s hands, BerlinEnergie’s
role was that of a small, rather toothless tiger.
9.1.4 The scientific community
Although smart grids are often claimed to be technically mature, in Berlin their development involves various
scientific challenges, and is therefore driven by research interests and institutions. Since the term ‘smart grids’ is
understood very broadly, existing research spans a wide range of topics from bi-directional loading to market
design to the social acceptance of smart meters. Many smart grid applications are indeed not new; yet their
combination still raises technical and/or political issues.
The two smart grid pilot projects in this investigation are research driven and aimed at tackling some of these
issues; these are the pilot projects at Technology Park Adlershof and at EUREF Campus. Both projects were
initiated and are headed by research consortia and are financed to a large part with public research funding.
They involve some of the city’s most prominent research institutions, including Berlin Technical University (TU
Berlin), Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) and the University of Applied Sciences (HTW) as well as research
institutions from outside the city, such as Freiburg-based Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems
(Fraunhofer ISE) and the Karlsruhe-based Research Center for Information Technology (FZI). Berlin Technical
University (TU Berlin) and Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) play especially prominent roles in in these two
research driven projects. They represent two areas of Berlin’s spectrum of scientific expertise: the engineering
sciences and the social sciences. It is worth mentioning that both projects, though predominantly focused on
solving engineering challenges, are significantly informed by social science scholarship.
Researchers at the pilot projects view their role as inventors, as conceptualizers, and as problem solvers
(interview researcher, EUREF, 2017). Researchers have indeed acted as intellectual pioneers of the smart grid
pilot projects and thus of smart grid development in Berlin. Other consortium members understand their role as
a kind of radical low-voltage guerilla: “Yes, we are the radicals in this system at the uncontrollable low-voltage
level” (interview, energy start-up, 2016).
Yet, their influence on actual project implementation has been limited. Their impetus to implement micro-smart-
grids systems in and outside of the future sites has been rather complicated and slow. As a result, it remains
unclear whether a smart grid ever existed at EUREF Campus. Researchers depend on funding from federal
institutions and on cooperation with private companies. Moreover, they also depend on the availability of
physical space for implementing their project ideas. The research community therefore depends on the project
management companies that manage the future sites. Inspite of its role as accelerator of Berlin’s smart discourse,
the scientific community largely depends on external funding and property to actualize its visions. The scientific
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community therefore plays an important role in activating and sustaining Berlin’s smart grid discourse but is
limited in its power to carry this discourse into the broader urban fabric.
9.1.5 Project development companies
Carrying stories into the broader urban fabric is the job of the project developers. Berlin’s smart grid discourse is
also being influenced by three project management companies that are responsible for managing and developing
the three future sites. These are EUREF AG (at EUREF Campus), WISTA Management GmbH (at Technology Park
Adlershof) and Tegel Projekt GmbH (at TXL Urban Tech Republic). While EUREF AG is a privately-owned company,
WISTA Management GmbH is commissioned by the Senate, and Tegel Projekt GmbH is a direct subsidiary of
WISTA. The latter two therefore work under governmental directives, and act as direct links between the smart
grid pilot consortia and the city administration. WISTA Management GmbH and EUREF AG are also both members
of the smart grid consortia at their respective campuses, although they hardly participate in the day-to-day
research and development activities. Their main job is to manage and market the future sites, whether in their
own or in the city’s interest. This includes communicating with the public, attracting businesses and negotiating
with research institutions. For advertising purposes, they each cultivate site-specific corporate identities,
maintain websites, and regularly organize public events. The project developers incorporate smart grids and
smart grid related artefacts into these advertising campaigns to varying degrees.
EUREF AG has used smart grids and smart grid related artefacts as core features of its marketing activities ever
since the Mobility2Grid project kicked off in 2011. Since then, smart grids have formed an integral part of the
developer’s campus advertising. This is in part because the campus is relatively small, and the smart grid project
therefore occupies a large portion of the campus’ overall area and involves numerous campus related
institutions. The marketing activities mostly circle around the physical smart grid infrastructures that are
presented on campus in catchy, interesting ways. These infrastructures are provided by different partners of the
research consortium, and EUREF AG uses them to present the campus via photos on its website, during campus
tours, and through activities at public events. For example, the company demonstrates electric vehicles and
different types of loading stations at public events or shows a small wind energy generation plant that is set up
at street level during campus tours. Even though my research reveals that the project developer shows
skepticism and even outright contempt for the pilot activities, the company publicly advertises the micro-smart-
grid and related technologies as “groundbreaking” and among its so-called “EUREF stars”32.
WISTA Management GmbH and Tegel Projekt GmbH use smart grids and smart grid related infrastructures to
promote their future sites in less conspicuous, less specific ways. In the case of Adlershof, this is arguably because
the smart grid pilot project is much smaller compared to the overall size of the Technology Park, involves fewer
participants and is therefore much less significant compared to the many other institutions and projects being
pursued on campus simultaneously. Here, smart grids are thus only one of many other technologies, institutions
and topics that dominate the site’s public image. In the case of TXL Urban Tech Republic, this is likely due to the
project’s ten-year period of uncertainty, and because none of the envisaged infrastructures have yet been built.
32 https://euref.de/en/euref-campus_en/#zeemobasemicro-smart-grid
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At both sites, smart grids are therefore used to feed into a broader narrative that brings “innovation and
sustainability”, “economy and ecology” together33.
Overall, the project development companies use smart grid research and implementation projects as interesting
and potentially helpful tools for marketing their sites as future-oriented, business-friendly and sustainable
spaces, but smart grids are not central or even necessary for this endeavor. Nevertheless, in their role as
managers and advertisers of the future sites, the project developers play a crucial role in embedding visions of
smart grid futures in a greater urban storyline, and for carrying this storyline into the broader public. In fact,
EUREF AG recently launched a second EUREF Campus in Düsseldorf where it boasts to be implementing an
“innovation campus” and “mobility research hub” to show that “the Energiewende can be done and financed”34.
A representative of EUREF AG therefore sees his role as that of businessperson, visionary and pioneer: “I’m really
a little bit like Elon Musk” (interview, project development company EUREF; 2016), he says. With or without
smart grids, the project development companies are powerful voices in Berlin’s landscape of urban techno-
scientific experimentation.
9.1.6 ICT and electronics companies
ICT and electronics companies are involved in the pilot projects, because they are interested in opening new
markets for their products. They view the potential to digitize electric grids like the potential to digitize all areas
of city life as progress and as opportunity. Their focus as project partners is therefore to understand the
technology and to push it. They are primarily interested in expanding their knowledge of specific ICT
technologies, which are already part of their portfolio, and which they are interested in expanding. A
representative of an international ICT company very clearly outlines their company’s role as followers:
“I would say that [the company] has no strategic orientation yet, for example, to systematically
develop anything with a partner; from the company’s perspective one would always say, if Vattenfall
has a smart grid project, then we are ready and willing to contribute the infrastructure. If it’s the
public utility, we do the same” (interview, ICT company, 2018).
This statement clearly shows that ICT companies are lined up to contribute smart grid technologies but not
interested in being their forerunners. If others take the lead, they will follow. The same representative states
that “the colleagues from sales […] are always quickly interested in the fast revenue goals, not so much in long-
term development partnerships” (interview, ICT company, 2018).
9.1.7 Civil society organizations (BUND, BürgerEnergieBerlin)
Civil society organizations are only marginally involved in smart grid experimentation in Berlin. Although they are
not directly involved in the pilot projects, civil society organizations have strongly influenced Berlin’s electric grid
politics in the past years. Most importantly, BürgerEnergieBerlin, the cooperative that successfully campaigned
33 https://www.adlershof.de/en/news/the-minus-sign-represents-something-positive/
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and then bid against the incumbent grid operator has strongly influenced Berlin’s electric grid politics, and thus
the grid discourse. However, BürgerEnergieBerlin primarily advocates for public participation in managing the
electric grid; not so much for the implementation of smart grids. The cooperative sees its role in ensuring
transparency and public participation and holding the grid operator publicly accountable rather than overseeing
the implementation of smartness into the grid. In sum, BürgerEnergieBerlin is only marginally involved in Berlin’s
smart grid discourse.
9.1.8 Concluding remarks: few powerless pioneers, many opportunists and an ambiguous administration
As this overview shows, the broad coalition of experts that has formed around the idea of smart grids in the city
has emerged despite an array of different interests and agendas. It unites unlikely allies under one discursive
umbrella that each display very different motivations and are equipped with varying degrees of power. As a
result, all actors find themselves in a reactive, following role, whether by choice or by force.
The discourse coalition is headed by a scientific vanguard of “thought leaders” (Levenda, 2016) and followed by
a reluctant majority of sustainability opportunists and ambiguous facilitators. The scientific community is willing
to take the lead but lacks the mandate and the financial ability to move forward on its own. The research
consortia are the driving forces behind the pilot projects and thus strongly involved in shaping visions of Berlin’s
smart grid futures. They have powerful voices in the discourse coalition but have little influence over the broader
smart grid system, because they depend on federal research money and project developers for support.
Meanwhile, the network operator has the position and the financial ability but lacks the willingness to go forward
and take the lead. The network operator has a unique position of power in Berlin’s smart grid discourse coalition
but is not driving the discourse out of fear of losing power and revenue. The newly founded public utility
company, by contrast, has no power over the grid and has instead been forced into a position of waiting. The
project developers have supported the pilot projects and are responsible for marketing the future sites, which
gives them a strong, but slightly ambiguous voice in the discourse. They use smart grids as entry points for
marketing the smart city more generally and are driven mostly by economic concerns. Finally, incumbent ICT
companies with the financial ability lack incentives. ICT and electronics companies are interested in selling their
technology, but not in the driver’s seat; they are going with the flow. While they might be pushing for smart grid
technologies internationally, their influence on the discourse in Berlin is rather marginal. Civil society
organizations have taken a strong leadership position in the city-wide discourse about re-instating public
ownership of the grid but have little to say about smartness. In this situation, the public authorities see
themselves as moderators rather than drivers of smart grids. The Berlin Senate is reserved when it comes to
Berlin’s smart grid futures.
Among other, this shows that smart grids work as common reference points for researchers and businesses,
energy and ICT companies, project developers and public administrators despite their diverging institutional
logics, cultures and objectives. Even beyond the day-to-day collaboration at the pilot projects, Berlin’s smart grid
storylines thus prove open and flexible enough to incorporate various vantage points and priorities, yet specific
enough to drive different actors in a common (discursive) direction. However, this broadness is also a deficit. It
disguises a lack of clarity about the ultimate goals and possible pathways towards these goals, i.e. a lack of
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political leadership, which has resulted in a general “wait-and-see” attitude. Everybody seems to have stakes in
smart grids, but nobody is taking the lead. It therefore comes as no surprise that in spite of a seemingly strong
and unified vision of the future smart grid city, material smart grid implementation has hardly travelled beyond
the borders of the pilot projects. Berlin’s discourse on smart grids remains marginal even though smart grids are
being developed, tested, and showcased at various future sites, backed by policy documents and promoted by
corporate advertisements. Yet the discourse about smart grids has not reached the general public. Unlike
adjacent discourses, for example about Berlin as a smart city, Berlin’s urban Energiewende, or even Berlin’s
electricity grid, the specific discourse about making Berlin’s grid smart remains confined to a relatively small
community of experts.
9.2 The politics of experimental “futuring” with smart grid infrastructures
In the previous chapter, I showed that the discursive dynamics of Berlin’s smart grid futures are being created by
a combination of research and implementation practices at the smart grid pilot projects, the city’s science and
technology centered future sites and by political policies and programs (see chapter 8 “Analyzing Berlin’s smart
grid discourse”). The sites, actors and types of discourse production are mutually reinforcing each other to create
a dominant smart grid discourse coalition and dominant storylines of Berlin as a future smart grid city. As
described in chapter 8, these dominant storylines promote smart grids as a) environmental necessity for
advancing Berlin’s local Energiewende, b) high-tech innovation for improving energy management while
maintaining current comfort-levels, c) economic imperative to secure Berlin’s future as a thriving metropolis, d)
facilitators of energy empowerment and public participation, and finally as e) exciting experimental challenge to
modernize the city’s infrastructure. These largely coherent and uncontested storylines of Berlin’s smart grid
futures are being produced by an unlikely coalition of public and private, corporate and research actors, and are
developing largely without controversy. Moreover, these dominant storylines fail to address risks and are muting
the discussion about possible alternatives (for the detailed analysis, see chapter 8 “Analyzing Berlin’s smart grid
discourse”).
This raises three main questions, which I explore in the following chapter: How are the design and practices of
urban experimentation shaping Berlin’s dominant smart grid storylines (and not others)? How are different
actors using urban experimentation to advance these storylines? And lastly, how is urban experimentation
therefore contributing to broader urban smart grid related change? The following chapter therefore addresses
the politics of envisioning Berlin’s smart grid futures, especially through urban experimentation.
To understand how Berlin’s dominant smart grid storylines are emerging under the specific circumstances of the
city’s experimental landscape, and how different actors are using urban experimentation to advance these
storylines, I now analyze the interplay between Berlin’s smart grid pilot projects, the city’s future sites and the
broader urban development policies and programs that they are embedded in. I show how the interplay between
different types and levels of smart grid discourse production (i.e. policy narratives, corporate marketing
strategies, research and development initiatives) are mutually reinforcing each other, and which role the pilot
projects, future sites and urban policy play in this process.
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This section does not, however, analyze the processes of day-to-day collaboration at the pilot projects. It does
not cover instances of discourse production that occurred in the context of internal project meetings. Because
this analysis is not based on ethnographic research, I do not make any statements about how different
definitions, positions, or arguments developed between project stakeholders internally.
9.2.1 What is urban experimentation?
In the introduction to this dissertation, I laid out that smart grid technologies are currently still in the making,
and that pilot versions are being developed and implemented at experimental sites in cities (see chapter 1.3
“Smart grids at urban labs”). This experimental approach is embedded in the growing interest of city
governments to initiate and govern energy and sustainability transitions, for example by supporting the
development of “green” technological innovations in experimental “urban labs”. Urban governments are
increasingly exploring ways to actively steer infrastructural change and are increasingly building on urban
experimental approaches to do so. These approaches build at least in part on experiences from the business
world, where novel technologies are commonly trialed with potential users under “real-life” conditions to test
and adapt them for better marketability. According to Bulkeley et al (2019), the readiness to experiment with
urban futures can be attributed to the rising overall awareness for the need to protect the climate, an increasing
uncertainty about how to do so, and an ever more flexible, adaptive and participatory understanding of urban
planning and urban governance, that has developed over the past decades and is increasingly being translated
into practice (Bulkeley et al., 2019: 318). Especially urban energy and infrastructural transitions are increasingly
being implemented within and through such spatially delimited sites of urban experimentation (Bulkeley et al.,
2013; Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Evans et al., 2016; Evans and Karvonen, 2014; Hoffman, 2011). These
sites are seen as ways to create the necessary knowledge for promoting grander societal change, especially in
contexts of uncertainty, or “indeterminate futures” (Edwards and Bulkeley, 2018: 352). They are often explicitly
aimed at triggering broader societal change by “scaling-up” or “rolling out” new infrastructural solutions (Potjer,
2019). Often these processes of experimenting are not the matter of politicians and urban administrations alone,
but increasingly involve a diverse range of stakeholders, from private businesses and universities to local grass
roots organizations (Blanchet, 2015). Due to their proliferation, experimentation in urban labs has arguably
become a new form of urban governance (Bulkeley et al., 2019; Caprotti and Cowley, 2017).
The idea of publicly experimenting in “urban labs” merges ideas from different research traditions that have
evolved in parallel and are increasingly overlapping. These are science studies on the one hand, and innovation
studies on the other. The idea of urban experimentation is based in part on the deconstruction of the scientific
lab as closed, placeless, “objective” and value-free environment, and on the acknowledgement that scientific
processes of knowledge production are deeply enmeshed with the interests and values of those involved. It is
therefore based on the idea of co-producing knowledge with actors from outside the scientific community
(Jasanoff, 2004). The German sustainability research community is strongly influenced by these insights from
science studies, which focus on the role of researchers in promoting sustainability related change, and on an
understanding of researchers as partners in collaborative processes of knowledge production rather than mere
external observers. This idea of promoting experimental labs as spaces of collaborative knowledge production of
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course resonates with the idea of introducing experimental niches to challenge existing socio-technical regimes
(see section 4.6 “How do infrastructures change?”). Although experimentation lies at the heart of the urban lab
rhetoric, Bulkeley and Castán Broto find that most urban labs “do not use experiment in the formal scientific
sense of the term but rather to signify purposive interventions in which there is a more or less explicit attempt
to innovate” (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013: 363). Experimental interventions are often loosely set up to
enable “learning by doing” in spatially and temporally bounded ways and aimed at applying whatever lessons
can be learned to a broader scale (Caprotti and Cowley, 2017: 1442).
Urban experimental constructs indeed go by multiple names and are built around different underlying concepts,
from real-world laboratories, innovation spaces, transition labs, real-world experiments, living laboratories, test
beds to urban labs. In the German context, the Federal Minstry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) defines
“real-world laboratories” as “regulatory sandboxes” that are “temporally and geographically bounded sites for
testing innovative technologies or business models under real-life conditions” (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
und Energie, 2019: 7). BMWi thus emphasizes technological innovation, business and regulatory learning but
remains vague regarding the design of these learning processes, the types of actors involved, and the types of
technologies in question. By contrast, scholars from the German sustainability research field explicitly focus on
sustainability related learning processes and sustainability related change. They conceptualize urban “living labs”
as transformative and transdisciplinary research programs that are aimed at promoting sustainability, and
designed to optimize processes of co-production, co-design and co-evaluation in geographically defined spaces
(Rose et al., 2019). In this conceptualization, the scientific community plays a key role in collaborating with
practitioners in an explicit effort to bring about sustainability related change. In an attempt to systematize
different understandings and make them useful for the study of urban governance, Karvonen and van Heur
(2014) conclude that “urban living labs” boil down to three common characteristics: local situatedness,
contingency and change-orientation. Bulkeley et al (2019) add that urban living labs must contain participatory
elements, display “alternative modes of leadership and ownership to those found in traditional private sector
projects or urban planning processes” (Bulkeley et al., 2019: 319) and involve some sort of institutionalized
monitoring and evaluation process.
Implicitly or explicitly, these conceptualizations all involve the idea of envisioning alternative futures,
demonstrating them in public and expanding them across time and space. Karvonen and van Heur (2014) make
an important point when they argue that experimentation in urban labs is as much about producing scientific or
technical knowledge as it about publicly performing and pursuing certain narrative strategies to persuade an
audience. Urban labs are therefore not necessarily about open-ended experimenting, but also about goal-
oriented showing, telling and steering. For the same reason, Jasanoff (2015) understands experimental sites not
only as sites of knowledge performance but also of political performance (Jasanoff, 2015: 10). They are public
exhibits that are aimed at effectively sparking and spreading certain discourses in the public arena (Hajer and
Versteeg, 2019). Hajer and Versteeg (2019) therefore also understand living labs as “technique of futuring”. In
urban lab settings, these techniques can include technical standardization processes, corporate advertisements,
artistic interventions or the creation of lived experiences (Pelzer and Versteeg, 2019).
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Although these performances are often accompanied by a rhetoric of radical innovation and system change, they
can also perpetuate dominant worldviews and reify existing (socio-technical) regimes. They can privilege certain
discourses of the future over others, and thus solidify existing power relations. Research has shown that urban
lab approaches are not necessarily as radical as their claims, and can very well disguise developmental “business
as usual” (Marvin et al., 2018).
As Berlin’s city government designates more and more spaces as experimental urban labs, these spaces, too, are
becoming important sites of urban governance, where Berlin’s urban futures are not only imagined but
materialized (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Engels and Münch, 2015; Evans et al., 2016). Understanding how these urban
labs are designed, which practices they encourage, and which types of visions they produce can then unravel
what kinds of urban electricity futures are being stimulated or suppressed and how.
9.2.2 Berlin’s pilot projects as demonstrators of entrepreneurial smart grid futures
The way smart grid technologies are being negotiated, technically trialed and publicly demonstrated within and
through Berlin’s pilot projects has helped create the dominant storylines of Berlin as a future smart grid city. The
pilot projects have created a space for transdisciplinary expert exchange on the topic, forging (discursive) bonds
between actors from different backgrounds and sensitizing them to each other’s perspectives. Moreover, they
have materialized the abstract smart grid idea into visible, tangible and usable artefacts and thus created a
reference point for actors to gather around, and a concrete “thing” for the public to touch and see. By way of
materialization, smart grids are thus being translated into an emotional experience and a thrilling, entertaining,
sensual adventure.
As I elaborated in the introduction to my case study, the pilot projects and the future sites in this analysis are at
very different stages of development (see chapter 7 “Introduction to my case study Berlin”). This is especially
true for their different levels of material smart grid implementation. While various material representations have
been developed at the “Research Campus Mobility2Grid” and the “Energienetz Adlershof” projects, nothing at
all has materialized at the “Low-Exergy Network” project. For my analysis of the discursive production of smart
grids at the level of the pilot projects, I therefore focus solely on the “Research Campus Mobility2Grid” and the
“Energienetz Adlershof” projects. For my analysis at the level of the future sites, I analyze all three, namely EUREF
Campus, Technology Park Adlershof and TXL Urban Tech Republic.
Both the “Mobility2Grid Research Campus” and the “Energienetz Adlershof” projects can be considered urban
living labs in the sense that they are locally situated, change-oriented and at least in part contingent. They are
“inclusive, practice-based and challenge-led initiative[s] designed to promote system innovation through social
learning under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity” (Sengers et al., 2019: 161). Both projects are also
technological niches in the sense that both the M2G and the Energienetz projects are headed by research
institutions and funded under research funding schemes, which shields them from the usual market pressures
and enables them to focus on processes of collaboration, knowledge production and learning. Unlike purely
commercial endeavors, the projects are governed by the logics of “co-creation and empowerment of multiple
stakeholders in co-shaping of the experimental approach in a ‘triple’ or ‘quadruple’ helix mode of bringing
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science, policy, business and civil society together” (Bulkeley et al., 2016a: 14). This also involves continuous
cycles of monitoring and evaluation aimed at identifying regulatory obstacles to smart grid integration, and at
giving advice on the possibilities and obstacles for upscaling smart grid solutions to other spatial entities in and
outside the city of Berlin. Like other urban living labs, both projects are conceived in part as testing grounds, and
in part as blueprints for other facilities, neighborhoods, cities and regions. Under the protective realm of the
spatially and temporally bounded “lab”, they are supposed to render results that are scalable and can be broadly
disseminated.
The projects are conceived both as experimental laboratories and as demonstration spaces, i.e. as spaces where
visions of smart grids are not only developed but also exposed to the public. For this reason, the consortia refer
to their projects as “field test” (Technische Universität Berlin, 2012: 6), “trial” (Forschungscampus Mobility2Grid:
2)and “real-life laboratory” (Bschorer et al., 2019; Gegner and Knie, 2020), and also as “reference neighborhood
(Forschungscampus Mobility2Grid: 2), “model” (Bschorer et al., 2019), and “experiential and demonstration
space” (Gegner and Knie, 2020). Both projects contain elements of testing smart grid infrastructures in open-
ended, contingent search processes, and elements of demonstrating their results as models for replication. Both
M2G and Energienetz are thus guided as much by experimental openness as by predetermination. They clearly
aim not only at testing, but at proving the technological feasibility of infrastructural integration through smart
grids, at convincing relevant actors and ultimately at multiplying their solutions throughout the city.
Figure 17: Ice storage facility at ZPO © TU Berlin (left) and cooling network being connected to ZPO ©
Energienetz Adlershof (right)
To increase the public visibility of their smart grid visions, both project consortia have created material
manifestations of smart grid infrastructures and have partnered with private companies to demonstrate and
showcase them to a broader public. They have both installed showrooms as interfaces between their research
process, material smart grid infrastructures and the public. Because the smart grid visions developed within the
Energienetz project concern heating and cooling, and those developed at M2G concern mobility, their material
manifestations greatly vary. The smart energy management system of the Energienetz project integrates a
photovoltaic plant with a cooling energy network, including a brine network as well as an aquifer and an ice
storage facility as energy retainers. This smart grid system synchronizes the energy supply from the photovoltaic
plant and three (conventionally powered) compression refrigeration machines with the cooling energy demand
of a total of eight laboratory buildings. Large engineering infrastructures such as water tanks, re-cooling units,
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absorber chambers and pipelines for brine distribution therefore dominate the physical appearance of this smart
grid system. Most of these technical artefacts are located inside or outside the various laboratory buildings,
where they are not staged or performed in any engaging way, but designed for purely functional purposes.
Figure 18: Newly constructed cooling distribution system with information point © TU Berlin
To demonstrate and explain certain parts of this system to a broader public, the project consortium has instead
built a special “demonstration pavilion”. This small, greenhouse-like building serves specifically to test and
showcase the extraction of brine as storage for excess heating energy, and is regularly used as demonstration
object to explain the research and its results to the interested public. Apart from these physical smart grid
installations, the Energienetz project consortium has also created an interactive mobile phone application that
invites the public to explore smart grids by answering quiz questions, earning points and playfully advancing in
five stages from “beginner” to “energy manager” (Bschorer et al., 2019). The app explains smart grids to
individual consumers in fun, visually attractive and motivating ways. It breaks down the complexity of smart grid
technologies and makes them accessible for (future) end users for the sake of actively engaging them. In sum,
the Energienetz project has built the majority of its technical infrastructures in rather sober and functional ways,
sidelining these artefacts with a few showcases that focus mainly on information rather than on emotion or
entertainment.
Figure 19: Demonstration pavilion from the outside (left) and the inside (right) © Energienetz Adlershof
By contrast, the M2G consortium has put significantly more emphasis on outside representation and the creation
of positive “smart grid experiences”. In concert with large ICT companies such as Schneider Electric and the
project development firm, EUREF AG, the consortium has installed physical smart grid infrastructures for
presentation to the public in highly visible and attractive ways. Among others, it has installed small wind energy
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generation plants at the top of the Gasometer that generate little electricity but are visible from afar, and built
numerous electric vehicle charging stations that are generously distributed across campus and regularly used by
EUREF AG’s CEO to park and exhibit his expensive Tesla limousines. The branded charging stations are covered
by a roof made of transparent solar panels that offers a close-up underneath view of photovoltaic technology
and provides welcome shade on hot summer days. These physical artefacts are aesthetically designed and
carefully staged to create an atmosphere of comfort, high-tech modernity and even luxury. Moreover, the
consortium has created a showroom that offers a glimpse of behind-the-scenes technologies, such as stacks of
lithium-ion batteries, which are visible behind glass windows. In this showroom, energy flows are visualized on a
screen that presents timely data on the amount of electricity being produced by the solar panels, the amount of
storage space available in the stationary batteries and the loading capacity of the electric vehicles. The
showroom’s design resembles something in between an interactive museum and a control room where smart
grids are presented as cutting-edge technical devices and abstract tools for automatic energy management. In
effect, the presentations at the showroom have created a point of contact between the living lab setting and the
interested public that is regularly invited to view and marvel at them during public events. Tours of the showroom
and related artefacts can be booked by interested groups anytime and are also regularly displayed at festival-like
open house happenings such as “E-Mobility Day” or “Future Mobility Summit”, which cater to the broad public.
At these events, smart grid infrastructures can be viewed and experienced as exciting high-tech attractions in an
entertaining environment of food trucks, volleyball tournaments, family games and the like. Not least through
these spectacles, the M2G project has regularly crafted positive “smart grid experiences”. As urban living lab, it
has therefore created a space of “experiential knowledge production” (Levenda, 2016: 132) where visions of
smart grid futures are interactively staged and enacted. It produces lived experiences of future states for the
sake of convincingly spreading its vision of the future smart grid city (Hajer and Versteeg, 2019: 125).
Figure 20: Wind energy generation plant (left) @ Reiner Lemoine Institute, and electric vehicle charging
stations at EUREF Campus (right) © Esteve Franquesa
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Figure 21: Photovoltaic roof and electric vehicle charging stations at EUREF Campus © InnoZ / Vipul Toprani
Figure 22: Interactive monitor (left) © Inno2Grid in M2G smart grid showroom (right) © InnoZ
These smart grid experiences are embedded in a broader “EUREF Campus experience”, which is being staged by
the project development company, EUREF AG. The boundaries between the way M2G is staging smart grid
technologies and the way EUREF AG is staging the EUREF Campus are at best blurred. It is somewhat unclear
where the research and demonstration project ends, and where the urban development site begins. The
consortium members, the project developer and the public authorities often refer to the two interchangeably,
promoting both as urban living labs, even though the two follow very different – and in part contradictory –
logics. While the M2G consortium works under the funding and governance framework of a research project,
EUREF AG follows the commercial logics of entrepreneurial real-estate development. The “smart grid
experience”, in this way, becomes enmeshed in the privately orchestrated branding and marketing scheme of
the “EUREF Campus experience”. This creates certain dissonances and contradictions. For example, EUREF AG
provides ample space for conventional, gas-powered automobiles in underground parking lots, while
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simultaneously promoting renewable energies and e-mobility above ground. As an M2G consortium member
comments:
“[EUREF Campus] isn’t completely accessible to us, you know? Because there is the investor, who has
completely different plans, who says ‘what do I care about the smart grid? Of course, I’ll gladly put
that into my marketing agenda, you know? But technologically, I’m not interested at all’” (personal
interview energy start-up, 2016).
This interview excerpt illuminates the ambiguous relationship between the goals of the M2G research project
and the goals of the EUREF Campus. While EUREF AG benefits from the M2G project and its science-based,
innovative artefacts for advertising purposes, it is unclear to what degree the M2G project benefits from the
activities of the EUREF AG. In a study of four of Berlin’s future sites, Suwala et al find that “EUREF feels […] like a
cleverly managed and extended show room with multiple convention centers, event locations, and top cuisine”
that “evokes an exhibition and trade fair venue” (Suwala et al., 2021: 424). Effectively, the visions of smart grid
futures being demonstrated by the experimental micro-smart-grid project are thus engulfed by demonstrations
of business-friendliness and of a fun, artsy and luxurious work environment that are being staged for the primary
purpose of profitable – not sustainable - Campus development.
Figure 23: EUREF Campus as event location © EUREF AG
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Figure 24: Office towers at EUREF Campus © EUREF AG
9.2.3 Berlin’s pilot projects as generators of social acceptance for smart grid futures
Both the M2G and the Energienetz Adlershof projects also aim at generating research results for campus-wide,
if not city-wide dissemination. For the purpose of replication and scaling, both M2G and Energienetz Adlershof
put a strong focus on generating “social acceptance”. They stress the need to generate social acceptance
between their project partners, especially businesses, and within their immediate neighborhood communities.
To foster this process, they emphasize participation, knowledge transfer and public outreach. Among others, the
Energienetz research consortium built its demonstration pavilion “to increase acceptance for the new
technology” (Bschorer et al., 2019), and ran campus wide information campaigns and campus internal workshops
aimed at increasing smart grid related knowledge and overcoming barriers for participation across the
Technology Park Adlershof. Moreover, the consortium partnered with the campus management firm, WISTA
Management GmbH, to create the Smart Grid Alliance, to generate interest for smart grids and acquire new
partners among other businesses and institutional facilities located on campus. Similarly, M2G regularly offers
activities aimed at creating strong social networks within its project consortium, and at generating acceptance
within its urban surroundings and vis-à-vis the general public. These activities include Master’s degree courses,
open house events, workshops, conferences, social media coverage and many more. Based on its experiences
from these activities, the M2G project has elaborated an advisory concept for other actors interested in
establishing similar urban living labs, especially with a focus on integrating energy and mobility technologies. The
concept mostly focuses on how to create high levels of internal project identification and community acceptance
by “gently dissipat[ing] potential reservations” (Gegner et al., 2020: 9) in and outside of the living lab. Internally,
both projects have successfully stimulated communication and cooperation across disciplinary boundaries, and
thus forged personal and professional connections between actors that would otherwise hardly collaborate,
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including research scientists, public utility companies, energy start-ups, research laboratories, the network
operator and new and incumbent mobility companies. Both consortia have successfully maintained this day-to-
day collaboration despite the broad range of diverging interests and agendas. In effect, both projects have been
awarded funding extensions for second and third project phases: Energienetz Adlershof was granted a second
three-year project phase (2018 – 2021) and M2G was granted a third five-year project phase (2022 – 2027) to
continue its research and development work.
However, neither of the smart grid pilot projects have integrated households into their experimental project
designs. Interaction with families, for example, is limited to showrooms that explain certain energy technologies
and visualize flows, but regular citizens are not part of the projects. This stands in stark contrast to the city’s
policy language, which embeds smart grids in a discourse of user empowerment, user responsibility and social
participation. The Senate’s vision is not mirrored by the experimental design of the pilot projects. Instead,
electricity users are only marginally involved, for example in their capacity as car drivers, laboratory tenants, or
building owners. In effect, both projects have focused internally on participation and externally on knowledge
transfer and outreach. The latter activities can arguably be understood as curated demonstrations of public
involvement.
While both projects have succeeded at creating strong networks within their project consortia, they have been
less successful at actually replicating their visions of future smart grid infrastructures at scale. The Smart Grid
Alliance, for example, was able to gather a pool of interested actors, but missed its original goal of extending a
smart energy management system to a broad range of facilities across the broader Technology Park Adlershof.
And although M2G plans to replicate parts of its living lab concept at two new sites in Berlin starting 2022, the
integration of energy and mobility technologies in a campus micro-smart-grid-system even at EUREF Campus still
poses technical and regulatory challenges. “'[U]pscaling' [....] comprises all activities aimed at embedding of the
experiment in regime-level structures (or transforming them), gaining structural support, involving key regime-
players, overcoming barriers and making experiment part of a broader process of change” (Sengers et al., 2019:
155). Although both projects have successfully involved key regime players, such as the grid operator or ICT
companies, they have gained little structural support and instigated only small-scale processes of change in
Berlin.
Both projects have addressed the issue of replication and scaling mainly by focusing on knowledge transfer and
social acceptance, not on learning. While M2G and Energienetz Adlershof both put a strong emphasis on
transferring smart grid related knowledge and generating social acceptance through participatory activities,
neither one of the projects has focused on organizational or institutional learning, for example within their
partner institutions or – more importantly – within business organizations or the public administration. Evans et
al (2021) find that “while learning is commonly identified as important to urban experimentation it rarely receives
explicit treatment” (Evans et al., 2021: 173). Instead, “[f]unding schemes position commercial markets and
technical performance as the motor of change in cities, but pay little attention to how cities develop new
organizational processes” (Evans et al., 2021: 178). The same holds true for the M2G and Energienetz Adlershof
projects. Both projects have effectively addressed questions of scalability as questions of communication. In
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other words, they have relied on creating strong visions and disseminating a powerful discourse rather than on
systematically initiating processes of institutional change.
9.2.4 The future sites as tools for smart city marketing
At the future sites, smart grid pilot projects are embedded in a greater endeavor to showcase and market the
city of Berlin as attractive places to work on science-based technological innovations. At the level of the future
sites, smart grids therefore serve the purpose of city marketing rather than of infrastructural development or
specific grid related change. Instead, smart grids are welcomed as useful assets and marketing tools to attract
high-skilled professionals and high-tech businesses from the “smart” and in part also the “green” economic
sectors. More than anything, the future sites are supposed to contribute to crafting Berlin’s “image as a city”
(Berlin Senate, 2016c: 42).
The image that Berlin’s authorities are promoting through these sites link “the future” first and foremost with
science, technology, businesses, innovation and jobs35. In line with this, different policy documents
interchangeably call them “future sites”36, “innovation spaces” (Berlin Senate, 2018: 12), “transformation
spaces“ (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 58) or “technology clusters“ (Enquête-Kommission, 2015: 20). As the city’s urban
development concept suggests, Berlin’s future sites are supposed to become “spaces for entrepreneurial
activities geared toward innovation” (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 34). Even though the same concept also suggests that
Berlin’s future sites will put strong emphasis on other urban issues such as “population growth, […] social
cohesion, climate change and energy transitions” (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 63), these issues are at most secondary.
Moreover, all concerns regarding the future sites are officially administered by the Senate Department for
Economics, Energy and Public Enterprises (SenWEB) and not – for example – by the Senate Department for Urban
Development (SenStadtWohn) or the Senate Department for the Environment (SenUVK). In public
communications at the city level, economic concerns thus clearly dominate the future sites’ agenda.
For this reason, the city authorities describe EUREF Campus, Technology Park Adlershof and TXL Urban Tech
Republic as hubs for techno-scientific innovation that support the city’s economic priorities. For example, the
city calls TXL Urban Tech Republic a “competence hub for urban technologies” (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 69) and “a
smart city laboratory” (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 69) that is supposed to attract the “industry of the future” (Berlin
Senate, 2018: 18). It calls Technology Park Adlershof the “economic motor of Berlin’s South-East” (Berlin Senate,
2015a: 72) and a “successful model for the attraction of science, research and businesses”, which it seeks to
“extend to other future sites” (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 91). These attributes and associations suggest that the city
authorities view economic development as main objective of the future sites and consider techno-scientific
innovation an appropriate vehicle to achieve it. As communicated across various policies and programs, the city
is thus putting the strongest emphasis on increasing its economic – not its sustainability related - potential
through techno-scientific development at all three future sites.
35 www.zukunfstorte.de
36 www.zukunfstorte.de
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The city’s policies and programs are echoed by the way the future sites are being advertised by their respective
managing companies. WISTA Management GmbH is advertising Technology Park Adlershof as Berlin’s “grande
dame” of techno-scientific development, marketing it as an established, successful, internationally competitive
role model for Berlin and other cities. The marketing language establishes the Technology Park as experienced,
senior development site with a long history and tradition in technological innovation. EUREF Campus is much
younger and smaller and therefore still depends on building a positive public image. EUREF AG is advertising the
campus as showcase for Berlin’s Energiewende on the one hand and for smart-entrepreneurial development on
the other. And lastly, Tegel Projekt GmbH is promoting TXL Urban Tech Republic as science-fiction fantasy of big
money and big dreams. It is wholly in the future and therefore very dependent on creating a brand through
catchy advertisement. Tegel Projekt GmbH is promoting TXL Urban Tech Republic as a fascinating, futuristic, even
otherworldly place for the realization of world-leading technological dreams: “The dream of flight has been
fulfilled. Time for a new dream” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2015: 3), and “Will we live in space stations on Mars?
Maybe. But maybe we will soon be living in space stations on Earth” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2015: 4). The 1970’s
architecture and the envisaged technologies are staged to leave the public awestruck. More than the other two
sites, TXL Urban Tech Republic is also being marketed with slogans that sound snazzy and young. It is marketed
as a hub for collaboration between creative, intelligent, international, productive pioneers in an open, innovative
and attractive space. Moreover, this image is connected directly to profitability: “Future technology is always a
future market. And that is no pipe dream” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2015: 13). Overall, it is marketed as being at the
cutting edge of urban technological innovation that is globally connected, and internationally leading. It is
marketed as a site where technological fixes to the most pressing urban problems in energy, water, mobility and
recycling will be developed, produced and exported globally. Here, smart grids are one of various technological
ideas that play into broader storylines of developing a smart, progressive, ecologically pristine city of tomorrow.
These technologies are described as the DNA of cities. They are intelligent, efficient, clean and perfectly flawless.
They are urgently necessary and absolutely inevitable. They (especially ICT) will make the world a better place,
make your life easier, and bring big money.
The visions of Berlin’s urban future promoted through the future sites are heavily based on a rhetoric of technical
innovation and economic growth. Smart grids, in this language, are only interesting in their capacity to attract
businesses and jobs, not as basis for real energy system change. While smart grids play only a minor role, the
smart city is much more present as an idea and link to the surrounding city, and cities around the world. Although
these broader storylines also influence and perpetuate the specific storylines about smart grids, they are not tied
specifically to smart grid technologies or specific on-site collaborations. Moreover, Berlin’s future sites are
designed for an exclusive urban business and research establishment, catering to the young, creative, intelligent,
cosmopolitan elite. They invite “students, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and researchers”, to “learn from one
another and come up with new ideas together” in a joint “democratic ambition” for making “the cities of the
future” (Tegel Projekt GmbH, 2015).
This stands in contrast to the high priority on public participation and civic engagement that Berlin’s current city
government has written into its energy and its smart city agendas. In its coalition agreement, it states that Berlin’s
Energiewende can only succeed with the participation of its inhabitants, and that the government therefore
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builds on “active energy citizens (Bürgerenergieakteure) (Berlin Senate, 2016a: 61) and "prosumer solutions"
(Berlin Senate, 2016a: 64). Apart from this, the city aims at regaining public ownership of the city’s electricity
grid, which it views as important tool for designing the city’s Energiewende, and whose communal ownership
could “offer Berliners an opportunity to engage in the concrete implementation of the Energiewende” (Berlin
Senate, 2016a: 65). Since 2016, the left-wing government coalition has also been very careful to embed its smart
city agenda in a vision of socially inclusive, participatory urban development. Among other things, it has set out
to publicly discuss and overhaul the previous government’s Smart City Strategy, in order to ensure that the city’s
inhabitants have a say in the digital transformation of their urban environment (Berlin Senate, 2016a). Citizen
engagement is being fostered at the newly founded CityLab, a space for collaborative exchange that explicitly
aims at “involving the urban public in exploring the potentials of smart city technologies and finding practical
solutions for Berlin and possibly other cities” (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, 2017), which was officially inaugurated
in 2019. At the same time, experimentation at the future sites and the pilot projects is less committed to public
participation than to innovation and economic growth.
Instead, the city explicitly envisions the future sites as places for advancing " urban Energiewende innovations
(Berlin Senate, 2016c: 32). It is marketing them as spaces for pioneering technological advancement and offering
cutting-edge research and development opportunities. They are supposed to “make Berlin future-proof, shape
its economic profile, and increase its international visibility” (Berlin Senate, 2015a: 54). They are depicted as “hot
spots”, and “innovation spaces” (Berlin Senate, 2018) for showcasing urban energy technologies to the world,
and increasing Berlin’s global competitiveness (Berlin Senate, 2015a). Adlershof even boasts to be Berlin’s Silicon
Valley (Tagesspiegel, 2018). Beyond their function as local testbeds, these sites are conceived as "lighthouses"
and shining examples with an outreach and impact far beyond the region (TSB Technologiestiftung Berlin, 2012:
26). Berlin’s city authorities are promoting the future sites as showcases and shining examples of urban
economic, environmental and scientific development. They are being advertised as places that will make the city
“fit for the future, strengthen its economic profile and increase its international appeal” (Berlin Senate, 2015a:
58). In sum, Berlin’s future sites are being created as demonstrators that show, inform and excite the public and
are being marketed as entrepreneurial spaces that promote spectacular visions of urban futures in thrilling and
theme-park type ways.
9.2.5 Visualizing Berlin’s smart grid constellation
The production of Berlin’s smart grid futures is not only influenced by social actors. It is also enabled and/or
constrained by rules and regulations, technical artefacts, and natural phenomena (such as the existence of sun
and wind power for harvesting). To complete the picture, I therefore add an analysis of Berlin’s overall smart grid
constellation, i.e. an analysis of all the different elements influencing Berlin’s smart grid discourse and thus the
production of the city’s dominant smart grid storylines. Constellation analysis is a concept that enables
interdisciplinary research on complex questions at the interface of society, technology and nature (Schön et al.,
2004: 1). It acknowledges the power not only of social actors, but also of signs, ideas, natural phenomena and
material artefacts in shaping current reality (Ohlhorst and Kröger, 2015: 97). In fact, it is a fundamental principle
of constellation analysis to regard the heterogeneous elements of a constellation as equally important (Ohlhorst
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and Kröger, 2015: 99). It is thus very much in line with my comprehensive understanding of discourse.
Constellation analysis identifies social actors (such as people or institutions), material artefacts (such as
technologies), natural phenomena (such as the sun or the wind), signs (such as laws and regulations) and ideas
(such as visions or Leitbilder) as equally powerful in producing current reality. By including all these elements
and visualizing their influence on smart grid discourse, I can paint a comprehensive picture of what is currently
driving or impeding its popularity, and thus driving or impeding smart grid development in the city (see next page
for visualization).
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Figure 25: Who and what is influencing Berlin's smart grid discourse? (own figure)
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9.3 Concluding remarks: everybody wants smart grids, but nobody nobody is taking the lead
The pilot projects have been fundamental in promoting visions of smart grids and shaping Berlin’s expert
discourse as generators of transdisciplinary collaboration and exchange. They have thus pioneered the idea of
smart grids in Berlin. However, the pilot projects are also embedded in an institutional environment that is
pursuing a primarily economic agenda, and thus promoting business-as-usual scenarios instead of radical system
change.
9.3.1 Pilot projects as drivers
The research consortia driving the pilot projects at M2G and Energienetz Adlershof have pioneered Berlin’s smart
grid discourse and continue to exert a strong influence on it through the pilot activities. These consortia are
spearheaded by the scientific community, which has been pivotal to generating the original project ideas,
initiating the consortia, acquiring federal funding and leading the research and development activities. Due to
the scientific community’s initiative, a broad range of stakeholders from various backgrounds and fields has
engaged in regular exchange on the topic, yielding countless discursive contributions, from written and spoken
communications, to public performances and material artefacts.
At the micro-level (i.e. at the pilot projects), smart grids have arguably functioned as successful Leitbilder in
Dierkes’ sense of the term. The smart grid Leitbild has worked as “framework that guides perception, thinking,
decision-making and action” (Dierkes et al., 1992: 11). It has developed enough force to enable communication
and collaboration within a heterogeneous expert community, working as communicative bridge across different
academic disciplines, business interests and political agendas. The pilot projects have forced reluctant actors
such as the grid operator to attend public events and confront the rising pressure to change the current grid
system. They have also pulled private ICT companies and project developers on board, giving them an incentive
to invest in physical smart grid infrastructures. In doing so, the Leitbild has successfully motivated Berlin’s expert
community to overcome communicative differences over the course of many years and sustained this effort for
years into the future. It has provided collective orientation on the one hand, and mobilized emotions of interest
and appeal on the other, thereby stabilizing interpersonal relations. In this way, the pilot projects have played
an important role in introducing smart grids to the city and developing a normative force within Berlin’s expert
community that has established smart grids as essential solutions to reaching the city’s climate goals and
implementing the urban Energiewende. Moreover, the pilot projects have given smart grids increasing public
visibility. They have created a connection between the abstract smart grid idea and its artefactual presence,
giving the conceptual idea a representation in built reality. This material representation has also given smart
grids a visibility beyond the small circle of experts involved in the research consortia. The visibility of smart grid
infrastructures at EUREF Campus has arguably been pivotal to attracting green tech businesses to the campus.
However, this showcasing has also blurred the boundaries between the research community’s interest in
advancing energy and mobility transitions, the companies’ interest in selling their products, and the project
developer’s interest in attracting renters to the property. Moreover, it has neglected questions of institutional
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learning, and thus remained on the far end of systemic socio-technical change. In this sense, visions of sustainable
and innovative smart grid futures as they are being developed within the pilot projects, are being buried under
the more powerful smart city imaginary, which caters to a techno-entrepreneurial, business-as-usual urban
development paradigm
9.3.2 Shared visions, questionable alliances
Yet in spite of these pioneering qualities, the pilot projects are also helping to reproduce the corporate language
of the smart city. They are perpetuating a restrictive, techno-centrist imaginary of the future sustainable city
instead of daring to promote radical alternatives (Hajer and Versteeg, 2019). These visions convey a future urban
development trajectory that is confined to the well-known trajectories of the past. They are narrowly confined
to the idea of linking technological innovation with economic growth and the “good” city. Hajer states that
"experiencing the possibility of alternatives" is a fruitful avenue for convincingly spreading the sustainability
paradigm (Hajer and Versteeg, 2019: 125). I argue that Berlin’s pilot projects have been largely successful at
creating an environment for “experiential futuring” (Pelzer and Versteeg, 2019). They have built up the idea of
smart grids into a discourse, gathered a community behind it and created material infrastructures. The pilot
projects in Berlin have successfully created “sites through which to explore and experience different futures”
(Edwards and Bulkeley, 2018: 350). However, they are producing experiences that are chic, entertaining, even
spectacular and awe-inspiring – but not necessarily challenging or new. The material realities they showcase can
be visited and “experienced” much like the technologies in a science museum. Technical artefacts are presented
as gadgets that can be tried out in fun ways. They are creating “experiential futures” (Pelzer and Versteeg, 2019)
in form of fun weekend excursions for interested citizens, but not fundamentally challenging their status quo.
More importantly, these experiences do not invite contestation. On the contrary, they are focused on knowledge
transfer and outreach for social acceptance. In this sense, M2G and Energienetz Adlershof are in many ways
curating Berlin’s smart grid future, not experimenting with it. As urban living labs, both projects are aimed at
generating technological know-how on smart grids, creating strong social bonds within their transdisciplinary
project consortia and transferring their technological findings to the broader market. In Berlin, the scientific
community is playing a major role in co-producing these business-as-usual scenarios and for spreading them into
the public. Among others, the project consortia are partnering with corporate actors to create these visions of
the future, instead of engaging a broader societal basis.
Through the future sites, the city is equally succumbing to the corporate imaginary and language of the smart
city. It is mainly promoting the future sites as futuristic, high-tech, competitive, young, exciting and comfortable
urban ideals (much in line with the smart city imaginary). It uses the Energiewende to accompany these visions,
treating it as welcome side-effect and dependent result. The project developers and other corporate actors are
hijacking this low-carbon rhetoric to pursue their own economic agenda, i.e. to sell their products and market
their property. Visions of smart grids are therefore being used to enhance the low-carbon rhetoric, but ultimately
drowned out by a much more mundane, business-as-usual, economic agenda. In sum, the future sites are
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embedding Berlin’s smart grid discourse into the broader marketing language of the “smart city”. The pilot
projects fit into these logics and perpetuate them.
9.3.3 The long path from visions to socio-technical change
Their embeddedness in the logics of the smart city might also explain why the smart grid Leitbild hasn’t translated
into broader urban socio-technical change. My research shows that the smart grid Leitbild is an attractive idea
that has reached a certain degree of popularity through connection with a technical artefact. It has not, however,
become generally established in organizational practices or institutional arrangements outside the pilot projects,
or even become “obdurate” in the sense of dominating the infrastructural landscape (Dierkes et al., 1992).
Visions of smart grids have activated a research community, but haven’t activated a broader city-wide discussion,
let alone radical city-wide change. In Jasanoff and Kim’s (2015) terms, visions of smart grid futures have not
evolved into a “collectively held, institutionally stabilized” socio-technical imaginary.
As I laid out in the conceptual underpinnings of my research design, Hajer (1993) distinguishes between the
concepts of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization (see chapter 6.3 “Analyzing discourse”). He
understands a discourse as structurated when it is widely shared, widely accepted, and largely uncontested, and
as institutionalized only when it consolidates into social institutions, such as organizational practices or
traditional ways of reasoning (Hajer, 1993). In Hajer’s (1993) terms, Berlin’s smart grid discourse can therefore
be viewed as structurated but not as institutionalized. Despite slight underlying differences, the dominant
storylines that comprise Berlin’s smart grid discourse are built on a solid foundation of general agreement that
is shared by many actors. The visions of the future that are transported by this discourse, and the broad lines of
argument that the discourse circles around remain largely undisputed. Yet despite the strength and consistency
of visions of Berlin’s smart grid futures, and the structurated nature of the discourse, there is no broad media
coverage, party political debate or even general knowledge about smart grids in the city. In spite of its success,
the Leitbild has not traveled far beyond the borders of the pilot projects, and the discourse is arguably stagnant.
Unlike the debate about the smart city or the urban Energiewende, there is hardly a city-wide debate about smart
grids. Going back to Hajer’s terms, Berlin’s smart grid discourse cannot therefore be viewed as institutionalized
in the sense of developing enough force to transform city-wide institutions, governance arrangements or
practices. Even though these dominant storylines are being produced and shared by policy makers, corporate
marketing strategists and researchers, the discursive dynamic that has mutually reinforced their visions has not
been powerful enough to reconfigure the city’s electricity related institutions. Instead, Berlin’s smart grid
discourse remains confined to a relatively small expert community that interacts closely at the pilot projects –
but remains invisible beyond. This is true even though both the pilot projects and the future sites were developed
with the explicit goal of disseminating and “scaling up” ideas for the city’s energy future.
This raises questions about the effectiveness of experimenting with infrastructural futures in Berlin. As the
sustainability transitions literature suggests, for local experiments to unfold a sustainable impact, visions are
important but not at all sufficient (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008). The establishment of durable social networks
and institutional learning are key (Potjer, 2019). According to Potjer (2019), the concept of scaling up is based on
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the assumption that experiments can "change the institutional world with little additional help". She then
concludes that "in reality, it is the other way around: it is the institutions that promote or restrict experimenting"
(Potjer, 2019: 15–16). While many urban labs use the rhetoric of "scaling-up" and "rolling out" their solutions,
Potjer is sure that no single experiment can spread its unique local solution into the broader urban fabric. Local
experiments need to connect, exchange learnings, inspire each other and develop a joint force or common
cultural shift (Potjer, 2019: 36).
Although Berlin’s smart grid pilot projects are all aimed, at least rhetorically, at “scaling up” and “rolling out”
their best practice solutions into the broader city, they lack a clear structure for how to go about this task. In
Berlin, the various smart grid experiments that are currently underway at the pilot projects and beyond have
little to no horizontal or vertical connections. There is no such thing as a "Platform for Living Labs" in Berlin
(Potjer, 2019), to foster exchange and learning between different smart grid pilot projects. The pilot projects in
Berlin are not embedded in a structural approach to experimental governance. They are stand-alone projects
with little to no institutional backing from the public authorities. Instead, they are embedded in the governance
logics of the future sites, which are mostly targeted at “improving the regional business structure”37. From an
urban governance perspective, smart grids are, in effect, part of a coordinated city-wide endeavor to create
economic growth, but not to create sustainable electricity grids. Therefore, the pilot projects are successfully
rendering innovative solutions to a variety of smart grid related problems at the local level – but have failed to
make their ideas, the discourse or their technological innovations spill over into the urban fabric.
There is a disconnect between the potentially idealist, sustainability-oriented lab environment of the pilot
projects, in which scientific consortia are experimenting, testing and demonstrating smart grids, and their
broader setting within the future sites, which are focused on showcasing these technologies as means of
attracting businesses, and thirdly, governmental policies, which link experimental sites more with technological
innovation for economic goals than for sustainability. Although the Berlin Senate is committed to implementing
more ICT technologies, it is not specifically committed to implementing smart grids. It is pushing a technology-
oriented agenda, which is little concerned with the outcome of specific technology trials, because its primary
objective is to secure jobs. The city is pushing this agenda with an indecisive rhetoric that paints Berlin as a smart
and participatory and experimental and low-carbon. Yet their main goal is the attraction of high-tech companies
and jobs. These goals and the institutional set-up of the future sites are therefore only supportive of the pilot
projects at the rhetorical level, but not at the institutional level. It is not offering an institutional embedding for
the lessons learned at the pilot projects to be translated into governmental logics. Energy and mobility regime
change is thus being smothered by economic – business-as-usual - interests.
37 https://zukunftsorte.berlin/en/
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10 Conclusions and outlook
The purpose of this dissertation has been to disentangle and critically discuss dominant visions of the future
smart grid city and how they are being (co-)produced in Berlin’s policy and implementation circles. My analysis
was guided both by Dierkes’ (1992) concept of technological Leitbilder and Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) concept of
socio-technical imaginaries, which understand visions as synchronizers of techno-scientific innovation on the one
hand (Dierkes et al., 1992) and political programs on the other (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009). By building on these
concepts, I was able to merge the analysis of visions at the micro-level of techno-scientific experimentation and
at the city-wide level of urban policies and programs. I used discourse analysis as operational framework for
examining the meanings (Keller, 2011) and the politics (Hajer, 1993) inherent in the (co-production of these)
visions. This discourse analytical approach enabled me to identify and critically scrutinize the (co-production of)
dominant storylines depicting Berlin’s future as a smart grid city.
My empirical findings show that visions of Berlin’s smart grid futures are being mutually reinforced by urban
policy narratives and corporate marketing strategies on the one hand and by research and implementation
practices on the other. This co-constitutive process of envisioning and making the smart grid city is driven by a
relatively small circle of experts. While urban policy experts and corporate professionals are primarily using smart
grids as marketing tools to attract businesses and professionals, researchers at the implementation level are
mostly committed to smart grids in a genuine effort to contribute technological solutions to Germany’s
Energiewende. Together, they are envisioning and enacting an urban future that is driven by techno-optimism,
built on few peoples’ perspectives, lacks critical negotiation and is strongly embedded in the economic
opportunities associated with the smart city.
I identify five dominant storylines that depict the smart grid city as a) environmental necessity for advancing
Berlin’s local Energiewende, b) high-tech innovation for improving energy management while maintaining
current comfort-levels, c) economic imperative to secure Berlin’s future as a thriving metropolis, d) facilitators
of energy empowerment and public participation, and finally as e) exciting experimental challenge to modernize
the city’s infrastructure. I show that these dominant storylines merge notions of technological progress (most
notably digitalization) with the achievement of Berlin’s urban energy transition, thus latching onto the techno-
positivist gravitation of Berlin’s smart city paradigm. Put differently, these visions depict urban smart grid
technologies as a necessary prerequisite for developing Berlin into a low-carbon city on the one hand, and a
smart city on the other, making ICT-implementation seem like a natural and inevitable process (i.e. "the smart
city will have smart grids" (Erbstößer and Müller, 2017: 11).
Moreover, I show that these visions of a progressive, eco-friendly, economically thriving, attractive and livable
future smart grid city are in part driven by a sincere interest in making Berlin’s energy transition work, but also
in part by economic concerns and the pure thrill of spearheading technological development. They thus
emphasize promises of economic competitiveness and (global) leadership over risks and vulnerabilities.
Moreover, I show that in Berlin, dominant visions of the smart grid city remain largely uncontested. Instead, the
combined promises of the smart grid city are being pursued and marketed by Berlin’s urban policy-makers,
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researchers and businesses alike, be they from the energy, the ICT or the urban development sectors. I argue
that the visions that are created, reproduced and publicly promoted through processes of experimentation at
Berlin’s urban labs are thus reinforcing what the city government is promoting in its policies and vice versa, and
that a broader, more inclusive and possibly controversial debate is lacking.
At the same time, my findings also show that a vision or a Leitbild, even if it gains enough traction to render
fifteen years of pilot activities, is not enough to effect broader urban socio-technical change. Visions can foster
collaboration and render local innovations, but for these innovations to travel and effect broader socio-technical
change, they need something more. In Berlin, visions of smart grid futures have “activated” and “motivated”
discourse coalitions among different actors to promote socio-technical change. But visions of the smart grid are
being obstructed by the stronger socio-technical imaginary of the smart city.
I draw the following main conclusions from my empirical findings. I complement these conclusions with
suggestions for further avenues of inquiry.
10.1 Treat smart technologies as a means not an end
First, my analysis shows that Berlin’s urban experiments are co-producing technology centered visions of the
smart (grid) city. These visions are not only fueled by urban (energy) policy but also gain traction through material
manifestations in urban laboratories. In Berlin, this co-productive process of mutual reinforcement has created
a spiral of reciprocal encouragement and affirmation rather than controversial debate or critical scrutiny. Smart
grids have arguably taken on the fetish-like qualities of a technological fix or a ‘boat’ that is not to be missed,
rather than one out of various means to an end. The resulting discourse presents smart grid technologies as
future energy solutions that need to be “reverse-engineered” (Cloke et al 2017) into the urban fabric to
accommodate current ideas of growth, comfort and (energy intensive) lifestyles by perpetuating technology-
based, and efficiency-enabled expectations of pleasure (Strengers 2013). The resulting visions are thus
reproducing the corporate language of the smart city, which is deeply embedded in the well-known,
unsustainable present. I criticize that these visions are foreclosing debate about other pathways towards low-
carbon urban development such as digitally sufficient alternatives (Lange and Santarius, 2018) or smart grids as
commons (Hall et al., 2019; Melville et al., 2017). Smart grid experimentation is currently producing a self-
referential discourse that emphasizes (possible) technological benefits instead of weighing them against the
environmental costs of technological expansion or the risks of digitally-born vulnerabilities.
Instead of critically interrogating the benefits of energy-efficiency and weighing them against the shortcomings
of increased energy use, Berlin’s urban laboratories are taking the benefits for granted and neglecting potential
shortcomings. As Strengers argues: “With the lure of efficiency benefits and energy savings, we too easily forget
that becoming smart also necessitates the consumption of smart stuff” (Strengers, 2014: 28). In the case of
Berlin’s smart grids, this extra “stuff” might include sensors, meters, electric vehicles, batteries, and server parks,
all of which have energy and environment-related effects not only during use, but also during production and
disposal. In addition, these effects might be exacerbated by ICT-induced economic growth. In the case of Berlin,
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the integration of electric vehicles into smart grid systems could lead to increased car-use, for example. If
attention is not paid to these trade-offs, then energy-efficiency gains might well be cancelled out by this so-called
“rebound effect” (Lange et al., 2020; Santarius and Soland, 2018). A burgeoning line of scholarship therefore calls
for a mind-shift away from researching and developing efficiency-inducing technologies toward focusing on
energy-efficient practices (Shove, 2018). It argues that for energy transitions to work, we need to encourage
energy-sufficient lifestyles, not technologies (Thomas et al., 2015). Another line of scholarship has taken a similar
approach by looking at smart grids as commons. Among others, this literature suggests that communities can
benefit from neighborhood level energy governance not only environmentally, but socially, too (Melville et al.,
2017). It suggests that novel forms of communal energy governance need to be considered in research and
development projects. These literatures all question the ability of the technology-centered paradigm to foster
energy and sustainability transitions and offer alternative, more socially sensitive entry points. Their critical
voices are not part of Berlin’s smart grid discourse.
10.2 Embrace the social
Secondly, my findings show that by focusing on techno-centric, techno-managerial urban futures, Berlin’s smart
grid discourse is glossing over some of the more complicated, unsexy and potentially conflicted issues relating to
urban energy transitions. Urban scholarship has shown that urban laboratories are often designed as privileged
sites of formalized knowledge production that favor certain actors and interests over others (Evans and
Karvonen, 2014). More often than not "the social aspects of urban development […] are largely ignored" (Evans
and Karvonen, 2014: 425). Similar to this observation, Berlin’s future sites and urban pilot projects are putting a
strong emphasis on technology and efficiency while neglecting the social.
At the same time, Berlin’s energy and climate related policies and programs are making very far-reaching
assumptions about the social life and social practices of future energy users living in future energy
neighborhoods. By advancing notions e.g. of household prosumage, micro-grid residential neighborhoods,
energy empowerment or energy capacity building, the Berlin Senate is proposing a complete overhaul of energy
production and use as we know it. Yet, these visions are built on simplistic, rationalized notions of ordinary energy
users. Notions of ordinary citizens as “active energy agents” or “grid participants” (Berlin Senate, 2016c) are
built on a perception of the average energy user as information-hungry, data-driven, energy-interested,
technology-savvy, efficiency-seeking Resource Man (Strengers, 2013). This perception assumes that households
are inhabited by individuals with the time, ability and motivation to subordinate their activities to managing
efficiency gains. It overlooks that homes are also inhabited by families or family-like systems that are kept
together by people with complex schedules, different personalities and multiple preferences. By promoting
visions of homes as resource management units and disregarding the complexity and messiness of the social life
they contain, these simplistic visions risk standing in the way of more far-reaching, and more transformative
change. As Pelzer and Versteeg (2019) criticize “cities are crucial for societies to move beyond carbon
dependency, but the current debate is dominated by corporate imaginaries of self-driving cars and other smart
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technologies. This technological vision does little right to the complexities of the urban fabric” (Pelzer and
Versteeg, 2019: 14).
This is especially problematic, because smart grids heavily depend on user integration and thus broad user
acceptance for their effectiveness. Research indeed suggests that user engagement is crucial to the success of
smart grids systems (Goulden et al., 2014; Kaufmann et al., 2013). At the same time, recent studies find that,
even despite extensive user engagement, user acceptance and with it the willingness to engage in micro-smart-
grid systems can dwindle substantially over time (Bugden and Stedman, 2021). Especially users who initially
embrace smart grids on the idealist basis of environmental protection are shown to lose interest over time,
resulting in less active involvement and a subsequent lowering of the overall environmental effectiveness of
micro-smart-grid systems (Bugden and Stedman, 2021). As Budgen and Stedman (2021) remark:
“That the public becomes less interested in smart grid technologies over time will be troubling for
proponents, especially those that advocate for distributed generation microgrids as a crucial
component of any future climate-friendly grid” (Bugden and Stedman, 2021: 7).
This points to the importance of developing a nuanced understanding of how users want to be involved in the
first place. It points to the need of integrating users into the development and design of micro-smart-grid-
systems not least for reasons of system effectiveness. Yet, in Berlin, where visions of smart grid futures strongly
circle around the idea of household and neighborhood prosumage, household and neighborhood prosumers are
in fact hardly involved in the smart grid pilot projects.
Moreover, Berlin’s techno-centric, techno-managerial visions do not account for the different ways users or
neighborhoods can be involved in smart grid systems. Indeed, smart grid systems can involve users with different
degrees of personal engagement - from end-users whose consumption is externally monitored and controlled
for example by utilities, all the way to prosumers who take active control over their own energy production,
consumption, trading and use (Goulden et al., 2014). Smart grids can be designed for any one of these extremes
or anywhere in between. Smart grid systems can therefore favor different degrees of centralized or decentralized
management, which go along with different degrees of individual responsibility. Yet Berlin’s visions of smart grid
futures are not differentiated in this respect. They promote highly decentralized household and neighborhood
prosumage as backbones of the city’s Energiewende without asking what people might be willing and able to
contribute. This is true even though my research reveals a certain underlying mismatch between the consistency
of these visions and the (lack of) confidence put in the people they are for. As long as this dissonance is not
resolved through active user engagement, smart grids are likely to fall short of their expected environmental
effects.
In sum, my research shows that acts of envisioning and experimenting with smart grid futures in Berlin are too
far removed from peoples’ experiences and aspirations. They do not reflect the complex, interconnected,
imperfect, and very human realities of urban existence (Greenfield, 2013), and are thus arguably stuck in the
energy intensive, unsustainable lifestyles of the present. This is exacerbated by Berlin’s urban experimental
design. There is a disconnect between Berlin’s corporate-inspired future sites, which cater to these techno-
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solutionist storylines, and the much more socially inspired urban Energiewende policy rhetoric. Instead, future
sites, urban labs and urban policies should engage more in discussions about the risks, environmental impacts
and implications for inclusive urban development when it comes to smart grid implementation projects instead
of advocating material intensive smart grid futures as the unalterable solution that will solve all urban energy
challenges we are currently facing. In short, they need to move from their eco-technological vantage point and
focus more on the eco-social.
10.3 Invite more pluralistic visions of urban sustainability
Stronger eco-social visions be achieved by engaging more people and perspectives into envisioning smart grid
futures, and inviting a more pluralistic, controversial debate. Currently, Berlin’s smart grid visions are being
promoted by a relatively small community of experts, who convey a sense of urgency that hardly tolerates
opposition, not least because urban experimentation is limiting – instead of encouraging - necessary public
debate. My findings show that the resulting visions of Berlin’s smart grid futures are therefore one-sided,
simplistic and undemocratic.
Through processes of urban experimentation, the Berlin Senate is effectively giving scientists, engineers and
corporations significant influence over imagining the city’s urban smart grid futures. It is entrusting processes of
experimental co-production to intrinsically motivated academics and engineers on the one hand, and
economically driven, opportunistic smart city advocates on the other. These actors rarely mention risks, and if
so, only in vague and unspecific ways. Only few critical voices or alternative futures are making themselves heard
in the city of Berlin. Issues such as supply security, data security and cyber security are mentioned as necessary
prerequisites for smart grid implementation, yet they don’t feature as part of the pilot project design. Instead,
costs are perceived as the most important “risk” or obstacle to smart grid implementation. Currently, Berlin’s
future sites are little more than showcases for new technological developments and experimental playgrounds
for engineers and tech-enthusiasts to pursue their inspiring high-tech innovations. I criticize that the urban
futures that are being mobilized through Berlin’s smart grid experiments are therefore fundamentally
technocratic and profit-oriented, as well as elite-driven and undemocratic. They exclude a broad spectrum of
people and perspectives, and thus do not reflect "a plurality of visions of the good life” (Appadurai, 2013: 300).
Due to this exclusivity, Berlin’s smart grid experiments are arguably depoliticizing the transition to smart grid
infrastructures in the city (Bues and Gailing, 2016). They are standing in the way of an open, city-wide dialog and
do not invite controversy or constructive deliberation. Instead, they are producing one-sided visions that
promote smart grids as necessary and good, but are largely “devoid of debate” (Sadowski et al., 2020). Currently,
Berlin’s smart grid experiments are driven by a strong belief in the possibility of “rolling out” generic technological
solutions to achieve energy sustainability. At least rhetorically, these experiments are prepared to “scale up”
their results and disseminate them throughout the rest of the city. As research in the field of sustainability
transitions has shown, this rhetoric neglects that the complexity of sustainability related problems requires
complex answers instead of one-size-fits-all technological solutions. It neglects and that “sustainability itself is
not a straightforward concept, but subject to ongoing ambiguities, uncertainties and contestations” (Raven et
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al., 2017: 580). It is an ambivalent concept that means different things to different people in different contexts
(Raven et al., 2017). How to prioritize economic development, environmental protection and social justice within
energy related urban change thus remains an open and very context-specific question that depends on the values
and norms of those involved in answering it. Research has indeed shown that conceptions of sustainability and
possible transition pathways vary according to different cultural contexts, values and norms (Matschoss et al.,
2019), and recommended to engage citizens to include different values into urban decision-making processes
(Elelman and Feldman, 2018). However, Berlin’s experiments are leaving this assessment to entrepreneurs,
academics and engineers. Within the context of urban experimentation, these actors are laying out possible
transition pathways toward sustainable energy solutions on the basis of a very narrow, techno-economic
perspective. This “anti-political” approach ignores or even suppresses “discussions of normativity and ethics in
socio-technical change” (Sadowski et al., 2020: 2). Most importantly, it inhibits political discussions about the
role of users in future smart grid systems. As a result, Berlin’s smart grid experiments are also defying their own
purpose of generating a city-wide smart grid discourse, realizing extensive smart grid implementation and
achieving universal smart grid acceptance.
Instead, urban experimentation needs to be designed with more democratic, emancipatory ambition. Similar to
practices in urban planning and design, it needs to be informed by collective processes of participatory
visioneering in order to yield more controversially discussed, more democratically inclusive and more socially
accepted results. If designed accordingly, smart grid experiments could benefit from the creativity, wisdom and
experience of ordinary, non-scientific energy users (Moezzi et al., 2017; Raven, 2017b). They could open up a
city-wide dialog about possible transition pathways towards sustainable energy futures that values different lived
realities and considers creative ways of problem-solving. On this basis, smart grids could also enjoy much broader
recognition, collective ownership and acceptance in the city. This is especially important if urban experiments
are undertaken with the aim of scaling-up smart grid solutions into the broader urban fabric. Plans to
comprehensively disseminate residential prosumage could benefit from embracing and reconciling the various
ideas, hopes and experiences of ordinary urban households. This way, smart grid experiments could not only be
finetuned to people’s needs and aspirations, but also gain widespread acknowledgement and appreciation.
Overall, I argue that acts of urban experimental future-making need to engage a broader cross-section of urban
actors, most importantly citizens, civil society organizations, artists and urban planners. This way, sites of urban
experimentation could become hubs for actively developing visionary ideas and ideals, much in the way urban
planning theory foresees, namely in a collaborative, democratic endeavor. Ideally, these participatory processes
of collective visioneering would unlock the city’s full potential to progress toward democratic, equitable,
accessible, just, sustainable, and generally livable urban futures. These pluralistic visions could work as
fundamental elements of a new, sustainability oriented experimental governance approach. In effect, urban
experiments could become places for inclusive, controversial and democratic debate and thus potential catalysts
for urban change.
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10.4 Dare more radical utopias
Fourthly, citizen participation has the potential to yield much more radically transformative visions of the future.
Berlin’s urban experiments have been discursively constructed as radically innovative Energiewende projects but
are in fact favoring pragmatic action over utopian ideas. They have successfully tested and demonstrated novel
technologies but have not created radically new energy experiences, let alone fostered sweeping socio-technical
change. Hajer argues that sustainability transitions are stalling in part because imaginations of post-fossil urban
futures are lacking (Hajer and Versteeg, 2019). Indeed, truly different kinds of futures are difficult to imagine
while wandering amid conventional office towers powered by conventional electricity surrounded by
conventional automobiles, as is the case at Berlin’s future sites. I criticize that the narrow techno-managerial
paradigm guiding Berlin’s smart grid experiments is constraining the development of more profoundly outside-
the-box ideas. In doing so, it is also constraining their potential as forces for urban change.
To activate more daring ideas, the future sites and the pilot projects first need to depart from the logics of “the
city as a market”. They need to be normatively guided by intentions beyond economic growth. Their tech-related
storylines need to be driven by a sustainability-oriented agenda and sustainability-oriented goals, not the other
way around. In the case of Berlin’s sites of urban experimentation, the sustainability related storylines are
currently driven by a predominantly technology-oriented agenda. Put differently, the “smart growth” paradigm
comes first, and the Energiewende paradigm comes second. If judged by this underlying orientation, the pilot
projects and the future sites have already been immensely successful. They have attracted businesses, created
jobs and increased the scientific knowledge on smart grid technologies in the city. They have thus fulfilled their
primary objectives. From the administration’s current perspective, there is no reason to change course, even
though smart grid experimentation has not fostered systemic energy-related change. I argue that if urban
experimentation was guided by a sustainability-oriented agenda, it could yield more sustainability related
imaginaries and more radical, sustainability related change. What if, for example, experimentation with smart
grids was guided by the overarching aim of empowering local energy communities? Or of capacitating residential
prosumers?
That said, it is important to note that Berlin’s current smart grid storylines have a radical core that is competing
with a century-old infrastructural ideal of the grid as a “copper plate” (Agora Energiewende, 2017). This cooper
plate imaginary has defined the relationship between energy and the city for the past one hundred years. The
copper plate stands for an electricity system based on centralized management and centralized coordination,
equal supply security, and equal pricing for all. Berlin’s current smart grid storylines are indeed challenging these
logics. Current visions of smart grid futures are radical in the sense that they stand in stark contrast to the
institutional and regulatory structure of the current electricity regime and possibly even the current networked
infrastructural ideal (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2020). However, they are much less radical when it comes to
envisioning sustainable urban futures. Here, Berlin’s urban experiments are (re)producing a techno-optimist
paradigm that is narrowly confined to – or arguably overwhelmed by - a hegemonic, business-as-usual ideology.
In doing so, they resemble “bounded studios within which to integrate finance, computation and digital media
with discourses of sustainability” (Halpern and Günel, 2017: 7). I criticize that Berlin’s visions of urban smart grid
146
futures are thus daring to challenge incumbent electricity system logics on the one hand, but failing to challenge
processes of smart, “entrepreneurial urbanism” (Datta, 2015) on the other.
For this to change, Berlin’s smart grid experiments need to embrace a much more clearly sustainability-oriented
agenda that is guided by inclusive, open-ended processes of radical visioneering, or what Strengers calls
processes of “reimagining how we live” (Strengers, 2014: 30). Currently, however, the visions of sustainable
urban futures promoted through Berlin’s future sites are limited to the effectiveness of novel technologies to
allow us to keep on doing as we already do, and living as we already live. Indeed, Pelzer and Versteeg assess that
visions of sustainable urban futures generally pay
“very little attention to the everyday intricacies of urban life after carbon. Terms like ‘decarbonization’
and ‘CO₂-neutral’ address the problems of our current world, but these descriptions are limited to
what the situation beyond the fossil era should not be and seem unable to sketch a vision of what it
could be like” (Pelzer and Versteeg, 2019: 13).
Too often, visions of the future dwell on assessments of the present while neglecting the difficult processes of
imagining the unknown future. Especially in relation to smart technologies, Hajer and Versteeg criticize that
these processes are left in large part to corporations, advertisers or norming institutions (Hajer and Versteeg,
2019). They also observe that “academics currently co-produce a highly restrictive imaginary of future cities”,
and that urban policy-makers are quick to follow suit (Hajer and Versteeg, 2019: 129). Too frequently, visions of
(smart) urban futures are not systematically developed but driven by the requirements of research funding
institutions or the corporate logics of public-private partnerships.
Building on these insights, scholars are increasingly examining how radical new ideas can be inspired and with
what effect. Pelzer and Versteeg (2019) find that urban experiments often simply lack an understanding of how
processes of imagining work in relation to sustainability transformations (Pelzer and Versteeg, 2019: 24). They
argue that an awareness for the strengths and weaknesses of different imaginative logics could positively
influence their ability to generate truly outside-the-box ideas. Various scholars thus encourage urban
experiments to systematically embrace the realms of art and emotion (Hajer and Pelzer, 2018; Pelzer et al., 2021;
Stripple et al., 2021). Among others, they invite the creative input of designers, film-makers, writers or
performance actors to challenge our relationship with the present through artistic interventions (Stripple et al.,
2021). In effect, they all point to the need to engage more consciously and more intentionally in processes of
imagining urban futures, and to make use of the abundant knowledge that exists in the creative disciplines. By
contrast, visions of Berlin’s smart grid futures are not being developed in a systematic way. Instead, they are
being promoted eclectically, be it through scientific conferences, corporate websites, brochures, showrooms,
presentations, family events or the like.
I argue that visions, too, need to be understood as governance tools and fundamental prerequisites for enabling
and shaping urban socio-technical transitions. Although the transitions literature finds that visions alone aren’t
able to generate transformative change (van der Voorn and Quist, 2018), visions nevertheless play a fundamental
role in instigating socio-technical change (Gustafsson and Mignon, 2020). As such, they need to be systematically
147
integrated into processes of urban experimentation. In this sense, I argue that urban experimentation could (and
should) also learn from processes of visioning as they have been practiced and theorized in urban planning. As I
laid out in my theoretical framework (see chapter 5.5 “Envisioning the future of the city”), guiding visions in
urban planning have a long history as fundamental parts of city-making processes. In planning history, the act of
envisioning urban futures was long considered the creative work of individual planner masterminds, but this
notion has been largely replaced by a conceptualization of visioning as processes of participatory community
development (Shipley and Michela 2006, p. 224-225). Although an ongoing debate reflects the need for both
inspiring individuals and community participation, acts of developing a guiding vision – or visioning – are
fundamental to the planning process and require a structured approach. As Shipley and Michela (2006)
synthesize:
“The first lesson for practice, therefore, is that the bases of influence from visions and visioning should
be conceptualized ahead of time, and actions to formulate, communicate and otherwise develop and
promote a vision should be shaped as precisely as possible to conform to one’s conceptual/theoretical
assumptions” (Shipley and Michela, 2006: 240).
Some of this urban planning literature expands the notion of visioning into the slightly broader but arguably more
accurate notion of storytelling, i.e. of giving meaning to certain pasts, presents and futures through imaginative
stories (van Hulst 2012; Throgmorton 2007; Sandercock, 2011). While notions of visions or visioning imply the
existence of an ultimate future state that can be achieved, the notion of a story or storytelling better captures
the procedural nature of planning and essentially of urban change. As an urban planning tool, storytelling is
understood as social (instead of individual) act of co-constructing a story that considers “the complex social
networks, physical settings, and institutional processes in which those stories are told” (Thogmorton 2007, p.
250 – from van Hulst). It thus strongly resonates with the concepts of discourse and of storylines, which underlie
this dissertation.
In urban planning literature, both storytelling and visioning are theorized as purposeful acts that depend on
shared meaning-making and on inclusivity for success. If visions or storylines are to be broadly accepted and to
incentivize change, they need to be created with not for audiences (van Hulst). If a vision is to lead to action,
then “the processes of formulating, communicating and otherwise shepherding a vision should keep salient the
connection between the ends sought in the vision and the values held by community members” (Shipley and
Michela, 2006: 240). Guiding these processes then has the potential to lead to radical urban change. This kind of
“dialectic utopianism” (Harvey, 1996) or “dialectical imagination” (Sandercock, 2012) refers to processes of
envisioning city futures that are not fixed and coherent, but “accept struggle and flux as necessary and in need
of acknowledgement, rather than something to be hidden in the creation of a supposedly conflict-free realm”
(Pinder, 2002: 238). Put differently, the idea of visioning in planning is strongly underpinned by notions of
deliberative, open-ended exploration and even conflict rather than the (rather authoritarian) idea of imposing a
fixed (technological) ideal and working toward it. It is precisely this process-orientation that “allows utopianism
to play a continuing role in radical thinking about cities” (Pinder, 2002: 239). Or as Stripple et al put it, “the best
imaginary worlds have an open-ended, work-in-progress quality” (Stripple et al., 2021: 89). By contrast, urban
148
experimentation in Berlin has brought expert communities closer together, but it has not rendered a broadly
discussed or socially accepted “strong story” (Hajer 2010) of Berlin’s future relationship with energy. It has not
offered a forum for deliberation or a platform for discussing what kinds of energy futures in what kind of city for
what kind of society could be desirable.
To do so, Berlin’s urban experiments might need to re-evaluate their relationship with contingency and control
(Bulkeley et al., 2019). They might need to re-evaluate in how far they are driven by a truly open-ended,
experimental approach or by predetermined, uni-directional steering. More precisely, Berlin’s urban
experiments might need to dare higher levels of contingency to allow more open and more radical processes of
sustainable city-imagining. Just like urban planning, urban experimentation might need to embrace what they
do as “always unfinished social project” (Sandercock, 2002). I close this section with the words of David Pinder,
who warns that “at a time when the language of alternatives is declared outdated if not impermissible, it appears
that the capacity to imagine and conceptualize social transformation and different urban futures – the very
essence of utopian urbanism – is itself thrown into doubt” (Pinder, 2002: 232).
10.5 Show stronger political leadership
Finally, I argue that by promoting smart grid experimentation in this way, the city of Berlin is squandering a much-
needed chance to fundamentally transform its current unsustainable energy system. Instead of understanding
and designing its sites of urban experimentation as governance tools for implementing the Energiewende, these
sites are designed as research and development projects for technology tinkering and demonstration. They are
embedded in the logics of industrialization and innovation politics, not Energiewende politics. Under these
circumstances, is not surprising that the Energiewende related visions and material infrastructures that have
been developed at these sites have functioned more as superficial branding than as catalysts for urban change.
I argue that if urban experimentation was more strictly understood and designed as tool for sustainability
governance, then Berlin’s urban Energiewende could benefit much more strongly from its smart grid related
results. Unfortunately, however, Berlin’s future sites are currently understood primarily as governance tools for
achieving regional economic growth, and the pilot projects are understood as possibility for scientific
collaboration and technological learning. This is reflected in their design, affects the technology centered
storylines they promote and restricts their energy related impact.
Even though the biggest obstacles for smart grid implementation in Berlin arguably lie in the institutional and
regulatory domains, Berlin’s smart grid pilot projects are neither designed to enable institutional learning nor
embedded in a structural approach to experimental governance. If cities want to learn from experimentation,
they need to build up structures to integrate the lessons learned from urban experimentation in a systematic
way. As enablers of experimentation, they must use the knowledge acquired in urban living labs to enable
transformative change, first within their own organizations. As Potjer et al summarize: “ Urban experimentation
as a form of governance can be an important catalyst to change, but only when it is connected to the practices
of governance that take place around it, whether that be on the urban level, the regional, national or
supranational level” (Potjer et al., 2018: 4). As long as Berlin’s experimental pilot projects are embedded first and
149
foremost in governmental programs to generate regional economic growth, they will hardly lead to energy
related institutional learning or catalyze energy related change. Instead, they need to be embedded in
governmental structures that enable and embrace energy related institutional learning. In other words, the
Berlin Senate needs to create the ideal environment for its pilot projects to thrive (Potjer, 2019). Evans et al
(2021) find that urban administrations are actually very often eager to learn from experiments, but that they
mostly do so “implicitly and without a clear methodology or dedicated resources for capturing learning” (Evans
et al., 2021: 176). For this purpose, Turnheim et al. (2020) argue that “policymakers may need new skills to deal
with a variety of stakeholders (beyond large firms), manage and evaluate experiments (including acknowledging
inevitable failures), and monitor progress on multiple dimensions (not just costs)” (Turnheim et al., 2020: 119).
Concomitantly, the idea of “scaling-up” needs to be more systematically addressed in the experimentation
processes themselves. The pilot projects need to extend their focus from technological and social learning to
systematically embrace questions of institutional learning. Currently, Berlin’s smart grid projects have addressed
learning mostly as internal processes of technological “learning-by-doing” between project partners, and as
external processes of public outreach and “experiential learning” at events. However, forms of institutional or
second-order learning have been largely neglected. Evans et al (2021) mention a smart grid project in the UK,
which “spent four years out of a five-year project resolving contractual and trust, rather than technical, issues”
(Evans et al., 2021: 177). According to Potjer et al. (2019), urban experiments need to involve policy-makers from
the start, nurture meaningful exchange with other pilot projects at the local level, and connect with the
institutional world “so that institutions can create the optimal conditions for experiments and use their lessons
for change” (Potjer, 2019: 87).
In sum, Berlin’s political leaders need to show stronger leadership when it comes to defining the goals of its
urban experiments (energy transitions not economic growth) and open their governmental practices to embrace
the changes advanced. Otherwise, experimentation will remain a hype. And hypes are typically followed by
disappointment. If the Berlin Senate was truly interested in smart grids as prerequisite for the city’s
Energiewende, it should understand urban experimentation as possibility to develop pluralistic visions of a future
smart grid system, to promote social (over technological) energy innovation, to tinker with different possible
transition pathways and to provide the necessary framework conditions for institutional learning and urban
change. In short, urban experimentation could use more sustainability oriented political leadership.
150
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Appendix
Interview guideline (english)
Block I - Introduction
1. My project
• How will urban energy production, consumption, and trading potentially change through the
introduction of smart grids?
2. What do you do at [your company]?
Block II – Ideas about and evluation of smart grid
3. In one sentence, what do you mean when you say „smart grid“?
4. How does [your company] relate to your definition of smart grid? And how do they differ?
5. What are smart grids good for?
• Renewables integration?
• Distributed generation?
• Flexibility?
• Co2 reduction?
• Lowering energy costs?
• Sector coupling?
6. What visions do you have for smart grid technologies in cities (at the distribution level)?
• Who will prosume in the city? SMEs? Households?
• Role model? (Brooklyn?)
• Network of networks?
Block III – Expectations of smart grid technology for people
7. Who will use the technology?
8. What will change for energy users (households) through smart grid technology?
9. Describe a typical prosumer, for example in Berlin
• What advantages or disadvantages might urban residents have?
10. What will change for neighborhoods or communities through smart grids?
• You say that the smart grid of the future will be able to operate “in total isolation”. What does
this mean for those neighborhoods?
• The brochures also says “community sustainability”. What do you mean by this?
164
Block V – Implementation of smart grids in Berlin
1. Do you have pilots of smart grids underway in Berlin? Elsewhere?
2. Tell me more about the pilot!
• Participants?
• Role of resarch institutions?
• Role of private companies?
3. What is the role of the Berlin Senate in this whole enterprise?
• How are you working with them?
4. What are obstacles to the implementation of smart grids (in Berlin)?
• Obstacles?
• Technical difficulties?
• Regulatory difficulties?
• Opponents?
• Is there critcism of smart grids? Why?
• Any Berlin-specific obstacles? Senate? Neighborhood collectives?
11. What do smart grids mean for the local utility?
• Wie sehen Sie die Rolle des Stadtwerks beim Thema Digitalisierung?
5. Alternatives to the smart grid?
• What alternatives are there to smart grids?
• Do you know people or groups that are against smart grids or proposing alternatives?
Block IV – Advantages and disadvantages of smart grids for Berlin
6. Where will renewable energies come from in the Berlin case?
• Roof tops?
7. Spatial effects?
• Different energy prices per region?
• Different supply security per neighborhood?
8. What are the risks that smart grids entail?
• Cyber attacks?
• Data privacy?
Block V - Closure
9. Could you recommend further interview partners?
