The political economy of coal in Poland: Drivers and barriers for a shift away from fossil fuels [original]

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

Available online 29 July 2020

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

The political economy of coal in Poland: Drivers and barriers for a shift

away from fossil fuels

Hanna Brauers

, Pao-Yu Oei

Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP) at the University of Technology Berlin, Germany

DIW Berlin, German Institute of Economic Research, Germany

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Poland

Coal phase-out

Energy transition

Triple embeddedness framework

Political feasibility

Political economy

ABSTRACT

Poland is the largest hard coal and second largest lignite producer in the EU, generating around 80 percent of its

electricity from coal. Resistance to a reduction in coal production and consumption comes from various actors,

namely, coal corporations, unions, parts of civil society and the government – as well as their coalitions. Their

opposition centres around the prospect of losing their business, past negative experiences with structural change,

fears of rising energy prices and energy security concerns, as well as potential unemployment in regions almost

entirely dependent on coal.

This paper identifies key political and economic drivers and barriers of a reduction in coal production and

consumption in Poland using the Triple Embeddedness Framework. Uneconomic coal mining, unavoidable en-

ergy infrastructure investments, rising air pollution levels and pressure from the European Union might provide

new political momentum for a shift away from coal in line with international climate targets. However, results

show that to achieve political feasibility, policies targeting a reduction in coal production and use need to be

implemented jointly with social and structural policy measures, addressing a just transition for the affected

regions in line with the vision of a ‘European Green Deal’.

1. Introduction

Greenhouse gas emissions related to coal combustion are the biggest

single contributor to global climate change. In order to avoid exceeding

dangerous levels of global warming by 1.5 �C or 2 �C, burning coal needs

to be cut drastically in the coming decades (UNEP, 2017, chap. 5;

Rockstr€

om et al., 2017; McGlade and Ekins, 2015). Internationally, ef-

forts to curb coal production and consumption are increasing, as

demonstrated by e.g. the Powering Past Coal Alliance (see e.g. (Green,

2018; Jewell et al., 2019)) and the commitment of many European

Union (EU) countries to a coal phase-out. This shift away from coal can

be seen as one important pillar of the sustainable energy transition.

So far, the main focus on how to reduce coal (and more generally

fossil fuel) consumption and production was on demand side policies (e.

g. carbon pricing or emissions performance standards for coal-fired

power plants). This is increasingly complemented by more research on

supply side policies (e.g. a moratorium on new mines or enforced mine

closures; see Special Issue on ‘Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate Policy’

(van Asselt and Lazarus, 2018), Mendelevitch et al. (2019) or potential

effects on coal exporting countries (Oei and Mendelevitch, 2019; Richter

et al., 2018)). Supply-side policies can e.g. contribute to reducing overall

mitigation costs, slowing down investments in fossil fuels, limiting

carbon lock-in effects, increasing moral pressure as well as public sup-

port for climate protection measures and restricting a short-term pro-

duction increase (Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018).

This is complemented by research focusing specifically on coal

transitions, combining the analysis of supply and demand side policies

as well as climate policy and transition (e.g. social and regional) policies

(Spencer et al., 2018). The combination has been found to be so

important as, from a political economy perspective, policies tackling the

* Corresponding author. Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623, Berlin, Germany.

E-mail address: [email protected] (H. Brauers).

‘Energy (system) transformation’ and ‘energy (system) transition’ are frequently used interchangeably in the scientific discourse, although differentiations – such

as a stronger focus on societal contributions to change in the energy transition literature, or bottom-up ‘transformations’ rather than top-down structured ‘transi-

tions’, as well as the transformation term comprising comprehensive social upheavals - have been identified (Child and Breyer, 2017). In the following, we use the

term ‘transitions’ to refer to substantial changes in societal, economic and, more specifically, energy systems. The term transformation will be used if scholars

explicitly refer to it.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111621

Received 20 December 2019; Received in revised form 11 May 2020; Accepted 18 May 2020

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

transition just from only one of these aspects has proven very chal-

lenging. Especially anticipatory and long-term policies to support

affected regions need to be included in a successful climate-policy

induced coal transition policy mix (Spencer et al., 2018; Sartor, 2018;

Oei et al., 2020).

Poland, until now, shows little ambition to limit its coal extraction

and use – as can be seen within its newest National Energy and Climate

Plan (NECP).

It is an interesting country to study for two main reasons.

Firstly, it is the largest hard coal producer and second largest lignite

producer in the EU (IEA, 2017). Unlike other main coal producers in the

EU (e.g. the UK, Germany, Spain, etc.), Poland has not committed itself

to end coal mining. Secondly, Poland does not only lag behind in its

missing commitment to end coal and to reduce its energy dependence on

coal as main energy carrier, but is also one of the main countries vetoing

EU policies that aim to increase climate protection ambitions (Jan-

kowska, 2017). This shows that it is not just a time lag between the

transition compared to other EU countries, but an active choice to

protect its coal industry. At the international climate conference COP 24

in Katowice, coal was proudly showcased, while President Andrzej Duda

confirmed that “there is no plan today to fully give up on coal” and that

Polish supplies would last for another 200 years.

Poland has hence

become an outlier within the EU, which makes it an interesting case to

analyse which factors hinder the necessary transition and which policy

options might overcome this.

Explaining current policy outcomes regarding coal in Poland, but

also in other countries, requires recognising the political influence of

powerful stakeholders (Goulder and Parry, 2008). In recent years,

attention in academic literature looking at energy transitions has shifted

from a more technical and innovation perspective – with a focus on

renewables and niche-innovations support (Bergek et al., 2008; Geels,

2002; Smith et al., 2010) – to the general call for a stronger integration

of social sciences in energy and transition research (Sovacool et al.,

2015) – including the analysis of how the incumbent fossil fuel regimes

can be destabilised and eventually replaced (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016;

Kungl and Geels, 2016; Turnheim and Geels, 2013).

Resistance to a shift away from coal originates from various actors –

namely, coal firms, unions, parts of civil society, and the government –

albeit for different reasons. Policy outcomes regarding coal production

and consumption are deeply influenced by these actors and their co-

alitions, as analyses for other countries have shown (Leipprand and

Flachsland, 2018; Kungl, 2015; Turnheim and Geels, 2013, 2012; Bra-

uers et al., 2018; V€

ogele et al., 2018).

Politics and power (structural forms, institutional politics and

discursive expressions of power) are important for the creation of a

certain pathway. A transformation is not planned and then put into place

by politicians. It is rather a “product of competition and interaction between

a number of pathways, supported by diverse social actors with highly uneven

political power” (Scoones et al., 2015). Hence, looking at the various

actors in and around the coal regime in Poland, their interests, relation,

and their influence is important to explain why the coal regime has been

able to uphold its position.

In addition to politics and power, economic development and tech-

nological innovation are important elements influencing energy transi-

tions (Cherp et al., 2018). A framework suitable to include all these

factors is the Triple Embeddedness Framework (TEF) (Geels, 2014),

which conceptualises interactions of an industry regime with its eco-

nomic and socio-political environments. Although the TEF focuses on

the technological and market level, it enables the incorporation of state

and citizen power, as well as politics in general. Regime destabilisations,

as transformations in general, have never been linear, structured, and

planned with specific targets, but are always messy and contested

(Scoones et al., 2015). The TEF enables the descriptive analysis of main

trends influencing the coal regime to make sense of such past

developments.

We combine this socio-technical transitions approach with political

economy thinking, which has been identified as a research gap in energy

transitions research (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012; Meadowcroft, 2011)

and is increasingly becoming a focus of analysis (see e.g. Newell and

Mulvaney (2013); Baker et al. (2014); Power et al. (2016); Kern and

Markard (2016); Arent et al. (2017); Paterson and P-Laberge (2018)).

Importantly, it complements the more innovation and techno-economic

focus of the socio-technical transitions literature with aspects of power,

interests, institutions, discourses and politics. The political economy

literature puts emphasis on the influence of power imbalances, political

business cycles, (informal) actor networks, institutions and inequality.

This paper aims to contribute to the literature by analysing why the

coal regime in Poland aims at maintaining the role of coal as major

energy source for the electricity industry (in contrast to most other EU

states), and which role socio-political and economic dimensions play in

this. To answer this question, we analyse which actors (and their net-

works) are supporting coal and which actors and interests might have

already started to destabilise the coal regime. The paper identifies

drivers and barriers for a reduction of Polish coal dependence,

acknowledging the underlying politics as well as the technical, economic

and social context.

The analysis of the coal regime in Poland for three decades from

1990 until 2019 is followed by an analysis of how policies addressing the

reduction of coal production and consumption can be complemented by

structural policies to increase political feasibility. The paper proceeds as

follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background and method-

ology. Section 3 presents the status-quo of coal in Poland and conducts

the analysis of the political economy of coal. Section 4 looks at supply

and demand side policy options to accelerate a decline of coal, as well as

structural policies suitable for the current status of the political econ-

omy. Section 5 concludes. The supplementary material gives a more

extensive description of the situation of coal in Poland and the TEF

analysis.

2. Methodology

2.1. Theoretical background: The Triple Embeddedness Framework

The TEF is a conceptual framework developed by Geels (2014) that is

part of the socio-technical transitions literature (for further information

see Supplementary Material Section 7.3). The framework refers to the

situation of firms within an industry regime, which is itself embedded in

two external environments – the economic and the socio-political

environment. An industry regime is influenced by its socio-political

environment, where e.g. legitimacy and social fitness determine its

success, and the economic environment that demands economic compet-

itiveness, efficiency and financial performance. The TEF acknowledges

the ability of firms to respond to their environments and influence them

through strategic actions. The responses of firms-in-industries are both

externally-oriented (towards the economic and the socio-political

environment) and internally-oriented (Geels, 2014). The TEF enables

us to investigate how incumbency can be weakened when single pres-

sures from the two environments align.

Industries that can be analysed with this framework are reluctant to

change, hold a high political influence and are scale-intensive with

many sunk investments, which is all true for the coal sector. The TEF

recognises institutional change and includes strategic behaviour as well

as power of actors. By enabling the analysis of the co-evolution and the

bi-directional relationships between an industry regime and its envi-

ronments, the TEF addresses shortcomings of previous methodologies

(e.g. industrial economists focusing only on economic pressures or neo-

gov.PL. 2019. ‘Executive Summary of Poland’s National Energy and Climate

Plan for the Years 2021–2030 (NECP PL)’. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/e

ner/files/documents/pl_final_necp_summary_en.pdf.

Reuters. 2018. ‘Katowice COP24 Notebook: Spotlight Descends on Mining’.

https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1O41NE.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

institutionalism simply on socio-political pressures) (see Kungl and

Geels (2018) for discussion).

The framework is part of the field of sustainability transition studies,

where the most prominent theoretical frameworks encompass transition

management, strategic niche management, the multi-level perspective

and technological innovation systems (Markard et al., 2012; Fünfschil-

ling and Truffer, 2014). For several reasons, they are not suitable for our

research questions: One of the criticism of all four approaches is that

they have a “rather unpolitical understanding of transitions” (Haas,

2019), however, the Polish case can only be understood when including

politics. Also, the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002) and strategic

niche management (Kemp et al., 1998) focus on emerging niches and

changes to a system. Hence, those approaches are not useful for this

analysis, as it focuses on the incumbent regime itself (see also Johnstone

et al. (2017) and Kivimaa and Kern (2016) for a discussion on regime

destabilisation) and aims to identify stabilising factors, besides the ones

enabling change. The technological innovation systems approach

(Carlsson et al., 2002) puts a specific emphasis on the interaction of

actors including firms, but the approach is also most suitable for the

analysis of niches and innovation processes, while we focus on the

opposite – prevention of innovation and inclusion of new technologies.

Transition management focuses on active government intervention,

being partly prescriptive and focusing on strategic, tactical, operational

and reflexive management approaches (Loorbach, 2010). This frame-

work would not enable us to understand the economic or technical

context sufficiently.

Hence, we chose the TEF, as it makes it possible to focus on the

incumbent regime, while it also enables us to include politics and

structural power as well as historical developments (see also Johnstone

and Newell (2018)), allows us to apply a political economy perspective

to understand the particularities of the Polish situation (see also Newell

and Paterson (1998), Levy and Newell (2002) and Newell (2018)), and

nevertheless include technology developments and the country specific

societal context as relevant influencing factors of sustainable energy

transitions. By highlighting the embeddedness of the regime in the

socio-political and techno-economic environment, we can highlight how

the incumbents protect their interests and create lock-ins into coal

dependence, but also identify current threats to coal’s dominance and

potential avenues for change.

2.2. Data collection and framework application

The TEF has been applied in several case studies, e.g. to analyse the

destabilisation of the British coal industry (Turnheim and Geels, 2013,

2012), in the context of electric mobility (Sovacool et al., 2017) and

incumbent electricity utilities in Germany and Switzerland (Kungl and

Geels, 2018; Mühlemeier, 2019). To our knowledge, we are the first to

apply it to the case of Polish coal use.

Data-collection is guided by the conceptual framework focusing on

the relevant actors and contexts rather than on dependent and inde-

pendent variables (Kungl and Geels, 2016, 2018). Our explorative study

relies on a literature review to determine the general political, technical

and economic situation of coal, it’s social relevance and aforementioned

actors’ positions. Collection of data on this includes primary literature,

such as statements provided by ministries, unions and NGOs, company

press reports and annual reports, as well as a range of daily newspaper

articles and blogs. The secondary literature used comprises of scientific

peer-reviewed journals, as well as other articles, reports and books.

Additionally, we consulted databases, e.g. by the Central Statistical

Office of Poland, to obtain information on the development of coal

mines, power plants and employment figures. In total we collected and

analysed more than 600 documents, mostly written in English or

German.

To gain a deeper understanding of the Polish situation regarding

coal, we had several informal background discussions with Polish

stakeholders on research visits to Warsaw, Ł�

od�

z and Katowice in 2017

and 2018, involving industry, civil society, and academia representa-

tives. A potential shortcoming is that only English and German docu-

ments

and no unofficial/secret government or corporate documents

have been analysed. However, we believe this has at least partly been

corrected for by discussions of preliminary results and draft versions of

the paper with Polish energy sector experts.

The extracted information from these different sources is then ana-

lysed with the TEF framework (compare e.g. with the approach taken by

V€

ogele et al. (2018)). The inductive approach intends to generate new

insights about the Polish coal sector based on empirical data. In our

iterative approach we refined intermediate results after presentations

and discussions with (Polish) stakeholders at five international aca-

demic conferences.

The main aim of the paper is to provide an overall picture of the

Polish political economy of coal in a novel way. Many of the single el-

ements included in the TEF have been studied by other authors. Our

main contribution is to bring these empirical results into the descriptive

framework to better understand the complexities of the many mecha-

nisms influencing the political economy of coal in Poland. We derive

policy implications through the identification and comparison of main

drivers and barriers of a coal phase-out.

Actor groups which are included in the analysis due to their impor-

tance for the coal industry more specifically, and sustainability transi-

tions more generally, are the firms of the incumbent coal regime, non-

governmental organisations (NGOs), governments, labour unions, civil

society and competitors for coal (based on Hess (2014) and Turnheim

and Geels (2013)). The analysis is conducted over the time period from

1990 to 2018, as the destabilisation of a regime is a long-term process

and historic events can reveal broader societal and economic trends

creating path dependencies and lock-in effects (see also Kungl and Geels

(2016)). Also, most data are only available post-1989, after the end of

the communist regime in Poland.

A special emphasis is put on the more

recent past after the Paris Agreement and the election of a new Polish

government as well as leading up to COP 24 in Poland from 2015 to

2019. Due to the close connection of upstream coal mining and coal use

for downstream electricity generation, both are included in the coal

regime analysis.

3. Results

The following section includes the analysis of the three main ele-

ments of the TEF: The socio-political environment, the economic envi-

ronment, and internal as well as external response strategies by the

regime to those influences.

3.1. Socio-political environment analysis of polish coal industry

Poland is, as a legacy from the communist regime, very centralised

(Baran et al., 2018). The national Polish government, now a coordinated

market economy (Rentier et al., 2019), has continuously supported the

coal industry, even though it also managed the historical decline e.g. by

enforcing the closure of the most inefficient mines (Szpor, 2017; Zien-

tara, 2009). The coal sector’s inefficiency due to overcapacity and

over-employment inherited from Soviet-era influence was targeted for

the first time at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990, almost 388,000

people worked in Polish coal mines (Szpor, 2017). During the 1990s,

four different government programs led to several mine pits closures,

while other mines were grouped together (profitable with unprofitable

ones) and later merged into larger coal corporations (Baran et al., 2018;

Suwala, 2010; Zientara, 2009). Decisive restructuring failed in impor-

tant factors including the total expenditure levels, delays in decisions of

As none of the authors speak Polish, no Polish texts were analysed.

A detailed description of the development of the Polish coal sector,

including periods before 1990, can be found in the Supplementary Material.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

employment cuts and a missing legal framework (Zientara, 2007;

Suwala, 2010). By 2015, 99,500 miners were left with around 13,000

people employed in coal fired-power plants (Alves Dias et al., 2018, 21).

A very dominant influence on the socio-political environment and

hindering coal industry restructuring has been, and still is, the miners’

unions. Their political power led to high employment and high salaries,

even in times when the coal sector was in a very poor state (Gurgul and

Lach, 2011). The extent of Polish coal miners’ power becomes apparent

when comparing their status to miners in other countries: Polish miners

work fewer hours a day and fewer days a year, have additional public

holidays, additional monthly salary, benefits for long-term employment

and earlier retirement options. Trade unions fought hard to obtain these

working conditions. They exert political power by lobbying through

direct talks with politicians but also strikes (Trappmann, 2012). The

government’s first attempt in 1991 to restructure the unprofitable

mining sector failed due to internationally low prices for coal and the

strong political power of the trade unions. The unions successfully

resisted all proposals to reduce wages or to cut employment until around

1996 (Suwala, 2010).

A government programme from 1998 was successful in winning

support from unions as well as corporations for the restructuring pro-

gram and related mine closures. Efficiency of mines increased for the

first time, especially by reducing employment numbers. Workers losing

their jobs got retirement benefits but no retraining (Suwala, 2010). Less

than three percent of all expenditures on restructuring programs during

these years went to job creation in other sectors. As local authorities,

which were meant to create new job opportunities, had little experience

with this task and received no support, success in that respect was very

limited (Suwala, 2010).

Reductions in coal mining and employment continued during the

2000s, however, much more slowly (see Fig. 1 for an overview of coal

mining, and coal related employment and electricity generation).

Unions continued to protest against the shutdown of mines, e.g. in

January 2015, after the announcement of the closure of four loss-

generating mines owned by KW,

employees went on strike. Only after

the parliament agreed on a special bill to restructure the coal mines to

prevent closures did the protests cease. Strikes restarted only days later

when JSW

announced that the number of miners’ working days would

be increased and their benefits cut.

The PiS party (‘Law and Justice’ party) has a strong pro-coal stance

(Osi�

cka et al., 2020), and won the parliamentary election in 2015

partly

on promises to protect the coal industry. Under the new PiS government,

(partly) state-owned utilities were forced to form the new mining group

PGG, rescuing various other mining companies from bankruptcy (EIA,

2016; Ancygier and Szulecki, 2016). As a consequence, PGG bought KW,

formerly Europe’s largest coal mining company, and later merged with

KHW

. The debt of the entire coal sector amounted to around

€

3.4

billion at the end of October 2015. Additional financial support for PGG

emerged from state-owned investors PGNiG, PGE, Enea, Energa and TF

Silesia, creating an even stronger link between mining and electricity

generation (Polityka Insight, 2017; Kuchler and Bridge, 2018).

Polish public opinion on coal mining is split: In several referendums

of villages affected by mine openings, the majority of citizens voted

against new coal mines (e.g. 2009 in Gubin and Brody) (Widera et al.,

2016). In other communities where mine openings were under discus-

sion, public acceptance for coal mine development was high (Badera and

Koco�

n, 2014). Factors influencing public opinion are especially fears

with respect to employment losses, rising energy prices and energy se-

curity. Fuel poverty in Poland is high, and fears persist that reducing

coal consumption might increase electricity prices further (Bouzarovski

and Tirado Herrero, 2017). High energy security concerns are mostly

linked to dependence on Russia (Szabo and Fabok, 2020; Szulecki, 2020;

Szulecki and Kusznir, 2018). Those concerns are often related to natural

gas consumption, but also an important argument mentioned in favour

of continuing Polish coal production (Szulecki and Kusznir, 2018;

Kuchler and Bridge, 2018). The Green Party and Greenpeace also refer to

energy security concerns regarding Russia, stating that only renewables

would reduce this dependence long-term (Szulecki and Kusznir, 2018).

Surveys show that Polish citizens are less interested in the economic

situation of the coal industry than in energy affordability and energy

security.

Coal-based energy is not the preferred energy source of the

future; instead, the majority of people favour renewable energies and to

a lesser extent nuclear energy. Similarly, subsidies towards the coal

sector are increasingly unpopular. Only around one-quarter support the

social privileges to miners and 64% want coal mines to receive the same

treatment as other companies (Bukowski et al., 2015). At the same time,

there are parts of society that would support trade unions in a conflict

over mine closures with national policymakers (Szpor and

Witajewski-Baltvilks, 2016).

The interplay between the political agenda, media and public

opinion is complex (Osi�

cka et al., 2020). However, generally stated,

public opinion is influenced by the media. Independent media can

enable civil society and science to disseminate their findings and thereby

inform the general public and assert pressure on incumbents.

State controlled media, on the other hand, has the potential to

strengthen socio-political protection of an (uneconomic) industry

regime opposing phase-out processes. State-owned media companies in

Poland tend to reproduce state-level policymakers’ views (Schwartz-

kopff and Schulz, 2017). Partisanship of the media has traditionally

Fig. 1. Coal mining, electricity generation and number of employees in Poland

from 1990 to 2018.

Own depiction based on Central Statistical Office of Poland (various years;

2019), World Bank (2017), and own calculations.

Kompania Weglowa (Polish coal mining company). For information on the

mentioned corporations see Supplementary Material.

Jastrzębska Sp�

ołka Węglowa (Polish coal mining company).

Czarzasty, Jan. 2017. ‘Poland: Tensions in Coal-Mining Escalate into Major

Conflict’. Eurofound. May 19. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/obser

vatories/eurwork/articles/industrial-relations/polandtensions-in-coal-

mining-escalate-into-major-conflict.

As well as the parliamentary elections in 2019.

Katowicki Holding Węglowy (Polish coal mining company).

See e.g. CEM Institute. 2015. Polish people’s attitudes towards the coal

industry (Polacy wobec przemysłu g�

orniczego). Cited in: Bukowski et al.

(2015).

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

been high in Poland. Polish state-owned media companies receive a

large share of their revenue from other state-owned companies through

state advertisement funds. Since the election of PiS in 2015, senior

management of major state media radio and TV channels can be

appointed by the government (Kundzewicz et al. 2019), increasing

partisanship (Dzięciołowski, 2017). Progressive voices and regime

critics speak only occasionally in mass media and more often in speci-

alised media (Schwartzkopff and Schulz, 2017).

Polish media focuses

on the importance of coal for the Polish economy and society, highlights

energy security concerns and mobilises support for the industry. Often

the future of coal is discussed as in how the government needs to keep

the coal industry alive, despite its uncompetitiveness (Osi�

cka et al.,

2020). Climate change and related policy has been covered less than in

other EU countries; Politicians speak out less about climate change and

do not refer to or downplay the link between coal and climate change

(Kundzewicz et al., 2019).

The only actor group actively working against coal mining and

power plants are, increasingly, NGOs like Greenpeace, “Development

Yes – Open Pit Mines No!”, Action Democracy or Client Earth. As the

government is backing coal, more lawsuits are being filed to stop the

expansion of new mines and construction of new power plants.

Climate change concerns are not as strong as in most other EU

countries (Ceglarz et al., 2018; Kundzewicz et al., 2019). Opposition to

coal therefore arises mainly due to relocation of citizens and air pollu-

tion. The poor air quality led to a ban of coal furnaces for household

heating in Krakow taking effect in 2019. However, the media discourse

focuses on smog related to local heating, and mostly not on coal mining

and large-scale coal-fired power plants (Osi�

cka et al., 2020). Neverthe-

less, due to the high air pollution levels in Poland (World Health Or-

ganization, 2016), awareness about the topic is generally high. A survey

found that Polish citizens believe that a “lack of policy coherence for

sustainable development in terms of air protection” is one of the greatest

barriers for the use of renewable energies (Wojciechowska-Solis, 2018).

Chandler et al. (2018) categorised actors in environmental and en-

ergy policies in Poland according to their position on coal and political

power. According to the analysis, NGOs remain weak political actors,

ranking far behind incumbent energy companies and political parties in

terms of political power. Polish NGOs are relatively small and lack

experience in applying for (EU) grants. Difficulties are enhanced by high

costs of employment and the absence of national funds supporting NGOs

(Wagner et al., 2016; Szpor and Zi�

ołkowska, 2018). Hence, as those

actors in support of a decline of coal use have less political power, they

can influence decision making less than pro coal forces.

3.2. Economic environment analysis of polish coal industry

The Polish coal sector is in a dire financial situation. Without direct

subsidies and government enforced bailouts, there would hardly be any

hard coal mining left within Poland: Problems persist with profitability

and liquidity in the hard coal mining sector leading to bankruptcies

(Van�

ek et al., 2017; Jonek Kowalska, 2015; Kuchler and Bridge, 2018).

The lignite sector is still generating (at least small) revenues; but lignite

reserves in currently operating mines are shrinking. Also, the economics

of coal-fired power plants is eroding, partly because of rising CO

prices

(CTI, 2018).

Poor grid infrastructure and missing installed capacities to cover the

entire electricity demand are further aggravating the difficult situation

of the Polish energy system. Power cuts happened during the summer of

2015, with further outages expected for the next years (Wierzbowski

et al., 2017). More than 50% of the total installed capacity is expected to

come offline between 2020 and 2035, including many coal power plants

(RAP, 2018), making new investments necessary.

Hard coal exports have decreased from more than 30 million tonnes

in 1995 to less than 7 million tonnes in 2017 (Szpor and Zi�

ołkowska,

2018; Alves Dias et al., 2018). Hard coal imports increased to more than

10 million tonnes in 2017 (Statistics Poland, 2018), which makes Poland

a (small) net coal importer, mainly from Russia.

Domestic coal

extraction costs are higher than the costs of importing coal, mostly due

to difficult geological and mining conditions as well as the compara-

tively low calorific value. Analysis shows that average productivity of

hard coal production in Poland decreased by 50% from 2005 to 2013

(Rybak and Rybak, 2016).

Despite the financial problems threatening several companies with

bankruptcy and expected cost increases for both hard coal and lignite

(Baran et al., 2018), the Polish hard coal and lignite mining industry sets

hopes in the small net profits made in 2017 by several of the coal mining

companies (e.g. PGG, JSW, PGE). However, other mining companies are

still generating losses and consider closing further mines (e.g. Tauron).

In March 2020, Polish climate minister therefore mentioned for the first

time the option of rearranging assets of state-run energy groups (PGE,

Tauron, Enea and Energa), similar to the German example of RWE and E.

ON.

Investment plans for a new coal-fired power plant (Ostrołęka C, 1

GW) existed as part of the government’s energy security plan in 2019.

Latest news from February 2020, however, have led to a suspension due

to financial problems. It remains unclear if the plant will ever be built or

whether it might be transformed into a gas power plant.

Without ca-

pacity payments, which will be ruled out under EU law for plants

emitting more than 550 gCO

/kWh Regulation (EU) 2019/943 Article

22(4)

, estimates suggest that investors including Enea and Energa

could lose up to

€

1.7 billion (net present value) (CTI, 2018). The new EU

standard will apply for all new power stations as soon as it enters into

force and as of July 2025 for all existing power plants. However, Poland

managed to introduce a “grandfathering clause”, which allows the

payment of power plants for capacity provision for all contracts

approved before 31 December 2019, regardless of the 550 gCO

/kWh

rule. In effect, this enables Poland to continue to subsidise coal-fired

power plants.

Polish coal has still no major competition in the electricity sector,

with only slowly improving market shares of wind energy and natural

gas (renewables <15% share in electricity production, solar <1% and

natural gas ~7% in 2018

). Reasons include hindering renewable

regulations and a strong political focus on energy security and

In the Freedom House ranking, Poland’s “Press Freedom Status” was

degraded in 2018 from “free” to “partly free”, https://freedomhouse.org/repo

rt/freedom-world/2018/poland.

The Atlantic coal market is mostly dominated by hard coal from Russia,

USA, Colombia and South-Africa (Oei and Mendelevitch, 2019). Entering the

Baltic Sea, however, increases the costs for potential coal deliveries to Poland.

The majority of imported coal in Poland therefore originates from the cheapest

exporter Russia. In 2015, the price per ton of Polish hard coal was ~260 PLN,

while the price of coal from Russia was only ~180 PLN (Kamola-Cie�

slik, 2017).

Reuters. 2020. Polish utilities may consider German-style reorganization:

minister, 12 March 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-chang

e-poland/polish-utilities-may-consider-german-style-reorganization-minister-i

dUSKBN20Z2HD.

Forbes. 2020. Polish Firms Suspend Financing for New Coal Plant, in Latest

Sign That King Coal is Slipping. 15 February 2020. https://www.forbes.

com/sites/scottcarpenter/2020/02/15/polish

-firms-suspend-financing-for-new-coal-plant-latest-sign-th

at-king-coal-is-slipping/#93bd0f019373.

Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of

5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity. https://eur-lex.europa.eu

/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼CELEX:32019R0943&from¼EN.

Euractiv. 2018. ‘EU Forges Deal on Coal Phase-out, with Special Polish

Clause’, 19 December 2018. https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/ne

ws/eu-hammers-deal-on-coal-phase-out-with-special-polish-clause/.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1003292/poland-power-production-

by-fuel/.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

independence of Russia (Kuchler and Bridge, 2018) (see also Supple-

mentary Material, Section 7.2). To lower dependence on the Russian gas,

Poland build a state-owned Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal, to

important gas e.g. from Norway or the MENA region. High utilisation

rates despite a price premium compared to Russian pipeline gas prices

are another example for the strong ambition by the Polish state for in-

dependence of Russia (Szabo and Fabok, 2020). Adding biomass to

coal-fired power plants was a (temporary) cheap way of lowering spe-

cific emissions per kWh and helped Poland to achieve its (relatively low)

renewable energy targets (Piwowar and Dziku�

c, 2016). However, the

renewable energy target of a 15% share of overall gross final energy

consumption for 2020 will most likely not be met (Janeiro and Resch,

2017).

3.3. External and internal response strategies of the coal regime

The discourse on the importance of coal mining and combustion is

not only enforced by the sector’s companies but also by policymakers,

the media and trade unions (�

Swiątkiewicz-Mo�

sny and Wagner, 2012). In

general, the government’s influence on coal is strong – especially in the

(partly) state-owned companies: When energy companies and mines

were merged (see section 3.1), the organisational changes entailed the

replacement of management staff with party officials. Zientara (2007)

describes how these former politicians lacked economic as well as

business knowledge and skills and instead were colluding with labour

union leaders. Additionally, costs were manipulated and the financial

losses were covered up. The interconnection between the government

and energy company management was able to enforce the decision to

write off most of the industry’s debt (Zientara, 2007). Within the first

months after the 2015 elections, the PiS-led government replaced the

managers of almost all state-run energy companies, in which the Trea-

sury holds stakes of at least 50%. This has further politicised the energy

sector (Vasev, 2017). The Polish Treasury and since 2016 the Prime

Minister has ownership rights over the partly state-owned companies

PGE, Tauron, Enea and Energa.

The influence between politicians and firms involved in coal, how-

ever, works in both directions. The large energy utilities are often con-

sulted when changing laws, while representatives of renewable energy

or environmental groups are excluded (Szulecki, 2017). Additionally,

personal links between the energy corporations and the government

(revolving-door principle) increase the influence of the coal regime on

policy outcomes (Szulecki, 2017, 2018). With a continuing coal de-

pendency from the power and heating sector, mining companies can

demand further political and financial support by the government,

especially as the main alternative would be importing more Russian

coal. The substantial number of employees in energy utilities and mining

companies and their supporters can exert indirect pressures on policy-

makers in the form of election votes (Chandler et al., 2018), especially in

local ones.

The energy utilities have formed alliances in the past to achieve

favourable regulation. The four biggest electricity companies, e.g.,

formed a bloc opposing any changes to the Energy Act in 2013 law that

would improve conditions for distributed renewable energy and, hence,

potentially threaten their secure market position (Skjærseth, 2014). One

argument that coal-based utilities have frequently used is that the lack of

high-voltage power lines and an insufficiently developed electricity grid

would not allow for an expansion of distributed renewable energy re-

sources (Szulecki et al., 2015). Among the coal mining companies

seemingly making progress in restructuring efforts is JSW. The corpo-

ration has replaced its management board and after transferring one of

its seven mines to the restructuring company in 2017 and selling some of

its assets, it has been making net profit in 2017, following years of net

loss (Jastrzębska Sp�

ołka Węglowa, 2018). As a measure to save money,

the company stopped providing social benefits like bonuses and free coal

for employees between 2016 and 2018. In June 2019, the CEO of JSW

was fired after a dispute with the Polish energy ministry, including the

refusal to buy a hard coal mine from struggling state-owned energy

utility and mining company Tauron.

As societal acceptance for the expansion of lignite opencasts was

eroding, operators of lignite mines developed new strategies to gain

public support. For example, information points and meetings as well as

other participatory structures were set up to involve local citizens more

in decision-making processes (Badera and Koco�

n, 2014). However, this

served mainly as an information tool for companies that would not only

learn more about the motives and aims of citizen groups, but also use

this knowledge to prepare targeted response strategies (Wagner et al.,

2016).

Both hard coal and lignite companies have developed Corporate

Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies, at least after they became

mandatory in January 2017. As they see their business model threatened

by “an uncertain political situation, many media attacks and unfav-

ourable public opinion”, they use CSR as a strategy to improve their

public image (Pactwa and Wo�

zniak, 2017). Additionally, coal is often

rebranded as “clean coal” to create an image of coal being a long-term

solution compatible with climate protection (Kuchler and Bridge,

2018). Some energy firms start to implement more structural changes:

The largest electricity utility PGE (majority state-owned), e.g., starts to

invest in several onshore and offshore wind farms.

Polish policy makers are, besides setting favourable domestic regu-

lation for the coal industry, also responding to the external environment.

This can especially be seen by their attempts to influence and soften EU

regulation (e.g. air pollution standards and CO

pricing mechanisms) to

protect the Polish coal industry: The dependence on coal played an

important role in creating opposition to EU climate policies (Braun,

2014; Zapletalov�

a and Komínkov�

a, 2020). Polish influence on EU

climate policies has been increasingly assertive, partly in coalition with

other Central and Eastern European countries (Bocquillon and Maltby,

2017; Zapletalov�

a and Komínkov�

a, 2020). Poland aimed to lower

ambition especially in the case of the EU GHG targets for 2020 and 2030,

the EU ETS reforms, argued against country specific renewable energy

targets, and blocked conclusions on the Low Carbon Roadmap for 2050

(Bocquillon and Maltby, 2017; Marcinkiewicz and Tosun, 2015; Skjær-

seth, 2016). Vetoes on EU common energy and climate policy were

justified by stating that the resulting economic costs would be too high

(Creutzig et al., 2014; Skjærseth, 2016).

4. Discussion

4.1. Continuing polish coal industry incumbency

Changing the status quo will be challenging: Coal has structural

power over the Polish state, as it relies on coal for electricity and heat

provision, tax revenues, employment, and support for coal at least partly

influences election results. Increasingly, coal corporations use also more

internally-oriented responses (changing aspects within the corporation

in contrary to influencing the economic or socio-political environ-

ments). They have, for example, abolished miners’ privileges, replaced

management boards, liquidated several mines, limited production from

remaining ones and started the diversification of some electricity utili-

ties towards more natural gas and renewable energies. However, both

externally-oriented and internally-oriented strategies energy generation

and coal mining firms still aim mostly at securing coal’s future in

Poland’s and the corporations’ energy mix. Despite dwindling available

resources, international decarbonisation efforts and renewable energy

expansion commitments, the main corporate response strategies are:

https://www.mining.com/web/poland-sacks-ceo-of-state-run-coal-miner-

jsw-shares-tumble/.

PGE. 2020. ‘PGE in Transition’. https://www.gkpge.pl/investor-relations/

content/download/5473/file/PGE%20in%20transition_January_II%202020.

pdf.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

lobbying for favourable legislation for coal, lobbying against support for

renewables, creating a discourse about coal being necessary for energy

security and the economic development of Poland as well as possibilities

for so-called ‘clean coal’ technologies. This includes revolving-doors

between government ministries and energy corporations, CSR policies

and media campaigns. Common requirements of the economic environ-

ment like economic competitiveness, efficiency and financial perfor-

mance, have – so far – only played a subordinate role, made possible

through state-ownership. The socio-political environment still legitimises

coal; however, parts of civil society’s acceptance of coal is declining.

Negative experiences with restructuring programmes, especially

during the late 1990s, created opposition by unions and citizens to exit

coal. The analysis above as well as previous analyses have shown that

the entanglement of the government with mining and electricity cor-

porations as well as unions led to the protection of a sector that has been

unprofitable for decades (Zientara, 2007, 2009). Until now, there ap-

pears to be no clear governmental strategy on how to reduce the

dependence on coal. The newest NECP, however, acknowledges parts of

this shortcoming and outlines future work within this area (gov.PL,

2019).

A challenge for the Polish energy sector will be to refurbish the aging

power plant fleet. This will need major investments – no matter whether

they will be in coal, natural gas, nuclear or renewables. The government,

however, struggles with their preferred option of new coal power plants

– due to stricter European regulations and little interest from investors

that are too afraid of potential stranded assets (L€

offler et al., 2019;

Gerbaulet et al., 2019). Also, the vision of nuclear appears very unlikely

observing rising costs of ongoing constructions in the UK, France or

Finland (Schneider et al., 2019). This leaves only two options: Natural

gas – which would potentially mean an increasing dependence on Russia

and relying on a fossil fuel that needs to be phased out under EU climate

neutrality targets by 2050 – or renewables.

A barrier for renewable instalments (in comparison to conventional

power sources) are its division of costs, consisting of high investment

costs and very low residual operating costs (Hirth and Steckel, 2016).

Furthermore, as most coal-based electricity was distributed centrally

from Silesia to the rest of Poland, much of the Polish electricity system

would need to be redesigned (Szabo and Fabok, 2020). This results in a

need for high upfront funding, exceeding the planned investments by the

Polish government, which would pay-off in the medium and long run.

Additional external financial volumes from the EU – e.g. through the

expected ‘European Green Deal’ (EC, 2019) – or private investors are

therefore needed to start of a successful energy transition in Poland.

Table 1 summarises drivers and barriers identified through the TEF

analysis for a reduction of coal’s dominance. Coal miners and company

board members have high political influence; citizens’ support persists

because of fears about rising energy prices if coal would be pushed out of

the market also due to limited access to information about renewables

and NGOs have limited influence. Coal has still no major competition on

the electricity market. The coal regime remains protected as jobs, energy

security, political and corporate power all depend on it. The only actor

group actively working against coal is NGOs. Their main argument

hereby concentrates on the reduction of air pollution, or in some cases

other environmental issues. Climate protection, on the other side, is of

much lower concern to the majority of population. The main political

driver for a coal phase-out is hereby the EU, with a mix of regulations

weakening the already bad economic condition of the coal industry as

well as policies supporting alternative industries.

4.2. Possible future policies to reduce coal’s importance

The analysis suggests that for a Polish pathway towards less reliance

on coal, external pressures (e.g. legislation by the EU or falling renew-

able energy prices, see Table 1) – in addition to domestic pressure, so far

mostly by NGOs – will be necessary, as the majority of powerful Polish

actors are still in favour of continuing coal consumption.

The European Union serves as spokesperson for the international

climate targets signed within the Paris Agreement, especially after the

announcement of the US to step aside. The European Commission has

announced to reduce emissions in Europe by 50–55% by 2030

(compared to 1990) and to reach full carbon neutrality by 2050 (EC,

2019). A necessary condition for these targets is the phase-out of Polish

coal sector. The European Union hereby uses a strategy of ‘sticks and

carrots’ to incentivize an energy transition in Poland: i) stricter climate

and environmental regulation to reduce coal consumption as well as ii)

(conditional) financial incentives for the instalment of renewables and

most important cohesion policies to help carbon intensive regions. An

example of this is the ‘European Green Deal’ which could provide

Table 1

Drivers and barriers for a reduction in Polish coal production and consumption.

Drivers Barriers

Economic Factors

Limited economic feasibility of domestic

hard coal mining. (þþþ)

Regional economic dependence and

high employment share in the coal

sector. (—)

Limited economic feasibility of new coal-

fired power plants. (þþþ)

Limited financial support mechanisms

for renewables (need for upfront

investment). (—)

Aging infrastructure of power plants and

the electricity grid and limited

domestic coal resources in still

operating mines. (þþþ)

Potentially rising (household) electricity

prices in the short-term. (—)

Reduction of load factors due to cheaper

electricity imports. (þþ)

No need for corporations to make profits

as the state does not expect them to be

competitive. (—)

Increasing competition of renewables

(including potential offshore wind

farms) and natural gas (availability of

LNG imports). (þþ)

Restricted government budget for new

investments in renewables, structural

policy programs, etc. (–)

EU ETS: fewer free certificates and rising

prices. (þ)

Political & Legislative Factors

Power plants breaching EU emission

limits (Industrial Emissions Directive,

IED). (þþþ)

Energy security concerns (about energy

imports and perceived unreliability of

RES). (—)

(Conditional) Financial incentives from

the EU for the instalment of

renewables and cohesion policies to

help carbon intensive regions. (þþþ)

Government in favour of continuing

high coal dependency (bail-out of

bankrupt companies, subsidies, capacity

market, etc.). (—)

Increasing pressure by the EU: Ban on

coal mining subsidies, restriction of

capacity markets, climate policies, etc.

(þþ)

Vested interests and high political

influence of coal companies. (—)

Rising international pressure on coal. (þ) High political influence of coal labour

unions. (—)

Investments in and discourse of “clean

coal” technologies. (-)

Social & Environmental Factors

(Local) protests due to air and water

pollution and against new mine

openings. (þ)

Fear of change and loss especially in coal

regions (energy poverty levels, past

negative restructuring experiences,

etc.). (—)

(International) climate change concerns.

(þ)

Ideology and culture: Belief that growth

is only possible with coal, that coal is

central to development, defining

national and regional identities. (—)

Note: For drivers and for barriers the (þ), (þþ), (þþþ) and (-), (–), (—) indi-

cation illustrates the relative strength of the impact, respectively. That an equal

number of drivers and barriers is included in the table does not mean that they

have an identical weight. To date, the barriers still dominate the drivers of a coal

phase-out. While economic drivers and EU legislation are the main points

weakening the coal regime, political and ideological reasons are the main

identified barriers for an end to coal production and consumption.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

support of up to 2 billion

€

to Poland, conditional on the promise of

carbon neutrality.

A policy discussion needs to take into account political feasibility as

one of the most important aspects. Going back to textbook first best

examples like carbon taxes or moratoria seem unrealistic in the context

of the political economy of coal. It is therefore important to account for

policy errors, to include upscaling mechanisms, to think about policy-

learning and sequencing while at the same time creating planning se-

curity and credibility (Purkus, Gawel, and Thr€

an, 2017; Kern and Rogge,

2018). Additionally, for a successful transition, policies need to include

anticipatory, long-term planning and to combine supply and demand

policy options as well as one focused on social aspects next to climate

impacts (Spencer et al., 2018).

As discussed in section 2, a destabilisation of a regime occurs when

more and more pressures align. Both the identified drivers and barriers

(see Table 1) should be addressed simultaneously when designing con-

crete policy packages. When looking at policy outcomes regarding coal

since the 1990s, policy objectives focus on energy security before any-

thing else, while sustainability and climate change concerns rank quite

low. Therefore, any policy targeting GHG emission reductions, at least in

the beginning, needs to be coupled with other policies with different

objectives, like lowering energy import dependence or energy poverty

levels, increasing jobs in other sectors or at least address their influence

on any of these aspects.

As part of a more sustainable energy strategy,

the Polish govern-

ment might therefore include coal phase-out and renewables phase-in

policies, structural policies aiming to increase social security and in-

novations support to create regions fit for the future in a new policy mix.

Table 2 includes therefore measures out of the climate policy toolkit

(Green and Denniss, 2018, Table 1), complemented by structural policy

measures, addressing the identified drivers and barriers:

5. Conclusions and policy implications

The aim of the paper was to analyse the political economy of coal in

Poland for three decades from 1990 until 2019, identifying reasons for

the persistence of the coal regime, but also identifying potential avenues

for change. Besides examining which actors are supporting coal and who

benefits from coal production and electricity generation, the paper

identified key barriers (factors stabilising the current status quo) and

drivers (initial factors that are destabilising the coal regime) using the

Triple Embeddedness Framework. By separating socio-political aspects

from economic aspects, it allows to distinguish between the main

influencing factors of the different contexts. These partly work in

opposite directions in Poland: The socio-political considerations mostly

argue in favour of the continued use of coal, while most economic

considerations are an argument for a decline or phase-out of coal.

Additionally, the framework shows how the coal regime responds to the

pressures from the two environments, highlighting their so far successful

strategies to prevent major changes to coal use and mining in Poland.

Based on these findings, policy options to support the existing drivers

and reduce barriers of reducing coal’s dominance were discussed.

Resistance to a shift away from coal exists mainly due to the deep

incumbency of the coal industry and a supportive government. Vested

interests of the coal regime are protected due to strong links between

coal corporations and the government. Most coal corporations are ma-

jority state owned and unions are highly involved in political decisions.

This makes it more difficult for coal opposing voices to weaken the

political support for coal. The main arguments put forward against a

coal phase-out are similar to other countries and include aspects of en-

ergy security, energy independency concerns, fears of rising energy

prices, concerns about the reliability of renewables and the prospect of

unemployment in regions mainly dependent on the coal industry. Other

specifics for Poland - locking the country even deeper into its depen-

dence on coal - are past negative restructuring experiences, strong

concerns about relying on Russia’s energy resources, little influence by

environmental NGOs, and limited financial strengths to experiment with

new investments.

We conclude that the socio-political environment of Poland still fa-

vours coal and therefore limits the potentially negative impact of the

economic environment by protecting the coal regime. However, as

restructuring efforts by coal corporations are increasing, their strategies

shift from targeting temporary problems to structural ones. Neverthe-

less, a deep-restructuring of core beliefs, identities and values within the

country is still pending. So far, the production and use of coal is linked in

political discussions as well as in most media coverage to the functioning

and prosperity of the entire Polish economy (see Newell and Paterson

(1998) and Newell (2018) for structural power of fossil fuel corporations

through connections of energy with economic growth). A limited but

increasing amount of studies and news headlines, however, starts to

point out the existing potential for a growth of renewable energies,

resulting also in additional job opportunities.

There are several internal drivers that might decrease coal’s domi-

nance in the future: Among them limited economic feasibility of do-

mestic hard coal mining and of new coal-fired power plants, dwindling

resources in currently open lignite mines, aging energy infrastructure as

well as increasing competition by natural gas, renewables, and cheaper

electricity imports, but also increasing public protests. Additionally,

external pressures by the European Union are growing: This becomes

apparent e.g. within the discussions surrounding the ‘European Green

Deal’ and the push towards climate neutrality by 2050 (EC, 2019). The

EU hereby pairs stronger environmental and climate regulation with

additional (conditional) incentives in the form of cohesion policies to

enable a ‘just transition’ of carbon intensive regions leaving no one

behind.

The need for energy security is deeply engrained in Polish politics, so

that no change will be possible without changing the belief that a secure

and affordable energy supply is possible without (a large amount of) coal

– especially as domestic renewables also increase energy security. To be

part of the EU’s ongoing energy transition, Polish policies aiming at

reducing coal production should be included in policy packages bundled

with renewable phase-in policies and structural policies addressing the

related negative social impacts. Important positive and negative lessons

can hereby be learned from other international examples, e.g. structural

policy programs guiding the phase-out of coal mining in Germany since

the 1960s (Oei et al., 2019; Stognief et al., 2019), long-lasting unem-

ployment effects in former coal mining areas in the United Kingdom

(Fothergill, 2017), and just transition approaches addressing interests

from labour and affected regions in negotiated settlements in Spain

(Rentier et al., 2019).

Poland is, like e.g. Spain, a coordinated market economy (CME),

where a major share of coal assets are owned and managed by the state

(Rentier et al., 2019). The research by Rentier et al. (2019) shows that in

this case, decisions about the phase-out of coal are “essentially public

decisions”, as opposed to one left to the electricity market. Decision

making is, therefore, more strongly influenced by employment protec-

tion concerns and not mainly by competitiveness (in contrast to liberal

market economies). However, the example of Spain also shows that

social and structural policies can help overcome resistance to

phasing-out coal and need to accompany climate policies to achieve a

just transition.

The majority of discussed policy measures are aimed at using the

identified drivers as well as to reduce the barriers. However, none of

these measures directly targets lowering the political influence of the

coal industry and unions. Analysing this further would be an interesting

Euractiv 2020. „Gerechte Energiewende“: Wer kriegt die EU-Gelder? 27

February 2020. https://www.euractiv.de/section/energie-und-umwelt/new

s/gerechte-energiewende-wer-kriegt-eu-gelder/.

A draft for the Polish Energy Plan until 2040 was presented in November

2018 with continued support for coal and very limited support for renewables.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

research question. Additionally, more specific policies, not just policy

fields, tackling the coal industry, should be analysed in-depth. As Poland

is an outlier within Europe in how the media covers climate change, and

only few publications deal with public opinion about coal, an analysis of

the Polish coal discourse and how it influences political decision making

would be important. Additionally, identifying and mapping the role of

media – in times of increasing social media use and fake-news – can be

an important aspect for future advancements and applications of the

Triple Embeddedness Frameworks and similar approaches. Finally, a

stronger focus should be put on the influence of the EU as external driver

pressurising the Polish coal industry and vice versa.

An alignment of rising internal and external pressures has started to

destabilise the coalition between a pro-coal government, coal dependent

and market dominating upstream and downstream corporations as well

as unions. This opens up the floor for more direct policies aiming at

reducing coal also in Poland. First signs can be seen within pledges of the

main opposition party (Civic Coalition) in their election campaign in

July 2019 to phase-out coal use in the energy sector by 2040.

The proposed measures identified by this research could be the start

for an increasingly ambitious plan for a just and timely transition of the

Polish energy system which:

a. Limits its impact on the climate, the environment and human health,

and at the same time also

b. Provides energy security, increases competitiveness of the Polish

economy and job opportunities, and therefore

c. Becomes a cornerstone within the ‘European Green Deal’ – leaving

no one behind.

Funding

This work was supported by the German Ministry of Education and

Research (BMBF) [grant numbers 01LN1704A, 01LA1810A].

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial

interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence

the work reported in this paper.

Table 2

Overview of policies addressing specific drivers and barriers of Poland’s political economy of coal.

Restrictive Policies Mix Supportive Policies

Supply Side

Policies

Restructuring of the remaining coal mining

sector and subsidies

Reducing and eventually stopping financial

support could end domestic production of coal

before 2040* (Bukowski et al., 2015). A

continuous phase-out plan like e.g. in the UK or

Germany (with production quotas or specified

years for mine closures) could increase planning

security for all affected actors. Our analysis shows

that a stronger policy like an immediate

moratorium on coal mining is currently politically

infeasible.

�Addressing drivers of financial problems of the

coal industry, limited coal resources in already

operating mines, pressure from the EU banning

coal subsidies, international pressure to phase-out

coal as well as concerns due to climate change, air

and water pollution.

�Reducing barrier of limited financial resources by

freeing state money that could be redirected to

renewables or structural/social programmes.

Diversifying corporations

As most corporations are state-owned, obligations

for a minimum diversification of energy sources

can be implemented: could encourage a process

from coal mining towards more sustainable

industries.

�Using the drivers of increasing competition from

renewables and natural gas, as well as the

electricity capacity gap, rising CO

prices and

societal concerns about climate change, air and

water pollution

�Might contribute to reducing barriers of rising

electricity prices, energy security and lower

concerns by civil society about negative

consequences related to reducing coal production.

Renewables phase-in

Pointing out how dwindling domestic coal resources

would make Poland import dependent in the medium

term future, and that ~50% of the total installed

electricity capacity comes offline between 2020-2035

could serve as a justification for more renewable

energy support (e.g. feed-in-tariffs, revoking of law

from 2016 restricting wind power expansion**,

investment of state owned-companies in renewables).

Domestic production of renewable energy related

technologies or development of auxiliary services

could create prosperity and knowledge apart from

coal.

�Addressing drivers of increasing competition by

renewables, electricity capacity gap after 2020, coal

power plants breaching EU emission levels, concerns

about climate change, general pressures to phase-out

coal open up space for renewables.

�Need to overcome barrier of limited support

mechanisms for renewables; renewables incorporating

a larger market share could increase pressure for coal

companies to be competitive and reduce fears about

unreliability of RES.

Demand Side &

Structural

Policies

Restructuring of coal-based electricity

generation

Limiting financial support and subsidies for coal

power plants. No support for ‘clean coal’ projects

or further modernisation. Being part of the EU

means that tighter emission standards e.g.

enforcement of already decided emission limits

(IED), limited capacity payments (e.g. a ban on

capacity payments for generation with more than

550 g CO

/kWh), increasing CO

prices, etc. need

to be implemented.

�Addressing drivers of financial problems of

existing coal-fired power plants, increasing

competition of renewables and natural gas, as well

as EU emission limits, rising CO

prices and

societal concerns with respect to climate change,

air and water pollution.

�Might contribute to reducing barrier of

unnecessary investment in so called “clean coal”

technologies.

Social and structural policy measures

A socially acceptable coal phase-out needs to prevent

electricity price increases for low-income households.

Negotiations with trade unions can result in a social

security programme including the creation of new,

well-paid jobs, a reliable social security net, retraining

programmes and job search support. Support for

former coal regions needs to increase their capacity to

diversify the local economy and create more resilient,

attractive and competitive regions. Local authorities

need sufficient funds and capacity training for

implementation.*** Household coal demand can be

reduced e.g. by subsidies for building refurbishments

or shift from coal heating to alternatives like heat

pumps.

�Addressing driver of air pollution concerns.

�Contribution to reducing the barrier of fears of

workers and citizens about negative impacts for the

region and themselves.

Notes: * This is not to say that 2040 should be the target year. Analysis has shown that compliance with the Paris Agreement would require an EU-wide coal phase-out

by 2030 (Climate Analytics, 2017).** Polish Act on Investments in Wind Power Plants (Sejm paper no. 961/2016). *** See Brauers et al. (2018) for dimensions for a just

transition in coal regions.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Hanna Brauers: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis,

Investigation, Writing - original draft, Visualization. Pao-Yu Oei:

Investigation, Writing - original draft, Visualization, Funding

acquisition.

Acknowledgements

We thank three anonymous reviewers and the editors for very helpful

feedback and suggestions that substantially improved the paper. We are

grateful to Paola Yanguas Parra for help with a better readability of the

text. We also want to thank the Polish experts we talked to for sharing

their experience with us. All potentially remaining errors are ours.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111621.

References

Alves Dias, P., Kanellopoulos, K., Medarac, H., Kapetaki, Z., Miranda-Barbosa, E.,

Shortall, R., Czako, V., et al., 2018. EU Coal Regions: Opportunities and Challenges

Ahead’. EUR 29292 EN. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

https://doi.org/10.2760/064809. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kacpe

r_Szulecki/publication/292893972_Die_polnische_Energie-_und_Klimapolitik_in_de

r_Verantwortung_von_PiS/links/56b1c42808ae56d7b06b0927/Die-polnische-Ene

rgie-und-Klimapolitik-in-der-Verantwortung-von-PiS.pdf.

Ancygier, Andrzej, Szulecki, Kacper, 2016. Die polnische Energie- und Klimapolitik in

der Verantwortung von PiS. Deutsches Polen-Institut Darmstadt, Forschungsstelle

Osteuropa an der Universit€

at Bremen, Institut für €

Offentliche Angelegenheiten

(Instytut Spraw Publicznych – ISP) Polen-Analysen Nr. https://library.oapen.org/bi

tstream/id/33d25f0e-62b8-4074-b973-6f0f6e853170/629602.pdf.

Arent, Douglas, Arndt, Channing, Miller, Mackay, Finn, Tarp, Owen, Zinaman (Eds.),

2017. The Political Economy of Clean Energy Transitions. World Institute for

Development Economics Research. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

Zientara, Piotr, 2009. Restructuring the coal mining industry: unionism, conflict, and

cooperation: evidence from Poland. E. Eur. Econ. 47 (1), 41–59. https://doi.org/

10.2753/EEE0012-8775470103.

Badera, Jarosław, Koco�

n, Paweł, 2014. Local community opinions regarding the socio-

environmental aspects of lignite surface mining: experiences from Central Poland.

Energy Pol. 66, 507–516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.11.048.

Baker, Lucy, Newell, Peter, Phillips, Jon, 2014. The political economy of energy

transitions: the case of South Africa. New Polit. Econ. 19 (6), 791–818. https://doi.

org/10.1080/13563467.2013.849674.

Baran, Jan, Lewandowsky, Piotr, Aleksander Szpor, Witajewski-Baltvilks, Jan, 2018.

‘Coal transition in Poland: options for a fair and feasible transition for the polish coal

secto’. IDDRI and climate strategies. https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/P

DF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Rapport/20180609_ReportCOAL_Poland-def.

pdf.

Bergek, Anna, Jacobsson, Staffan, Carlsson, Bo, Lindmark, Sven, Rickne, Annika, 2008.

Analyzing the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems: a scheme of

analysis. Res. Pol. 37 (3), 407–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.12.003.

Bocquillon, Pierre, Maltby, Tomas, 2017. The more the merrier? Assessing the impact of

enlargement on EU performance in energy and climate change policies. E. Eur. Polit.

33 (1), 88–105. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1279605.

Bouzarovski, Stefan, Herrero, Sergio Tirado, 2017. Geographies of injustice: the socio-

spatial determinants of energy poverty in Poland, the Czech republic and Hungary.

Post Commun. Econ. 29 (1), 27–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/

14631377.2016.1242257.

Brauers, Hanna, Herpich, Philipp, Oei, Pao-Yu, 2018. The transformation of the German

coal sector from 1950 to 2017: an historical overview. In: Energiewende ‘Made in

Germany’ Electricity Sector Reform in the European Context, edited by Clemens

Gerbaulet, Claudia Kemfert, Casimir Lorenz, and Pao-Yu Oei. Springer International

Publishing AG, Berlin, Germany. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-31

9-95126-3.

Braun, Mats, 2014. EU climate norms in east-Central Europe: EU climate norms in East-

Central Europe. J. Commun. Media Stud.: J. Common. Mark. Stud. 52 (3), 445–460.

https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12101.

Bukowski, Maciej, Ma�

snicki, Jędrzej, �

Sniegocki, Aleksander, Trzeciakowski, Rafał, 2015.

Whither Are You Headed, Polish Coal? Development Prospects of the Polish Hard

Coal Mining Sector. Wise Europa (Warsaw Institute for Economic Studies), Warsaw,

Poland. http://wise-europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Whither-are-you-h

eaded-Polish-coal..pdf.

Carlsson, Bo, Jacobsson, Staffan, Holm�

en, Magnus, Rickne, Annika, 2002. Innovation

systems: analytical and methodological issues. Res. Pol. 31 (2), 233–245. https://

doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00138-X.

Ceglarz, Andrzej, Benestad, Rasmus E., Kundzewicz, Zbigniew W., 2018. Inconvenience

versus rationality: reflections on different faces of climate contrarianism in Poland

and Norway. Weather Clim. Soc. 10 (4), 821–836. https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-

D-17-0120.1.

Central Statistical Office of Poland, 2019. Energy Statistics in 2017 and 2018. Central

Statistical Office of Poland. https://stat.gov.

pl/en/topics/environment-energy/energy/energy-statistics-in-2017-and-2018,4,14.

html.

Central Statistical Office of Poland, various years. Concise Statistical Yearbook. Central

Statistical Office of Poland. https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/statistical-

yearbooks/statistical-yearbooks/concise-statistical-yearbook-of-poland-2017,1,18.

html.

Chandler, William, Kassenberg, Andrzej, Hille, Ewaryst, 2018. ‘Moving Poland beyond

Coal: Asessment of Potential and Strategy’. Annapolis. Energy Transition Research

Institute, Maryland USA. http://www.etransition.org/Entri.2018.Poland%20Beyond

%20Coal.pdf.

Cherp, Aleh, Vinichenko, Vadim, Jewell, Jessica, Brutschin, Elina, Sovacool, Benjamin,

2018. Integrating techno-economic, socio-technical and political perspectives on

national energy transitions: a meta-theoretical framework. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 37,

175–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.015.

Child, Michael, Breyer, Christian, 2017. Transition and transformation: a review of the

concept of change in the progress towards future sustainable energy systems. Energy

Pol. 107, 11–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.04.022.

Climate Analytics, 2017. A Stress Test for Coal in Europe under the Paris Agreement. KR

Foundation. https://climateanalytics.org/media/eu_coal_stress_test_report_2017.pdf.

Creutzig, Felix, Marcus, Hedahl, James, Rydge, Szulecki, Kacper, 2014. Challenging the

European climate debate: can universal climate Justice and economics Be reconciled

with particularistic politics? Glob. Pol. 5 (October), 6–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/

1758-5899.12156.

CTI, 2018. Burning more money than coal - the asset economics and financial

implications of energa’s and enea’s proposed new Ostroleka coal power plant C.

Carbon Tracker Initiative. https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/burning-mor

e-money-than-coal/.

Dzięciołowski, Krzysztof, 2017. Is There a Chance for Non-partisan Media in Poland? ’

Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford. https://reutersinstitute.

politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-12/Is%20there%20a%20chance%20for%

20non-partisan%20media%20in%20Poland%20-%20Krzysztof%20Dzieciolowsk%

20Paper.pdf.

EC, 2019. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament. the

European Council, the Council. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european

-green-deal-communication_en.pdf.

EIA, November 2016. ‘Poland - Analysis’. EIA (Energy Information Administration) Beta.

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso¼POL, 2016.

Fothergill, Steve, 2017. ‘Coal Transition in the United Kingdom’. IDDRI and Climate

Strategies. https://coaltransitions.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/coal_uk_v04.pdf.

Fünfschilling, Lea, Truffer, Bernhard, 2014. ‘The structuration of socio-technical

regimes—conceptual foundations from institutional theory’. Res. Pol. 43 (4),

772–791. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.010.

Geels, Frank W., 2002. ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration

processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study’. Res. Pol. 20 (8–9),

1257–1274. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(02)00062-8.

Geels, Frank W., 2014. Reconceptualising the Co-evolution of firms-in-industries and

their environments: developing an inter-disciplinary Triple embeddedness

framework. Res. Pol. 43 (2), 261–277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.

respol.2013.10.006.

Gerbaulet, Clemens, von Hirschhausen, Christian, Kemfert, Claudia, Lorenz, Casimir,

Oei, Pao-Yu, 2019. European electricity sector decarbonization under different levels

of foresight. Renewable Energy. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2019.02.099.

March.

Goldthau, Andreas, Sovacool, Benjamin K., 2012. The uniqueness of the energy security,

Justice, and governance problem. Energy Pol. 41 (February), 232–240. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.042.

Goulder, L.H., Parry, I.W.H., 2008. Instrument choice in environmental policy. Rev.

Environ. Econ. Pol. 2 (2), 152–174. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/ren005.

govPL, 2019. ‘Executive summary of Poland’s national energy and climate plan for the

years 2021-2030 (NECP PL)’. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/docume

nts/pl_final_necp_summary_en.pdf.

Green, Fergus, 2018. Anti-fossil fuel norms. Climatic Change. https://doi.org/10.1007/

s10584-017-2134-6.

Green, Fergus, Denniss, Richard, 2018. Cutting with both arms of the scissors: the

economic and political case for restrictive supply-side climate policies. Climatic

Change 150 (1), 73–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2162-x.

Gurgul, Henryk, Lach, łukasz, 2011. The role of coal consumption in the economic

growth of the polish economy in transition. Energy Pol. 39 (4), 2088–2099. https://

doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.052.

Haas, Tobias, 2019. Comparing energy transitions in Germany and Spain using a political

economy perspective. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 31 (June), 200–210. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.eist.2018.11.004.

Hess, David J., 2014. Sustainability transitions: a political coalition perspective. Res. Pol.

43 (2), 278–283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.008.

Hirth, Lion, Christoph Steckel, Jan, 2016. The role of capital costs in decarbonizing the

electricity sector. Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (11), 114010. https://doi.org/10.1088/

1748-9326/11/11/114010.

IEA, 2017. Coal Information 2017. OECD/IEA, Paris.

Insight, Polityka, 2017. Energy report. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?

q¼cache:T_IH2eHtNc8J:www.politykainsight.pl/en/politics/politicsofmemory/_re

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei

Energy Policy 144 (2020) 111621

source/multimedium/20113859þ&cd¼4&hl¼en&ct¼clnk&gl¼de&lr¼lang_e

n&client¼firefox-b.

Janeiro, Luis, Resch, Gustav, 2017. ‘2020 Renewable Energy Target Realisation Forecast

for Poland: Final Report’. Ecofys by Order of Polish Wind Energy Association. Ecofys

and TU Wien, Berlin. http://psew.pl/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/

2020-Renewable-Energy-Target-Realisation-Forecast-for-Poland.pdf.

Jankowska, Karolina, 2017. ‘Poland’s clash over energy and climate policy: green

economy or grey status quo?’ in the European Union in international climate change

politics: still Taking a lead?. In: Rüdiger Wurzel, James Connelly, and Duncan

Liefferink. Routledge, London. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct¼tr

ue&scope¼site&db¼nlebk&db¼nlabk&AN¼1427563.

Jastrzębska Sp�

ołka Węglowa, S.A., 2018. ‘Jastrzębska Sp�

ołka Węglowa SA - for

Contractors - Coal Properties’. https://www.jsw.pl/en/for-contractors/coal-proper

ties/.

Jewell, Jessica, Vinichenko, Vadim, Nacke, Lola, Cherp, Aleh, 2019. Prospects for

powering past coal. Nat. Clim. Change 9 (8), 592–597. https://doi.org/10.1038/

s41558-019-0509-6.

Johnstone, Phil, Newell, Peter, 2018. ‘Sustainability Transitions and the State’, 27.

Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, pp. 72–82. https://doi.org/

10.1016/j.eist.2017.10.006. June.

Johnstone, Phil, Stirling, Andy, Sovacool, Benjamin, 2017. ‘Policy mixes for incumbency:

exploring the destructive recreation of renewable energy, shale gas “fracking,” and

nuclear power in the United Kingdom’. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. Pol. Mixes Energy

Transit. 33 (November), 147–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.005.

Jonek Kowalska, Izabela, 2015. Challenges for long-term industry restructuring in the

upper silesian coal basin: what has polish coal mining achieved and failed from a

twenty-year perspective? Resour. Pol. 44, 135–149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.

resourpol.2015.02.009.

Kamola-Cie�

slik, Małgorzata, 2017. ‘The government’s policy in the field of hard coal

mining restructuration as an element of Poland’s energy security’. Pol. Polit. Sci.

Yearbk. 46 (2), 247–261. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2017215.

Kemp, Ren�

e, Schot, Johan, Hoogma, Remco, 1998. Regime shifts to sustainability

through processes of niche formation: the approach of strategic niche management.

Technol. Anal. Strat. Manag. 10 (2), 175–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/

09537329808524310.

Kern, Florian, Markard, Jochen, 2016. Analysing energy transitions: combining insights

from transition studies and international political economy. In: Thijs Van de Graaf,

Sovacool, Benjamin K., Ghosh, Arunabha, Kern, Florian (Eds.), The Palgrave

Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy, Michael T. Klare,

291–318. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-

55631-8_12.

Kern, Florian, Rogge, Karoline S., 2018. Harnessing theories of the policy process for

analysing the politics of sustainability transitions: a critical survey. Environ. Innov.

Soc. Transit. 27 (June), 102–117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.11.001.

Kivimaa, Paula, Kern, Florian, 2016. Creative destruction or mere niche support?

Innovation policy mixes for sustainability transitions. Res. Pol. 45 (1), 205–217.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.008.

Kuchler, Magdalena, Bridge, Gavin, 2018. Down the black hole: sustaining national

socio-technical imaginaries of coal in Poland. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 41 (July),

136–147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.04.014.

Kundzewicz, Zbigniew W., Painter, James, Kundzewicz, Witold J., 2019. ‘Climate change

in the media: Poland’s exceptionalism’. Environ. Commun. 13 (3), 366–380. https://

doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2017.1394890.

Kungl, Gregor, 2015. Stewards or sticklers for change? Incumbent energy providers and

the politics of the German energy transition. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 8 (July), 13–23.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.04.009.

Kungl, Gregor, Geels, Frank W., 2016. The Destabilisation of the German Electricity

Industry (1998-2015). Application and Extension of a Multi-Dimensional

Framework. University of Stuttgart Institute for Social Sciences. https://www.sowi.

uni-stuttgart.de/dokumente/forschung/soi/soi_2016_2_Kungl_Geels_Destabilisation

_of_the_German_Electricity_Industry.pdf.

Kungl, Gregor, Geels, Frank W., 2018. ‘Sequence and alignment of external pressures in

industry destabilisation: understanding the downfall of incumbent utilities in the

German energy transition (1998–2015)’. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 26, 78–100.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.05.003.

Lazarus, Michael, van Asselt, Harro, 2018. Fossil fuel supply and climate policy:

exploring the road less taken. Climatic Change 150 (1), 1–13. https://doi.org/

10.1007/s10584-018-2266-3.

Leipprand, Anna, Flachsland, Christian, 2018. Regime destabilization in energy

transitions: the German debate on the future of coal. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 40 (June),

190–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.02.004.

Levy, David L., Newell, Peter J., 2002. Business strategy and international environmental

governance: toward a neo-gramscian synthesis. Global Environ. Polit. 2 (4), 84–101.

https://doi.org/10.1162/152638002320980632.

L€

offler, Konstantin, Burandt, Thorsten, Hainsch, Karlo, Oei, Pao-Yu, 2019. Modeling the

low-carbon transition of the European energy system - a quantitative assessment of

the stranded assets problem. Energy Strat. Rev. 26 (November) https://doi.org/

10.1016/j.esr.2019.100422.

Loorbach, Derk, 2010. Transition management for sustainable development: a

prescriptive, complexity-based governance framework. Governance 23 (1), 161–183.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2009.01471.x.

Marcinkiewicz, Kamil, Tosun, Jale, 2015. Contesting climate change: mapping the

political debate in Poland. E. Eur. Polit. 31 (2), 187–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/

21599165.2015.1022648.

Markard, Jochen, Raven, Rob, Truffer, Bernhard, 2012. Sustainability transitions: an

emerging field of research and its prospects. Res. Pol. 41 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.

respol.2012.02.013, 995–967.

McGlade, Christophe, Paul, Ekins, 2015. The geographical distribution of fossil fuels

unused when limiting global warming to 2 �C. Nature 517 (7533), 187–190. https://

doi.org/10.1038/nature14016.

Meadowcroft, James, 2011. Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions.

Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 1 (1), 70–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.

eist.2011.02.003.

Mendelevitch, Roman, Hauenstein, Christian, Holz, Franziska, 2019. The death spiral of

coal in the U.S.: will changes in U.S. Policy turn the tide? Clim. Pol. 19 (10),

1310–1324. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1641462.

Mühlemeier, Susan, 2019. Dinosaurs in transition? A conceptual exploration of local

incumbents in the Swiss and German energy transition. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit.

31 (June), 126–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2018.12.003.

Newell, Peter, 2018. Trasformismo or transformation? The global political economy of

energy transitions. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 26 (1), 25–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/

09692290.2018.1511448.

Newell, Peter, Mulvaney, Dustin, 2013. ‘The political economy of the “just transition”:

the political economy of the “just transition”’. Geogr. J. 179 (2), 132–140. https://

doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12008.

Newell, Peter, Paterson, Matthew, 1998. A climate for business: global warming, the

state and capital. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 5 (4), 679–703. https://doi.org/10.1080/

096922998347426.

Oei, Pao-Yu, Mendelevitch, Roman, 2019. Prospects for steam coal exporters in the era of

climate policies: a case study of Colombia. Clim. Pol. 19 (1), 73–91. https://doi.org/

10.1080/14693062.2018.1449094.

Oei, Pao-Yu, Hanna, Brauers, Herpich, Philipp, 2019. ‘Lessons from Germany’s hard coal

mining phase-out: policies and transition from 1950 to 2018’. Clim. Pol. 1–17.

https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1688636.

Oei, Pao-Yu, Hermann, Hauke, Herpich, Philipp, Oliver, Holtem€

oller,

Lünenbürger, Benjamin, Schult, Christoph, 2020. ‘Coal Phase-Out in Germany –

Implications and Policies for Affected Regions’, 196. Energy. https://doi.org/

10.1016/j.energy.2020.117004.

Osi�

cka, Jan, Kemmerzell, J€

org, Zoll, Maksymilian, Lehotský, Luk�

a�

s, �

Cernoch, Filip,

Knodt, Mich�

ele, 2020. ‘What’s next for the European coal heartland? Exploring the

future of coal as presented in German, polish and Czech press’. Energy Res. Soc. Sci.

61 (March), 101316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101316.

Pactwa, Katarzyna, Wo�

zniak, Justyna, 2017. Environmental reporting policy of the

mining industry leaders in Poland. Resour. Pol. 53 (September), 201–207. https://

doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.06.008.

Paterson, Matthew, P-Laberge, Xavier, 2018. Political economies of climate change.

Wiley Interdiscipl. Rev.: Clim. Change 9 (2), e506. https://doi.org/10.1002/

wcc.506.

Piwowar, Arkadiusz, Dziku�

c, Maciej, 2016. Outline of the economic and technical

problems associated with the Co-combustion of biomass in Poland. Renew. Sustain.

Energy Rev. 54 (February), 415–420. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.10.044.

Statistics Poland, 2018. Energy statistics in 2016 and 2017. Warsaw, Poland. https://stat.

gov.

pl/en/topics/environment-energy/energy/energy-statistics-in-2016-and-2017,4,13.

html.

Power, Marcus, Newell, Peter, Baker, Lucy, Bulkeley, Harriet, Kirshner, Joshua,

Smith, Adrian, 2016. The political economy of energy transitions in Mozambique

and South Africa: the role of the rising powers. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 17 (July),

10–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.007.

Purkus, Alexandra, Gawel, Erik, Thr€

an, Daniela, 2017. ‘Addressing uncertainty in

decarbonisation policy mixes – lessons learned from German and European

bioenergy policy’. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 33 (November), 82–94. https://doi.org/

10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.020.

RAP, 2018. ‘Report on the polish power system’. Country profile, version 2.0. Berlin: the

regulatory assistance project. Agora Energiewende. https://www.agora-energiewe

nde.de/fileadmin2/Projekte/2018/CP-Polen/Agora-Energiewende_report_on_the

_Polish_power_system_WEB.pdf.

Rentier, Gerrit, Lelieveldt, Herman, Kramer, Gert Jan, 2019. Varieties of coal-fired power

phase-out across Europe. Energy Pol. 132 (September), 620–632. https://doi.org/

10.1016/j.enpol.2019.05.042.

Richter, Philipp M., Mendelevitch, Roman, Frank, Jotzo., 2018. ‘Coal taxes as supply-side

climate policy: a rationale for major exporters?’ climatic change. https://doi.org/10.

1007/s10584-018-2163-9.

Rockstr€

om, Johan, Gaffney, Owen, Rogelj, Joeri, Meinshausen, Malte,

Nakicenovic, Nebojsa, 2017. A Roadmap for rapid decarbonization. Science 355

(6331), 1269–1271. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aah3443.

Rybak, Aurelia, Rybak, Aleksandra, 2016. Possible strategies for hard coal mining in

Poland as a result of production function analysis. Resour. Pol. 50 (December),

27–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.08.002.

Sartor, Oliver, 2018. ‘Implementing coal transitions: insights from case studies of major

coal-consuming economies’. IDDRI and climate strategies. https://www.iddri.org/sit

es/default/files/PDF/Publications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Rapport/201809-Synthesis

%20Report%20Iddri-COALTRANSITIONS-def.pdf.

Schneider, Mycle, Antony, Froggatt, Hazemann, Julie, Katsuta, Tadahiro, Lovins, Amory

B., Ramana, M.V., von Hirschhausen, Christian, Ben, Wealer, 2019. World Nuclear

Industry Status Report 2019. Mycle Schneider Consulting, Paris, London. htt

ps://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2019-v2-hr.pdf.

Schwartzkopff, Julian, Schulz, Sabrina, 2017. Climate & energy snapshot: Poland - the

political economy of the low-carbon transition. https://www.e3g.org/docs/

Climate_energy_snaphot_PL.pdf.

H. Brauers and P.-Y. Oei