
Vol.:(0123456789)
Review of Managerial Science
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-020-00429-6
1 3
ORIGINAL PAPER
Local preferences andtheallocation ofattention
inequity‑based crowdfunding
MarcoBade1· MartinWalther1
Received: 1 April 2020 / Accepted: 2 December 2020
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
This study examines drivers of investment probability in equity-based crowdfunding
using a hand-collected and comprehensive data set from a well-established platform.
The analysis confirms several effects that have been reported in the recent literature
on other crowdfunding markets. Extending recent research, we study moderators of
local preferences of investors. Novel to the literature, we find that (1) local pref-
erences are more pronounced in campaigns of younger ventures, (2) herding-like
behaviour is stronger in local campaigns and (3) local investors are more respon-
sive to updates posted by entrepreneurs, compared to non-locals. Our results suggest
that investors allocate more attention to campaigns for which they have information
advantages, such as local campaigns, due to their limited capacity to process infor-
mation. Such behaviour may eventually amplify information asymmetry and local
preferences. Our findings have practical implications for entrepreneurs, investors
and platforms.
Keywords Individual investor behaviour· Local preferences· Attention allocation·
Limited information processing capacity· Equity-based crowdfunding
JEL Classification D83· G11· L26· M13
1 Introduction
Recently, alternative forms of business financing, such as equity-based crowdfund-
ing, have emerged and are on the rise. In particular, the transaction value of equity-
based crowdfunding in Europe (excluding the UK) has grown from 63.1 million
* Marco Bade
Martin Walther
martin.w[email protected]
1 Chair ofFinance andInvestment, Technische Universitaet Berlin, Sec. H 64, Straße des 17. Juni
135, 10623Berlin, Germany

M.Bade, M.Walther
1 3
EUR in 2012 to 278.1 million EUR in 2018 (Statista 2020). Therefore, the topic
continuously gains attention of researchers. Equity-based crowdfunding is defined as
“[…] a form of financing in which entrepreneurs make an open call to sell a speci-
fied amount of equity or bond-like shares in a company on the Internet, hoping to
attract a large group of investors” (Ahlers etal. 2015, p. 955).
Remarkably, recent research confirms that crowdfunders tend to invest in ven-
tures which are located nearby. The overrepresentation of local assets in a portfolio
is commonly referred to as “home bias” or “local bias”.1 In the following, we refer
to “local preference” as a higher probability of investors to invest in local ventures.
Since French and Poterba (1991), a steadily growing stream of literature has dealt
with the phenomenon of home bias in many different contexts, for example, interna-
tional trade (Wolf 2000; Hillberry and Hummels 2003; Disdier and Head 2008) and
financial investment decisions (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; Coval and Moskowitz
1999; Stuart and Sorenson 2003; Ahearne etal. 2004; Karlsson and Nordén 2007;
Graham etal. 2009; Dziuda and Mondria 2012).
In the crowdfunding context, Agrawal et al. (2015) examine the prepurchase
platform “SellaBand” that connects musicians with funders. Compared to distant
funders, local funders appear to be less responsive to information about the cumula-
tive investments in an artist. However, this distance-related effect is explained by
funders who fall into the category “friends and family”. According to Hornuf etal.
(2020), the local bias is also present on the German equity-crowdfunding platform
“Innovestment”. Likewise, in the context of equity-based crowdfunding, based on
data from the “ASSOB” equity-based crowdfunding platform, Guenther etal. (2018)
show that geographic distance is negatively correlated with investment probabil-
ity for home country investors. In contrast, overseas investors are not sensitive to
distance. By employing a quasi-experimental design, Lin and Viswanathan (2016)
investigate the mechanisms behind local bias on a virtual peer-to-peer-lending mar-
ketplace called “Prosper”. They find evidence that local bias exists in peer-to-peer
lending. They argue that economic-based explanations cannot fully explain local
bias. Instead, behavioural reasons, such as the familiarity bias, drive this phenom-
enon at least partially.
We aim to contribute to this stream of literature in two ways. First, we test
whether recent findings on drivers of investment decisions in crowdfunding can be
confirmed using a unique hand-collected data set from a well-established platform
and a modified dyadic approach based on Agrawal etal. (2015). Second and new to
the literature, we explore interactions between these drivers and geographic proxim-
ity, in order to examine the explanation of local preferences related to asymmetric
information, in particular the limited information processing capacity and attention
allocation of investors (see, e.g., Sims 2003; van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009;
Mondria and Wu 2010).
For this purpose, we investigate several hypotheses that are expected to pro-
vide novel insights. First, we test how the degree of publicly available information
1 Note that the first relates to local preferences across borders and the second refers to local preferences
within countries.

1 3
Local preferences andtheallocation ofattention in…
(proxied by venture age) moderates local preferences. It seems natural to assume
that locals’ information advantages are particularly pronounced in younger ventures.
Therefore, investor’ preference to invest in local campaigns might be stronger the
younger the venture. In our analysis, we aim to substantiate this intuition. Second,
we examine whether locals or non-locals are more responsive to signals (posted
updates) by presumably better-informed entrepreneurs. Third, we test which type of
investor is more responsive to signals from peer investors (recent previous invest-
ments). On the one hand, it seems intuitive that signalling by entrepreneurs or by
peer investors alleviates asymmetric information between locals and non-locals and
thus reduces local preferences. On the other hand, however, if investors pay more
attention to signals concerning local campaigns, as is suggested by the attention-
allocation theory, it is conceivable that information asymmetry and local preferences
get reinforced by updates or recent previous investments. Our study aims to help
clarifying this puzzle.
The results of our study confirm the existence of local preferences in equity-based
crowdfunding. Consistent with recent research, we find indication for L-shaped
investment patterns (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2018), herding-like behaviour (e.g.,
Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2018; Vismara 2018; Walther and Bade 2020) and a
positive effect of recent updates (Block etal. 2018). Remarkably, the more updates
have already been posted, the weaker the positive effect of updates. Novel to the
literature, we find that, first, local preferences of investors decrease in venture age.
Second, herding-like behaviour is more pronounced among local investors. Third,
compared to non-local investors, locals are more responsive to updates posted by
entrepreneurs. We link these new empirical findings to investors’ limited capacity to
process information and argue that our results are consistent with the related atten-
tion-allocation-based explanation of local preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect.2 presents the theory
on local preferences. Section3 develops our hypotheses. In Sect.4, we explain the
empirical setting and the sample construction. Section5 presents our economet-
ric model. Subsequently, in Sect.6, we present the results. Section7 discusses the
results of our analysis. Section8 concludes the paper.
2 Theory onlocal preferences
Table1 provides on overview of explanations of home bias, local bias or local pref-
erences in the non-crowdfunding-related literature. The table is structured as fol-
lows: rows represent reasons that may explain the phenomenon. The first column
lists exemplary studies focusing on the respective explanation from the non-crowd-
funding-related literature. The second column assesses the potential relevance of
each explanation for equity-based crowdfunding. The last column justifies why it
is important to investigate the respective explanation in the context of local prefer-
ences in equity-based crowdfunding. In the following subsections, we present the
theoretical background of our study based on a comprehensive literature review, in
which we refer to this table. Note that for the sake of completeness the table also
includes literature on behavioural explanations, which we do not test in this study.

M.Bade, M.Walther
1 3
Table 1 Explanations of Local Preferences
Studies in the non-crowdfunding-related
literature
Relevance for equity-based crowdfund-
ing
Why should this be investigated in the
context of local preferences in equity-
based crowdfunding?
Economic reasons (related to, e.g.,
asymmetric information and cost of
information acquisition, exchange
rates, transaction costs, riskiness of
investments)
Lewis (1999)
Coval and Moskowitz (1999)
Coval and Moskowitz (2001)
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)
Malloy (2005)
Ivković and Weisbenner (2005)
Kimball and Shumway (2006)
Fidora etal. (2007)
Butler (2008)
Hortaçsu etal. (2009)
Baik etal. (2010)
Most relevant: asymmetric information
- Degree of information asymmetry in
equity-based crowdfunding higher than
in other forms of crowdfunding
- Economic/financial objectives of
investors more important than in other
forms of crowdfunding
- Investors are mostly unsophisticated
and have weak skills to acquire private
information, thus might be particularly
receptive to public information signals
Transaction cost, exchange rates, etc.
more relevant in international context
and less relevant in equity-based
crowdfunding, because no product or
service is traded (no shipping cost, no
consumption of services)
Previous research in context of equity-
based crowdfunding provides mixed
evidence on the role of information
asymmetry for local preferences:
- Agrawal etal. (2015): local investors are
less responsive to public information
on cumulative investment than distants;
friends & family explain local bias
largely
- Hornuf etal. (2020): friends & family
and angel-like investors are better at
resolving information asymmetry, thus
have stronger local bias than other inves-
tor types; well-diversified investors care
less about geography
- The role of information asymmetry
between entrepreneurs and different
types of investors and within the crowd
is underexplored
- How differently informed investors
(locals vs. non-locals, non-friends-&-
family) respond to different types of
signals has not yet been studied
Idea: Investors with different levels of
information may behave differently in
terms of investments

1 3
Local preferences andtheallocation ofattention in…
Table 1 (continued)
Studies in the non-crowdfunding-related
literature
Relevance for equity-based crowdfund-
ing
Why should this be investigated in the
context of local preferences in equity-
based crowdfunding?
Limited information processing capacity
(“Attention allocation theory”)
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009)
Mondria and Wu (2010)
Prevalence of asymmetric information,
predominance of unsophistication
among investors, weak information
processing skills, limited capital
stock suggest that investors are highly
selective concerning their allocation of
attention to campaigns in equity-based
crowdfunding
- Investors’ allocation of attention has not
yet been studied in the crowdfunding
literature
- Theory is closely connected to
information-asymmetry explanation of
local preferences
- The fact that the literature has over-
looked this theory in the context of
crowdfunding opens research gap
- Understanding how investors’ attention
allocation in the presence of asymmetric
information affects local preferences is
important for entrepreneurs, platforms
and investors themselves
Idea: Locals have superior information;
theory suggests that investors are dif-
ferently attentive to local and remote
campaigns, thus respond differently to
information signals
Loading more pages...