Perspective: How a short-term relapse to coal could put exporting countries and just transition processes at risk [original]

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

Available online 16 February 2023

nc-nd/4.0/).

Perspective

Perspective: How a short-term relapse to coal could put exporting countries

and just transition processes at risk

Paola Andrea Yanguas-Parra

, Nicolas Malz

, Pao-Yu Oei

, Andrea Furnaro

Christian Hauenstein

, Grace Quiceno

, Felipe Corral-Montoya

, Thomas Mitterecker

Jonathan Hanto

Technische Universit¨

at Berlin, FossilExit Research Group, Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), Straße des 17. Juni 135, Berlin 10623, Germany

Europa-Universit¨

at Flensburg, FossilExit Research Group, Center for Sustainable Energy Systems (ZNES), Munketoft 3b, Flensburg 24937, Germany

Albert-Ludwigs-Universit¨

at Freiburg, Workgroup for Industrial Ecology (INDECOL), Fahnenbergplatz, Freiburg im Breisgau 79085, Germany

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Coal

International thermal coal market

Global energy crisis

Just transition

Stranded assets risk

ABSTRACT

This article examines the potential impacts of the global energy crisis in 2022, following the invasion of Ukraine

by Russia, on international coal markets and the risks and opportunities for coal exporting countries. Based on

the short-term reaction and medium to long-term plans of the main coal consumers and producers, we claim that

the temporary increase in demand and prices in mid 2020s will likely be followed by a rapid decrease in in-

ternational coal demand that could lead to a “boom and bust” scenario.

We highlight four risks of this “relapse to coal” for coal exporters, due to a fundamental mismatch between the

short-term incentives resulting from the current coal “bonanza” and the long-term implications of investments

and policies executed to take advantage of it: i) risk of alteration of the national political economy in favor of the

coal sector, ii) risk of increased investments in the coal sector and ballooning stranded assets, iii) intensified

social, ecological and economic risks for coal-producing regions, and iv) risk of macroeconomic vulnerability.

Taken together, and in a global context of economic recession, those risks could become a vicious cycle that will

slow down national and international efforts for just transitions beyond coal. In contrast, if managed wisely, the

additional short-term earnings that governments and companies are receiving as a result of the crisis (high

coalprices) can become an important financing source for kicking off just transition processes in coal-dependent

regions and communities. We conclude with a discussion on a possible outlook for coal exporting countries that

could help to reduce the risks identified.

1. Introduction

There is a broad consensus within climate science that a fast coal

phase out for electricity generation is needed to keep global warming

within the limits of the Paris Agreement [1], which would require a

global phase out of unabated coal power generation by 2040 and 2030 in

OECD countries [2,3]. This urgency is reflected in the COP26 Glasgow

“pact” to gradually reduce global coal consumption, which took place

after rising political and financial pressures for the implementation of

decarbonization policies [4]. However, since the second half of 2021,

unprecedented changes in international energy markets reversed the

direction of coal prices and demand, potentially disrupting the emerging

consensus around coal phase out in the short to medium term [5,6].

Throughout the year 2021, economic recovery prompted surges in

energy demand and increases in coal consumption. China’s and India’s

coal production and consumption levels reached historic highs and

continue to do so by the moment of drafting this article in late 2022 [7].

In the midst of post-pandemic recovery, Russia began its invasion of

Ukraine. The ensuing trade sanctions from Western countries in

response to the war caused tectonic shifts in global oil, fossil gas and

hard coal markets. This crisis sparked the largest hike in fossil fuel prices

observed since the 1970s [8].

Fossil gas prices saw a particularly high

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [email protected] (P.A. Yanguas-Parra).

For a visualization see https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/fossil-fuel-price-index.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Research & Social Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.102989

Received 11 November 2022; Received in revised form 1 February 2023; Accepted 1 February 2023

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

increase, leading countries heavily relying on gas imports to reconsider

their energy policy and planning priorities.

The current series of disturbances affecting the demand-side of

global energy markets has required a reconfiguration of supply chains

and has led to a spike in demand for readily-available energetic substi-

tution products, such as coal instead of natural gas for electricity gen-

eration. With prices for all fossil fuels spiking, much of current research

and media attention has focused on what net importer fossil-fuel

countries can do to mitigate the effects of the global energy crisis.

However, these aspects of the crisis (namely supply chain reconfigura-

tion, substitution effects, and exorbitantly high prices) can also lead to

pivotal changes in the economic and environmental strategy of some

fossil fuel exporter countries.

Our perspective article focuses on coal and coal-exporting countries

to answer what risks and opportunities their sustainability transitions

face as a result of the current global energy crisis. Our analysis yields

that the ‘relapse’ to coal can have wide-reaching impacts on coal im-

porters and exporters alike. Considering our summary of the situation in

the most important consumer and producer-countries of thermal coal

(See Annex A for details), we reckon that high coal prices will very likely

persist during the mid-2020s until alternative energy sources, import

routes and means, and suppliers consolidate. However, with abundant

supply alternatives to Russia, we argue that there is no structural scar-

city in the global thermal coal market. Instead, what can be observed is a

reconfiguration of trade flows. The standout features of this reconfigu-

ration include: 1) The revival of the Atlantic exports market to the EU. 2)

China and other importers like India to a lesser extent absorbing some of

Russia’s coal exports but mostly focusing on increasing national pro-

duction. 3) Indonesia shifting from supplying China to supplying India.

These shifts in trade flows will take place in parallel with reductions

in global demand for thermal coal. Even under the “Stated Policies

Scenario” from the most recent World Energy Outlook of IEA, global coal

use will decrease gradually by 30 % by 2050 [9]. In their more ambitious

“Announced Policies Scenario”, coal consumption will fall by 20 % by

2030 and 70 % by 2050, with peaks in China “in the early 2020s” and in

India later this decade. Paris Agreement-compatible scenarios would

mean much steeper reductions. In this context, extremely high prices

will begin to ease as the trade patterns adjust to the new realities of

global energy markets.

The duration of high coal prices is difficult to predict, but coal futures

markets indicate that they could last until at least 2025–2026.

It is thus

crucial for both exporters and importers of coal to plan for such a ‘high

price, reconfigured market’-scenario. While high prices only strengthen

the long-term drivers behind the structural decline trajectory of coal

demand,

the medium-term impacts of the crisis on coal markets before

they re-enter their long-term terminal decline trajectory, remain

uncertain.

To emphasize the importance of employing diverse perspectives to

understand this uncertain context, we opt for an interdisciplinary

approach based on our previous research – encompassing individual

case studies of coal exporting and consuming countries, case studies on

just transition experiences, and modeling of international coal markets.

Our article is structured as follows: Section 2 identifies four key risks for

exporting countries in the current market environment. The discussion

in Section 3 puts forward our own perspective on how these risks relate

to each other and to what extent they could constitute an opportunity for

exporting countries’ sustainability transitions. Section 4 concludes by

providing an outlook and avenues for future research.

2. Risks of the current developments for coal exporting

countries

Several risks arise for coal exporters with the ongoing global energy

crisis. In this section, we highlight some of the most important ones. The

‘relapse to coal’ is tightly linked to four risks that arise due to a funda-

mental mismatch between the short-term incentives resulting from the

current coal ‘bonanza’ and the long-term implications of investment

decisions or policy executed to benefit from it: 1) Risk of alteration of the

national political economy in favor of the coal sector. 2) Risk of

increased investments in the coal sector and ballooning stranded assets.

3) Risk of intensified social, ecological and economic risks for coal-

producing regions. 4) Risk of macroeconomic vulnerability. This sec-

tion elaborates on each of those risks.

2.1. Risk 1: alteration of the national political economy in favor of the

coal sector

Before the crisis, governments and companies in several traditional

coal exporting countries were beginning to adapt to the largely negative

outlook for coal exports, as a majority of importers had plans to move

away from importing coal in the mid- or long-term [12]. In South Africa,

for instance, mining companies like Exxaro were planning to diversify

away from coal progressively [13] and the country had managed in

2021 to secure international financial support for a just transition out of

coal, in the form of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) be-

tween South Africa and Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the

United States, and the European Union.

[14].

Similarly, discussions about just transitions and planning processes

for coal-dependent regions were starting to take place in other countries

like Colombia and India [15,16,14]. Another example is the ongoing

process to phase-down and eventually phase out coal in the European

Union which was advancing, among others, within the framework of the

“Coal regions in transition” platform of the European Commission.

Other countries with big domestic coal consumption like Indonesia, on

the contrary, were aiming to increase local coal use to mitigate the

decline in exports [7], albeit while stopping the expansion of coal mines

[17].

Yet, increasing fossil fuel prices have put mounting pressure to stick

to coal phase out and phase-down strategies. Two key levers in the po-

litical economy of fossil fuel extraction were affected by the global en-

ergy crisis: (1) the energy transition discourse lost force, and (2) pro-coal

sectors recovered resources thanks to windfall profits.

On the first lever, as proposed elsewhere [18], ideas, narratives and

discourses are powerful forces that can change the direction of transition

processes. The current global energy crisis strengthened at least three

narratives in favor of the coal sector. First, that eliminating coal as a key

measure to promote the energy transition is a big mistake in terms of

energy security, as the countries of the EU demonstrate (see for example

[19,20]). Second, that increasing rents from coal and other fossil fuel

exports are necessary for development, as research has observed in the

past (e.g. for Colombia [21,22]) and even to finance the national energy

transition given the failure of Global North countries to meet their in-

ternational climate finance targets [23]. Third, this claim is often linked

to the idea that coal extraction, combustion and exports Global South

countries, in Africa for example, are entirely legitimate, as it is the

Global North which has the most historical responsibility for GHG

emissions, as has been observed in Tanzania [24] or Mozambique [25].

For instance, a December 2026 contract for Newcastle coal is priced at

$233.15 a ton as of August 2022, up from $111.15 in early 2022 and $80.80 in

early 2021 [10,11].

See Annex B for details on the long-term drivers. In brief, due to sustained

efforts in climate diplomacy and finance against the coal sector, the ever-

increasing gap between renewables and coal in terms of LCOE, and the diffi-

culties for developing countries in finding finance for expanding coal capacity,

the mid to long-term outlook for coal demand is weak and has not been

improved by the current energy crisis. Moreover, coal-exporting countries

should not rely on large consumers like China or India in the medium or long

term as they aim for a gradual coal phase out while mostly relying on domes-

tically produced coal, which will leave little to no room for imports.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

The recent tours to Africa by several European leaders searching new

fossil fuel deals to replace Russia’s exports [26] has strengthened this

narrative, as evidenced in the discourses by African leaders at COP27,

referring to their right to develop their fossil fuel reserves [27].

The second lever has to do with how this crisis leads to a massive

reshuffle of resources available to pro-coal actors (e.g. coal companies,

unions, and suppliers) as extraordinary revenues are generated from

coal sales and exports. Before the current ‘bonanza’ several coal com-

panies such as Glencore in Colombia had been complaining about

sinking profitability [28]. Others, such as Tungela Resources, a spin-off

of Anglo American’s South African coal operations, were accused of

“drowning in liabilities” due to dim market perspectives and mounting

social and ecological liabilities [29]. The crisis produced unexpected

profits via coal sales abroad for both companies.

These resources enable

pro-coal narratives to gain public relevance. In Australia, for example,

after the 2011 coal boom, different lobby organizations sprung up to

improve the public standing of the sector and question its deleterious

impacts [32]. It is precisely in junctures of boom or crisis that actors with

vested interests into continued fossil fuel extraction may attempt to in-

fluence contracts, legislation or even local socio-economic interactions

[33], as it was the case in many post-Covid recovery programmes [34].

The combination of a discursive environment increasingly skeptic

towards the energy transition, let alone coal phase out, and over-

optimistic about the sector’s future, with a massive injection of re-

sources that empower actors profiting from such narratives, bears the

risk of promoting long-term commitments for coal in legislation, con-

tracts, and investments, despite the likely short life of the current coal

bonanza.

2.2. Risk 2: increased unnecessary investments in the coal sector and

ballooning stranded assets

Investments into new fossil fuel supply, and in particular coal, are

increasingly considered to be at risk of becoming stranded assets

[35,36,37]. Their long lifetime, high operation cost and well-known

lock-in risk make them all but financially attractive or ecologically

tenable [38]. In order to achieve the Paris Agreement 1.5 ◦C target,

global coal consumption would have to be significantly reduced [39].

With demand in 1.5 ◦C scenarios decreasing faster than existing supply

capacities are exhausted, large shares of operating coal mine capacities

become excessive and thus face the risk of asset stranding in a future

oversupplied coal market [40,36].

Until 2050, more than half of the existing cumulative coal mine ca-

pacity has to remain unused and retired early. Around USD

2015

140

billion of coal mine asset values (unrecovered overnight capital expen-

diture) would be stranded from existing mines alone [40]. For new coal

projects the risk is considerably higher, as these would still have to

recover the full value of the project’s investment costs [41]. Hence, the

value at risk could rise considerably if the current crisis triggers addi-

tional investments in coal infrastructure.

The current surge in global coal prices and demand is nevertheless

tempting traditional coal-exporting countries like Australia, Colombia,

Indonesia, South Africa and the USA to consider investing in new export-

oriented coal supply capacities, e.g. new mines, operational extensions

for existing mines, or export-related, coal-specific infrastructure, e.g.

railways or harbor terminals [42]. Beyond traditional exporters, we

observe with particular concern possible new deals that European

buyers are considering or negotiating with non-traditional exporters

such as Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Mozambique and Nigeria [43]. This in-

creases incentives for those countries to invest in untapped coal reserves

and related infrastructure.

A fundamental mismatch becomes apparent: while a short-lived coal

sector bonanza may drive the expansion of the sector, related in-

vestments and actions such as opening new mines or building rail lines

and ports are long-term of potentially irrevocable nature. What is more,

increased supply on a globalized market tends to suppress prices, not

raise them as previous oversupply periods in coal markets, for instance

in 2012, 2015 and 2017, have shown [44,45,46]. Even if coal demand

remains high in the mid-to long-run, analyses based on the global coal

sector model COALMOD-World v2.0 [40] show that only limited in-

vestments in new coal mines in exporting countries are required

globally.

The current reconfiguration of coal trade flows amid the embargo on

Russian coal by several key importers such as the EU, Japan and South

Korea has caused disruptions in the coal market. Some exporting

countries, such as Colombia and Indonesia, now face larger coal demand

from countries that seek to substitute Russian coal, e.g. Germany. To

gauge the impact this could have on exporting countries and whether

this causes an increase in medium- to long-term coal output and exports,

we mirrored the embargo on Russian coal in our COALMOD-World v2.0

model. The embargo was implemented by placing a prohibitively high

tariff on coal imports from Russia, starting in 2025,

in all countries that

reportedly participate in the embargo.

One conclusion from our analysis (see Table 1) is that Russia’s coal

exports will remain widely unaffected by the sanctions in long-term as

trade is simply shifted: In our model with sanctions, exports from Russia

to China grow almost tenfold from 6 to 60 million tonnes per year – more

than offsetting the complete halt of exports to Germany, Finland, Korea

and Japan. This seems plausible since a similar shift was observed in the

natural gas trade patterns after Western states and their allies started to

impose import bans in 2022. A trade flow reconfiguration away from

Europe and towards China, India, and other countries was the result.

Three other exporters stand out: 1) The USA, a swing producer

(supplying Europe and Asia), experiences a rise in exports throughout

the 2025–2040 period as a consequence of increased European demand

for Appalachian coal. However, a sharp decline in exports follows in the

2040–2050 time period. 2) Indonesia sees consistently high export fig-

ures as a result of growing exports to India. This growth offsets the

decline in exports to China since China now imports ten times more coal

from Russia. 3) South Africa experiences the sharpest decline in exports

as a result of India’s shift away from South African and towards more

competitive Indonesian coal.

All these changes notwithstanding, the embargo on Russian coal only

minimally affects the prospective diminishing cumulative coal output of

coal exporting countries until 2060. On average, coal exports in million

tons are merely 0.64 % higher in the sanctions-scenario compared to the

no sanctions scenario. A reconfiguration of coal trade flows is predicted

by our model following potential sanctions. However, no renaissance is

visible for overall coal export demand. Any additional investment in coal

production and export capacity that is motivated by the current shifts in

the international coal markets will consequently only increase the

already high risk of stranded assets that coal exporting countries face. In

our scenario, coal will keep following its trajectory of (low) demand-

Glencore has reported extraordinary income since the end of 2021 in

Colombia, recovering in months its 588 USD million investment on the El

Cerrej´

on mine in La Guajira [30]. For its part, Tungela’s share has increased its

value in over 450 % between September 2021 and November 2022 [31].

These new export-oriented capacities would be concentrated in Indonesia,

while only marginal new coal capacities would be required in Australia,

Colombia, Russia and South Africa in the 2030s to replace retiring capacities

[41].

In line with the long time horizons for energy and mining investments, our

model operates in 5-year steps. Hence, 2025 was the earliest year the ‘treat-

ment’ of an import tax could be implemented. For a detailed explanation of the

scenarios we ran through our COALMOD-World v2.0 model confer Appendix D.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

driven decline – despite the sanctions. The significant expansion of coal

mining and exporting capacity that has been called for in some countries

is therefore all but unnecessary.

2.3. Risk 3: intensified social, ecological and economic impacts for coal

producing regions

Looking beyond the considerable asset-stranding risks for private

owners and investors of coal mines, an increasing number of publica-

tions have identified potential impacts for subnational coal-producing

regions, their inhabitants, and local governments. This includes not

only economic but also social and ecological impacts. In the case of a

boom and bust cycle, coal producing regions would be doubly affected:

in the short-term they would have to deal with the socio-environmental

implications associated with the intensification of coal extraction. In the

medium to long term, they would face the impacts of a fast decline in

their main economic activity, which could leave entire regions

‘stranded’ in economic terms with drastic social consequences.

The short-term impacts of the boom are already evident in several of

the coal-producing regions we actively research.

In Colombia, intensi-

fied coal mining operations continue despite two constitutional rulings

regarding commanding the El Cerrejon to reverse and mitigate the

environmental and social impacts of the mine in the surrounding com-

munities. The intensification of those impacts in the light of intensified

mining activity has resulted in protests from the local population which,

for instance, blocked rail lines and entry to the mines, reducing pro-

duction by 70 % in September 2022 [48,49]. In South Africa, illegal

mining operations have soared in the coal province of Mpumalanga as

prices of coal climb up and have resulted in massive fires, air pollution,

among other intensified environmental and social problems [50]. Even

industrialized and non-exporting producer countries have to deal with

social and environmental problems related to this relapse to coal. For

instance, in Germany, outrage and massive protests from environmental

groups have been awoken by the decision of the government to allow the

destruction of the village Lützerath, which became a symbol of the

resistance against coal in the current context with the expansion of

operating coal mines [51,52].

For the medium to long term, these regions can also expect intensi-

fied socio-economic and environmental problems. Several economic

challenges that coal-producing regions face as this activity enters into

structural decline have been documented by analyses of previous ex-

periences from coal regions in the Global North

[53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63]. They include high levels of

poverty and unemployment and outward migration; low levels of

economic diversification, even after decades of structural change; low

qualification of workers and few alternative good-quality jobs; deficient

environmental rehabilitation and restoration; heavily impacted post-

coal mining landscapes and ecosystems; and restricted public budgets

to support social security systems, long-term environmental impacts, as

well as economic diversification efforts.

Of special concern are coal-producing regions in the Global South.

The challenges faced by coal regions in the Global North are expected to

be amplified in these regions where additional challenges exist related to

weaker economic, legal, and social institutions [64,65]. Among these

additional challenges particularly important are the following. First, the

exacerbated precariousness of local economies based on high levels of

informal and low value-added activities. Second, the governance gap to

fulfill the role of some coal companies in local infrastructure investments

and social spending (through their contribution to the local budget as

well as through direct financing of educational, health and other social

programs). Third, limited institutional capacity to implement measures

for a planned economic and labor market restructuring, and to carry out

monitoring and oversight tasks for the correct closure of mining oper-

ations, including costly environmental remediation processes.

Raising awareness about the unavoidable decline of coal in exporting

countries, and embryonic discussions about just transition processes for

workers and communities that emerged in the context of the decline in

demand during the COVID-19 pandemic could have been the start of a

planning process for a managed decline that avoids the worst impacts of

a fast decline scenario. However, as outlined in relation to the first risk

described above, rising coal prices and demand feed the narrative that

coal is central to socioeconomic development in mining-dependent re-

gions, putting at risk the evolution of this planning process. With

thousands of formal and informal jobs related to the coal mining sector

and high unemployment rates

these arguments fall on fertile ground

[13,66]. This stands in stark contrast to our research findings, showing

that for a just energy transition to work, plans for workers and com-

munities dependent on coal mining must be put in place and imple-

mented quickly in advance to enable a smooth transition [67].

2.4. Risk 4: macroeconomic vulnerability

At times of high currency depreciation, which could be observed

almost everywhere after the pandemic [68], the boom in fossil fuel

prices and demand will increase the natural resource rents of govern-

ments in exporting countries, at the very least in their own currencies.

However, it is well known from previous experiences that ‘boom and

Table 1

Projected annual steam coal exports in million tons for selected exporting countries. Demand calculations are based on IEA announced pledges scenario (APS) [47].

Historic data from 2015 is used as baseline for calibration of the model (as model results from 2020 are distorted due to COVID). BAU =Business-as-usual, Sanc =

Sanctions. Source: The authors’ own calculations based on COALMOD-World v2.0. Confer Appendix D.

Year 2015 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050

Scenario Baseline BAU BAU Sanc BAU Sanc BAU Sanc

AUS 225.86 207.26 163.65 163.65 53.08 55.43 29.49 31.69

COL 80.00 80.00 76.62 77.30 44.98 45.45 17.72 18.12

IDN 375.00 410.00 410.00 410.00 410.00 410.00 254.01 254.01

KAZ 26.97 14.93 20.34 20.36 8.66 10.13 42.83 43.17

MNG 1.97 6.97 11.82 11.82 10.39 10.39 4.04 4.04

MOZ 1.97 1.94 1.78 1.78 1.33 1.33 0.67 0.67

RUS 135.00 135.00 135.00 135.00 82.76 84.49 47.42 47.85

USA 8.83 69.61 91.04 91.04 80.68 80.68 5.00 5.00

ZAF 82.00 73.35 55.49 55.49 5.69 6.39 6.32 6.62

For a systematic overview of our research see Appendix C.

For instance, >90,000 people employed in South Africa and 30.000 in

Colombia, and unemployment rates in their main coal-producing regions

(Mpumalanga and Cesar) reaching 30 % and 19 % respectively.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

bust’ dynamics in commodity markets can have large macroeconomic

impacts on exporters of these commodities [69,70,71,72]. Depending on

the composition of both exports and imports, existing macroeconomic

policy tools, and the duration and severity of the boom and bust, the

impacts can be significant and long-lasting in factors such as GDP

growth, fiscal deficit, public spending and investment [73].

At the macroeconomic level, renewed investment attraction in the

coal sector can have a ‘crowding-out’ effect on the domestic transitions

to renewables. In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, prices for

new power generation capacity, including renewable energy, have

increased due to a series of factors, particularly supply chain disruptions,

increases in interest rates, increases in the prices of critical minerals

required for manufacturing (e.g. lithium, cobalt, nickel and aluminium

[74]), and the weakening of local currencies in developing countries

against the USD.

This is further exacerbated by high energy costs and

inflation [75] [76].

While renewable energy investments have increased in most coun-

tries over the past years, becoming even more appealing in the current

crisis, rising costs are limiting the capacity of governments to encourage

short-term investments in low-carbon alternatives [77].

Increased

government support for the coal sector, no matter if it is via tax ex-

emptions, subsidies, loans or private equity investments, in countries

with constrained national budgets and limited access to private invest-

ment capital, will slow down the transition to renewables.

Similarly, additional investments in coal extraction can have a

crowding out effect on the necessary investments into alternative

export-oriented sectors to replace the future gap in government income

as coal rents decline, and into economic diversification efforts in coal-

producing regions, which are fundamental to avoid the worst conse-

quences of regional economic decline. Without sufficient and timely

investment in alternative sectors, the probability of these sectors

maturing enough to compete in international markets by 2030 when

model simulations show the strongest decline in the seaborne thermal

coal trade (see Annex 3), is very low.

This decline would either represent a massive economic shock for

national economies or would force exporting countries to jump into

alternative export oriented and low-added value activities that are

“quicker” to implement, such as the mining of minerals to replace the

fiscal and trade balance deficit left by declining coal exports. While this

option can mitigate some of the macroeconomic consequences of the

coal decline in the short to medium term, it does little to reduce the

medium to long-term macroeconomic vulnerability of the national

economy to the cycles of commodity markets and it does not address the

economic challenges faced by coal-producing regions (unless the un-

likely coincidence happens of these new extractive activities also taking

place in coal regions).

3. Discussion - turning the risks of the crisis into opportunities

for a just transition

As reiterated throughout this article, the current crisis has had mixed

effects on the prospects of coal phase out plans in coal-dependent

countries: On the one hand, high prices and prospects of higher de-

mand in the short term have been well-received in coal-exporting

countries. The income from coal exports will, after all, provide them

with the financial resources urgently needed in the aftermath of the

pandemic. On the other hand, high import prices for steam coal have

made this technology even less competitive than before the crisis. The

economic gap between renewable energies and coal-fired power

generation has all but risen in coal-importing countries [78]. Moreover,

many countries putting coal-fired power plants back online are doing so

reluctantly as almost all of them had plans to abandon coal within the

next two decades. Naturally, these ambitions paired with the economic

cost of coal have prompted a further acceleration in renewable energies,

notably in the USA with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) [79] and in

the European Union with the acceleration of their renewable energy

targets[80].

The current situation puts exporting countries at crossroads: They

can either use the current boom to merely expand coal production, or

they can take the path towards a just, gradual and controlled transition

beyond coal dependence. A crucial factor to determine which path these

countries will follow is the attitude and signals of the international

community, in particular, coal-importing countries.

3.1. The important role of coal importers and the international

community

Coal importers can influence the direction that exporter countries

take not just because of their power as customers, but also due to the

global perception that the EU, for example, is a “role model” on climate

and energy policy debates. Coal-importing countries and companies

could play a key role in helping exporting countries avoid falling into the

‘boom and bust’ trap.

First, importers can convey the right message about the short-term

nature of the increase in demand and the medium to long-term inten-

tion of a consumption phase out. Without clear messages from importing

countries strengthening their commitment to abandon coal consump-

tion, voices within exporter countries justifying inaction on phase-down

policies will be strengthened. These include arguments justifying

climate inaction based on the lower historical responsibility of devel-

oping countries for global emissions, or arguments highlighting the need

for coal-based power generation for ensuring energy security and

sovereignty.

Second, importers can proactively engage in discussions with

exporting countries on what role they as buyers can play to facilitate and

support a managed coal phase out. This second aspect can include

measures like strengthening green technology transfer and capacity

building with coal exporting countries directly (e.g., green finance and

climate finance flows, just transition international transfers) or indi-

rectly (e.g., debt-relief programs conditional on investments on green

sectors). Importantly, given the dynamic environment coal countries

and markets face, any support schemes should be transparent and

regularly monitored and if needed reconfigured to meet changing

conditions.

While current initiatives in this direction are emerging to target

heavily coal-dependent countries like South Africa, Indonesia and India

[14], these still remain largely disconnected from (or even in opposition

to) the short-term messaging and financial incentives resulting from

increased demand – thus missing an important opportunity to redirect

outgoing financial flows in a way that better supports just transition

efforts in exporting countries

to the coal sector, and sending a

https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm.

With the costs of solar panels and wind turbines being up by between 10 %

and 20 % since 2020, the IEA estimates that almost half of the additional USD

200 billion in capital investment in the energy sector in 2022 will be used to

cover higher costs rather than additional generation capacity.

An example of this is South Africa, which has been working on the devel-

opment and implementation of its own concept of a “just transition” in the

energy sector, aimed at decreasing its high dependency on coal, and has been

able to leverage $ 8.5 billion from European countries over the next 3–5 years

by forming the Just Energy Transition Partnership [81]. The partnership aims

to assist South Africa in reaching its NDC targets and should provide a decar-

bonization model for other developing countries. However, as the focus shifts

from energy transition to energy security in most European countries, the EU

shifts its support to 54 % concessional loans and 43 % commercial loans,

leaving only 2.7 % as grants. In addition, increasing coal exports to Europe

actually supports the expansion of the South African coal industry, counter-

balancing the fund provided under the Partnership.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

contradictory message about the urgency of accelerating the global coal

phase out [82].

3.2. Short-term trap prevention steps for coal exporters

Coal exporters on their side can avoid falling into the ‘boom and

bust’ trap with concrete short-term steps. First, countries and companies

still considering expanding coal production and export infrastructure, in

particular non-traditional exporters, can strongly reconsider investment

decisions if they incorporate better medium to long-term demand sce-

narios in their decision-making. Several of those scenarios at the global

and regional level are already available open source,

or could be

produced at the national level by a national authority in charge of the

topic, such as the Climate Change Committee of the UK.

Second, governments of exporting countries can take advantage of

the boom by increasing the absolute value and relative share of gov-

ernment revenue from the coal sector, e.g. through increased royalties or

windfall taxes, or by reducing or eliminating subsidies to the coal sector,

e.g. tax exemptions. The additional resources resulting from those pol-

icies can then be directed towards policy measures that promote eco-

nomic diversification and strengthen just transition efforts. This includes

both a) economic diversification efforts in coal-producing regions, and

b) improving regulatory frameworks to implement an organized phase-

down and eventual closure of mining operations that also attend to its

socio-ecological aspects.

Some exporting countries like Australia, Colombia and Indonesia are

already considering concrete options to increase government intake

from coal mining and coal exports in the current boom.

Moreover, the

destination of this additional income is not yet targeted to just transition

processes. Research shows that more targeted investment [87], as well

as policy sequencing [88] and preventive policies with a long-term view

to help regions and workers [89], will be needed for a managed decline

process. Also, given concerns about employment perspectives in coal

regions, it is important to prioritize investments that ensure more sus-

tainable regional economies and high-quality jobs in future, such as

implementation of labor market policies and anticipatory educational

and professional orientation strategies that allow for training, skilling

and re-skilling of the current and future labor force for greener and more

added-value oriented sectors [90,91,92], diversity and inclusion stra-

tegies, and social protection measures [93]. In addition, investments in

environmental remediation are sensible since they create short- and

medium-term employment while ensuring appropriate ecological con-

ditions for new productive activities [64,13].

4. Conclusion: never waste an energy crisis

While the COVID-19 pandemic and the Glasgow Pact seemed to have

been the final stoke for thermal coal, the energy crisis of 2022 and

increasing concerns about energy independence of large energy con-

sumers have brought new hopes of a revival of international steam coal

markets, with highly uncertain impacts for global decarbonization ef-

forts. In this article, we reflect on how the recent changes in coal markets

could have serious repercussions in the medium to long term, in case of a

“boom and bust” scenario. We also draw attention to the challenges

faced by coal exporting countries while stressing the opportunities this

crisis could bear for just coal transition processes.

On the demand side, high coal prices reduce the incentives of coal

users for expanding coal generation capacity. In addition, many coun-

tries have strengthened their support for renewable energies to reduce

their fossil fuel dependence. In turn, this strengthens the drivers for a

structural decline of long-term global coal demand.

On the supply side, traditional and new coal exporting countries

have quickly jumped in to replace Russian coal exports, delaying

divestment decisions in the coal sector and locking-in new investments.

Model results predict a reconfiguration of new trade routes, as Russia is

shifting most of its exports from Europe to China, replacing other inner-

Asian trade volumes. Overall increasing supply volumes result in the

medium-term in a reduction of prices and a risk of a “boom and bust”

dynamic in international coal markets.

To conclude, we believe that if a combination of the national and

international commitment measures highlighted within this paper is put

in place, decision-makers in coal-dependent countries could harness the

momentum to accelerate a just and timely coal phase out and avoid the

risk of falling into a vicious cycle of stranded assets, regions, and

economies. With the right combination of national policies and inter-

national cooperation and support, coal exporting countries have the

chance to kick start a virtuous cycle that strengthens economic diver-

sification efforts into the green sectors and accelerates the national

transition to renewable energies. At the same time, this can encourage

new economic activities with added value and employment opportu-

nities, increase macroeconomic resilience to the decline in international

coal demand, and ultimately improve the chances of implementing a just

transition out of coal. Lessons from the international coal market can, in

addition, also be taken as an indicator for upcoming challenges for the

gas and oil market - as complying with international climate targets does

imply the end of all fossil fuel markets.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial

interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence

the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

See for instance the IPCC scenarios database (https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6/), and the IEA net zero report scenarios (https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/d

ataproduct/net-zero-by-2050-scenario).

The Climate Change Committee is an independent, statutory body which advises the UK government on emissions targets and other climate change related topics

(See: https://www.theccc.org.uk/).

Australia’s coal exporting region Queensland implemented a progressive royalty scheme, increasing the current 15 % rate to 20 % for prices above AUD$175, 30

% for prices above AUD$225, and 40 % when prices exceed AUD$300. Moreover, the country is planning to spend the additional income on building public hospitals

and infrastructure [83]. Colombia’s new tax bill also includes a tax of 10 % per cent on coal exports when prices exceed USD$87 per tonne and also ends the

eligibility of royalty payments to be offset against income tax payments for coal mining companies. This could improve substantially the government intake but is

closely targeted to anti-poverty programs instead of concrete just transition efforts in producing regions [84,85]. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral

Resources was considering to collect a levy on coal exporters to compensate the power utility PLN for the difference between the current $70 per tonne cap and but

now has moved towards considering instead an increase in the royalties share [86]. This can improve the financial situation of PLN but does not guarantee the money

will flow into efforts for a reduction of national coal consumption and leaves completely unaddressed the supply side of coal.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

Appendix A. The pandemic aftermath and global energy crisis: reactions by most important coal producers and consumers

The COVID-19 pandemic had a considerable impact on economic activity and energy markets, in particular coal markets. The IEA estimates that

global coal demand fell by 4.4 % in 2020, with regional disparities varying dramatically from 1 % increase in China to impressive declines of around

20 % in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) as well as more moderate declines by around 8 % in emerging economies like India and

South Africa [94]. The recession in 2020 however was followed by a strong economic recovery in 2021, which was accompanied by a rise in coal

demand.

The pandemic also had considerable effects on other energy sources, with renewable energies being the biggest ‘winner’ of the pandemic in the

electricity sector: global renewable power generation grew by 7 % in 2020, with net installed renewable capacity growing by about 4 %. They

accounted for almost 90 % of the increase in global power capacity [95]. Moreover, many economic stimulus measures targeted renewables, setting

many countries on track to meet their renewable energy goals[95]. However, new power additions were not enough to keep up with the steep recovery

of industrial activity in 2021, resulting in power shortages in countries such as China and India [96,97].

Supply chain shortages and logistical bottlenecks in the world’s main ports raised commodity prices significantly, adding to inflationary pressure.

In the context of economic uncertainty, political instability ensued in many countries (e.g. Sri Lanka). Additionally, on February 24th 2022 Russia

invaded Ukraine. Several countries countered by introducing different financial, commercial or political sanctions. For instance, the EU and the US

unilaterally closed the Atlantic market to Russian coal and oil exports, prompting a massive shift in their demand to alternative exporters. As the

region most dependent on Russian fossil fuel exports, the EU’s import ban excluded fossil fuels at first. When the EU, together with Japan, first

announced a Russian coal import-ban in April 2022, its implementation and the finding of alternative suppliers proved so difficult that its start-date

was pushed back to August 11th [98].

Soon, Russia reacted by reducing fossil gas flows into the EU, triggering a surge in fossil gas prices. As the EU has engaged in a global spree to find

alternative suppliers for energy, global energy prices, most notably fossil gas, have dramatically increased [99]. This drastic increase in global gas

prices that have forced countries like Germany, the US, Japan, and South Korea to increasingly turn to coal [100]. The prices for non-Russian coal have

increased quickly as a consequence.

The situation in the EU has been worsened by historic lows in nuclear energy supply in France due to technical issues and low water levels in the

rivers that provide the reactors with coolant [102]. As a result, the day-ahead price per MWh in France currently trades at a more than tenfold multiple

compared to pre-pandemic levels. Similar, if slightly lower, price hikes can be observed in Germany [103]. Due to a lack of alternatives in the short

term, some countries in the EU like Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and France are seeing themselves forced to restart power plants that were shut

down or postpone upcoming closures.

Another large coal user, the USA, has increased coal consumption in the short term while accelerating its national transition to renewable energies.

Given its sufficient production capacity, the USA is unlikely to become a significant coal importer again. In addition, the US Congress passed the

Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which includes a large package of new grant and loan programs, tax credits and emissions fees that target green sectors.

The IRA is expected to contribute significantly to decarbonizing the US energy system, resulting in a 60–81 % share of clean power generation

(including nuclear) by 2030, putting the country on a favorable track to meet the goal of 100 % clean power generation by 2035 [79].

For the world’s largest importers and producers of coal, China and India, condoning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine makes sense in the short term,

since it has allowed them to enjoy price discounts from their trade with Russia of up to 50 % - 60 % [104]. The short-term consequences of this are

significantly larger imports of thermal coal from Russia, which is now the largest coal exporter to China for both thermal and even metallurgical coal

[105], the third largest coal exporter to India [106].

While rising Russian coal exports to China make headlines, the prospects for other countries seeking to export their coal to a resurgent Chinese post

pandemic economy are not as good as some coal producers expect, especially in the short term. China’s total coal imports have so far trailed those of

2021 by over 20 % in quantity; with China’s top coal-trading partner, Indonesia, even seeing a fall in exports to China of over 40 % year-on-year as of

June 2022 [107].

In response to the increased coal demand and prices, traditional coal exporting countries like Australia, Indonesia, South Africa and Colombia

boosted their coal production and exports. The following table summarizes the responses to the energy crisis in the biggest producers and exporters of

coal as of October 2022.

Australian coal (Newcastle FOB, 6000 kcal/kg) rose from 250 USD/t to over 450 USD/t between April and August 2022. Over the same period, Russian coal

(Vostochny FOB, 5500 kcal/kg) traded just short of 150 USD/t [10,101].

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

Table 2

Responses to the energy crisis in the biggest producers and exporters of coal.

Country Role in the coal market Short-term response Ref.

Australia Largest net coal exporter and important thermal coal exporter, unofficial

imports ban from China was putting coal export sector under pressure.

Boosted exports to north western Europe 5.4 million tons in the first half

of 2021 to 9.2 million tons a year later. Top coal importer now in

Netherlands’s port

[108,109]

China Largest producer and importer of coal in the world. China has plans for

autarky in terms of energy and is expected to further strengthen domestic

steam coal production and electrification until the late 2020s.

Historically, China was never forced to rely on importing coal,

nevertheless, it has often chosen to do to smooth out sharper rises in

demand and maintain the security of supply.

Imports from Russia reached all-time highs, 55 % of which seaborne, as

much of China’s coastal power plants also have their own ports, allowing

them to be supplied via ships. In addition, domestic coal mines have

ramped up production to meet growing demand after the post-covid

recovery and to increase domestic stock piles.

[12,107,110]

Colombia Fifth largest thermal coal exporter, with the coal sector mostly (%)focused

on exports, with >50 million tons per year, mainly exported to Europe

and Turkey.

Some coal mines closed in 2020–21, affecting production and exports in

2022. Despite a drop in exports to Europe by 1.5 million tons in the first

half of 2022 year–on-year (YoY) prices have allowed the value of exports

to this region to increase by 32 %.

[28,48,111]

EU Some countries in the EU produce coal mainly for domestic consumption.

Coal consumption has fallen steadily in recent years, but import

dependency from outside the EU remains high, especially for hard coal

(>55 % in 2020).

Increased domestic coal production and ramp-up of coal imports from

alternative suppliers following a reduction in imports from Russia.

Despite the extension and re-activation of coal-fired power plants, the use

of coal began to decline towards the end of 2022.

[7,112,113]

Table 3

Continuation of Table 1: Responses to the energy crisis in the biggest producers and exporters of coal.

Country Role in the coal market Short-term response Ref.

India Second largest coal producer and consumer. Coal accounts for 55 % of the

country’s energy need. Facing challenges the coal imports and trying to

promote national production.

Even though India’s pledge to achieve net zero emissions by 2070 and

36 % of capacity at operating mines goes unused, new coal project

continue to be auctioned (The Coal Ministry has successfully auctioned

10 coal mines for commercial exploitation in September 2022).

[114–116]

Indonesia World’s top coal exporter, with >405 million tons year, mainly exported

to China and India. Extensive use of coal for domestic electricity

generation (>90 % of electricity supply). Local prices are currently

capped at US$70 per tonne, but with coal exports so economically

attractive, coal producers have stopped renewing contracts for locals

sales.

Indonesia experienced a 20 % year-on-year increase of coal exports to

167 Mt. between January and May. This is due to increased demand from

India and Germany, responsible for additional shipment of 15 Mt. and 6

Mt. in Indonesia coal, respectively. Yet, production in the first half of

2022 only went up by 3.17 % (YoY), totaling 249 Mt. Increasing price

gap between bid export prices and the set local price, some coal

producers even prefer paying penalties over selling their coal at a home.

[7,83,117]

Russia Large coal producer and third largest coal exporter, serving mostly the

European coal market (>40 %)

Some mines have been forced to close temporarily as a result of the

decline in exports to the European Union and limited exports capacities

to China from Siberia. Russia has started to export coal at discounted

prices to alternative importers, mainly China and India

[104,106,118]

Table 4

Continuation of Table 1: Responses to the energy crisis in the biggest producers and exporters of coal.

Country Role in the coal market Short-term response Refs

South

Africa

Coal exports accounted for around 26 % of production in tonnes and

around 39 % of revenues in the sector in 2019. >86 % of the coal

exported in 2021, or 50.7 Mt., went to India, Pakistan, and China.

Extensive use of coal for domestic electricity generation.(>90 %) of

electricity supply.

Exported around 40 % more tons of coal to Europe(e.g. Germany, France,

and Spain) from the Richards Bay Coal Terminal than in all of 2021, in

spite of supply constraints. Increased exports of South African coal

through Mozambique.

[119–122]

USA ‘Swing exporter’ with most production dedicate to supplying domestic

consumption and with old and aging coal power plant fleet.

Exports to Europe have increased to about million tons per month since

the start of the war. Further increase in exports is not expected since

seaborne transport capacity has already reach its maximum.

[123,124]

Others Smaller exporters and producers have been experiencing difficulties to

compete with traditional exporters with the stagnation of global demand

and trends to a structural declines as a results of climate policy.

Kazakhstan’s exports to the EU have more than tripled compared to 2021

while Mozambique’s exports have increased more than six times in 2022

compared to 2021, a big part of this are exports of South African coal.

[112,125,126]

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

Appendix B. Long-term drivers for the decline of coal demand

B.1. Global coal power plant fleet in decline and poor economic prospects for new coal power plants

Fig. 1. Global coal power plant pipeline by country. The y-axis is on a log scale. Source: The authors’ own elaboration based on [127].

For a number of years in a row, the Global Coal Plant Fleet pipeline has been progressively shrinking, with increasing cancellations of proposed

capacity additions. The yearly survey of the Global Energy Monitor for 2021 has shown that global coal plant capacity under development shrank by

13 % in 2021, with the global coal fleet outside China shrinking for the fourth year in a row [128]. While this is still not enough to reach targets under a

1.5 ◦C scenario, it nevertheless is an indication of coal’s declining trajectory. When looking at net additions of coal power on a global scale, China is

responsible for >90 % of additions (see Fig. 1), creating a somewhat distorted picture of the overall trend in international coal markets [127]. China,

however, is unlikely to import larger amounts of coal in the future since it is fixated on pursuing autarky. Therefore, China’s coal expansion

notwithstanding, the coming downward trend in coal demand is expected to be even swifter and sharper for international steam coal trade flows.

In addition, high fossil fuel prices, like the ones observed in the current energy crisis, affect the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and operating

costs of fossil fuel-based power generation, raising opportunity costs and rendering low-LCOE renewable energies even more attractive. In 2021

already, new coal power was no longer competitive with new utility-scale PV and wind installations – with new renewables even outcompeting some

already operating coal power stations (see Figs. 2 and 3) [78]. Increased fuel prices will likely make most operating coal power plants economically

uncompetitive in 2022, putting operators in financial distress, and possibly accelerating the global decline in net installed coal power generation

capacity.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

Fig. 2. Global mean LCOE for select power generation technologies. Source: The authors’ own elaboration based on [78].

Fig. 3. Median LCOE by technology, based on IEA sample; IEA countries only. Source: The authors’ own elaboration based on [182].

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

As for the plans of some developing countries (e.g. Vietnam or Pakistan) to considerably increase their coal-fired capacity in the coming years: It is,

in our view, unlikely that they will be able to secure the funding for all those projects. All of the largest international financiers of coal power plants,

namely Korea, Japan, and China, have put moratoriums in place to stop financing new coal power plants abroad [7]; so did multilateral lenders like

the World Bank over the past decade. Private financing for such projects is more expensive than ever before, with a growing list of actors in the

financial sector announcing moratoriums or restriction policies [129], and generally high interest rates around the world [130].

Financing for renewable energy projects, on the other hand, enjoys dedicated financial schemes that have been created to facilitate access to

financing for renewable energy projects in those countries, notably in South and South East Asia, like the Energy Transition Partnership [131] and the

Energy Transition Mechanism of the Asian Development Bank [132].

B.2. Concentrated policy and diplomatic efforts to accelerate global coal phase out

Considering the importance of eliminating coal from the global electricity mix for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals [133,3], this topic

was the first to get its own “climate club” in the process of the international climate change negotiations, with the launch of the Powering Past Coal

Alliance (PPCA) in 2017.

The PPCA is a coalition of national and sub-national governments, businesses and organizations working “to advance the

transition from unabated coal power generation to clean energy” and by 2022 has over 170 active members.

While scholars were not very optimistic about the PPCA model of a “climate club” as an effective mechanism to significantly accelerate action

against coal globally [134], the energy crisis has shown an important advantage of this group: its stability and the long-term signal it creates for energy

markets nationally and internationally. For instance, since the signature of the Paris Agreement and thanks to diplomatic and advocacy efforts, over

100 globally significant asset managers (understood as owners with assets under management (AuM) greater than US$50 billion, and banks and

insurers/reinsurers with AUM or loans outstanding larger than US$10 billion) have announced their divestment from coal mining and/or coal-fired

power plants.

Although some members of the PPCA have increased coal consumption as a result of the energy crisis, none of them has officially changed their coal

phase out date or decided to leave the alliance. Similarly, while the coal divestment policies of several financial organization still have loops, none of

them has weakened or withdrawn their coal restriction policies as a result of the energy crisis. This brings us to the conclusion that Climate diplomacy

in the coal sector has not been structurally weakened by the current crisis. Therefore, its sustained efforts will continue to play a fundamental role in

the decarbonization of the electricity sector in the future.

B.3. Largest consumers advancing quickly in their national transition and aiming at eliminating coal imports

With around 3,7 billion, and 0,8 billion tons per year, China and India concentrate the Lion’s share of global coal production, consumption and

imports.

Therefore, the future of global coal demand and the prospects for coal exporters are largely determined by the individual decisions of these

two countries.

China on its side, surprised the world in late 2020 when the country announced that it would become carbon neutral by 2060 [135]. Moreover,

China has committed to see its emissions peak before 2030, with scholars closely affiliated with the government estimating the actual peak to take

place as soon as 2027 [136]. In June 2022, several top government agencies and ministries, including the powerful National Development and Reform

Commission, released a joint notice on the issuance of a “Synergistic Implementation Plan for Pollution and Carbon Reduction”. This plan entails a

significantly stricter control of coal consumption until 2025 and first mentions a reduction of coal consumption on the national level starting in 2026

as well as nationally putting the construction of new coal power plants to a halt [137].

In the wake of these announcements and promising levels of renewable energy expansion in China, the overall prospects for coal look dim in the

medium to long term [138,139]. Studies have shown that decarbonizing China is feasible and cost-effective [140]. Considering China’s self-sufficiency

in terms of coal reserves, it will seek to sustain its coal industry at home as long as possible. Additionally, a phase out would affect the employment of

more than five million workers in the coal sector [141]. China’s governments and industry want to keep these jobs as long as possible, which is why a

swift coal-exit at home and shift towards importing more coal from abroad is highly unlikely.

The prioritization of the domestic coal sector is reflected in several projects, that reduce the cost of domestic coal and increase its competitive

advantage over mostly seaborne imports. Most of these projects involve overland coal-transportation infrastructure such as the Haoji rail line.

Simultaneously, scholars have observed an inward shift of coal consumption. Thanks to ultra-high voltage transmission lines, coal power plants no

longer have to be situated on the coast near the industrial centers of the country. This tilts the playing field towards domestic coal that can be delivered

by rail directly, offering a competitive advantage over seaborne imports [12].

India on its side, made a much-awaited announcement at the COP26 in 2021: the country will reach net-zero emissions by 2070 [142]. This was

ratified in August 2022 with the update of its NDC. The updated contributions include, among others, reducing the emissions intensity of the GDP by

45 % by 2030, compared to the 2005 level; achieving about 50 % of cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy

resources by 2030; adopting a climate-friendly and cleaner path for economic development[143,144,145].

Driven by the rising population, expanding economy and a quest for improved quality of life, energy usage in India is expected to rise [146]. To

build its energy security and put in place measures to permanently reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels, especially coal, India is, on the one hand,

building out domestic renewable energy generation capacity, for instance in the first half of 2022 India added 98 % of net new capacity with renewable

energy and hydroelectricity making up 2 %, and no net new thermal capacity [147]. A study suggests that “a renewable-based power system by 2050 is

lower in cost than the current coal-dominated system, has zero greenhouse gas emissions, and provides reliable electricity to around 1.7 billion

people” [148].

https://www.poweringpastcoal.org/about/history.

https://ieefa.org/coal-divestment.

https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-coal-production-2018-2021, https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-information-overview/consumption, htt

ps://www.iea.org/reports/coal-information-overview/imports.

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

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Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

On the other hand, the government is boosting self-reliance through commercial coal auctions. Despite some failures in the first half of 2022, in

November 2022 The Union Ministry of Coal launched a new round of coal mine auctions for commercial purposes with the largest-ever basket of 141

mines [149]. Nevertheless, these new projects are unneeded as the underutilized capacity at India’s existing mines exceeds the projected capacity from

new coal projects [150]. Under this scenario, there is not much room for coal exporters to supply the Indian market in the long term.

Appendix C. Compilation of research done on coal-dependent regions and countries by the authors

In this article we opt for an interdisciplinary approach based on our previous research – encompassing individual case studies of coal exporting and

consuming countries, case studies on just transitions experiences, and modeling of international coal markets. The following table summarizes the

various publications our team has contributed to the research of energy transitions in coal regions or coal-dependent countries in general, which are

the basis for our general understanding of the challenges and opportunities these regions face for a transition out of coal.

Table 5

Research on coal-dependent regions and countries by the Authors from the FossilExit research group.

Country Region

Australia Galilee Basin [41]

China General [151,140]

Colombia El Cesar [64,152], La Guajira [153,18,154]

Czechia General [155]

Germany Lusatia [156,157], NRW [158,159,160,161,162,163], Leipzig [164], General [165,166,167,89,159,168,169,170]

India General [171]

Poland General [172]

South Africa Mpumalanga [173,174,175]

United Kingdom General [176,177,178,179]

United States Appalachia [180,124], General [178]

Global [181,4]

Appendix D. COALMOD-World v2.0

To calculate the stranded asset risks and projected coal export figures, we used our open partial equilibrium model “COALMOD-World v2.0”

(CMW) [40]. This section elaborates on the basic functionality of the model as well as the assumptions made when calculating the projections made

exclusively for this paper.

D.1. General features and method of the model

CMW is a partial equilibrium model of the global steam coal market that takes into account around 90 % of steam coal production and consumption

worldwide. Several studies have already used the model to study the international coal market, its dynamics and the respective policy implications

[152,180,124,41,4]. It is a comprehensive model to the extent that it takes into account the limited lifetimes of existing and new coal mines, transport

costs and routes, as well as the possibility of expanding or reducing capacity through in- or divestment (see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Basic features of COALMOD-World v2.0 model structure. Source: [40].

D.2. Input data used with COALMOD-World v2.0

Historic data from 2015 is used as baseline for general calibration of the model. To reflect the most recent developments in global coal markets

accurately, this paper uses the recently published demand forecast from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook [47] as input. The specific subset used was

the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario (APS). We chose the APS scenario because it anticipates significant changes in energy policy throughout the

next decades we deem realistic. APS assumes that “all aspirational targets announced by governments are met on time and in full, including their long-

P.A. Yanguas-Parra et al.

Energy Research & Social Science 97 (2023) 102989

term net zero and energy access goals”. Contrarily, the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) merely assumes the continuation of today’s policies which we

consider unlikely considering the rapid and drastic changes in the global energy landscape observed. Next, in accordance with Hauenstein [40,124],

the model and input scenario data were calibrated.

D.3. Alterations made to COALMOD-World v2.0 and model runs

CMW, by default, has the possibility of implementing trade restrictions in the form of an import tax for import from port e to port sea in period a

−

(a,e,sea)

. This tax t

−

(a,e,sea)

is part of the exporter’s problem and applies to all seaborn exports to the selected destinations (see Appendix in [40] for a

detailed elaboration on the mathematical model assumptions and problems). To simulate the import ban, we applied a prohibitively high tax of +∞ to

all exports from Russian ports to countries that have reportedly issued a ban on Russian coal imports or where an import ban can be expected soon.

This includes all EU countries in the model, the US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. The time period for this tax begins in 2025 (first

calibration period after the real import ban in 2022 considering the 5-year step nature of this model) and lasts indefinitely. Russian seaborne exports to

countries such as China or India are not subject to the import tax and thus continue as in the no sanctions scenario. The same is true for land-based

exports which the model assumes only take place from Russia to countries that do not have an import ban in place anyway, namely China, Kazakhstan,

India, Mongolia and Pakistan.

Then, we ran the model using the same APS demand scenario with and without trade restrictions. We subsequently compared the results for

exporting countries, specifically the total amount of production that is exported, and computed the average difference between sanctions and non-

sanctions scenarios. The results can be found in Table 1 in Section 2.2. Additional results based on runs with demand consistent with the STEPS

scenario or a 1.5 ◦C compatible scenario are available but have not been reported in this article. They can be provided to interested readers upon

request.

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