S. Šalkauskio terminologijos teorija

LIETUVIŲ KALBOS SPECIALIOJI LEKSIKA LIETUVIŲ KALBOTYROS KLAUSIMAI, XXII (1983) K. Gaivenis S. Šalkauskis’s Theory of Terminology 1. Introductory Remarks Prof. S. Šalkauskis (1886–1941) was a prominent bourgeois public figure and a philosopher of the neo-scholastic school1; he became interested in terminology while studying at Moscow University. He was encouraged in this work by R. Bytautas (1886–1915), a publicist and linguist, and a member of the RSDLP, who studied at the same university from 1905 to 1912 and at the time had written several significant scholarly articles (published as separate pamphlets) about the Lithuanian language (e.g., “How to Pronounce and Write Foreign Words,” “A Few Thoughts on the Philosophy of the Lithuanian Language,” etc.). S. Šalkauskis wrote of him: “This dear friend of mine (R. Bytautas.—K. G.) from Moscow University partly infected me with his passionate love of the question of terminology; therefore, when speaking about the need for terminology, I cannot refrain from mentioning him as the direct source of my inspiration”2. S. Šalkauskis’s published legacy consists of two parts: (a) research into the theory of terminology3 and (b) a four-language (Lithuanian–French–German–Russian) collection of philosophical terms entitled “General Philosophical Terminology”4. In addition, fragments of S. Šalkauskis’s handwritten glossary of pedagogical terms have survived. Research into S. Šalkauskis’s methodology of scholarly work is also partly related to terminology. 2. Principles of Term Creation and Standardization 2.1. S. Šalkauskis became interested in theoretical questions of terminology before he began standardizing Lithuanian philosophical terminology. He published a fairly extensive study on this subject, in which he discussed the nature and properties of the term, sources of terms, categories, and features of usage, and formulated general rules for creating Lithuanian terminology. In explaining the properties of the term and its relations to logical, grammatical, and philosophical categories, S. Šalkauskis relied chiefly on the work “Grammatica speculativa” by the medieval philosopher and scholastic Duns Scotus (1265–1308), and on research by French linguists, for example, M. Bréal’s (1832–1915) “Essai de séman- 1 For more on his philosophical views, see Plečkaitis R., Šliogeris A. The influence of Vladimir Solovyov’s philosophy on Stasys Šalkauskis’s worldview during the pre-Freiburg period. — Lietuvos TSR Mokslų Akademijos darbai. A series, 1973, vol. 4(45); Sverdiolas A. The problem of culture and religion in the works of Stasys Šalkauskis. — Ibid., 1978, vol. 4(65); and also his. The concept of the human being in Stasys Šalkauskis’s philosophy of culture. — Ibid., 1978, vol. 1(62). 2 Šalkauskis S. Theory of Terminology and Lithuanian Philosophical Terminology. — Logos, 1927, No. 1, p. 1. 3 Ibid., 1935, No. 1; 1927, Nos. 1, 2; 1934, No. 1; Gimtoji kalba, 1935, No. 4. 4 Šalkauskis S. Bendroji filosofijos terminija. — Logos, 1937, Nr. 2; 1938, Nr. 1. 128 tique“, Ž. Vandrijeso (1875–1960) „La Language“ ir kt. Š. Šalkauskio lingvistinis pasirengimas terminologijos darbui nebuvo visiškai be spragų, todėl to meto kalbininkai – J. Balčikonis, A. Salys, P. Skardžius – jo straipsnius teoriniais terminologijos klausimais yra šiek tiek taisę. Dėl tos pačios priežasties kai kurie elementarieji kalbotyros terminai (pvz., galūnė ir kt.) jo straipsniuose vartojami kiek kitokia reikšme, negu apskritai kalbotyros literatūroje. 2.2. Speaking about the object of terminology, Š. Šalkauskis emphasized that terminology is not a separate, autonomous scientific discipline. As a word, a term belongs to the science of grammar, and as a concept—to the science of logic. Through grammar, a term enters linguistics, and through logic—philosophy. Š. Šalkauskis was among the first to notice that the word terminologija is ambiguous. He wrote: “The Lithuanian language can use two words side by side in different senses—terminija and terminologija—whereas other languages generally use only one corresponding word, terminologijos, in such cases. Since our language uses the ending -ija to denote a set of homogeneous things, terminija accordingly means the totality of technical terms of a particular science or art… Terminology is the science, or at least the theory, of terminija”5. Š. Šalkauskis regarded terminology as a special part of semantics. Understanding terminology in this way, Š. Šalkauskis, clearly, had to draw two general conclusions: 1) that scientific progress narrows the concept of the term itself, and 2) that a term is inseparable from the concepts of sign and concept. According to the understanding of logic at the time, signs were thought to be of two kinds: natural (signum naturale) and conventional (signum arbitrarum seu conventional). In another respect, signs can be formal (signum in quo) and instrumental (signum ex quo). Finally, there are also manifestative and suppositious signs (signa manifestativa et suppositive). Drawing on this understanding of signs, Š. Šalkauskis provided the following definitions of language, writing, word, and term: 1) “Language is a system of conventional signs serving the purpose of communication”; 2) “Writing, or a system of written characters (in Latin scriptura or scriptio), is written signs used to represent words”; 3) “Words are manifestative signs for concepts and suppositious signs for things”; 4) “A term is a word denoting a concept that has a special meaning for a particular subject of science.” Thus, in Š. Šalkauskis’s words, “a term is always a verbal sign that stands for a subject and manifests a concept, although not all such words are terms. For such a verbal sign to become a term, it must enter the domain of some science and be scientifically worked out”6. This understanding of term, terminija, and terminology was quite advanced for its time. 2.3. Š. Šalkauskis distinguished three main sources of terminija: 1) the living language of the people; 2) the inventory of word-formation devices; and 3) other languages. These sources of terminija are sometimes mentioned even today, although in fact this classification is not entirely justified. It is more accurate to speak of only two main sources of terminija (the vocabulary of one’s own language and that of other languages), or to speak of methods of term formation rather than their sources, because: a) neologisms in terminija can be formed using both words from the vernacular and borrowed and international words, and b) compound terms (two-word and multi-word) 5 Šalkauskis S. Terminologijos teorija... — Logos, 1927, Nr. 1, p. 1. 6 Ibid., pp. 6 ff. 5. 1019 129 terms can be formed as fixed word combinations not only from various words, but also from combinations of words and symbols. 2.3.1. The word in the language of the people used in scientific terms, in S. Šalkauskis’s words, must be “scientifically worked out,” or, to use the current term, terminologized. To describe the terminologization of ready-made words, S. Šalkauskis used the concepts of “extension” (extensio) and “comprehension” (comprehensio). In his view, “the extension of a term is measured by all the individuals covered by the extension of the concept, while the comprehension of a term is measured by all the marks that make up the comprehension of the concept.” The extension of a term coincides with its meaning, while its comprehension coincides with its sense. As comprehension increases, extension decreases; and as the sense of a term becomes more complex, its meaning narrows, that is, it is limited to a smaller number of things. Understanding terminologization in this way, S. Šalkauskis stressed that “univocal terms should not be confused with terms having the same meaning. A univocal term is so with respect to the concept that lies at its basis; a term with the same meaning is so with respect to another term with which it has an equal meaning, in other words, it applies to the same thing or things. A univocal term has one concept at its basis and signifies, in one sense, an entire series of things. Terms with the same meaning, signifying the same thing or things, express different concepts about them and therefore have different senses”8. Unable to do without the concepts of “univocal” and “same-meaning” terms, S. Šalkauskis also used an intermediate concept—that of analogical terms. In discussing these terms, he drew on three analogies of scholastic logic: analogia proportionis, analogia proportionalitatis, and analogia attributionis. He needed these analogies when discussing the terminologization of ready-made words from the vernacular by three methods: a) refining a word’s meaning; b) broadening a word’s meaning; and c) transferring a word’s meaning. S. Šalkauskis considered terminologization an ongoing process in general, since the content of a term is continually supplemented with new features. Terminologization usually passes through the following genetic stages: “1) forming a term from an etymological basis and explaining it with synonyms; 2) defining the term nominally, on the basis of its direct and principal sense; 3) classifying the term nominally, if it has more than one sense; 4) refining the understanding of the term (precisifying it), by more strictly determining the scope of its sense and the extension of its meaning; 5) developing the understanding of the term in connection with progress in knowledge of the subject itself”9. In general, S. Šalkauskis’s understanding of the terminologization of ready-made words was rather convoluted, logistic, and excessively detached from the general and specific processes of linguistic semantics. He understood terminologization only as an action and did not consider it as a process. Moreover, the process of terminologization cannot be analyzed successfully without linking it to its dialectical opposite—determinization. 2.3.2. Speaking about neologisms in terminology, S. Šalkauskis distinguishes two methods of forming them: “deriving new words” (derivatives) and “joining words together” (compounds). In word formation, he considers the suffix more important than the prefix. S. Šalkauskis also notes that the more complex a suffix is, the further removed it is from the “concrete- 7 S. Šalkauskis wrote “tysa,” but we adapt this term of his to current orthography. 8 Šalkauskis S. Terminologijos teorija..., pp. 11 ff. 9 Ibid., 1925, No. 1, p. 21. 130 the concept of things,” it means. He also understood the ending in his own way: for him, an ending is the part of a word extending from the root to its end. Complex, multiple suffixes were precisely the most suitable for terminology. S. Šalkauskis insightfully observed that prefixes and suffixes rarely participate together in the formation of neologisms, expressing this figuratively: “a prefix tends to do without a suffix, and, conversely, a suffix seems to get along poorly with a prefix.” This was an insightful observation. Sekdamas A. Leskyno veikalu „Die Bildung der Nomina im Litauischen“ (1891), S. Šalkauskis pirmasis imasi nagrinėti terminų kategorijas ir jų reiškimo būdus. Jis pateikia tokią terminų kategorijos definiciją: „Terminų kategorija mums yra ne kas kita, kaip terminų grupė, tipiška savo lytimi, dažniausiai — savo priesaga ir atitinkanti turinčių tam tikrą bendrumą sąvokų grupę“10. Sekdamas Aristoteliu ir viduramžių logikais, jis skiria substanciją — subjektą ir substanciją — objektą. Smulkiau klasifikuodamas, abiem atvejais jis išskiria dar po 4 kategorijas: substancijos — subjekto — veiksmo subjektą, vyksmo — nustatymo subjektą, kokybės subjektą ir santykio subjektą; substancijos — objekto — veiksmo objektą, antrinę medžiagą, įranki-priemone ir talpos daiktą. S. Šalkauskis detaliai aprašė šių terminologijos kategorijų darybos priemonių inventorių. Demanding that neologisms in terminology be typical and applying the principle of analogy strictly, S. Šalkauskis criticized some of the terms of that time. He particularly disliked the Lithuanian names for the cases. S. Šalkauskis wrote about them as follows: “On this occasion, it must be observed that our case terms ending in -ininkas are formed quite unsuccessfully. First of all, the ending -ininkas is used in them in a wholly atypical way. According to the most typical meaning of this ending, vardininkas should mean a person concerned with a name or names; kilmininkas, a person concerned with origin; naudininkas, a person concerned with their own benefit; galininkas, a person who occupies the rearmost place; įnagininkas, a person who makes a living by means of tools; vietininkas, a person who lives in one place for a long time, or who takes someone else’s place; šauksmininkas, a person who expresses themselves by shouting, who cares only about shouting. These terms could denote the cases of a word only by analogy with lower-leg-wearers or span-wearers. It is clear that such term formation, based on a highly questionable analogy, goes against the natural and typical tendency of our language. Moreover, the things by which the cases in this instance acquire their names—namely, name, origin, benefit, end, tool, place, and call—are, for the most part, merely accidental grounds for naming the cases one way or another; only place is an exception. Only vietininkas is named after the universal and essential feature of the case. All the other case names are purely accidental. Nevertheless, naming the cases vardiniu, kilminiu, naudiniu, galiniu, įnaginiu, vietiniu, šauksminiu would be better than calling them vardininku, kilmininku, and so on.”11 These critical remarks by S. Šalkauskis were only partly correct, because names for the bearers of nominal properties—derivatives with the suffix -ininkas—refer not only to people but also to inanimate things. Moreover, derivatives with the suffix -ininkas are formed not only from nouns but also from verbs, adjectives, and numerals. 10 Ibid., 1934, No. 1, p. 6. 11 Ibid., p. 35. 5* 131 S. Šalkauskis was not entirely right in what he wrote about the term speech manner either: “The manner of speaking that has become established among artists is wholly unjustifiable. This word could have an analogy, if any, only with life and quarrels (in the sense of squabbling), which likewise do not denote concrete things. But if manner of speaking were to mean a way of pronouncing, it would usurp, in a wholly unjustifiable manner, the entirely legitimate and typical term pronunciation style, which, by analogy with manner of running, walking, and writing, ought precisely to mean a way of pronouncing. The proposed word tartis cannot replace tarsena here, because, being the infinitive of a substantivized verb, to pronounce denotes a pure action, saying nothing about manner; whereas, when one wishes to express the aspect of diction, it is precisely important to emphasize the manner of pronunciation. Thus, diction is rendered in Lithuanian only by the word tarenos”12. Nevertheless, contemporary linguistics uses the term tarties. Derivatives with the suffix -tis are generally more concrete than the abstractions formed with the suffixes -imas or -ymas. Derivatives with this suffix sometimes acquire an entirely concrete meaning (e.g., station, obstacle, etc.). All these observations lead to the conclusion that S. Šalkauskis’s distinction of term categories and the application of word-formation devices to express them was a new departure in terminology at the time; however, it: 1) neither encompassed nor systematized the diversity of the formation of terms or ordinary words; 2) did not examine cases in which word-formation devices were specialized for particular fields of science, a phenomenon that was already clear and tangible in the term formation of that period. Word formation examines three related but nevertheless distinct matters: the structure of words, the relationships among related words, and the creation of neologisms. Teachers and university instructors deal chiefly with the first two, while the third should be of particular concern to terminologists and those cultivating the language. Although neologisms were at the center of S. Šalkauskis’s theory of terminology, he wrote little about how they were formed, focusing instead mainly on the derivational and semantic relationships among related words. 2.3.3. Borrowing terms from other languages—an inevitable necessity. There is not, nor can there be, a single language that is entirely pure. S. Šalkauskis says that the borrowing of words from one language into another is just as widespread a fact in the history of languages as the migration of peoples in world history. Speaking about borrowings in terminology, S. Šalkauskis quite reasonably distinguishes two cases: replacing established borrowings with native words, and admitting foreign neologisms into the language. In the first case, S. Šalkauskis is prudent and far-sighted. He writes: “Therefore, terms particularly rich in content, which have long traditions in international human communication and stand in close relations with many related concepts, should not be replaced by neologisms, which generally suggest only as much content as such formative semantic elements as the root, suffix, and prefix can etymologically carry”13. In the second case, he is superficial, since he asserts that a foreign word should be borrowed when “the required term cannot be obtained either by adapting a word from ordinary speech or by forming a new term through compounding or derivation”13. This is a shallow opinion, because in reality there are no cases in which word-formation resources are incapable of creating an equivalent for a term in another language. The point is that replacing a neologism with a newly coined word is not always expedient. This depends not only on linguistic but also on extralinguistic circumstances. 12 Ibid., 1934, No. 1, p. 45. 13 Ibid., 1927, No. 1, p. 25. 132 2.4. Words that have been terminologized and entered the language of science do not become semantically fixed; they continue to change. All the principal semantic processes—polysemy, synonymy, antonymy, and so on—are manifested in their own way in terminology. S. Šalkauskis’s idea that a term’s meaning depends on context is interesting (contrary to A. Reformatsky’s view in 1959, but in agreement with V. Danilenko’s view in 1977). In discussing a term’s use in a particular context, S. Šalkauskis introduces the term supposition, defining it as follows: “A term’s supposition is its use in place of the thing for which it is a substitutive sign”14. He distinguishes several kinds of supposition—first of all, material and formal supposition (suppositio materialis et formalis). These suppositions cannot be substituted for one another. The latter is further divided into logical and real supposition (suppositio realis et logica). Reasoning in which real supposition is replaced by logical supposition (or vice versa) cannot be valid. Real supposition, in turn, is divided into singular and common supposition (suppositio singularis et communis), and the latter into relative and absolute supposition (suppositio absoluta et relativa sive personalis). Relative common supposition may be universal (suppositio universalis) or particular (suppositio particularis), and so on. This detailed subdivision of the kinds of supposition did not adequately clarify the features of a term’s contextual use, especially since S. Šalkauskis illustrated them with logical propositions, treating not only common but also proper words as terms. 2.5. S. Šalkauskis’s great contribution to our terminology was that he was the first to attempt to formulate the principal principles of term formation. He formulated these principles on the basis of the aforementioned theoretical source on terminology and his studies of the characteristics of terms. There is no indication that, in drawing up these principles, he made use of the works of J. Pabrėža, J. Grinius, F. Butkevičius, and other authors, which had also formulated principles for organizing the terminology of individual fields of science. S. Šalkauskis attempted to establish general principles for creating terms in all branches of science, dividing them into three groups: 1) principles of antiquity, 2) principles of innovation, and 3) principles of evolution. The principles in the first group concern the past of the language. There are said to be two: a) one should neither borrow a foreign term nor coin a new native one if a word from ordinary speech can be satisfactorily adapted to scientific needs; and b) no word that has become established in the language may be removed from scientific usage without clearly justifiable reasons. He called the first principle the principle of maximum utilization, and the second the principle of traditional establishment. The second group is said to contain three principles: a) of two neologisms or borrowings, the more acceptable is the one that allows more derived forms to be made, all other conditions being equal; b) every neologism adopted as a scientific term must be formed according to the characteristic features of the relevant category of concepts; c) of two neologisms or borrowings, the more acceptable is the one that better satisfies the aesthetic requirements of the language, all other conditions being equal. S. Šalkauskis called the first of these principles the principle of maximum utility, the second the principle of typicality, and the third the principle of aesthetic quality. The third group is also said to contain two principles: a) categorical suffixation—that is, the use of typical endings to form terms according to the relevant categories of concepts—must be kept alive in the usage of the language and developed consistently to the limits of its rightful scope; b) when it is absolutely necessary to alter the mean- 14 Ibid., 1927, No. 1, pp. 29 ff. 133 ing and sense of words, whether by adapting them anew or in a particular context, they must be changed in ways that can be justified by the laws of linguistics and logic. S. Šalkauskis called the first principle in this group the principle of categorical suffixation, and the second the principle of changing the sense and meaning of words. S. Šalkauskis’s principles were significant and original at the time. Some of them, especially those in the first (antiquity) group, remain relevant to terminology today. 3. General Philosophical Terminology 3.1. Lithuanian philosophical terms were first collected by Prof. V. Sezemanas in 1935. At that time, the Terminology Section (TS) of the Lithuanian Language Society (LKD) entrusted Prof. S. Šalkauskis with the task of organizing philosophical terminology. He substantially augmented Prof. V. Sezemanas’s collection, and his work was discussed at 35 meetings of the LKD TS, with the participation of prominent linguists of the time, J. Balčikonis, A. Salys, and P. Skardžius. The terms considered in 1937 were systematized and published in the journal “Logos” (No. 2), and later also issued as a separate offprint. S. Šalkauskis’s work “General Philosophical Terminology” consists of two parts: 1) a four-language (Lithuanian–French–German–Russian) glossary and its German version, published in the journal “Logos” in 1938; and 2) a collection of explanations and examples, in which 302 groups of terms (or, in his own terminology, semantic families) are discussed at greater or lesser length. Šalkauskis’s glossary contains only Lithuanian philosophical terms, so it does not include the names of many specialized concepts in this field of science. All the Lithuanian terms are accented by P. Skardžius, and for some, important forms are also provided: for nouns, the singular genitive and dative; for verbs, the present and simple past tense. Terms are arranged alphabetically in groups by meaning, although the alphabetical order is not always followed strictly. Most of the terms in this glossary are literary-language words that have been terminologized, but new coinages also occur. In the preface, S. Šalkauskis says that most of the new coinages were proposed by J. Vabalas-Gudaitis and A. Varnas. It appears that S. Šalkauskis himself also coined quite a number. The following terms, for example, may be considered new coinages: aistriškas (passionné, leidenschaftlich, страстный), añtgam­tis, -čio (surnature, Übernatur, сверхъестественная область), añtlaikis, -io (surtemps, Überzeit, сверхвремя), añtsąmonė (sourconscience, Überbewusstsein, сверхсознание), atdaira, -õs (égard, respect, Rücksicht, Achtung, внимание, уважение,), atpala­reigõjimas (dispense, exemption, Dispensation, Entbindung, освобождение от обязанности), gyvėnžiūra (conception de vie, Lebensanschauung, жизнесозерцание), išmana, -os (intelligence, Verständnis, понимание, разумение), išprotis, -čio (conclusion, syllogisme, Vernunftschluss, умозаключение), mąstinys (objekt de pensée, Denkgegenstand, предмет мышления), pažinys (objekt de connaissance, Erkenntnisgegenstand, предмет познания), mągis, -io (plaisir, Lust, удовольствие), among others. Many of the new coinages mentioned here failed to take root either in philosophical terminology or in our literary language. Some other terms given by S. Šalkauskis were new coinages, but not his own, or words from everyday speech, for example: atveika, -õs (réaction, Reaktion, Gegen- 134 wirkung, реакция, противодействие) — a coinage by J. Baronas or P. Avižonis; daiktybė (matiere, substance, Stoff, Materie, вещество) — a coinage by J. Jablonskis; esybė (être, Sein, Selende, сущее, бытие) — a word used by K. Širvydas, J. Basanavičius, and V. Kudirka; jutimys (objekt de sensation, Empfindungsgegenstand, предмет ощущения) — a coinage by A. Vireliūnas; nuokrypa (déclinaison, Abweichung, уклон, отклонение) — a coinage by P. Avižonis, and so forth. The second part of S. Šalkauskis’s “General Philosophical Terminology,” in which he examined groups of related terms, is more significant for terminology theory. Here, S. Šalkauskis indicates what a given term or word should mean, how it can be translated into other languages, and provides examples of terms in context. Some of his arguments, however, are contradictory. For example, on p. 165 he writes: “From science and purpose we obtain two equally extensive semantic families, namely, on the one hand: mokslingas, mokslingumas, moks linis, moksliškas, moksliškumas, mokslus, mokslumas, and on the other: tikslingas, tikslingumas, tikslinis, tiksliškas, tiksliškumas, tikslus ir tikslumas. Mokslingas ir tikslingas mean an abundance of science and purpose. Mokslinis ir tikslinis denote belonging to the domains of science and purpose; moksliškas ir tik-sliškas describe a subject or object in terms of its innate correspondence to the nature of science or purpose; mokslus ir tikslus indicate, on the one hand, an inclination toward science, and, on the other, toward purpose.” On p. 205 we find: “Science is one of the goals of human beings. Tikslingas scientific inquiry requires a system and a method. In general, in the field of science, system and method are conditions of purposiveness. The question of purpose, or of what is purposeful, is obligatory for every human activity. Tikslingas is work that has its own purpose. An artist carves a shape out of wood tiksliškai. The precision of bees’ work is very great. Tikslinti means determining the correspondence between a thing and its purpose or norm. By specification, one most often seeks to establish the correspondence between a thing and the truth. Tikslus is a thing inclined toward its purpose, not deviating from it. A person can know the truth precisely. The accuracy of cognition is one of the goals of cognition.” The statements in the second quotation are more precise. For example, the adjective tikslingas actually means not “an abundance of purpose,” but “corresponding to a purpose, done precisely,” and so forth. In this work, S. Šalkauskis tried to terminologize some words from vernacular speech and form new coinages from them (e.g., omė, omingas, omingumas, omnis, omiškas, omiškumas; tūlas, tūleriopas, tūlerionumas; žiūra, žiūrus, žiūr umas and the like), but they did not take root in the language of science. The explanations and commentary discuss more terms than are included in the glossary, for example: amžinuma, apybrėža, bendramatiškas, pagrindumas, pojūtiškas, prietapus, among others. In standardizing philosophical terminology, S. Šalkauskis generally took the word, rather than the concept, and the lexeme, rather than the sememe, as his basis. He classified terminological concepts according to word forms. In this respect, one can even discern a contradiction between his understanding of categories of terminology (see 2.3.2.) and the method he uses to examine the semantic word families of general philosophical terminology. 4. Conclusions 4.1. S. Šalkauskis, a philosopher of the neoscholastic school, became interested in terminology while studying at Moscow University (1905–1911), and published his most significant works in this field (“Theory of Terminology and Lithuanian Philosophical Terminology”, 135 “General Philosophical Terminology” and others) in 1925–1938, while teaching at Kaunas University. 4.2. S. Šalkauskis developed his theory of terminology on the basis of the works of ancient and medieval logicians and the research of modern French linguists (from the early 20th century) (M. Bréal, J. Vendryes, and others). He was also assisted by prominent Lithuanian linguists of the time: J. Balčikonis, A. Salys, and P. Skardžius. 4.3. S. Šalkauskis’s theory of terminology belongs to the linguistic approach to terminology. It addressed all the most important aspects of terminology: the nature and properties of a term, sources of terminology, categories, usage characteristics, and the main principles of term formation. In its originality and depth of scholarly thought, his theory was at the level of European scholarship of its time. 4.4. S. Šalkauskis’s theory of terminology is contradictory. It has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths are as follows: 1) S. Šalkauskis correctly distinguished the concepts of “terminology” and “terminological lexicon,” appropriately characterized the object of terminology and its relations with other neighboring branches of scholarship; 2) identified the main sources of terminology and some important features of its usage; 3) formulated the principal principles for creating and standardizing terms; 4) correctly understood the significance of international words for terminology and the relations between this type of terminology and Lithuanian lexis, etc. Its weaknesses are as follows: 1) S. Šalkauskis did not distinguish single-word terms from proper names, or compound terms from logical propositions; moreover, he considered not only nouns but also verbs and adverbs to be terms; 2) he understood terminologization one-sidedly, without mentioning its dialectical opposite—determinologization; consequently, the relations between terminology and the lexis of the standard language remained unclear; 3) he paid too little attention to the classification of terminological concepts and the related specialization of word-formation devices, etc. Moreover, in a number of cases, S. Šalkauskis’s practical work on term management contradicts the theoretical principles of terminology he advocated. THE TERMINOLOGY THEORY OF S. ŠALKAUSKIS Abstract С. Шалкаускис (1886–1941) — литовский буржуазный общественный деятель и философ — терминологией заинтересовался еще в годы учебы в Московском университете (1905–1911). А в 1925–1938 гг., уже будучи профессором Каунасского университета, он опубликовал серию научных статей по теории литовской терминологии. S. Šalkauskis based his theory on the teachings of ancient and medieval philosopher-logicians and French linguists of the early 20th century (M. Bréal, J. Vendryes, and others). S. Šalkauskis’s theory of terminology addressed all the main issues of Lithuanian terminology: the categories, properties, and sources of terminological lexicon; the use of terms; the main principles of term formation; and so on. Original and scientifically grounded, this theory is of great significance both for Lithuanian terminology and for the history of terminology in general. However, it is contradictory. On the one hand, it correctly defines the object of terminology, does not equate terminology with terminological lexicon, and correctly evaluates foreign words, among other things. On the other hand, its author considered not only genuine terms but also proper names and even certain logical propositions to be terms; he understood terminologization in a peculiar and narrow way, paid little attention to the classification of concepts, and so on. 136