Is it possible to identify phenomenal consciousness in artificial systems in the light of the gaming problem?

Is i possible o iden i y phenomenal consciousness in a i icial sys ems in he ligh o he gaming p oblem?1 Michele Fa iscoa,b,*, Ka hinka E e sa, aCen e o Resea ch E hics and Bioe hics, Uppsala Uni e si y, Uppsala, Sweden bBiogem Molecula Biology and Gene ics Resea ch Ins i u e, A iano I pino (AV), I aly *Co espondence: Michele Fa isco (michele. a [email protected]). Abs ac We analyze he ques ion how phenomenal consciousness (i any) migh be iden i ied in a i icial sys ems wi h speci ic e e ence o he gaming p oblem (i.e., he ac ha he a i icial sys em is ained wi h human-gene a ed da a, so ha possible beha io al and/o unc ional e idence o consciousness is no eliable). Ou goal is o e iew selec ed illus a i e app oaches o ad ancing in his di ec ion. We highligh s eng hs and sho comings o each app oach, inally p oposing a combina ion o di e en s a egies as a p omising ask o pu sue. 1 The manusc ip has been submi ed o he special issue “E alua ing A i icial Consciousness” (in Philosophy and he Mind Sciences). 2 In oduc ion Among he issues a ising om ecen de elopmen o A i icial In elligence (AI), he p ospec o a i icial o ms o consciousness eme ges as pa icula ly challenging, aising signi ican expec a ions (ei he posi i e o nega i e) om bo h specialis s in he ield and he gene al public (Lenha o, 2024, Colomba o and Fleming, 2023). One o he main challenges aised by a hypo he ical AI consciousness is how o iden i y i . In ac , he classical o he minds p oblem, which essen ially makes any a ibu ion o consciousness in e en ial, is e en mo e icky o candida e conscious AI sys ems in i ue o he so-called gaming p oblem. The gaming p oblem a ises in connec ion o he hypo hesis o a i icial consciousness, speci ically om he hypo hesis o a i icial phenomenal consciousness o sen ience, because a i icial sys ems a e ins uc ed wi h human-gene a ed da a in o de o gi e hem he appea ance o ins an ia ing human ea u es, whe e o e unc ional o beha io al ma ke s o sen ience a e un eliable and canno be conside ed as e idence o ac ual phenomenal consciousness (Bi ch and And ews, 2024). Chang-Eop has ecen ly p oposed a logical a gumen in suppo o he un eliabili y o beha io al mani es a ions o conscious abili ies by a i icial sys ems, speci ically by La ge Language Models (LLM), concluding ha in he case o LLM consciousness denial leads o con adic ion while consciousness a i ma ion leads o inde e minacy (Chang-Eop, 2024). The gaming p oblem has bo h heo e ical and e hical ele ance, since i may be a gued ha a i icial sys ems should no con use human use s abou hei conscious s a e (Schwi zgebel, 2023a). The e o e, i is pa icula ly u gen o elabo a e possible s a egies o managing and p ospec i ely sol ing he gaming p oblem. In he ollowing we e iew i e illus a i e app oaches ha ha e been p oposed by expe s in he ield o iden i ying conscious abili ies in AI sys ems. We p o ide a desc ip ion o hese s a egies o e en ually highligh ing ha a combina ion among hem is p obably he bes choice o ad ancing owa ds a mo e eliable a ibu ion o conscious capaci ies o AI sys ems. We s a om a de ini ion o phenomenal consciousness as he subjec i e eeling o a pa icula expe ience, o “wha i is like o be” in a pa icula s a e (Block, 1995, Block, 2022), and as “sen ience”, o he capaci y o ha ing alenced expe iences, like pain o pleasu e (Bi ch, 2024, Bu lin and Lappas, 2025). Then we desc ibe i e s a egies ha ha e been a icula ed o de ec ing hypo he ical a i icial o ms o phenomenal consciousness: 1. A heo y-based s a egy ha s a s om selec ed heo ies o consciousness o in e ele an indica o s (Bu lin e al., 2023) 2. A li e-based s a egy which ou lines he necessa y connec ion o consciousness wi h biological li e (Se h, 2024); 3. A b ain- based s a egy ha akes he b ain, i s e olu ion, and i s co ela ion wi h consciousness as a benchma k o a i icial consciousness (Fa isco e al., 2024b, A u e al., 2023); 4. A consciousness-based s a egy ha sea ches o o he o ms o biological consciousness han he 3 human, in o de o iden i y wha (i any hing) is eally indispensable o consciousness and wha is dispensable, and hus o e coming he con o e sy be ween he many heo ies o consciousness and p oceed owa ds he iden i ica ion o eliable e idence o a i icial consciousness (Bi ch and And ews, 2024); 5. A indica o s-based app oach ha elabo a es a lis o indica o s, concei ed as ea u es ha we end o ag ee cha ac e ize conscious expe ience and ha a e indica i e (i.e., p obabilis ic a he han de ini i e e idence) o he p esence o consciousness in a i icial sys ems (Penna z e al., 2019), and on hei basis elabo a e ele an es s o a i icial consciousness (Bayne e al., 2024, Elam ani and Yampolskly, 2019). 1. Phenomenal consciousness Phenomenal consciousness may be de ined as he subjec i e expe ience, “wha i is like o be” in a pa icula s a e (i.e., including expe iences o pe cep ions which a e no cogni i ely accessed) (Block, 1995, Block, 2022). Ano he way o concei e phenomenal consciousness is in e ms o “sen ience”, which basically e e s o he capaci y o ha ing alenced (o hedonic) expe iences, like pain o pleasu e (Bi ch, 2024). Valenced expe ience ela es o a ec i e s a es, ei he posi i e o nega i e. In ac , oge he wi h a ousal, alence is a undamen al componen o a ec (Russell, 1980, Posne e al., 2005). As e iewed by Bi ch, he e a e di e en unde s andings o he na u e o alence, including i s desc ip ion as immedia e quali y o he expe ience (i.e., aw eelings), as non-concep ual ep esen a ion o alue, and as impe a i e con en (Bi ch, 2024). The concep o alue has been ecen ly explo ed in ela ion o hypo he ical conscious AI sys ems (Fa isco and E e s, In P ess). The s a ing poin o his analysis is he capaci y o e alua ion (i.e., sensi i i y o ewa d signals and he abili y o disc imina e be ween good and bad hings in he wo ld on he basis o speci ic needs, mo i a ions, and goals) as a de ining ea u e o biological o ganisms, namely o he human b ain. In ac , e alua ion has been posi ed as a undamen o lea ning and memo y (Dehaene and Changeux, 1989, Edelman, 1992), as well as o consciousness and e hical delibe a ion (E e s, 2009). A c ucial cha ac e is ic ha makes his kind o e alua ion pe o med by biological o ganisms a conscious expe ience is he capaci y o au onomously pe o ming i on he basis o subjec i ely salien d i es. Impo an ly, e alua ion hus concei ed, as well as he ela ed concep o alue, include bo h cogni i e and emo ional dimensions: cogni i e ep esen a ions like concep s, goals, and belie s a e combined wi h emo ional a i udes ha ing posi i e o nega i e alence (h ps://www.psychology oday.com/in l/blog/ho - hough /201304/wha -a e- alues). Emo ions a e pa icula ly c ucial o e alua ing in o ma ion coming om he inside o he o ganism (Benne , 2023). The concep s o phenomenal consciousness and sen ience play an impo an ole in bo h heo e ical and mo al deba es. The e is a wide endency o iden i y consciousness ou cou wi h 4 phenomenal consciousness, a leas in a mo ally ele an sense (Le y, 2014), o o a i m he necessi y o phenomenal consciousness o any cogni i e o m o consciousness o be possible. Wi h e e ence o he p ospec o a i icial consciousness, acco ding o hese pe spec i es, he cen al ques ion is whe he i may be possible o enginee an a i icial o m o subjec i e expe ience. 2. Le els o phenomenal consciousness Since subjec i e expe ience o he phenomenal cha ac e o a conscious expe ience may ha e di e en le els, and hese le els may depend on some speci ic aspec s o dimensions (e.g., du a ion, in ensi y, equency, p ecision, e c.), we canno logically exclude p ima acie ha a sys em, whe he biological o a i icial, may ha e a leas e y udimen a y, low-le el o ms o subjec i e expe ience. Acco dingly, we mus a oid iden i ying subjec i e expe ience exclusi ely wi h high-le el, sophis ica ed o ms (e.g., hose usually a ibu ed o human subjec s), and a oid an an h opocen ic bias in he a emp o iden i y i in non-human sys ems (e.g., in a i icial sys ems). Acco dingly, we should a oid se ing he ba oo high in de ining he gold s anda d in ou sea ch o indica o s o phenomenal consciousness in AI. Two low-le el o ms o consciousness a e o pa icula in e es o conside he e: p ima y/minimal consciousness and con en less consciousness. Ad oca es o di e en models ha e p oposed he concep o p ima y o minimal consciousness as opposed o seconda y o mo e ad anced consciousness wi hin a g aded iew o consciousness. One p oposal is o concei e minimal consciousness as subjec i e expe ience. Mo e speci ically, as he mos basic (non- e lec i e) subjec i e eeling ha includes ex e ocep i e (e.g., isual, ol ac o y), in e ocep i e (e.g., pain, hunge , hi s ) and p op iocep i e (bodily posi ion) expe iences (B on man e al., 2016, Me ke , 2007). The key poin o his p oposal is ha consciousness includes a mo e basic, non-cogni i e o m (Pe ei a J , 2021, Baluška and Rebe , 2019, Baluška e al., 2025). The p oponen s o his iew a gue ha he concep o consciousness as a undamen al capaci y o expe iencing ha is dis inc om high-le el cogni i e capaci ies is use ul o iden i y wha is necessa y and su icien o app op ia ely cha ac e izing a (biological o a i icial) sys em as (minimally) conscious. The concep o anoe ic consciousness as in oduced by Endel Tul ing is e y close o his iew (Tul ing, 2005). Acco ding o him, he e a e h ee kinds o consciousness: au onoe ic, which is ela ed o he knowledge o he sel ; noe ic, which is ela ed o he knowledge o he ou side wo ld; and anoe ic, which is ela ed o he absence o explici cu en knowledge (LeDoux and Lau, 2020). Anoe ic consciousness is concei ed as he condi ion o being ali e and esponsi e o s imuli as opposed o ha ing explici conscious con en s (LeDoux, 2021), o as "a s eam o p e- e lec i e a ec i e and senso ial pe cep ual consciousness essen ial o he waking s a e o he 5 o ganism in he absence o an explici sel - e e en ial awa eness o associa ed cogni i e con en s " (Vandeke ckho e e al., 2014) (p. 6). O he s use “p ima y” o “senso y” (Edelman, 2003) (Feinbe g and Malla , 2016, Edelman, 1989) consciousness o indica e a basic capaci y o de ec s imuli, o p ocess hei saliency and alue, and o eac acco dingly. Impo an ly, p ima y/senso y consciousness as quali ied, o ins ance, by Ge ald Edelman can ha e access only o he p esen , ac ual expe ience. To illus a e, o Feinbe g and Malla (Feinbe g and Malla , 2018), he basic o m o consciousness is “ alue-based” as dis inguished om “image-based” consciousness. The alue- based consciousness does no ely on any kind o explici , men al images o he wo ld, bu a he on an o ganic, and in some cases neu onal, map o schema ha allows he o ganism o disc imina e a o dances (i.e., o de ec and dis inguish dange s and posi i e oppo uni ies) in o de o inc ease i s i ness (c . (Changeux, 1986, Changeux, 2004)). The dis inc ion be ween basic and mo e sophis ica ed o ms o consciousness has been p oposed also wi h speci ic e e ence o phenomenal consciousness, o ins ance h ough he dis inc ion be ween minimal phenomenal sel hood (i.e., “ he expe ience o being a dis inc , holis ic en i y capable o global sel -con ol and a en ion, possessing a body and a loca ion in space and ime” (Blanke and Me zinge , 2009) (p.7)), and a mo e elabo a ed phenomenal sel -expe ience (Blanke and Me zinge , 2009, Se h and Tsaki is, 2018). Con en less consciousness, also called pu e consciousness o minimal phenomenal expe ience, is a o m o conscious expe ience de oid o any speci ic con en (Me zinge , 2020) ha is ela ed o he abo emen ioned dis inc ion be ween mo e basic and mo e sophis ica ed o ms o phenomenal consciousness. No ably, con en less consciousness is conside ed as ei he he g ounding o he highes o m o consciousness in some Eas e n eligions and spi i ual adi ions, as well as he ul ima e goal in medi a ion (Thompson, 2015). The e is discussion abou whe he his o m o consciousness ac ually exis s, and, i i does, wha i s main ea u es migh be and how o e en ually ope a ionalize i in o de o elabo a e c i e ia o iden i ying i (Sulli an, 1995, Woods e al., 2024). The possibili y o inde e mina e cases o sen ience, i.e. sys ems o which he e is no de e mina e ac o he ma e whe he hey a e conscious o no (see (Lee, 2020, Simon, 2017, Schwi zgebel, 2023b), adds u he complexi y o he ques ion whe he a i icial phenomenal consciousness/sen ience is possible and how o de ec i . 3. How can phenomenal consciousness be ope a ionalized and made de ec able in a i icial sys ems? Di e en app oaches o he ques ion how o de ec phenomenal conscious ac i i y in a i icial sys ems ha e been sugges ed. Among hem, we he e ocus on he ollowing i e: 6 1. Theo y-based s a egy: s a ing om selec ed heo ies o consciousness in o de o in e ele an indica o s (Bu lin e al., 2023) 2. Li e-based s a egy: consciousness necessa ily connec s wi h biological li e (Se h, 2024) 3. B ain-based s a egy: he b ain, i s e olu ion, and i s co ela ion wi h consciousness a e benchma k o a i icial consciousness (Fa isco e al., 2024b, A u e al., 2023) 4. Consciousness-based s a egy: sea ching o o he o ms o biological consciousness han he human, in o de o iden i y wha (i any hing) is eally indispensable o consciousness and wha is dispensable, and hus o e coming he con o e sy be ween he many heo ies o consciousness and p oceed owa ds he iden i ica ion o eliable e idence o a i icial consciousness (Bi ch and And ews, 2024) (h ps://aeon.co/ essays/ o-unde s and-ai-sen ience- i s -unde s and-i -in-animals) 5. Indica o s-based s a egy: s a ing om he ea u es o consciousness we end o ag ee abou o elabo a ing a lis o indica o s o consciousness in a i icial sys ems (Penna z e al., 2019), and ela ed es s o a i icial consciousness (Bayne e al., 2024, Elam ani and Yampolskly, 2019). 3.1 Theo y-based s a egy The i s s a egy we ocus on consis s in s a ing om selec ed heo ies o consciousness in o de o in e indica o s o consciousness om hem. (Bu lin e al., 2023) illus a es his kind o app oach. In his pape , he au ho s p opose a “ igo ous and empi ically g ounded app oach o AI consciousness”: hey selec some neu oscien i ic heo ies o consciousness and iden i y espec i e indica o s o consciousness. They base hei analysis on h ee main p emises. Fi s , hey assume compu a ional unc ionalism (i.e., pe o ming compu a ions o he igh kind is necessa y and su icien o consciousness) as a wo king hypo hesis; second, hey claim ha neu oscien i ic heo ies o consciousness can help us in eliably assessing AI consciousness because o he empi ical suppo hey ha e; and inally hey a gue ha a heo y-hea y app oach (i.e., explici ly elying on empi ically g ounded heo ies o consciousness) is he bes s a egy o assessing AI consciousness. Basically, he heo y-based s a egy hey a gue o a ibu es consciousness o AI sys ems depending on how many indica o s o consciousness in e ed om he selec ed heo ies he sys ems in ques ion show. The au ho s acknowledge ha he e a e many scien i ic heo ies o consciousness, no all compa ible and no always commensu able ei he (Se h and Bayne, 2022, E e s e al., 2024, Chis-Ciu e e al., 2024, No ho and Lamme, 2020, Kuhn, 2024). Consis en ly, hey do no endo se any speci ic heo y, bu a he de i e a lis o indica o s om he sampled heo ies, and conside he e idence de i ing om hem cumula i e, meaning ha he mo e indica o s a e p esen , he mo e likely i is ha he sys em in ques ion is conscious. 7 The heo ies hey e e o a e he ollowing, wi h ela ed indica o s: - Recu en p ocessing heo y, om which hey de i e wo indica o s: inpu modules using algo i hmic ecu ence and inpu modules gene a ing o ganized, in eg a ed pe cep ual ep esen a ions. - Global wo kspace heo y, om which hey de i e ou indica o s; mul iple specialized sys ems capable o ope a ing in pa allel (modules); limi ed capaci y wo kspace, en ailing a bo leneck in in o ma ion low and a selec i e a en ion mechanism; global b oadcas : a ailabili y o in o ma ion in he wo kspace o all modules; s a e-dependen a en ion, gi ing ise o he capaci y o use he wo kspace o que y modules in succession o pe o m complex asks. - Compu a ional highe -o de heo ies, om which hey de i e ou indica o s: gene a i e, op-down o noisy pe cep ion modules; me acogni i e moni o ing dis inguishing eliable pe cep ual ep esen a ions om noise; agency guided by a gene al belie - o ma ion and ac ion selec ion sys em, and a s ong disposi ion o upda e belie s in acco dance wi h he ou pu s o me acogni i e moni o ing; spa se and smoo h coding gene a ing a “quali y space”. - A en ion schema heo y, om which hey de i e one indica o : a p edic i e model ep esen ing and enabling con ol o e he cu en s a e o a en ion. - P edic i e p ocessing, om which hey de i e one indica o : inpu modules using p edic i e coding. In addi ion o hese heo ies, he au ho s e e also o Agency and embodimen , om which hey de i e wo indica o s: agency, concei ed as lea ning om eedback and selec ing ou pu s so as o pu sue goals, especially whe e his in ol es lexible esponsi eness o compe ing goals; embodimen , concei ed as modeling ou pu -inpu con ingencies, including some sys ema ic e ec s, and using his model in pe cep ion o con ol. As men ioned abo e, he au ho s conside he e idence de i ing om he iden i ied indica o s as cumula i e. In ac , some AI sys ems al eady mani es some o he indica o s, while he e is cu en ly no sys em capable o consis en ly implemen all o hem. The e o e, he au ho s conclude ha he e is no sys em ye ha can be conside ed a s ong candida e o consciousness acco ding o a heo y-based app oach. The second s a egy we desc ibe consis s in conside ing consciousness as a biological phenomenon which is a ea u e o li e and dependen on i . Di e en au ho s p opose heo e ical in e p e a ions ha end o endo se his iew, including John Sea le (Sea le, 2007), Pe e God ey-Smi h (God ey-Smi h, 2016, God ey-Smi h, 2023), E an Thompson (Thompson, 2018, Thompson, 2007), and Anil Se h (Se h, 2024, Se h, 2021), among o he s. He e we summa ize he posi ion o he la e , which is illus a i e o he li e-based s a egy. 8 Anil Se h ames his p oposal wi hin biological na u alism, acco ding o which consciousness is a p ope y o only (e en hough no all) li ing sys ems. He acknowledges ha his iew has di e en a ia ions, a guing ha i is no necessa y ha li e is ca bon-based. In p inciple his lea es he doo open o he possibili y o a “li ing conscious AI”. Impo an ly, Se h cla i ies wha is he meaning o consciousness he e e s o in his analysis: conscious expe ience, o “ o eel like some hing”. Acco dingly, consciousness is eal, no an illusion, and he e is a ac -o - he-ma e abou whe he some hing is conscious. Basically, biological na u alism as de ined abo e opposes o compu a ional unc ionalism. In ac , o biological na u alism he biological basis o consciousness is no jus an enabling ac o o he igh kind o compu a ion, like, o ins ance, a gued o in (Wiese, 2024), bu a he a undamen al condi ion o consciousness. On he basis o heo e ical models like p edic i e p ocessing and he ee ene gy p inciple, Se h a gues o wha he calls an “on ological con inui y” be ween li e and consciousness: li ing sys ems a e au opoie ic (i.e., hey con inually egene a e hemsel es), and his cha ac e is ic o he li ing ma e is he basis o conscious ac i i y. In e es ingly, acco ding o his iew consciousness may be ins an ia ed in e y basic, udimen a y o ms, a “g ound s a e” o conscious expe ience cha ac e ized by “an inchoa e, shapeless, o mless eeling o simply ‘being ali e’”. A he heo e ical le el, wo o ms o biological na u alism a e possible: a weak biological na u alism, o which li e ma e s o consciousness “in i ue o enabling (o being necessa y o ) speci ic pa e ns o unc ional o ganiza ion”, and s ong biological na u alism, o which consciousness undamen ally depends on li e. Fo bo h hese e sions, conscious AI will no come along o he ide as con en ional AI ge s sma e , because, as said abo e, consciousness is concei ed as a p ope y o li ing sys ems, he e o e AI needs o be ali e o being conscious. Neu omo phic and syn he ic echnologies could po en ially be p omising in his espec , i we accep he hypo hesis ha he mo e AI is simila o he b ain and li ing sys ems, he mo e likely i is ha i may be conscious. The c ucial poin o he li e-based s a egy is ha li e, ei he ca bon-based o o di e en na u e, imposes a numbe o cons ain s and necessa y condi ions o consciousness o a ise. Fo ins ance, Se h ou lines he c ucial ole played by me abolic cons ain s, elec omagne ic ields, and ine-g ained iming ela ions (Se h, 2024). In sho , he e a e se e al dependencies and con ingencies accumula ed in a “gene a i e en enchmen ” in he in e nal o ganiza ion o he b ain, which e en ually cons ain hypo he ical al e na i e implemen a ions o i s men al ea u es. The conclusion by Se h is ha i may be impossible o sepa a e wha b ains do om wha hey a e: a ailu e o eplica e he signi ican amoun o unc ional and a chi ec u al de ails ha appea o play an impo an ole o consciousness would esul in a change o he sys em’s o ganiza ion, which likely a ec s he unc ions ha he eplica o sys em is able o pe o m. 3.2 B ain-based s a egy The hi d s a egy we desc ibe can be quali ied as b ain-based because i assumes ha he b ain, i s e olu ion, and i s co ela ion wi h consciousness a e he benchma k o de eloping a i icial 9 consciousness. Examples o his app oach may be ound in (A u e al., 2023) and (Fa isco e al., 2024a). The la e pape analyses a i icial consciousness om an e olu iona y pe spec i e, aking he e olu ion o he b ain and i s ela ion wi h consciousness as a e e ence model o benchma k. This analysis e eals a numbe o s uc u al and unc ional cha ac e is ics o he b ain ha a guably play a key ole o human-like conscious expe ience. Impo an ly, cu en AI sys ems lack hese ea u es, o a leas hey ail o ins an ia e a su icien le el o hese ea u es. The p oposal o he au ho s is aking inspi a ion om he b ain o ad ance owa ds de eloping conscious AI. Mo e speci ically, he ollowing b ain ea u es a e p oposed o be o ele ance in esea ch on conscious AI : - Hie a chical, nes ed, and mul iple le els o o ganiza ion - Rewa ds sensi i i y based on embodied mul idimensional senso imo o expe ience - Spon aneous physiological ac i i y con ibu ing o conscious in o ma ion p ocessing - The capaci y o p oduce a iabili y om he same unc ional o ganiza ion and he long pos na al de elopmen esul ing in mul iple nes ed epigene ic synapse selec ions - Degene acy, ha is di e en connec ion pa e ns may ha e he same unc ion, leading o plas ici y, indi idual di e ences, and c ea i i y - Capaci y o in e ac ion be ween indi iduals in a social g oup - A physical and ope a ional dis inc ion be ween conscious and non-conscious b ain ep esen a ions, leading o he de elopmen o seman ic compe ence and singula p ope ies o associa ion o conscious ep esen a ions. S a ing om hese ea u es, he au ho s iden i y he ollowing limi a ions o cu en AI ha need o be amelio a ed o ad ancing owa ds conscious AI: - Compu a ional app oach wi h insu icien b ain da a - Ha dwa e wi h limi ed chemical elemen s - Ha dwa e implemen ing pa allel le els o compu a ion opposed o he nes ed b ain o ganiza ion - Lack o an e olu iona y and epigene ic de elopmen - Lack o a mul idimensional and mul isenso y ep esen a ion based on embodimen - Lack o social ela ionships and in insic e hical esponsibili y - Lack o di e en ia ion o he singula i y o he indi idual and hei li e expe ience. The hypo hesis sugges ed is ha he mo e an AI sys em implemen s he iden i ied b ain ea u es co ela ed o consciousness, and he mo e an AI sys em imp o es he limi a ions lis ed abo e, he mo e likely i is ha i may be o become conscious. Impo an ly, (Fa isco e al., 2024a) limi hei analysis o human-like consciousness, bu hey also acknowledge ha in p inciple i is possible o ha e an AI consciousness al e na i e o he human model. While his possibili y canno logically be excluded, assuming human consciousness and co ela ed b ain ea u es as e e ence models o benchma ks is a p agma ic choice ha makes i possible o o mula e ealis ic hypo heses. 16 In conclusion, he consis ency among he i e iden i ied s a egies, and consequen ly he kind o ela ionship be ween he e idence o consciousness de i ing om hem (i.e., complemen a y s cumula i e) depend on which speci ic dimension o logical o empi ical s uc u e we conside . Fo ins ance, all he i e s a egies appea logically consis en in ela ion o hei concep ual ounda ions (i.e., hey de ine consciousness as phenomenal consciousness o sen ience, o a e compa ible wi h such de ini ion o consciousness), and empi ically consis en in ela ion o hei me hodology (i.e., hey sha e he necessi y o empi ical es ing he iden i ied indica o s). This implies ha in o de o ge a g ea e e idence o AI consciousness we should i s cla i y which speci ic logical and/o empi ical dimensions we e e o and hen e en ually cumula e o complemen he e idence de i ing om he di e en s a egies. The e o e, he bes “me a- s a egy” o ad ancing owa ds a be e and s onge e idence o AI consciousness is combining di e en speci ic s a egies, bu how o conc e ely achie e his goal is a ma e o analy ical easoning, and i needs a clea iden i ica ion o which s uc u e (i.e., logical o empi ical) and espec i e dimension o add ess. Wha we sugges o be necessa y is o combine di e en kinds o indica o s in o de o de elop es s o consciousness ha go beyond he classical wo app oaches (i.e., a chi ec u al o beha io al (Elam ani and Yampolskly, 2019, Bayne e al., 2024)) and ha include an e hological/ecological and diach onic (i.e., ex ended in ime) obse a ion o add essing he issue o a i icial consciousness. 4.3 Rele ance o he di e en s a egies o iden i y di e en le els o consciousness As desc ibed abo e, consciousness, including phenomenal consciousness, may a guably exis a di e en le els, he main o which a e p ima y o minimal consciousness, con en less consciousness, and e lec i e consciousness. In sho , p ima y/minimal consciousness is he non e lec i e and non cogni i e le el o consciousness, o he undamen al capaci y o expe iencing. Con en less consciousness is he le el o consciousness de oid o any speci ic con en , like a aw eeling o exis ing. Re lec i e consciousness is he mos sophis ica ed le el o consciousness, cha ac e izing a subjec able o cogni i ely access hei own expe ience. The i e s a egies p esen ed abo e appea o ha e di e en ele ance o hese h ee le els o consciousness (See Table 3). All he s a egies po en ially p o ide in o ma ion ele an o add ess e lec i e le el o consciousness, while no all appea ele an o he o he wo le els. The heo y-based s a egy s ands on he s ong compu a ional unc ionalis p emise, which excludes non cogni i e and con en less le els o consciousness. Bo he he li e-based and he consciousness-based s a egies allow he possibili y o bo h p ima y/minimal and con en less consciousness, o ins ance in he o m o he eeling o being ali e. Bo h he b ain-based and he indica o s-based s a egies appea o be compa ible, a leas in p inciple, wi h p ima y/minimal consciousness bu no wi h con en less consciousness, because bo h hese s a egies ake a ep esen a ional iew o consciousness (i.e., consciousness e e s o some hing, ei he cogni i ely o non-cogni i ely). 17 Since phenomenal consciousness is a guably mul ile el, i is impo an o ake in o accoun which speci ic le els he di e en s a egies abo e a e ele an o, in o de o a oid excluding o -hand some le els o consciousness because he chosen s a egy is no compa ible wi h hem. In conclusion, he combina ion o di e en s a egies is he bes way o p e en his isk. We p opose ha combining he di e en s a egies desc ibed abo e is necessa y o ad ancing owa ds a mo e eliable assessmen o a i icial consciousness o wo easons among o he s: i s , consciousness is a mul idimensional and mul ile el ea u e, and combining di e en logical and empi ical s a egies inc eases he chances o co e ing his complexi y; second, in o de o add ess he gaming p oblem, i is c ucial o look o as many indica o s as possible, om s uc u al o a chi ec u al, om unc ional o socio-e hological. Conclusion We ha e e iewed i e s a egies o ope a ionalizing and iden i ying hypo he ical phenomenal consciousness in AI sys ems. Each s a egy has i s own speci ic empi ical and logical cha ac e iza ion, bu hey can be compa ed wi h each o he in ela ion o di e en empi ical and logical dimensions, esul ing compa ible o complemen a y. We p opose o combine di e en s a egies o elabo a ing mo e eliable indica o s o consciousness in AI sys ems, ei he combining o complemen ing he e idence de i ed om compa ible o complemen a y s a egies, espec i ely. We a gue ha his combina ion is necessa y o wo easons among o he s: he mul idimensional and mul ile el na u e o consciousness, and he gaming p oblem. Funding This esea ch has ecei ed unding om he p ojec Coun e ac ual Assessmen and Valua ion o Awa eness A chi ec u e—CAVAA (Eu opean Commission, EIC 101071178). 18 Table 1 App oach Main ene s Ad an ages Sho comings Theo y-based  In e ing indica o s o consciousness om selec ed scien i ic heo ies o consciousness  Ex ensi e heo e ical base elying on empi ically alida ed heo ies  Concep ual cla i y abou he speci ic no ion o consciousness which is he objec o he indica o s  Compu a ional unc ionalism ega ding consciousness is deeply p oblema ic bo h heo e ically and e hically  pe o ce selec i e: he heo ies ou he e a e oo many. Some o hem may lead o p opose simila measu es and indica o s o consciousness, bu many di e on bo h poin s which poses a p oblem in e ms o commensu abili y  a ec ed by he limi a ions o he selec ed heo ies  isk o biases (e.g., an h opocen ic o bio-cen ic)  how o sol e he indica o s’ necessa y/su icien issue  how o compa e di e en heo ies in o de o de i e a cumula i e e idence (in ac di e en heo ies o en a ge di e en o ms o kinds o consciousness, so ha he indica o s de i ed om hem a e no eally cumula i e) 19  gene aliza ion p oblem, o he gold s anda d p oblem: heo ies o consciousness a e usually o mula ed wi h e e ence o ypical adul consciousness, so ha he ele ance o he indica o s de i ed om hem o add ess a i icial consciousness is ques ionable. Li e-based  In e ing indica o s o consciousne ss om li e ea u es associa ed wi h consciousne ss  i elies on he ac ha all known examples o conscious sys ems a e biological, he e o e i is no specula i e  i may be in e p e ed as excluding o - hand he possibili y o o ms o AI consciousness al e na i e o he biological o ms B ain-based  In e ing indica o s o consciousne ss om b ain ea u es associa ed wi h consciousne ss  i elies on empi ically- g ounded da a abou he b ain bases o consciousness, he e o e i has a s ong scien i ic base  i a oids specula ions abou hypo he ical al e na i e o ms o consciousness  i is p agma ic, in he sense ha is p one o be ope azionalized in o speci ic app oaches o es  i is limi ed o human-like o ms o consciousness, so i may lead o o e look al e na i e o ms o machine consciousness  he dis ance be ween cu en AI and he b ain is qui e big, so his app oach may se he ba oo high and e en ually be no applicable 20 machine consciousness Consciousness-based  Compa ing di e en kinds o consciousne ss o in e wha is indispensabl e o i (and hen check o i in AI)  in p inciple, i a oids an h opomo phic and an h opocen ic aps: i accommoda es e idence coming om di e en ins ances o consciousness  i e en ually make e e ence o selec ed compu a ional heo ies o consciousness, inally aising he isk o ep oducing he same sho comings o he heo y-based app oach  he sea ch o compu a ional ma ke s o consciousness in AI sys ems is limi ed by he a chi ec u e o ac ual AI sys ems, which lack anspa ency and explicabili y  i isks o eplacing a big challenge (iden i ying AI consciousness) wi h ano he big challenge (ad ancing a compa a i e unde s anding o di e en o ms o consciousness in na u e). Indica o s-based App oach  In e ing indica o s o consciousne ss om ag eed-upon ea u es o consciousne ss  i elies on wha we end o ag ee cha ac e ize conscious ac i i y, ying o s ay neu al wi h ega ds o speci ic heo ies o consciousness  in p inciple, i is compa ible wi h di e en heo e ical  i is concei ed wi h e e ence o biological consciousness, and he e o e i s ele ance and applica ion o AI consciousness may be limi ed 21 accoun s  i can accommoda e he p isma ic na u e o consciousness, including i s phenomenal and cogni i e dimensions 22 Table 2 KIND OF STRUC TURE DIMENSION THEORY- BASED LIFE- BASED BRAIN- BASED CONSCIOU SNESS- BASED INDICATORS- BASED LOGIC AL CONCEPTU AL FOUNDATI ONS (Unde s anding and de ini ion o key concep s) Phenomenal Consciousne ss Sen ience Conscious p ocess, compa ible wi h Phenomen al Conscious ness Sen ience Bo h Access and Phenomenal Consciousness X X X X X THEORETIC AL FRAMEWO RK & INTERPRET ATIVE APPROACH (The way o assigning ele ance and meaning o da a) Compu a ion al unc ionalis m. Biological na u alism. (Neu o- )biological na u alism. Biological na u alism. Biological na u alism. X V V V V EMPIRI CAL EVIDENCE OF CONSCIOUS NESS (i.e., Type(s) o da a (e.g., quan i a i e o beha iou al) conside ed necessa y and su icien o in e ing consciousness) Sys em’s ope a ions (wha i does) + a chi ec u e (how i is in e nally o ganized) Sys em’s na u e (i s inhe en cha ac e ) Sys em’ na u e + a chi ec u e Sys em’s ope a ions (wha i does) + a chi ec u e (how i is in e nally o ganized) Sys em’s ope a ions (wha i does) + a chi ec u e (how i is in e nally o ganized) 23 X V V X X METHODOL OGY (i.e., Gene al esea ch s a egy de ining how he esea ch p ocess has o be unde aken) F om heo ies o indica o s, o be checked empi ically (i.e., looking o hi d- pe son, empi ically es able e idence) F om li e de ini ion o indica o s, o be checked empi ically (i.e., looking o hi d- pe son, empi ically es able e idence) F om b ain ea u es o indica o s, o be checked empi ically (i.e., looking o hi d- pe son, empi ically es able e idence) F om di e en ypes o consciousness o indica o s, o be checked empi ically (i.e., looking o hi d- pe son, empi ically es able e idence) F om wo king de ini ion o consciousness and i s ea u es o indica o s, o be checked empi ically (i.e., looking o hi d-pe son, empi ically es able e idence) X X X X X Table 3 LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS THEORY- BASED LIFE- BASED BRAIN- BASED CONSCIOUSNESS- BASED INDICATORS- BASED PRIMARY/MINIMAL NO YES YES YES YES CONTENTLESS NO YES NO YES NO REFLECTIVE YES YES YES YES YES 24 Re e ences ARU, J., LARKUM, M. 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