The Israel-Palestinian Conundrum: The HYCET Solution

1 Israel-Palestinian Conundrum: Cutting the Gordian knot1 Teddy L. Desta, PhD 2018 Old Problem, New Times The years 2017 and 2018 hold historical significance in Middle East politics. The Balfour Declaration, which recognized the rights of Jews for a homeland in historic Palestine, celebrated its 100th anniversary in 2017. The state of Israel has just turned 70 years in May 2018. It has been 50 years since Israel conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights following the Six Days War in 1967. As glorious and vital as the years 1917, 1948, and 1967 are to Israelis, for the Arabs-Palestinian population of the Land, they remember the same years as a series of low points in their national history. For the Arab-Palestinians, the years signify alienation or exile from their ancestral homeland and subjugation by what they consider a colonizing Jewish Diaspora. The two competing narratives by Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians, laying total claim to the silver of territory on the western edge of the Middle East has plunged the region into several decades of crisis, no end in sight so far. Despite a series of UN resolutions to address the problem and several rounds of negotiations coordinated by the international community, the Israeli-Palestinian problem is still with us. Sometimes it erupts into deadly wars and uprisings, and most of the years, it drags on as chronic pain in the body politic of the state of Israel, which has become the master in the lives of most Palestinians. 1 The idea of Israel-Palestine confederation (or, as I dubbed it here The Have-Your-Cake-andEat-It-Too plan) has its origins in the 1980s based on my understanding of Zechariah 9:1-8. The idea developed in several phases: email correspondence (2003), LinkedIn discussion board debate (2011), and final in its present journal article format (2018). 2 In 1948, in a predominantly Arab and Muslim Middle East region, a new state, Israel, suddenly emerged and upset the configuration of the area. Israel became a pariah state, not only because it did not fit the profile of the typical cultural profile of the regional countries, but equally important, its establishment led to the displacement of thousands of Arab Palestinians from their homes in Israel. They became permanent refugees, proving a significant cause of the rift between surrounding Arab nations and an incipient and militant nationalism among the Palestinians. One main reason the Israel-Palestinian problem has been intractable is that few people, like the Jews, have returned to its central homeland after thousands of years of exile. And they practically totally supplanted the people who occupied the Land in their absence in setting up a Jewish state in one part of the Palestine Mandate. The Zionist movement carved out a state in old Palestine as a haven for European Jews who were fleeing pogroms and genocide. The firstgeneration Zionists wanted to create a nation that contained minimal Arab presence. In 1947, the Zionists readily agreed to the UN plan of partition that divided Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian entities. The UN-sponsored partition plan, which the Palestinians have rejected outrightly, resulted in their mass expulsion from the Israeli side of the Land. Palestinians who lived in the Land during the long absence of the Jews now found themselves either in exile or living in Israel as marginalized minorities. To redress their loss, the Palestinians formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The PLO emerged as a force of resistance to reverse what it called the Jewish occupation of Palestine. Subsequently, the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation intensified as two nationalisms fought for supremacy over the same Land. Over the years, there have been various attempts to reverse Israel’s gains and redress Palestinian losses. The 1967 Arab-Israel war further compounded the problem. After the War, Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza, ending the 1948 UN partition plan. On Israel’s side, the control of the West Bank has two dimensions. Some Israelis primarily consider as part of their historic mission to restore Israel’s sovereignty over land they consider the nation’s biblical heritage. Other Israelis see it from a security angle, with the argument that controlling the West Bank gives Israel a critical strategic depth and the natural fortress of the Jordan Valley. Israel continued to hold on these two areas as bargaining chips in a future land-for-peace deal-making. However, for Palestinians, coming under the control of Israel was another humiliating experience 3 next to their 1948 disaster. For Palestinian nationalists, their sole goal now became how to reverse their humiliation by liberating Palestine from intruder-occupying Jews. The PLO and other Palestinian nationalist organizations intensified their attacks against Israel; countries supportive of Palestinians boycotted Israel, and the rise of the Islamist Hamas group in the 1980s took the Palestinian resistance movement in a new direction. Hamas proved a formidable enemy through the uprisings (intifada) it organized and led and deadly terrorist attacks it launched deep in Israel. Since 1948, surrounding Arab nations fought a series of wars against Israel on behalf of Palestinians. Palestinians themselves engaged in the armed struggle of various natures, including guerilla warfare, terrorist attacks, and intifada. There have been several attempts to solve the dispute between Jewish Israel and Arab Palestinians. After several United Nations resolutions and rounds of peace negotiations, today, we are no closer to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem than we were in 1947 when the partition plan enacted. Today, the Israel-Palestine issue remains one of the most vexing international crises of our age. The Holy Land has become nothing but a cycle of bloodshed, hostility, and injustice as two nationalisms compete for the same land. The widely popular suggested solution for the Israel-Palestinian problem of reverting to the 1947 partition plan, in creating a two-state solution, has proved a futile attempt. As the concession one side demands often becomes a nonnegotiable point for the other side, a TSS has always left the stalemate in place. The Idea of Two-state Solution The two-state solution has been the most acknowledged formula nearly for all peace settlement negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. However, this negotiating formula forgets that both communities are indigenous to the Holy Land, with their own historical and cultural attachments to the whole Holy Land. The city of Jerusalem holds a special place in the psyche of both Jews and Arab-Palestinians, both desiring it as their capital city. Wars, uprisings, and failed peace negotiations arise because of the failure from both sides to recognize the basic aspiration of the two communities towards the same Land and to several significant historical artifacts. For 4 this primary reason, the proposal of a two-state solution becomes inherently unjust to many Israeli Jews and Arab-Palestinians. As the two-state solution alienates Israeli Jews and ArabPalestinians from part of the Land they consider to which they historically belong, the project has always faltered and failed. Since a significant number of Israeli Jews and Arab-Palestinians claim to live in the undivided Land, the two-state solution as a plan has proved a fruitless exercise. Supporters of a two-state solution on both did not find it easy to agree on how to divide the Land. Key issues such as the status of the city of Jerusalem, final borders, and the right-ofreturn to Palestinian refugees have always proved stumbling blocks to a successful deal-making. The right of return of Palestinians exiles to their former homes in Israel proper has always been one of the stumbling blocks of every peace negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians have declined to consider any two-state solution that will not recognize the right of return for Palestinian refugees. However, Israel, for demographic and political reasons, has always rejected the possibility of receiving thousands of Palestinian returnees. Instead, Israel argues that Arab countries where the Palestinian refugees live have the moral obligation to extend citizenship rights to their kin. But Palestinians insist that they have the historical and legal right to return to their ancestral homeland from which, they argue, they have been forcefully expelled in 1948. As Israel wants it, any form of a two-state solution must envision that the large West Bank settlements come under Israel’s jurisdiction, and Israel must have security control of the Jordan valley. That means the future Palestinian state and Israel will have ill-defined borders and jurisdictions on peoples and territories, which has become a recipe for endless political wrangling. No Palestinian government will long tolerate a contingent of the IDF stationed on one of its international borders. There are doubts that the two-state solution will work out either in the short or the long run. However, to let the present stalemate continue will inevitably lead to a one-state solution by default. The present status quo, Israel controlling the West Bank, will let Israel create a one-state solution in its terms. However, OSS Israel-style is fraught with immense dangers. Under such a scenario, as many observers have warned, in the presence of millions of Palestinians without 5 political, legal, and economic rights, Israel will erect an apartheid state. Such a plan instead of giving Israel peace will always garner it an endless cycle of criticism in the UN and the ire of the Arab and Islamic world. Israel will be endlessly defending itself at enormous military and diplomatic costs. An Alternative to Two-States Solution For its long-history of failure, it is time to retire the two-state solution and instead propose a new plan with a better chance of success. Here I propose a confederal-cum-commonwealth arrangement that will initially involve Israelis and Palestinians and later add the Kingdom of Jordan to the relationship. The keystone of the proposal is creating an Israel-Palestine confederation. The confederation covers the territory of the historical Palestine Mandate or as commonly known as the Holy Land. The new proposal takes the history, aspirations, and concerns of both parties into consideration in a balanced manner. The proposal aims at the ideals of fairness and logic. It aims at creating the right negotiating environment by triggering good faith and hope from the outset. The confederation understands that if the Israelis and Palestinians have to agree to live in a conjoined confederal state, then should get their minimum demands met. For example, the plan recognizes that on Israel’s side, the key demands are two. First, Israel has a constant concern in maintaining internal and external security of the state. Second, it wants to maintain the Jewish identity of the state. For the Palestinian side, their key demands include: self-administration, a contiguous state in the West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem as their capital, and the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland. The confederation-cum-commonwealth plan offered here is a novel attempt to meet the basic needs of all quarters among Israelis and Palestinians. The plan is also an attempt to allay the worst fears of all groups regarding any peace agreement they have to make with their enemy. 6 This proposal likely has a better chance of success in the long-run, because, so to speak, it allows both sides “to achieve mutual benefits.” The plan I propose will address the primary concerns of both parties, while it lets them enjoy the blessings that come from living in the whole Holy Land through a graduated process. The plan I have called “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” (HYCET) provides for the security needs of Israel, which is a primary concern to that nation. On the Palestinian side, HYCET offers opportunities for them to realize their political, social, and economic aspirations without flaunting the just interests and natural rights of Israelis. The HYCET plan accepts Jew’s presence in the Palestinian portion of the Land, and by the same logic, it permits Palestinian presence in the Israeli part of the Land. Except for some legal restrictions, each side may impose at the initial stage, otherwise, movement and residence rights will be as unfettered as possible. Hence, HYCET will allow Israeli presence in the West Bank, both military and settlement wise. This plan accepts “the right of return” to Palestinian refugees, Palestinian decision-making power over all the Land in the West Bank, a Palestinian capital (i.e., head office) in Jerusalem. Some details of HYCET follow here: The Israel-Palestine HYCET State The HYCET, in its first phase, is an Israel-Palestine commonwealth. It debuts as a confederation that holds together Israel proper and the Palestinian Territories, two autonomous administrative units. Because of Gaza’s special status in the early years, the confederation involves only the West Bank of the Palestinian territories and Israel proper. Some of the significant features of the confederation will be the following: ➢ Sovereignty: Each side will have primary jurisdiction in its own pre-1967 designated area. I envision all sides will be as autonomous as possible as much as pragmatic realities require and allow. For both entities, sovereignty will reside in popularly elected parliaments. Each government will be supreme in its domestic affairs. 7 ➢ Constitution: Devising the protocol of agreement that governs the Israel-Palestinian (or, the Israel-Palestinian-Jordan) commonwealth will be more than the usual peace negotiation and peace plan. The writing of the protocol will be handed over to legal experts versed in the region’s history, politics, economics, and culture. The involvement of international law legal minds is essential to bestowing a disinterested neutral and fair approach to the process. The Articles of Confederation will cover, for example, the following elements: ➢ Security: Since security is a primal concern for Israel, this will make one of the primary concerns that parties will address through their agreement. For example, they may agree to set up a joint security committee which will continually assess threats and rigorously implement border controls. ➢ Politics: accepting the state of Israel as a Jewish state in the larger confederacy will be a litmus test for any political party which chooses to operate legally. Any political organization which does not recognize Israel as a Jewish state will be banned in all parts of the IPJ commonwealth. This acceptance is key cornerstone of the HYCET proposal. It is intended to fulfill a key demand of liberal Zionists. This plan helps to eliminate fringe extremist parties from operating. ➢ The status of Jerusalem: The Palestinians, if they choose to do so, will have their head office in East Jerusalem. It is interesting to see Israeli and Palestinian governments head offices both located in Jerusalem. The head offices of the two governments, in their location, should be only a stone’s throw away from each other, literally and figuratively. There is a lot of discussion, coordination, and interaction the two sides that should take place to make the HYCET confederation system to work. ➢ WB Settlements: Israeli settlers in the West Bank will stay put where they are today. To begin with, they may be considered special administrative areas within the PA jurisdiction. However, any new settlement-related activity will take place only under the legal permission of the PA confederal government. To regulate the expansion of the west 8 Bank settlements, property rights of all land will remain in the hands Palestinians authority. ➢ Gaza: Gaza will be designated a special administrative zone. An international body (consisting of at least four countries and multi-lateral organizations, for example, the UN, the EU, NATO, Norway, and Egypt) will take over Gaza to administer it as a UN mandate at least for ten years. The mandate authority will replace Hamas as a governing body, carrying all aspects of government. The mandate government in Gaza would lead to the lifting of Israel’s blockade against Gaza. The Mandate: o It will decommission the weaponry in possession of Hamas and other Islamist groups. It will ensure the total disarmament of Gaza’s armed groups, including Hamas. o It will be responsible for law and order in Gaza. It will secure the border with Israel and Egypt. It will work with Israel and Egypt that there is no cross-border operation against any side. o It will be responsible for all types of public services that include healthcare, education, and transportation. It will undertake infrastructure development in Gaza. o It will represent Gaza before the rest of the world, protecting and promoting the interests of Gazans. It will serve as a contact point between Gazans and the outside world. o It will promote normal economic activities, through required policies, investments, and infrastructure development. It will work towards making Gaza have a normal economy, weaning it from near total reliance on foreign aid. o It will facilitate the emergence of grassroots community organizations and civil societies. It will promote an independent mass media and the establishment of political parties, o It will work towards bringing closer political, cultural, and economic ties between Palestinians in Gaza and those in the West Bank. Its goal will be to merge the Palestinian administrations in Gaza and the West Bank into one body. 9 ➢ The Right of Return: One of the planks of HYCET is the fact that all interested Palestinian refugees could trickle back to the Holy Land. In the first phase of HYCET, the returnees can settle only on the Palestinian side of the confederation. Later, based on an agreed protocol, they could settle anywhere they choose in the Holy Land. But the pace of their free movement will depend on how fast the two confederal entities develop trust and confidence. ➢ Aid & Compensation: Resuscitating the economy in the West Bank and Gaza will relieve joblessness and hopelessness which have been sources of anger and violence against Israel. International aid for re-construction and re-settlement of Palestinian returnees can pacify the area, as Palestinian youth are now widely employed. Israel’s readiness to integrate its economy with that of Palestinians will build goodwill and trust between the two communities. There must also an act of justice in form of reparation. Israel will compensate Palestinians for any loss property they have suffered under Israeli rule. Compensation will be administered by the highest court or a special commission set up for this purpose. ➢ Regional dimension: If the Palestinians like the deal, so would regional Arab countries and rest of the developing world. Since it meets all of their critical demands, HYCET has a high probability of acceptance by the Palestinians. The acceptance of HYCET by Palestinians will bring a windfall of diplomatic endorsements and world opinion support for Israel. HYCET will relieve the tension in the Middle East. ➢ Triangulation: Ideally, to make the confederation a stable polity, it is desirable to invite the Kingdom of Jordan to join the confederation. As more than 75% of Jordanians are of Palestinian descent, inviting Jordan to the new polity will also enhance the national aspiration of the Palestinians. Second, it can ally Palestinian worries being an isolated island in a Jewish sea by joining them to their brethren on the east side of the Jordan River. The economic and cultural opportunities of WB (and later Gaza) Palestinians will improve greatly by gaining access to Jordan. At the same time, it will also relieve the 16 Christians, and others. City ordinance will respect the legal and religious interest of each sect, which took their abode in the Holy City. Sharing Jerusalem will ultimately overcome the inherent weakness of the two-states solution. It will allow Palestinians to throw away the hatchet. It is not only the politics which will benefit but also the economy. Tourism to the Holy City will take off once Christendom has noticed peace has returned to the Promised Land. Something for all Sides On both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, there are four distinct positions on how to solve the Israel-Palestine problem. On Israel side, we recognize the doves, the left-leaning liberal Zionists who are ardent supporters of a two-state solution idea. There are also the right-leaning biblical Zionists, including Likud and all other nationalistic and religious parties, who believe in annexing the West Bank to Israel. On the Palestinian side, there are two major camps. There are the moderates who support a two-state solution, such as the PLO. There are also Palestinian Islamist parties such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad who want to replace the state of Israel in creating a Palestinian dominated one state between the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean Sea. The HYCET plan has something to satisfy these four dominant ideological camps.2 Liberal Zionists: Left-leaning liberal Zionists are most eager to preserve the Jewish and democratic identity of Israel. They are ready to deal with land for peace in creating a two-state solution. Hence, most of the peace negotiations between the two sides, including the Oslo Accord, have been conducted under their auspices. Even though liberal Zionists will give Palestinians their own state, they have not conceded to the Palestinian demand of the right to 2 There is a growing chorus of voices among Palestinian and Israeli intelligentsia-cum-politicians calling for a binational one state. These individuals say why not turn the one state Israel is creating on its own terms today, where Palestinians enjoy minimal rights, into a full-fledged democratic state where Jews and Palestinians enjoy equal political and legal rights. 17 return and having east Jerusalem for their capital city. Therefore, creating two states has so far floundered. Senior army officers also want to maintain IDF presence in the Jordan valley. The HYCET will keep Israel proper as it is with its institutions and ways of life. It will also regulate the number and manner of Palestinians returning to Israel proper, either for a visit or to live. The other way HYCET will guarantee the Jewish identity of Israel (in the face demographic changes) is through its incorporation of the Jewish Diaspora as part of the Israeli electorate. HYCET will also prevent Israel from devolving into an apartheid state as it gives statehood to Palestinians. HYCET also proves interesting to liberal Zionist generals in the IDF since its protocol gives preeminence to Israel’s security worries. Religious Zionists: These groups are eager to settle all the biblical promised lands to the Jews, and that includes the West Bank, which they call by its biblical name, Judea and Samaria. In terms of Israel’s identity, their most concern is about the land. They believe that they can maintain the Jewishness and the democratic identity of Israel through the predominance of force vis-à-vis Palestinians. The religious Zionists’ vision of Greater Israel calls for the gradual annexation of the West Bank and entails keeping the Palestinians in a subjugated position. But this a recipe for continued turmoil. First, the idea will lead to endless friction with liberal Zionists who hate the idea that their dream of a Jewish democratic state gets derailed. Second, the Palestinians will in a mode of endless resistance, struggling either for full equality within one-state or their own independent state. Third, the condemnation Israel will receive from the international community will continue. Israel will remain isolated in the Arab Middle East. The confederation plan fulfills the religious Zionist dream of settling the West Bank (i.e., as they call it Judea and Samaria), but without the three associated problems as listed here. Good relations with Palestinians will allow for more Jewish to settle in the West Bank. Jewish settlements will no longer be based on the expropriation of Palestinian lands, and it will not demand high-security commitment by the IDF. To sweeten the deal, Jewish settler activity, can proceed, for example, reciprocally. The reciprocity is that Israel allows Palestinian returnees into Israel proper. 18 As Palestinians win their state in the confederation system and as they accommodate the Jewish settlements, the three problems listed and discussed above will disappear. The religious Zionist is in its Judea and Samaria, is part of Israel politically, and settle in more land in the West Bank for the good relations established with the Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, there are two camps vis-à-vis their reaction to the State of Israel and their strategy to solve the Israel-Palestine problem. The confederation plan has the quality to meet the minimum demands of each side. Palestinian rejectionists: This group includes Hamas and Islamic Jihad and other militants who call for the elimination of the state of Israel and replacing it with one big Palestinian state that compromises Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The major problem with a Palestinian-dominated Islamic one-state solution is that Israel will fight it to death. As the series of wars between Israel and Hamas controlling Gaza has showed, this is a death wish for Palestinians. By maintaining active land and sea blockade around Gaza, Israel has ensured that Hamas will not get gamechanging weapons that will threaten Israel security beyond measure. The IDF has shown to Palestinians that there cannot a military solution for their problems. Even to Hamas and its foreign backers, it has become increasingly clear that they cannot win militarily against the formidable army in the Middle East, namely the Israeli military. Therefore, the confederation plan has something more realistic and pragmatic for the aspiration of Palestinians nationalists to belong to the whole Holy Land, to enjoy self-government, and to unite Palestinians in the West Bank with those in Gaza, and even in the Kingdom of Jordan, eventually. The confederation idea can be appealing to the Rejectionists for pragmatic and ideological reasons. On the one hand, the one-state proposal of the Rejectionists to be established on the grave of the state of Israel has proved an untenable dream. Israel has emerged as an invincible state, which its enemies, the Rejectionists, have found hard to destroy. The Rejectionist Palestinian groups reject the two-sates solution because it will deny Palestinians the right of return and access to their heritage in Israel proper. 19 The confederation plan dismissed the Rejectionist’s idea of destroying the State of Israel. But, it recognizes the Palestinian historical connection to the whole Holy Land. It accepts the right of return for Palestinians, but based on an agreement, the two sides should sign. The confederation plan endorses a virtual one-state solution, but not like the one advocated by the Rejectionist camp. HYCET goes one step further in re-creating historic Palestine by joining Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and the Kingdom of Jordan in the form of a confederation or commonwealth. Palestinian Moderates: This group includes the PLO, whose primary goal is to create an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Based on their negotiating position, this group’s minimal demands have comprised the following. The Palestinian Moderates support a two-state solution that requires Israel to return to its pre-June 1967 border. The TSS should recognize East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state, and it must make Israel accept Palestinians’ right-of-return to their ancestral homes in today’s Israel proper. In return, The Moderates are ready to accept land swaps to allow Israel to incorporate some large West Bank settlements into its territory; Israel has always rejected the Palestinian demands on East Jerusalem and the right-of-return. On these two pre-conditions, most TSS negotiations have faltered and failed. The HYCET confederation plan is smart. It has a quality to overcome these two sticking points. HYCET makes Jerusalem a shared city and capital for both Israel and Palestine, a virtual city condominium. Each side will receive supreme powers in some parts of the city. While in other parts of the city, they will share common ownership. HYCET recommends negotiation guided by understanding that ends in deal-making on the rightof-return. Israel and Palestinian negotiators can work out a protocol and a process for the rightof-return, along with the agreement related to population movements across the confederation borders, the settlements, and immigration. 20 HYCET confederation plan has the potential to succeed because it provides what hawks and doves on both Israeli and Palestinian sides strongly desire to realize. For all camps, the plan avoids their worst outcome in any peace deal. The doves, which include liberal Zionists and moderate Palestinians, would now see how the sticking points of a two-state solution overcome. There will be two sovereign state entities, Israeli and Palestinian, sharing Jerusalem for a capital. The right of return will be observed first to the Palestinian side of the confederation. The Palestinian state will be demilitarized. The confederation plan can give them all that they want while preventing all that they fear. The hawks, which include religious Zionists and rejectionist Palestinians, will get a virtual onestate solution. Both peoples will have access to the whole Holy Land. They staunchly lay claim. The confederation plan, as outlined here, fulfills the inherent demand from each side; it recognizes both sides’ historical attachment to the Holy Land. Through a progressive unfolding arrangement, HYCET allows for Jews and Palestinians to settle anywhere they want in the Land. It is good to remember that moderates and pragmatics on both sides have much more in common more than they like to admit in public. It takes concerted effort by the moderates and pragmatics to make their interest prevail vis-à-vis that of the hardliners on both sides who have dictated the terms on which the search for permanent peace must proceed. Hardliners, on both sides, are interested in achieving a lopsided outcome that benefits only their in-group. Their position is strongly influenced by dogmatic ideology, misrepresentation of history, and selfishness. They are propelled by their respective a narrow tunnel vision of history and destiny. Their statements and actions reflect hate and fear instead of goodwill, acceptance, and hope. But their stranglehold on the problem must be broken by popularizing and mobilizing for a balanced solution that satisfies the key needs of the major stakeholders in the conflict and at the same time allay their worst fears they have entertained about a peace agreement. The HYCET plan has the power to conquer the hardliners on both sides as it satisfies their key demands and allays their worst fears. Conclusion 21 There is hope for the Holy Land if we learn some lessons from King David, a great nationalist, state-builder, and a religious man. King David knew how to reconcile with his enemies. He knew how to make his enemies his friends. For example, King David’s most loyal troops were made of a contingent of Philistines. Some of his high army officers were Philistines. King David, a revered figure in Jewish lore, can serve as a model of statecraft and diplomacy. King David shows that it is possible to be a Jew nationalist, a security hawk, a religious fanatic, but, a man of justice, diplomacy, and kindness. King David shows that there is a possibility to dry the blood between modern-day Jews and Palestinians. Modern Israelis can find a model in King David how to live and work cooperatively with Palestinians to build one stable country. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Selected References Selected References https://www.cfr.org/israeli-palestinian-conflict https://www.cfr.org/article/trumps-middle-east-mirage https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-should-united-states-pursue-israeli-palestinian-twostate-solution https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/trump-plan-options-palestinian-leaders200130101701133.html https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-palestinian-spring-200203115358215.html https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2020-02-04/trumps-unfair-middle-east-planleaves-nothing-negotiate https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr 22 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/opinion/israeli-palestinianpeace.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2019-10-15/there-will-be-one-state-solution