Gridlocked: How New York's Battle Against Traffic Repeats Itself, From Horse Manure to the Ghost of Robert Moses

Gridlocked: How New York's Battle Against Traffic Repeats Itself — From Horse Manure to the Ghost of Robert Moses by Jeff Kaufman Gridlocked: How New York's Battle Against Traffic Repeats Itself, From Horse Manure to the Ghost of Robert Moses © 2025 by Jeff Kaufman is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International. To view a copy of this license, visit https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Introduction The streets of New York City have long been congested. Whether choked with horse-drawn carriages in the 19th century or with automobiles since the 1970’s, the challenge of moving millions of people through limited urban space has remained constant across nearly two centuries. Yet the attempted solutions to this perennial problem have evolved dramatically, from the revolutionary pneumatic tube and elevated railway systems of the late nineteenth century to today's sophisticated congestion pricing schemes, expanded cycling infrastructure, and modernized mass transit networks. This study examines the parallel histories of urban transportation crises in New York City, exploring how each era responded to its mobility challenges and what lessons can be drawn from comparing Victorian-era innovation with contemporary urban planning strategies— with particular attention to the safety of pedestrians and cyclists, who remain the most vulnerable users of urban streets. Part 1 The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century: When Horses Ruled the Streets The Scale of the Problem By the 1880s and 1890s, New York City faced a transportation crisis that contemporary observers believed threatened the city’s future viability. The streets of Manhattan teemed with horse-drawn vehicles of every description: private carriages, delivery wagons, omnibuses, streetcars, and commercial carts. Estimates suggest that by 1900, there were approximately 150,000 to 200,000 horses working in New York City, producing between 2.5 and 5 million pounds of manure daily, along with thousands of gallons of urine (McShane & Tarr, 2007). The streets were literally carpeted in waste. The congestion was extraordinary. Broadway, the city’s main commercial thoroughfare, often came to a complete standstill during business hours. Crossing the street could take upwards of ten minutes as pedestrians navigated through the chaos of competing vehicles, each jockeying for position. The average speed of traffic in Manhattan’s business district rarely exceeded three to four miles per hour—about the pace of a brisk walk (Morris, 2007). During the busiest periods, vehicles simply could not move at all. This paralysis was not only the byproduct of population growth and commerce, but also of entrenched political and economic interests that profited from the city’s dysfunction. Figures such as Alexander T. Stewart, the powerful merchant prince, and William M. Tweed, the notorious Tammany Hall boss, wielded enormous influence over transit policy. Stewart feared that transit lines on or beneath Broadway would harm his department store empire, while Tweed sat on the board of horse-drawn streetcar companies and resisted innovations that threatened the profits NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 1 streetcar companies and resisted innovations that threatened the profits of his allies. Their obstructionism compounded the crisis, ensuring that New York’s streets remained clogged and dangerous at the very moment the city needed relief. Pedestrian Safety in the Horse-Drawn Era The danger to pedestrians in late nineteenth-century New York was considerable, though different in character from today’s traffic violence. Horses, while capable of causing serious injury or death, moved more slowly and were more responsive to their environment than modern motor vehicles. Nevertheless, pedestrian fatalities were common. Runaway horses, spooked by noise or sudden movements, would bolt through crowded streets, trampling anyone in their path. Heavy wagons, difficult to stop quickly, regularly struck pedestrians attempting to cross busy thoroughfares (Hood, 1993). Children faced particular danger. Playing in streets that served as de facto playgrounds, they were frequently kicked by horses or run over by carts. The lack of designated pedestrian spaces meant that walking and vehicular traffic competed directly for the same limited street space. Unlike today’s painted crosswalks and traffic signals, pedestrians navigated entirely at their own risk, reading the flow of traffic and darting across when opportunities appeared. The environmental and public health consequences were severe. The accumulation of horse manure attracted swarms of flies, which spread diseases including typhoid fever. Dead horses—an estimated 15,000 per year in New York City—often lay in the streets for days before removal, creating both sanitary hazards and traffic obstacles (McShane & Tarr, 2007). The noise was deafening: steel-rimmed wheels on cobblestone streets, the constant clopping of hooves, and the shouts of drivers created what contemporary accounts described as an unceasing roar. Accidents were common; pedestrians were regularly struck by vehicles, and horses, spooked by the chaos, would bolt into crowds. NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 2 Urban planners and social commentators spoke of the “horse crisis” with genuine alarm. In 1898, the first international urban planning conference in New York ended without any viable solutions to the manure and congestion problems. Some predicted that if current trends continued, the streets would become literally impassable, buried under three stories of manure by the 1930s. The city seemed to be choking on its own success. Revolutionary Solutions: Pneumatic Tubes, Elevated Railways, and Political Obstacles Two late nineteenth-century innovations offered partial solutions to New York’s traffic woes, each addressing different aspects of the mobility crisis: pneumatic tubes for mail and small parcels, and elevated railways for mass passenger transit. Yet alongside these experiments, Alfred Ely Beach’s clandestine pneumatic subway beneath Broadway demonstrated both the promise of innovation and the ferocity of political resistance. The Pneumatic Tube System The pneumatic tube system represented a creative approach to one component of urban congestion: the movement of mail and small packages. Invented and refined throughout the nineteenth century, pneumatic tubes used compressed air to propel cylindrical carriers through underground pipes at speeds of up to 35 miles per hour. New York City’s first pneumatic tube line began operation in 1897, connecting the General Post Office with the Produce Exchange (Walker, 1918). By the early 1900s, New York boasted an extensive pneumatic network spanning 27 miles of tubes beneath Manhattan’s streets. The system connected 23 post offices and could transport 95,000 letters per hour. Each tube was approximately 8 inches in diameter, and carriers could hold up to 600 letters. The system dramatically improved mail delivery times within the city—messages could cross Manhattan in minutes rather than hours. More significantly, it removed thousands of mail wagons from the streets, reducing both congestion and the environmental burden of NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 3 streets, reducing both congestion and the environmental burden of maintaining delivery horses. The pneumatic tube system operated efficiently for decades, handling an enormous volume of intra-city mail. During World War I, the system proved invaluable for rapid communication. However, the system had significant limitations. It could only handle relatively small, lightweight items. The infrastructure was expensive to maintain, requiring constant attention to air pressure, tube integrity, and mechanical systems. As telephone communications improved and as the economics of the system became less favorable compared to truck delivery, the New York pneumatic mail system gradually declined, finally ceasing operation in 1953 (Cudahy, 1990). Beach’s Pneumatic Subway and the Tammany Leviathan If pneumatic tubes addressed freight movement, Beach’s pneumatic subway attempted to solve the far greater challenge of moving people. Conceived in the 1860s and secretly constructed beneath Broadway, Beach’s project offered New Yorkers a glimpse of a modern underground railway, propelled not by smoke-belching locomotives but by clean air power. Passengers descended into an elegant waiting room furnished with chandeliers, fountains, and upholstered cars, riding quietly beneath the chaos of the streets above. (Algeo, 2025). Yet this marvel collided head-on with Boss Tweed and his allies. Tweed, whose power rested on Tammany Hall’s control of contracts and franchises, regarded Beach’s independent subway as a threat to the revenues of streetcar companies tied to Tweed’s Ring. Stewart, too, feared disruption to his commercial empire. Together, they ensured the project’s legislative defeat in Albany, substituting their own graft-laden “Viaduct Railway” scheme in its place. For Tweed, public need and technological progress mattered less than the preservation of political patronage and financial gain. (Algeo, 2025). Though Beach eventually secured a charter, the Panic of 1873 and the NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 4 Though Beach eventually secured a charter, the Panic of 1873 and the relentless obstruction of Tweed’s machine doomed the subway to abandonment. His lost dream, however, became a symbol of both the city’s frustrated ambitions and its struggle against corruption. The Elevated Railway Revolution If Beach’s pneumatic subway revealed the obstacles of politics, the elevated railways demonstrated the possibilities of engineering success. The concept of grade-separated mass transit—removing trains from street level to avoid conflicts with other traffic—emerged as the most promising solution to congestion. New York’s first elevated railway, powered by steam locomotives, opened in 1868 along Greenwich Street and Ninth Avenue. By the 1880s and 1890s, an expanding network of elevated lines, or “Els,” crisscrossed Manhattan. The elevated railways transformed urban mobility. Running on steel structures high above the streets, the Els could operate at speeds impossible for street-level vehicles. They provided frequent service, with trains arriving every few minutes during peak hours. A journey that might take over an hour by horse-drawn streetcar could be accomplished in fifteen or twenty minutes on the El. The system enabled the city to grow vertically and horizontally, as workers could live farther from their places of employment while maintaining reasonable commute times. Critically for pedestrian safety, the Els removed a major source of street congestion. By carrying passengers above the streets, they freed surface space that had been occupied by horse-drawn streetcars and omnibuses. This reduced the density of vehicles competing for street space, making crossing the street somewhat less hazardous for pedestrians. However, the Els created new dangers: debris falling from elevated structures, including hot ashes from steam locomotives, posed risks to those below (Hood, 1993). The Els also had significant economic effects. By improving access to upper Manhattan and eventually to the outer boroughs, the elevated NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 5 upper Manhattan and eventually to the outer boroughs, the elevated railways opened vast new areas for residential development. Property values along El routes initially rose as accessibility improved. The system carried hundreds of thousands of passengers daily, and at its peak in the 1920s, the elevated railway network transported nearly 400 million passengers annually. However, the Els came with considerable drawbacks. The steam locomotives initially used were noisy, dirty, and showered sparks and ashes on the streets below. Even after electrification in the 1900s, the structures themselves darkened the streets beneath them, creating gloomy corridors that depressed property values directly under the tracks. The noise remained intense—the screech of steel wheels on steel rails, the rumble of trains passing overhead. Business owners whose establishments fell into the shadows of the El tracks frequently complained about lost trade. Most importantly, while the Els partially solved the congestion problem, they were ultimately a transitional technology. The real solution would come in the form of the subway. The Subway: Going Underground The opening of New York’s first subway line on October 27, 1904, marked a watershed moment in urban transportation. Running from City Hall to 145th Street, the initial Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) line could move passengers at unprecedented speed through the most congested parts of the city without interfering with surface traffic at all. The subway combined the speed and capacity of rail transit with complete grade separation, avoiding all of the Els’ problems with shadowing, noise pollution at street level, and aesthetic blight (Hood, 1993). The subway’s impact on pedestrian safety was profound. By removing hundreds of thousands of daily trips from the street surface, the subway significantly reduced the density of surface vehicles. Streets that had been choked with horse-drawn streetcars and omnibuses became more NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 6 choked with horse-drawn streetcars and omnibuses became more navigable. Pedestrians gained more space to cross safely. The risk of being struck by a vehicle, while still present, diminished as the most efficient transport mode moved underground. The subway’s impact was immediate and dramatic. On its first day of operation, over 150,000 New Yorkers rode the new system. Within a few years, daily ridership reached hundreds of thousands, and eventually millions. The subway enabled the consolidation and growth of New York City, making it practical for people to live in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx while working in Manhattan. The system grew rapidly, with competing companies building additional lines. By the 1930s, New York boasted the largest subway system in the world, a title it retains to this day. Crucially, the subway reduced surface congestion by providing a faster, more reliable alternative to street-level transit. While it did not eliminate horse-drawn vehicles—that would require the automobile’s arrival—it significantly reduced the number of streetcars and omnibuses clogging the streets. Combined with the gradual replacement of horses by motor vehicles in the early twentieth century, the subway helped resolve the Victorian-era traffic crisis. NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 1: The Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century 7 2023, 30 cyclists were killed on New York City streets—the highest total in 23 years. Between 2014 and 2024, roughly 4,000 to 5,000 bicyclists were injured in traffic crashes citywide each year, with annual cyclist fatalities ranging from the low teens up to about 30 per year. The rise in cyclist deaths coincided with dramatic increases in cycling, particularly e-bike use. E-bikes, which provide pedal-assist up to speeds of 20-25 mph, have become ubiquitous for delivery workers and commuters. Their higher speeds relative to traditional bicycles mean crashes are more likely to result in serious injury or death, both for cyclists and for pedestrians struck by e-bikes. E-bike safety has become an increasing concern, particularly with the faster pedal-assisted models used in bikeshare systems. In response to safety concerns, Lyft (which operates Citi Bike) has made adjustments to e-bike speeds, though specific speed caps have varied and been adjusted over time. The city has worked with bikeshare operators to balance the convenience of e-bikes with safety considerations for both riders and pedestrians. The types of crashes killing cyclists reveal familiar patterns enabled by Moses-era infrastructure design: drivers turning across bike lanes, "dooring" (cyclists struck by opening car doors), drivers failing to yield, speeding drivers losing control, and distracted drivers drifting into bike lanes. The deadliest scenario involves large trucks, particularly in righthook crashes where trucks turn right across bike lanes, with cyclists positioned in drivers' blind spots. Despite "side guards" required on citycontracted trucks, many private trucks lack these protections, and cyclists continue to be crushed under truck wheels—a hazard Moses never considered because he never imagined cyclists as legitimate street users. The uneven distribution of cycling infrastructure exacerbates these dangers and reflects the continuing influence of Moses's automotive paradigm. While Manhattan below 60th Street has relatively extensive protected bike lane networks, large swaths of the outer boroughs lack any dedicated cycling infrastructure—particularly areas where Moses's highways and parkways dominate the streetscape. Cyclists in these areas NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 2: The Modern Crisis 14 highways and parkways dominate the streetscape. Cyclists in these areas must either ride in general traffic lanes with fast-moving cars and trucks, or ride on sidewalks (illegally) where they pose dangers to pedestrians. This infrastructure gap particularly affects delivery workers, disproportionately immigrants from Latin America and Asia, who rely on e-bikes for their livelihoods and who account for a large share of cyclist fatalities. The psychological barrier to cycling remains profound, a direct consequence of the hostile environment Moses engineered. Surveys consistently show that the majority of New Yorkers are interested in cycling but afraid to do so because of traffic dangers (Transportation Alternatives, 2025). The "interested but concerned" represent roughly 60% of the population—people who would cycle if they felt safe, but who perceive current conditions as too dangerous. This perception is not irrational; videos of near-misses between cyclists and cars circulate widely on social media, reinforcing fears. Parents particularly cite safety concerns as reasons for not allowing children to cycle, despite the health and independence benefits cycling could provide. Undoing Moses's legacy requires not merely adding bike lanes to existing streets but fundamentally reimagining urban transportation in ways that prioritize human life over automotive throughput. This remains politically contentious precisely because Moses succeeded so thoroughly in making automobile dominance seem natural and inevitable rather than the product of deliberate policy choices that could be reversed. NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 2: The Modern Crisis 15 Part 3 Contemporary Solutions: A Multipronged Approach Historical Context: From Tweed's Obstruction to Moses's Legacy The contemporary struggle to create safe streets for pedestrians and cyclists represents the latest chapter in a long history of New York's transportation battles, where political power and private interests have repeatedly shaped infrastructure decisions at the expense of public welfare. The challenges facing Vision Zero and modern street safety initiatives echo conflicts dating back to the nineteenth century, when Boss Tweed's corruption derailed Alfred Ely Beach's pneumatic subway and condemned the city to decades of continued horse-drawn chaos (Beach, 1870; Mandelbaum, 1965). Beach's pneumatic subway, demonstrated in 1870, offered a glimpse of grade-separated rapid transit that would have removed dangerous vehicles from street level, protecting pedestrians from the hazards of horse-drawn traffic that killed and injured thousands annually (Beach, 1870). Tweed's obstruction—rooted in his financial interests in surface transit and his control of city franchises—meant that viable solutions to street safety remained unimplemented while people continued to die. The pattern would repeat: those profiting from dangerous transportation systems blocking safer alternatives. When subways finally arrived in the early twentieth century, they provided exactly the pedestrian safety benefits Beach had envisioned—grade separation removed the most dangerous element from street level (Walker, 1918; Hood, 1993). Yet even as subways expanded, street-level dangers evolved. The automobile's arrival transformed the threat, replacing relatively slow horse-drawn vehicles with machines capable of vastly greater speeds and kinetic energy. The response, shaped decisively by Robert Moses, prioritized automotive flow over pedestrian and cyclist NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 16 by Robert Moses, prioritized automotive flow over pedestrian and cyclist safety, embedding design choices that continue to kill New Yorkers today (Caro, 1974). Moses's infrastructure—highways with inadequate pedestrian crossings, wide arterials designed for speed, intersections prioritizing vehicle throughput—created the dangerous conditions contemporary safety initiatives struggle to remediate (Caro, 1974; Jackson, 1985). His systematic exclusion of bicycles from legitimate consideration meant that cycling infrastructure had to be retrofitted onto streets designed explicitly to exclude it. His hostility to public transit investment meant that alternatives to driving remained inadequate, forcing more people into cars and creating the very congestion and danger his highways purported to solve. Contemporary solutions must therefore work within and against a built environment deliberately engineered to subordinate pedestrian and cyclist safety to automotive convenience. Congestion Pricing: Market-Based Traffic Management On January 5, 2025, New York City implemented the nation's first congestion pricing program, marking a historic attempt to manage traffic through economic incentives rather than infrastructure expansion alone (NPR, 2025). The system charges vehicles entering Manhattan's Central Business District—areas south of 60th Street, known as the Congestion Relief Zone—during peak hours. Passenger vehicles pay $9 per day during peak periods, motorcycles pay $4.50, and trucks and buses pay between $14.40 and $21.60 depending on their size. For-hire vehicles including taxis incur a per-trip surcharge: $0.75 for traditional taxis and $1.50 for rideshare services like Uber and Lyft (MTA, 2023). The program draws on decades of economic theory and successful implementations in cities including London, Singapore, and Stockholm. The logic is straightforward: congestion is a negative externality—when a driver enters crowded streets, they impose costs on everyone else through increased travel times, pollution, noise, and danger. Pricing this externality encourages drivers to consider these social costs in their decision-making, NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 17 encourages drivers to consider these social costs in their decision-making, incentivizing shifts to public transit, carpooling, or avoiding unnecessary trips during peak periods (Vickrey, 1973). The pedestrian and cyclist safety implications of congestion pricing are substantial and directly address the dangers created by Moses-era automobile dominance. Fewer vehicles mean fewer opportunities for conflicts between cars and vulnerable road users. Lower traffic volumes allow pedestrians to cross streets more easily and safely—a basic right denied them when Moses's infrastructure prioritized uninterrupted automotive flow. Cyclists face fewer cars that might turn across their paths or drift into bike lanes, reducing the types of crashes that Moses's street designs made inevitable. Air quality improvements reduce the respiratory burdens borne disproportionately by children and the elderly. The psychological experience of urban streets shifts from hostile, cardominated spaces to more human-scaled environments—reversing the intimidation that Moses deliberately engineered. Early results have been encouraging. Initial data from the MTA showed traffic entering the zone decreased by approximately 7.5-8% in the first weeks of operation, with some reports indicating around 43,000 fewer vehicles daily entering Manhattan (MTA, 2025). Travel times across bridges and through tunnels into lower Manhattan showed improvements during rush hours, with various sources reporting reductions in travel times. Air quality monitoring has shown measurable improvements in particulate matter and nitrogen dioxide levels within the congestion zone. The revenue generated—projected to reach approximately $500 million in 2025, which will support $15 billion in bonds for capital improvements—is being invested directly in public transit improvements that Moses systematically underfunded, creating a virtuous cycle of reduced driving and better alternatives to driving. However, congestion pricing remains politically contentious, revealing how thoroughly Moses succeeded in making automobile dependency seem natural and inevitable. Critics argue that it functions as a regressive NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 18 seem natural and inevitable. Critics argue that it functions as a regressive tax, disproportionately affecting working-class drivers who lack convenient public transit options—a problem directly traceable to Moses's refusal to prioritize transit investment. Residents of outer boroughs, particularly in areas with limited subway access, face difficult choices between paying the toll or enduring long commutes on inadequate bus service. These transit deserts exist precisely because Moses directed resources toward highways instead of expanding the subway system that had proven so effective at removing dangerous traffic from street level. Some businesses worry about reduced customer traffic, though similar concerns in other cities proved largely unfounded (Eliasson, 2009). The system includes various exemptions and discounts for low-income drivers, residents within the congestion zone, and vehicles carrying persons with disabilities, but these mitigations have not silenced opposition rooted in decades of automobile-centric planning. The Bicycle Renaissance and the Infrastructure Gap Perhaps the most striking parallel to the Victorian era's search for alternatives to horse-drawn transport is the twenty-first century's rediscovery of the bicycle. Once dismissed as a recreational vehicle or a conveyance for children—a perception Moses actively encouraged by excluding bicycles from legitimate transportation planning—the bicycle has emerged as a serious urban transportation mode, particularly for trips of one to five miles, the distance range that dominates urban travel (Pucher and Buehler, 2017). New York City has dramatically expanded its cycling infrastructure over the past two decades, explicitly repudiating Moses's automotive paradigm. From fewer than 200 miles of bike lanes in 2006, the city has grown its network to over 1,300 miles of bicycle facilities, including hundreds of miles of protected bike lanes that physically separate cyclists from motor traffic (NYC DOT, 2025). The NYC Streets Plan, adopted in 2019, mandates the construction of 250 miles of protected bike lanes between 2023 and 2026, though implementation has lagged behind targets (NYC DOT, 2019). NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 19 The results have been dramatic. Between 2007 and 2024, the number of New Yorkers commuting by bicycle tripled. Daily bicycle crossings over East River bridges reached an all-time high in 2024, with an average of 28,108 cyclists crossing the Brooklyn, Manhattan, Williamsburg, and Queensboro Bridges each day during the counting period (NYC DOT, 2025). Approximately 1.8 million adult New Yorkers ride bicycles at least occasionally, with 762,000 riding regularly—remarkable numbers given that the infrastructure they use had to be retrofitted onto Moses-designed streets that never contemplated their existence. Protected Bike Lanes: A Proven Safety Intervention The safety benefits of protected bike lanes—those with physical barriers separating cyclists from motor traffic—are well documented and represent a direct rejection of Moses-era street design principles. Studies show that protected bike lanes reduce cyclist injury rates by 40-90% compared to cycling in mixed traffic or painted bike lanes (Teschke et al., 2012). The physical barrier prevents the most common types of crashes that Moses's infrastructure enabled: cars drifting into bike lanes, drivers opening doors into cyclists' paths, and drivers making turns across bike lanes without looking. Protected intersections, featuring concrete islands and signal phasing that separates turning movements from throughcycling movements, further reduce crashes. The network effect proves crucial and illustrates the inadequacy of incremental approaches when confronting Moses's systematic exclusion of cycling. Isolated protected bike lanes provide some benefit, but connected networks enable cyclists to complete entire trips on protected infrastructure, dramatically increasing both safety and ridership. Cities that have built comprehensive networks—notably Sevilla, Spain and Copenhagen, Denmark—have seen cycling mode shares rise to 30-50% of all trips, with correspondingly low injury rates (Buehler and Pucher, 2021). New York's network, while growing, remains fragmented, forcing even cyclists using protected lanes to merge into Moses-designed high-speed NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 20 cyclists using protected lanes to merge into Moses-designed high-speed arterials at regular intervals. The bicycle's advantages for urban mobility are considerable and represent precisely the pedestrian-scale transportation Moses rejected. Bicycles occupy far less space than automobiles—roughly 20 bicycles can fit in the space required for one car. They produce no emissions and little noise. They're economical to purchase and maintain. For trips under three miles, bicycles often prove faster than cars in congested urban environments. Cycling provides health benefits, with regular cyclists experiencing lower rates of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and obesity (Oja et al., 2011). From a safety perspective, every trip shifted from car to bicycle eliminates a potential source of danger to pedestrians and other road users—reducing the very hazards Moses amplified through his infrastructure choices. However, cycling's growth faces significant obstacles beyond the infrastructure gaps created by Moses-era planning. Weather significantly affects ridership—rain, snow, and extreme cold dramatically reduce cycling. Bicycles are poorly suited for transporting children, heavy groceries, or bulky items, though cargo bikes partially address this limitation. The elderly and those with mobility limitations may find cycling impractical. While bicycles can replace many car trips, they cannot fully substitute for comprehensive public transit—the very transit system Moses systematically undermined. Pedestrian Infrastructure and Priority Pedestrian safety improvements have evolved beyond simple crosswalk painting to encompass comprehensive street redesigns that prioritize walking—directly contradicting Moses's philosophy that pedestrians should accommodate vehicles rather than the reverse. Leading pedestrian intervals (LPIs), which give pedestrians a several-second head start before vehicles get a green light, significantly reduce turning vehicle conflicts that Moses's intersection designs made routine and deadly. Pedestrian refuge islands allow people to cross wide streets—often Moses-designed NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 21 refuge islands allow people to cross wide streets—often Moses-designed arterials—in stages, reducing exposure time in the roadway. Curb extensions (also called "bulb-outs") shorten crossing distances and improve sightlines. Raised crosswalks force vehicles to slow to traverse them while keeping pedestrians on a level plane. Daylighting—removing parking spaces near corners to improve sightlines —addresses a common crash scenario where pedestrians and drivers cannot see each other until the last moment, a problem exacerbated by Moses's prioritization of on-street parking and wide turning radii that encouraged high-speed turns. Speed reduction measures including speed humps, chicanes, and narrowed lanes force drivers to slow in areas with high pedestrian activity, implementing through design the speed limits Moses refused to consider. Pedestrianization of streets—banning vehicles entirely from selected blocks or districts—creates oases of safety and dramatically improves quality of life for residents and visitors, reclaiming street space that Moses had ceded entirely to automobiles. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated some pedestrian improvements and demonstrated the political possibility of reclaiming street space from vehicles. The Open Streets program, initially created to provide outdoor space during lockdowns, converted dozens of street segments to pedestrian and cyclist use only. Many of these conversions have become permanent, demonstrating the viability of car-free streets and the public appetite for them—a demand Moses's infrastructure had suppressed for decades. Similarly, the Open Restaurants program expanded sidewalk and street space for outdoor dining, reclaiming roadway from vehicles for people and proving that streets could serve purposes Moses never contemplated. Yet pedestrian improvements face constant opposition from drivers who view any reduction in car space as an unacceptable imposition—an attitude Moses cultivated by making automobile dominance seem natural and inevitable. Removal of parking spaces, even for safety improvements, generates intense controversy. Business owners often oppose pedestrian NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 22 generates intense controversy. Business owners often oppose pedestrian improvements, fearing reduced access for driving customers, despite evidence that pedestrian-friendly streets increase foot traffic and retail sales (Carmona et al., 2018). The political challenges of prioritizing pedestrian safety over driver convenience remain formidable, revealing how thoroughly Moses's automotive paradigm became embedded in public consciousness. Mass Transit Modernization: Reversing Moses's Neglect The foundation of New York's transportation system remains the subway and bus network operated by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)—the very system Moses systematically starved of resources while lavishing billions on highways. With over 4 million daily riders on the subway alone (pre-pandemic levels), the system's importance cannot be overstated, yet decades of Moses-influenced underinvestment left it facing significant challenges: aging infrastructure, chronic underfunding, reliability issues, and the need to adapt to changing urban patterns. Recent investments, partly funded by congestion pricing revenue, focus on several areas and represent belated recognition of priorities Moses rejected. Signal modernization aims to increase train frequency and reliability—the current system uses technology dating to the 1930s in many locations, a legacy of the underinvestment Moses championed. Station accessibility improvements seek to bring the system into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, with only about 30% of stations currently wheelchair-accessible—another consequence of Moses's refusal to prioritize transit infrastructure. The introduction of contactless payment systems and real-time arrival information enhances user experience. New subway cars with more capacity, better climate control, and improved safety features gradually replace aging rolling stock. From a safety perspective, grade-separated mass transit removes the most dangerous element from streets: motor vehicles—precisely the benefit Beach's pneumatic subway would have provided in 1870 and precisely the NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 3: Contemporary Solutions 23 Several lessons emerge from comparing these eras. First, successful solutions address multiple problems simultaneously. The subway provided not just congestion relief but also faster travel times, increased urban accessibility, reduced street-level danger to pedestrians, and public health improvements (by removing both horses and elevated railway pollution). Similarly, congestion pricing generates revenue for transit improvements while reducing emissions, improving safety for pedestrians and cyclists, and encouraging mode shift—multiple benefits from a single intervention. Second, infrastructure changes must be substantial, not incremental. A few miles of bike lanes accomplish little; a comprehensive protected network changes behavior. A single subway line helps; a system-wide network transforms a city. Half-measures typically fail to reach the threshold where alternatives become truly competitive with existing modes. For pedestrian safety specifically, isolated improvements at individual intersections help those locations but do little to reduce overall fatality rates; systematic street redesigns across entire neighborhoods prove far more effective. Third, pricing and regulation matter as much as infrastructure. The pneumatic tube system succeeded partly because postal regulations required its use for certain mail classes. Congestion pricing works by changing the economic calculus of driving. Building bike lanes helps, but enforcing parking regulations and speed limits in bike lanes proves equally important. Lowering speed limits saves lives, but only if enforced through automated cameras or increased police presence. Infrastructure creates possibilities; pricing and regulation determine whether those possibilities are realized. Fourth, success requires patience and political courage. The subway took decades to build and initially faced skepticism and opposition. Vision Zero and congestion pricing remain controversial years after implementation. Transformative change threatens established interests and requires sustained political will across multiple election cycles. Leaders must be NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 4: Comparing Eras 30 sustained political will across multiple election cycles. Leaders must be willing to endure criticism for long-term benefits. Particularly for pedestrian and cyclist safety, the benefits—lives saved, injuries prevented —are often invisible (they are crashes that never happened), while the costs—parking spaces removed, driving lanes converted to bike lanes, tolls imposed—are highly visible and generate immediate opposition. What Didn't Work History also illuminates failures. Building more roads to solve congestion, whether horse-drawn or automobile, has repeatedly failed. New capacity generates new demand, a principle proven across centuries (Duranton and Turner, 2011). The construction of urban highways in the midtwentieth century briefly improved traffic flow, then induced more driving until congestion returned to previous levels—or worse. Moreover, these highways devastated pedestrian safety, creating high-speed barriers that divided neighborhoods and made walking dangerous or impossible. Technological solutionism—the belief that new technology alone will solve mobility problems—has also repeatedly disappointed. Elevated railways helped but didn't eliminate congestion. Automobiles eliminated horse manure but created worse air pollution and vastly more dangerous streets for pedestrians. Electric vehicles may reduce emissions but won't solve congestion or make streets safer for vulnerable users. Technology enables solutions but cannot substitute for intelligent policy, adequate investment, and political will. Education campaigns telling pedestrians to be more careful or cyclists to wear bright clothing, while well-intentioned, fundamentally misunderstand the problem. The vast majority of pedestrian and cyclist deaths result from driver behavior—speeding, failure to yield, distraction, aggressive driving—not from pedestrian or cyclist error. Placing the burden of safety on vulnerable road users while leaving the dangerous behavior of drivers unaddressed proves both ineffective and unjust. The safe systems approach embodied in Vision Zero recognizes that humans will make errors, and that streets should be designed to make those errors NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 4: Comparing Eras 31 will make errors, and that streets should be designed to make those errors non-fatal. Finally, ignoring equity concerns dooms reforms. Transportation changes affect different communities differently. Working-class neighborhoods often bear the burdens of new infrastructure—highways demolished stable communities in the 1950s and 60s, and their high speeds and volumes continue to kill disproportionate numbers of low-income residents and people of color. Conversely, inadequate transit in poor neighborhoods perpetuates disadvantage. Successful transportation policy must explicitly address distributional consequences and ensure that improvements benefit all residents, not just the affluent. Pedestrian and cyclist safety improvements must be distributed equitably, not concentrated in wealthy neighborhoods where political pressure is greatest. NYC Gridlock Then and Now Part 4: Comparing Eras 32 Conclusion: The Path Forward New York City stands at a crossroads similar to that faced by Victorian planners confronting horse-drawn gridlock. The current automobiledominated transportation system is environmentally unsustainable, economically inefficient, socially inequitable, and lethally dangerous to pedestrians and cyclists. Yet the path forward remains contested, with various stakeholders advocating different solutions: more bike lanes, better buses, additional subway capacity, congestion pricing expansion, autonomous vehicles, or simply better traffic management. History suggests that no single solution will suffice. The late nineteenth century required multiple innovations—pneumatic tubes for freight, elevated railways and then subways for passengers, motor vehicles for flexibility, and eventually buses for distributed service. Similarly, twentyfirst century urban mobility will require a diverse toolkit: expanded and modernized mass transit forming the backbone of the system, protected cycling infrastructure for shorter trips, congestion pricing to manage demand, comprehensive pedestrian improvements to reclaim street space for walking, and targeted use of private vehicles where alternatives prove impractical. Prioritizing Safety: The Non-Negotiable Foundation The most critical lesson from comparing eras is that pedestrian and cyclist safety must be the foundational principle of street design, not an afterthought. The Victorian era subordinated pedestrian safety to vehicle movement, with predictable results: injuries, deaths, and streets that felt hostile to human presence. The automobile age repeated this mistake at vastly greater scale, designing streets as conduits for vehicles rather than places for people. Streets became so dangerous that parents forbid children from playing in them, eliminating what had historically been children's primary recreational space. NYC Gridlock Then and Now Conclusion: The Path Forward 33 Breaking this pattern requires fundamentally reordering priorities. Streets should be designed first for pedestrian safety, second for cycling and transit, and last for private automobile movement. This means: •Reducing speeds aggressively: Every 1 mph reduction in vehicle speed reduces pedestrian fatality risk by approximately 5%. Speeds should be 20 mph or lower on residential streets and 25 mph on commercial corridors, enforced through both physical design (narrow lanes, speed humps, chicanes) and automated speed cameras. •Completing the protected bike lane network: The current 1,300 miles of bike facilities should expand to 2,500+ miles of protected lanes, creating a comprehensive network allowing safe cycling throughout all five boroughs. Protected intersections should become standard at all major crossings. •Redesigning streets systematically: Rather than improving individual intersections one at a time as funding allows, entire corridors should be redesigned holistically, with pedestrian safety as the primary goal. This means pedestrian refuge islands, curb extensions, daylighting, raised crosswalks, and leading pedestrian intervals as standard features. •Expanding car-free zones: Pedestrianization of commercial districts, following the model of Times Square and 14th Street, should expand to dozens of additional locations. Open Streets should become permanent and expand to hundreds of street segments. •Strict enforcement of traffic laws: The current culture of impunity for traffic violations—speeding, blocking bike lanes, failing to yield to pedestrians, running red lights—must end through both automated enforcement and police action. Traffic law enforcement should be reconceived as a public health measure, not merely revenue generation. The implementation of congestion pricing in January 2025 represents a NYC Gridlock Then and Now Conclusion: The Path Forward 34 The implementation of congestion pricing in January 2025 represents a promising step, applying economic principles to manage demand while generating resources for infrastructure improvements. The continued expansion of bicycle infrastructure offers a low-cost, high-benefit intervention, particularly for the many trips within the city that are currently made by car despite alternatives existing. Ongoing investment in mass transit—while expensive and slow—remains essential for moving large numbers of people efficiently. Yet the biggest lesson from history may be about timeframes and expectations. The transformation from horse-drawn to modern urban transportation took roughly fifty years, from the 1890s to the 1940s. Similarly, transitioning from automobile dominance to sustainable urban mobility will require decades of sustained effort. It will require not just infrastructure investment but changes in land use, pricing, regulation, and culture. It will face opposition from entrenched interests and skepticism from those who cannot envision alternatives to current patterns. The Moral Imperative of Safe Streets Beyond the practical considerations of mobility and efficiency lies a moral imperative: cities must not accept preventable deaths as the cost of transportation. When 112 pedestrians die in a single year simply trying to cross streets or walk on sidewalks, when 30 cyclists die riding to work or school, these are not accidents but failures of design and policy. Each death represents not merely a statistic but a life cut short, a family devastated, a community traumatized. The Victorian era ultimately rejected the horse-based transportation system not merely because it was inefficient but because the environmental degradation and public health consequences became intolerable. The streets buried in manure, the swarms of flies spreading disease, the dead horses rotting in public—these affronts to human dignity finally generated sufficient political will for transformation. Modern traffic violence should generate similar resolve. The normalization of traffic deaths—the assumption that a certain number of NYC Gridlock Then and Now Conclusion: The Path Forward 35 normalization of traffic deaths—the assumption that a certain number of pedestrians and cyclists will simply die each year as the price of mobility— represents a collective moral failure. The urgency of climate change perhaps makes the contemporary challenge more pressing than the Victorian manure crisis. Yet the fundamental dynamics remain the same: cities must move people and goods efficiently through limited space while maintaining livability, economic vitality, social equity, and—crucially—safety for all road users, especially the most vulnerable. New York City addressed this challenge successfully once before, pioneering solutions that cities worldwide emulated. Whether it can do so again remains to be seen, but the stakes— for New York and for cities globally—could hardly be higher. The path forward requires acknowledging uncomfortable truths: that automobile dominance has failed, that streets designed primarily for vehicle movement kill people, that the convenience of driving cannot justify preventable deaths. It requires political leaders willing to prioritize safety over speed, people over cars, and long-term sustainability over short-term convenience. It requires investment at scale, measured in tens of billions of dollars and sustained over decades. It requires treating traffic violence as the public health crisis it is, with the urgency and resources that designation implies. 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