EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans. EPC ISSUE PAPER NO.79 July 2015. Edited by Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 Issue Paper No. 79, July 2015 EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans Edited by Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat Cornelius Adebahr Franco Algieri Ioannis Armakolas Graham Avery Steven Blockmans Kārlis Bukovskis Ruth Ferrero-Turrión Andrea Frontini Gunilla Herolf Christoph Hillion Beáta Huszka Isabelle Ioannides Paul Ivan James Ker-Lindsay Andrew Konitzer Marin Lessenski Hans Martens Diāna Potjomkina Theresia Töglhofer Giorgios Triantafyllou Natasha Wunsh Tomasz Žornaczuk Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 x Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans E P C I S S U E P A P E R NO.79 J u l y 2 0 1 5 Edited by Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS ISSN 1782-494X PROGRAMME Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 ii The EPC’s Programme on European Politics and Institutions With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the new focus of this programme is on adapting the EU’s institutional architecture to take account of the changed set-up and on bringing the EU closer to its citizens. Continuing discussion on governance and policymaking in Brussels is essential to ensure that the European project can move forward and respond to the challenges facing the Union in the 21st century in a democratic and effective manner. This debate is closely linked to the key questions of how to involve European citizens in the discussions over its future; how to win their support for European integration and what are the prospects for, and consequences of, further enlargement towards the Balkans and Turkey. This programme focuses on these core themes and brings together all the strands of the debate on a number of key issues, addressing them through various fora, task forces and projects. It also works with other programmes on cross-cutting issues such as the reform of European economic governance or the new EU foreign policy structures. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 iii Table of Contents About the authors .................................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. ix Foreword ................................................................................................................................................. xi Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. xiii List of graphs ......................................................................................................................................... xv List of tables .......................................................................................................................................... xvi Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................... xvii 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 by Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat 2. Enlargement policy in perspective............................................................................. 11 by Graham Avery 3. Masters or servants? Member states in the EU enlargement process ....................... 19 by Christophe Hillion 4. Germany ................................................................................................................... 29 by Cornelius Adebahr and Theresia Töglhofer 5. France ...................................................................................................................... 43 by Natasha Wunsch 6. United Kingdom ....................................................................................................... 53 by James Ker-Lindsay 7. Poland ...................................................................................................................... 63 by Tomasz Żornaczuk 8. Italy ........................................................................................................................... 73 by Andrea Frontini 9. Spain ........................................................................................................................ 85 by Ruth Ferrero Turrión 10. Austria ...................................................................................................................... 93 by Franco Algieri 11. Croatia .................................................................................................................... 103 by Andrew Konitzer 12. Hungary ................................................................................................................. 115 by Beáta Huszka Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 iv 13. Greece .................................................................................................................... 129 by Ioannis Armakolas and Giorgos Triantafyllou 14. Bulgaria .................................................................................................................. 143 by Marin Lessenski 15. Romania ................................................................................................................. 155 by Paul Ivan 16. Cyprus .................................................................................................................... 167 by Isabelle Ioannides 17. Sweden................................................................................................................... 179 by Gunilla Herolf 18. Denmark ................................................................................................................. 189 by Hans Martens 19. Latvia ...................................................................................................................... 199 by Kārlis Bukovskis and Diāna Potjomkina 20. The Netherlands ..................................................................................................... 211 by Steven Blockmans 21. Conclusions and recommendations ........................................................................ 223 by Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat Appendices .......................................................................................................................................... 237 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 v About the authors Cornelius ADEBAHR is a political analyst and entrepreneur based in Washington, DC, USA, and Berlin, Germany, working on European foreign policy. He is an Associate in the Europe Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an Associate Fellow of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). He furthermore teaches a master’s course on EU-Iran relations at Georgetown University. He studied Political Science (International Relations), Philosophy, Public Law, and International Economics in Tübingen, Paris, and at the Free University Berlin, where he graduated in 2001, before receiving his PhD (Dr. rer. pol.) in 2008. Franco ALGIERI is Associate Professor and Head of the International Relations Department at Webster University Vienna. Prior to that, he was Director of Research at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, a Research Fellow at the Institute for European Politics in Bonn, at the Research Group on European Affairs, University of Mainz, as well as a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich. He was a Lecturer at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute, University of Munich, and at the Institute of Political Science, University of Tübingen. He was appointed Guest Professor at the School of International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Studies, both at the Renmin University of China, Beijing. His research covers the development of the European integration process, European and Asian security issues and EU-Asia relations. Ioannis ARMAKOLAS is Assistant Professor at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, and Head of the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, published by the Taylor and Francis Group. He has extensive research, policy analysis and consulting experience with European and American organisations, with a special focus on post-conflict policymaking in the Western Balkans. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge, an MA from the University of Kent and a first degree from Panteion University. Graham AVERY is Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre (EPC), Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and Honorary Director-General of the European Commission. He worked for the European Commission in Brussels as a Policy Adviser and Planner in agricultural policy, foreign affairs, enlargement policy, and in the Cabinets of the President and other Commissioners. His last post was as Director for Strategy, Coordination and Analysis in the Directorate General for External Relations. He has been Secretary General of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Natolin, and Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Rosa BALFOUR is a former Director of the European Policy Centre (EPC), where she headed the Europe in the World Programme until mid-May 2015. She has since become Senior Adviser to the EPC and has moved to the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). She has researched and published widely on issues relating to European foreign policy and external action, relations with the Mediterranean region, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, EU enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, and the role of human rights and democracy in international relations. Her latest work has focused on the EU’s new diplomatic service and its implications for European foreign policy, with a volume published by Ashgate in 2015 (co-edited with Caterina Carta and Kristi Raik, “The European External Action Service and national foreign ministries: convergence or divergence?”). Her book on “Human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy: the cases of Ukraine and Egypt”, was published by Routledge in 2012, and is now in paperback. She holds an MA in History from Cambridge University, and an MSc in European Studies and a PhD in International Relations, both from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Steven BLOCKMANS is Head of EU Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), in Brussels, and Professor of EU External Relations, Law and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. He is the author of “Tough love: the EU’s relations with the Western Balkans” (2007) and the (co-)editor of more than 10 volumes, including “The European Union and peacebuilding” (2010), and “The EU's role in global governance” (2013). For almost 20 years he has worked for EU institutions and member states’ and in Asia. Between 2007 and 2009, he served as a long-term expert in the framework of a EuropeAid project in support of the Ministry of European Integration of Albania. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 vi Karlis BUKOVSKIS is Deputy Director and Researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), and author of numerous articles and scientific editor of several books. He is also a Guest Lecturer on global political economy and economic diplomacy of the EU at several universities in Latvia, including the Riga Graduate School of Law and Riga Stradiņš University. He served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, dealing with EU institutional affairs and cooperation with the European Parliament. He has also been engaged in the preparation of the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, where he has been in charge of developing the Presidency’s six-month work programme, and of dealing with ECOFIN matters. Currently, he is also a Consultant of the Ministry of Finance of Latvia on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union. Among his areas of interest are international political economy, the international financial system and EU institutional affairs. He holds master’s degrees from the University of Latvia and the University of Helsinki, and prior to that he studied at the University of Trier and the Riga Stradiņš University. Ruth FERRERO-TURRIÓN is Associate Professor of European Studies at Universidad Complutense and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and Senior Research Associate at Complutense Institute of International Studies (ICEI). She has been Research Fellow at the Columbia University, the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Babes-Bolyai University (Romania), the Hungarian Institute of International Relations, and the Open Society Foundation-Sofia. She has been working on Eastern and South-Eastern European issues (especially focussing on the Balkans) since 1997 in areas such minority rights, national minorities, territorial issues, and migration flows in broader sense, including trafficking. She collaborates regularly with think tanks and foreign affairs publications such as Real Instituto Elcano, Esglobal and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, among others. She has also been an International Observer since 1996 in several countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (fYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Ukraine, and Armenia). She holds an MPhil in Eastern European Studies (UNED), a BA in Political Sciences and Sociology (UCM), a Postgraduate Diploma in Political Science and Constitutional Law from Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales in Madrid, and Expertise in European Union at the Spanish Diplomatic School. Andrea FRONTINI has been a Policy Analyst in the Europe in the World Programme of the European Policy Centre (EPC) since April 2015. He joined the EPC as a Programme Assistant in February 2012. Prior to that, he worked at the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission, in Brussels (2011-2012), the Secretariat General of the Italian Atlantic Committee in Rome (2010-2011), the Italian Mission to NATO in Brussels (2010), and the Marketing and Commercial Affairs Division of Finmeccanica Spa in Rome (2007). He holds a BA and MA in International Affairs and Diplomacy from the University of Trieste (Gorizia Campus), an International Exchange Certificate from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences-Po) and a Postgraduate Degree in International Relations and International Protection of Human Rights from the Italian Society for the International Organisation (SIOI). His main areas of expertise cover EU foreign, security and defence policies and EU’s relations with the Middle East, Northern Africa and Eastern Asia. Gunilla HEROLF has been a Researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Her main fields of interest are European integration and security cooperation, with a focus on Germany, France, the UK, and the Nordic countries. She has lectured at Stockholm University in Sweden and Shandong University in China. She is a Board Member of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), a Member of the Steering Committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) and Chairman of the Research Council of the Åland Islands Peace Institute. She is also Member, and formerly the Vice-President, of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences (RSAWS). She holds a PhD from the Stockholm University. Christophe HILLION is Professor of European Law at the Universities of Leiden and Gothenburg, Senior Researcher at the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS, Stockholm), an Academic Fellow of the European Policy Centre (EPC, Brussels), and a Member of the Governing Board of the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER, The Hague). He has published on EU external relations, enlargement and constitutional law. Beáta HUSZKA is Assistant Professor at the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), in the Faculty of Social Studies, where she teaches security studies and related subjects. Since 2012, she has been leading the Work Package Six of FRAME (Fostering Human Rights among European Policies), a large-scale collaborative research project funded under the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7). Between 2012 and 2014 she worked as a Senior Researcher at the Hungarian Institute of International Relations, dealing with the Western Balkans. She is the author of the book “Secessionist movements and ethnic conflict: the development and impact of nationalist rhetoric”, published by Routledge in 2014. She completed her PhD in International Relations at the Central European University, focusing on the discursive framing of nationalist movements in the Western Balkans. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 vii Isabelle IOANNIDES is a Senior Associate Researcher in the European Foreign and Security Policy cluster of the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and a Policy Analyst in the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value of the European Parliamentary Research Service. She was an Adviser in the Bureau of European Policy Advisers of the former European Commission President, from 2010 to 2014. She has published, taught and commented extensively, and consulted governments, international organisations and think tanks. Her expertise covers EU peacebuilding and crisis management, the external aspects of justice and home affairs, border management, security sector and police reform, governance in post-conflict and transitional societies, with a focus on the Western Balkans. She has lived and worked in fYROM, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Isabelle holds a PhD and a Master of Research in international relations and security studies from the University of Bradford, UK, a Master of Research in Political Science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, France, and a Bachelor in foreign affairs and French literature from the University of Virginia, USA. Paul IVAN is a Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC), where he works in the Europe in the World and the European Politics and Institutions Programmes. Before joining the EPC, Paul was a diplomat in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and a Researcher on EU external relations and security issues at the Romanian Center for European Policies (CRPE), where he remains an Affiliated Expert. Paul holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and bachelor’s degrees in International Relations, European Studies and History. James KER-LINDSAY is Eurobank Senior Research Fellow in the Politics of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His research focuses on conflict, peace and security in the Western Balkans and on EU enlargement in the region. He is the author or editor of 12 books, including: “Civil society and transitions in the Western Balkans” (co-edited, 2013), “New perspectives of Yugoslavia: key issues and controversies” (co-edited, 2010), and “Kosovo: the path to contested statehood in the Balkans’ (2009). In addition to his academic work, he is a regular media commentator and has served as a Consultant or Advisor to a number of governments and international organisations, including the European Union, Council of Europe and the United Nations. Andrew KONITZER is Acting Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies (REES) and Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He specialises in electoral institutions, party politics, voting behaviour, EU enlargement, and issues of democratic decentralisation and federalism within the former Communist states of Eastern Europe. His publications include the book “Voting for Russia's governors: regional elections and accountability under Yeltsin and Putin” (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and articles in such journals as Europe-Asia Studies, Post-Soviet Affairs, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, East European Politics and Societies, Russian History, and Electoral Studies. In addition to extensive field research experience in the Western Balkans, Russia, the Baltics and Ukraine, he has also participated in the planning and implementation of technical assistance and exchange programmes throughout the region. Marin LESSENSKI is Programme Director of the European Policies Programme of the Open Society Institute, Sofia. Previously, he has been Director of Programmes of the Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS) from 1998 to 2008. He has been a Freedom House Visiting Fellow with the Hudson Institute’s Center for European and Eurasian Studies and the Center of National Security Studies. He has also been a participant in the Transatlantic Young Leaders Program of the Aspen Institute, Berlin. At OSI-Sofia, he manages the European Policies Initiative-EuPI and the European Catch-Up Index. His areas of interest also include EU foreign, security, neighbourhood, and enlargement policies, democratisation, foreign policy, security and institutional developments in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region, identity politics, and interethnic relations. He holds an MA in Southeast European Studies from the Central European University, Budapest, and an MA in History from the University of Sofia. Hans MARTENS joined the European Policy Centre (EPC) as Chief Executive in 2002, and retired from that post in September 2013. He has been Visiting Professor at the Universities of Aarhus and Copenhagen, and he is a regular lecturer at business schools and universities in Europe and the USA. He is the author of a number of books and articles on European integration, monetary affairs, energy and climate policies, and the demographic challenges for Europe. He was born in Denmark and studied Political Science at Aarhus University, specialising in EU affairs and public administration, and went on to become Associate Professor in international political and economic relations. Diana POTJOMKINA is a Research Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA). She has also served as Expert for three opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and taught courses on European Integration at the Riga Stradins University. Diana’s main research interests are Latvia’s foreign policy and Europeanisation processes, Latvia’s relations with the CIS/Eastern Partnership states, and interaction of governmental and non-governmental actors in foreign policy decision-making. Diana’s education includes a Master's degree in International Relations (with distinction) and a Bachelor's degree in Political Sciences (International Relations-European Studies, with distinction), both from Riga Stradins University. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 xiv The present dynamics between the EU and the Balkans serve as a prime example of politics getting in the way of progress: on both sides, those in power and responsible for delivering success still need to show real engagement with the process. On the EU’s side: At EU level:  The Commission and the Parliament should communicate better and work more closely with member states in the process of assessing progress and devising strategies for assisting and responding to the Balkan countries, such as by organising meetings with ministries of foreign affairs and national parliaments to discuss enlargement, as well as by coordinating better horizontally with other European institutions and bodies;  The Commission is arguably best placed for taking the initiative to launch a broad based consultation with member states and other relevant stakeholders in order to revamp the enlargement narrative and spell out in its annual enlargement strategy meaningful ways of reengagement with the Balkans on the basis of shared values and interests;  The Brussels’ executive should also find ways to present its progress reports in a manner that is measurable and thus more clearly comparable across time and countries, including by means of clear and concrete benchmarks to motivate individual countries and stimulate constructive competition among the Balkan aspirants;  The European Parliament – and more specifically, European party families with which political parties in the Balkans are affiliated – should help more their sister parties in the region to develop politically, including by rising above ideological lines to denounce party conduct whenever it strays from European democratic values and norms;  The EP should also encourage better cooperation with and among national parliaments inside the Union, and a more extensive exchange of best practices across the EU. At member state level:  Governments, parliaments, ministries and other specific interests within individual member states should coordinate better in order to strengthen their national position on the dossier and then rally support for it among counterparts across the EU;  The member states should complement their hard-line on conditionality with strong incentives (economic and political) that keep the benefits and perspective of accession tangible. EU capitals should commit more in every sense – financial assistance, investments or training – and across various areas – like the economy, education, transport and infrastructure, energy, the environment – to help the region improve its difficult socioeconomic outlook and catch up with the West;  The member states should choose their ‘battles’ carefully in order to preserve their diplomatic capital and political weight within the enlargement process, and they should always assess the long-term implications of their decisions so as to ensure that their interference with enlargement results in sustainable solutions and not just quick fixes to the region’s problems for the sake of stability. On the Balkans’ side:  The EU-hopeful countries in the Balkans should accept that enlargement is now defined by the logic of ‘strict and fair’ and by political ‘frontloading’, which means that the process is more complex, more rigorous and more unpredictable than before. Instead of fixating on the end result, the countries of the region should focus on reforms first and foremost for the sake of self-improvement;  The Balkan aspirants should acknowledge the concerns that individual member states bring forward that hinder their progress and should address these preoccupations bilaterally. They should also cultivate friendships with different EU capitals through direct and repeated interactions;  Regional cooperation among the Balkan countries should also be pursued to tackle common issues of concern to the member states but also as a means of assisting each other’s economic and political development. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 xv List of graphs 4.1 Opposition to further enlargement in Germany, France and Austria (2005-2013) 33 4.2 Number of new asylum applications from the Western Balkans to Germany (2008-2013) 38 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 xvi List of tables 10.1 Austrian direct investment in Western Balkan countries (2012) 99 10.2 Austrian imports and exports with Western Balkan countries (2012-2013) 100 10.3 Austrian public opinion concerning EU enlargement (2014) 101 11.1 Open-bilateral issues by neighbouring non-EU member states 105 12.1 Value of Hungarian FDI by country 118 13.1 The Greek political landscape 132 14.1 Support for fYROM’s EU entry in Bulgaria 147 14.2 Voting preferences in a potential referendum on EU membership in Bulgaria 149 14.3 Visits of Bulgarian citizens abroad (2014) 152 14.4 Imports to Bulgaria by main trade regions 153 14.5 Exports to Bulgaria by main trade regions 153 18.1 Official view on EU enlargement of Danish political parties represented in the Parliament (Folketing) 193 18.2 Danish military intervention in the Balkans 195 19.1 Latvia’s trade relations with the Balkan countries (2013) 209 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 xvii Abbreviations AfD AFET AII ANEL BAMF BiH BMZ BND BSP CDU CEB CEE CEFTA CEI CeSPI CFSP CGIL COELA COREPER COSAC COWEB CSDP CSOs CSU CVM DFID DIMAR EBRD EC ECB ECJ ECR ECSC EEA EEAS EEC EP EPolC EPP ESDP EU EULEX EUPAT EUPOL EUSAIR FDP fYROM FPŐ GAC GERB GUE/NGL HDZ HSS ICTY ICEC IMF Alternative for Germany European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Adriatic and Ionian Initiative Independent Greeks Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany) Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany) Bulgarian New Democracy Bulgarian Socialist Party Christian Democratic Union (Germany) Council of Europe Development Bank Central and Eastern Europe Central European Free Trade Agreement Central European Initiative Centre of International Political Studies (Italy) Common Foreign and Security Policy Italian General Confederation of Labour Working Group on Enlargement Permanent Representatives Committee Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union Working Party on the Western Balkans Region Common Security and Defence Policy Civil society organisations Christian Social Union (Germany) Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Department for International Development (United Kingdom) Democratic Left (Greece) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Community European Central Bank European Court of Justice European Conservatives and Reformists group European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Area European External Action Service European Economic Community European Parliament European Political Community European People’s Party European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Rule of Law Mission European Union Police Advisory Team European Union Police Mission EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region Free Democratic Party (Germany) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Freedom Party (Austria) General Affairs Council Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria European United Left/Nordic Green Left Croatian Democratic Union Croatian Peasants Party International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Committee for European Coordination International Monetary Fund Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 xviii IPA ISIS KFOR KKE LAOS JHA MFA MFAIC MoD MRF MVEP NATO NCFP ND NGOs NI OECD ŐVP PASOK PermRep PfP PSD RCC SAA SAP S&D SEA SECI SEECP SME SP SPD SPD SPŐ SYRIZA TAIEX TAP TEU UDMR UKIP UN UNMIK UNSC V4 VMRO (IMRO) Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Kosovo Force Greek Communist Party Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece) Justice and Home Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Italy) Ministry of Defence Movement for Rights and Freedoms Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Council of Foreign Policy (Greece) New Democracy (Greece) Non-governmental organisations Non-Inscrits Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Austrian People’s Party Panhellenic Socialist Party (Greece) Permanent Representation (to the European Union) Partnership for Peace Social Democratic Party (Romania) Regional Cooperation Council Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association Process Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Single European Act Southeast European Cooperative Initiative South-East European Cooperation Process Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Stability Pact Social Democratic Party (Croatia) Social Democratic Party (Germany) Social Democratic Party of Austria Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece) Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office Trans Adriatic Pipeline Treaty on European Union Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania United Kingdom Independence Party United Nations United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Security Council Visegrád Group Bulgarian National Movement Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 1 INTRODUCTION BY ROSA BALFOUR AND CORINA STRATULAT 1.1 Research design and methodology 2 1.2 Key findings of the individual case studies 4 Since Croatia became the 28th member state of the European Union (EU) on 1 July 2013, suspicions have increased that the EU was reluctant to further enlarge. In the crisis-ridden EU, the decade-long commitment expressed by the member states in Thessaloniki to the European perspective of the Balkan countries has given way to ambiguous positions on the future entry of the neighbouring region. Even if the accession track remains open to the remaining countries in the Balkans, the process is often derailed not just by outstanding challenges pertaining to the region, but also by hurdles which develop within the Union – more specifically within the member states. Compared to previous rounds of expansion, the European Commission has lost its position driving EU policy in this dossier to the member states. Increasingly, opinions motivating key political decisions are sought not from the Brussels executive but from national parliaments. The German Bundestag in particular has taken a key role in assessing progress made in the region itself, rather than relying on opinions of the Commission or European External Action Service. This has been the case with regard to both Serbia and Albania’s membership bids. While this can make the enlargement process more participatory and democratic, the downside is the risk of excessive interference with technocratic procedures and of frequent blockages. Other examples do not involve parliaments but vetoes imposed in EU Council meetings on decisions that reflect domestic politics in several member states, some in the neighbourhood of South East Europe (like Bulgaria or Romania), and others in the mainstream of EU politics (such as France or Germany). But does all this imply a ‘nationalisation’ of enlargement policy? The enlargement process has been traditionally characterised by a transformative force based on agreed standards and procedures, managed by technically assessable criteria and benchmarks, and politically driven by the overall commitment of the EU member states, manifested at key decisionmaking moments, and democratically backed and ratified by national parliaments. Yet, at present, it does not seem to be any longer ‘business as usual’. Some of the reasons for this apparent shift away from the classic model include uneasiness with the potential consequences of further EU widening given the particularities of the region (especially war legacies and state weakness) but also the ‘digestion’ problems caused by the 2004 and 2007 waves of accessions. The general economic and political malaise in the EU and the member states have then Chapter 1 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 2 conspired to sustain an enlargement-adverse context. Finally, bilateral disputes between individual member states and aspiring Balkan countries have led to well-known blockages, such as Slovenia and Croatia; Greece/Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM); Romania and Serbia; Cyprus and Turkey; and France and Turkey. Hindrances occurred in the past as well (for instance, Italy and Slovenia), but what is different at present is the frequency of these incursions and the opportunities that member states have to diverge in functional terms from the internal EU procedures for handling enlargement. The consequence of such developments is that the enlargement process is far more unpredictable and dependent on politics in EU member states than on progress in the region, according to the Brussels-based institutions. This can undermine the credibility of integration and the transformative leverage that the EU can have in the region, with potential negative spillover effects both for the Union and the Balkan countries. Against this background, it is quite clear that the way in which the EU capitals, their governments, parliaments, and political constituencies respond to enlargement has become an increasingly important variable in understanding decision-making in this field, which remains one of the most crucial dossiers of EU integration. Preoccupations related to freedom of movement of people, minorities, asylum seeking, sustainability of welfare systems, bilateral disputes, economic prospects, border definition, stability in the Balkans, fundamental freedoms, corruption, organised crime (all legitimate concerns for policymakers) very often influence the enlargement agenda, but in unpredictable ways and with uncertain outcomes, largely due to a lack of awareness of political developments within the 28 member states. Electoral trends and the emergence of new political parties, some of which are joining national parliaments for the first time, only add to the uncertainty of national policies on enlargement. 1.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY In light of this, the present study puts the spotlight on the member states. This is an under-researched perspective that can provide an innovative and useful contribution to the current literature and debate about EU enlargement on the basis of in-depth case studies conducted by experienced researchers in 17 member states. The sample of countries included in this volume mirrors existent distinctions between EU capitals as regards, for instance, their foreign policy positions and sensitivities, time of EU accession (old and new), geographical location (Western and Eastern; Northern and Southern), size (big(ger) and small(er)), degree of democratic consolidation (lessand well-established democracies), as well as the extent to which they have been affected by the crisis. It is also noteworthy that the project covers the six biggest EU members. Following a common methodology, the case studies investigate domestic political dynamics and the positions of key actors influencing EU enlargement, as well as identifying the kind of considerations and potential ‘roadblocks’ that shape national policies on this subject. This helps to understand the political context in which the EU brings forward its enlargement process, bridging the widening gap between Brussels and national capitals in terms of debates about political choices on enlargement and integration, and setting new grounds for rethinking and revitalising a policy which has been struggling to maintain its raison d’être. The case studies draw on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data and analytic techniques, with extensive and semi-structured interviews as the main source of empirical research. Quantitative data used by researchers – as deemed necessary in their respective chapters – come from polls and surveys (public and expert opinion polls at EU or national level) but also from statistics on issues like commercial and business activities, investments (notably foreign direct investments), cultural and Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 3 educational exchanges, immigration, visa applicants and asylum seekers, minorities, number of diplomatic, consular and cultural promotion posts, bilateral disputes, and electoral trends. Qualitative materials include official government/party documents, specific policies and declarations of party leaders and politicians in foreign and domestic media, and especially semi-structured interviews (about 20-30 per member state studied). A basic grid of questions was jointly agreed with the researchers as a guide to the interviews. However, as some countries required more in-depth analysis or closer attention to specific issues that are not shared by others (for example, minority issues), researchers were encouraged to tailor their interviews to the specificities of their country studied. Finally, each researcher’s experience and expertise, as well as secondary sources, like scholarly publications on the topic, helped to frame the chapter and interpret the data in each case. The policy fields scrutinised take account, beyond the enlargement process itself, of the free movement of people, security issues, justice and human rights, anti-corruption and organised crime, trade and economic exchanges, and so on. Moreover, the different actors interviewed cover:  government/executive actors, such as from the Prime Minister’s office, ministries (like that of foreign/European affairs, interior, welfare, economy/trade, agriculture and defence), ministries/governmental bodies dealing with minorities and/or diasporas, regional governments having direct relations with Balkans countries, or embassies of aspiring Balkan countries;  legislative/political parties of different ideological colours; members of the Parliament’s foreign affairs/European affairs committees;  representatives of civil society (for example, interest and/or lobby groups, think tanks, social movements, trade unions), and of the business community and media sector (journalists/foreign policy editors such as at a financial paper, a tabloid or regional paper). The desk and field work carried out by the project’s researchers in their respective case country explored a wide range of issues:  the position of the country on enlargement (in general and to the Balkans);  the position of specific ministries/institutions/actors on enlargement (in general and to the Balkans);  domestic views on the process of European integration more generally;  the formal mechanism in place in each country to formulate the national position on enlargement, including the main actors responsible for shaping that stance;  any differences between formal procedures and actual practice in the way a member state arrives at its position on the dossier;  instances of institutional cooperation within or across member states in order to advance a certain position on enlargement;  domestic perceptions on the influence that the European Commission and also other EU bodies and institutions, such as the European External Action Service and the European Parliament or the Rotating Presidency of the EU Council, have in the enlargement process;  the member state perceived as particularly influential (constructively/obstructively) on enlargement policy;  reasons why the country/ministry/institution/actor interviewed holds that position on enlargement;  any changes in the position of the country/ministry/institution/actor interviewed and why;  main arguments in favour and against EU enlargement (to the Balkans);  specific policy areas/issues that are important/bear on national positions on enlargement;  the aspiring Balkan country considered particularly important by a given country/institution; Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 4  the aspiring Balkan country considered particularly problematic by a given country/institution;  national views on the effectiveness of the EU’s enlargement strategy/conditionality towards the Balkans, in its current form, and – if applicable – any suggestions on how to improve the approach;  domestic assessments on whether EU enlargement policy has become ‘nationalised’. All case studies follow a largely similar structure, including a brief introduction to the country in question (in terms of its foreign policy, domestic political dynamics, legal/constitutional decisionmaking framework, national position on Europe, activism as member state in the EU and in the Balkans, and so on) and an analysis of the above-listed issues as they transpired from the interviews and research undertaken. The chapters’ conclusions then spell out the main findings, potential implications of what the research revealed, and policy recommendations relevant to the case study but also to EU enlargement policy towards the Balkans and (the countries of) the region. The order of presentation of the case studies is roughly based on a first group of the largest member states (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, and Spain), a second group of neighbouring countries to the Balkans (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania) and then a third group that brings together the remaining cases (Cyprus, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, and the Netherlands). 1.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE STUDIES It is difficult to do justice to the rich and informative analysis of each and every chapter of this volume but the condensed abstracts below are meant to give the readers a flavour of the main findings in each case and to map the wealth of member states’ positions and practices on enlargement. While there is sufficient variation across countries to call attention to the need for tailor-made approaches by the Balkan aspirants and the European Commission to address potential concerns or to build on existing sympathies in individual member states vis-à-vis enlargement, the common trends that emerge from the overall research suggest that there is also a certain degree of predictability in the EU capitals’ behaviour and thus scope for a European solution to the current labours of the enlargement process. The conclusions of the volume return to this idea. Germany recognises the strategic importance of enlargement to the Balkans, but its support for the dossier is conditional upon the fulfilment by the aspirant countries of strict criteria. Under the pressure of growing domestic political and public opposition to further EU widening, Berlin is actively seeking to use the leverage of the enlargement process to address early on both internal reforms and unresolved stabilisation issues in the region. Germany’s initiatives on Serbia-Kosovo and BosniaHerzegovina are illustrative in this regard. The ongoing crisis in Europe, the headaches caused by previous enlargement rounds, as well as the question of asylum seekers from the Balkans and migration within the EU feed Germany’s caution about potential new entrants. At the same time, new threats posed by Russia and ISIS in the region highlight the importance of the enlargement agenda in Berlin. While the Federal Government defines Germany’s strategic direction in the field of enlargement policy, since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Bundestag enjoys greater powers over the executive’s decisions at the EU level and is not shy of bringing them to bear on the integration process. Divergent interpretations and assessments by Berlin and Brussels on when a country should advance towards EU membership abound, as seen in the cases of Serbia and Albania. This side-lines the European Commission, but can strengthen Germany’s negotiation position in the Council as long as the Parliament and government are on the same page. Berlin’s tough line on conditionality is seen as a means to achieve substantial and sustainable transformation in the Balkans, and to convince the enlargement sceptics at ‘home’ that the integration process is being led responsibly and constructively. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 5 France is supportive of the enlargement process as a way to live up to the EU’s commitment made to the Balkan countries in 2003, to avoid the isolation of a region surrounded by member states, and to bolster the political construction of Europe. The eventual accession of the Balkans is seen as inevitable but not of strategic importance for Paris, and therefore France does not actively pursue enlargement. The positive French attitude towards the dossier is complemented by an emphasis on the rigorous application of the membership conditionality and by a referendum requirement on future accessions. The formulation of the French position on enlargement is largely executive-driven, with the Parliament as secondary player in the process. While Paris agrees with the Commission on the notion of ‘frontloading’, it also perceives the Brussels executive to be biased in favour of facilitating new EU entries. France tends to align itself on enlargement with the positions of Germany – its key European partner – but adopts a less vocal and more passive stance than Berlin. Furthermore, both France and Germany have a largely enlargement-sceptic population that views new member states as a threat to the welfare state, and the sour mood about further EU expansion has been spreading across the party political spectrum at Élysée. The United Kingdom is still keen to express rhetorical support for EU enlargement, but its overall attitude towards the dossier, and its ability to shape the Union’s policies in this area, have been dampened by an increasingly hostile immigration debate, coupled with rising Euroscepticism and growing support for the UK Independence Party. To be sure, all political parties in the country have become increasingly hard-line on the subject of immigration, so that the freedom of movement within the EU has been conflated with the arrival of people from outside the European Union. In addition, the question of whether the United Kingdom will leave the EU has arguably weakened the weight of its views on new members and its influence on the Balkan region. To the extent that there is a strong and specific British interest in the accession of the Balkans, it is narrowly focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the interrelated paths of Serbia and Kosovo. Beyond that, there are no underlying historical, cultural or economic factors driving Britain’s commitment to the European perspective of the Balkan region. Poland is part of the ‘Friends of Enlargement’ group, and a country where further expansion of the EU has been uncontroversial in both parliament and society, where support for this process is among the highest in Europe. This sentiment is also reflected in the government’s approach, with an emphasis placed on conditionality and the technical nature of the process, with every effort made to streamline procedures and reduce bureaucratic hurdles. Therefore, not only does Poland not question the Commission’s control over benchmarks but it often supports an even softer approach than the one presented by the Brussels executive. With this position, Poland finds itself in opposition to member states like Germany and the Netherlands, which advocate the upgrading of conditions. The Balkans have traditionally not been a focus for Poland, which has been more interested in Eastern Europe. Although security has long been on the Polish agenda and the country has contributed extensively to stabilisation missions in the Balkans, these actions were not followed by development aid, nor by visits of high-ranking Polish officials to the region. However, recent years have seen increased cooperation at both the expert and working levels. The motivation behind this has been the opportunities for Poland to play a more active role in shaping both the EU’s energy agenda and its policy towards its neighbours, while simultaneously reinforcing social solidarity, stability and democratic values. Italy conceives the European integration of the Balkans as very much beneficial to its vital interests as an ‘Adriatic power’, most notably in terms of geo-economic projection and regional (and domestic) security. Italy considers Serbia and Albania as the most important countries for its national agenda, particularly for economic, commercial and energy reasons, and is strongly concerned about the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Italian government plays the leading role in defining the country’s position on the dossier. Rome welcomes the Commission’s insistence on the consolidation Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 12 In historical terms, it is instructive to compare the expansion of the European Union with that of the United States of America. In the 19th century, Americans argued that “our manifest destiny [is] to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent that Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us” 1 . By contrast, Europeans, including those who have promoted a ‘United States of Europe’, have rarely considered the enlargement of the EU as a ‘manifest destiny’. In fact, the widening of the EU has often been perceived as antithetical to its deepening. While EU membership has always been open to ‘any European state’ – and the European institutions have never defined the geographical limits of the term ‘European’ – the EU has not expressed a continental vocation. In a report on enlargement to the European Council in 1992, the Commission argued that “the Community has never been a closed club, and cannot now refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental responsibilities and contribute to the development of a political and economic order for the whole of Europe” 2 . Significantly, this ambitious language was not taken over by the EU’s leaders, who, in their conclusions, simply noted that “the principle of a Union open to European States that aspire to full participation and who fulfil the conditions for membership is a fundamental element of the European construction” 3 . In reality, the main driver for enlargement has been, and remains to be, pressure from neighbouring countries that wish to join, not expansionist ambition on the Union’s part. During the Cold War, when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were separated politically and economically from Western Europe, some far-sighted individuals in the West believed that, one day, these countries would join the process of European integration. During the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Robert Schuman declared: “We must make Europe not only in the interests of the free countries but also, to be able to welcome the peoples of the East who, freed from the subjection that they have suffered until now, will ask to join us and request our moral support” 4 . However, as long as the Cold War lasted, the possibility of extending European integration was effectively limited to Western Europe. Indeed, one can argue that enlargement did not emerge as a ‘policy’ of the EU until the 1990s. At this time, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe expressed a wish to join and the EU first defined its accession criteria and a pre-accession policy. It was not until 1998 that the European Commission first created a Directorate General for Enlargement, an activity that, before then, was handled by temporary Task Forces. Although it was in the 1990s that the EU first defined a pre-accession policy, it is salutary to recall that the idea of a pre-accession period was not new. In its Opinion on the application of Greece, the Commission proposed a period of preparation before the opening of accession negotiations in order to ensure that Greece was ready for membership. However, this idea was summarily rejected by the member states in 1982 as a technocratic error of judgment, which would be perceived by Greece as a political refusal. The unsatisfactory experience of Greece within the EU – with its unresolved problems of governance, as well as its current economic and financial travails – suggest that the Commission’s proposal was justified. Moreover, in view of the positions that are usually taken by Britain and France on matters of enlargement, it is ironic to recall that the proposal concerning Greece came from a British Commissioner (Christopher Soames) and its rejection was led by a French president (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing). 1 O'Sullivan, John L., New York Morning News, 27 December 1845. 2 European Commission, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, Report to the European Council, 24 June 1992, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 3/92, p. 9. 3 Conclusions of the European Council, Lisbon 26-27 June 1992, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 6/92, p. 10. 4 Quoted in Avery, Graham (2000), Robert Schuman on Hungary and Europe, Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 51, Number 198, p. 12. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 13 At Copenhagen in 1993, the accession criteria was agreed. For the first time, the requirements of EU membership – political, economic and administrative – were laid down. Furthermore, the political criteria – democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities – embodied a series of basic values that were to be considered as inherent in the EU. However, the Copenhagen criteria were not altruistic in nature. They were designed to protect the EU and its members from the risk of disruption, arising from the accession of countries where political and economic stability was uncertain and the capacity to take on EU rules was untested. In 1993, the situation confronting the EU was unprecedented. Never before had it faced the prospect of the accession of so many countries, separated from it by a greater economic and political gap than it had previously experienced. It is not surprising that the promise of membership was accompanied by prudent conditions. Although the conditions that were defined at Copenhagen were not unreasonable or unattainable, they were of a high order of generality. From the outset, it was evident that, in some respects, they were not actually fulfilled by existing member states. This naturally led to criticism of the EU for practising double standards. It may have sometimes seemed that perfection was demanded of applicant countries but, in practice, this was not the case. The criteria were not applied in such a way as to make enlargement impossible and all of the countries for that the Copenhagen criteria were designed for obtained accession in due course. The EU’s aim in the accession process was not to obtain perfect new members but to ensure satisfactory enlargement. 2.2 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE POLICY An important question that receives insufficient attention in the analysis of enlargement policy is the criteria for evaluating its success or failure. What exactly is a satisfactory enlargement? Inadequate evaluation is a common feature of EU policies. This is not only due to lack of clarity of political accountability (who is ultimately responsible for the conduct of EU policies – the EU institutions or the member states?) but also, from a lack of agreement on the objectives of policies and the criteria for their assessment. In the case of the enlargement policy, both these factors are present. While the member states have all of the competence for decisions on enlargement (the process is almost entirely intergovernmental), the European Commission has an influential role in developing and managing the policy. As for criteria, it would evidently be naive to judge the success of enlargement by the number of countries that join or the speed of their accession. Not only must an evaluation of the policy cover the period preceding enlargement but also, the period after accession. After all, what matters is the result of the accession, not the accession itself. The correct method of evaluation of the policy is therefore two-fold, with a set of criteria for the period before enlargement and another set for the period after accession. For the pre-accession period, the criteria are similar to those that are applied to foreign policy in general. An enlargement policy may be considered successful if it enhances security, stability and prosperity for both the EU and the neighbouring countries that are concerned. For the post-accession period, an enlargement may be considered successful if it leads to the harmonious integration of new members without disrupting the existing members, allows the EU’s institutions and policies to function correctly, and the EU to develop satisfactorily in the long-term. None of these criteria is simple to apply and the post-accession criteria are exceptionally difficult to formulate. There is little or no consensus among EU theorists, or among practitioners, on the ‘correct’ functioning of the institutions, the policies and the ‘satisfactory’ long-term development of the EU. The Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 14 fact that member states have such different views on these matters helps to explain why they have divergent views on the desirability of enlargement itself. It is often supposed that supporters of expansion want to impede integration and weaken the EU. Meanwhile, opponents of enlargement want to promote integration and protect the ‘acquis’. These caricatures show how and why attitudes to the enlargement policy can differ so widely. The distinction between the two groups of criteria – before and after accession – shows why the common assertion that ‘enlargement is the EU’s most successful foreign policy’ is misleading. For the EU, enlargement is only ‘foreign policy’ until the moment of accession. After that, it ceases to be foreign policy. By adjusting to membership, enlargement modifies the EU’s basic constituents and shapes its future identity. 2.3 EVALUATING THE 2004/2007 ENLARGEMENT The 2004/2007 rounds of enlargement, which brought in 12 new members in 2004 and 2007, were the most important expansions ever in terms of the number of new member states. However, in relative terms (population and economic product), the increase in the EU’s size was less important than with the first enlargement of 1973. Judged by the criteria that are defined above, there is no doubt that the Union’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was a considerable success. In the pre-accession period, it assisted the peaceful transition of the CEE countries to democracy and a mixed economy. The post-accession experience with the new member states has been largely positive for the EU. They integrated rapidly into the system, the institutions have functioned as well (or as badly) as they did when there were 15 members and the EU’s policies have continued to develop. Expansion did not result in the paralysis of the decision-making system. Although the new partners have proved difficult on some issues, they have not been more obstreperous than the old members. It was not the new members who killed the Constitutional Treaty and delayed the Lisbon Treaty. Instead, it was the old members (France, the Netherlands and Ireland), where the referendums said ‘no’. Although dissatisfaction with the EU’s enlargement is sometimes cited as a reason for the results of those referendums, opinion surveys at the time showed that it was certainly not the main cause. The forecast, which was common in the 1990s, that the accession of the Central and East European countries would encourage the EU’s trend towards ‘differentiated integration’ or ‘variable geometry’ has not proved correct. The majority of the new members have joined Schengen, many have joined the euro and most of the remaining members plan to do so when the Eurozone’s current problems are resolved. Nevertheless, the last round of enlargement was, in some respects, a failure. The accession of Cyprus without the hoped-for reconciliation between its Greek and Turkish communities was a disappointment. It brought a divided island into the EU, which complicates both the internal functioning of the Union and its external relations, particularly with Turkey. The accession of countries with poor governance in the fields of justice, rule of law and public administration has led to problems for the countries concerned, as well as the EU as a whole. This was not only the case for Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession was arguably premature, but also, for other new members. The risks were perceived before accession but it was hoped that standards of governance would continue to improve as a result of the accession. Furthermore, the risks were underestimated because of the skill with which some applicant countries presented inadequate preparation in a favourable light (‘Potemkin’ reforms). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 15 However, experience has shown that, as soon as an applicant country becomes a member, the ‘leverage’ of membership disappears. In fact, the loss of leverage begins when a target date is set for accession and an accession treaty is signed. Conditionality disappears after accession because the Copenhagen criteria are not applied to existing members. The ‘post-accession monitoring’, which was introduced for Bulgaria and Romania, has had a limited effect. Furthermore, in general, the EU’s capacity to sanction members if they deviate from the basic principles of the Treaty is inadequate, as the case of Hungary currently shows. 2.4 LESSONS OF THE 2004/2007 ENLARGEMENT It is natural that the lessons of the 2004/2007 enlargement have affected the EU’s attitude to future enlargement, including the accession of countries of the Western Balkans. One lesson of the 2004 enlargement was the disappointment surrounding the accession of Cyprus as a divided island. Although this has not resulted in an explicit reformulation of enlargement policy – after all, the Copenhagen criteria do not deal with the status of national borders – it has made the EU more conscious of the potential problems of the accession of new members with unresolved frontier disputes, not least in the Western Balkans, where some frontiers are still contested. The case of Kosovo and Serbia is the most obvious example and EU commentators are apt to remark that they do not want another Cyprus. Another important lesson was the failure to ensure adequate standards of governance in several new members. In 2006, the EU’s ‘Renewed Consensus’ introduced strict conditionality at all stages of the accession negotiations. Moreover, in 2012, it adopted a ‘New Approach’, under which the chapters of the negotiations concerning fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security were treated as a priority. By ‘slicing’ the negotiations into a series of small steps, the EU multiplies the occasions when it can reward progress or sanction non-progress. This makes conditionality more effective. In the past, the main ‘carrot’ in the process was the opening and closing of accession negotiations, with inadequate attention being paid to the progress of applicant countries during the negotiations. By ‘frontloading’, the EU puts more focus on the negotiations concerning the underlying problems of governance that were neglected in the past. This offers a better chance of ensuring satisfactory enlargement. It is not surprising that the countries of the Western Balkans feel that they are subjected to stricter rules than preceding applicants. The new approach is the result of the EU’s failure in the past to handle the conditionality of membership as effectively as it should. However, the EU cannot be accused of differential treatment in respect of current applicants, for it has taken the same approach to Turkey and even to Iceland. Iceland is the smallest and richest country ever to apply for EU membership and is, arguably, the best-prepared applicant in terms of membership criteria. It was noticeable that the EU’s approach to Iceland in 2009-13 was quite different from that which it took for other EFTA countries in 1993-95. At that time, the EU did not evaluate the applications of Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway on the basis of the criteria that it had adopted at Copenhagen in June 1993. It was understood that those criteria were designed for countries of Central and Eastern Europe with uncertain democratic status, low levels of economic development and poor standards of administration. They were not for EFTA countries that had none of these problems. However, when Iceland applied for membership in 2009, the EU strictly applied the Copenhagen criteria and preaccession procedures. This was not because of any substantial problems that were presented by Iceland but rather, to avoid unequal treatment and the risk of weakening conditionality for the Western Balkans and Turkey. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 16 Today, it is clear that the EU applies the enlargement policy to applicant countries in a different and stricter way than it did in the past. Furthermore, the development of the policy from a historical perspective is not only explicable but also, justified in terms of the criteria by which the policy should be evaluated. 2.5 ‘RENATIONALISATION’ OF THE ENLARGEMENT POLICY As for the potential ‘renationalisation’ of the enlargement policy – the argument that, in recent years, the enlargement dossier has become more and more under the control of the member states, with a reduction in the influence of the Commission and an increase in the influence of domestic political considerations – there is plenty of evidence to support this development. The assertion by the German Bundestag of greater control over its government’s positions on enlargement; the change in the French constitution, which obliges the government to hold a referendum on enlargement, unless it can obtain a large majority in the Assemblée Nationale; the wave of hostility to immigration from new member states, which has made British politicians cautious about future enlargement, are just a few examples in this regard. However, it is an exaggeration to interpret this development as renationalisation. The enlargement policy was always under the strict control of member states. The EU’s internal procedures for handling it, which have been practically unchanged since they were formulated for the accession negotiations in 1969-72, are almost entirely intergovernmental in character. It is the member state that holds the six-monthly rotating Presidency (not the Commission) that presents the EU’s positions to the applicant countries. All of the decisions on enlargement are taken in the Council by unanimity and all of the important decisions on it are made by the heads of government in the European Council. The European Parliament only has a role at the end of negotiations – when it is asked to decide on a yes/no basis. The Treaty of Accession is only signed by the member states. The EU institutions are spectators, not signatories, and it is the national parliaments that have the last word on enlargement during the process of Treaty ratification. Since the process has never been denationalised, it is hardly correct to describe the recent developments as a renationalisation. What they do represent is a markedly increased caution on the part of member states in their approach to enlargement. This is due to a number of factors, of which the most important is the difficult economic situation that the EU and its member states have experienced since the financial crisis of 2008. In economically uncertain times, decisions on key questions, such as enlargement, have always been problematic for the EU. Moreover, the economic situation today is complicated by the problems of the governance of the Eurozone. Another factor is the wish to avoid repetition of the problem of the 2004/2007 enlargement, when some countries that joined were not well prepared. This has led to the formulation of a more prudent and demanding approach to accession negotiations. To what extent migration from new member states is a factor in the hesitation of the EU’s political leaders to pursue enlargement is less clear. Although migration resulting from the 2004/2007 enlargement has had an impact on public opinion in some countries, there is, in practice, a much less risk of large-scale migration from countries of the Western Balkans when they join the EU. Not only are their populations relatively small but also, measures can be included in future accession treaties to avoid problems resulting from migration. The wish of member states to control the process presents risks, as well as advantages. A major risk is the blockage of the enlargement process because of linkage with bilateral issues between member states and applicant countries, or with unrelated issues in domestic politics. Neither of these problems is new as they have occurred in the past, but clearly there is a risk that they may become more frequent Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 17 in future. On the positive side, increased involvement of member states in the process implies the assumption of increased responsibility of national politicians. Furthermore, at a time when decisions by the EU institutions are often questioned, this involvement should enhance the legitimacy of the enlargement policy. 2.6 WHAT PROSPECTS ARE THERE FOR THE WESTERN BALKANS? In conclusion, what can be said of the prospects for the countries of the Western Balkans to be included in the enlargement of the EU? Here, it is not necessary to dwell on the difficulties that these countries face such as problems of poor governance, corruption and criminality; a historical syndrome of dependency on external actors; a legacy of ethnic, social and religious conflicts; and unresolved problems of frontiers and statehood. Objectively, it is more difficult for the countries of the Western Balkans to reach EU standards than it was for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their path to EU membership is arduous and is taking a much longer time than they initially hoped. When taking up his post as president of the Commission in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker declared that he expected no new accessions during his fiveyear mandate. This forecast is realistic. Nevertheless, there are a number of positive factors that allow one to be optimistic that, in the longterm, the countries of the Western Balkans will succeed in joining the EU. The first important consideration is that two countries of the Western Balkans have already joined – Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013. While Croatia, the most recent arrival, still faces many challenges, its accession took place in a harmonious manner. It has not disrupted other EU members or the institutions and policies, neither has it presented problems for the EU in terms of ‘absorption capacity’. One factor that helped to make Croatia’s accession unproblematic was that it acceded singly, not as part of a group, as was the case for the countries that acceded in 2004/2007 and indeed for all previous new members, with the exception of Greece. If other countries of the region accede singly, as is logical if they progress at different speeds in fulfilling the membership criteria, this will facilitate matters. Another basic consideration is that the Western Balkans are not the same as Turkey. ‘Enlargement’ tends to be an undifferentiated concept for European public opinion and the distinctions between the applicant countries are not well understood. However, there is a fundamental variance that politicians are – or should be – well aware of. From the EU’s point of view, the question of Turkey’s accession is seen in an entirely different light from that of the Western Balkan countries. With a current population of 78 million, which is expected to grow to 90 million or more in future, Turkey is the biggest country ever to apply for EU membership. As a member of the EU, it would be bigger than any of the others. In terms of the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, it presents a serious problem. This is not the case for the Western Balkans, where Serbia has a population of seven million and other countries are smaller. As we have seen, the EU member states now wish to control the enlargement process more closely. Does this mean that their leaders are less committed to the promise that they made at Thessaloniki in 2003 – that the Western Balkan countries will join the EU when they satisfy the conditions. Although the member states’ approach to enlargement today is cautious, the political commitment remains valid. Much has been written about the phenomenon of ‘rhetorical entrapment’, whereby the political promise of membership made by the member states at Copenhagen in 1993 – a promise based on geopolitical considerations and the EU’s collective identity in terms of values and norms – overrode their subsequent hesitations and doubts about the consequences of admitting the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. For the EU, the enlargement process of the Western Balkan has different, but Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 18 important, geopolitical implications and, in terms of values, it relates to a constitutive element – the concept of European integration as a peace process for the reconciliation of people after war. In this context, the progress towards the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is a significant example of the success of the enlargement process. Although the EU’s accession criteria are demanding in nature and are applied strictly by the member states, we may reasonably expect that the EU will honour its commitments. As such, all of the countries that were promised membership at Thessaloniki in 2003 will join the EU when they meet the conditions. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 19 MASTERS OR SERVANTS? MEMBER STATES IN THE EU ENLARGEMNT PROCESS BY CHRISTOPHE HILLION 3.1 Introduction 19 3.2 Enlargement as an inter-state procedure 19 3.3 Enlargement as an EU policy 21 3.4 The nationalisation of EU enlargement policy 24 3.5 The constitutional nature of EU enlargement 27 3.6 Conclusion 28 3.1 INTRODUCTION The EU member states have always played a dominant role in the enlargement of the Union but the degree of their involvement has varied over the years. Initially, the Community founders opted for a state-centred procedure to admit new members, inspired by the canons of international institutional law (section 3.2). With time, however, enlargement became a fully-fledged EU policy, governed by its own substantive and institutional rules aimed at preparing the applicant’s accession, and predominantly crafted by the institutions of the Union (section 3.3). In the face of the perceived unpopularity and weaknesses of the enlargement process, member states have recently sought to regain and enhance their influence over its conduct (section 3.4). While this trend makes it plain that national positions remain decisive in enlarging the Union, one cannot ignore the evolving EU constitutional framework in which enlargement is to be carried out (3.5). This framework determines the way in which member states’ powers may be exercised. 3.2 ENLARGEMENT AS AN INTER-STATE PROCEDURE The 1951 Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), vested the competence to open the latter to other contracting parties with the Coal and Steel Community itself, rather than with the member states. The enlargement process was conceived as essentially technical, with no parliamentary supervision, whether at European or member states’ level. The Treaty establishing the stillborn European Political Community (EPolC) went further in filling the accession Chapter 3 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 20 mechanism with supranational elements, and did not envisage any role for member states as such. Instead, enlargement was a quasi-federal matter, in the hands of the EPolC institutions. 5 The accession provisions of the two subsequent 1957 Rome Treaties were different in that the member states were given a more prominent role. 6 While the ECSC and the EPolC treaties envisaged an enlargement based on an executive arrangement defined by the Council, the EEC and EAEC treaties foresaw that the terms of admission were to be negotiated and ratified by the member states and the applicant country. Also, the Rome treaties disposed of the European parliamentary control foreseen by the EPolC Treaty. The process of accession to the European Communities was thus imbued with state-centrism, with member states acting as gatekeepers of the Community treaties. While the Rome procedure was henceforth used as the standard enlargement mechanism, the process leading to the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK demonstrated that the EEC Treaty provided a basic procedure which member states could implement and elaborate almost as they pleased. Two incidents exemplify this. First, the earliest endeavour to enlarge the Communities to Great Britain was vetoed twice by France, clearly demonstrating that the procedure could easily be held up by one single member state. The event also epitomised that enlargement could be blocked for reasons that had more to do with the domestic interests of a member state than with the applicant’s failure to fulfil the basic Treaty requirements. 7 The declaration made by the Council of Ministers that discussed the second British application typifies these points when noting that “one member state considered the re-establishment of the British economy must be completed before Great Britain’s request [for admission] can be considered” (emphasis added). 8 A state could thus invoke an unwritten argument (in casu the economic situation of one of the candidates) to prevent an application from being “considered”, regardless of the fact that the Commission had already provided its opinions, recommending the opening of accession negotiations with the country in question. 9 Secondly, the Council’s abovementioned statement suggests that member states could articulate the Treaty-based procedure by invoking additional substantive conditions to which accession would be subject. The 1969 Hague Summit confirms this. Having “reaffirmed their agreement on the principle of the enlargement of the Community, as provided by Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome”, the heads of state or government of the member states pointed out that: In so far as the applicant States accept the Treaties and their political finality, the decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties and the options made in the sphere of development, the Heads of State or Government have indicated their agreement to the opening of negotiations between the Community on the one hand and the applicant States on the other. They agreed that the essential preparatory work could be undertaken as soon as practically and conveniently possible; by common consent, the preparations would take place in a most positive spirit. 10 (emphasis added) 5 Further: Hillion, Christophe (2011), “EU enlargement” in Craig, Paul and de Búrca, Grainne (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 187. 6 See Article 237 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and Article 205 of the Treaty establishing European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). 7 Tatham, Allan (2009), Enlargement of the European Union, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, pp. 7 et seq. 8 See Puissochet, Jean-Pierre (1974), L’Elargissement des Communautés Européennes, Paris: Editions Techniques et Economiques, p. 16. 9 Avis de la Commision au Conseil concernant les demandes d’adhésion du Royaume Uni, de l’Irlande, du Danemark et de la Norvège; COM(1967) 750; Bull. EC Supp. 11-1967. 10 Final Communiqué of the Hague Summit, 2 December 1969. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 21 The foregoing suggests that the drafters of the 1957 treaties of Rome crafted a classic state-centred accession procedure inspired by the canons of international institutional law. 11 The reference in the above quote to the “Heads of State or Government” without referring to member states typifies such state-centrism. This basic approach endures in its essentials as illustrated by today’s Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU): Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in their respective constitutional requirements. In particular, both the start and finalisation of the enlargement procedure primarily depend on a unanimous approval by the member states, while the terms of accession to the Union as enshrined in the Accession treaty are in principle negotiated between them and the candidate, rather than determined by the EU itself. 3.3 ENLARGEMENT AS AN EU POLICY While Article 49 TEU makes it clear that the Union’s enlargement requires common action by states, its first paragraph nevertheless foresees a significant involvement of the EU political institutions: the Council, the European Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament all have a role to play, under the supervision of the European Court of Justice. The successive amendments of the enlargement provisions in the EC and subsequently EU Treaties, shows that the involvement of the common institutions has steadily increased, tempering the initial predominant position of the member states. 12 Moreover, they have entrenched the hybrid nature of the EU enlargement process. Hence, since the Single European Act, admission of new states to the Union no longer depends solely on the member states’ will, but equally requires the consent of the European Parliament. 13 In addition to the required Commission’s opinion, which has always featured in the procedure, enlargement cannot take place without the approval of the other EU supranational institution. 11 In this respect: Schermers, Henry G & Blokker, Niels (2003) International Institutional Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 70. 12 Note that the enlargement procedure of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty did not envision any role for the member states as such. Article 98 ECSC stipulated that: “Any European State may apply to accede to this Treaty. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the High Authority; the Council shall also determine the terms of accession, likewise acting unanimously. Accession shall take effect on the day when the instrument of accession is received by the Government acting as depository of this Treaty.” 13 Article 8 SEA, which foresaw that the European Parliament was to act by an absolute majority of its component members. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 28 own particular characteristics — to the implementation of the process of integration that is the raison d’être of the EU itself. (…) the Member States are obliged, by reason, inter alia, of the principle of sincere cooperation set out in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, to ensure, in their respective territories, the application of and respect for EU law. In addition, pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU, the Member States are to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the EU… To be sure, the procedure fulfils a particular function in the system of the EU treaties, notably in relation to the general integration objective. Embedded in the EU legal order, the enlargement mechanism entails a discipline and a loyalty of the different actors involved therein, namely the member states as well as the EU institutions. 3.6 CONCLUSION Hopefully, this report has demonstrated that member states continue to play a predominant role in the enlargement process. It has been suggested that, of late, this role has taken various forms, from a stricter application of the original state-centric elements of the procedure, to a politicisation of the Commission’ approach towards and role in the enlargement policy. Aside from the consequences the abovementioned paradigmatic shift may have for the effectiveness and credibility of the EU enlargement policy, notably in relation to the Western Balkans, its compatibility with the canons of the EU legal order, which underpins the enlargement procedure, may be questioned. While this development calls for a thorough and critical examination of the member states positions on the enlargement, this must be done while keeping in mind the normative constraints derived from the EU constitutional order in which the enlargement process is embedded. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 29 GERMANY BY CORNELIUS ADEBAHR AND THERESIA TŐGLHOFER 4.1 Introduction 29 4.2 Germany as firm supporter and harsh critic of EU enlargement policy 31 4.3 Maximising the leverage of enlargement conditionality 34 4.4 Bringing the people in: an enhanced role for the German Bundestag 36 4.5 Asylum seekers from the Western Balkans: numbers on the rise 37 4.6 Conclusion and recommendations 39 4.1 INTRODUCTION Germany’s enlargement policy towards the Balkans is shaped by a number of factors, not least by its current position within the broader European Union (EU) framework. Most obviously, the country’s role as the critical power – for better or worse – in overcoming the financial crisis also influences the weight of its views on enlargement. This holds true both for EU members aligning with the Federal Government on specific issues and for the Balkan countries seeking support from Berlin, with the latter drawing on a long history of German economic and political involvement in their region. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has not only changed EU policymaking but, indirectly, also the legal and political landscape in Germany. The verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court has given the federal parliament – the German Bundestag – unparalleled powers over the executive’s decisions at the EU level. 52 This concerns in particular the opening and closing of accession negotiations and treaty amendments, giving the legislative – and even political groups – new sway over and, consequently, interest in the actual conduct of negotiations. This has exposed a process that, in the past, was dominated by administrative procedures based on foreign policy considerations, but now is influenced by domestic issues at a time when, with a view to past enlargements as well as the continuing effects of the economic crisis, German citizens are no longer reflexively positive about European affairs. Furthermore, the subtle shift of competence from the Foreign Office to the Federal Chancellery – a consequence of the ‘summitisation’ of European economic and financial crisis management since 2009 – can also be felt in other areas of EU and foreign policy, including enlargement policy. 52 In its judgement of 30 June 2009, the Federal Court came to the conclusion that “the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures.” It consequently reached the decision that “[t]he Federal Republic of Germany’s instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force.” Federal Constitutional Court, Press office, Press release no. 72/2009, 30 June 2009. Chapter 4 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 30 Germany is connected to the region by close and multiple ties. At the same time, given Germany’s sheer political, economic and demographic weight among the EU member states, relations with the Balkans are in most areas characterised by pronounced asymmetry. More than 1.4 million people originating from the Balkans’ aspirant countries and the new member state Croatia currently live in Germany. 53 Migrants from Serbia and Croatia constitute significant groups of non-EU foreigners or Germans of foreign origin 54 . Germany also figures among the top six trade partners and biggest foreign investors in the countries of the region. In addition, with a high number of projects in different fields, such as tourism or trade, as well as with German political and corporate foundations having a strong presence in the region, Germany is the biggest donor of biand multilateral development aid for the Balkans among the EU member states. 55 The German army has reduced its military engagement by withdrawing from the mission EU Force Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2012, but remains next to the United States the largest contributor of troops to NATO’s Kosovo Force – which also constitutes the Bundeswehr’s second biggest mission abroad after Afghanistan. Thus, in many regards, Germany continues to be present in and committed to the region. As the financial and sovereign debt crisis, the ensuing problems within the European Union, as well as other international hot spots have strained resources and political attention, the Balkans and the EU’s enlargement policy have been pushed down the list of priorities in recent years. Nevertheless, the region has kept its significance for Germany’s EU and foreign policy, especially in view of pending stabilisation issues. As stressed by her party colleagues, Chancellor Merkel “absolutely has the region on the radar.” 56 This is demonstrated by frequent diplomatic and parliamentary visits 57 , as well as by the fact that Germany’s enlargement and foreign policy engagement towards the region is not solely left to the Foreign Office, with the Chancellery closely following the most important dossiers. The first conference on the Western Balkans, which gathered the region’s prime ministers, foreign ministers and ministers of the economy in Berlin in August 2014, as well as the British-German initiative on Bosnia and Herzegovina launched in early November can be understood as the latest expressions of Germany’s aspiration to actively shape the EU’s relations with the region. Berlin has thus become an attractive destination for official visitors from the region, soliciting German support for their EU bid. 58 Not always strictly in line with diplomatic protocol, Members of the 53 Numbers include persons with former or current citizenship of one of the Western Balkan countries (including Croatia), with the latter group comprising more than 800,000 persons; Statistisches Bundesamt. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund. Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2012, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2, Wiesbaden, 2013. 54 Statistisches Bundesamt. Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Ausländische Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, Wiesbaden, 2013. 55 According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany provided around 340 million euros of biand multilateral official development aid to the six (potential) EU candidate countries of the Balkans in 2012, with the share of multilateral aid (around 190 million euros) being slightly larger than the share of bilateral aid (around 150 million euros); “Germany’s bi and multilateral net-ODA classified by countries”, BMZ, 2008-2012, available at: http://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/zahlen_fakten/leistungen/bi_netto_oda_2008_2012/index.html (last access on: 3 October 2014. 56 Interview with representative of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 29 August 2014. 57 Chancellor Merkel visited Serbia and Kosovo in August and December 2011 respectively, and participated in the BrdoBrjiuni summit with the region’s heads of state in July 2014. During his 2009-2013 mandate, Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle travelled to different countries of the region on a yearly basis, with Serbia and Kosovo as main destinations; his successor Frank-Walter Steinmeier paid his first official visit to the region in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the heavy flooding in May 2014 – another visit to Sarajevo together with UK Foreign Minister Hammond followed in January 2015. Furthermore, members of Parliament from all political parties represented in the German Bundestag undertake frequent visits to the countries of the region. 58 A representative of the Bundestag described Germany’s role with regard to candidate countries as follows: “The weight is enormous and thus also our influence and our responsibility.” Interview with representative of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 29 August 2014. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 31 Bundestag or high-ranking officials speak to their counterparts, but equally important, enjoy access to aspiring countries’ ministers as well as heads of state and government. However, Berlin has built a reputation of not only being a supporter of Balkan enlargement but also the one drawing the red lines for EU aspirants. It is through the application of strict accession conditionality that Germany aims to encourage domestic reforms and to facilitate a solution to bilateral conflicts in the region. Insisting on tough conditionality also takes account of the scepticism and indifference towards enlargement widespread among the German electorate – as well as in the political class. Explaining enlargement policy domestically has become even more significant since the German Bundestag received extended information and participation rights after the Constitutional Court’s verdict on the Lisbon Treaty, thus gaining an important say in European affairs and in particular the area of enlargement. Finally, the Balkans’ closer association with the EU has immediate repercussions on other domestic policy areas, with the high numbers of asylum seekers from the region as a result of visa liberalisation being a case in point. It is this weight and principled support for the Balkans’ integration perspective, combined with a high dose of scepticism, which makes Germany both a “desired and dreaded partner” 59 for the accession hopefuls of the region. 4.2 GERMANY AS FIRM SUPPORTER & HARSH CRITIC OF EU ENLARGEMNT POLICY Over the past years, Germany has profiled itself as both a firm supporter and a harsh critic of EU enlargement to the Balkans. The position promoted by the German government and parliament can thus be summarised as ‘yes, but'. Germany recognises the strategic importance of bringing the Balkans into the EU’s fold as a means to transform and stabilise the region. Chancellor Merkel, foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, his predecessor Guido Westerwelle, as well as other government officials, have on many occasions underlined the significance of the accession perspective for all the Balkan countries. This commitment has been reconfirmed by the Berlin conference on the Western Balkans convened in August 2014, which mainly focused on regional cooperation and economic development, and where the Federal Government expressed its readiness to help inject new momentum in the EU integration of the Balkans’ accession hopefuls. In contrast to the contested Turkish enlargement dossier, there is widespread consensus among all four parliamentary groups represented in the German Bundestag that the future of the Balkans lies within the EU. 60 Irrespective of the government coalition in place, Germany’s enlargement policy has been marked by a high degree of continuity over time. The latest change in the German government after parliamentary elections in October 2013, where the junior partner of the ruling Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), was replaced by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as coalition partner, so far has not provoked any significant changes in Germany’s position towards the Western Balkans. 59 Interview with representative of the Federal Ministry for Economy Affairs and Energy, 18 September 2014. 60 Namely, the Christian Democratic Union and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Left Party (Die Linke), and Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary groups. A divergent and openly more sceptical position is taken by the newcomer in the German party landscape, Alternative for Germany (“Alternative für Deutschland“ or AfD), which insists that a national referendum on the accession of any new member state should be held. While AfD has not passed the 5% hurdle to enter the federal parliament in the 2013 elections, it is meanwhile represented in the State Parliaments of Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia and received 7% of the votes in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 32 The conviction that the accession perspective is key to creating long-term stability in the region is firmly rooted in the opinion of German decision makers, and has become the most frequently cited reason for supporting EU’s widening towards the Balkans. Across the board, there is a shared perception that any new conflict situation would have clear repercussions on Germany, and therefore, neglecting these states would in the long-run be more cost-intensive than engaging with them under the current Stabilisation and Association Process. In addition, the potential for democratic transformation and economic development via European integration, complete the list of reasons invoked by German officials to argue in favour of EU enlargement to the Balkans. However, the expression of support for the Balkans’ European perspective is immediately followed by references to the accession conditionality. A ‘strict but fair conditionality’, coupled with the determination to prevent any aspiring country from cutting corners, have become the mantra of German enlargement policy, invoked constantly by public representatives across institutional and party cleavages. Yet the German government rejects the label of ‘enlargement sceptic’, arguing that it insists on strict conditionality precisely because enlargement matters. 61 In this line of argumentation, taking in countries that do not fulfill the necessary criteria with regard to domestic reforms and good neighbourly relations would benefit neither the European Union nor the potential entrants themselves. As a representative of the Federal Chancellery put it, Germany “wants to live the acquis communautaire”, with the willingness and capacity to respect the rule of law, good neighbourly relations as well as a certain degree of economic maturity being considered as essential ingredients. The risk that reforms falter or slow down after a country joins, as demonstrated by the experience with the rule of law in Romania and Bulgaria and the continuing division of Cyprus, explains to a large extent why Germany wishes to make sure that the “rules of the game” are in place and respected already prior to accession 62 . Moreover, there is an important domestic dimension to Germany’s insistence on a rigorous application of conditions. A strict conditionality is seen as “the only reasonable way” 63 to make the case for enlargement to the Balkans in front of an ever-more skeptical public. In particular in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, the already large camp of enlargement opponents has expanded. With around 70% of Germans declaring themselves against taking in new members, Germany – together with France and Austria – ranks among the countries with the most hostile public views on enlargement (see Graph 4.1). This critical stance was clearly displayed by media in the run-up to Croatia’s accession, when the headlines of both national newspapers and tabloids ranged from seemingly factual statements (“the EU has not learnt its lesson”) to not-so-subtle inquiries (“who continues to admit losers to the EU?”), to outright suggestive questions (will Croatia be “a new grave of billions” for German tax payers?) 64 . 61 See for instance “Klare EU-Perspektive für Balkanstaaten”, Federal Chancellery, Video podcast Die Kanzlerin direkt, 7 June 2014; Speech by Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 30 June 2014. 62 Interview with representative of the Federal Foreign Office, 12 March 2014. 63 Interview with representative of the Federal Foreign Office, 1 July 2014. 64 “Die EU lernt nicht dazu“, Die Welt, 3 April 2013, available on: http://www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/debatte/article114952528/Die-EU-lernt-nicht-dazu.html (last accessed on: 2 January 2015); “Wer lässt immer neue Versager in die EU?“, Focus, 24 April 2013, available at: http://www.focus.de/finanzen/doenchkolumne/kroatiens-eu-beitritt-wer-laesst-immer-neue-versager-in-dieeu_aid_968967.html (last accessed on: 3 October 2014); “Kroatien wird das nächste Milliarden-Grab“, Bild, 23 May 2013, available at: http://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/europaeische-union/kroatien-naechstes-milliarden-grab-30506248.bild.html (last accessed on: 3 October 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 33 The growing opposition to enlargement is not limited to the electorate, but is also discernable among policymakers. While there is cross-party consensus on the importance of enlargement to the Balkans, as well as on the need for strict conditionality, a pro-enlargement attitude can no longer be taken for granted. Even decision makers involved in foreign and EU affairs, who were once broadly supportive of the dossier, have now embraced more nuanced positions as a result of disappointments with the performance of member states and aspirants. Their party colleagues from more domestically-oriented policy fields, in contrast, are sceptical to indifferent towards enlargement policy. Graph 4.1: Opposition to “further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years” in Germany, France and Austria (2005-2013) 65 This growing scepticism has its roots in two phenomena. First, the crisis within the EU, which has contributed to the perception that the EU might be “overstretched and overloaded”, and should therefore focus on its internal consolidation before accepting new members. Second, the headaches caused by previous enlargement rounds or specific member states, which in the eyes of German policymakers have revealed a marked difference between “the ambition to join the European Union and the capacity to do so”. 66 From a German standpoint, the accession conditionality is thus not only a means to ensure that the integration goes hand in hand with the transformation of the aspiring countries. It is also necessary in order to overcome reservations towards potential newcomers within the domestic context, as well as among other EU member states. Last but not least, the stricter conditioning of the enlargement process fits with a more general trend in the context of the economic crisis, whereby compliance with specific criteria is not only demanded from EU-hopeful countries but also from member states. Chancellor Merkel has thus underlined on 65 Standard Eurobarometer 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, and 80. 66 Speech by the President of the German Bundestag Norbert Lammert (CDU/CSU) at the event “EU10x10 – Europaserweiterter Horizont”, Berlin, 3 June 2014; As revealed in interviews conducted with representatives of the federal government and the German Bundestag, the lessons learned from previous enlargements encompass different areas of accession preparations: Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Hungary and Croatia are frequently cited examples of the necessity to insist on the implementation of rule of law-related criteria. The need to focus on economic criteria was underlined in relation to Croatia’s accession, while Cyprus as well as Croatia were quoted as examples that showed that the resolution of bilateral disputes should take place before accession. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Percent of population Germany France Austria Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 34 various occasions that respect for values and principles enshrined in the treaties is “something we need to stress again and again, also for EU member states.” 67 4.3 MAXIMISING THE LEVERAGE OF ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY When it comes to decision making on enlargement policy, the Federal Foreign Office via its department on EU enlargement is formally in the lead, giving directions to the Permanent Representation in Brussels after consulting with all relevant ministries and, most importantly, according its position with the Federal Chancellery, which keeps a close eye on the process and is actively involved in key dossiers. Berlin’s approach towards EU enlargement reflects the ambition to maximise the leverage of the association process by insisting on conditionality at various stages of the accession preparations. Germany has supported the “slicing” of the association process into a sequence of small units in order to create incentives that allow to “exercise pressure time and again”. 68 Policymakers have been anxious not to give away rewards such as candidate status or the opening of accession negotiations for a too low a price. Instead, they aim to increase the leverage generated through the promise of membership by asking aspiring countries to deliver on reforms, both at the domestic level and with regard to good neighbourly relations. Consequently, Germany remains opposed to any ‘automatism’ that would reward a (potential) candidate country that has not fulfilled required reforms, for example by determining fixed dates for accession or the opening of accession talks. Berlin is also firmly supportive of “political frontloading” 69 , which – based on the experience that domestic reforms and the resolution of bilateral conflicts need time – entails dealing with thorny issues from the early stages of the integration process. It thus aims to avoid a scenario wherein the pressure in the final phases of the accession negotiations is already too high to address remaining deficits. 70 While fully endorsing the key principle of “strict but fair conditionality” stipulated in the EU’s enlargement strategy, Germany has in fact defended a stricter application of conditionality than the one proposed by the European Commission, and has repeatedly disagreed with the Commission’s assessments and ensuing recommendations. This was the case for the Commission’s recommendation to declare Serbia an official candidate state, which Germany declined in December 2011 on the grounds that more progress was needed in improving relations with Kosovo. Likewise, Germany did not immediately follow the 2012 avis of the Brussels executive to grant candidate status to Albania, but asked first to see results from the new government in Tirana on the defined key priorities. Such sidelining of the Commission is given a twofold justification. First, the Treaties offer the member states the final say in the negotiation process and have encouraged them to become more assertive, also during the pre-accession phase, which was traditionally led by the Commission. Second, government representatives as well as parliamentarians have little trust in the assessments of the Brussels executive. The Commission’s reports, as well as the Commission’s approach more generally, 67 “Klare EU-Perspektive für Balkanstaaten”, Federal Chancellery, Video podcast Die Kanzlerin direkt, 7 June 2014; also see Declaration of Chancellor Merkel on the European Council of 13/14 December 2012 in front of the German Bundestag in Berlin, 13 December 2012, available at: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2012/12/118-1-bkregerkl-bt.html (last accessed on: 3 October 2014). 68 Interview with representative of the Federal Chancellery, 22 July 2014. 69 Interview with representative of the Federal Foreign Office, 1 July 2014. 70 As one interlocutor formulated on the lesson learnt from the accession process with Cyprus; “If the resolution of problems is postponed to the last minute, there might be no solution at all.” Interview with representative of the Federal Chancellery, 22 July 2014. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 35 are considered too technical and dependent on a “transformation automatism” 71 which in practice does not seem to transpire. Moreover, the Commission’s reviews are criticised for often painting too rosy a picture of reform progress in aspiring countries, which does not adequately reflect the reality on the ground. German policymakers, including members of the Bundestag, thus increasingly rely on their own evaluations. This tendency is also mirrored by the two respective Bundestag resolutions on opening accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia, both of which stipulate that “progress on the path towards accession should not only be assessed by the European Commission, but also on a regular basis by the Federal Government by relying on its diplomatic representations.” 72 Germany’s approach to increase the leverage of the EU association process has become particularly visible since 2011 in its policy towards Serbia, when Berlin took the lead in placing the ‘normalisation’ of relations with Kosovo at the centre of the conditionality for Belgrade. At the press conference following her August 2011 meeting with the then President Boris Tadić in Belgrade, Chancellor Merkel – in a rather tense atmosphere between the two interlocutors – spelled out the demand that parallel structures in the North of Kosovo needed to be removed, and underlined that Berlin saw the successful continuation of Belgrade-Pristina talks as a precondition for giving its green light to the Council decision on Serbia’s candidate status. 73 This “Merkel moment” 74 was crucial in explicitly linking the accession process to Serbia-Kosovo relations, the two being on two separate tracks hitherto. Germany was subsequently instrumental in defining the contents of EU’s conditionality with regard to the “normalisation of relations” between Serbia and Kosovo 75 . Its firm position was backed by the UK and the Netherlands against the (initial) resistance of other member states. Striving to keep up the pressure on Serbia, Germany pushed the granting of candidate status and, with the help of a Bundestag resolution 76 , the opening of accession negotiations with Belgrade back for several months. Germany’s handwriting can also be seen in Serbia’s framework for accession negotiations, which contains the British and German demand that Belgrade and Pristina should conclude a legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia’s accession talks. 77 On the issue of Serbia-Kosovo relations, Germany has thus used the leverage of the accession process as a foreign policy instrument to advance the resolution of bilateral disputes. While the Serbia-Kosovo dossier has been at the centre of Germany’s foreign policy engagement in the Balkans over the past years, Berlin has been much more hesitant in its attempts to push the gridlocked accession processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) forward. The recent British-German initiative towards overcoming the Bosnian EU integration stalemate is a turning point in 71 Interview with representative of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 18 September 2014. 72 “Fortschritte auf dem Weg zum Beitritt sollen nicht nur von der EU-Kommission, sondern regelmäßig auch von der Bundesregierung unter Einbeziehung ihrer diplomatischen Vertretungen bewertet werden.” Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP. Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag der Republik Montenegro zur Europäischen Union […]. Resolution 17/7768, 22 November 2011, II, §7; Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP. Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag der Republik Serbien zur Europäischen Union […]. Resolution 17/14108, 25 June 2013, II, §12. 73 Press statements of Chancellor Merkel and the President of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadić, Federal Chancellery, 23 August 2011, available at: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2011/08/2011-08-23-pkmerkel-tadic.html (last accessed on: 4 October 2014). 74 Interview with representative of the European Commission, 13 March 2014. 75 Germany’s demands voiced at Chancellor Merkel’s press conference in August 2011 are mirrored in the 2011 enlargement strategy which for the first time spells out what a successful dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina implies and that EULEX should be able to operate freely in the entire territory of Kosovo. 76 Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP. Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag der Republik Serbien zur Europäischen Union […]. Resolution 17/14108, 25 June 2013, II, §12. 77 General EU position, Ministerial meeting opening the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of Serbia to the European Union (Brussels, 21 January 2014), CONF RS 1/14, Brussels, 9 January 2014, §23. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 36 this regard, announcing Berlin’s willingness to take on a stronger leadership role in the Bosnian dossier. Endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2014 78 , the new approach essentially entails a shift from a focus on the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci ruling towards a broader set of conditions, in particular economic and good governance reforms and an effective EU coordination mechanism. Germany’s renewed engagement towards Bosnia might also be interpreted in the wider picture of Berlin’s aspirations to assume greater responsibility in matters of foreign and security policy around the globe and especially in Europe. This is what high-ranking politicians have announced in early 2014, from Federal President Joachim Gauck to Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to defence minister Ursula von der Leyen 79 . However, the government does not aim to engage in all conflicts everywhere but rather chooses the cases where it believes it can have an impact. In the Greek-fYROM name dispute, for example, Germany feels that in light of its continuing conflict with Greece over economic and fiscal policies, it is not exactly best placed to push Athens on enlargement issues as well. Careful attempts from Chancellor Merkel to mediate informally between the two sides’ positions, however, did not bear fruit. While the ambition to address stability risks in the region in the frame of the EU’s enlargement policy is thus discernible, Germany has shown a pragmatic approach by focusing on areas/situations where it could use its weight in the resolution of dilemmas. 4.4 BRINGING THE PEOPLE IN: AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG While the Federal Government defines Germany’s strategic direction in the field of enlargement policy, the German Bundestag has seen its right to information on and participation in EU affairs considerably widened since 2009. With the far-reaching amendments to the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union (Federal Act on EU Cooperation) accompanying the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Bundestag obtained the right to be regularly informed by the Federal Government and deliver an opinion on legislative acts and other projects of the European Union. 80 Regarding the opening of accession negotiations with aspiring countries, the Federal Government is to reach an agreement with the Bundestag before the final decision is taken in the Council or in the European Council. 81 While the government is required to take into account the interests expressed in the Bundestag’s opinion, it has the right to “take divergent decisions for good reasons of foreign or integration policy.” 82 The 2009 amendments to the Law have enabled the Bundestag to participate in decision-making on enlargement policy not only for the ratification of an accession treaty, but already in earlier stages of the association process. In line with their new rights and responsibilities, parties have also stepped up their monitoring of the accession process, with parliamentarians of all four parliamentary groups frequently visiting the region to obtain first-hand information from the EU-hopeful countries of the 78 Foreign Affairs Council, Conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 December 2014. 79 Speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck, "Germany’s role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances", 50th Munich Security Conference, 31 January 2014, available at: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2014/140131-Munich-SecurityConference.html, (last accessed on: 2 January 2015). 80 Act on Cooperation between the federal government and the German Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union, Section 8. The right to give an opinion also comprises different states of a country’s association. By referring to this regulation, the Bundestag has for instance delivered an opinion on the granting of candidate status to Albania. 81 Similarly, the Bundestag has to give its consent to all other treaty amendments, including the introduction of the euro in a member state (Ibid., Section 9-9a.). 82 Ibid., Section 9, §4. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 37 region. For each (potential) candidate, the parliamentary groups have appointed one rapporteur from their ranks in the respective Committees on Foreign and on European Affairs. Apart from fact-finding and networking, the regular visits to the region made by members of the German Parliament also serve to convey political messages on behalf of their parliamentary groups. An eminent example in this regard was the visit to Serbia in September 2012 of members of the CDU/CSU Group. In an event organised by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, they publicly announced seven conditions that Serbia needed to fulfil in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo before their party could acquiesce in the Bundestag to the opening of accession negotiations with Belgrade. Interpreted as new conditions imposed by “Germany” – despite assertions from CDU/CSU representatives that they had only reiterated well-known demands – this appearance led to confusion in the Serbian public about the scope of requirements coming from Berlin. Moreover, the Bundestag has used its right to deliver its opinion on the opening of accession negotiations with Montenegro in November 2011 and Serbia in June 2013. Both occasions were a demonstration of the prevailing enlargement fatigue and scepticism towards aspiring countries’ willingness and capacity to meet the conditions for membership. Originally intended as a mechanism to better inform and involve the public, CDU/CSU internal consultations on a resolution for Montenegro revealed that there was first and foremost “not a need to convince the population, but to convince the own party” 83 . Only after postponing their intra-party vote in the Bundestag for one week, CDU/CSU representatives in charge of EU and foreign affairs were able to persuade a majority of their party colleagues to give their consent to the opening of accession talks with Montenegro. It can thus be presumed that the CDU/CSU’s subsequent tough stance on Serbia’s accession bid was not only addressed to a Serbian audience, but also aimed at reassuring the own party that conditionality was taken seriously. Concrete repercussions of the Bundestag’s involvement in the decision process could be observed in the case of Serbia. While the Conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2013 stated that accession negotiations with Serbia will be opened in January 2014 at the very latest 84 , the Bundestag opinion passed three days earlier stipulated that negotiations could be launched in January 2014 at the earliest – and only if a series of conditions with regard to Kosovo-Serbia relations would be met prior to that 85 . Even though the overlap between those two positions – an opening of accession negotiations in January 2014 – was also the actual outcome, EU colleagues felt obliged to remind the German representatives in the Council that “they did not find themselves in the German Bundestag, but in the Council of Ministers.” Still, as far as the German government is concerned, the support of the Bundestag is perceived more as a benefit than a burden. While the mandate from the Bundestag limits the government’s room of maneuver and compromise, it ultimately strengthens Germany’s negotiation position in the Council as long as the Parliament and government broadly want the same thing. 4.5 ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS: NUMBERS ON THE RISE Since the introduction of the visa-free regimes, Germany has been the top destination for asylum seekers from the Balkans within the European Union. As shown in Graph 4.2, the number of asylum seekers has steeply risen since 2009/2010. The increase of cash benefits for asylum seekers ordered 83 Interview with representative of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, 29 August 2014. 84 European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 104/2/13, 28 June 2013, § 19. 85 Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP. Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag der Republik Serbien zur Europäischen Union […]. Resolution 17/14108, 25 June 2013, II, §1. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 44 sovereignty and the commitment to Europe as a peace project and a counterweight to the transatlantic relationship. The European Union is a clear foreign policy priority for France, with a focus, however, on the internal dimension of European integration rather than on the EU’s external activities. There is a strong desire to preserve the core of European integration – first and foremost the eurozone and the Schengen area – and an understanding that the future of the Union implies a trade-off between widening and deepening. Despite a hardening of its stance, the French approach towards the Balkans is one of principled support. France is in favour of a policy of ‘controlled’ enlargement that stresses the full preparedness of new member states and thus ensures the ongoing functioning of the EU’s institutions. The French position on enlargement is formulated largely by the executive, with the Parliament relegated to a secondary role. Germany is France’s major partner in the European arena, with both countries converging in their emphasis on conditionality and a rigorous compliance of aspiring countries with the membership requirements. Media coverage of the Balkans in France is sparse and to a large extent focused on the negative dimensions of enlargement, reflecting a public opinion that is becoming increasingly hostile to further accessions. On the whole, given the limited objective impact that the Balkans’ EU membership would have on France, the dossier remains comparatively marginal to the country’s engagement at the European level. 5.2 FOR A ‘CONTROLLED’ ENLARGEMENT The interviews conducted by the author confirmed that French support for the accession of the Balkan countries was firm but largely passive. Following significant involvement of France during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it was French President Jacques Chirac who called for an EUBalkans summit in May 2000 in order to develop “a more determined strategy” towards the region. 95 The result was the Zagreb Summit in December of the same year, a meeting which for the first time offered a membership perspective to all Balkan countries. During the years of post-2000 stabilisation, France’s interest in the region dwindled. 96 The eventual accession of the Balkans region is seen as inevitable but is not pursued in an active manner by the French diplomacy. Instead, the emphasis lies on a ‘controlled’ enlargement and rigorous evaluation of aspirants’ preparedness for membership. Not least because of the widespread perception among diplomats and government officials that the accession of Bulgaria and Romania reinforced France’s stance and contributed to the country calling for a thorough case-by-case evaluation of each step of the Balkans’ accession process. 5.2.1 The Balkans’ accession as an inevitability France’s official position is that of a clear commitment to the membership perspective of the Balkan region, in line with the promises made at the Zagreb and Thessaloniki Summits. The main argument in favour of Balkans EU membership advanced by French officials is thus one of principle: an accession perspective was given to these countries in 2000 and 2003, and subsequent administrations need to live up to the engagements their predecessors assumed. Moreover, the region’s geographic position on the fringes of the EU and surrounded by member states makes its full inclusion into the Union seem unavoidable in the longer term in order to avoid creating a ‘black hole’ inside the EU. While both are valid arguments, it is telling that they come before any deeper strategic consideration of the benefits and pitfalls of further EU enlargement. 95 “Chirac Seeks EU Summit With Balkan States”, New York Times, 30 May 2000, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/31/news/31iht-chirac.2.t.html (last accessed on: 12 December 2014). 96 “L’effacement de la France dans les Balkans”, DGAP Analyse, November 2010. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 45 A key concern in France’s position towards further EU enlargements is the urge to preserve the Union’s achievements and to maintain European integration as a political project. A political conception of enlargement policy predominates, with any new accessions seen as a means to strengthen the political construction of Europe. At the same time, there is an underlying nostalgia for a ‘small Europe’ as France senses a threat of losing control over decision making in Brussels. The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 was met with great scepticism in the population, with the elite sharing the impression that the expansion from 15 to 25 members reduced France’s influence at the EU level. What is more, the European division over the Iraq war in 2003 had confirmed that the new Central and Eastern European member states were politically close to the United States, while enjoying economic ties with Germany – France’s reference point in the EU when it comes to assessing its own power. Given the position of France as one of the major players on the European scene, Balkan leaders frequently travel to Paris to seek support for their country’s membership bid. In May 2014, both Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbia’s President Tomislav Nikolić had official meetings at the Elysée to discuss the membership prospect of their respective countries. Favourable declarations were made during both visits and were widely reported on by Balkan media. The French press, in contrast, barely took notice of these encounters, confirming the lack of interest for the region among the broader public in France. The latest public expression of France’s support to the Balkans’ integration perspective consisted of an informal summit in July 2013 gathering the heads of state and government from the region in Brdo at the initiative of the Slovenian and Croatian presidents. French President François Hollande, invited to join by his regional counterparts, used the occasion to reaffirm to the Balkan countries that France was “by their side” when it came to entering the EU, underlining at the same time that such a step required substantial reforms to take place prior to accession. 97 This combination of rhetorical support and insistence on the fulfilment of conditionality is characteristic of the French position. There is no interest in speeding up the accession process nor any recognition of a strategic importance of the Balkans region for France. On the contrary, over the past decade, the country has tightened its stance on enlargement, introducing a number of obstacles to future accessions. 5.2.2 Higher obstacles: constitutional change and emphasis on rigueur The most obvious sign of French wariness of further enlargements is the introduction of a referendum requirement for all accessions following the EU entry of Croatia. Initially, this ‘referendum bolt’ was inserted into the French Constitution in March 2005 in the hope of preventing the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, threatened among others by a highly emotional debate about the Turkish EU membership application. Despite original plans to abolish it, the requirement was maintained in a mid2008 constitutional revision, which adds, however, the possibility to circumvent a referendum should both chambers of the parliament authorise the ratification of an accession treaty by a three-fifths majority. In practice, it is unlikely this threshold would be reached even for the Balkan countries, giving the French electorate a de facto ability to block any future accessions even once all membership conditions have been met. More than the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, the key reference point for the hardening of the French position is the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. The ongoing problems of both countries in 97 “Hollande participe à un sommet inédit des pays des Balkans”, Le Point, 25 July 2013, available at: http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/hollande-participe-a-un-sommet-inedit-des-pays-des-balkans-25-07-20131708324_24.php (last accessed on: 26 September 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 46 the fields of justice and home affairs are seen as symptomatic of an accession which, in the final stages, was driven by political calculations rather than by objective assessments of the candidates’ readiness. The desire of both countries to enter the Schengen area crystallised French fears, with the harsh attempts to repress Roma settlements and the ensuing criticism of the European Commission dominating the headlines recurrently. Partly as a result of this polemic, support among political parties for further enlargement is declining: not only the far-right Front National calls for an end to enlargement but the centre-right UMP, several points in front of the governing Socialist Party in the opinion polls for the 2017 presidential elections, similarly opposes future accessions, even beyond the much-debated case of Turkey. 98 It is in this context of dwindling domestic backing for enlargement that France has embraced a more subtle form of raising the bar for future membership hopefuls that consists of a strong support for the Commission’s ‘new approach’ to negotiations, described as ‘frontloading’. This approach sees the more demanding negotiation Chapters 23 and 24 dealing with the judiciary, fundamental rights, justice, freedom, and security be opened first and closed last, with progress in these chapters conditioning the pace of the overall negotiations. The new approach is widely viewed as a crucial measure to preserve the credibility of the enlargement process and to prevent a further rise of Europhobia among the population that may turn not only against enlargement but against the EU itself. It is complemented by a policy of small steps and a case-by-case assessment rather than a regional approach to the Balkans. 5.2.3 The way ahead: a policy of small steps and case-by-case assessment Despite a hardening of its stance, there is no widespread sentiment in France that the EU’s enlargement policy is in need of a major overhaul. Instead, the feeling is that full respect for existing conditions and a strict and objective evaluation of compliance will be sufficient to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the accession process. Yet while France generally shares the Commission’s assessments of Balkan countries’ progress, there is an impression that the evaluations of the Brussels executive are shaped by a ‘positive tropism’ and that while the objective of the Directorate General for Enlargement is to facilitate further accessions, France’s aim is to ensure, in the words of a highranking French diplomat, “well-done enlargement, which is not quite the same”. Unlike the de facto regional approach adopted towards the countries of the 2004 enlargement round, France insists on a case-by-case evaluation of the Balkan aspirants’ progress, expressing no desire for a grouped accession. This strict evaluation concerns not only the final approval for membership but each of the intermediate steps on the way leading up to accession, with France rejecting any regular automatism in terms of advancement towards EU entry. For instance, Paris was very sceptical regarding the preparedness of Albania for obtaining the candidate status given the ongoing political divide in the country. Together with Germany and the United Kingdom, France delayed this step for several months until after the Commission had given its initial positive recommendation. There is an understanding among officials that the accession process does and should take time in order to allow countries to enter fully prepared and also to avoid their populations undergoing dramatic reforms over a short period of time. Moreover, it is not seen as useful to accelerate the process as capacity needs to be built to fulfil the conditions. France is one of the main providers of technical support to the region, both through twinning projects and bilateral support, for instance in the fields of agriculture and the administrative set-up of structures in charge of negotiations and coordination of EU affairs once the country has become a member. 98 “Pour la France, agir en Europe”, UMP, 25 April 2014, available at: http://www.u-m-p.org/actualites/editos/pour-la-france-agir-en-europe-106722504 (last accessed on: 25 September 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 47 5.3 AN EXECUTIVE-DOMINATED PROCESS As is the case for French policymaking more generally, the formulation of the country’s stance on EU enlargement is a largely executive-driven process. It is characterised by a fairly straightforward interministerial concertation conducted through the Secrétariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE). Despite a rather active EU Committee in the National Assembly, the current institutional set-up leaves little room for legislative or third-sector actors to feed into the process. Cooperation with other European partners concentrates on Germany, whose position France generally aligns itself with. 5.3.1 An efficient mechanism of concerted action The formal procedure of policy formulation for issues related to European affairs foresees a prominent role for the SGAE – a government agency attached directly to the Prime Minister’s office that is in charge of facilitating the exchange of views between different ministries and arbitrating the official position adopted by the French administration. It works closely with France’s Permanent Representation in Brussels, which defends the country’s positions from technical working groups through the COREPER right up to intergovernmental conferences. This process of concerted action consists of physical meetings or digital exchanges that precede every enlargement-related reunion in Brussels, ranging all the way from working group consultations on specific technical issues up to intergovernmental conferences that decide on major steps in the accession process. It is relatively informal and functions on the ‘principle of silence’, whereby a call for input is distributed widely among ministries and other executive bodies and those desiring to contribute to the issue in question can react, while the approval of the remaining bodies is taken for granted. More than a place for fundamental debate, the SGAE’s meetings are an opportunity for different ministries to feed information into the decision-making process. The Foreign Office, thanks to its privileged access to information through its network of diplomatic representations on the ground, is recognised as the main shaper of the deliberations, with the Ministries of Economics, the Interior and Justice contributing important sectoral views. The Ministry of Interior is more reserved on enlargement questions, insisting on the sustainability of reforms and a focus on areas that serve as anchors for further change, such as training, human resources, and the fight against corruption, which are part of Chapters 23 and 24. Nonetheless, occasional differences of views during the SGAE meetings tend to concern the weighting of issues rather than any substantial divergences over the basic position to be adopted. Where major discord does persist, an inter-ministerial meeting can be called by the Prime Minister, who has the final call on issues of disagreement. On the whole, the SGAE thus allows for an efficient coordination of the French executive position and ensures that this position is defended consistently across ministries and across levels of government. At the same time, the process is very much conducted on a day-to-day basis, with little ambition to develop a strategic vision for the integration of the Balkan region. Moreover, it leaves little room for input from legislative or third-sector actors. 5.3.2 Parliament as a secondary player France’s policy on enlargement is clearly dominated by executive actors, who see little need to involve the legislative into their decision making. Despite representatives of the Foreign Office regularly appearing before the National Assembly’s EU Committee, these occasions are perceived by both sides more as a one-sided provision of information rather than a lieu for equal-level exchange. Nonetheless, Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 48 the Committee follows the developments in the region closely and seeks to feed its largely favourable assessments into the process of policy formulation. The EU Committee convenes whenever a Balkan country is set to complete a further step in the accession process and distributes its resolutely positive positions widely among both national and EU institutions. Moreover, despite its limited influence on positions adopted by the Executive, the EU Affairs Committee sees a role for itself in practicing ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ and thereby influencing the situation directly on the ground. Besides its EU Committee, the National Assembly has friendship groups for each Balkan country, which are mirrored in the Senate by a regional France-Western Balkans friendship group. These groups serve as the basis for inter-parliamentary cooperation and regularly deliberate current events in the region. Nonetheless, they have a weak policy role, contributing at best to the respective chamber’s EU Committee, and thus serve more as a forum of exchange for interested MPs whose main substantial work takes place in sectoral committees. 5.3.3 Germany as a key partner Germany is without a doubt France’s key partner when it comes to allies among the EU member states. Not only is there a continued attachment in France to the joint ‘French-German motor of integration’, but the two countries also agree on their more substantial appreciations of the enlargement process. Both countries have a largely enlargement-sceptical population that views the entry of new member states as a threat to the welfare state and a risk of drifting towards an EU that is little more than a free trade zone. 99 As a result, both Paris and Berlin have complemented their generally pro-accession attitude with a strong emphasis on conditionality and the rigorous evaluation of the aspiring countries’ full compliance with membership requirements. What differs is the degree of engagement of the two countries with enlargement questions. While Germany is becoming increasingly vocal on enlargement and is one of the key players when it comes to shaping the EU’s policy towards the Balkans, France adopts a more passive stance, generally aligning itself with German positions and defending these with somewhat less vehemence. One important instance of disagreement between the French-German tandem emerged, however, concerning the question of the opening of negotiations with Serbia. Paris enjoys close historical ties with Belgrade ever since the First World War and has, if without much enthusiasm, supported the country’s membership bid on a regular basis. Whereas Berlin adopted a very hard position towards Belgrade over what it felt was insufficient progress in the ongoing dialogue with Pristina, Paris was reluctant to establish such a close connection between Serbian accession negotiations and its relations with Kosovo. Given ongoing German opposition, France became more deeply involved, and eventually succeeded in seeing the June 2013 European Council endorse the European Commission’s recommendations to open accession negotiations with Serbia, a step that was eventually taken in January 2014. Interestingly, the looming issue of Belgrade-Pristina relations and their impact on Serbia’s European path was also one of the rare occasions where the National Assembly played a more visible role: a joint French-German parliamentary visit to Belgrade on 10 and 11 April 2013 revealed the difference in appreciation between Paris and Berlin, with the French report on the mission pointing out that it is 99 Lequesne, Christophe (2008), “Français et Allemands face à l’Europe élargie: peur de l’infinitude et nécessité de surmonter les angoisses”, in Koopmann, Martin and Martens, Stephan (ed.) (2008), L’Europe Prochaine: regards francoallemands sur l’avenir de l’Europe, Paris, L'Harmattan, Collection “Logiques politiques”, pp. 133-143. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 49 “not always easy to harmonise our points of view” and that despite a close coordination of positions, the German side presented a different stance “at least in tone” from the one adopted by the French parliamentarians participating in the delegation. 100 Eventually, consensus was reached to speak out in favour of opening accession talks with Serbia and to call for the ‘normalisation’ of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, with the term implying that there is no dissociation of the two processes, but also no explicit requirement for a full recognition of Kosovo by Serbia prior to accession. From the French perspective, it is this joint parliamentary mission that paved the way for the Brussels Agreement reached on 19 April, where the term ‘normalisation’ features prominently. 5.4 THE BALKANS AS A ‘NON-ISSUE’ The Balkans are largely a ‘non-issue’ in France, with little strategic effort invested in pursuing a coherent policy towards the region. Media coverage is low and the French public can be called disinterested at best, if not openly hostile. The scarce attention France grants to the region is explained by the limited objective importance of the Balkans to France, be it in terms of economic relations or the possible migratory impact of accession. Stabilisation as one of the key justifications for the integration of the Balkans is largely viewed as a ‘mission accomplished’, leaving the Balkans very low on France’s priority list. 5.4.1 Balkans under the radar External observers tend to agree that the Balkan region is not a strategic priority for France. Even inside the institutions, it is not unusual to hear that the region has “no strategic role” and is of “no vital interest” to France. The country has diplomatic representations in each of Balkan states; however, diplomatic postings to the region are not held in high regard. Moreover, France’s cultural presence is being reduced as its interest in the region dwindles. In 2013, the then French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in a letter to President François Hollande justified the decision to close the three French cultural centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the need to give up “diplomatic antennas in countries where our interests are non-existent”. 101 One of the reasons for this absence of interest is the small size of the Yugoslav diaspora in France. Estimated at a mere 250,000, with Serbs forming the largest group at 120,000 102 , these expatriates cannot build up the same political pressure as the larger communities in other member states. Beyond public conferences held on the occasion of formal visits by Balkan policymakers, the level of attention given to the region is limited, be it in academic or policy circles. Balkan specialists in think tanks typically cover a broader region, such as Eastern Europe or the EU’s neighbourhood, or act as experts for other think tanks as well. The lack of salience of the enlargement dossier is also reflected in the allocation of human resources. Following the economic crisis, several ministries cut down the number of contractual staff, leaving less people in charge of broader areas. The Balkans is one of the regions particularly affected by these measures, with the Ministry of Defence, for instance, going from three full-time analysts in charge of the Balkans a decade ago to only a single person on a part-time contract today. More anecdotally, as of September 2014, the latest update on the website of the French Permanent Representation 100 Assemblée Nationale, Secrétariat de la Commission des affaires européennes, Communication sur les Balkans et sur la mission franco-allemande à Belgrade Mme la Présidente Danielle Auroi et de Mm. Christophe Caresche et Michel Herbillon, 5 June 2013, pp. 4-5. 101 “En Bosnie-Herzégovine, selon Fabius, les intérêts de la France sont inexistants”, Courrier des Balkans, 6 September 2013, available at: http://balkans.courriers.info/article23144.html (last accessed on: 3 September 2014). 102 “Dijaspora može da promeni Srbiju”, Politika, 29 December 2013, available at: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Temanedelje/izmedju-matice-i-rasejanja/Dijaspora-moze-da-promeni-Srbiju.lt.html (last accessed on: 8 October 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 50 regarding the EU’s enlargement policy is dated 25 January 2013, with Croatia still presented as a member-to-be. 103 5.4.2 Between indifference and opposition: media and public opinion European issues feature regularly in the French media but are discussed mostly from a national perspective, focusing on the impact of European events or decisions on France. Coverage of the Balkan region is marginal at best, with the dominant topics being those of delinquency and immigration. Other triggers of media attention are official visits of French ministers to the region or of Balkan leaders to France, with the tone remaining factual and the treatment superficial. The entry of Croatia yielded a number of informative articles presenting the country to the French audience; however, attention quickly subsided. None of the French media have permanent correspondents in the Balkan region, and the only serious source of information for French-speaking readers is the Courrier des Balkans, a specialised online outlet that offers translations of articles from Balkan media alongside its own contributions, and regularly runs into funding difficulties. The absence of public debate on the Balkans’ accession is lamented by some officials, while others fear a potential for polemic and therefore welcome the fact that ongoing membership negotiations with countries of the region pass under the radar of public attention. The most recent Eurobarometer survey shows a strong scepticism towards further EU enlargement in France: second only to Germany, a mere 23% of French respondents declare themselves in favour of the admission of new members, with 69% explicitly against. 104 This is a marked decrease in comparison to the survey conducted just after the entry of the ten new countries in May 2004, when already only a minority of 39% of French respondents supported further enlargement. 105 5.4.3 Limited impact, limited interest There is a general understanding in France that while no major negative effects can be expected from the Balkans’ EU membership, their accession would not bring many tangible benefits either. Where enlargement has triggered emotional reactions in the past, namely in terms of its economic impact, the accession of the Balkans would affect France only marginally. EU expansion to the east is in fact often equated with growing domestic unemployment and the delocalisation of French firms to more competitive regions. However, already in the case of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) enlargement, this widespread perception did not hold up in reality. A study conducted for the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) showed that only 4.2% of French firms moved abroad any kind of activity in the period of 2009 to 2011. Whereas the majority – 55% – of these delocalisations did concern a transfer within the European Union, only 22% of firms chose to relocate in one of the ten new member states, with 38% preferring a country belonging to the EU15. 106 Given the small size of the Balkan economies, it can be assumed that the extent of delocalisations following their EU accession would be very limited. The same goes for the more immediate economic effect of the Balkans accession: the region’s role in the internal market is already extremely constrained; in addition, France’s bilateral economic relations with the Balkans are weak in comparison to the involvement of other EU member states. While Serbia 103 “L’élargissement de l’Union européenne”, Réprésentation permanente auprès de l’Union européenne, available at: http://www.rpfrance.eu/L-elargissement-de-l-Union (last accessed on: 25 September 2014). 104 Standard Eurobarometer 81, Spring 2014, p. 66. 105 Standard Eurobarometer 62, December 2004, p. 153. 106 Fontagné, Lionel and D’Isanto, Aurélien (2013), “Chaînes d’activité mondiales: Des délocalisations d’abord vers l’Union européenne”, INSEE Première, Number 1451. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 51 represents France’s main trade partner in the region, accounting for 47% of France’s exports to the Balkans and 43% of its imports from there, France only ranks as Serbia’s 10th biggest supplier with a market share of 2%, and is only its 12th most important client. 107 Fear of work migration, which was very acute in the case of the CEE accession, is not an issue in the discussions about the Balkans, be it within the institutions or in public perception. Trade unions and business associations are focused on Turkey when they worry about their competitiveness, while the Balkans are not considered a threat. Finally, whereas the immigration of Roma was discussed polemically, it is essentially linked to Bulgaria and Romania. The aim of stabilising the previously war-torn region is only very marginally present in the French narrative on Balkans accession. While France remains involved in the various military and civilian missions throughout the region, with a leadership role in Kosovo, the country’s engagement is rapidly declining. France has terminated its involvement in KFOR (the Kosovo Force) in February 2014 108 , while the country’s significant involvement via EUFOR (European Union Force) Althea missions to Bosnia has lessened considerably. 5.5 CONCLUSION As one of the founding member states, France remains attached to the view of Europe as a community of values and a vehicle to strengthening France’s voice on the international scene. It is reluctant to accept its declining relative importance as the number of member states grows, and sees an emphasis on conditionality as a means to ensure coherence within the Union and to avoid ‘overstretching’. While the country’s stance on the accession of the Balkans is positive, its support is perfunctory and does not go significantly beyond the rhetorical level. The economic and immigration implications for France of an eventual Balkans accession are limited, explaining the reduced interest in the region. When it comes to the nationalisation of enlargement policy, there is a feeling in France that the approval of new member states has always been a national competence, and that member states with their recent greater involvement in questions of accession are merely taking back prerogatives they have always had. Still, there is a recognition that the varying priorities of different member countries make the overall enlargement process less flexible, with member states now seeking to shape the content rather than just the outcome of accession negotiations. The new approach is seen as a sign of the return of enlargement under the member states’ control. Overall, despite its clear stance on enlargement, France is no major player in the EU when it comes to defining the Union’s long-term approach towards the Balkans. Instead, the country tends to align itself with Germany’s positions on the dossier, stepping forward only in the case of divergences, such as the question of the opening of Serbian membership negotiations. Expertise and human resources dealing with the Balkans are limited both within and outside the French institutions, reflecting a lack of national strategic interest in the region. The awareness that no enlargement will take place in the 107 France Diplomatie (2014), “La France et la République de Serbie: Relations économiques”, available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/serbie/la-france-et-la-republique-de-1127/ (last accessed on: 6 October 2014). 108 “Défense: la France retire ses troupes du Kosovo”, Le Parisien, 6 February 2014, available at: http://www.leparisien.fr/international/defense-la-france-retire-ses-troupes-du-kosovo-06-02-2014-3566499.php (last accessed on: 8 October 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 52 coming years confirms France in its perception that there is no need for any particular investment in the Balkans. Over the next years, France is therefore likely to keep a low profile, neither supporting enlargement too vocally nor actively hindering an advancement towards the eventual membership of the Balkan countries. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 53 THE UNITED KINGDOM BY JAMES KER-LINDSAY 6.1 Introduction 53 6.2 Britain and European Union enlargement 54 6.3 Britain’s relationship with the Balkans 55 6.4 Current attitudes to Balkan enlargement 56 6.5 Freedom of movement and the enlargement debate 58 6.6 The Brexit debate 60 6.7 Conclusion 61 6.1 INTRODUCTION In an episode of the classic British political comedy, Yes Minister, Jim Hacker, the fictional Minister of Administrative Affairs, is discussing Britain’s relationship with the then European Economic Community (EEC) with his wily Permanent Secretary, Sir Humphrey Appleby. Sir Humphrey explains that for the past 500 years, Britain has had one key policy objective: to create a disunited Europe. In response, Hacker asks why, if that is the case, Britain had been pushing for more members. To which Sir Humphrey replies, “the more members it has, the more arguments it can stir up, the more futile and impotent it becomes.” This sketch has become somewhat legendary for the way in which it managed to encapsulate traditional British thinking on the European Union (EU) and on enlargement. Although the rationale for encouraging expansion was primarily – though not exclusively – driven by very specific reasons, most notably the wish to prevent a further deepening of political ties within the EU, over the decades it has nevertheless benefited those countries that have been queuing up to join the Union. This in turn made London an important potential ally for aspiring members. However, this has now changed. While the Foreign Office is still keen to stress that the United Kingdom is committed to further EU expansion, and that it remains a lead actor in the enlargement process, the reality is that the UK is no longer regarded as the champion of the dossier. With the growth of euroscepticism, and the increasingly hostile debate over immigration, Britain’s political leaders have ceased to be the Union’s most strident supporters of further expansion. Meanwhile, increasing talk of the possibility that the United Kingdom may yet leave the European Union has also served to weaken British influence in the region. Chapter 6 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 60 become notoriously difficult and expensive to obtain a British visa. 139 This would appear to be having a very negative effect on how the countries of the region see the UK. 140 As one observer put it, the immigration policy, “isn’t in accordance with the rhetoric on enlargement.” 141 6.6 THE BREXIT DEBATE In addition to freedom of movement, another factor that is shaping the discussion about the United Kingdom and enlargement is the question of British membership of the European Union. Over the course of the past few years, attention has increasingly turned to the possibility that the UK may in fact leave the EU. Although on balance this may seem to be unlikely, the mere fact that the argument has gained such prominence suggests that it cannot be discounted entirely. As a result, there is a growing concern amongst observers that the European Union, realising that Britain may be on its way out, is taking less notice of its views. 142 It would seem likely that this applies as much to enlargement as to any other issues, perhaps even more so given that it seems strange to pay attention to the views of Britain on new members when it wants to leave the ‘club’. At the same time, the debate is also being followed in the Balkans. This is having a negative impact on Britain’s influence and standing. It seems that these states increasingly question whether it is worth engaging actively with the United Kingdom when their invariably meagre diplomatic and political resources would be better used engaging with countries that can help them to join the EU. Even the discussions about a possible British exit from the European Union may well have contributed to a growing sense amongst political elites engaged in the accession process in these countries that Germany is now the main actor they should focus on. 143 This impression will no doubt have been cemented by the fact that Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, appears to want Germany to become the champion of the Balkan expansion. 144 There is also a sense that aligning with Britain may actually be counterproductive inasmuch as it is far better to be seen as a good European. 145 Meanwhile, at a popular level, a rather more mixed picture emerges. On the one hand, the possibility of the UK leaving the EU appears to have received little widespread attention in the region, certainly when compared to the greater level of attention given to the immigration debate. As one British official put it, the media and ordinary citizens appear to have little awareness about the internal politics of the United Kingdom. 146 However, it has not gone completely unnoticed. As elsewhere in Europe, there are many Eurosceptics in the Balkans who oppose membership of the European Union; even if their place in mainstream politics tends to be rather limited. 147 Amongst these political parties and organisations opposed to EU membership, there is in fact a lot of admiration for Britain “for standing up to 139 As pointed out, it is now more expensive to get a six month visa for the UK than a 10-year one for the United States. This has had an enormous impact on how people in the region view Britain. International official, comment to the author, October 2014. 140 United Kingdom MEP, comments to the author, July 2014. 141 International official, comments to the author, October 2014. 142 “Lobbyists fear loss of British sway in EU”, Financial Times, 6 March 2013. 143 International official, comments to the author, October 2014; Former ambassador from a Balkan state, comments to the author, July 2014. As the diplomat noted, “Germany is now seen as the most important country, full stop. United States comes second.” 144 “Merkel to organise Western Balkans conference in August”, Euractiv, 13 June 2014. However, other countries, such as Greece and Italy, are still seen by some as key actors. In contrast, Britain is not. Serbian official, comments to the author, July 2014. 145 Serbian official, comments to the author, July 2014. 146 British official, comments to the author, October 2014. 147 For more on Eurosceptic parties in the region see Stratulat, Corina (ed.) (2014), “EU integration and party politics in the Balkans”, EPC Issue Paper, No.77. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 61 ‘Europe”. 148 As one regional diplomat stated, “You would not believe how popular Nigel Farage [the leader of UKIP] is in parts of the Balkans.” 149 To these groups, Britain is increasingly seen as an ally in the campaign to keep them out of the EU. 6.3 CONCLUSION Traditionally, the United Kingdom has been a staunch supporter of European Union enlargement. Over the past three decades, Britain has seen the continued expansion of the European Union as the best defence against efforts to pursue more political integration. To this extent, successive British governments have taken a strong interest in helping new member states join the European Union. Even if Britain has tended only to pay close attention to a small number of countries, namely Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, the wish to see the EU expand has necessarily had a positive effect on other countries in the Balkans. However, there can be little doubt that the UK’s overall attitude towards enlargement, and its ability to shape the Union’s policies in this area, has undergone a profound transformation over the course of the Conservative-led period of coalition governments, and particularly since the latter half of 2013. The increasingly shrill immigration debate in Britain, coupled with rising Euroscepticism and growing support for UKIP, has meant that the British government has been faced with an increasingly unpalatable political choice. While further EU enlargement would help to maintain the continued battle to minimise political union within the EU, it also means the arrival of more people to British shores. The fact that there is no appetite within the EU to allow for restrictions on freedom of movement means that this matter has become an either/or issue: either more expansion and more new immigrants, or less future enlargement and less new arrivals. It seems as though, under prevailing political conditions, London has opted for the latter. While the Foreign Office remains absolutely adamant that Britain remains one of the strongest supporters of enlargement, and is still a driving force behind enlargement, this is not how it is perceived beyond the United Kingdom, or even amongst pro-Europeans within Britain. 150 The discussions over immigration have presented a very negative picture about British support for further enlargement within the Balkans. Even amongst Britain’s European partners, there is a clear sense that the UK is no longer the force behind enlargement that it once was. 151 As a British official working for an international organisation in the region noted, he had long since ceased arguing that “Britain was the biggest supporter of enlargement.” 152 As a result, the countries of the region are starting to turn their attention elsewhere in the search for support for their EU membership aspirations. Germany, in particular, has now emerged as the crucial actor. The question is whether Britain might be able to regain a leadership role on questions of enlargement and new members. It is quite possible. It is important to recognise that there are other trends emerging that could well force Britain to rethink its growing distance from the region. Most notably, the rising concerns about Russia mean that many EU members now believe that a return to the enlargement agenda, which has been off the EU radar for the past six or seven years, is crucial. This seems, for example, to be a key element shaping German thinking. 153 At present, however, such views have yet to be articulated openly in Britain. For the meanwhile, the growing distance between the UK and the EU, and the widespread worries in Britain about the impact of further immigration appear to be at the 148 Serbian official, comments to the author, July 2014. 149 International official, comment to the author, October 2014. 150 Senior Liberal Democrat, comments to the author, July 2014. 151 Senior official, EU member state, comments to the author, August 2014. 152 British official, comments to the author, October 2014. 153 “Merkel to organise Western Balkans conference in August”, Euractiv, 13 June 2014. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 62 forefront of the debate about enlargement. However, it is clear that this cannot happen until the United Kingdom makes a firm decision on its own membership of the European Union, and politicians are willing to make a positive case for EU enlargement; freedom of movement and all. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 63 POLAND BY TOMASZ ŻORNACZUK 7.1 Introduction 63 7.1.1 Balkans miss the cut on Poland’s priority list 63 7.1.2 An uneven approach to the Balkans 64 7.2 EU enlargement to the Balkans 65 7.2.1 The Balkans on Poland’s EU enlargement map 65 7.2.2 Party and public consensus on enlargement 66 7.2.3 The government’s perspective 67 7.2.4 Official position versus diplomatic activities 67 7.2.5 The mechanisms shaping Poland’s position on EU enlargement 69 7.2.6 A reflection on the EU enlargement process 70 7.3 Conclusion 71 7.1 INTRODUCTION 7.1.1 Balkans miss the cut on Poland’s priority list In the foreign policy field, Poland’s priorities and activities are devised with the aim of securing the country’s independence, territorial integrity and national security, and respecting the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. This makes state security, which is embedded in a broader European and international context, the foremost consideration in Poland’s foreign policy. A strong Poland in a strong European Union (EU) is a notorious leitmotiv of the country’s approach to external relations. A deeper European integration, both in political and economic terms – such as through strengthening EU institutions, creating a more efficient internal market, a common energy market (an idea recently developed into the Energy Union), a labour market, a common European research space, and an ambitious EU budget with a relevant share of Cohesion Policy and Common Agriculture Policy – defines Poland’s strategic thinking 154 . For Poland, the Balkans are not of special importance. After achieving its post-1989 strategic goals to join NATO (in 1999) and the EU (in 2004), and given its geographic location, as well as its historic and cultural ties, Poland has tended to focus on its neighbours in Eastern Europe (mostly Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia). Similar to the Balkan states, these areas remain outside of the European Union’s structures. Poland has shared its experience in democratic transition and has provided development aid to these countries, which, since 2009, have been covered by the Eastern Partnership. 154 “Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016” (2012), Warsaw, p. 8, available at: www.msz.gov.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). Chapter 7 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 64 This is a project that was initiated by Poland and Sweden and is a flagship endeavour in the foreign policy of Poland, post EU entry. 7.1.2 An uneven approach to the Balkans The Balkans is not in the immediate vicinity of Poland, and historical and economic ties with the region are not strong or long-standing. Moreover, the 1990s armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and the unstable political situation that came thereafter did not pose a direct security threat or cause significant migration flows for Poland. Therefore, Poland’s policy towards the Balkans has been primarily influenced by its membership in NATO and the European Union. It has translated into a strong involvement in security issues for the stabilisation of the political and economic situation in the region, as well as into support for the accession of the Balkan countries to these two organisations. In addition, Poland’s membership in Central European structures, namely the Visegrád Group (V4) and – to a lesser extent – the Regional Partnership 155 , has provided another reason for Poland’s engagement with the Balkans. This is because the region – and the development of cooperation with the Balkans – continues to be of great importance in the foreign policies of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Austria. Even though the security and democratisation of the EU’s direct neighbourhood are among Poland’s foreign policy priorities, the country’s interests in the Balkans are, in fact, largely limited to the first goal, which is to be achieved through the region’s integration into NATO and the EU. Poland has participated in virtually all of the stabilisation missions in the Balkans over the last two decades. This was initially explained by Poland’s aspirations to join NATO. Currently, the Poles are part of each of the three stabilisation missions in the region, with nearly 100 policemen within EULEX and up to 250 soldiers within KFOR in Kosovo. In this sense, one can conclude that, ever since the 1990s, Poland has maintained the same approach towards the region, which is based on bringing peace and security. This is reflected in the fact that the Balkan states are not among the priority countries in the Polish development cooperation 156 . The country’s aid for transformation and democratic changes in the Balkans is essentially invisible. In recent years, it equalled about €40,000 annually in the form of small grants to the whole region (excluding Croatia and Kosovo). In comparison, the aid offered by Poland’s Visegrád partners to the Balkans amounts to millions of euros each year. Poland sees itself as a promoter of democracy and peaceful transformation in North Africa, especially in Tunisia, where it sent significant financial support. However, in the case of the Balkans, this element of the Polish foreign policy is ignored. At the same time, Poland was able to donate roughly €260,000 to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in 2014 to help these countries fight the effects of the floods. The country’s support for the accession of the Balkans to NATO and EU, apart from being securityrelated, is also linked to Poland’s policy towards Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. From this perspective, Poland believes that the sooner the Balkan states join the Union, the sooner the EU will revitalise its enlargement plans to cover areas that fall within the scope of Warsaw’s main foreign policy interests. Yet, for a number of years, the country’s backing of the region’s accession was largely confined to the declarative sphere and was rarely followed up by concrete actions by the government. 155 The Visegrád Group states, plus Austria and Slovenia. 156 These countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (as of the Eastern Partnership), Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenia, Ruanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (as of East Africa), Libya, Tunisia, and Palestinian Autonomy (as of North Africa and Middle East), and Afghanistan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan (as of Central Asia). See: Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012-2015. Solidarity, Democracy, Development (2012), Warsaw, available at: www.polskapomoc.gov.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 65 There have been recent changes in this respect, mostly on a working level, which are mainly due to Poland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2011. Although Poland has embassies in all of the Balkan countries, except for Kosovo, high-level bilateral political relations remain limited and there is little interest to deepen such cooperation. This, in turn, is perhaps the reason for only marginal economic cooperation. Poland enjoys a positive balance of trade with each of the countries in the region. However, neither imports from nor exports to the region go beyond one per cent of Poland’s total trade exchange. In recent years, it continues to remain at a similar level, with an increase in Serbia’s significance as a market for Polish products and a reduction in trade exchange with Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM). On the other hand, recent years have seen a more active cooperation with the region on the expert and working levels. A lack of balance between this and the high-level contacts, as well as the fact that Poland recognised Kosovo as an independent state, but has not established any diplomatic relations with it, are often taken as indication of the inconsequential nature of Poland’s policy towards the Balkans. 7.2 EU ENLARGEMENT TO THE BALKANS 7.2.1 The Balkans on Poland’s EU enlargement map Poland’s support for the continuation of EU’s enlargement to the Balkans has been reiterated by every government after the country joined the Union in 2004. After the Eastern enlargement was completed in 2007, the Balkans became a priority region in the EU’s foreign policy. This explains why, in the same year, it also enjoyed a more extensive reference in the government’s information of the Parliament about Polish foreign policy tasks. Here, support was expressed for the EU’s enlargement to the Balkans (with only Croatia being named as the most crucial in this respect), together with Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey 157 . Since then, a similar set of countries has been repeatedly mentioned in government statements, strategies and other documents. Here, the Balkans is often cited after Ukraine and Moldova, but before the South Caucasus states and Turkey 158 . Following the change of government in 2007 159 , the Balkans have appeared in the ministerial 160 information on Polish foreign policy task – from occupying a single sentence in 2008, through to no mention at all in 2009 (with the agenda then dominated by the Eastern Partnership project), to general support for the region on the path to the EU and for Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, which was expressed in the 2014 document. Moreover, in a questionnaire, which was prepared by Rzeczpospolita daily in the spring of 2014 for the candidates in the European elections, one of the 12 questions on the future of the EU focused on enlargement and named (in the original order) Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey 161 , leaving the Balkan countries out of the survey (and, in general, out of the answers). 157 “Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007” (2007), Warsaw, available at: www.rp.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 158 “Polish Foreign …” (2012), Warsaw, p. 11, available at: www.rp.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 159 Since November 2007, the majority-based government consists of the Civic Platform, a centre-right, liberal and Christiandemocratic political party; and the Polish People’s Party, a centre-right, agrarian and Christian-democratic political party, both members of the European People’s Party. 160 Radosław Sikorski was Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs from November 2007 to September 2014. Since then, Grzegorz Schetyna has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Poland. 161 See, for example, “Ankieta” Rzeczpospolitej: Krzysztof Iszkowski (Europa + Twój Ruch, Miejsce 3, Okręg nr 4, Warszawa)”, Rzeczpospolita, March 2014, available at: www.rp.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 66 7.2.2 Party and public consensus on enlargement Despite the fact that the EU’s enlargement to the Balkans is not part of the domestic political discourse, there is wide consensus on this subject among the relevant Polish parties. The ruling coalition (Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party, enjoying respectively 31-35% and 4-11% of the public support in the opinion polls between October 2014 and March 2015 162 ) consists of pro-European parties, which advocate further EU widening, including to the Balkans. The biggest opposition party, Law and Justice (right wing, 30-35%) – which was the major partner in the coalition government in 2005-2007 – as well as its smaller right wing allies, officially support EU enlargement, despite their frequent critical remarks about Poland’s membership in the Union 163 . The Law and Justice even attempted to make the Polish Parliament ratify Croatia’s Accession Treaty by a qualified majority (with the opposition votes needed) instead of a simple majority. During discussions in the joint parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and the European Union, this party called for a broader debate on Croatia’s accession. They noted a possible influence of its entry on the benefits derived by Poland from the Cohesion Policy, as well as a potential decrease of Warsaw’s impact on EUrelated matters 164 . The issue proved to be driven by domestic politics, as the Parliament eventually approved the Treaty with only one abstention and no votes against. The two left-oriented political parties within the Polish Parliament (that is, the Democratic Left Alliance, eight to 11% of support in the polls; and Your Movement, zero to four per cent) are strongly pro-European, favouring both the deepening and widening of the EU. On the rare occasion of a parliamentary debate on EU integration processes, the parties usually criticise the government for the slow pace of the enlargement process, including to the Balkans. They also assert that – except for this region – Turkey and Ukraine are of key importance, if the EU has ambitions to become a global – not just regional – actor in the future. Within the national consensus, the only exception on EU enlargement is the Congress of the New Right. This has one out of 460 members of the Polish Parliament, four out of 51 Polish Members of the European Parliament, and zero to four per cent of public support. This party is Eurosceptic and opposes the very existence of the EU, hence it also objects to further enlargements. What helps the Polish government to maintain a consistently favourable position on EU enlargement, and perhaps dwarfs the right wing opposition’s more hostile attitude on the issue, is the fact that, ever since Poland joined the Union, the country’s public support for further EU expansion is among the highest of all member states. Poland topped the list in 2009, when 70% of respondents (compared to an EU average of 46%) expressed their support for enlargement. This trend was also seen in 2010 and 2011, at similar levels 165 . It continued to be high, with a slight drop to 64% in 2014. This decline only reflects the public mood on enlargement across the EU, with an average of only 39% in favour at that time 166 . The media coverage of the EU enlargement process in the Balkans is scarce and was recently limited to the Prime Minister’s visits to Croatia during Poland’s Presidency of the EU, as well as the reports of 162 “Poparcie Partii Politycznych”, Millward Brown opinion polls, available at: http://wybory.millwardbrown.com (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 163 See, for example, “Modlę się, żeby UE się sama rozwaliła”, Rzeczpospolita, June 2013, available at: www.rp.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 164 “Potrzebne Głośne “tak””, Gazeta Wyborcza, August 2012, available at: www.wyborcza.pl (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 165 Standard Eurobarometre 72, Autumn 2009; Standard Eurobarometre 75, Spring 2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 166 Standard Eurobarometer 82, Autumn 2014, available at: http://ec.europa.eu (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 67 when Croatia joined the Union. However, while elections in the Balkan countries and visits by Polish politicians in the region (and vice versa) do not often make the news, the disastrous floods that hit the Balkans in the spring of 2014 offered considerable visibility to the region in Poland. 7.2.3 The government’s perspective Poland belongs to the ‘Friends of Enlargement’ informal group 167 and supports the accession of the Balkan countries to the EU on the basis of the conditionality criteria. Moreover, Poland advocates an approach whereby the conditionality should be balanced against the real capacities of the applicant countries. Therefore, not only does Poland not question the European Commission’s control over the benchmarks but it often supports an even softer position than the one presented by the Brussels executive, for example, when evaluating the progress of Montenegro. In the Polish diplomatic circles, there is a common view that the accession process should be shorter and less bureaucratic. With this position, Poland finds itself in opposition to, for example, Germany and the Netherlands, which favour upgrading the conditions related to – among others – the economy, the judiciary and the fight against corruption. From Poland’s perspective, Serbia is the priority country in the Balkan enlargement. However, this notion derives more from Serbia’s importance for the stability of the region rather than from Warsaw’s interests towards Belgrade. A key reason for Poland’s support for the EU’s enlargement towards the Balkans is the country’s own experience with the Union. In diplomatic circles, it is widely accepted that the EU accession proved highly beneficial for Poland, in terms of general development and modernisation. Additionally, 73% of Polish citizens share the opinion that EU membership has been advantageous to the country, with only 13% in disagreement 168 . Moreover, enlargement is seen as a peace-oriented project that supports democratic change, as well as bringing stability and prosperity. These are precisely Poland’s priorities within the EU foreign policy towards the Union’s Eastern neighbours, with Ukraine being of the utmost importance in this regard. Furthermore, the process is fully in accordance with the EU’s commitments that derive from the treaties. The Balkans are part of Europe and, for that reason — according to Poland — the countries of the region should join the EU as soon as possible, avoiding that national interests of the member states becoming obstacles in that process. In other words, as a beneficiary of the Union’s expansion, Poland strongly opposes the perception of EU enlargement as a process that brings risks to the member states. The fact that Poland has not suffered an economic decline during the global crisis might go some way towards explaining such an attitude. At the same time, it is widely believed that the Balkan countries do not constitute a threat to the benefits that Poland derives from the Cohesion Policy. This is because they are not expected to join the Union within the current budgetary framework, and, in any case, Poland will profit progressively less from the next budgets because of the country’s gradual development. 7.2.4 Official position versus diplomatic activities Although Poland strongly supports the inclusion of the Balkans in the EU, the position is mainly declarative rather than actively pursued. A somewhat more hands-on approach to the region was presented by Poland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2011. Next to the development of relations with the Union’s other neighbours, EU enlargement was included 167 Except for Poland, the group also consists of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Italy Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The meetings at desk officers’ level, which are held twice a year, serve as a forum for exchange of information on bilateral relations and general observations on the EU enlargement policy. 168 Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2014, (2014), The German Marshal Fund of the United States, p. 27, available at: http://trends.gmfus.org (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 68 in the presidency’s priorities under “An Open Europe” catchphrase. In the spring of 2011, Radosław Sikorski, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the same period, the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. Except for some visits of deputy prime ministers and ministers, for example those responsible for regional development or defence, these were the only Polish official bilateral visits to the region on a high governmental level since the incumbent coalition has been in power. 169 The three main aims of Poland’s presidency, with regards to the Balkans, included the signing of the Accession Treaty with Croatia, launching accession negotiations with Montenegro and granting Serbia candidate status 170 . In the end, only the signing of Croatia’s Accession Treaty in December 2011 (in Brussels, not in Warsaw, as was initially envisioned by the Polish government), was achieved. Moreover, given that this accomplishment was the result of events that occurred before Poland took over Presidency in July 2011, it cannot fully be credited to Warsaw. Poland’s interest in the region at a high political level subsided again after the completion of the Presidency of the EU Council. Moreover, some of its subsequent actions contradicted previously declared priorities. For example, in 2012, Poland found itself among the three countries that expressed reservations over granting Serbia candidate status 171 . Such a position was noticed both in Belgrade and Brussels 172 . Additionally, earlier in 2008, Poland was not among the 17 states of the Schengen Zone, which signed a political declaration. This was initiated by France on facilitations regarding visa free travel for Serbian citizens 173 . Only a joint declaration of Regional Partnership countries eventually persuaded Poland to support the initiative. This showed that Poland’s membership in regional organisations mobilised the country’s involvement in Balkan affairs. Poland’s Presidency of the Visegrád Group (July 2012-June 2013) presumed some actions to enhance cooperation between the V4 and the Balkan countries. One such instance was a meeting of the foreign ministers of the V4, Balkan countries, Romania and Bulgaria. By then, events in similar formulas were a tradition of the V4 presidencies of the other Visegrád partners. On this occasion, the “V4 – Western Balkans Expert Network on Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights” was established, a multilateral initiative to support the EU integration process in the Balkans. Within this framework, Poland has shared its experience in the fundamental rights sphere 174 . Poland’s previous presidency of the group (July 2008-June 2009) only saw marginal activities in the Western Balkans, as the agenda was dominated by the promotion of the Eastern Partnership. Furthermore, in most cases, at the V4 ministerial meetings on the Balkans, Poland was represented by a deputy foreign minister (although it changes recently, too), whereas its Visegrád partners usually send foreign ministers. 169 Other visits at a high political level to the Western Balkans included the visits of Bronisław Komorowski, the President of the Republic, to fYROM in 2013, which was an official visit. Furthermore, the president, as well as the Prime Minister, visited the Polish military and police bases in Kosovo. Moreover, Prime Minister Tusk—as the head of the country holding the EU Presidency—visited Zagreb in September 2011, with the aim of handing over the Accession Treaty to Jadranka Kosor, the then Prime Minister of Croatia. He later took part in the welcoming ceremony in Zagreb, on the occasion of Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013. Prime Minister Tusk also paid a working visit to Belgrade in 2013. However, these visits were not of an official bilateral character. 170 Such a conclusion could be drawn from the speech of Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, the then Secretary of State for European affairs in the MFA, during a conference at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw, held on 29 June 2011. 171 Serbia’s close relations with Russia were an official argument for Poland’s reservations. 172 “Rumunija, Litvanija, Poljska Imaju Ograde Prema Kandidaturi Srbije”, Vesti, February 2012, available at: www.vesti.rs (last accessed on: 21 March 2015); and “EU Diplomats: Serbia to get Candidate Status”, EUObserver, February 2012, available at: www.euobserver.com (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 173 “Visas: Communiqué Conjoint de 17 Pays Européens”, information of the Embassy of the French Republic to Serbia from 6 May 2008, available at: www.ambafrance-srb.org (last accessed on: 21 March 2015). 174 The examples include the V4 and Western Balkan Ombudsmans meeting in Warsaw in (2013) and the meeting of the Ombudsman’s office representatives from Poland, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, fYROM, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia, as well as Greece and Turkey (2014). Additionally, the V4 and Western Balkan Children’s Ombudsmans’ meeting took place in Warsaw (2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 69 The modest number of high-level contacts limits the visibility of Polish actions at a working and experts’ level, which have been more frequent ever since the presidency in the EU Council was completed in 2011. Previously, examples of cooperation included not much more than passing the Polish know-how on justice and home affairs to Croatia (2008-09). As the EU presidency approached, a long-standing collaboration on the working level between Poland and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established in the form of the Skopje Conference (annually, since 2010). This is an institutionalised cooperation, aimed at providing this Balkan country’s public administration with Poland’s preaccession experience (a formula that is based on the Utrecht Conference in which Poland – on its path to the EU – received similar assistance from the Netherlands). In addition, Poland is part of a twinning project in consortium with Germany and Croatia on “further strengthening of organisational and institutional capacities for the EU integration process” of fYROM (2014). An enhanced cooperation between Poland and Montenegro was established, based on a memorandum of understanding and cooperation on regional development (2012), and the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development signed a separate memorandum for cooperation and experts’ exchange (2014). Common actions with Serbia are based on the memorandum on cooperation in European integration, signed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) of the two countries (2013). Within this framework, for instance, a seminar on the usage of the EU funds took place (2015) – a notorious subject in Poland-Western Balkans experts’ cooperation. Furthermore, Poland participates in a twinning project on modern human resources concepts in Serbia’s Ministry of Interior (2014). Furthermore, a memorandum on cooperation on European integration was signed between the MFAs of Poland and Albania (2014) and two experts’ meetings were organised, including on the subject of EU funds (2015). Additionally, the know-how share with this country is bilaterally developed within the above-mentioned V4-Western Balkans expert network. In addition, cooperation between the Supreme Audit Offices (2012) will be further developed within the Polish twinning project in consortium with Croatia, on “strengthening of external auditing capacities” (2015). These actions clearly show that Poland tends to more actively support those Balkan countries that are the most advanced in the negotiations with the EU. 7.2.5 The mechanisms shaping Poland’s position on EU enlargement EU enlargement, just like any other aspect of Poland’s European policy, is conducted by constitutional prerogative by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MFA is the main actor – and in most cases the only one – involved in EU enlargement issues. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, as well as the Office of the President of the Republic, is informed on the subject through regular reports, but neither contributes to shaping the policy in this respect. Such reports are prepared once every three months by the Committee for European Affairs (Foreign Minister, other ministers or their deputies, and the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister). The MFA prepares a statement for the Prime Minister every time that EU enlargement issues are discussed at the European Council. In such situations, the Prime Minister is assisted by the MFA Secretary of State for European affairs. Regarding the enlargement issues, which are discussed within the General Affairs Council, Poland is represented by the Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, who is the Secretary of State responsible for European affairs. There is no lobby on EU enlargement that is conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from any other state institution. This is because, in Poland, the subject is far from being politically controversial. Within the MFA, the European Policy Department handles matters related to the political dimension of Poland’s EU membership and the future of European integration. It also deals with the Union’s expansion and European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as EU developments in the field of freedom, security and justice. The Balkans and EU enlargement to this region are covered by the South-East Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 76 8.2 THE ITALIAN POSITION ON EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS THE BALKANS 8.2.1 Issues shaping Italy’s stance Italy’s stance towards EU enlargement in the Balkans is clearly driven by the above-mentioned national interests at stake in the region. Rome ultimately deems these to be best safeguarded by the mid-term European integration of the region. Indeed, Italy’s position on EU enlargement towards the Balkans has generally been one of vocal support. Furthermore, Rome has traditionally described the European mid-term perspective of the region as a strategic interest for at least four specific reasons. These are: (1) the positive effects of European integration on domestic and regional reconciliation in the Balkans, including through the progressive resolution of pending tensions and disputes; (2) its benefits for the institutional stability and internal security of the Balkan countries; (3) the expected opportunities that are offered to Italy by the region’s socio-economic development as a consequence of European integration; and (4) the likely rebalancing of Europe’s geopolitical equilibrium between northern and southern member states, following EU’s enlargement to the Balkans (and, possibly, Turkey). 188 Thus, Italy considers its national interests and objectives as largely compatible with those of the EU, in line with a wider pro-integrationist attitude towards EU foreign and external policies. 189 In particular, the most important reasons why Italy supports the EU enlargement towards the Balkans are the promotion of trade and economic exchanges, the consolidation of local capacities in justice and home affairs, the fight against corruption and regional organised crime, the strengthening of the rule of law, the advancement of security and stability, and the functional complementarity between EU enlargement and sub-regional cooperation platforms. Consequently, Italy considers the potential economic and budgetary costs of enlargement as largely compensated by the expected security and economic benefits of the region’s mid-term integration. Italy’s support of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Balkans is also facilitated by a lack of bilateral issues with non-EU Balkan countries. However, such issues played a role in influencing Rome’s earlier stance towards Slovenia and Croatia, in an occasionally obstructive way. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, Italy threatened to veto Slovenia’s EU membership application if Ljubljana failed to amend a constitutional clause that prohibited the foreign ownership of land, in turn affecting the long-standing demands of Italian exiles from Istria and Dalmatia. Additionally, in 2007, Italy and Croatia entered into a fierce diplomatic row about the very controversial issue of ethnic violence in Istria and Dalmatia before, during and after the Second World War. This posed the risk of Rome’s opposition of Zagreb’s EU accession. However, the successful diplomatic rapprochement and increased economic integration with both of the countries enabled a gradual and peaceful resolution of those disputes. 188 See, MFAIC (2008), “Rapporto 2020: Le Scelte di Politica Estera”, Rome: MFAIC, pp. 57-60, available at: www.esteri.it/mae/doc/MD_COMPLETO.doc (last accessed on: 17 March 2015), and Gori, Luca (2007), L’Unione Europea e i Balcani Occidentali: La Prospettiva Europea Della Regione (1996-2007), Rome: Rubbettino Editore, pp. 193-194, from which the ‘list’ was taken. 189 For further details, see, for instance, Frontini, Andrea, “Allegro Ma Non Troppo: The European External Action Service and Italian diplomacy”, in Balfour, Rosa and Raik, Kristi (2013), The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies, Brussels: European Policy Centre (EPC), pp. 23-34, available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3385_the_eeas_and_national_diplomacies.pdf (last accessed on: 7 December 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 77 Unlike other EU member states, mobility trends and migration flows from the Balkans do not have a negative impact on Italy’s position towards enlargement, given the fact that the country is not a meaningful destination for Balkan migrants but rather, faces illegal migratory flows from Northern Africa, the Horn and Sahel. Moreover, according to several observers, the integration of Italy’s Albanian and Serbian communities has, so far, progressed relatively well. 190 Furthermore, the media and public opinion tend to only have a marginal impact on Italy’s official position. The media have sometimes depicted Albanian and undefined “Slavic” migrants negatively, for example, in the mid-1990s. However, this does not seem to be the case anymore, even if tensions or incidents of intolerance have affected other migrant communities in recent years, including Italy’s large Romanian population. Interviewees considered public opinion as largely uninterested in the policy debate on EU enlargement. This is primarily because of the traditional inward-looking attitude of large segments of the Italian population, with the exception of a few past episodes of political polarisation, in particular on the occasion of Italy’s military intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. However, the political consequences of the severe socio-economic crisis in the country, including the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric and Eurosceptic feelings among Italian citizens, are taking their toll on the positive sentiment towards European integration in general, as documented by recent surveys. For instance, in the second half of 2014, only 30% of Eurobarometer respondents in Italy were in favour of further EU enlargements. 191 While no straightforward conclusion can be drawn with specific regard to the Balkans, it is plausible that the appeal of Balkans’ EU integration among Italians could indeed become increasingly affected by the diminishing popularity of the European project. Over time, there have been no major changes in Italy’s pro-enlargement position towards the region. However, the ongoing economic crisis has affected the financial and human resources that are available for Rome’s ample engagement in the region. This has been evident since 2005, with the de facto suspension of Law 84/2001, supporting the stabilisation, reconstruction and development of the Balkans. 192 In Italy’s view, this has helped to make the European integration process a cost-effective substitute for purely national diplomatic efforts. However, some observers have complained about the potential risks of ‘political disinvestment’, which is associated with Rome’s mere ‘off-loading’ of the Balkan dossier to EU institutions and processes. 8.2.2 Priorities and concerns vis-à-vis individual Balkan countries Italy considers Serbia and Albania as the most important countries for its national agenda, particularly for economic, commercial and energy reasons. However, security concerns and the presence of about half a million Albanians in Italy very much influence Rome’s attention to Tirana. Although perhaps a bit less of a priority for Rome, Montenegro is nonetheless likely to grow in importance in the near future. This is due to Italy’s economic projection and in spite of the persisting challenges that are posed by the country’s weak rule of law, organised crime and widespread corruption. Interviewees shared strong concerns about Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was often defined as a ‘black hole’. This is particularly due to the risks of internal institutional failure and the perceived cracks 190 See, Ministry of Labour and Social Policies of Italy (2014), op. cit. 191 See, for instance, European Commission (2014), “Rapporto Nazionale: Italia”, Standard Eurobarometer No. 82, Autumn 2014, Brussels: EU, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_it_it_nat.pdf (last accessed on: 10 March 2015). 192 Official Journal of the Italian Republic (2001), “Disposizioni per la Partecipazione Italiana Alla Stabilizzazione, Alla Ricostruzione e allo Sviluppo di Paesi dell'area Balcanica”, Official Journal, No. 76, March 2001, available at: http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/01084l.htm (last accessed on: 7 December 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 78 in the 1994 Dayton Agreements’ architecture, notably in light of the renewed separatist temptations in Republika Srpska. According to several interviewees, the Bosnian conundrum goes very much beyond the EU’s responsibility. “Sarajevo is not delivering” was a common impression among several Italian officials and experts. However, this widespread impression is now set to evolve following the European Council’s adoption of a British-German plan 193 to revive Bosnia’s EU integration path in December 2014. This also comes after the formation of a new government in Sarajevo in February 2015, whose reform agenda and commitment towards EU membership have paved the way for the (overdue) entry into force of the Association and Stabilisation Agreement in July 2015. 194 Interviewees assessed Kosovo as less problematic but thought that it needed to develop additional autonomous institutional and governance capacities. Rome deemed the process of normalisation of relations between Pristina and Belgrade as encouraging. However, in Italy’s opinion, further progress is essential, both at a technical and political level. The threats of jihadism and ‘freedom fighters’ were also highlighted as worrisome security challenges, both in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most interviewees considered the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM)’s name dispute with Greece as, ultimately, a bilateral affair. While some vented their frustrations at Athens’ intransigence on the subject, others highlighted that Skopje’s internal political controversies had largely contributed to the weakening support among member states for the Commission’s repeatedly positive avis on the opening of accession negotiations with that country. 8.2.3 Formal decision-making processes and actual practices The leading role in the dossier is played by the government, which constitutionally holds the ‘keys’ to Italy’s foreign policy and external relations in general. Within the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) exerts a clear supremacy over the formulation and expression of the Italian position on EU enlargement, as well as its contribution to the wider EU enlargement process, including via national participation in the relevant technical programmes and financial instruments. Two Units in the MFAIC are specifically in charge of the preparation of the Italian position on the region and EU enlargement, respectively. The latter is first expressed in the Council’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the Union (COELA) and is then discussed in the Comité des Représentants Permanents (COREPER). It is finally approved in the General Affairs Council (GAC), where Italy is represented by the Minister of European Affairs, a non-portfolio minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. Another set of governmental institutions, notably the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice, are involved to varying degrees in the formulation of the Italian position. This is notably due to their respective competencies in the implementation of bilateral treaty provisions and in ensuring Italy’s participation in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX), 193 Brown, Stephen and James, William, “UK, Germany Offer Plan to Break Bosnia's EU Deadlock”, Reuters, November 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-bosnia-eu-accession-idUSKBN0IP1V620141105 (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). 194 See, Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Office of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), “Transcript of the First Press Conference of the Head of Delegation of the European Union and EU Special Representative in BiH, Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, held in Sarajevo”, Sarajevo: EU, April 2015, available at: http://europa.ba/News.aspx?newsid=10832&lang=EN (last accessed on: 19 April 2014), and Gross, Eva (2015), “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Back on an EU Track?”, Alert, No. 19, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), March 2015, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/bosnia-and-herzegovina-backon-an-eu-track/ (last accessed on: 19 April 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 79 and CSDP missions and operations, among others. Coordination among these ministries takes place via regular inter-service meetings and on the occasion of high-level ministerial visits or meetings with Balkan counterparts. In recent years, the former President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, has played a special role. His symbolic role and international prestige tended to reinforce the government’s own demarches in the region, as was the case on the occasion of his official visit to Albania in March 2014. 195 The formal role of the Italian Parliament counterbalances the Executive’s general action in external relations, including in European affairs. It does this by exerting a function of orientation and control, as well as through (confidential) informative flows from Italian diplomatic posts, interrogations and hearings with senior governmental representatives. 196 However, the actual practice reportedly tends to differ. Normally, the Parliament struggles to discuss EU affairs (including enlargement issues) in a timely and systematic manner, due to the rather ‘schizophrenic pace’ of Italian domestic politics. Relations between the government and the Parliament are also affected by some lack of effective coordination on the dossier. This is due to what is perceived by some observers in the Parliament as the Executive’s underlying resistance to promptly submit to the constitutionally-granted authority of the Italian Parliament to co-shape foreign and European policies. At the same time, a general lack of interest by Italian Members of Parliament (MPs) in the intricacies of the EU enlargement process is observed. In turn, this tends to weaken the influence of the legislator in this policy area. Last but not least, the relative ‘normalisation’ of the Balkans, in terms of stability and security, has lessened the (already volatile) political attention of MPs towards the region. Instead, they focus on ‘hotter’ topics such as the Ukrainian crisis, Northern Africa (notably Libya) and the Middle East. Despite such problematic constraints, a wide – yet sometimes superficial – support for the Balkans’ European perspective exists across the Italian political spectrum. This is normally expressed in general acts and statements by the relevant parliamentary Committees, both in the Chamber of Deputies (Committee III – Foreign and EU Affairs) and the Senate (Committee XIV – Policies of the European Union). 197 The political positions that are occasionally taken by Italian MPs reportedly emphasise the need to maintain the momentum of EU enlargement towards both the Balkans and Turkey, despite the current difficult juncture, through the continuation of accession or pre-accession negotiations and the application of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Formal and informal contacts also take place between Italian MPs and official representatives from the Balkans, particularly Serbia and Albania, including through ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ with regional political representatives. 198 A number of Italian regions, such as Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Marche, and Puglia, have also become fairly pro-enlargement players. This is due to their tradition of commercial and peopleto-people relations with the Balkan area, as well as their participation in nationally and EU-funded cross195 For a detailed report on that visit, see, for instance, Pedrazzi, Nicola (2014), “Napolitano in Albania: Le Repubbliche di Fronte”, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, March 2014, available at: http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Napolitano-in-Albania-le-Repubbliche-di-fronte-149013 (last accessed on: 2 December 2014). 196 For the legal basis, see: Official Journal of the Republic of Italy (2012), “Norme Generali Sulla Partecipazione dell'Italia alla Formazione ed all'attuazione della Normativa e Delle Politiche dell'Unione Europea”, January 2014, Official Journal, No. 3, available at: http://www.politicheeuropee.it/normativa/18408/legge-24-dicembre-2012-n-234 (last accessed on: 2 December 2014). 197 See, for example: Chamber of Deputies (2011), Resolution 6-00091, Rome: Italian Parliament, available at: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc53267f2a1013272a9b23407c8.do (last accessed on: 2 December 2014). 198 For a selection of activities on the Balkans by the Chamber of Deputies between 2008 and 2012, see Italian Parliament (2015), “Temi dell’attività Parlamentare: Balcani Occidentali”, available at: http://www.camera.it/camera/browse/465?area=2&tema=15&Balcani+occidentali (last accessed on: 19 April 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 80 border cooperation programmes. For example, in the framework of the Italian ‘Decentralised Cooperation’ policy, as well as via EU’s ‘European Territorial Co-operation’ and IPA funds. The present collaboration between Italian and Balkan local actors covers a wide range of policy areas such as welfare, environmental cooperation, tourism, culture and territorial economic development. Several Italian regions, particularly Marche, have also strongly advocated the development of EUSAIR and reportedly pushed the Italian government to fully commit to that objective. 199 Other actors are acknowledged to play an informal advocacy role in shaping the Italian proenlargement position. These include the private sector and the ‘big players’ who are involved in the Balkans. For example, the state-owned ‘energy giants’ ENI and ENEL, as well as FIAT, the biggest Italian car-producer. Other economic factors that have a different modus operandi, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), could become more influential in the near future. It is likely that this could gradually shift the focus of Italy’s economic presence in the region from traditional export (or re-import-) oriented ‘de-localisation’ to a more network-based collaboration, and long-term integration, with local businesses. 200 A much lesser degree of influence is exerted by social (and sometimes politically affiliated) movements, trade unions and non-governmental organisations, notably those that are involved in development cooperation and environmental protection. Such actors have often pointed out a number of problematic elements in Italy’s relations with the region, including the issue of social and normative dumping driving de-localisation of Italian businesses to the region 201 , the potential environmental risks posed by the ongoing energy projects 202 , as well as the need to make local recipients more accountable for the use of Italian and EU development aid. The expert community, including think tanks and academia, tends to strongly support the European perspective of the Balkans, often urging the Italian government to keep the regional dossier at the top of its diplomatic agenda. 203 Nonetheless, decreasing budgetary resources for Balkan-focused research and information activities, as well as the traditional difficulty for foreign policy debates to resonate in the Italian media, tend to limit the impact of expert opinions on national policymaking. 199 See, for instance, Conference of the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces, “Ordine del Giorno Sulla Macroregione Adriatico Ionica”, 11/17/CR12/C3, 23 June 2011, Rome: Conference of the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces, available at: http://www.regioni.it/upload/230611_Macroreg_Adr_Ion.pdf (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). 200 See, for example, Stocchiero, Andrea (2014), op.cit. 201 See, for example: Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) (2010), “FIAT: Epifani, Azienda Riapra Dialogo con CGIL e FIOM”, 23 July 2010, Rome: CGIL, available at: http://www.cgil.it/news/Default.aspx?ID=14332 (last accessed on: 4 December 2014). 202 In particular, the debate on the environmental impacts of TAP has recently evolved into a politically sensitive confrontation between Puglia’s regional authorities and the Italian Government but also, among Italian political parties. See, for example, “Puglia, Grillo e i Parlamentari M5S Contro il Tap: ‘Opera di Fantascienza’”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 2014, available at: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/09/20/m5s-grillo-e-i-parlamentari-in-puglia-allamanifestazione-contro-il-tap/1127717/ (last accessed on: 5 December 2014), and “Gasdotto Tap, Matteo Renzi: ‘Non si Può Dire No a un'opera Così’. Sindaci Salento: ‘Troveremo Soluzione Alternativa’”, Huffington Post, September 2014, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/09/13/gasdotto-tap-matteo-renzi_n_5815806.html (last accessed on: 19 April 2015). 203 See, for example, Greco, Ettore (ed.) (2014), “Scegliere Per Contare: Rapporto Sulla Politica Estera Italiana”, Quaderno IAI No. 11, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, pp. 32-43, available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiq_11.pdf (last accessed on: 4 December 2014), and Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso (2013), “Position Paper: L’allargamento dell’UE ai Balcani e alla Turchia”, 21 November 2013, Rovereto: Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, available at: http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/Occasional-papers/L-allargamento-dell-UE-ai-Balcani-e-alla-Turchia (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 81 8.2.4 EU coalition-making strategies and approaches towards European actors Italy has often allied with a ‘core’ group of like-minded EU partners such as Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, and – although on a less frequent basis – the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Spain, and Slovakia. The linking factor among those countries, especially those in the ‘core’ group, is the attempt to couple a pro-enlargement attitude with a strict but fair application of the EU’s conditionality in the region. More generally, Italy is fully aware that “not all European capitals weigh the same”, and considers Germany and France particularly influential on enlargement, although often in a rather problematic sense, due to domestic issues including migratory matters (especially for the former) and a rising Eurosceptic public opinion (notably, for the latter). However, Italian interviewees acknowledged that Germany has become much more active in the region in recent times, notably from a commercial diplomacy viewpoint and despite the sometimes complicating role played by the Bundestag both in this and other European and foreign policy dossiers. Indeed, the Berlin Conference on the Balkans of July 2014 204 , involving Germany, France, Austria, the European Commission, and the Foreign Ministers of all the non-EU countries in the region, was perceived by Italy with some ill-concealed suspicion. This was due to its restricted format and its expected political and economic benefits for Germany’s stance in the region. Likewise, in Italy’s eyes, the influence of EU institutions tends to vary considerably, based on their bureaucratic competences and political clout. Rome considers the role of the European Commission as crucial in supporting the Balkans’ EU integration. Furthermore, Italy has reportedly backed Berlaymont’s distinctive interpretation of EU’s conditionality, as opposed to the one that was advanced by other member states, particularly Germany. At the same time, several observers placed some emphasis on the need for a more ‘politically-charged’ Commission to keep the enlargement process en route. Many interviewees also stressed the fact that, given the ultimately intergovernmental nature of EU enlargement policy, political consensus among EU member states remains a key driving force, well beyond EU institutional processes and actors. The function of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is assessed by Italy as one of diplomatic added value, as witnessed by the former High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton’s mediating role in the 2013 Serbia-Kosovo negotiations but also, in light of EEAS’ overall responsibility over EU Delegations in the region. More generally, Italy considers the progressive stabilisation of the Balkans as one of the few success stories of EU foreign policy so far. It very much encourages a stronger cooperation between the HR/VP and the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, along the lines of the deputisation suggested by President Juncker. According to Italian interviewees, the Rotating Presidency of the EU does play a role in the dossier, notably as the Chair of the COELA Working Party. However, its task is perceived more as one of overall coordination than ultimate steering, especially in the current inward-looking drift of the EU. At the same time, however, Italy believes that the Rotating Presidency can be used as a diplomaticallymeaningful ‘hat’ at a higher political level, in order to remind EU fellow capitals about the importance of enlargement and convey messages to the region. 204 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, “Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans”, 28 August 2014, Berlin: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, available at: http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/684762/publicationFile/195973/140828-Abschlusserkl_Konf_Westl_Balkan.pdf (last accessed on: 4 December 2014). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 82 In this light, the Italian Rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU included the enlargement dossier among its stated priorities. 205 The former Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini made a symbolical tour des capitales in the Balkans last July 206 . She spread a fairly optimistic message across the region, in a seemingly sharp contrast with the Commission President Juncker’s earlier statement on the ‘freezing’ of EU enlargement for the next five years. Moreover, during a hearing at the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) in early September 2014, former Minister Mogherini (who was, at that time, still a representative of the Italian EU Presidency) further stressed the importance of EU enlargement towards the Balkans for the “stability, security and prosperity of the whole European continent”. 207 However, such statements did not admittedly translate into any spectacular policy delivery during the ‘Presidency Semester’, with the partial exception of the opening of four additional negotiating chapters with Montenegro and the above-mentioned adoption of the EUSAIR. 208 On the contrary, several observers in Rome deem the European Parliament’s role as relatively marginal for the time being and, mostly, one of political counterweight to EU’s executive actors. Furthermore, some interviewees described the recent parliamentary reports as somewhat innovative, especially compared to the Commission’s annual Progress Reports. 8.3 STRATEGIES, CONDITIONALITY AND NATIONALISATION TRENDS 8.3.1 Rome’s views on EU enlargement strategy and conditionality Overall, the EU enlargement strategy and conditionality are assessed positively by Italy but interviewees made some critical points. Rome still considers the use of ‘sticks and carrots’ as the best way to encourage the countries in the region to carry the internal reforms needed and to gradually adapt to the acquis communautaire. The progress recently made by Serbia (with the first EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Conference in January 2014, signalling the formal start of Belgrade’s accession negotiations held) and by Albania (with Tirana’s EU candidate status being granted, albeit conditionally, by the GAC in June 2014) were evoked by interviewees as good examples of the relative success of the EU conditionality. The Commission’s insistence on ‘fundamentals first’, including its decision to have Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) 209 opened in the early stages and closed in the last phases of the accession negotiations was welcomed by Italy as an effective approach, given the crucial importance attached by Rome to the consolidation of the rule of law in the region. 205 Government of Italy (2014), “Europe, A fresh start: Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union”, Rome: government of Italy, pp. 16-17, available at: http://italia2014.eu/media/1349/programma_en1_def.pdf (last accessed on: 2 December 2014). 206 MFAIC (2014a), “Mogherini in missione nei Balcani: L'Italia punta all’’integrazione’ UE e sostiene processo riforme”, July 2014, Rome: MFAIC, available at: http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2014/07/20140724_mogbalcsar.htm (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). 207 Rettman, Andrew, “Mogherini Backs Western Balkan Enlargement”, EUObserver, September 2014, available at: http://euobserver.com/enlargement/125442 (last accessed on: 17 March 2015), and government of Italy (2014), “EU Enlargement: Extract of the Hearing of Federica Mogherini Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EU Parliament”, Rome: government of Italy, available at: http://italia2014.eu/en/news/video/european-parliament-hearings/extract-ofthe-hearing-of-federica-mogherini-before-the-foreign-affairs-committee/ (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). 208 Denti, Davide, “Allargamento UE, il Magro Bilancio Della Presidenza Italiana del Consiglio UE”, East Journal, January 2015, available at: http://www.eastjournal.net/allargamento-ue-il-magro-bilancio-della-presidenza-italiana-del-consiglioue/52975 (last accessed on: 17 March 2015). 209 European Commission (2014), op. cit. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 83 By the same token, Rome deems the ‘regatta approach’ as the only viable strategy for the region. This is in light of the precedents that have been set by Slovenia and Croatia, the perceived differences in political maturity and socio-economic development among candidate countries, as well as the need to inject a dynamic of positive competition among Balkan EU applicants. However, from an Italian standpoint, it is of paramount importance that the ‘enlargement fatigue’, which was recently experienced among the EU member states, does not generate a parallel ‘accession fatigue’ among EU ‘wannabes’ in the Balkans. In this regard, it is crucial that conditionality is kept ‘strict but fair’ – in the words of some interviewees, “the bar should be neither further raised nor lowered”. Moreover, according to some Italian officials, this calls for “more political responsibility” among EU capitals, in order to keep the process both credible and predictable. 8.3.2 Perceptions towards the nationalisation of EU enlargement Exceptions aside, Italian interviewees agreed that, to a certain degree, the EU’s enlargement policy has been ‘nationalised’ 210 in the past few years. Some observers referred to the past diplomatic struggle between ‘reluctant’ and ‘supportive’ European capitals over the granting of the candidate status to Albania as a case in point. 211 However, others noted that the ‘intergovernmental DNA’ of this policy inevitably made national incursions in the dossier much easier than in other EU policy areas. This, in turn, highlighted the essentially political nature of EU’s enlargement decision-making process. Interviewees placed the blame for this phenomenon on different factors, according to individual views and sensibilities. For some, it was very much part of the wider ‘enlargement fatigue’ wave that has affected the European Union in recent years. This is notably due to some ‘digestion problems’ and overall dissatisfaction with the latest rounds of enlargement (notably to Romania and Bulgaria), as well as the admittedly challenging internal reform processes in current Balkan aspirants. For others, it came primarily from the impact of the current political and economic crisis in Europe and the exposure of several European governments to increasingly sceptical public opinions. They also made reference to the increasing competition among EU member states in advancing their economic interests in the region. Italy generally perceives the supposed process of ‘creeping nationalisation’ 212 as a worrisome one, although several interviewees in Rome remain convinced that stronger, but constructive, activism by member states in the dossier can potentially make the EU enlargement process more credible and resilient. In this regard, some observers noted that the increased oversight by some national capitals on the concrete deliverables of the enlargement process was admittedly instrumental in pushing, for example, Albania, to devote more efforts to the fight against corruption and organised crime. According to this view, closer political involvement by member states in the dossier could help Balkan countries to get prepared sooner and better for their future European accession. 8.4 CONCLUSIONS: REVAMPING ITALY’S SÜDOSTPOLITIK Overall, and despite some (ultimately healthy) internal debates on its very modus operandi in the region, Italy conceives the European integration of the Balkans as very much beneficial to its vital 210 For the theoretical framework, see, Hillion, Christophe (2010), “The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy”, Report No. 6/2010, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), available at: http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2010_6_.pdf (last accessed on: 8 December 2014). 211 See, for example, “European Union Doesn’t Grant the Candidate Status to Albania”, Independent Balkan News Agency, 17 December 2013, available at: http://www.balkaneu.com/european-union-doesnt-grant-candidate-status-albania/ (last accessed on: 9 March 2015). 212 See: Hillion, Christophe (2010), op. cit. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 84 interests as an ‘Adriatic power’, notably those related to geo-economic projection and regional (and domestic) security. The overall perceived compatibility of Italy’s bilateral and EU objectives has made Rome into a strong supporter of enlargement. Furthermore, it has nurtured its traditional attempts to act as a mediator between the region and the EU. However, the Italian approach to the Balkans, including towards the EU’s enlargement to the region, remains affected by some structural constraints. These include a potential ‘democratic deficit’ due to the poor knowledge of the dossier by its political elites and the scarce interest – and possibly growing scepticism – of ordinary citizens, and the coordination challenge, posed by a ‘spaghetti bowl’-styled framework of national and sub-national institutional dialogue – one even more risky in times of severe fiscal austerity. Furthermore, there are dangers of a regional approach that is too focused on commercial opportunities and security concerns to the potential detriment of a much-needed parallel focus on emerging political challenges, such as media freedom and the overall state of democracy in the Balkans 213 . A further constraint is the occasional lack of sufficient political leverage to influence EU decision-making in the dossier, compared to other European capitals, as witnessed by the recent ‘Berlin Conference’ and the Anglo-German ‘plan for Bosnia’. As a result, and despite the competing thematic and geographic priorities of its foreign (for instance, the Southern Mediterranean but also, emerging economies in Asia, the Gulf and Latin America) and European (particularly growth, employment and migratory policies) policy agendas, Rome should strengthen and further enrich its natural ‘Balkan vocation’. With this, it should strive to match a more pro-active, comprehensive and participatory diplomatic engagement with a continuing support for a credible and effective EU enlargement strategy in the region. 213 See, for example, Dempsey, Judy (2015), “The Balkans’ Rocky Path to Democracy”, Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 20 April 2015, available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59830 (last accessed on: 21 April 2015), and Balfour, Rosa and Stratulat, Corina (2011), The Democratic Transformation of the Balkans, Issue Paper, No. 66, Brussels: European Policy Centre (EPC), available at: http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=2&pub_id=1363 (last accessed on: 21 April 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 85 SPAIN BY RUTH FERRERO TURRIÓN 9.1 Introduction 85 9.2 Historical background: Spain’s attitude to the 1990s enlargement 85 9.3 The Spanish position on Balkan enlargement 87 9.4 The Kosovo issue 89 9.4.1 Spain among the five non-recognising EU member states 89 9.4.2 Implications for Spain’s relations with Kosovo 91 9.5 Conclusion 92 9.1 INTRODUCTION Spain has had a dual approach towards the European Union’s enlargements. It joined the EU as a developing member state and, in a short period of time, managed to catch up in terms of influence. Due to its recent history as a transition country, official statements have always been in favour of an enlargement policy. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, Spain was more focused on deepening the European Union than on widening it. Its main goals were to have more presence and power in the Council – to reinforce cooperation in areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds, and to sign agreements with Mediterranean and Latin American countries. In the enlargement dossier, two options were possible: to block the process in the Council or to try to negotiate and win some influence in the European institutions. Spain chose the latter, applying political pragmatism to all of its choices. This strategy won the support of the public at ‘home’ – in May 2008, 53% of respondents were favourable to enlargement, according to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). As in previous rounds of enlargement, Spain does not lead the process of Balkan integration into the EU but looks for common positions and tries to negotiate in its own political interest. While Spanish interests are not in the Balkans, developments in the region affect Spanish domestic politics and Madrid is well aware of this. 9.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SPAIN’S ATTITUDE TO THE 1990S ENLARGEMENT When the association process with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) started at the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Spain was fighting to have more weight inside the European institutions. Chapter 9 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 92 9.5 CONCLUSION The Spanish case study prompts three main conclusions: 1. Leadership: The Spanish approach to the Balkans was shaped by the action of individual figures such as the Foreign Affairs Ministers, Fernández-Ordóñez and Moratinos. The former saw enlargement as the best means to avoid war and the latter promoted regional cooperation such as the Sarajevo Conference, which was organised during the Spanish Presidency of EU. 2. Multinational states as something to preserve. Spanish authorities have been very proactive in trying to maintain the presence of other multinational states, like the former Yugoslavia or, more recently, that of the UK facing the referendum on Scotland’s independence. This position directly relates to domestic politics, including the issue of Catalonia and the Basque Country, but also, to the belief that national heterogeneity enriches the state as a whole. Spain supports this argument with a strong defence of international law in territorial matters. Due to the internal situation of the country, Spanish authorities have always defended the preservation of territorial integrity, regardless of their political orientation. This is illustrated in Spain’s approach towards Kosovo, Scotland and Crimea. 3. Political pragmatism. The third pillar of the Spanish orientation towards the Balkans, and Eastern Europe in general, is the political pragmatism of its politicians. The heavy eastern orientation of Germany, firstly towards the CEECs and then to the future incorporation of the Balkan countries, made Spain feel that it would lose influence in the Union. For this reason, Spain insisted that any step towards the east had to be counterbalanced with one in its own interests (for example, related to the Mediterranean or Latin America). This way, Spain has been able to maintain a certain power among its partners. On the other hand, Spain has exploited its positive perception in the Balkan region in order to assist in mediation matters, especially in the relations with Belgrade. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 93 AUSTRIA BY FRANCO ALGIERI 232 10.1 Introduction 93 10.2 The deepening and/or widening nexus 94 10.3 The conceptual dimension: comprehensive security, multilateralism, & targeted initiatives 95 10.4 The actor dimension 96 10.4.1 Ethnicities, nationalities and migrants 97 10.4.2 Austrian politicians, diplomats, ministries, and political parties 98 10.4.3 Austrian economy 99 10.4.4 Critically concerned integration supporters and public opinion 100 10.5 Ambivalence at work 101 10.1 INTRODUCTION The debate regarding EU enlargement and especially with respect to the Balkans, is of particular concern for Austria. Within its wider geographical area, the Western Balkans is a key region for Austrian foreign policy. Understanding Austrian interests and strategy requires approaching the topic in a multidimensional manner and emphasising the following four issues. First, no other EU member state can be compared to Austria when historical links, as well as the geographic proximity between an EU member state and Balkan countries are taken into consideration. Second, applying a comprehensive understanding of security, as well as support for mechanisms and fora dealing with regional stability and security is an intrinsic part of Austria’s policy towards its neighbourhood. Third, linked to geography and history, the economic interdependence between Austria and the Balkans is of high relevance. Fourth and finally, during the period when Austria joined the European Union two decades ago, a broader and controversial scholarly and political debate had begun in Europe concerning the question of how to deepen European integration while at the same time enlarging it. The nexus between deepening and/or widening is still present in the inner Austrian debate about the European Union’s future in general, as is the country’s self-perception as a member of that Union in particular, causing an ambivalent position in today’s attitude towards enlargement and the Western Balkans. 232 The author would like to thank Tobias Salfellner, who compiled data for this article. Chapter 10 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 94 10.2 THE DEEPENING AND/OR WIDENING NEXUS During the period when Austria became a member of the EU, vivid debate about the finalité of the European integration process and the nature of the Union could be observed. A major topic in this context was the issue of how to bring in line the enlargement of the Union with the systemic deepening of integration. 233 Four different schools of thought were discussed: (1) widening first; (2) deepening first; (3) widening and deepening by differentiated and affiliated membership; (4) deepening for also widening. 234 Even though no consensus was reached on which of these schools could be considered the most promising for the future, the debate remains relevant today. While the terminology used has changed and it now appears to focus more on differentiated integration, the core problem has remained: the need to find a conceptual and strategic explanation for governing an enlarged Union. Just as differentiated integration is considered “a necessity if the EU wants to remain effective and overcome current and future challenges” 235 , it can be argued that without squaring the enlargement of the EU with an adequate systemic structure capable of meeting the goals of the Union, the internal and external challenges that the EU faces will further erode the European integration process. Some of these challenges, which includes the economic or financial problems of some EU member states, intra-state conflicts and the erosion of stability in the EU’s neighbourhood, or increasing societal cleavages within EU member states, are often used by some political actors in Austria, as well as in other European countries, to point to a perceived weakness within supranational governance. However, the causes of the malfunctioning of supranational policymaking can often be traced back to decisions made at the national level. 236 From the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty, the deepening of European integration by means of changing treaty provisions required the unanimous approval of EU member states. Similarly, during the different enlargement rounds since the 1990s, EU capitals have proven unwilling to relinquish their powers for deciding on whether or not a new member could join the Union. Apart from constitutional requirements and legal provisions, which need to be considered through national decision-making processes, several other factors influence the multifacetted discourses on EU enlargement within the member states. One of these is public opinion. Linked herewith, the interests of political actors and the role of media play a crucial role in creating sentiments or resentments towards the European integration project. 237 Another almost teleological argument in favour of enlargement is built around the assumption that European integration can be a normative model for non-EU countries. Consequently, joining the ‘integration club’ cannot be reduced simply to achieving added economic value. On the contrary, equally 233 Wessels, Wolfgang and Engel, Christian, eds. (1993), The European Union in the 1990s. Ever closer and larger?, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. 234 Wessels, Wolfgang (1993), “Deepening versus widening? Debate on the shape of EC-Europe in the nineties”, in Wessels and Engel (1993), pp. 17-56. 235 See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. (2013) “Which lessons to draw from the past and current use of differentiated integration?”, in Directorate General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C. Citizens’s rights and constitutional affairs, Challenges of multi-tier governance in the European Union. Effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, Brussels, pp. 62-77, here p. 66. 236 Robert Menasse demanded in one of the leading Austrian newspapers a European migration and asylum policy and criticised EU member states for their reluctance to arrive at one. The reactions that followed his article showed a differentiated picture, ranging from opinions immediately rejecting any proposal to strengthen the supranational level to those showing support for a stronger European approach. Menasse, Robert, “Geht hin und benennt die wahren‚ Mörder’!”, Die Presse, 23 April 2015, available at: http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gastkommentar/4714901/Gehthin-und-benennt-die-wahren-Morder?from=suche.intern.portal (last accessed on: 25 April 2015). 237 See further and with examples for Austria Schneider, Heinrich (2010), “Die Gretchenfrage an die Mitgliedstaaten: ‚Sag, wie hast Du’s mit der Integration?”, Institute for European Integration Research Working Paper Series, Number 2, Vienna, p. 87. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 95 important are the benefits for political and societal stability. 238 Using this line of reasoning, the concept of shared interests and common values amongst old members and newcomers is expected to trigger a kind of mainstream support for European integration. 239 Closely connected to this and symbolic for the enlargement discourse of the early 1990s was the argument that accession to the EU should not be seen as a “subject of minor importance”, because this would create “mistrust and will only lead to negative backlashes later on”. 240 The integration debate has always presented diverging opinions about enlargement and the extent to which states may be willing to pool sovereignty. At the same time, it has always been clear that all steps in favour or against a deepened and widened Union were linked to the realist understanding that states are ultimately the decisive actors. 10.3 THE CONCEPTUAL DIMENSION: COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY, MULTILATERALISM AND TARGETED INITIATIVES When the characteristics of Austrian foreign policy are discussed, the search for a definition of Austria’s neutrality in the context of the country’s participation in the CFSP/CSDP of the EU immediately arises. 241 However, apart from the neutrality debate, it seems important to concentrate on two essential terms: ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘multilateralism’, as these are central to the conceptualisation of Austrian foreign, security and defence policy in the 21st century. In accordance herewith, foreign, security and defence related activities shall be embedded in a multilateral framework, mainly the EU, UN or the OSCE. Furthermore, when a comprehensive security concept is applied in Austrian Balkan policy, regional, internal and economic security become interwoven. (1) Regional security: due to a shared history and established interdependence between Austria and the Balkans, regional security plays a pivotal role in Austrian foreign policy. 242 National security interests are therefore best served by using and contributing to the EU’s interests, policies (for example, CFSP, CSDP and ENP) and instruments. 243 The self-perception of Austria as a member of the EU, as well as security interests deriving from geographical proximity, is used to justify the support of regional stability initiatives in the Balkans. (2) Internal security: in the context of Austria’s internal security interests, “a pro-active contribution to the stability and security of problematic countries of origin and transit, which are relevant to the security of Austria and the EU” 244 is pursued. This entails, inter alia, support for “the countries in the Western Balkans and South-East Europe, as they are brought into line with EU security standards”. 245 (3) Economic security: the Balkan region is of high importance to Austria’s external economic relations. Keeping the Balkan countries out of the European Union is expected to cause negative effects for 238 For the experiences of Spain and Portugal becoming EU members in 1986, see Diedrichs, Udo and Wessels, Wolfgang (1996), “From newcomers to mainstreamers. Lessons from Spain and Portugal”, in Algieri, Franco and Regelsberger, Elfriede (eds.), Synergy at work. Spain and Portugal in European foreign policy, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, pp. 315-330. 239 Diedrichs and Wessels (1996), p. 330. 240 Wessels (1993), p. 56. 241 For an analysis of the controversial debate in Austria see Hummer, Waldemar (2004), “Panta rhei - Die immer währende Neutralität Österreichs und die Europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur im Fluss”, in Busek, Eberhard and Hummer, Waldemar (eds.), Etappen auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Verfassung, Wien: Böhlau, pp. 141-168. 242 The civil and military engagement of Austria within multilateral missions and operations in the EU’s neighbourhood is regularly stressed. Furthermore, Austria “will also continue to participate in the entire spectrum of CSDP activities referred to in the TEU, including the EU Battlegroups, within the scope of its capabilities.” Republik Österreich (2013), Austrian Security Strategy. Security in a new decade – Shaping security“, Vienna, p. 13. 243 See Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres (2013), Außenund europapolitischer Bericht 2013, Vienna. 244 Republik Österreich (2013), p. 14. 245 Ibid. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 96 Austrian companies such as insufficient legal frameworks or fewer possibilities for investment. 246 Accordingly, it has become obvious that it is in Austria’s best interest to support reform processes in the Balkan countries, for example, through measures aimed at the strengthening of the rule of law and democracy. The scenario of a standstill or even an end to Balkan enlargement is considered undesirable, because it is assumed that the costs for Austria in terms of regional, internal and economic security will be higher than the costs of integration. Only by means of cooperation within an arena of highly interconnected actors can Austria’s interest materialise: Comprehensive security policy means that external and internal aspects of security are inextricably interlinked, as are civil and military aspects. It extends beyond the purview of the ministries and departments traditionally in charge of security and encompasses instruments from policy areas, like economy and social affairs, integration, development, environment, agriculture, finance, transport and infrastructure, education, information and communication, as well as health. Integrated security policy must be based on a cooperative approach between governmental and non-governmental actors; security must be understood as a “comprehensive package”, as it were. Proactive security policy means working towards preventing threats from emerging in the first place or at least taking steps to mitigate their negative impact (shaping security). Security policy based on solidarity takes into account that the security of neutral Austria is now largely interconnected with the security of the EU as a whole. 247 In addition to the broader EU framework, Austria has been in favour of specific targeted initiatives. On the assumption that the “Western Balkans belong to Europe” 248 , cooperation with other Central and Eastern European states, for example the Visegrád 4 (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) or in the framework of the Central European Initiative are deemed as important factors that can contribute to regional stability. The “Forum Salzburg” 249 , which focuses amongst others on the implementation of a common external strategy in a European context, specifically towards the Western Balkans, can be taken as another case in point. To sum up, a comprehensive understanding of security, cooperation within multilateral arenas, as well as specific targeted initiatives defines the contours of Austria’s conceptualisation of a foreign policy strategy in general and to Balkan enlargement in particular. 10.4 THE ACTOR DIMENSION Beneath this overarching level, different actors shape Austrian preferences and interests with regard to the Balkans and enlargement of the EU. 246 The Austrian economy became a main profiteer of the strategy to associate neighbouring countries closer to the EU and finally integrating them as members into the Union. See Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (July 2014), 10 Jahre EUErweiterung. Eine Bilanz der Wirtschaft, Vienna. 247 Republik Österreich (2013), p. 4. 248 Lopatka: “EU-Erweiterungsprozess am Westbalkan entscheidend für Österreich”, available at: http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium/pressenews/presseaussendungen/2013/lopatka-eu-erweiterungsprozessamwestbalkan-entscheidend-fuer-oesterreich.html (last accessed on: 22 November 2014). 249 This forum was founded in 2000 between Austria and the then EU accession countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in order to “strengthening cooperation in the centre of Europe in the field of internal security, and supporting the members not yet belonging to the EU in their efforts to meet EU standards and their preparations for EU accession”. It was then further enlarged and in 2007, countries of the Western Balkans participated for the first time at a ministerial conference within the framework of the ‘Friends of the Salzburg Forum’. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 97 10.4.1 Ethnicities, nationalities and migrants History links Austria to the Balkans in a very specific way. Whether during times of the Habsburg Empire, the First World War, the Second Word War, the Cold War or the dissolution period of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the region has continued to be of importance for Austrian politics within an extended historical perspective. While relations between Austria and this adjacent region were largely conflict-ridden during the first half of the 20th century, both sides have moved closer together since the second half of the previous century. Different ethnicities, nationalities and migrations have driven the association between both sides. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire, with its various ethnicities and languages, was often described as a multi-ethnic society. Today, the Republic of Austria still brings together different ethnicities and nationalities, as well as a significant number of people from the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia. A first group refers to Slovenian and Croatian minorities. Article 7 of the State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) of 1955 determines the legal rights of Slovenian and Croatian minorities in some of the Austrian Bundesländer. 250 A second group is linked to labour migrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, Austria witnessed a significant increase in its labour force. Not least due to a bilateral labour recruitment treaty, which was signed between Austria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1966, labour migration to Austria became part of a structured process. In the 1970s, three quarters of the foreign labour force in Austria came from this country and until 2002, accounted for almost half of the foreign workers in Austria. 251 A third group is composed of refugees and asylum seekers from the Balkans. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars, Austria faced a strong increase of refugees from this region, especially in the 1990s. However, during the period 2004-2013, records of requests for asylum in Austria from Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo suggest that the numbers lagged significantly behind those from the Russian Federation, Afghanistan, Iran and Syria. 252 Austria is an immigration country and people with a migrant background are a shaping societal factor. 253 Regarding non-EU country nationals living in Austria, Serbia is ranked first, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the states that joined the EU since 2004 are taken into account, Croatia ranks first. 254 During the course of several decades, many of these migrants have obtained Austrian citizenship. 255 Therefore, representatives of such different groups are present and participating in different social, cultural and political fora in Austria. As lobbies and interest groups in particular and as 250 For the further legal framework, see „Bundesgesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Volksgruppen in Österreich (Volksgruppengesetz – VoGrG)“, Vienna, available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000602 (last accessed on: 12 January 2015). 251 Biffl, Gudrun, Rennert, Lea and Aigner, Petra (2012), “Migrant workers in Austria and Europe. Challenges for industrial relations, in particular trade unions”, Monograph Series Migration and Globalization, Krems: Danube University Krems, p. 32. 252 Statistik Austria (2014), Migration & Integration. Zahlen, Daten, Indikatoren 2014, Vienna, p. 37. 253 Concerning immigration over the period 2009-2012, Austria ranked ninth amongst EU/EEA countries, with an average of 9.3% immigrants within the population, clearly behind, e.g., Luxembourg, Cyprus and Switzerland, but ahead of, e.g., Germany and France. Statistik Austria (2014), p. 35. 254 Statistik Austria, available at: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_staatsangehoeri gkeit_geburtsland/index.html (last accessed on: 21 January 2015). 255 Of people being naturalised in Austria in 2013, 32.7% originally held the nationality of a country within former Yugoslavia and almost half of them were born in Austria. Statistik Austria (2014), p. 85. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 98 part of the electorate in general, Austrian political parties cannot ignore these specific interests and links with the Balkans. 10.4.2 Austrian politicians, diplomats, ministries, and political parties Against the background of strong historic relations between Austria and the Balkans, diplomacy towards the Balkans holds a prominent place in Austrian political discourse and foreign policy. Politicians and diplomats from Austria have frequently engaged in Balkan affairs, on both bilateral and multilateral levels. 256 Their activities reflect the fact that the government in Vienna considers the Western Balkans as part of Europe and a central area of interest for Austria. In general, the Austrian government supports the accession strategy as it is managed at the supranational level. A specific Austrian ranking or prioritising of the countries of the Western Balkans does not exist. Nevertheless, in the Austrian government Work Programme 2013-2018, it is stressed that the required accession criteria have to be fulfilled; the progress of each candidate’s individual progress has to be considered and the ‘absorption capacity’ (Aufnahmefähigkeit) of the EU has to be guaranteed. 257 How the term Aufnahmefähigkeit is understood by the Austrian government is not explained in this document. Several federal ministries (in particular, the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports, and the Federal Ministry of the Interior) are engaged in a cross-ministerial process and in cooperation with the Federal Chancellery regarding topics and programmes targeting the region. Special attention is paid to supporting the transformation of the aspiring countries in the Balkans in order to bring them closer to EU standards. Among the different ministries, the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs plays a prominent role. The ministry’s report on the ‘EU Work Programme 2015’ stresses that offering the Balkans a European perspective is still considered the most important force for the stabilisation and development of the region. Due to geographic proximity, economic interconnection and historic links, the countries of the Western Balkans are considered to be of specific importance for Austria, and thus remain a priority for Vienna’s foreign policy. 258 The programmatic approach is carried out through various initiatives that address different target groups. For example, on the initiative of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, a Western Balkans Conference was hosted in June 2014 in Vienna with the foreign ministers of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), Albania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy, as well as the EU commissioner Štefan Füle and Vice President of the World Bank, Laura Tuck. This event underlined that from the point of view of Austria, enlargement is considered to be of mutual benefit to Austria and other countries in the region. Showing support for the civil society sector, whether within a UN or EU context, or conceptualised as an explicit Austrian approach, has become a popular feature of Austria’s diplomacy. 259 256 For example, former Foreign Minister Alois Mock had already advocated in the early 1990s (before Austria joined the EU) in favour of the idea of bringing the Balkan region closer to the European integration process. Former Vice Chancellor Eberhard Busek acted as Special Representative of the EU, acting as Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. The diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch served as EU Special Envoy for Kosovo, EU Chief Negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris, as well as the High Representative of the International Community for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter position is now held by Valentin Inzko, who was also EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 257 Republik Österreich (2013), “Arbeitsprogramm der österreichischen Bundesregierung 2013-2018. Erfolgreich. Österreich.”, Vienna, p. 71. 258 Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres (2015), “EU Arbeitsprogramm 2015. Bericht des Bundesministers für Europa, Integration und Äußeres an das österreichische Parlament”. Vienna, pp. 10-11. 259 For example, a conference commissioned by Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz on ‘Civil Society as a Factor for Change in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in September 2014 in Vienna, and the ‘Vienna 3C Appeal’, a collaboration between Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 99 The Austrian Parliament is primarily supportive of the government’s position on EU enlargement and the Western Balkans. Considering the governing political parties in Austria, the two coalition partners SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) and ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) are mainly in favour of enlargement. The Social Democrats consider enlargement of the EU as part of the effort to maintain a zone of peace and stability in Europe. It is believed that enlarging the EU has to follow a step-by-step approach and should create added economic and social value for Europe. 260 For the conservative ÖVP, there are no alternatives to the deepening of European integration or to EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans. For this reason, the party advocates pro-active Austrian engagement in this region as a core element of Austria’s EU and foreign policy. The stability of the Balkan region is equalled to greater security and better economic conditions for Austria. 261 The Green Party is also largely supportive of bringing the Western Balkans into the EU. This task is seen as part of the European peace project. The Greens emphasise respect in terms of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the aspiring countries. 262 The liberal NEOS describe the approach of enlarging the Union prior to institutionally deepening it as a mistake. Therefore, this party calls for fundamental institutional reform to render the EU capable of further enlargement. 263 The populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) reflects the most EUand integration-sceptical attitude. 264 With regards to EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, the party has generally wavered between opposition and support. Yet in the hope of increasing its electoral appeal, the FPÖ has tried to follow a Serbia-friendly line. 265 10.4.3 Austrian economy Compared to other EU member states, the Austrian economy profited extensively from the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The Western Balkans enlargement is expected to offer similar far-reaching economic opportunities for Austria. For some of the countries in the region, Austria has become the biggest direct foreign investor (see Table 10.1). Furthermore, in terms of imports and exports, the region is also important to Austria (see Table 10.2). Table 10.1: Austrian direct investment in Western Balkans countries, 2012. 266 Country/Year Austrian investment (%) Position of Austria as investor Albania/2011 15.6 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina/2012 23.8 1 Macedonia/2012 11.8 2 Montenegro/2011 2.7 12 Serbia/2012 17.2 1 governments and non-governmental actors, available at: http://bim.lbg.ac.at/en/story/news/civil-society-factor-changebosnia-and-herzegovina-conference-8-10-september-2014 (last accessed on 12 January 2015) and http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/Vienna_3C_Appeal.pdf (last accessed on: 23. November 2014). 260 SPÖ (1998), “Das Grundsatzprogramm”, Vienna, p. 27. 261 ÖVP (2015), “Grundsatzprogramm 2015 der Österreichischen Volkspartei”, Vienna, pp. 42-44. 262 Die Grünen, “Pläne, Projekte, Visionen. Europawahl 2014”. Vienna, pp. 26-27. 263 NEOS, “Wahlprogramm 2014. Pläne für ein neues Europa”, Vienna, pp. 11, 23 264 FPÖ (2011), „Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)“, Vienna, p. 12. 265 See “Voller Liebe für die Arier Anatoliens”, Zeit Online, 27 September 2013, available at: http://www.zeit.de/2013/40/fpoe-rechtspopulismus-migranten (last accessed at: 23 November 2014). 266 Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (2014), p. 5. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 100 Table 10.2: Austrian imports and exports with Western Balkan countries, 2012-2013, value in €. 267 Imports 2012 Imports 2013 Exports 2012 Exports 2013 Albania 26.674.383 20.388.894 55.166.029 49.202.357 Bosnia-Herzegovina 387.014.082 405.006.269 344.021.561 351.151.186 Kosovo 6.509.764 6.508.472 30.846.183 29.967.452 Macedonia 62.207.677 62.919.583 106.960.879 119.511.260 Montenegro 3.490.529 3.594.143 39.594.012 44.016.383 Serbia 260.277.718 329.246.805 544.612.860 502.574.240 Total 746.174.153 827.664.166 1.121.201.524 1.096.422.878 Without doubt, Austria benefits from close bilateral economic cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans. The Austrian government, as well as representatives of Austrian business and industry, are well aware that a profitable trade and investment environment in the Balkans is interlinked with the policies and support instruments provided by the European Union and other multilateral organisations in the region, for example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). From Austria’s perspective, the EBRD serves as an important forum for improving economic conditions. In 2013, Austrian companies were able to gain €40.3 million from EBDR contracts and Austria benefitted tremendously from the bank’s work. 268 Looking at economic forecasts, Austria is expected to profit from the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans. Some Austrian economists demand a systemic deepening of the EU, while emphasising that enlargement should not be postponed for too long. 269 10.4.4 Critically concerned integration supporters and public opinion Of course, it could be argued that in light of the geographical proximity and economic interdependence between Austria and the countries of the Balkans, support for (1) the EU’s efforts to stabilise the region and (2) to extend the European peace project to the Balkans should guide Austria’s strategy. Many representatives of Austrian political parties, the government or the economic sector therefore back the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans, stressing that this should not be seen as a one-way street, but rather as a policy beneficial to the economy and to overall regional stability. At the same time, within Austria, critical supporters of the European integration project 270 , who are generally in favour of deeper European integration, point out that the EU’s current state of affairs can have detrimental effects on the idea of achieving ‘more Europe’. They raise doubts about the effectiveness of the EU’s ‘carrots and sticks approach’ to individual Balkan countries and the region as a whole. Furthermore, there is a lack of alternative scenarios and visionary approaches regarding this issue. As is the case concerning the supranational level and within numerous other EU member states, ‘enlargement fatigue’ has also taken hold of the wider Austrian public. Public opinion on Balkan enlargement reflects a mix of perceived negative experiences regarding past enlargements, general scepticism towards governance structures at the national and supranational levels, as well as the feeling that the EU lacks a new and adequate integration narrative. In particular, the entry of Bulgaria 267 Data compiled from STATCube, Statistical Data Base of Statistic Austria, available at: http://sdb.statistik.at/superweb/autoLoad.do (last accessed on: 15 January 2015). 268 Danninger: “Westbalkan bleibt nach wie vor ein bedeutsamer Wirtschaftsfaktor für Österreich”, 14 May 2014, available at: https://www.bmf.gv.at/ministerium/presse/archiv-2014/mai/EBRD_Danninger.html (last accessed on: 25 January 2015). 269 See “Aiginger: Österreich könnte vom Balkan profitieren”, eu-infothek.com, 25 January 2014, available at: http://www.euinfothek.com/article/aiginger-oesterreich-koennte-vom-balkan-profitieren (last accessed on: 25 January 2015). 270 Several interviewees were strong supporters of the EU and the integration project, however, not in a purely prointegration rhetoric fashion, but rather critical and concerned about deficiencies of the EU, which is often caused by its member states. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 101 and Romania is often mentioned in Austria as an example of a failed enlargement strategy. Consequently, hesitance towards Balkan enlargement remains persistent. Concerns also remain about whether or not the countries of the region can develop effective measures for countering prevalent corruption or to implement instruments for conflict management in order to overcome disputes between different ethnicities and social cleavages. Thus, calls for enlargement at the political level are not echoed by the Austrian public, the latter fearing that another problematic enlargement may ensue. Moreover, despite the high degree of economic interdependence between Austria and the Balkan countries, a large part of the Austrian population views far-reaching economic engagement in the region, especially in the financial and banking sector, with scepticism. 271 Consequently, Austrians, like many other EU citizens, remain opposed to further enlargement in future. 272 Table 10.3: Austrian public opinion concerning EU enlargement, in %, 2014. 273 BosniaHerzegovina Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Albania Kosovo Iceland Turkey Favourable 27 26 25 27 21 20 57 8 Against 55 56 57 58 61 63 24 84 Don’t care 12 12 11 13 13 13 13 4 Rest to 100% no opinion/not specified. In this context, it should not be forgotten that the perception of the EU by Balkan countries has become ever more critical. Today, membership to the EU is not necessarily seen as a preferred prospect for the future. On the contrary, European integration is increasingly often being described as a failing or exclusive project. Enlargement scepticism within the EU has also contributed to fostering a similarly negative mood in the countries of the Balkans, which had for a long time linked their hopes for prosperous development and political stability to EU membership. 274 Member states like Austria and Germany, which once had a positive image in some parts of the region due to the roles they played during the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s, are presently questioned as reliable supporters of the Balkans’ integration within the EU. The countries of the region are neither naïve nor do they lack critical awareness of the EU’s cumbersome developments and deficiencies. Trust in the EU is eroding and the belief in an enlargement-friendly EU is becoming weaker. 10.5 AMBIVALENCE AT WORK While the official position of Austria concerning the EU’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans is still positive and supported by the government, in most political parties, as well as in the economic sector, a strong ambivalence exists between the official stance and the much more sceptical public opinion on the subject. Ambivalence also characterises the debate about the future of the European integration process and, in particular, of how to bring enlargement in line with other institutional reforms of the Union. Even within the enlargement-friendly Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs there appears to be disagreement about what a successful approach to integration should look like. For example, whilst supporting the candidate status of Albania and fYROM is seen as symbolic of the region, there is uncertainty about how to handle Serbia. One of the crucial questions here is how to achieve the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and whether this 271 The experience with the Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank has influenced this scepticism. 272 See Standard Eurobarometer 81, p. 137. 273 Survey of Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft (SWS) on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics, September 2014, available at: http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20141008_OTS0002/oegfe-schmidtoesterreicherinnen-konstant-skeptisch-gegenueberkuenftigen-eu-erweiterungen (last accessed on: 25 January 2015). 274 See Dzihic, Vedran (2012), “Ein Plädoyer für die EU-Erweiterung. Warum es zum europäischen Erweiterungsprojekt am Westbalkan keine Alternative gibt”, OIIP Policy Paper 10/2012, p. 5. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 108 side. These efforts carry certain domestic political risks, especially around specific sensitive issues such as missing persons, war crimes, the use of Cyrillic text in a highly symbolic ‘hero city’ like Vukovar, or near critical political moments like elections. One example was a visit by Pusić to Belgrade, where she gave an interview suggesting that war crimes were the responsibilities of the then-existing Serbian and Croatian governments – thus appearing to implicate former Croatian President, former president of the HDZ and ‘father of Croatia’, Franjo Tuđman. As one might expect, such statements drew a harsh reaction from the HDZ and other centre-right-oriented Croatians. 283 This ‘restructuring and redemption’ approach seeks to work with BiH to meet similar conditionality requirements and to also place pressure on Serbia to alter some of its behaviour – ostensibly in preparation for a more meaningful membership. Intermingled with the cooperative declarations towards BiH are statements advocating the ‘equal status’ of Croats in the neighbouring state, some of which seem to suggest a renegotiation of the Dayton accords and the possible creation of a third, ‘Croatian’ entity. While all stakeholders advocating this particular approach were adamantly supportive of EU membership with conditions for all neighbours, conversations frequently focused primarily on BiH, and particularly the state of Croats within that neighbouring state. With regard to Serbia, proponents of this approach are careful to note that they do not explicitly support bilateral vetoing by Croatia. However, the line between insisting on Serbia’s meeting certain (Croatian) conditions prior to membership and bilateral vetoing is rather fuzzy. Public statements aligned with the ‘restructuring and redemption’ narrative proliferated in the fall of 2014 after Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Šešelj’s provisional release from the Hague, the International Court of Justice’s simultaneous dismissal of the Croatian and Serbian genocide cases and during the run-up to the hard-fought Croatian presidential elections, which resulted in the victory of HDZsupported candidate Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović over incumbent president and committed enlargement supporter Ivo Josipović. Grabar-Kitarović stated in a presidential debate that she would make Serbia’s entrance into the EU conditional on it providing information on missing persons from the early 1990s war in Croatia and on guaranteeing rights for its minorities. In another setting, she also made statements supporting constitutional changes in BiH that would guarantee the equal rights of Croatians. In reaction to Šešelj’s public appearances in Serbia, HDZ MEP Andrej Plenković successfully proposed a resolution to the EU Parliament that reminded the Serbian government of its obligations as an EU candidate country and called on it to condemn Šešelj’s public statements and investigate whether he was in violation of any laws. In a more direct attempt to actively block Serbia’s progress towards membership, Plenković joined three of his party colleagues and another representative from the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS) to propose an amendment to a European Parliament resolution on Serbia, which would have brought further negotiations between the EU and Serbia to a halt until the Serbian government changed laws that provided the legal basis for the arrest and detainment of former Croatian soldier Veljko Marić on war crimes charges. This would constitute the first explicit effort by Croatian political actors to use European Union institutions to obstruct Serbia’s quest for membership in the organisation. In a more unsettling twist to the story, Croatian Premier and Social Democratic Party president Zoran Milanović picked up the ‘redemption’ narrative himself, declaring that Croatia would block Serbia’s membership bid unless the laws were changed. This suggests that this discourse is potentially jumping party and ideological divides and that even members of previously supportive parties may feel pressure to adopt a more obstructive stance. 283 “Pusić izjednačuje krivnju I amnestira protagonist velikosprske politike,” Tportal.hr, 28 February 2014, available at: http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/318607/Pusic-izjednacuje-krivnju-i-amnestira-protagoniste-velikosrpskepolitike.html (last accessed on 12 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 109 Looking back to the summer of 2014, one can note a disturbing (from the standpoint of continued EU enlargement) shift in the overall rhetoric of the HDZ and even some in the centre and centre-left (that is, Milanović) towards statements that are seemingly at odds with the Croatian Parliament’s 2011 pledge to support enlargement and reject bilateral vetoing. Committed advocates of enlargement like Foreign Minister Vesna Pusić may have been heartened by successfully placing the ‘new approach’ on the EU agenda, but such voices are increasingly competing with other actors in the domestic sphere, employing less cooperative language and operating on increasingly important positions, both internally and on the EU stage. 11.4 ROOTS OF THE POLICIES From the interviews and media analysis, one can identify certain common factors that were frequently cited as the bases for the aforementioned approaches. These include: (1) the enlargement policy and conditionality will help neighbouring states build stronger states and markets; (2) enlargement will promote regional stability and security; (3) enlargement will re-integrate Croatia into a market where it previously held significant advantages; (4) the entry of BiH into the EU would benefit Croatians living there; and (5) integration will consolidate the rest of the region into the European camp, and thus ward off potential competing influences from Russia and Islamic states. With regard to the positive impacts of conditionality, interlocutors pointed to the fact that Croatia as a state benefited from a lengthy and rigorous accession process, which forced difficult decisions on both politicians and society. Subjecting other countries in the region to similar conditions is expected to produce comparable results, thus contributing to the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. Yet these arguments must be taken with some scepticism. EU reports and statements by the Croatian president himself suggest that even Croatia’s ‘hardest road’ was not enough to overcome endemic corruption and a weak legal system. For additional proof, one needs to look no further than the new ‘enhanced’ accession process proposed for Montenegro and Serbia which, like the process applied to Croatia, seeks to draw on lessons learned from previous enlargement rounds (in Croatia’s case, from the accession of Romania and Bulgaria). Related to this state capacity argument, interviewees also revealed that enlargement would promote stability and security in the region by stimulating better governance and resolving ongoing issues over borders, and relations between citizens and the state. With Croatia sharing land borders with three Balkan countries, including a particularly long border with BiH, interviewees claimed that it was in the state’s national interest to promote the strengthening and stabilisation of neighbours within the EU framework. In recent months, as the ‘restructuring and redemption’ approach became increasingly salient, arguments in favour of potentially blocking Serbia’s progress towards membership oftentimes made explicit or implicit reference to concerns over human rights and regional stability – particularly with regard to Vojislav Šešelj and the furore around the Veljko Marić case. Serbia’s reaction to the ICJ’s rejection of the two countries’ genocide cases also elicited statements by Croatian political actors suggesting that Serbia had not come to terms with its past. Similar appeals to human rights can be heard in calls to ensure the equality of Croatians in neighbouring BiH. Economic arguments also figure prominently. When Croatia entered the EU, it effectively ‘exited’ the Central European Free Trade Agreement, a regional free trade organisation that encompassed states in the former ‘Yugo-sphere’, where Croatian products tended to enjoy the highest demand. From 20072012, about 60% of Croatia’s exports were absorbed by the European Union, while roughly 20% were Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 110 absorbed by CEFTA countries. 284 Croatia’s exit from CEFTA was estimated by a number of analysts to have a negative impact on the Croatian economy both in terms of lowered exports and loss of investment, as certain Croatian companies set up satellite operations in neighbouring countries to avoid higher tariffs. The impact was felt differently in each sector, as tariff duties rose and fell accordingly. 285 On 25 June 2014, Serbia and Croatia signed a new protocol that would essentially give Croatian goods the same treatment in Serbia that they had before Croatia entered the EU. 286 With varying degrees of explicitness, the issue was also linked to the interests of Croats living in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina. This received more emphasis in the HDZ’s statements, likely due to the party’s close ties to Croatians in the region. Nonetheless, all major actors focused part of their treatment of BiH’s membership prospects on the state of the Croatian minority there. A problem with this factor for actors of any political stripe, but particularly for those to the right of the centre, is that such statements can quickly draw accusations of Croatian meddling in the internal affairs of postDayton Bosnia. Declarations made by Croatian conservatives, including HDZ president Tomislav Karamarko, lent more than an element of validity to such concerns. 287 Finally, as suggested in the arguments of Jović and others, the enlargement issue has also been overshadowed by the events unfolding in Ukraine, and increasing concerns about Russia’s intentions in the region. It was also posed in terms of warding off what could best be summarised as ‘Islamic extremism’ – a concern which has only increased given the growing threat of ISIS. From this perspective, by helping neighbouring countries make a solid choice for Europe, the region would become less vulnerable to other possible influences opposed to Croatia’s national interest. 11.5 POLICY FORMULATION While certainly not formally enshrined in the constitution, interviewees frequently pointed out that the president has “50%” of the responsibility for foreign policy. For individual member states, especially as small as Croatia, the effort to revive and sustain enlargement is as much about public statements and the hosting of international forums and delegations as it is about concrete legislation. In this respect, current President Ivo Josipović has been quite active. Interviews with individuals from the president’s circle of advisors indicate that the president consults with supporters of the status quo, special status for BiH and ‘big bang’ approaches, and this has been reflected also in his statements made throughout his presidency. The fact that Josipović is a highly educated and politically astute actor in his own right also means that he is hardly a passive mouthpiece for any particular member of his circle. Turning next to the government, one cannot speak about decision making within the Foreign Ministry without focusing on the person of the Foreign Minister herself – Vesna Pusić – who has been a longtime and very passionate advocate of Croatia’s accession, and who sees EU membership as contributing not only to national interest but to the greater cause of the EU as an idea. This has made her a frequent target of more inward-looking politicians who find it easy to accuse her of selling out the country’s national interests. Her position in the tellingly named Ministry of Foreign and European 284 Holzner, Mario (2013), “Impact of Croatian EU Accession on Regional Trade Patterns,” wiiw Policy Notes and Reports, Number, 2, p. 3. 285 “CEFTA after Croatian joins the EU: Commotion at the top”, Biznis & Finansije, December 2014, available at: http://bif.rs/2013/12/cefta-after-croatia-joins-the-eu-commotion-at-the-top/ (last accessed on: 12 March 2015). 286 “EU natjerala Srbiju na veći uvoz naših cigareta”, Jutarnji List, 25 June 2014, available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/potpisanprotokol-na-ssp-izmedu-srbije-i-eu-a--povoljniji-tretman-za-hrvatski-izvoz/1201710/ (last accessed on: 12 March 2015). 287 “Naša je obveza izboriti se za jednakopravnost hrvatskog naroda u BiH”, Dnevnik.hr, 13 September 2014, available at: http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/karamarko-rh-ce-se-zbog-hrvata-mijesati-u-stvari-u-bih---352086.html (last accessed on: 12 March 2015). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 111 Affairs (MVEP) places her at the very centre of any decisions related to the European Union, including enlargement. Government policies related to the issue either initiate from within the Ministry itself or arrive there in a consultative framework with other relevant ministries. Either way, no foreign or European policy is made without the active involvement of the MVEP. The Parliament’s role in this process is more complicated. Various committees are involved in developing recommendations for policies which most frequently originate with governing bodies such as the MVEP. Of course, any legislation proposed by the government must be approved by the Parliament before becoming law. During meetings of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), the Croatian Parliament’s Committee on European Affairs has been a persistent voice for enlargement. Furthermore, parliamentary bodies are also active in working with other parliaments in the region, assisting them with EU-related policies and promoting coordination of activities with an eye, at times, towards the EU accession process. Croatian MEPs also use their seats in the European Parliament to push the government’s, their party’s and their own personal agendas regarding the enlargement process. The particular agenda they promote is partially dependent on their role within either party or government, as well as on their own personal political ambitions and prospects. This latter point became evident with the joint efforts of Tonino Picula (SDP) and Davor Stier (HDZ), member of rival parties, to endorse more rights for Croatians in BiH as a means to potentially resolve that state’s internal problems, oftentimes ostensibly within the framework of facilitating its eventual membership in the EU. Both apparently received some backlash from members of their parties indicating that this bipartisan initiative was not entirely welcome. Many commentators saw the attempt as a means for the two politically ambitious actors to further their careers in the Croatian political scene. At the same time, the incident with Plenković and his colleagues in the EP demonstrates that EU-level action can also complicate the efforts by neighbouring states to gain membership. Given Croatia’s relatively recent independence and the soundly national orientation of much of its political elite, it is perhaps unsurprising that the elites’ main focus is on the more supra-nationally profiled institutions, and that the Commission is referenced primarily as an ‘environmental’ factor that drives or obstructs the enlargement process. Policy elite speak mostly in terms of the EU as an arena to advance Croatian interests – a point of view which sits uncomfortably with any discussion of the European Commission. 11.6 THE RECORD TO DATE Research suggests that the Croatian government’s record is mixed in terms of putting enlargement on the EU table and defining a niche for itself around this issue. As the President of the Serbian National Council and Chair of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Milorad Pupovac, and others indicated, Croatia has not succeeded in setting forward a single policy concerning enlargement. The very existence of at least three separate approaches, plus the under-institutionalised nature of the Croatian foreign policy establishment, has arguably undermined Croatia’s efforts to fight an already difficult (considering Croatia’s small size and the broader circumstances in the EU) battle to both establish itself as a main voice for this issue and effectively move it forward. Speaking more broadly, Pupovac was highly critical of Croatia’s entire foreign policy, arguing that Croatia had largely failed at all levels of government to come forth with a clear position on most issues in the EU, including enlargement. In his opinion, this left the country without a clear EU identity and was symptomatic of a general lack of direction in domestic politics and the development of domestic institutions. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 112 However, aside from pointing to the German and British co-optation of Croatia’s ‘new approach’ to Bosnia as at least some kind of indicator of Croatia’s success on the broader EU foreign policy stage, one could also counter critics like Pupovac by arguing that, even with a much more consistent and robust foreign policy direction advanced by a highly cohesive and experienced foreign policy establishment, Croatia’s position within the EU, along with the EU’s post-2008 economic and financial realities and the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, make it nearly impossible to strongly impact the EU or the large member states’ policies towards the Balkans. As once again demonstrated by the ‘new approach,’ perhaps Croatia could leverage its special knowledge and position to shape the details of an enlargement process. However, the current debate is more focused on whether enlargement should occur at all, not how the enlargement might be shaped to expedite membership for individual states. Unfortunately for Croatia’s enlargement supporters, the former issue is a matter for larger players in the Union, and thus, Croatia is woefully underequipped to push forward a largely idled or even extinguished agenda. Paradoxically, there is one way in which Croatia can most certainly impact the enlargement process: using bilateral issues to block the membership track of countries in the region. As mentioned throughout this chapter, the current foreign policy establishment has taken a number of steps to show its determination to avoid any repeat of Slovenia’s obstruction of Croatia’s accession. However, Croatia’s policies, like those of many states, are driven by personalities. This lack of institutionalisation introduces an element of uncertainty as to whether government pledges to reject the use of the membership process to settle bilateral issues will be honoured in the medium to long term. As Senada Šelo Šabić argues: “Personalities matter (author’s emphasis) and in this case, people who currently occupy key government positions evidently support this role…In the case of Croatia, it is still too early to say whether consecutive governments will also endorse this foreign policy objective.” 288 The spring 2014 wave of the Eurobarometer indicates that popular attitudes towards enlargement in Croatia are still comparatively high. A full 64% (down from 71% in 2013) of Croatians favoured EU enlargement as opposed to only 37% of Europeans across the EU. This made Croatians the third strongest supporters of enlargement after Romanians and Lithuanians. 289 It would be very useful if detailed analyses existed on this issue, which explored more probing questions about the costs and benefits of broader regional membership, as well as variation in support for certain potential members (for instance, BiH versus Serbia). Nevertheless, overall, it appears that enlargement fatigue is much less of a factor in Croatia than it is in the rest of Europe. However, at present, there is cause for deep concern about future directions in Croatian society in general and how these might impact popular support for political options that would oppose different regionally cooperative options, including enlargement. Today’s Croatian society is marked by distrust in the available mainstream political options and by a lack of clear consensus about the direction of the country. The accomplishment of the goals of independence and EU membership left the Croatian political establishment with no new guiding political principles. Six years of economic recession and poor prospects of recovery have only worsened the situation. As a result, political parties are themselves in a crisis. The HDZ has recently made a turn towards a more conservative brand of 288 Adopted from: Selo Sabic, Senada (2013), “Back to the Balkans – Croatia’s Foreign Policy After the EU Accession”, Paper presented at the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Warsaw, September 2013, available at: http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Selo%20Sabic_Back%20to%20the%20BalkansCroatia_%27s%20foreign%20policy%20after%20the%20EU%20accession.docx.pdf (last accessed on: 11 March 2015). 289 Eurobarometer 80, 81. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635818 113 ‘Tuđmanism’ while an apparently shrinking number of party members maintain the moderate views, if not the corruption, of Ivo Sanader. The largest party in the ruling coalition, the Social Democratic Party, is divided and ideologically rudderless. At the same time, events like the ICJ’s rejection of the competing genocide cases, the release and subsequent incendiary rhetoric of Vojislav Šešelj, the suspiciously quid pro quo release of Croatian war crimes suspect Branimir Glavaš, continued inter-ethnic tensions in the city of Vukovar, the Veljko Marić case, and several other developments are creating a highly permissive environment for chauvinistic or nationalistic ideologies that could fill the programmatic and even existential void that marks the country – a development that would have obvious consequences for Croatia’s approach to enlargement. The symptoms of this tendency were well demonstrated during and immediately following the recent presidential elections, and more of the same rhetoric is expected for the upcoming (by February 2016) parliamentary elections. By most public opinion measures, it is very likely that these next elections will yield an HDZ-led government. Given Croatia’s weak institutionalisation, the concomitant influence of individual personalities and beliefs on the direction of foreign policy, and a growing tendency in the HDZ to talk in terms of bilateral vetoing with Serbia and interference in BiH, such a change could have a major impact on Croatia’s foreign policy. Previous HDZ governments, particularly after Ivo Sanader’s rule as party president, tended to pursue policies which were very much in line with the general interests of the EU and its member states. However, the achievement of membership and the evident rise of more conservative elements in the post Sanadar/Kosor HDZ pose the risk of less cooperative policies moving to the fore. To end on a more general note, it is worth remembering that government pledges and other public statements such as those made by the Croatian Parliament and Presidency at various times in the past five years are as good as any other political agreements – they are honoured only so long as the actors holding these posts are determined to abide by them. As any student of international relations theory knows, the anarchical nature of the international system makes it difficult to enforce commitments in the long or even short term. 290 The enforcement question is further complicated by the fact that it is not so easy to differentiate the instrumental use of bilateral issues to maliciously block a neighbouring EU aspirant from a more laudable effort to uphold basic principles of the Union. For instance, how to assess an instance where a future Croatian government insists on Belgrade’s handing over information on missing Croatian citizens as a precondition for the ratification of Serbia’s final admission to the Union? Is this Croatia as the new Slovenia (Piran Bay), Greece (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) or Romania (rights for Vlachs), or a country legitimately upholding the rights and values upon which the larger Union is ostensibly founded? The distinction between bilateral obstruction and maintaining the principles of conditionality remains subjective. As a result, future Croatian policymakers will have more leeway to act as inward-looking gatekeepers than government pledges and executive promises might suggest. The implications of this observation for the enlargement process into the Western Balkans are obvious and might not spell good news. 290 Oye, Kenneth (1979), Cooperation Under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 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