Rise and Fall of Cannabis Clubs in Spain: A Case of Contentious Politics

1 Rise and Fall of Cannabis Clubs in Spain: A Case of Conten5ous Poli5cs Arturo Alvarez-Roldan ([email protected]), Iván Parra ([email protected]), and Juan F. Gamella ([email protected]) Department of Social Anthropology, University of Granada, Spain Paper presented at the 35th Annual Conference of the European Society for Social Drug Research (ESSD), Manchester, 18th–20th September 2024. Introduc)on Cannabis social clubs are groups of users who collecTvely culTvate and distribute cannabis for their personal use. By the late 2010s, Spain had over 1,500 registered associaTons operaTng these clubs, parTcularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Advocates of this model argue that cooperaTve culTvaTon provides a soluTon for adults who wish to use cannabis without resorTng to the illegal market. Furthermore, these clubs are seen as an alternaTve to both prohibiTon and unregulated free markets, proposing a framework for the lawful regulaTon of cannabis within a closed circuit of adult consumers. Cannabis clubs in Spain are a complex and mul)faceted phenomenon, shaped by the country’s poliTcal and legal framework, as well as the acTons of the procannabis social movement. This presentaTon explores the rise of these associaTons as a case of contenTous poliTcs, following Tilly and Tarrow’s concept, where actors challenge authoriTes through public acTons, alliances, and a blend of insTtuTonal and noninsTtuTonal tacTcs. Over the last three decades, the Spanish pro-cannabis movement has drawn inspiraTon from civil rights movements to push for its objecTves, blending noncompliance and confrontaTon, such as collecTve cannabis culTvaTon. The movement also leveraged Spain's decentralized poliTcal system, where autonomous communiTes have considerable autonomy. This decentralizaTon, combined with poliTcal rivalries between regional and central governments, enabled the movement to challenge cannabis prohibiTon and promote the cannabis club model as an alternaTve. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17285292 2 Pro-cannabis acTvism has pursued both judicial and legislaTve strategies. The judicial approach seeks legal recogniTon of clubs within the exisTng legal framework, while the legislaTve approach aims to change the laws governing club acTviTes. The Emergence of the Cannabis Social Movement in Spain (1991–2000) In 1991, Spain's first cannabis associaTon, ARSEC (Ramon Santos AssociaTon for the Study of Cannabis), was established in Barcelona. The country was at the final stage of the heroin crisis and experiencing the peak of the HIV/AIDS spread among drug users, which created a climate of public concern. In response, the Socialist government, with support from conservaTve Catalan and Basque naTonalist parTes, passed the Law for the ProtecTon of CiTzen Security, introducing administraTve penalTes for drug use in public. In its founding manifesto, ARSEC denounced legal ambiguity and abuses of power against cannabis users, commidng to cannabis research, consumer rights, and opposiTon to cannabis prohibiTon. In 1993, ARSEC launched its first major public act of defiance when 97 members planted cannabis and reported it to the Public Prosecutor to challenge the exisTng legal framework. One member explained, "Our goal was to denounce ourselves to iniTate a social debate, not to consume the ligle we would have collected." Despite iniTal acquigals, the case reached the Supreme Court, drawing media agenTon and swelling ARSEC's membership. Other organizaTons like the Basque AssociaTon for the Study of Cannabis (Kalamudia) quickly followed suit, expanding the movement. In 1997, they launched the campaign "Against ProhibiTon? I Stand Up!" expressing solidarity with ARSEC and calling for the decriminalizaTon of cannabis culTvaTon for personal use. As part of this campaign, Kalamudia organized a collecTve plantaTon of 600 plants. Despite iniTal legal challenges, the case was dismissed, and the harvest was collected. The emergence of publicaTons like Cañamo magazine, created by ARSEC members, and the opening of Spain’s first grow shops in 1997 further helped spread cannabis culture and solidify the movement’s posiTon. 3 Forma)on of the Cannabis Club Model by the Judiciary The cannabis club model began to take shape in the early 2000s, largely influenced by legal professionals and the judiciary. Drug trafficking is criminalized in Spain, but drug use is not. With no specific drug laws in Spain, judges developed criteria disTnguishing shared personal use from trafficking, ulTmately laying the legal foundaTon for the club model. A landmark development occurred when the Andalusian government commissioned two lawyers from the University of Malaga, Muñoz and Soto, to drao a report exploring the legal feasibility of creaTng establishments for cannabis acquisiTon and consumpTon. This request arose amid a poliTcal conflict between the Socialist-controlled Andalusian regional government and the ConservaTve Popular Party-controlled central government. The former had requested permission from the Ministry of Health to carry out a clinical trial for prescribing heroin to opioid addicts, but it was delayed unTl 2002. The Cannabis Club Model The report outlined five key features that cannabis clubs should adopt to avoid involvement in drug trafficking: 1. Closed establishments for regular consumer members. 2. Cannabis consumpTon limited to personal use. 3. On-site consumpTon to prevent third-party access. 4. A non-profit framework. 5. A safe space to reduce harm and avoid substance adulteraTon. However, the issue of supply remained unresolved. Triumph of the Cannabis Club Model in the Basque Country (2002–2011) The model rapidly gained followers among leaders of the pro-cannabis movement in the Basque Country. In 2002, Marrn Barriuso, head of Kalamudia, dissolved the associaTon to create five cannabis clubs, laying the groundwork for a wider network across Spain. The FederaTon of Cannabis AssociaTons (FAC) was established in 2003, and the Basque government supported the movement, funding research and public 4 discussions around cannabis regulaTon. The model’s viability was affirmed in the Oña' Manifesto (2005), which called for the decriminalizaTon of personal cannabis use and culTvaTon. By 2010, the FAC had published a Cannabis Club Crea'on Guide, and the movement’s expansion was underway. However, regional courts issued mixed rulings, acquidng clubs where no evidence of drug trafficking was found but convicTng others for illegal sales. Self-regula)on Through a Code of Good Prac)ce In 2011, ENCOD published a Code of Conduct for European Cannabis Social Clubs. The code included a series of principles, mostly drawn from the Muñoz and Soto report, which clubs were required to adopt to self-regulate. The most innovaTve element was the creaTon of a detailed producTon and consumpTon registry in each club. The Catalonia Boom In Catalonia, the club model rapidly expanded aoer 2011, but the clubs there adopted a more commercialized approach, agracTng a broader membership, including tourists. In 2012, the mayor of Rasquera, a village in Tarragona severely affected by the economic crisis, promoted a highly publicized project: allocaTng municipal land for the culTvaTon of marijuana through a municipal company, with the aim of supplying the 5,000 members of the Barcelona Cannabis Self-ConsumpTon AssociaTon (ABCDA). Although the culTvaTon did not take place, the project demonstrated that many Catalan clubs were not in favor of self-regulaTon and advocated for a more commercial model. The number of members became a criTcal factor in the sustainability of the model under the self-regulaTon approach. Government Response The expansion of clubs in Catalonia led to fricTon with both the central and Catalan governments. In 2013, the General Prosecutor’s Office issued a direcTve clarifying that cannabis culTvaTon required authorizaTon. This direcTve aimed to encourage prosecutors to appeal acquigals of clubs so they could be reviewed by the Supreme Court, which had not been done before. 5 The rapid growth also prompted the Barcelona City Council, controlled by the main Catalan NaTonalist Party, to inspect and close dozens of clubs in 2014 for noncompliance with urban planning regulaTons. A year later, the council draoed an urban planning ordinance for clubs that aimed to shut down 92% of the remaining clubs in the city. This plan was ulTmately shelved aoer Barcelona en Comú, a new leo-wing poliTcal party with strong roots in ciTzen movements, won the 2015 municipal elecTons. Expansion of the Poli)cal Conflict to Regional Parliaments The contenTous poliTcal bagle reached regional parliaments, with Navarra and Catalonia passing laws to regulate clubs in 2015 and 2017. Catalan naTonalists, who had sought to close clubs from the Barcelona City Council, advocated for their regulaTon in the regional parliament, fueling the confrontaTon with the central government at the peak of the Catalan sovereignty process. The central government challenged these laws, and the ConsTtuTonal Court ulTmately struck them down, dealing a blow to the movement. The Supreme Court and the Fall of Cannabis Clubs In late 2015, the Supreme Court issued three rulings declaring the cannabis club model illegal. In the first ruling, several magistrates issued a dissenTng opinion defending the legality of clubs, provided they met the following condiTons: 1. Members had to be regular, adult consumers, and there had to be a waiTng period between joining the club and being allowed to share the substance. 2. ConsumpTon had to take place on-site at the club. 3. Membership could not exceed 30 people. 4. The club’s supply could not exceed the immediate consumpTon needs of its members. Most clubs failed to meet these condiTons. These rulings set a legal precedent, leading to the gradual dismantling of many clubs. The criteria established by earlier case law conTnued to apply: small, closed, and non-commercial clubs could survive, but large-scale operaTons were shut down. 6 Ten years later, history repeats itself. In July 2024, Barcelona Council, now controlled by the Socialist Party, closed 30 clubs in the capital. The Socialist deputy mayor has expressed his intenTon to close all clubs where cannabis is consumed or sold. Conclusions The rise and fall of cannabis clubs in Spain exemplifies how social movements can challenge exisTng legal frameworks through poli)cal conten)on. The pro-cannabis movement leveraged decentralized governance, judicial ambiguity, and poliTcal rivalries to push for a regulated cannabis market. While the movement succeeded in establishing a network of clubs, poliTcal conflict with the central government ulTmately hindered long-term success. The legal challenges faced by cannabis clubs in recent years, culminaTng in the Supreme Court rulings and the ConsTtuTonal Court’s annulment of regional laws, underscore the limits of grassroots movements when faced with entrenched legal and poliTcal opposiTon. Today, the future of cannabis clubs in Spain remains uncertain, as the movement confronts the challenge of aligning its goals with the exisTng legal framework. Nevertheless, the legacy of these clubs conTnues to inform debates on cannabis policy, both in Spain and globally. The model of Spanish Cannabis Clubs has been a convenient myth, highly influenTal despite its unproven success as an alternaTve system for providing cannabis to adult users in its country of origin. 1 Rise and Fall of Cannabis Clubs in Spain: A Case of Contentious Politics Arturo Alvarez-Roldan Juan F. Gamella Iván Parra Toro 35th Annual Conference of the European Society for Social Drug Research Manchester, 18th–20th September 2024 2 INTRODUCTION •Cannabis social clubs: collective cultivation for personal use. •1,500+ registered associations by the 2010s. •Clubs as an alternative to prohibition and unregulated markets. •Shaped by Spain's political, legal framework, and procannabis activism. •Contentious politics framework: Tilly and Tarrow. 3 The Emergence of the Pro-cannabis Social Movement in Spain (1991–2000) •1991: ARSEC (first cannabis association) founded in Barcelona. •Context: Heroin crisis, HIV/AIDS, and public concern. •Law for the Protection of Citizen Security (administrative penalties). •ARSEC's defiance: 1993 selfdenunciation (Supreme Court case). •Expansion: Kalamudia's campaigns and collective cannabis plantation (1997). •Publications (e.g., Cañamo magazine) and first grow shops. 10 Expansion of the Political Conflict to Regional Parliaments •2015–2017: Navarra and Catalonia pass laws to regulate clubs. •Political confrontation with central government (Catalan sovereignty process). •Constitutional Court strikes down regional laws. 11 The Supreme Court and the Fall of Cannabis Clubs •2015: Supreme Court rulings declare the cannabis club model illegal. •Dissenting opinion: conditions for legal clubs. •Most clubs do not meet these conditions. •Gradual dismantling of clubs (small, non-commercial survive). 12 History Repeat Itself 13 Conclusions •Rise and fall of clubs: social movements challenging legal frameworks. •Leveraging decentralization, political rivalry, judicial ambiguity. •Political conflict limits long-term success. •Supreme Court and Constitutional Court rulings block the movement. •Future uncertain, but legacy informs cannabis policy debates. •A convenient myth: influential despite unproven success as an alternative system of cannabis provision 14 Thanks for your attention [email protected] @alrold Department of Social Anthropology University of Granada, Spain