India's Brics Strategy: Walking the Tightrope of Autonomy and Alliance

International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 457 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 India’s Brics Strategy: Walking the Tightrope of Autonomy and Alliance Colonel Piyush Chandra Indian Army [email protected] Abstract India’s engagement with the BRICS grouping, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, reflects a complex balancing act between fostering non-Western multilateral solidarity and preserving strategic autonomy. This article examines India’s BRICS strategy through the dual lens of realist international relations theory and its historical commitment to strategic autonomy, evolving from Nehruvian non-alignment to present-day multi-alignment. While India shares BRICS’ objectives of reforming global governance institutions and amplifying the voice of the Global South, it remains cautious of China’s dominant position within the bloc and wary of being drawn into an overtly anti-Western coalition. The paper analyses India’s participation in BRICS summits, its role in initiatives such as the New Development Bank (NDB), and its nuanced stance on issues like the Russia-Ukraine war and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It contrasts India’s BRICS engagements with parallel alignments such as the Quad and G20, arguing that India uses platform diplomacy to maximize geopolitical flexibility. The study concludes that India’s future in BRICS will depend on its ability to manage intra-bloc rivalries while projecting leadership among Global South nations. The findings have implications for India’s foreign policy doctrine and for understanding multipolarity in the evolving world order. Keywords - Strategic Autonomy, BRICS, Indian Foreign Policy, Multipolarity, NonAlignment 2.0, Global South Introduction In an era marked by the erosion of unipolarity and the rise of competing global power centres, multilateral platforms like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) have emerged as influential vehicles for promoting a multipolar world order. Formed in the late 2000s as an economic bloc of emerging powers, BRICS has gradually evolved into a broader International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 458 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 strategic forum that challenges the dominance of Western-led institutions and norms. For India, BRICS represents a paradox: it is simultaneously a platform to amplify the voice of the Global South and a space where India must navigate complex power asymmetries, particularly with China. This duality defines India’s strategic calculus within BRICS which is rooted in a desire to foster non-Western solidarity while preserving its autonomy in a contested global order. India’s post-independence foreign policy was long guided by the principle of strategic autonomy, a legacy of Nehruvian non-alignment that emphasized independence from Cold War-era blocs. While the concept has evolved—particularly in the post-Cold War context—it remains a core tenet of Indian diplomacy (Hall, 2019). Contemporary Indian foreign policy exhibits a more pragmatic version of this autonomy: multi-alignment, or issue-based cooperation with diverse actors. This flexible approach allows India to deepen ties with both the West (e.g., through the QUAD, G7, and I2U2) and the non-Western world (e.g., BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). India’s participation in BRICS reflects this multi-vector approach. On one hand, it supports the BRICS agenda of promoting reform in international financial institutions, boosting South-South cooperation, and resisting unilateralism. On the other, it must contend with China’s increasing assertiveness, Russia’s strategic pivot toward Beijing, and the ideological positioning of some BRICS members visà-vis the West. These internal divergences were on display during recent BRICS expansions and discussions around the Ukraine conflict, where India has attempted to strike a neutral position that serves both its national interest and its global standing. This paper investigates how India manages this tightrope by leveraging BRICS to champion a multipolar world while safeguarding its strategic independence. It begins by outlining the theoretical underpinnings of India’s foreign policy orientation, with a particular focus on strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. The next section delves into India’s objectives and role within BRICS, examining key mechanisms such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. The paper then assesses the internal contradictions within BRICS, especially concerning China-India tensions and diverging geopolitical interests. A further section analyses how India balances its BRICS engagements with Western alignments, including its strategic partnerships with the United States, European Union, and International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 459 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 Indo-Pacific allies. It also raises important policy questions, vis-à-vis, Can India continue to hedge effectively between competing coalitions and whether BRICS will remain a viable platform for Global South leadership, or will internal contradictions erode its strategic coherence? Through this analysis, the paper argues that India’s BRICS strategy is not a binary choice between East and West but a sophisticated exercise in platform diplomacy wherein it engages across multiple, often competing, multilateral groupings to maximize influence without overcommitting to any single geopolitical bloc (Patrick et al, 2025). The conclusions drawn suggest that while BRICS will remain an important part of India’s foreign policy toolkit, its utility will depend on India’s ability to maintain issue-based coalitions, assert its national interests, and avoid entrapment in rivalries that undermine its autonomy. Given the evolving nature of global geopolitics comprising great-power competition, regional fragmentation, and institutional fatigue, India’s approach to BRICS offers broader lessons on navigating multipolarity in the 21st century. Theoretical Framework: Strategic Autonomy, Non-Alignment 2.0, and Multi-Alignment India’s foreign policy trajectory has long been shaped by the principle of strategic autonomy which is the ability to independently determine its national interests and foreign engagements without undue influence from external powers. This concept, rooted in India’s postcolonial experience and its founding diplomatic philosophy of non-alignment during the Cold War, continues to underpin India’s international strategy even as global realities evolve (ICWA 2023). Strategic Autonomy: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment Originally articulated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the mid-20th century, nonalignment aimed to keep India free from the polarized Cold War blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. This policy was more than mere neutrality; it was an assertion of India’s sovereign right to chart an independent course in international affairs, reflecting both a normative commitment to peaceful coexistence and a pragmatic strategy to safeguard national security and development priorities (Rajeev 2025). In the post-Cold War era, the rigid binary of non-alignment has been supplanted by more flexible concepts such as multi- International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 460 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 alignment or strategic autonomy 2.0. These approaches acknowledge the complexity of a multipolar world, where strategic interests often require engagement with multiple, and sometimes competing, powers. India’s participation in a range of multilateral forums— including BRICS, the Quad, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the G20— illustrates this pluralistic engagement (Bhattacharya 2024). Multi-alignment enables India to hedge its bets, capitalizing on partnerships with both Western democracies and non-Western actors to maximize its diplomatic leverage and economic opportunities. Realism and Constructivism: Analytical Perspectives From an international relations (IR) theory standpoint, India’s strategy can be analysed through the lenses of realism and constructivism, which offer complementary explanations for India’s behaviour in BRICS and beyond. Realism emphasizes power dynamics, national interest, and the anarchic nature of the international system. From this perspective, India’s cautious approach to BRICS, particularly its wariness of China’s dominant role, is a reflection of power balancing. India seeks to avoid overdependence on any single bloc while securing strategic advantages through diverse partnerships (Mearsheimer, 2001). Constructivism, by contrast, highlights the role of ideas, norms, and identity in shaping foreign policy. India’s historic commitment to non-alignment, its self-perception as a leader of the Global South, and its emphasis on sovereign equality and multilateralism within BRICS reflect identity-based motivations. This framework helps explain why India values the normative appeal of BRICS as a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions, even as strategic rivalries persist (Wendt, 1999). Strategic Autonomy in Practice: Implications for BRICS In practical terms, strategic autonomy compels India to pursue issue-based alignments rather than rigid ideological coalitions. For example, India’s engagement with BRICS supports efforts to reform international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, which aligns with India’s economic development goals. Yet, India simultaneously deepens security cooperation with Western allies to counterbalance China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific (Tellis, 2020). India’s strategic autonomy also manifests in its calibrated responses to contentious issues within BRICS, such as the Russia-Ukraine war. India has avoided International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 461 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 condemning Russia outright, mindful of long-standing defence ties and energy interests, while maintaining its strategic partnerships with the West. This stance underscores India’s determination to preserve manoeuvrability and avoid entanglement in binary geopolitical contests (Sharma, 2022). The notion of platform diplomacy complements the concept of multi-alignment by emphasizing India’s active role in multiple international groupings to advance its interests. BRICS, in this view, is one among several platforms where India projects its voice, negotiates interests, and cultivates partnerships. Such diplomacy requires sophisticated balancing: India must navigate intra-BRICS rivalries (especially between China and Russia), maintain coherence with its broader foreign policy objectives, and leverage the collective power of emerging economies to reshape global governance. Through multialignment, India avoids the pitfalls of alliance entrapment and retains strategic flexibility in an unpredictable international environment. This theoretical framework situates India’s BRICS strategy at the intersection of normative commitments and pragmatic calculations. Strategic autonomy remains the guiding principle, while multi-alignment and platform diplomacy provide the flexible mechanisms through which India pursues its national interests. Understanding these dynamics is essential for analysing India’s behaviour within BRICS and its broader international strategy. India’s Role and Interests in BRICS India’s engagement with BRICS reflects its aspirations to secure a more equitable global order while advancing its national interests in economic development, political influence, and strategic positioning. As one of the original founding members since the group’s informal inception in 2006, India has actively shaped BRICS into a platform for emerging economies to collectively challenge Western dominance and advocate for Global South priorities (Stuenkel, 2015). This section explores India’s multifaceted role in BRICS and the core interests driving its participation. Historical and Diplomatic Foundations India’s commitment to BRICS arises from a recognition of the shifting global power dynamics post–Cold War, particularly the relative decline of Western hegemony and the rise of emerging economies. India views BRICS not merely as an economic coalition but as a International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 462 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 strategic forum to amplify the voices of developing countries in global governance institutions (MEA India, 2011). This aligns with India’s longstanding foreign policy goal of reforming the international system to reflect contemporary realities, including permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council and greater influence in international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Since the first formal BRICS summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia (2009), India has leveraged the grouping to assert leadership on issues ranging from sustainable development to counterterrorism. Indian Prime Ministers have emphasized BRICS as a mechanism for South-South cooperation and as a counterbalance to Western-centric multilateralism (Kirton & Larionova, 2022). Notably, India’s active participation demonstrates its preference for inclusive, multipolar governance rather than alignment with any singular great power. Economic and Developmental Interests One of India’s primary interests within BRICS lies in advancing economic cooperation among member states to foster growth and development. India supports the expansion of trade, investment, and infrastructure connectivity among BRICS countries, seeking to create a mutually beneficial economic bloc that reduces dependency on Western financial systems (Patrick, 2025). A landmark achievement reflecting this is India’s support for the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 and headquartered in Shanghai. The NDB embodies BRICS’ ambition to provide an alternative to the IMF and World Bank by financing infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member and other developing countries (NDB, n.d.). India has been a significant contributor to the bank’s capital and has sought to direct funding to priority sectors like renewable energy, transportation, and urban development. The NDB not only symbolizes a shift towards South-South financial cooperation but also provides India with a platform to influence international development finance norms. Another financial instrument is the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a framework aimed at providing liquidity support to member countries during balance-ofpayments crises. India sees the CRA as a mechanism to increase financial stability among emerging markets, reducing vulnerability to external shocks and speculative capital flows (Agarwal, 2015). Beyond finance, India’s economic interests in BRICS include technology sharing, digital economy cooperation, and promoting trade facilitation. The grouping International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 463 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 facilitates dialogues on innovation ecosystems, information technology partnerships, and ecommerce regulation, reflecting India’s ambition to position itself as a global digital hub. Political and Geostrategic Considerations India’s role in BRICS transcends economic objectives and encompasses broader geostrategic aims. India views BRICS as a vehicle to diversify its diplomatic partnerships and assert its status as a rising power. Through BRICS, India projects an image of leadership among the Global South, advocating for a more representative international order that addresses developmental disparities and respects sovereign equality. The BRICS platform allows India to engage with both Russia and China, countries that occupy pivotal positions in its foreign policy calculus. While relations with Russia are characterized by longstanding defence and energy cooperation, India’s relationship with China is marked by rivalry and cooperation (Tellis, 2020; Ferragamo 2025). Within BRICS, India navigates this dynamic carefully, using the platform to foster dialogue while maintaining vigilance over China’s regional ambitions and strategic posturing. India’s engagement also serves as a balancing act against Westerndominated frameworks. BRICS membership provides diplomatic cover for India’s efforts to resist unilateral pressure, particularly on contentious issues like trade disputes, technology access, and global governance reforms. It also complements India’s active participation in Western-led coalitions by enabling it to sustain a degree of independence and leverage. India’s Engagement in BRICS Summits and Initiatives India’s role in BRICS is prominently displayed during annual summits, where the group discusses cooperation strategies and issues of mutual interest. Indian leaders have consistently used these forums to emphasize BRICS’ relevance in addressing contemporary global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and pandemics (MEA, India, 2024). A key focus has been the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR), an initiative that India supports to foster cooperation in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and 5G communications (PIB India 2025). This aligns with India’s ambition to modernize its industrial base and enhance technological capacities. India’s participation in the recent expansion of BRICS, which includes countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Argentina, signals its endorsement of a broader coalition of Global South actors International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 464 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 (Carvalho et al 2025). India supports the expansion as a means to strengthen the bloc’s global legitimacy and economic clout while safeguarding its own leadership role within the group. Despite India’s enthusiasm for BRICS as a cooperative platform, it remains cognizant of the asymmetries and divergent interests within the group. India is aware that China’s dominant economic weight and assertiveness can overshadow smaller members, potentially constraining India’s influence. Furthermore, geopolitical frictions such as the India-China border disputes and differing positions on global security issues complicate India’s engagement. Nonetheless, India’s strategic calculation sees value in maintaining and strengthening BRICS ties as part of its broader multi-alignment strategy. By engaging with diverse partners on shared developmental goals, India enhances its global profile while preserving its ability to engage in other bilateral and multilateral forums. Therefore, India’s role in BRICS is shaped by its ambitions to reform global governance, promote South-South cooperation, and project strategic leadership without compromising autonomy. Its engagement in economic initiatives like the New Development Bank and policy dialogues underscores India’s commitment to leveraging BRICS as a platform for advancing national development objectives and global influence. However, India’s strategic autonomy requires careful management of internal bloc dynamics, particularly vis-à-vis China and Russia, ensuring that BRICS complements rather than constrains its broader foreign policy agenda. Strategic Constraints within BRICS While BRICS presents itself as a unified bloc advocating the interests of emerging economies and the Global South, the internal dynamics among its members reveal significant strategic constraints that affect India’s ability to leverage the grouping fully. Divergent geopolitical interests, economic asymmetries, and historical rivalries challenge the coherence of BRICS and compel India to exercise caution and strategic finesse. This section examines these internal constraints, focusing on India’s complex relations with China and Russia, economic disparities within the bloc, and broader geopolitical contradictions that shape India’s engagement. The most significant strategic constraint for India within BRICS arises from its complex and often adversarial relationship with China. Despite both being founding International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 465 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 members, their bilateral relationship is marked by border disputes, competing regional ambitions, and ideological differences that directly impact India’s position within the grouping. The India-China border clashes, particularly the violent Galwan Valley incident in 2020, have heightened tensions and underscored the limits of cooperation. These disputes challenge India’s ability to trust China as a genuine partner in BRICS and raise concerns about Beijing’s strategic intentions. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which India rejects on sovereignty grounds due to its route through disputed Kashmir territory (ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor), further complicates the relationship (Pant, 2011; Singh, 2021). Within BRICS, China’s economic and political dominance is apparent. China’s GDP far surpasses that of other members—accounting for over 70% of the bloc’s combined GDP—which grants it disproportionate influence over the grouping’s agenda and decisionmaking processes. India must therefore navigate carefully to avoid being overshadowed or coerced into positions that conflict with its national interests (Singh, 2023; Garcia-Herrero 2024). Despite these challenges, India maintains engagement with China in BRICS to sustain dialogue and multilateral cooperation, signalling a nuanced approach that balances competition and collaboration. India’s diplomatic language in BRICS summits reflects this delicate balance, emphasizing common interests such as sustainable development while sidestepping contentious bilateral issues. Russia, another key BRICS member, presents a unique challenge for India. Historically, India and Russia have shared close strategic ties, particularly in defence, energy, and nuclear cooperation. Russia’s role as a major arms supplier and strategic partner has been pivotal for India’s military modernization (Bhowmick & Stauder 2025). However, Russia’s deepening partnership with China, especially amid Western sanctions following the Ukraine conflict, complicates India’s strategic calculus. The Russia-China strategic partnership is increasingly viewed as a counterweight to Western influence, raising concerns in India about being caught in the crosshairs of great power rivalry. India’s refusal to unequivocally condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine at BRICS forums reflects this dilemma. India balances its historical ties with Russia against its growing strategic alignment with the United States and Western democracies. This balancing act limits India’s room for manoeuvre within BRICS and exposes it to criticism from multiple sides (Freeman et al, 2024). Moreover, International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848 p-ISSN: 2348-795X Vol. 12 Issue 09 September 2025 Received: 20 September 2025 472 Revised: 25 September 2025 Accepted:28 September 2025 Copyright  authors 2025 DOI: HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.5281/ZENODO.17289351 In response, India has adopted a nuanced multi-alignment approach—balancing cooperation with BRICS partners alongside deeper ties with Western democracies and regional allies. This calibrated diplomacy allows India to harness the benefits of BRICS while preserving its freedom to act independently on critical issues. 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