An Effect of "Corrosive" Globalization? Trading "Knowledges": The Career of Bartolomeu Baião Between Portugal, Spain, and England (1564–1572)

Terrae Incognitae The Journal of the Society for the History of Discoveries ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/ytin20 An Effect of “Corrosive” Globalization? Trading “Knowledges”: The Career of Bartolomeu Baião Between Portugal, Spain, and England (1564–1572) Nuno Vila-Santa To cite this article: Nuno Vila-Santa (2025) An Effect of “Corrosive” Globalization? Trading “Knowledges”: The Career of Bartolomeu Baião Between Portugal, Spain, and England (1564– 1572), Terrae Incognitae, 57:1, 60-84, DOI: 10.1080/00822884.2025.2458433 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00822884.2025.2458433 © 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 21 Feb 2025. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 81 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ytin20 An Effect of “Corrosive” Globalization? Trading “Knowledges”: The Career of Bartolomeu Baião Between Portugal, Spain, and England (1564–1572) NUNO VILA-SANTA Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Abstract The Portuguese Bartolomeu Baião is a poorly known character in the history of Anglo-Portuguese maritime exchanges in the 16th century. This article aims to reconstruct Baião’s career, as a pilot, a merchant, a cosmographer, and a spy, among Portugal, Spain, and England. Using Spanish and English documents, the main moments of Baião’s career are debated. The motivations for Baião’s departure from Portugal and his nautical proposals in Spain in 1564–65, and all Baião’s endeavors, between 1565–71 with John Hawkins, William Cecil, Robert Dudley are discussed. By drawing the connection between the knowledge that Baião brought to England and the expeditions notable Elizabethans organized in the 1570-80s, it is argued that Baião was another “informal” but decisive agent who leaked Iberian maritime knowledge to Elizabethan England. It is also claimed that more research is needed on the role these agents could play in the “corrosive” globalization of knowledge. KEYWORDS maritime knowledge; go-between; espionage; diplomacy; Atlantic Ocean; global knowledge Resumén El portugués Bartolomeu Baião es un personaje poco conocido en la historia de los intercambios marítimos anglo-portugueses del siglo XVI. Este artículo TERRAE INCOGNITAE, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2025, 60–84 © 2025 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. DOI 10.1080/ 00822884.2025.2458433 pretende reconstruir la trayectoria de Baião, como piloto, comerciante, cosmógrafo y espía, entre Portugal, España e Inglaterra. Utilizando fuentes documentales españolas e inglesas, se debaten los principales momentos de la carrera de Baião. Se abordan las motivaciones de la salida de Baião de Portugal y sus propuestas náuticas en España en 564-65, ytodas las gestiones de Baião, entre 1565-71, con John Hawkins, William Cecil, Robert Dudley. Al establecer la conexión entre los conocimientos que Baião llevó Inglaterra y las expediciones organizadas por los navegantes isabelinos en los años 1570-80, se argumenta que Baião es otro agente “informal” pero decisivo que filtró conocimientos marítimos ibéricos ala Inglaterra Isabelina. Además, se propone que son necesarios más estudios sobre el papel que estos agentes podrían desempeñar en la “corrosiva” globalización del conocimiento. PALABRAS-CLAVE conocimiento marı ´timo, intermediario, espionaje, diplomacia, Oce ´ano Atla ´ntico, conocimiento global Resumo O português Bartolomeu Baião é um personagem pouco conhecido na história do intercâmbio marítimo anglo-luso do século XVI. Este artigo pretende reconstituir acarreira de Baião, como piloto, mercador, cosmógrafo e espião, entre Portugal, Espanha eInglaterra. Recorrendo afontes documentais espanholas e inglesas, são debatidos os principais momentos da carreira de Baião. Abordam-se as motivações para asaída de Baião de Portugal, as suas propostas náuticas em Espanha, em 1564-65, e todas as diligências de Baião, entre 1565-71, com John Hawkins, William Cecil, Robert Dudley. Ao estabelecer aligação entre os conhecimentos que Baião levou para Inglaterra e as expedições organizadas por navegadores isabelinos nas décadas de 1570-80, argumenta-se que Baião foi mais um agente “informal” mas, decisivo que fez chegar à Inglaterra Isabelina os conhecimentos marítimos ibéricos. Defende-se ainda que são necessários mais estudos sobre opapel que estes agentes poderão desempenhar na globalização “corrosiva” do conhecimento. PALAVRAS-CHAVE conhecimento marı ´timo, intermedia ´rio, espionagem, diplomacia, Oceano Atla ˆntico, conhecimento global Introduction Studies on global history, maritime history and history of knowledge have highlighted the importance of examining the interchange through both formal and YTIN 61 informal channels of maritime knowledge and its bearing on the planning of overseas voyages among rivals. 1 Historians of knowledge have long emphasized the critical impact of poorly known cultural intermediaries, 2 often labeled as go-betweens, in the early modern Atlantic world. 3 Many of these studies stress that knowledge exchanges between the mercantile cultures of the Iberian and British worlds were pivotal for both sides. 4 They influenced the emergence of the early modern Iberian and British overseas empires. The importance of interchanges has been underscored due to the impact of the first globalization, sometimes called the “Iberian globalization.” One of the key-consequences of 16 th century Iberian globalization has been its “corrosive” effects. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla has explained, the “corrosive” globalization dynamics on politics, economy, society and culture was brought by the first globalization. During the 16 th century, the ever-escalating intensity of the circulation of people, goods, and ideas, on a planetary scale brought a “corrosive” effect of globalization: none of the players involved (merchants, missionaries, political and military rulers, sailors, kings) proved able to control the major flows, even when they were detrimental to their interests. Although this reality was clearly detectable in the Iberian World, due to its intensity, it soon impacted the rest of Europe. 5 1 To mention simply three of these recent cases see: Paula Findlen, “Introduction,” in Empires of Knowledge: Scientific Networks in the Early Modern World, ed. Paula Findlen (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 2 and 8; Lauren Benton and Nathan Perl-Rosenthan, “Making Maritime History Global” in A World at Sea. Maritime Practices and Global History, eds. Lauren Benton and Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, (Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), pp. 13–14; Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “Early Modern Iberian Empires, global history and history of globalization,” Journal of Global History 17–3, (2022), pp. 1–23. 2 The bibliography on this field is large. Just to mention some of the most important studies: Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Peter Burke, James A. Secord, “Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95–94 (December 2004), pp. 654–72; Lorraine Daston, “The History of Science and the History of Knowledge,” Know 1, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 131–54; Circulation of Knowledge: Explorations in the History of Knowledge, eds. Anna Nilsson Hammar, David Larsson Heidenblad, Kari Nordberg, Johan Östling, and Erling Sandmo (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2018). Connecting Worlds: Production and Circulation of Knowledge in the First Global Age, edited by Amélia Polónia, Fabiano Bracht and Gisele C. Conceição (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018); Anna Nilsson Hammar, David Larsson Heidenblad, Johan Östling, Knowledge Actors: Revisiting Agency in the History of Knowledge (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2023). 3 Alida C. Metcalf, Go-Betweens and the colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600 (Austin: TX/University of Texas Press, 2005); Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe, edited by Andreas and von Koppenfel Höfele (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011). Benjamin Schmidt and Pamela H. Smith, Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: Practices, Objects, and Texts, 1400–1800 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820, ed. James Delbourgo, Kapil Raj, Lissa Roberts and Simon Schaffer (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009). 4 Francisco Bettencourt, “The Iberian Atlantic: Ties, Networks, and Boundaries” In Theorising the IberoAmerican Atlantic, eds. Lisa Vollendorf and Harald Braun (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 15–36. For another wellknown example in historiographical terms, although mainly for the 17 th century, see: Merchant Cultures. A Global Approach to Spaces, Representations and Worlds of Trade, 1500–1800, eds. Francisco Bettencourt and Cátia Antunes (Leiden: Brill, 2022). 5 The thesis on the Iberian origin of contemporary globalization has been defended recently by Anna More, Rachel Sarah O’Toole, and Ivonne del Valle, “Iberian Empires and a Theory of Early Modern Globalization,” in Iberian Empires and the Roots of Globalization, eds. Anna More, Rachel Sarah O’Toole, and Ivonne del Valle (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2019), pp. 3–5. However, it is to the already classical works of Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, that one needs to turn to dig better this idea, and particularly the effects of “corrosive” globalization in the Iberian World. Among the author’s many works a good start point is: Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, Iberian World Empires and The Globalization Of Europe 1415–1668 (Singapore: Springer Verlag, 2019). 62 NUNO VILA-SANTA On the other hand, underlying studies on the history of knowledge lies an assumption that the circulation of knowledge enacted by go-betweens was always made easily. In most cases, the tensions knowledge circulation between maritime rivals created remain almost “invisible” as they were embodied in the details of the careers of the go-betweens themselves. Such details are often forgotten, generating the idea that knowledge circulation was smoother than it really was. This problematic is traceable when applied to Elizabethan England, whose maritime and overseas expansion was facilitated by a combination of factors. At the beginning of Queen Elizabeth I’s reign (1558–1603), England was underdeveloped in terms of its overseas ventures when compared to Portugal, Spain, or France. Richard Hakluyt (1553–1616), the leading compiler and publisher of English records, acknowledged this in his Principal Navigations. He wrote that “seeing that the wealth of the Spaniards and Portuguese . . . they [the English] there upon resolved upon a new and strange navigation.” 6 Scholars have also long asserted that England in the 16 th century learned nautical knowledge from its Portuguese and Spanish rivals. 7 Portuguese pilots such as Simão Fernandes and Nuno da Silva were hired for the great English voyages of discovery. 8 In the 1570-80s, in the service of Elizabeth I, Fernandes guided voyages of notable Elizabethan explorers such as Humphrey Gilbert (1539–1583), Richard Grenville (1542–1591) and Walter Raleigh (1552–1618). 9 Silva was a Portuguese pilot from Oporto that Francis Drake (1540?−1596) kidnapped, in 1577, at Cape Verde Islands to guide his circum-navigation in the South Atlantic. 10 Part of these interchanges were motivated by the intensity of the English commercial connection to Portugal and Spain. 11 6 Richard Hakluyt, Voyages in Eight Volumes, ed John Masefield, vol. I (Dent: London, 1962), pp. 266–267. 7 Just to mention some works from relevant authors, who made this argument see: E. G. R Taylor, The English debt to Portuguese nautical science in the 16 th century, offprint from I Congresso da História da Expansão Portuguesa no Mundo, Lisbon, 1958, pp. 5–11, later developed at E. G. R. Taylor, The Haven-Finding Art. A History of Navigation from Odysseus to Captain Cook (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Louis B. Wright, English explorers´ debt to the Iberians (Coimbra: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1980); David Waters, The Iberian Bases of the English Art of Navigation in the Sixteenth Century (Lisboa/ Coimbra: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1970) – The author had already made this argument in his renamed: David Waters, The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart times (London: Hollis and Carter, 1958). 8 Megan Barford, and Louise Devoy, “Using the Seas and Skies: Navigation in Early Modern England” in Tudor & Stuart seafarers. The emergence of a maritime nation, 1485–1707, ed James Davey (London: National Maritime Museum Greenwich, 2018), pp. 106–107. 9 David Quinn, “Simão Fernandes, a Portuguese Pilot in the English Service, circa 1573–1588” in Actas do Congresso Internacional de História dos Descobrimentos, Vol. III, (Lisbon: Comissão para a Comemoração do V Centenário da morte do Infante D. Henrique, 1961), pp. 463–464. 10 On the topic see: José María Moreno Madrid and David Salomoni, “Nuno da Silva’s third relation: an unknown report on Francis Drake voyage (1577–1580),” Terrae Incognitae 54 (2022), pp. 64–82. 11 Even during the years of open war between 1585 and 1603 as stated by Pauline Croft, “English mariners trading to Spain and Portugal, 1558–1625,” Mariner’s Mirror 69 (1983), pp. 251–266. YTIN 63 But earlier, other Portuguese served England, including António Eanes Pinteado, Francisco Rodrigues, and Bartolomeu Baião. 12 While Pinteado and Rodrigues were active in the 1550s, 13 Bartolomeu Baião operated in the 1560-70s. Baião’s career remains obscure. 14 Mainly remembered as a privateer in English service, Baião was also a merchant, an expert in navigation, and a sort of spy dealing maritime intelligence between the Iberians and the English. The reasons for his coming to England, his services to John Hawkins (1532–1595), William Cecil (1520–1598) and to London merchants have not been studied in detail. 15 The primary objective of this article is to reconstruct Baião’s career across Portugal, Spain, and England, to evaluate its impact on the transmission of maritime knowledge between the Iberian Peninsula and Elizabethan England and to discuss the intricacies of knowledge circulation in the 16 th century. This study will utilize Spanish and English sources to reconstruct Baião’s career. The contexts in which Baião operated will be examined, with a particular emphasis on understanding his motivations at each stage. This study aims to elucidate the methods and strategies mediators of nautical knowledge like Baião used to circulate, negotiate, and secure employment with rival maritime powers. The conclusion will assess whether Baião can be considered a mediator of Iberian maritime knowledge by comparing him to his predecessors and contemporaries in England. Furthermore, it will explore how Baião’s career influenced English overseas ambitions and reflect on how it can contribute to further studies on maritime knowledge circulation in the 16 th century. Exchanging Portugal for Spain for a Nautical Proposal (1564–65) Little is known about the early life of Bartolomeu Baião. Since he participated in the expedition of Simão de Alcáçova (1470–1535), the Portuguese explorer under Spanish service who died in the Patagonian area in 1535, Baião may have been born in the late 1510s. Given the pattern of intense circulation of Portuguese nautical experts between Portugal and Spain and even the nautical espionage in which both sides engages during during the 1530s, 16 it is possible Baião subsequently returned to Portuguese service. Yet, the Portuguese rulers John III (r. 1521–1557) and Sebastian (r. 1557–1578) did not 12 James Alexander Williamson, Sir John Hawkins: the time and the man (London: Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 99; Alan Haynes, Walsingham: Elizabethan Spymaster and Statesman (Stroud: Sutton, 2004), p. 42. 13 For an overview of the broader impact of Pinteado and Rodrigues’ actions in England in Anglo-Portuguese maritime and diplomatic relations see Nuno Vila-Santa, Knowledge Exchanges between Portugal and Europe: Maritime Diplomacy, Espionage and Nautical Science in the Early Modern World (15 th -17 th centuries) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2024), pp. 87–120. 14 P. E. H. Hair, “The Teixeira da Mota Archive and the Guinea Texts Project,” History in Africa, 10 (1983), p. 388. Avelino Teixeira da Mota (1920–1982) planned to write an article on Baião but this work appears not to have been completed. I have searched for the Admiral’s notes for his article on Baião at Lisbon’s Academia de Marinha, Biblioteca de Marinha, Arquivo Histórico de Marinha and at the ancient archives from IICT, where most of Teixeira da Mota’s papers are kept, but have not found them. It seems that the article was never published after Mota’s death. 15 Recent works on London’s trading community do not mention Baião. For instance: Jessica Hower, S. Tudor Empire. The Making of Early Modern Britain and the British Atlantic World, 1485–1603 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Edmond Smith, Merchants. The community that shaped England’s Trade and Empire, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021). 16 Vila-Santa, Knowledge Exchanges, p. 63. 64 NUNO VILA-SANTA provide Baião with any royal grant. Baião’s name is absent from the Portuguese royal chancellery records between the 1530s and the 1570s. 17 The Spanish archive of Simancas holds two undated papers Baião signed, both in the Secretaria de Estado Portugal, which contain records relating to Spain’s diplomatic relations with Portugal. The legajo 382 contains several documents relating to Dom Alonso de Tovar, the Spanish ambassador to Portugal between 1561 and 1567. 18 Both of Baião’s papers are autographs, probably addressed to Tovar, given that in 1563, stationed in Lisbon, Tovar dealt with the Portuguese pilot Bartolomeu Borges, whom he tried to recruit into Spanish service. 19 A report from the late 1560s, by Esteban Berçon de Medina del Campo, who met Baião in Spain while he was in prison, stated that Tovar gave Baião letters of credence to present to Philip II (r. 1556–1598). 20 As legajo 382 contains documents for the years 1564–65, it is likely that Baião’s papers also date from 1564–65. The more formal tone of the first document suggests that Baião intended it for Philip II. Baião began by discussing the navigational challenges Spanish ships returning from the Americas and Northern Europe faced in Iberian waters. Baião claimed that inadequately trained pilots were too often unaware of their exact position because they were unable to calculate their latitude. As most pilots were ignorant of the principles of astronomical navigation, did not know how to calculate the height of the sun, and relied only on their practical experience at sea, the result was frequent shipwrecks. Baião vaunted his invention of a novel nautical instrument enabling pilots to accurately measure the height of the sun, even under cloudy or stormy conditions. The instrument was so easy to use that any sailor would be able to operate it without difficulty. Additionally, it could also be used at night to measure the height of the polar stars, not only in the Northern Hemisphere, but also in the Southern Hemisphere, where these stars were more difficult to locate. Baião emphasized that his invention was particularly valuable for navigation in the Pacific, where sailing meant spending many days without sighting land. Baião offered to present his invention in person, along with all his other “secrets.” He concluded by stating that he had special intelligence to convey regarding the Portuguese court’s response, based on the famous 1494 meridian of Tordesillas in the Atlantic, to Spanish claims in Florida. Baião promised to disclose this information, despite the significant risk he faced in Portugal. Thus, he ended this first document by hinting that if he was accepted into the Spanish service, he would provide his nautical invention and intelligence on Florida. 17 At Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), I searched for royal grants to Baião or even a pardon-letter to him by Kings John III and Sebastian, and there is no such record (at Chancelaria de D. João III and D. Sebastião e D. Henrique (Próprios and Perdões). 18 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Secretaria de Estado, Legajo 382. The documents in this legajo are not numbered. 19 On the topic see: Nuno Vila-Santa, “The Untold Story of Oceanic Pilot Bartolomeu Borges who Guided Jean Ribault to Florida in 1562: Document Transcription and Translation, accompanied by an Historical Introduction,” Terrae Incognitae 55–1 (2023), pp. 82–102. 20 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Patronato 171, nº 1, R. 18, fo. 24. YTIN 65 Baião’s second Portuguese paper is almost a repetition of the first. Titled “Notes on the effect of the instrument,” it seems to have been directed to ambassador Tovar, who likely requested that Baião provide more scientific details about his invention before Tovar informed Philip II and his cosmographers about Baião’s proposal. Nonetheless, it was not in Baião’s interest to disclose the scientific “secrets” of his invention to a third party, rather than presenting them personally in Spain. After outlining the advantages of his nautical instrument, Baião stated that he had been considering serving Spain for many years. Since Spain was the greatest European maritime power, he decided to present his nautical instrument there, as no one in Portugal appreciated it. To deliver the intelligence about Florida personally, Baião requested letters of credence to safely cross the Portuguese-Spanish border. As stated, there is no formal indication that ambassador Tovar replied to Baião. Still, considering that Tovar approached pilot Borges in 1563, he may have accorded Baião the credence letters that Berçon later claimed to have seen. Baião’s drafts indicate his familiarity with the traditional rhetoric Portuguese pilots attempting to serve Spain in the Pacific employed. Portuguese cosmographer João Pacheco in 1535 proposed that Emperor Charles V (r. 1516–1556) organize a Spanish venture to the Pacific. 21 Baião’s rhetoric closely resembles Pacheco’s, but Baião also proffered his nautical invention shortly before the Spanish inaugurated the nautical route between New Spain and the Philippines in 1565. Baião clearly saw this as an opportunity to claim that his nautical instrument could be used in the Pacific voyages. Baião also contended that the Portuguese court was preparing to challenge Spain’s rights to Florida, even though Florida was clearly within the Spanish hemisphere according to the Tordesillas Treaty of 1494. Baião’s reference to the Portuguese claim to Florida suggests that the pilot was aware that this would immediately raise concern at Philip II’s court and might also enhance his chances of acceptance into Spanish service. There is no evidence, however, that Portugal ever presented such a protest to Spain. It also remains unclear whether cosmographers from the Casa de la Contratación of Seville ever examined Baião’s nautical instrument, as would have been typical had the Spanish court seriously considered it. Still, Baião knew well the language and tactics necessary to “sell” his nautical expertise. 22 Baião also operated as another typical Spanish arbitrista, proposing his remedies to the Spanish challenges. In this, Baião was also influenced by his Portuguese origin. Since the emergence of the Portuguese overseas empire, such type of “remedies” literature is common in Portuguese archives. 23 Baião’s proposal warranted consideration less because of his questionable nautical invention, than because he promised to provide intelligence on Florida. In 1564–65, 21 Vila-Santa, Knowledge Exchanges, pp. 44–45. 22 This is mostly the case for the artillery men employed by the Casa exactly in the same period as Baião. See Brice Cossard, Les artilleurs et la Monarchie hispanique (1560–1610). Guerre, savoirs techniques, Etat (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2021). 23 See Luís de Albuquerque, José Pereira da Costa, “Cartas de serviços da Índia (1500–1550),” Mare Liberum nº 1, 1990, pp. 309–396. 66 NUNO VILA-SANTA amid the Franco-Spanish conflicts in Florida, 24 any nautical, geographical, maritime or political intelligence that Baião might have had would have been valuable for Spain. There is no indication, however, that he received any formal reply from Tovar, Philip II or the Consejo de Indias. Baião thus turned to England, hoping to capitalize on his nautical expertise by offering to support John Hawkins’ voyages. Maritime and Mercantile Intelligence in the Service of John Hawkins and the Spanish Imprisonment (1565–69) Aware of Hawkins’ first voyage in 1562 and of his commercial profits from selling slaves from West Africa to the Spanish outposts in the Caribbean, Baião likely heard that in October 1564 Hawkins departed from Plymouth to repeat his feat. 25 The Portuguese ruler was informed of this via the many warnings sent by João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France between 1557 and 1568. 26 Portuguese preparations against English voyages to West Africa in 1564–65 were no secret either. Portuguese pilots António Eanes Pinteado and Francisco Rodrigues had actively participated in the voyages of Thomas Wyndham and William Towerson in the 1550s. In 1561, Portuguese New-Christian Belchior Vaz de Azevedo was sent to England by Nicholas Throckmorton (1516–1571), the English ambassador in France. In the ambassador’s words, Azevedo was being sent with “the best pilot in the world.” 27 Azevedo would advise the London merchants on optimal trading locations in West Africa. When Baião went to London in 1565, it was also well known that Hawkins had hired Spanish pilots in the Canary Islands for his first voyage. 28 Baião likely signaled his willingness to serve the English as a projector and offered to help foster the financial goals of English voyages to West Africa, in exchange for the social promotion denied in Portugal and Spain. 29 Baião presented himself to Hawkins and the London merchants. It is unclear if he did so as a slave trader, a merchant who could also trade with many commodities, or as an expert cosmographer. Impressed by his credentials, Hawkins and the London merchants appointed Baião captain of an English ship. In 1565, Baião raided the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands where he stole slaves that he subsequently sold in the Caribbean to the Spanish. 30 24 See John T. McGrath, The French in Early Florida: in the Eye of the Hurricane (Miami: University Press of Florida, 2000). 25 On Hawkins see: Harry Kelsey, Sir John Hawkins Queen Elizabeth’s Slave Trader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 19. 26 Nuno Vila-Santa, “Fighting for Mare Clausum and Secret Science: Spain, France and England in the strategies of ambassador Dantas (1557–1568),” Vegueta 23–2 (2023), pp. 1141–1143. 27 Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the reign of Elizabeth, 1561–62, edited by Joseph Stevenson (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1866), doc. 279. 28 Kelsey, Sir John Hawkins, p. 14. 29 On the topic of English projectors see: Koji Yamamoto, Taming Capitalism before its Triumph: Public Service, Distrust, and “Projecting” in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 30 Gordon Kay Mcbride, “The politics of economic expansion: English economic and diplomatic relations with Portugal and incursions into the Portuguese overseas empire, 1550–1590,” PhD thesis (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 1975), p. 95. YTIN 67 and sell more slaves in the region. Spes refrained from giving Baião a definitive response until he could confirm Philip’s stance on the matter, enclosing his correspondence with Baião for the king’s review. 53 Baião was attempting to see who would offer him better terms, England or Spain. Philip II replied ambassador Spes on 26 June: If Bartolomé Bayon fulfils his promise, he shall be willingly supplied with what he asks; but as matters of this sort are generally very easy to say and more difficult to do, they usually turn out vain, and it will be well for you to come to closer quarters with him, and find out the exact way in which he thinks to do what he promises. You will send full particulars of this for my decision. 54 Thus, for the first time, Philip personally addressed the Baião affair, indicating a heightened level of concern, even though Baião’s case had been on his desk since 1564–65. On 30 June, Philip informed Spes that he had yet to receive Baião’s enclosed letters that Spes had forwarded and instructed Spes to resend them. 55 Without being certain of Baião’s intentions, the king could not make a final decision. 56 Meanwhile in England, the situation quickly changed. On 28 July, another Spanish agent in Spes’ service, Antonio de Guaras, relayed new developments to Philip. Hawkins was preparing a fleet for Florida and Guaras warned that Hawkins would employ Baião as his pilot and was scheduled to leave in August. 57 Three days later, Guaras informed the Portuguese court that Baião had departed with Hawkins from London to Plymouth to pilot the voyage. He added that Baião was dangerous: “This bad pilot, who knows much and has great experience, will certainly do us some grave injury if means are not quickly devised to prevent it.” 58 Guaras’ missive suggests that the Spanish were even contemplating assassinating Baião. 59 Nevertheless, at this juncture, Philip had not yet responded definitively to Spes, which allowed Baião to seize the opportunity to switch allegiances once again and enter Hawkins’ service. On 5 August, Spes informed Philip that Baião would pilot the English voyage intended to attack the Indian fleet returning from the Americas. After, the English would head not to the Magellan Strait, but to New Spain. 60 Baião was using his personal connections to recruit Iberian sailors to serve England, posing another problem for Spain and Portugal. Guaras confirmed that 53 Ibidem, doc. 189. 54 Ibidem, doc. 197. 55 Ibidem, doc. 193. 56 See the considerations of Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) who has long reflected on the consequences of this approach to Spain’s overall interests, even claiming that Philip II was as an “imprudent king.” On Philip II as a spider at his nest at El Escorial see also: Arndt Brendecke, The Empirical Empire. Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). 57 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 198. 58 Ibidem, doc. 199. 59 Similarly to what Spanish ambassadors in France did. See Vila-Santa, “Fighting,” pp. 1132–1136. 60 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 200. 74 NUNO VILA-SANTA Baião had “seduced” two Spanish sailors (Damien Dela and Barrientos) to join Hawkins’ attack on the Spanish. Hawkins and Baião’s plans were clear; to unite with the French raider Jacques de Sores and attack the Carrera de Indias. 61 Thus, Baião had unmistakably picked a side and seems to have been acting in revenge for Philip’s refusal to offer him a post in the Spanish fleet. Guaras’ update was worrying for another reason. Sores was one of Coligny’s vice-admirals and had raided Santiago de Cuba with success in 1555. Ever since, Sores’ plans were always a matter of concern to Spain. Nonetheless, on 9 August, Guaras informed Philip, Hawkins had decided to remain in Plymouth to observe what would happen in Flanders (a reference to the tension between the English and the Spanish over the much-needed supplies sent by sea from Spain to the Netherlands to defeat the rebellion in the region). Baião thus returned to London. 62 The looming prospect of an open war between England and Spain, together with the fact that commercial relations between England and Portugal, 63 were still officially suspended, impacted Baião’s next maneuvers. Baião realized that opportunities for personal gain under Hawkins were limited due to the strained relations between England and the Iberian crowns. Consequently, on 12 August, Baião hurried to inform Spes that Hawkins intended to sail twelve ships to San Juan de Ulloa for plunder rather than colonization. If Hawkins found the area fortified, he would attack to settle past grievances. Baião provided this intelligence because he was once again contemplating a return to Spain’s service, conditional on acceptance by Philip. Should his offer be declined, Baião warned Spes that he would join another English voyage. 64 The same day, Guaras reported that Baião was tricking Spes and was only buying time, as ultimately, he would sail with Hawkins. 65 On 20 August, Guaras wrote Philip that Elizabeth had decided that Hawkins would not set sail so long as the Spanish fleet to Flanders did not pass through the English Channel. He also confirmed Baião’s true intentions: “I have since discovered that the Portuguese pilot was really to go with the fleet although he denied.” 66 Baião once again acted as a double agent, misleading both Spes and Guaras to conceal his true intentions. However, his plans were exposed. By this point, Baião’s duplicity was well-known but did not diminish Philip’s need to monitor Baião’s movements, as Baião remained a threat to Iberian overseas interests were he to sail with Hawkins. 61 Ibidem, doc. 202. 62 Ibidem, doc. 203. 63 On the topic see the classical: A. B. Wallis Chapman, V. M. Shillington, The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal (London, George Routledge & Sons Limited, 1907) and also the article on the English ambassador Thomas Wilson dispatched to Lisbon by William Cecil in 1567 before King Sebastian decided to seize English properties in Portugal in 1569: Susana Oliveira, “Networks of exchange in Anglo-Portuguese sixteenth-century diplomacy and Thomas Wilson’s mission to Portugal,” in Exile, Diplomacy and Texts: Exchanges between Iberia and the British Isles, 1500–1767, edited by Ana Sáez-Hidalgo and Berta Cano Echevarria (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2020), pp. 32–54. 64 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 204. 65 Ibidem, doc. 205. 66 Ibidem, doc. 210. YTIN 75 In September, Spes again forwarded Baião’s letters to Philip. Spes recommended that Philip hire Baião and pledged to engage with Baião further. Philip rejected Spes’ proposal, citing his mistrust of Baião’s intentions, and instructed Spes to continue monitoring Hawkins. 67 Therefore, it becomes clear that Philip II had taken his decision and disagreed with Spes concerning Baião. Even so, Spes continued to negotiate with Baião and to try to persuade Philip to hire the renegade pilot. This is revealed in Spes’ missive to Philip on 19 September. The transcription is relevant as it specifies the details of the negotiation between Spes and Baião, fully revealing how far Baião had arrived: I have taken care, in fulfilment of Your Majesty’s instructions, to deal with Bartolomé Bayon, as if on my own account, in order to get him to make clear how he thinks he could best serve Your Majesty. I told him, in order to get him to open out, that I would communicate on the subject through a friend of mine who was a secretary of the Council of the Indies. The result was that I got him to make the statement which I enclose herewith, and it seems to me undoubted that he is a man who could serve with advantage, and whom it is important to separate from the English and the pirates, who think by his help to make great progress in the Indies. It is true that some of the clauses in his document need moderation; but if he sails only with Your Majesty’s subjects, Your Majesty will always be able to punish him or modify the agreement at your discretion. His request to be allowed to take victuals without present payment and without giving security in Seville, appears somewhat impertinent, but the rest of his demands, after abating the export of negroes, and the taking of merchandise from here, do not seem to be objectionable. 68 This letter from Spes reveals that Philip had instructed him to negotiate with Baião informally, acting only in his name and not on behalf of the king himself. This would permit Philip to assess whether Baião harbored any genuine intention to serve Spain without involving the king directly. Philip acknowledged on 2 November that he had received Baião’s letters but indicated that he would carefully analyze them before making his decision. 69 Therefore, it appears that Philip was inclined to yield to ambassador Spes’ persistence in luring Baião back to Spain. But, because Hawkins did not set sail, Baião in 1570 could no longer use the threat of sailing with Hawkins in his negotiations with Spes. Even so, Baião had much to gain by aligning with Hawkins rather than Spain. It is plausible that Baião was playing both sides, feeding information to Hawkins about Spes’ activities and vice versa, just as he did with Spes’ predecessor, ambassador Guzmán de Silva in 1567, when he misled him regarding the destination of his voyage based on William Cecil’s counsel. 70 Philip notified Spies of his decision concerning Baião on 31 January 1571. Once more the transcription is essential to understand how the king formed his opinion of Baião: 67 Ibidem, docs. 213, 214 and 217. 68 Ibidem, doc. 218. 69 Ibidem, doc. 224. 70 Ronald, The Pirate Queen, p. 103. 76 NUNO VILA-SANTA Having considered what you have written on various occasions about Bartolomé Bayon and the memorandum he gave you, I have come to the conclusion that his proposals are quite out of the question, and were no doubt only made for the purpose of getting more credit and reputation with the people there in consequence of the reply he hoped to get from here. Although this was the case, you will do well not to appear to slight him, and you may tell him, as if on your own account, that the person who was your intermediary had informed you that, if he would moderate somewhat the demands he makes, he might be dealt with reasonably, but that it would be much better, in order that it should be settled more speedily and easily, that he himself should come here to treat on the matter; for which purpose a safe conduct would be given to him. You can proceed cautiously in accordance with this as you see fit and let me know what passes. 71 Philip continued his typical ploy of dissimulation, instructing Spes to state clearly to Baião that he needed to moderate his demands, but permitting the ambassador to issue Baião a safe conduct to travel to Spain for further negotiation. Like Spes, Philip wanted to capture the “traitorous” Baião before the latter could do more damage. Once more, Baião eluded arrest, and events in England compelled Spes to adopt a new strategy. William Winter and Hawkins were ready to depart in seven or eight ships and Baião was to follow them in two ships to buy slaves in West Africa and to sell them in the Caribbean. 72 Spes was worried enough to address two letters to Philip, dated March 2 and 10. In the second, Spes admitted his previous misjudgment of Baião’s intentions: I have not been able to settle anything with the Council, and still less with Bayon. When I sent to summon him hither, he was already in agreement with a Portuguese Doctor here and certain Flemish exiles to fit out two ships, and he refused to come to me, but wrote to me that he would not touch in Your Majesty’s territory. I do not believe him, but I am not abandoning the matter and profess great affection for him, although he presumes a great deal more than he has any right to do. The Council are willing, however, that he should go. 73 Following Philip’s instructions, Spes altered his approach. While publicly showing favor toward Baião, he clandestinely worked toward his downfall. He had an additional motive for undermining Baião: the latter’s collaboration with Flemish exiles in London. Thus, on 10 March, Spes persuaded the English authorities to imprison Baião, and informed Philip that Baião was incarcerated but efforts were underway for his release. Spes disclosed that negotiations with Baião, who now enjoyed open support from members of the Privy Council, continued even while Baião was detained. Spes stated, with evident frustration, that “It has been impossible to bring him to decency, as he is a great scamp. If weather do not prevent him, I understand he will go to the river Senegal and thence all these pirates hope that the winds will carry them to the coast on the north of the Island of Hispaniola, where there are good ports and opportunities of profit.” 74 71 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 234. 72 Ibidem, doc. 238. 73 Ibidem, doc. 240. 74 Ibidem, doc. 242. YTIN 77 Meanwhile, warned of Baião’s involvement with Flemish rebel exiles and Doctor Hector Nunes (1521–1591), a Portuguese-Jewish physician in Elizabeth’s service, Philip reacted. He wrote to Spes on 17 April that he had long distrusted Baião and only endorsed the dissimulation strategy at Spes’ insistence: “What you write about the pilot Bayon has been no news to us here as we always judged that his proposals made to you were simply an artful trick.” Still, the King also promised to keep Spes updated on Baião and Nunes’ connections in Spain. 75 Spes persisted in his efforts to secure Baião’s definitive imprisonment. On 27 April, in a letter to Philip, he explained in detail how he managed to obtain Baião’s arrest, by exploiting Baião’s debts. Spes’ account is noteworthy for his tactics, but also for the reference to the “French” danger: “I have had Bartolomé Bayon arrested here through certain creditors of his, and he will not be able to go to the Indies now, even though he be released, as the season is too far advanced. I will try to stop him for any future season, and also his going to Rochelle, which he intends to do in default of any other voyage.” 76 Once more, Spes was wrong in assuming that Baião would not be released in time to sail with the English fleet. Baião considered fleeing to the Huguenots at La Rochelle, which was allied with Coligny, whose interest in hiring Portuguese maritime experts was well-known. 77 Spes considered Baião an imminent threat to Spain’s interests, whether he sailed in 1571 under English or French flag, because he knew that Coligny would target Spanish and Portuguese overseas territories. The previous year, Coligny’s vice-admiral Sores had raided the Canary Islands and executed the new Portuguese governor of Brazil, along with several Jesuits. The prospect of Baião, a skilled pilot and captain knowledgeable about Portugal and Spain’s Atlantic routes, aligning with Coligny was a deeply alarming scenario for both realms. Spes warned Spain to move quickly. He judged it preferable to have Baião in Elizabeth’s service, as she still hesitated to attack Iberian shipping and feared open war with both Portugal and Spain. Baião would be more dangerous working for Coligny, who advocated a maritime war between France and the Iberian powers. Ultimately, Baião remained in English service. The English may have sought to retain Baião and to prevent him from joining Coligny. Some years before, precisely because of his nautical knowledge, Jean Ribault was jailed in London to avoid his reentry into Coligny’s employ. 78 Upon his release from prison and with the support of the Privy Council and London merchants, Baião resumed preparations for his voyage. Philip issued two orders on 31 July The first was directed to D. Juan de Borja, the Spanish ambassador in Portugal from 1570 to 1575. Philip instructed Borja to thoroughly investigate and verify Spes’ report that Baião and Nunes had instructed Bernardo Ruiz to purchase a ship in Lisbon for a voyage to the Spanish Indies with their cargo. If confirmed, Borja was tasked with thwarting these plans 75 Ibidem, doc. 248. 76 Ibidem, doc. 250. 77 Vila-Santa, “Fighting,” pp. 1123–1130. 78 For details on Ribault’s career between England and France see: McGrath, The French, pp. 50–56. 78 NUNO VILA-SANTA in Lisbon. 79 The second directive was dispatched to Spanish authorities in Biscay. Spes had alerted Philip that Baião and Nunes had an associate, Pedro Zuazo, in Bilbao, and warned that Baião would captain this voyage. Consequently, Philip commanded authorities in Biscay to prevent any such schemes involving Biscayan accomplices. 80 On 5 August, he informed Spes of these orders and acknowledged that he had acted upon Spes’ counsel. 81 Despite these efforts to obstruct his departure, Baião sailed. Philip wrote to Spes on 13 August: It was well to report the sailing of the pilot Bartolome Bayon, as I at once had the necessary step taken to catch him, and advised my nephew, the King of Portugal, to capture him when he called in to take the negroes, that being the place where he can be most easily taken. We do not doubt that the Portuguese will do their best as they are much offended with him. 82 Philip’s letter affirms the collaboration between the Portuguese and the Spanish in their efforts to apprehend Baião in 1571, akin to their actions with Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira in 1567. Regrettably, the complete correspondence of Francisco Giraldes in 1571, the Portuguese ambassador in England, has not survived, making it impossible to verify this Portuguese-Spanish collaboration from the Portuguese perspective. Nevertheless, another document confirms Baião’s English service in 1571. It pertains to English plans to sail to New Spain, ostensibly dated 1575, though its contents strongly suggest it was composed around 1571. This document references Baião’s negotiations with ambassador Spes in 1570 regarding his potential return to Spain’s service. It also notes that during these negotiations, Baião made undisclosed promises to Thomas Earne, an individual who had served in Ireland under Robert Dudley, the 1 st Earl of Leicester and Elizabeth’s favored courtier. 83 Earne likely introduced Baião to Dudley and subsequently to William Cecil. Baião convinced Dudley and Cecil that he would lead an English expedition to New Spain. To secure their trust, Baião swore complete loyalty to England, even suggesting that failing, they could cut off his head. Despite their recognition of Baião’s skills as a cosmographer, Dudley and Cecil hesitated to approve the expedition’s departure due to Baião’s history of shifting allegiances. This hesitation was not unprecedented, as the English had previously encountered similar situations involving Portuguese pilots. In 1567, Portuguese sailors Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira had arrived in England offering to guide the English to purported gold deposits in West Africa. They had made similar promises in Spain and France earlier. Accepted into Elizabeth’s service and subsequently under Hawkins, they later admitted to fabricating their knowledge of the gold mines and fled. 84 Similar suspicions likely arose in Dudley and Cecil’s minds regarding Baião’s proposal in 1571. Cecil was always cautious and meticulous, and also very attentive to everything connected to Portugal as a recent manuscript found in his 79 AGI, Indiferente, 426, book 25, fo. 119 v-120 v. 80 AGI, Indiferente, 426, book 25, fo. 119 r-119 v. 81 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 269. 82 Ibidem, doc. 275. 83 See Sarah Gristwood. Elizabeth & Leicester: Power, passion and politics (New York: Viking, 2007). 84 See Bourdon, Deux aventuriez. YTIN 79 personal library demonstrates. 85 Thus, Cecil could not afford the danger of Baião jeopardizing his influential court position, 86 particularly during the 1570s, a time of escalating power struggles for control over Elizabeth. Baião therefore collaborated with other London merchants to organize a new expedition. On 18 July 1571, he departed from London as the captain of a ship crewed by sixty men. His objective was to emulate Hawkins’ successes by procuring wine in the Canary Islands, selling cotton in Cape Verde, gathering slaves in Rio Grande, and then trading them in the Caribbean. Baião successfully completed this journey. While passing near Puerto Rico, he retaliated for past grievances endured there in 1565. However, before Baião’s departure, he was summoned by Dudley and Cecil. Both requested that he lead the expedition to New Spain, given their previous negotiations. Baião declined, citing that the navigational schedule for his departure was too advanced, but assured them he would captain the voyage in 1572. Based on Baião’s assurance, Cecil and Dudley allowed him to set sail. Baião planned to utilize the profits from this voyage to acquire five ships and commence the enterprise to New Spain the following year. In 1572, he intended to personally demonstrate to the English the effective methods and locations for trading in that region. 87 This document suggests that Cecil and Dudley, as members of the Privy Council in 1571, likely facilitated Baião’s release from the jail. Secondly, it raises the question of whether Baião was involved in plans for an English expedition to New Spain with Francis Drake (1540?−1596). Was Baião planning to sail alongside Drake, or did he share information that Drake later utilized in his attacks on Panama in 1572–73? While no documents confirming this have been found, the possibility remains open, given Baião’s close associations with Drake’s confidants like John Hawkins and William Cecil. Moreover, Drake had sailed with Hawkins, and it cannot be discounted that he may have met Baião personally at some point, either in 1565 or in 1570–71. Baião’s turbulent career was ending. On 22 November 1571, António Fogaça reported to Rui Gomes da Silva (1516–1573), the Prince of Eboli who served Philip, 88 that Doctor Nunes was impatiently awaiting Baião’s return. 89 Baião’s capture likely occurred in West Africa during his return voyage, where a local African chief apprehended him and delivered him to António Velho Tinoco, the Portuguese governor of the Cape Verde Islands from 1571 to 1577. According to a Portuguese account, Tinoco executed Baião in Santiago for piracy probably in late 1571 or early 1572. 90 The Portuguese and the Spanish may have collaborated to orchestrate Baião’s capture, especially as Philip disclosed to Spes that he had proposed such a strategy to Sebastian. Baião’s execution can be compared with the 85 Nuno Vila-Santa, Kate Lowe, “An unknown history of Portugal (c. 1570) in William Cecil’s library: Commissioning and writing history during the Elizabethan Era,” The Antiquaries Journal 2024, pp. 1–29. 86 On the topic see: David Loades, The Cecils: Privilege and Power Behind the Throne (Richmond/Surrey: The National Archives, 2007). 87 AGI, Patronato, 265, R. 27. 88 On Silva see: James M. Boyden, The Courtier and the King: Ruy Gómez de Silva, Phillip II, and the Court of Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 89 Calendar of State Papers, (Simancas), 1568–1579, doc. 291. 90 André Donelha, Descrição da Serra Leoa e dos rios da Guiné e Cabo Verde (1625) (Lisbon: Junta das Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1977), pp. 336–337. 80 NUNO VILA-SANTA persecutions and public final execution of pilots Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira in Lisbon in 1568. The Portuguese celebrated Baião’s death, underscoring its significance. Conclusion Bartolomeu Baião’s story offers an example of how difficult it was for European rulers to control pivotal figures who circulated with critical knowledge to their disadvantage. Throughout his career, Baião effectively exploited this dynamic to the detriment of three maritime powers: initially the Portuguese, then the Spanish, and to some extent, even the English. Baião’s ability to circulate among and offer his services to Portugal, Spain, and England illustrates this. A versatile figure, Baião adapted his proposals to align with the maritime interests of the powers he sought to serve. Portugal and Spain, as established maritime empires, demanded innovative approaches. Accordingly, Baião advocated for a new nautical instrument to gain attention and further his plans for maritime employment. But, as was argued, if in Portugal and Spain, Baião made proposals that could label him as an arbitrista for nautical knowledge, 91 his action in England easily suggests that he acted as projector. 92 By Baião’s time in England, maritime endeavors were less developed than in Portugal and Spain. This meant that he could leverage his maritime expertise to swiftly secure employment. This strategy proved successful with the London merchants, John Hawkins, William Cecil, and Robert Dudley, all of whom recognized Baião’s capabilities. Even if the specifics of the knowledge Baião exchanged with them remain unclear due to gaps in the historical records, it is evident that he capitalized on his experience. Given his earlier career in Portugal and Spain, where he participated in voyages like Simão de Alcaçova’s in 1535, Baião likely shared Iberian maritime expertise, such as nautical rutters, charts, and geographical insights, critical for English preparations for voyages to West Africa, the Caribbean, or South America. This parallels the actions of Portuguese pilots like Pinteado in 1553–54 and Antão Luís and Gaspar Caldeira in 1567, who similarly shared their knowledge in England. There is no compelling reason to believe that Baião would not have pursued the same strategy in England, especially after his departure from Spain where he had already proposed nautical innovations. His ability to circulate and exploit the knowledge gaps between maritime powers underscores his significance in the history of Anglo-Iberian maritime relations in the 16 th century. This leads to a second conclusion. Baião’s remarkable adaptability within the English maritime context, echoing other Portuguese seafarers in England, underscores his awareness of the “global” value of his maritime knowledge as he moved between rival powers. Baião recognized that his expertise could secure employment in Portugal, Spain, France, or England – the key players in maritime affairs all 91 See Reforming Early Modern Monarchies. The Castilian “Arbitristas” in Comparative European Perspectives . . . 92 See Koji Yamamoto, Taming Capitalism YTIN 81 seeking navigational knowledge for their overseas ventures. This demand facilitated his mobility among these maritime powers. His allegiance to Protestant England over the Catholic Iberians did not hinder his opportunities; rather, he prioritized the chance to apply his nautical skills for personal gain. Baião’s career sheds light on the strategies pilots employed to bargain and secure employment with maritime powers, influencing global disputes between maritime rivals. Concurrently, Baião exemplified the Renaissance practice of self-fashioning, 93 molding his persona to suit the expectations and needs of different patrons. Baião also capitalized on the enduring archetype of the Portuguese pilot, which was established across Europe since the early 16 th century. 94 Thirdly, it is evident that Baião’s impact on English maritime ventures during the Elizabethan era was not as profound as that of his Portuguese predecessors and successors. Unlike figures such as António Eanes Pinteado, who charted new nautical routes for West Africa, Nuno da Silva for the Magellan Strait, and Simão Fernandes for North America, Baião did not introduce groundbreaking nautical routes during his shorter tenure in English service. Nevertheless, Baião’s presence was significant in inspiring other prominent Elizabethans toward oceanic exploration and geographical discoveries in the Americas, as Spes reported to Philip II. The correlation between Baião’s proposals for New Spain, Florida, the Caribbean, and the Magellan Strait, and subsequent voyages led by Francis Drake, Richard Grenville, Humphrey Gilbert, and Walter Raleigh in the 1570s and 1580s is evident. Although Baião did not participate in these expeditions, the knowledge he brought to England played a pivotal role. Hence, Baião emerges as a multifaceted figure in the Elizabethan era, part cosmographer, sailor, merchant, and pirate, contributing to the evolving concept of an English overseas empire that emerged through trade and plunder. 95 It is at this juncture that Baião’s contributions to England merit assessment. Fourthly, in line with the historiographical imperatives outlined in the Introduction, further investigation is warranted regarding how other Spanish and Portuguese, like Baião, contributed to the development of English overseas strategies in the Elizabethan era, especially from the 1580s onwards. As Richard Hakluyt candidly asserted, England ventured into overseas endeavors to emulate the successes of the Iberians and to seize opportunities for enrichment. Hakluyt envisaged a “miracle” when António Eanes Pinteado arrived in England in 1552–53. 96 Likewise, it is plausible that figures like Hawkins, Cecil, and Dudley viewed Baião through a similar lens as Hakluyt did with Pinteado. They recognized the potential benefits that such “miracles” could bring to England. By supporting Baião’s initiatives, akin to Walsingham’s backing of Portuguese pilot Simão Fernandes, 97 Cecil and Dudley perceived that knowledge 93 On the topic see: Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning. From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005). 94 Vila-Santa, Knowledge Exchanges, pp. 323–325. 95 Notably by Andrews, Trade, and Ronald, The Pirate Queen. 96 See note 49. 97 See note 9. 82 NUNO VILA-SANTA held more than just intrinsic power - it could serve as a cornerstone for developing an English overseas empire and garnering favor with Elizabeth I. Nonetheless, Baião’s career also typifies that of an “unofficial” actor disseminating “global” maritime knowledge. It serves as another compelling case study illustrating how the establishment of overseas empires in the 16 th century was continually shaped by the exchange of knowledge among maritime rivals. Finally, Baião’s career was also relevant in the unanswered questions it leaves. If the surviving documents suggest that he acted in Portugal, Spain, and England mainly as a slave trader, it is also clear that Baião capitalized on his nautical knowledge. He mostly managed to elude capture, a key-feature that needs to be addressed within the framework of studies of the circulation of knowledge. Baião’s career underscores how he had shifting and always adaptable schemes to resist capture. Baião was persecuted both for his actions, but also for his practical knowledge. His story testifies to how the circulation of carriers of sensitive knowledge among rival maritime powers could sometimes result in persecution and death. If while Baião was in England, Spain and Portugal perceived him as a “traitor,” we cannot ascertain from the sources if when he sought to reenter Spanish service his English interlocutors viewed him as a “traitor” or even a “Spanish Elizabethan.” 98 Cecil’s concerns about Baião’s fidelity suggest this was the case. Ultimately, for Baião’s career, but also for other individuals studied by historians of knowledge, not only actions and knowledge were at stake: perceptions were always and also key. Recent scholarship has stressed the “corrosive” effects of 16 th century globalization, 99 as it was mainly the effects of that “corrosive” and uncontrollable globalization that enabled Baião to circulate and have the career he had between Portugal, Spain, and England. Seen in this light, Baião is another case showing the complete failure of Iberian (Portuguese and Spanish) attempted secrecy policies in the 16 th century. 100 Therefore, future historiographical studies need to incorporate this “corrosive” dimension of globalization to better apprehend the complexities of maritime knowledge circulation among European rivals in the 16 th century. Acknowledgements This article was written in the framework of the RUTTER project. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 833438). Financed by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P./MCTES and by national funds (PIDDAC): UIDB/00286/2020 e UIDP/00286/2020. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Rui Manuel Loureiro for the exchanges of references on works and documents on Bartolomeu Baião’s used in this article. Additionally, the author is indebted to the comments of two anonymous reviewers which helped him to improve this research. 98 Albert J. Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans: The English Exiles at the Court of Philip II (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963). 99 One of the examples, among many others, of such historiographical claims can be seen in several works by Bartolomé Yun-Casalillla mentioned in notes 1 and 5. 100 Vila-Santa, Knowledge Exchanges, pp. 323–325. YTIN 83