Can London Still Accommodate the Next Generation of Young Graduates?

Can London Still Accommodate the Next Generation of Young Graduates? Candidate Number: 2425SUN14 Department of Architecture University of Cambridge Word Count (excluding captions & bibliography): 8,752 words This dissertation is submitted for Part II Dissertation April 2025 Acknowledgements Completing this dissertation has made me realize how fortunate I have been to receive invaluable support from Cambridge. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Ying Jin, for his insightful guidance and prompt responses throughout my research. I am deeply thankful to Professor Nicholas Bullock for his intellectual generosity and all the inspiring discussions. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Felipe Hernández for his consistent encouragement and understanding. Finally, I wish to extend my appreciation to Dr. Jinze Sha, who truly excelled in guiding me to excel in Excel. Abstract Young graduates - those who come from universities, colleges and other further education and are traditionally inspired by London jobs – are finding the city’s accommodation well beyond reach. This dissertation investigates how London has been changing in the recent decade. My research first reviews the predicament for the young graduates; next, Census 2011 and 2021 data are analysed to track shifts in young adult populations; this is then compared against housing stock changes by unit size and location, with case studies of what is happening on the ground. The findings reveal a clear structural challenge that has escaped most researchers in the field: London’s young adult population group aged 25-34, of which the young graduates belong, is actually declining in most areas, while housing construction is now skewed towards larger or high-end units for older, wealthier families. This means London appears to be pricing out its next generation of young graduates and this catastrophic trend demands strong policy intervention and innovative design solutions. Table of contents List of figures ix 1 Housing predicaments for the new generation 3 1.1 BankofMumandDad ............................ 4 1.2 Universities, Workplaces and Charities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3 Government Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4 Lack of understanding of the current situation in London . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 The Impact of Covid-19 and Shifting Demographics 11 2.1 Evaluating the Reliability of Census under COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2 Structural Shift, Not a Pandemic Glitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) 15 3.1 AgeGroup20-24 ............................... 16 3.1.1 Overview............................... 16 3.1.2 2011Distribution........................... 17 3.1.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.2 AgeGroup25-34 ............................... 20 3.2.1 Overview............................... 20 3.2.2 2011Distribution........................... 20 3.2.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3 AgeGroup35-44 ............................... 23 3.3.1 Overview............................... 23 3.3.2 2011Distribution........................... 23 3.3.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.4 Age Group 45-54 and 55-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 viii Table of contents 3.4.1 Overview............................... 26 3.4.2 2011Distribution........................... 26 3.4.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.5 Age65andAbove .............................. 30 3.5.1 Overview............................... 30 3.5.2 2011Distribution........................... 31 3.5.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4 Can London still accommodate young people with suitable housing? 35 4.1 One-Bedroom Units 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.2 Spatial Misalignment for 1-bedroom Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.3 Two-Bedroom Units in 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4.4 Limited Alignment with 25-34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.5 Three-Bedroom Units in 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.6 Four and more Bedroom Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.7 Good News? Lots of 4-beds are built . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5 Structural Failures in London’s Housing Market for the New Generation 47 5.1 Self-Regulated Market v.s. Social Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.2 Policy and Planning Shortcomings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.3 Bottlenecks in the planning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5.4 Consequences: Young Londoners’ Coping Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6 Conclusions 57 6.1 Potential interventions for a more responsive housing system . . . . . . . . 57 6.2 Summary and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 References 61 List of figures 1.1 Total Number of Dwellings in London by Period of Construction(1900-2024) 9 1.2 Dwelling Completions in London by Tenure Type and Time Period (1990-2024) 10 2.1 Comparison of 2021 Census and Mid-Year Estimates (2021-2023) by Boroughs 12 2.2 Change of Population by Age Band in London, Mid-Year Estimates(2001-2023) 13 2.3 Change in Population Share by Age Band in London, Mid-Year Estimates (2001-2023).................................. 13 3.1 London Tube Fare Zone Transport for London (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2 Share of age 20-24 in Resident Population (a) 2011, (b) 2021. . . . . . . . 17 3.3 Share of 20-24 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . 18 3.4 Share of 20-24 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . 19 3.5 Share of age 25-34 in Resident Population (a) 2011, (b) 2021. . . . . . . . 20 3.6 Share of 25-34 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . 21 3.7 Share of 25-34 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . 22 3.8 Share of age 35-44 in Resident Population (a) 2011, (b) 2021. . . . . . . . 23 3.9 Share of 35-44 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . 24 3.10 Share of 35-44 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . 25 3.11 ........................................ 26 3.12 Share of 45-54 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . 27 3.13 Share of 55-64 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . 28 3.14 Share of 45-54 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . 29 3.15 Share of 55-64 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . 30 3.16 Share of 65+ in Resident Population (a) 2011 (b) 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.17 Share of 65+ in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 . . . . . 32 3.18 Share of 65+ in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 . . . . . . . . 33 3.19 Comparison on Share of Different Age Groups - Difference 2011-2021 . . . 34 6Housing predicaments for the new generation • Many parents in their 40s now did not experience the same financial advantages as those in their 50s and 60s, many of them might still be repaying heavy loans when the younger Gen Z cohort need such help. • As life expectancy is extending, the older generations are increasingly aware of the need to secure their financial ability for later-life care, given the context of world-wide ageing problem and the rising costs of elderly care. Therefore, while financial transfers from parents will remain an important source of financial support for young adults, they are becoming increasingly unsustainable due to rising financial pressures over time. 1.2 Universities, Workplaces and Charities Aside from parental help, it would be reasonable to consider possible assistance from institutions-such as universities/colleges, workplaces, and charities-to provide housing support. However, these institutions can only offer limited assistance. For example, the largest university in London in terms of students’ size - University College London (UCL) states that first year undergraduates are prioritised for a place for university accommodation, while the rest may still apply and stand a chance for getting university accommodation (UCL, 2024). A current final-year UCL undergraduate confirmed that, in practice, it is extremely difficult for secondand third-year students to obtain university accommodation, despite being eligible to apply. He also mentioned that first-year universitymanaged housing in London can cost as little as £245 per week, including utilities and meals, an option almost impossible to find in the private housing market. Similarly, only first-year undergraduates at Imperial College London (IC) are guaranteed college accommodation. (Imperial College, 2025). One IC student described how, during his first year, he lived in university-provided ensuite accommodation in North Acton for just £170 a week. However, once students move beyond their first year, they must navigate the private rental sector because of the shortage in school accommodation. The same IC student, now a third-year intern at AstraZeneca in Cambridge, receives only £300 weekly as salary from the company and struggles with living costs: during the week, he stays at Travelodge near Cambridge Station, and on weekends he commutes back to London, sharing a £400-per-week apartment in Kensington. The two cases reveal that both universities and workplaces rarely provide substantial housing assistance. While it is understandable that first-year students 1.3 Government Interventions 7 require greater housing security, this policy leaves soon-to-graduate students and early-career professionals in a precarious position. Recognising these housing challenges, UCL also references charities as potential source of housing support. However, by examining the major charities listed (Students’ Union UCL, 2024), it is obvious that they are primarily focused on preventing homelessness and providing temporary shelter for individual cases, rather than addressing the broader issue of housing for young renters. 1.3 Government Interventions Given that universities and charities may only provide assistance in limited cases, the responsibility for ensuring housing conditions has now and historically fallen on council intervention. When there are housing difficulties, government usually has two solutions: mass production of social housing and the introduction of minimum housing standards. As Palate (2020) noted, ‘along with the widespread campaign for Homes fit for Heroes, housing would not be resolved solely as a quantitative issue, but also, and most importantly, as a qualitative concern by the state.’ These two approaches were initially aimed at reducing postwar housing shortages, and they successfully ensured basic living conditions. However, as societal and economic conditions evolved, both strategies have become increasingly difficult to implement effectively. The idea of Mass-produced houses is to provide the disadvantaged people with increasing housing supply. However, it is often misconstrued as a direct solution to affordability. The Help to Buy Policies aimed to provide UK’s first-time buyers with financial assistance, however served as bigger failure buy receiving national-wide criticism. Wolf (2013) strongly opposed the scheme, arguing that this would instead keep housing costly. He wrote: ‘a policy of increasing demand is absurd. It may increase supply a little, but only by raising prices still higher than they would otherwise be. If one wanted to increase supply, the solution is evident, but politically unthinkable: make a large quantity of land available for development and impose a swingeing site value tax, to compel building’. Wolf (2013) There was also the Right to Buy policy (1980) which led to the sale of thousands of councilowned homes at a cut price, yet with very few new replacements built by local authorities. (Malpass, 2005). Nationally, the share of households renting form councils halved from 31% in 1980 to just 16% in 2022/23 (New Economics Foundation, 2024). This seemingly offered 8Housing predicaments for the new generation an opportunity for social housing tenants to become homeowners. However, the long-term effect, as Malpass (2005) pointed out: “On the one hand, the importance attached to the sale of council houses, a policy for changing the ownership of existing dwellings, adding nothing at all to the total stock. And on the other hand, far from promising the electorate so many hundred thousand dwellings each year, Michael Heseltine steadfastly refused to predict how many dwellings would be built. By the early 1980s output targets had ceased to be a measure of ministerial virility and had disappeared from the political agenda. The Government has, however, continued to promote the expansion of home ownership as the cure-all for housing problems”. Malpass (2005) In the UK, an estimated 41% of homes sold under Right to Buy are now being rented out by private landlords (New Economics Foundation, 2024) - an effective transfer of public assets into the private rental sector. For young Londoners today, this means far fewer inexpensive social homes are available than for previous generations, forcing many into the costlier private rental market or long waits for council housing. The effort on setting housing standards has also encountered difficulties. If the Tudor Walters Report(1918) and the Dudley Report(1944) represented the government’s early efforts to tackle the problem of post-war housing crisis, the Parker Morris Report(1961) then stands out to be the first to respond to social changes. While the earlier reports set explicit requirements for the mass-produced council houses, the PM report is more complex as it targeted housing type and strategies. First, the PM report was published in the backdrop of rapid social changes, including greater female participation in the workforce, the rise of television and private cars reshaping daily life, higher education levels leading to more people getting university degrees, and the economic prosperity of the 1960s. These social changes rendered previous housing standards outdated Palate (2020). Second, the PM Report regulated private enterprises houses, as it foresaw the future rise of the private rent sector. One last significant progress is the approach of overall recommendations. Instead of setting exact minimum requirements on the area of the room, the PM report provided an overall recommendation, allowing for certain flexibility in practice Palate (2020). The lesson learned from setting such requirements is a forward-thinking mindset, emphasising that housing policies, like urban planning, must anticipate future needs. However, despite its progressive vision, the Parker Morris Standards were eventually abolished, partly due to overly optimistic estimations of housing supply Palate (2020). 1.4 Lack of understanding of the current situation in London 9 Since the abolition of the PM standards, most subsequent housing standards have remained in a grey zone. The Nationally Described Space Standards (Greater London Authority, 2014), the London Housing Design Guide (Mayor of London, 2010), and the London Plan Guidance (Mayor of London, 2023) all have set similar regulations on minimum housing standards, yet they remained largely advisory. The main conflict lies between enforcing minimum standards and maintaining housing supply. In a market already struggling with slow housing delivery and undersupply, imposing mandatory standards will reduce supply even further, thereby exacerbating the situation. The Mayor’s London Plan sets a target of 52,000 new homes per year, yet only 35,000 were delivered last year (Barber, 2024). Across the city, an average of 37,768 new homes were added annually between 2020/21 and 2022/23, but the majority (69%) were for the private market, with just 1,148 completions per year allocated to social rented housing (Barber, 2024). The failure of the plan can be explained by a quote from Alain Bertaud: ‘trying to use minimum housing standards to address a housing shortage is like trying to “solve a famine” by passing a law that everyone must eat 2,000 calories a day, instead of simply producing more food.’ 1.4 Lack of understanding of the current situation in London While there is a clear sense of a national housing crisis, e.g. in the revised National Planning Policy Framework (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2024) which the current government inherits from the previous one, the specific London situation is far less well recognized. In general terms, a recent Competition and Markets Authority study concludes that the house-building sector “is not delivering the number of homes. . . needed” (Competition and Markets Authority, 2024). The official documents also recognizes the “social objective” of ensuring a sufficient number and range of homes for present and future generations. However, despite this extensive attention and policy focus, the actual housing supply in London continues to fall short. Figure 1.1 Total Number of Dwellings in London by Period of Construction(1900-2024) 10 Housing predicaments for the new generation Figure 1.2 Dwelling Completions in London by Tenure Type and Time Period (1990-2024) The actual housing delivery data (Figure 1.1) suggests a persistent mismatch between stated ambitions and built outcomes. The following analysis is based on housing construction data compiled by the author using official statistics from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2024). As shown in housing stock data by period of construction, only around 257,870 dwellings were added between 2009 and 2024—just over half the volume built in the 1983-2009 period (495,850), and less than a quarter of the pre-WWII (1900-1939) total (1,040,470). Meanwhile, disaggregated dwelling completion figures reveal a stark disparity in who builds: local authorities delivered fewer than 4,000 homes in total between 2020 and 2024, compared to over 59,000 by private developers in the same period (Figure 1.2). While much has been written about London’s housing crisis, few studies have systematically examined how the predicament has evolved over the past decade, even less regarding young graduates. The 2011 and 2021 Census is a clear source offering a unique opportunity to investigate whether young graduates are still moving to London(Census on age groups) and whether the housing delivered matches their needs(Census on housing type). The following studies addresses this knowledge gap through a novel study that has not yet been done in the field. Chapter 2 The Impact of Covid-19 and Shifting Demographics An analysis of the decade 2011-2021 using Census data does give us a full picture of how the resident population evolved, involving all age cohorts, at very detailed level of geography of London neighbourhoods. However, we note that the year 2021 was a special year in many respects. The decennial Census data was carried amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. With the widespread lockdowns, remote working, and universities’ shift to online learning, it is reasonable to expect that a considerable number of university student and recent graduates may have left London and return to their family homes. This raised concerns about whether the 2021 Census might have undercounted the true number of young people residing in London. To assess this extent, it is useful to compare the Census figure with the Mid-Year Estimates (MYEs). The Census data is based on an actual count on people and their households on Census Day, 21 March 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2023). In contrast, MYEs are produced annually using detailed demographic models that account for births, deaths, and migration, offering a more realistic estimation of the entire resident population at the midpoint of each year. This MYE is particularly useful to verify the population across all years (i.e. including but not restricted to the Census years). Nevertheless, the MYE is available only at a higher level of geography of boroughs. In this context, the comparison between 2021 Census and 2021 MYEs has two specific purposes: 12 The Impact of Covid-19 and Shifting Demographics • To evaluate the reliability of the Census conducted under COVID-19. • To see if there is a significant demographic shift over the years. 2.1 Evaluating the Reliability of Census under COVID-19 Figure 2.1 Comparison of 2021 Census and Mid-Year Estimates (2021-2023) by Boroughs Figure 2.1 compares the 2021 Census with MYEs from 2021, 2022, and 2023 across London’s 33 boroughs. The comparison confirms that the 2021 Census figures by borough were close to the 2021 MYE, with a small undercount as expected (since we expect a small number of households did not return their Census forms). There is no substantial deviation that would suggest a very significant undercount or major distortion due to the pandemic, hence the 2021 Census remains a reliable source for our analysis below. A comparison with the population estimates in 2022 and 2023 show subsequent increase in residential population in all boroughs. 2.2 Structural Shift, Not a Pandemic Glitch 13 2.2 Structural Shift, Not a Pandemic Glitch Figure 2.2 Change of Population by Age Band in London, Mid-Year Estimates(2001-2023) Figure 2.3 Change in Population Share by Age Band in London, Mid-Year Estimates (20012023) Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 present age-specific trends from 2001 to 2023, in both absolute numbers and population shares. While the 25-34 age group saw a slight dip in 2021, possibly due to short-term migration or lockdown impacts, the subsequent recovery by 2023 indicates a return to pre-pandemic patterns. However, the long-term trend implies the share of young adults (20-34) has stagnated from 2001 to 2011, and then turned to decline. On the other hand, the 55+ age group have steadily increased in both absolute and proportional terms. 14 The Impact of Covid-19 and Shifting Demographics This suggests a structural ageing of London’s population—further reinforcing concerns that the city is becoming less accessible to younger generations. Chapter 3 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) Building on the broad demographic trends identified in Chapter 2, this chapter examines the detailed spatial patterns of London’s young adult population and the housing stock. While the Census data is compared for all age groups, the analysis is focused on the distribution of the population group aged 20-34 across London in 2011 versus 2021, and in so doing, investigates whether changes in housing supply over that decade did aligned with the housing needs of this demographic. The analysis has two parts: first, how the geographic concentration of young adults has evolved, and second, how the supply of different types of housing (by number of bedrooms) has changed, and finally how those changes correspond to where young people live. This will highlight whether there is any mismatch between where housing is being added and where young adults aspire to live. The maps are created at the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level, a geographic unit used in UK census data that typically contains around 1,500 residents. The LSOA definition changed for [number] of areas between 2011 and 2021, and my own work following the guidance of ONS (reference) has produced a modified definition that can be used to compare across the years for all areas in London. The bar charts are presented below at the borough level with the boroughs lined up from West London to East London for easy comprehension of the patterns. 22 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) 3.2.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 Figure 3.7 Share of 25-34 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 By 2021, the share of 25-34-year-olds-now falling within Gen Z’s category-had declined in the vast majority of boroughs (Figure 3.7). 29 out of 33 boroughs experienced a drop from -0.2% to -4.5% (Figure 3.6). Unlike the 20-24 cohort, some large decline are also found in the centre boroughs historically favoured by this group, such as Camden(-2.6%), Westminster(-3.1%) and Kensington & Chelsea(-4.5%). Nevertheless, a few exceptions like the City of London and Havering saw an increase. Significantly, the North Greenwich peninsula stands out with exceptional large gains, with increases reaching up to 60 percentage points. This can be attributed to the Greenwich peninsula development project in 2018 by Allies and Morrison Architects, transforming a post industrial site into a 35,000 people community with 17,500 new homes (Allies and Morrison, 2021). This includes key developments such as the Upper Riverside neighbourhood, completed in 2020 by the internationally renowned firm SOM (Greenwich Peninsula, 2025). 3.3 Age Group 35-44 23 3.3 Age Group 35-44 3.3.1 Overview Compared to younger age groups, the 35-44 year band typically consists of individuals who are more established in their careers, many of them will have a family and may often be homeowners. As such, their residential patterns are less sensitive to short-term disruption and reflects either a transitional, or long-term settlement strategies. 3.3.2 2011 Distribution (a) (b) Figure 3.8 Share of age 35-44 in Resident Population (a) 2011, (b) 2021. 24 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) Figure 3.9 Share of 35-44 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 The distribution of 35-44 age group shows that most are distributed evenly across London(creffig:SD3a). Most boroughs maintain a similar population share ranging between 13.4% and 17.9%, with Richmond upon Thames and Havering showing the highest and lowest shares respectively (Figure 3.9). This outward shift indicates a wider choice of housing strategies including detached and semi-detached homes. As priorities shift toward space and children’s education, longer commuting distances become more acceptable. 3.3 Age Group 35-44 25 3.3.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 Figure 3.10 Share of 35-44 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 Between 2011 and 2021, The 35-44 age group exhibits a more balanced variation (Figure 3.10). Slight decreases are found in inner boroughs like Camden and Westminster, while some areas in outer London, for instance, Redbridge and Newham, show minor growth. These changes suggest that this cohort is increasingly favouring outer London locations. Moreover, compared to the younger cohorts, the 35-44 age group appears less vulnerable to housing shocks and more resilient to affordability pressures. However, this narrative becomes more complex when examining patterns in West Central London-an area typically associated with affluence and high-status residential living. Despite high-profile residential developments in recent years-such as One Hyde Park by Richard Rogers and Battersea Power Station by Frank Gehry, there has been no visible growth in the 35-44 population in these areas-some LSOAs even experienced a 3% to 10% decrease. This could suggest this age group is also being displaced by rapidly rising housing cost, in a market where one-bedroom unit could sell for nearly 7 million (Zoopla Limited, 2025a). 26 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) 3.4 Age Group 45-54 and 55-64 3.4.1 Overview The 46-54, and 55-64 age group typically comprises the older, often wealthier class of individuals approaching retirement. This demographic primarily prioritise stability and larger living spaces, making them more inclined to settle in outer rings where detached and semi-detached houses are more abundant. (a) Share of 45-54 in Resident Population - 2011 (b) Share of 45-54 in Resident Population - 2021 (c) Share of 55-64 in Resident Population - 2011 (d) Share of 55-64 in Resident Population - 2021 Figure 3.11 3.4.2 2011 Distribution The distribution of middle-aged groups (45-54) follows an outward trend, yet remains quite evenly distributed towards outer edges of London. The proportion in most areas falls within the range of 10-20%, with some concentrations start to emerge in Bromley, Croydon, and Barnet. The 55-64 cohort continues this outward migration pattern but with significantly 3.4 Age Group 45-54 and 55-64 27 lower representation in inner boroughs ranging 5% to 10%. The gradual outward movement from 45-64 highlights their preference of residing in the outer boroughs. Figure 3.12 Share of 45-54 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 28 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) Figure 3.13 Share of 55-64 in Resident Population by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 3.4 Age Group 45-54 and 55-64 29 3.4.3 Patterns and Changes in 2021 Figure 3.14 Share of 45-54 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 30 Spatial Distribution of Young Adults vs. Housing Stock (2011-2021) Figure 3.15 Share of 55-64 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 Contrary to the typical assumption of outward migration, the 2021 Census reveals that both age brackets experienced modest yet widely distributed increase across London, notably, the Share of 54-65 increase among 32 out of 33 boroughs in London (Figure 3.13). However, as shown in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15, it is also worth mentioning that most of the changes for both cohorts lies within ±10%, indicating a gradual and steady ageing of the population across London. 3.5 Age 65 and Above 3.5.1 Overview As this group of people primarily consist of the retirees with more established living arrangements, they exhibit lower mobility and are more likely to remain in permanent homes. Their distribution patterns are often shaped by health service accessibility, proximity to family, and 3.5 Age 65 and Above 31 overall quality of the living environment, given that this tends to be the wealthiest group overall. (a) (b) Figure 3.16 Share of 65+ in Resident Population (a) 2011 (b) 2021 3.5.2 2011 Distribution The distribution of the 65+ age group inverts from to the young generations (20-34): there is virtually a void in the city centre and they concentrate heavily in outer London. In inner boroughs, most areas have proportions below 8%. However, the highest gatherings, with some LSOAs exceeding 25%, are found in Havering, Bromley and Harrow (Figure 3.16a). This pattern is likely to be shaped by long-term home ownership, quieter environments, and better access to suburban healthcare and community services. 38 Can London still accommodate young people with suitable housing? 4.3 Two-Bedroom Units in 2011 (a) (b) Figure 4.4 Share of 2-Bedroom in All Households (a) 2011, (b) 2021. Two-Bedroom remains a good choice for young couples or small families, or those seeking flat-sharing arrangements within this 25-34 Age Group. The properties are more evenly distributed across both inner and outer boroughs, making them the most evenly distributed housing type in London. (Figure 4.4a). Their proportion ranges from 24% in Harrow to 42% in Tower Hamlets, indicating their widespread availability. The balanced distribution suggests two-bedroom units could serve as a transitional stage that accommodates not only young professionals but also small families. 4.4 Limited Alignment with 25-34 39 4.4 Limited Alignment with 25-34 Figure 4.5 Share of 2-Bedroom Dwellings in All Households by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 (a) Share of 25-34 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 (b) Share of 2-Bedroom in All Households - Difference 2011-2021 Figure 4.6 40 Can London still accommodate young people with suitable housing? Two-bedroom properties experienced a mixture of increases and decreases across central London at the LSOA level, which, when aggregated, resulted in minimal change at the borough level (Figure 4.5). The largest change was a modest -1.7% in Richmond upon Thames. In Outer London, however, most LSOAs recorded a general decline. Figure 4.6b further illustrates that the few notable increases in two-bedroom units tend to be scattered and isolated, showing little alignment with the spatial patterns of the 25-34 age group’s migration. (Figure 4.6a) 4.5 Three-Bedroom Units in 2011 (a) (b) Figure 4.7 Share of 3-Bedroom in All Households (a) 2011, (b) 2021. 4.5 Three-Bedroom Units in 2011 41 Figure 4.8 Share of 3-Bedroom Dwellings in All Households by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 42 Can London still accommodate young people with suitable housing? Figure 4.9 Share of 3-Bedroom in All HouseholdsDifference 2011-2021 Three-bedroom homes have traditionally served larger families and are predominantly located in outer London boroughs. This type of property dominates the outer ring of London, and Figure 4.8 indicates that the highest proportions of three-bedroom homes are found in boroughs such as Havering(49.6%), Bexley(45.7%). The prevalence of these larger properties in outer rings aligns with the older age groups’ decentralisation, who are more likely to seek permanent housing solutions. 4.6 Four and more Bedroom Units 43 4.6 Four and more Bedroom Units (a) (b) Figure 4.10 Share of 4 and More Bedrooms in All Households (a) 2011, (b) 2021. Figure 4.11 Share of 4 and More Bedrooms Dwellings in All Households by Boroughs - 2011 and 2021 44 Can London still accommodate young people with suitable housing? Multi-bedroom units-typically four bedrooms or more-are most suitable for large families, intergenerational households, or elderly residents who have aged in place. In 2011, these properties were overwhelmingly located in the outer boroughs, forming clear clusters across North and South London, particularly in Barnet, Bromley, and Croydon (Figure 4.10a). Their presence was minimal in central boroughs, where high-density, smaller units dominate. Interestingly, the spatial pattern of these homes mirrors the distribution of the 65+ age group, suggesting these units serve long-term residents more than incoming young adults. 4.7 Good News? Lots of 4-beds are built (a) Share of 25-34 in Resident Population - Difference 2011-2021 (b) Share of 4 and More Bedrooms in All Households - Difference 2011-2021 Figure 4.12 By 2021, every borough saw a noticeable increase in the proportion of these large homes (Figure 4.11), making them the only housing category with across-the-board growth. We could see major increase in outer-ring London. These additions appear more tailored for the older population groups than the influx of younger residents. The locations of these four-bedroom increases align poorly with 25-34 age band emerging geographies, offering little support for the kinds of housing young adults might actually need.(Figure 4.12b). There is 3.6% increase in Havering-a place where 25-34 years old have shown an increase-and none of the other house-types can address the problem. So, the good news for Gen Z is that they can now possibly share in a 4-bedroom houses in Zone 6 (Figure 3.1). 4.7 Good News? Lots of 4-beds are built 45 (a) (b) (c) (d) Figure 4.13 Comparison on Share of Different Households - Difference 2011-2021 Across London boroughs, the supply of smaller homes declined or stagnated, while larger, family-sized properties-ironically less relevant to Gen Z-saw increases. Chapter 5 Structural Failures in London’s Housing Market for the New Generation The evidence of the previous chapters reveals a troubling finding that London’s housing supply appears to be following the money (of the wealthier, older families) rather than the aspirations of young graduates (who are arguably the very future for the city). On the one hand, there is the geo-demographic shifts (a declining of youth share in the most affluent parts of London, where the young graduates are likely to find the best jobs), and on the other hand, there is a housing supply mismatch (few affordable small homes, plenty of large ones, especially in the most attractive parts of the city to the young graduates). These worrying trends appear to be symptoms of deeper, structural and systemic issues. This chapter dissects these failures and explores what they mean from the perspective of future young architects. The chapter will also investigate how young graduates are coping today in London through case studies on the ground. 5.1 Self-Regulated Market v.s. Social Needs One fundamental issue is the over reliance on market-driven housing delivery, assuming that if the demand for housing is high, developers will build enough houses to meet that demand. However, the developers often choose to build luxury or upscale housing to maximize returns, rather than the types of housing that are most needed. For example, Bishops Avenue in North London - also known as “Billionaires Row” - dramatically illustrates the market’s skewed priorities. The street was revealed to have £350m worth of luxury properties left vacant 54 Structural Failures in London’s Housing Market for the New Generation Case Studies: World’s End Estate World’s End Estate (Figure 5.3) was a mass social housing project in Chelsea by architect Eric Lyons and Jim Cadbury-Brown (Architecture Review, 1977) It was born out of slum clearance of Victorian terraced houses in 1970s: 830 houses has been pulled down and 744 new homes - accommodating 500 people - were proposed (Architects’ Journal, 1977). Although the project was proclaimed as “village style living in the heart of London”, Lyon’s plan for 250 people per acre was once rejected by London County Council for being far above its limit of 136 people per acre (Municipal Dreams, 2024). This was fought back by Chelsea council, arguing only such arrangement would rehouse all the displaced people from the slum clearance. (Municipal Dreams, 2024) Lyon’s plan was later approved, featuring seven high-rise tower blocks (18-21 storeys) interconnected by lower-rise blocks and walkways. Inside the estate, the dwelling contains a mix of unit types, ranging from studios and 1-bedroom flats to larger 4-bedroom maisonettes to accommodate various sizes of households (Municipal Dreams, 2024). In this sense, the social objective (housing everyone) was prioritized over strict adherence to density norms. Comparison on Space Standards - Because World’s End predates the 2010/2015 space standards, many of its flats would not meet today’s minimum sizes or layouts as dictated by London Housing Design Guide. However, it is worth considering the trade-offs in the design because: • The point of the studies is only to provide an example of council housing that does not completely comply with the current regulation yet has proved to be successful. • The 2010 London Housing Design Guide clearly enumerates requirements for different types of spaces. • The criteria of minimum space standards have either stayed the same or become less demanding over time, so what conformed to the 1970 standards should still comply with the current standards. 5.4 Consequences: Young Londoners’ Coping Strategies 55 Figure 5.5 Comparison on different house types in World’s End Estate and London Housing Guide (Mayor of London, 2010). (Units not meeting modern standards are marked in red. Data based on real-estate listings.) This suggests that, while most of the criteria fall above the London Housing Guide, some larger apartments feature smaller hallways, limited living space and constrained bedroom areas. For instance, although London Housing Guide requires that a minimum living space for 6 people should be 31 m², the actual number for the 3-bedrooms stays at 28.2 m² - even lower than that of 2-bedroom flat (London Development Agency, 2010). Early reviews of the estate were harsh. Architecture Review (1977) commented “‘As a nice place to living in’, it fails”; the irregular internal spaces were further described using words like “odd” and “dark and squalid”; the previous Victorian Slums on the site was compared as offering greater “human dignity”. However, 30 years later, the Building Design Magazine (2008) described it as “Living Proof of Success”. The Magazine re-exams how the residents had adapted after 30 years in residence. Obviously, the residents are finding it like a home. The “irregular balconies” criticized by the Architecture Review was commented from the residents as “Each of the tower flats had a small balcony. Last summer it was de rigueur to block up the outlet, fill up the water to the threshold level and there was a small paddling pool for the kids just outside the 20th storey living room window.” They continued “I like the unusual and quirky design a lot” and “It’s awkward for fitting furniture but infinitely more interesting than your average council block” 56 Structural Failures in London’s Housing Market for the New Generation We have to admit that the high-density tower block solution is not the solution in the current housing, but its lesson for the young architect is, first, that it shows that rigid standards are not the only path to a successful living environment - a design that bends some rules can still foster strong community and resident satisfaction, given time and adaptation. It also illustrates the importance of evaluating architecture not just by drawings or regulations, but by how it works for people over decades. Chapter 6 Conclusions Addressing London’s housing structural failure requires action on multiple fronts - no single change will be sufficient for this complex problem. This chapter discusses a range of strategies that could be applied to alleviate the crisis and make the city more accommodating for the next generation of young graduates. 6.1 Potential interventions for a more responsive housing system Bramley et al. (2010) research reveals the superiority of building more council housing over private housing in relation to catering the unmet housing need. Therefore, one would naturally think constructing new social homes directly benefits the young graduates and future generations who cannot afford market prices. Confidence is given by a history of councils’ ability to deliver them at scale - over 5 million council homes were built in the UK between 1949 and 1980 (UK Parliament, 2025). However, we must admit there are other aspects that complicate this demand and supply issue. One argument is that the provision of housing might be circular like building new roads: the more we provide, the greater the demand. Holmans (2013) studies concludes that this mainly happens at local rather than national level. That being said, in some communities, the supply of new housing may simply be occupied by more affluent in-migrants (Hall and Ward, 2014). Therefore, one general solution will be a more careful approach to the planning of social houses, both centrally and regionally. For example, the government must first realize 58 Conclusions how much the shortages of the housing, and thus provide a strategic plan in a national level. Below this level, the local councils may then create sub-regional plan that builds the right number of houses and right type of houses in the right spaces. A further key issue is that the expansion of social housing is restrained by land availability. Historically, governments and public development entities systematically allocated their land reserves for both private and social housing projects without implementing replenishment mechanisms for these public land inventories. This legacy has left housing associations dependent on acquiring land at inflated market rates to develop social housing (Hall and Ward, 2014). Regeneration of brown field sites and the conversion of redundant commercial space gain importance. London’s development is physically constrained by its Green Belt - a ring of protected open land around the city. A nuanced reform of Green Belt policies could alleviate some structural pressure. This does not mean wholesale elimination of green belts, but a careful review to identify low-value or poorly utilized land that could be released for sustainable housing development. For instance, pockets of land around transport nodes on the city’s edge that are technically “green belt” but perhaps of low environmental quality could be re-designated for high-density, transit-oriented development focused on affordable housing. Llewelyn-Davies Planning, who are commissioned to maximize the use of brownfield sites found that such places might provide for between 52,000 and 106,000 new homes in London. (Hall and Ward, 2014) Another potential direction is the conversion of other types of buildings. With changing work patterns (especially post-COVID), London now has a significant amount of under-utilized office buildings. Recent data show that about 9% of London’s offices are sitting vacant, with vacancy rates as high as 20% in some areas like Hammersmith (Kollewe, 2025). Converting even a portion of this space could yield tens of thousands of new housing units without consuming new land. To be fair, the above policy considerations are being debated in the policy arena in general terms with affordable housing being targeted to vulnerable groups like the unemployed, the long term sick and disabled.The policy conversations are almost entirely blind to the predicaments of the young graduates, who are expected to fend for themselves. There is currently little sense of what help they need. This is why the research findings revealed by this dissertation is cogent for further policy development. 6.2 Summary and future work 59 6.2 Summary and future work The research findings reveal a very disturbing picture: London’s current housing system is failing to accommodate its new generation of young graduates. Chapter 1 showed that despite a long history of housing reform, today’s young graduate faces unprecedented affordability challenges. Chapter 2 revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic had only a transient effect on where young adults live, and the deeper trend is a structural ageing of the city’s population, which has not been seen since post WWII. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 highlighted a clear misalignment between housing supply and young Londoners’ needs and London is largely building the wrong types of housing in the wrong locations for the next generation of workers. If the status quo persists, London may risk a growing exodus of young talent. To avoid such a future, both policymakers and architects must take decisive action. Policymakers must reshape housing supply—expanding affordable and social housing, enforcing affordability quotas, and reforming planning policies with the added focus on the young graduates. History shows that the market alone favours wealth over need; public intervention is essential to support young renters and buyers. 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