InvigoratEU Long Policy Report on Turkey's Ambitions and Leverage (D6.3)

ć Strahinja Subotić, Matteo Bonomi, Nona Mikhalidze, Nicoletta Pirozzi, Luca Cinciripini, Miloš Pavković, Julian Plottka, Vladislav Kulminski, Tatiana Nistorica, Vadim Pistrinciuc, Giorgi Khishtovani, Guga Tsukhishvili, Irakli Sirbiladze, Irena Rajcinovska Pandeva, Ivan Damjanovski, Nenad Markovic A* j^lnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe Long Policy Report on Turkey's Ambitions and Leverage Author Marko Todorovi Contributors H Funded by the European Union Executive summary Between Minarets and Megaprojects: Turkey's Influence Across Ell Candidate Countries This report examines Turkey's influence in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herze¬ govina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) over the past decade, focusing on political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Influence Index— an empirical tool specifically designed for this study— it systematically measures and compares Turkish leverage across nine EU candidate and partner countries. The Index captures shifts from 2015 to 2025, offering a cross-country and longitudinal analysis of how Ankara has engaged with the region and how these countries have responded. The findings show that Turkey's influence is neither uniformly benign nor overtly antagonistic, but shaped by local receptivity, institu¬ tional interest, and historical or cultural proximity. Unlike coercive actors, Turkey typically avoids direct confrontation with the EU, opting instead for relational diplomacy, targeted investments, and long-term societal engagement. Political influence has grown modestly, driven by high-level visits, security cooperation, and elite alignment— especially in Kosovo, Ukraine, and North Macedonia. Economic influence has expanded more steadily, fuelled by concessional loans, preferential trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. However, macroeconomic instability in Turkey casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of this out¬ reach. Societal influence emerges as the most persistent and embedded dimension. Through cultural diplomacy, religious networks, educational initiatives, and media pres¬ ence-including popular Turkish TV series— Turkey has cultivated durable societal linkages, particularly in Muslim-majority areas of the Western Balkans. While this influence is less pro¬ nounced in the Eastern Trio, it plays a growing role in public perceptions. These trends sug¬ gest that Turkey's influence is best understood as adaptive and opportunistic rather than expansionist or ideological. It advances where EU presence is weak, particularly at the local level, and where Turkey can act quickly and visibly. Importantly, Turkish influence should not be seen as inherently malign. As a NATO member, Ankara has often supported Euro-Atlantic security priorities— from contributing troops to regional missions to backing collective defence measures in the Black Sea— and in some cases has complemented rather than competed with EU objectives. Yet the line between constructive engagement and problematic interference can be thin, especially when Turkey externalises its domestic political agenda through pressure on partner governments. For the EU, this calls for a strategic response that reinforces its credibility, reclaims societal space, and avoids unnecessary antagonism with Ankara - while remaining alert to cases where Turkish influence can undermine democratic resilience in EU candidate countries. The Union's response should therefore be less about constraining Turkey and more about investing in its own appeal and effectiveness. This means ensuring timely delivery of prom¬ ised financial and infrastructure projects, making EU engagement more visible on the ground, and working directly with municipalities, universities, and civil society to generate bottom-up legitimacy. It also requires pragmatic coordination with Ankara in areas of shared concern, such as migration management or infrastructure security, while safeguard¬ ing conditionality whenever Turkish pressure risks undermining rule-of-law or human rights commitments in partner states. Preventing asymmetric dependencies will be equally im¬ portant: the EU must support investment screening and provide credible alternatives through instruments like the EIB and EBRD. Finally, reclaiming the soft-power edge will ć ć š ć demand more robust cultural and educational programmes, investment in regional media, and clear communication of the EU's core values - secularism, inclusivity, and democratic governance -as the non-negotiable foundations of the European project. Taken together, these measures would allow the EU to channel Turkey's presence into a more complemen¬ tary direction, while ensuring that European norms and institutions remain the decisive ref¬ erence point for countries on the path to accession. Author Marko Todorovi Researcher European Policy Centre (CEP) Contributors Strahinja Suboti , Programme Manager and Senior Researcher, European Policy Centre (CEP) Matteo Bonomi, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Nona Mikhalidze, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Intenrazionali (IAI) Nicoletta Pirozzi, Head of Programme on European Union and Institutional Relations Mana¬ ger, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Luca Cinciripini, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Milo Pavkovi , Researcher, European Policy Centre (CEP) Julian Plottka, Scientific Senior Project Manager, Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) Vladislav Kulminski, Executive Director, Institute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Tatiana Nistorica, Expert and Former State Secretary, Institute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Vadim Pistrinciuc, Expert and Former Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova for Reintegration, In¬ stitute for Strategie Initiatives (IPIS) Giorgi Khishtovani, Research Director, PMC Research Center Guga Tsukhishvili, Affiliated Researcher, PMC Research Center Irakli Sirbiladze, Affiliated Researcher, PMC Research Center Irena Rajcinovska Pandeva, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Ivan Damjanovski, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Nenad Markovic, Professor, Faculty of Law, SS. Cyril and Methodius University Approved by: Funda Tekin, Director Institute for European Politics, Scientific Lead, InvigoratEU Michael Kaeding, Professor for European Integration and European Union Politics at the Department of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, Project Coordinator, InvigoratEU About InvigoratEU InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 5 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour. DOI 10. 5281/zenodo. 17359529 License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4,0 Unported License. Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not neces¬ sarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Funded by the European Union About the project: www.inviqorat.eu Invigorating Enlargement and Neignbc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Methodological Framework 4 Conceptual Foundations of the InvigoratEU External Influence Index 5 Structure of the InvigoratEU External Influence Index 6 Research Design and Data Collection 6 3 Turkey's 21st Century Ambitions: From Western Flank to Sovereign Pole 8 4 Dimensions of Turkish Influence 10 Political Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Political Sub-Index 11 Economic Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Economic Sub-Index (2013-2023) 17 Societal Influence: Evolution, Patterns and the Societal Sub-Index 22 Overall InvigoratEU External Influence Index: General Trends of Chinese Influence 29 5 Key Findings 34 6 Recommendations 36 Bibliography 39 Annex I InvigoratEU External Influence Index: Detailed Breakdown 45 Annex II InvigoratEU External Influence Index per Candidate Counry 54 Annex II. 1 Albania 54 Annex 11.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 55 Annex 11.3 Georgia 56 Annex 11.4 Kosovo 57 Annex 11.5 Moldova 58 Annex 11.6 Montenegro 59 Annex 11.7 North Macedonia 60 Annex 11.8 Serbia 61 Annex 11.9 Ukraine 62 1 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figures Figure 1: The Political Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 11 Figure 2: Political Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 12 Figure 5: The Economic Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 18 Figure 4: Economic Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 18 Figure 5: Relative Importance of Turkey in Trade Flows of Western Balkans and Eastern Trio, 2025 19 Figure 6: The Societal Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2015-2025) 24 Figure 7: Societal Influence Sub-Index Values in 2025 Compared to 2015 24 Figure 8: Categorisation of Turkish Influence by InvigoratEU External Influence Index Score 50 Figure 9: Aggregated Turkish Influence Index by Dimension and Year (2015-2025) 50 Figure 10: Shifts in Turkey's InvigoratEU External Influence Index Across the Region (2015-2025) 51 Figure 11: Country-Level 2025 Scores of Turkish Influence in EU Candidates, Colour-Coded by Influence Intensity 52 Figure 12: Turkey's Influence in Albania (2015-2025) 54 Figure 15: Turkey's Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015-2025) 55 Figure 14: Turkey's Influence in Georgia (2015-2025) 56 Figure 15: Turkey's Influence in Kosovo (2015-2025) 57 Figure 16: Turkey's Influence in Moldova (2015-2025) 58 Figure 17: Turkey's Influence in Montenegro (2015-2025) 59 Figure 18: Turkey's Influence in North Macedonia (2015-2025) 60 Figure 19: Turkey's Influence in Serbia (2015-2025) 61 Figure 20: Turkey's Influence in Ukraine (2015-2025) 62 Tables Table 1: InvigoratEU External Influence Index 45 2 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report 1 Introduction The trajectory of EU-Turkey relations offers a revealing case study in how a long-standing can¬ didate country can gradually evolve into an increasingly autonomous and assertive regional actor. What began with the signing of the Association Agreement in 1965 and deepened through the establishment of a Customs Union in 1996, the granting of candidate status in 1999, and the launch of accession negotiations in 2005, was once widely perceived as a pathway toward eventual EU membership.1 Over time, however, this trajectory was disrupted by a con¬ vergence of challenges - including democratic backsliding within Turkey, increasing diver¬ gence from the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and unresolved disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. These include Turkey's continued support for the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, bilateral tensions with Greece, and additional frictions over regional security - most notably Turkey's military involvement in Syria and Libya, which has frequently placed it at odds with EU member states. Since 2018, accession talks have been effectively frozen,2 and the EU has gradually adjusted its posture: Turkey is no longer ap¬ proached primarily as a prospective member state, but rather as an external strategic actor with distinct - and at times competing - geopolitical interests. Still, Turkey cannot be equated with other revisionist or illiberal actors such as Russia or China. Its relationship with the EU is anchored in a broad institutional framework that includes formal accession negotiations (though currently stalled), pre-accession financial assistance through the IPA mechanism, a longstanding Customs Union covering industrial goods and processed agricultural products, and ongoing political and technical dialogue across various policy ar¬ eas. Moreover, on the societal level, Turkey is closely intertwined with the EU through a large and active diaspora - primarily in Germany - and through the enduring influence of European norms and values in Turkey, particularly among the urban middle classes, civil society actors, and political constituencies that continue to support EU membership. Furthermore, as a NATO member situated at a critical geopolitical junction, Turkey retains a constructive role in Euro¬ pean security affairs. This layered and ambivalent positioning suggests that Turkish influence in neighbouring regions should not be labelled a priori as malign but rather assessed contex¬ tually - through the lens of both its instruments and effects. Against this backdrop, Turkey's expanding presence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio region deserves nuanced analysis. Building on historical linkages and geographical prox¬ imity, Ankara has pursued a multi-dimensional strategy combining political support for select leaders, security cooperation, economic investment, as well as cultural and religious outreach. While such involvement is not intrinsically problematic, it may - under certain political and so¬ cietal conditions - contribute to the normalisation and mainstreaming of illiberal narratives, reinforce personalised leadership styles, or foster a more favourable perception of Turkey's increasingly authoritarian model of governance. Moreover, Turkey may be cited as an example offering an alternative model of engagement with the EU - one that allows for significant economic and strategic benefits without alignment with democratic standards or a credible commitment to full membership. Yet Turkish influence is not always destabilising. In certain 1 Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye: The European Union and Türkiye, 28 September 2021, available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/turkey/european-union-and-turkey en?s-250 (last accessed: 23.06.2025) 2 Council of the EU: Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Accession Process, 10555/18, 26 June 2018. (last accessed: 23.06.2025) 5    ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report contexts, Ankara has maintained pragmatic relations across political and ethnic divides, sup¬ ported institution-building efforts, or contributed to regional dialogue - suggesting that, under the right conditions, its engagement can complement EU objectives rather than undermine them. As such, understanding the nature and consequences of Turkish engagement is crucial for crafting informed EU policy. In light of Turkey's ambivalent presence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio, its role must also be viewed through the broader lens of EU resilience. Resilience - understood as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises5 - extends beyond the EU's borders and includes the stability and integrity of its candidate and partner countries. While not all external actors operate with hostile or revi¬ sionist intent, their involvement can shape institutional trajectories and political choices in ways that do not always align with EU norms or strategic interests. To navigate this landscape, the EU applies a dual logic: a "modernisation logic", which seeks to foster democratic govern¬ ance, inclusive development, and social cohesion within neighbouring states; and a "geopo¬ litical logic", aimed at protecting these countries from external influence that may compromise such progress.4 In this context, Turkey presents a distinctive case - its influence is neither overtly antagonistic nor unequivocally benign. As its role evolves, particular attention must be paid to how certain modes of engagement - such as elite alignment, foreign investments, or cultural diplomacy - may affect democratic institutions and undermine the overall resilience of candi¬ date countries to external pressures. Resilience-building must, however, encompass not only candidate countries' capacity to absorb and manage such influence, but also the EU's own ability to anticipate and respond to indirect pressures on its normative and strategic environ¬ ment. Thus, this policy report offers an in-depth analysis of Turkey's geopolitical ambitions and instru¬ ments of influence across two regions of strategic relevance to the European Union: The West¬ ern Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Covering the period from 2015 to 2025, the analysis draws on the InvigoratEU External Influence Index to map, compare, and quantify the scope and intensity of Turkish influence across political, economic, and soci¬ etal domains. In doing so, the report investigates Turkey's strategic objectives, available lever¬ age, and modes of engagement, and provides actionable recommendations to EU policymak¬ ers on how to effectively navigate and respond to what is increasingly perceived as an ex¬ panding Turkish presence in its immediate neighbourhood. 2 Methodological Framework This study applies a structured and multi-dimensional methodology to assess Turkey's geopo¬ litical influence across the EU's Neighbourhood, encompassing both the Eastern Trio and the 5 European External Action Service: European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p. 23. 4 See Hannah Brandt/Funda Tekin/Paul Bargues/Ramu nas Vilpis auskas: Growing Resilient Together: Reshaping EU-Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy in a Geopolitical Era, June 2024. * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 4 ć ć š ć ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Western Balkans. The analysis integrates qualitative and quantitative research methods, tai¬ lored to reflect the complexity of external influence in these regions. Central to this method¬ ological framework is the InvigoratEU External Influence Index - an empirically grounded instrument developed within the project InvigoratEU - How to Reform the EU's Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe, funded by the European Commission's Hori¬ zon Europe programme.5 The Index systematically quantifies and compares the political, eco¬ nomic, and societal leverage of three major external actors: Russia,6 China,7 and Turkey. It has been jointly developed by the European Policy Centre (CEP) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), in collaboration with partner institutions: Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), PMC Re¬ search Center (PMC RC), Ss. Cyril and Methodius University (UKIM), and the Institute for Stra¬ tegie Initiatives (IPIS). Building on CEP's earlier work on a pilot index measuring foreign influ¬ ence in Serbia,8 the methodology has been significantly expanded to cover nine countries and three external actors, thereby allowing for both cross-country comparison and longitudinal analysis. This collaborative approach underpins a robust and scalable framework for evaluat¬ ing external influence, in full alignment with the objectives of this Horizon-funded research initiative. Conceptual Foundations of the InvigoratEU External Influence Index The development of the InvigoratEU External Influence Index is grounded in established con¬ cepts that explore how external actors shape the behaviour of third countries. A key concep¬ tual foundation are the notions of "linkages" and "leverage", introduced by Levitsky and Way, 9 which differentiates between two main mechanisms of external influence. Linkages refer to structural interdependencies - economic, intergovernmental, technocratic, societal, informa¬ tional, and civil society-based - that bind a country to external actors and shape its domestic political and economic choices. Leverage, by contrast, denotes the capacity of an external power to apply direct pressure on domestic elites to induce policy shifts or strategic realign¬ ment. These two dimensions interact dynamically, with deeper linkages often reinforcing an external actor's leverage over internal decision-making processes. In parallel, the Index integrates the concept of "soft power", as theorised by Joseph Nye,10 highlighting the role of non-coercive influence exercised through culture, values, and narra¬ tives. As also demonstrated in this report, this dimension is particularly relevant in the case of Turkey, which has increasingly invested in projecting a favourable image abroad and cultivat¬ ing influence through a diverse set of instruments - such as cultural and religious institutions, media outreach, development aid, and educational initiatives. 5 See InvigoratEU: Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe project's website at https://inviqorat.eu (last accessed: 24.06.2025). 6 See Marko Todorovi : Long Policy Report on Russia's Ambitions and Leverage, May 2025. 7 See Matteo Bonomi: Long Policy Report on China's Ambitions and Leverage, August 2025. 8 Strahinja Suboti /Milo Janji : Serbia at the Crossroads between the West and the East, European Policy Centre (CEP), 2020. 9 Steven Levitsky/Lucan A. Way: Linkage versus leverage. Rethinking the international dimension of regime change, in: Comparative Politics, 38 (4), 2006, pp. 379-400. 10 Joseph Nye: Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs 2004. 5 ş ş •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report positioned itself as a counter-weight to Russian influence in the Black Sea.26 Montenegro saw notable gains, aligned with its NATO accession and deepened defence cooperation,27 while Serbia's score has plateaued - further engagement is constrained by Ankara's strengthened ties with Kosovo.28 Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded an initial rise in Turkish influence until 2018, followed by a decline by 2025. This downturn can be attributed to Ankara's reduced leverage over a more fragmented Bosniak political landscape and the stronger presence of alternative external actors, which jointly diluted the sense of Turkey as a privileged partner in Bosnia. Other partner and candidate countries likewise recorded modest increases, under¬ scoring Turkey's steady, friendly foreign-policy approach that leverages its NATO membership and extensive diplomatic networks for gradual influence growth. Figure 2: Political Influence Sub-Index Values in 2023 Compared to 2013 Shifts in Political Influence: 2023 Sub-Index Values and 2013-2023 Change Political Influence Sub-Index 2023 Value Turkey's appeal as a regional partner stems from its consistent respect for the core national and geopolitical objectives of its Western Balkan and Eastern Trio neighbours. Ankara en¬ dorses their Euro-Atlantic integration and strengthened defence cooperation with them.29 In the Eastern Trio, Turkey also reinforces the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Mol¬ dova— each of which has faced direct (in Georgia and Ukraine) or indirect (in Moldova) chal¬ lenges coming from Russia— thereby upholding a rules-based regional order. In the Western 26 Yevgeniya Gaber: The West Must Back Ukraine and Turkey to Counter Russia's Attempts to Control the Black Sea, 5 August 2023, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/the-west-must-back-ukraineand-turkey-to-counter-russias-attempts-to-control-the-black-sea / (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 27 Nazli Yuzbasioglu: Türkiye, Montenegro Share possibility for Intensive Regional Cooperation: Montenegrin Presi¬ dent, 8 June 2022, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkiye-montenegro-share-possibility-for-intensive-regional-cooperation-montenegrin-president/2608873 (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 28 Giorgio Cafiero: Turkey and the Intractable Serbia-Kosovo Dispute, 20 December 2023, available at: h ttps: / /trendsresea rch. org /insight /turkey-and-the-intractable-serbia-kosovo-dispute/?srsltid=AfmBOoqaj-aKHYHr0sCvSMPAxWfmGRI6mANDkQKLmywglebj2P4ttPA0 (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 29 Ash Aydinta ba : From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey's Role in the Western Balkans, 2019. 12 ğ •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Balkans, Turkey's recognition of Kosovo's independence is significant for Pristina, while its re¬ spect for Bosnia and Herzegovina's unity underscores Ankara's adherence to established insti¬ tutional arrangements. Economically, Turkey bolsters growth and living standards through in¬ frastructure investments and trade agreements, which is a shared national interest across gov¬ ernments in the region. However, Serbia represents a distinct case: Ankara's recognition of Kosovo's statehood means it cannot endorse Belgrade's territorial claims. Yet diplomatic prag¬ matism has prevailed, with Turkey continuing to support Serbia's EU integration and its eco¬ nomic development. This convergence on universally accepted goals provides a solid basis for Turkey's diplomatic activism, making its engagement both welcome and effective across the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio. This commitment of Turkey to both regions has been confirmed by a series of courtesy visits at the highest level, reflecting Turkey's preference for direct personalised diplomacy. Between 2015 and 2023, each country in our analysis saw at least one summit-level exchange with Ankara. To illustrate, since President Erdo an took presidency in 2014, he himself visited six of the nine states - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova - often returning multiple times to reinforce bilateral ties;50while the remaining three - Georgia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia - had hosted him in the preceding years during his tenure as prime minister. . These high level-visits often led to Turkey anchoring its political partnerships in formal strategic mechanisms. For example, Albania and Turkey created a High-Level Stra¬ tegic Cooperation Council in January 2021, committing both capitals to annual consultations on defence, EU integration and cultural exchange.51 Ukraine and Turkey have convened under their Strategic Council since 2011s2 and, since 2020, in a "Quadriga" 2+2 format of foreign and defence ministers.55 Georgia and Turkey, too, formalised their own High-Level Council in 2016, describing Turkey as "Georgia's leading partnership in the region".54 Beyond these coun¬ cils, Turkey has sometimes introduced special diplomatic arrangements. For example, Monte¬ negro became the first - and so far only - country for which Ankara provides consular services in third states, offering assistance to Montenegrin nationals in 25 countries where Podgorica has no diplomatic presence.55 Such tiered structures - ranging from routine presidential and ministerial visits to institutionalised strategic councils and unique service agreements - form the backbone of Turkey's bilateral diplomacy, ensuring that high-level contact is translated into sustained policy coordination and concrete cooperation. To amplify its influence beyond bilateral channels, Turkey leverages a wide array of regional and international fora. Within NATO, Ankara has not only hosted strategic planning meetings - such as the 2018 Land Forces Conferences in Istanbul55 - but also positioned itself as a bridge 50 Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, available at: https://tccb.tr/en/ (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 31 The Government of Albania: A New Chapter on Path of Strategic Partnership with Turkey, 6 January 2021, available at: https://kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/40754-2 / (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, Relations between Türkiye and Ukraine, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ relations-between-turkey-and-ukraine.en.mfa (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 33 Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Türkiye, Political Relations between Ukraine and Türkiye. 34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, Relations between Türkiye and Georgia, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-georgia.en.mfa (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 35 Levent Kenez: Montenegro Becomes the First and Only Country Turkey Provides Consular Services to in Third Countries, 10 August 2021, available at: https://nordicmonitor.com/2021/Q8/montenegro-becomes-the-first-andonly-country-turkey-provides-consular-services-to-in-third-countries / (last accessed: 08.07.2025). 33 NATO: "How We Fight" Discussed at LC3 Conference, available at: https://lc.nato.int/media-center/news/2018/12th-lc5-how-we-fight- (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 15 ‐ ‐ ‐ İ ş •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report between South Eastern Europe and the Alliance's southern flank, sponsoring joint exercises and training programmes open to partners across the Western Balkans.57 In the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Turkey contributes personnel to field missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, while advocating within the Permanent Council for consensus building measures that reinforce stability.58 In the Western Balkans, Ankara has at times acted as a direct mediator, most notably by launching the Serbia-Bosnia and Herze¬ govina-Turkey trilateral consultation mechanism in 2010, which helped unlock diplomatic block¬ ages and produced tangible confidence-building measures. Beyond security organisations, Ankara plays an active role in Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), both of which convene annual ministerial and headsof-state meetings attended by Turkey's foreign minister or president. In BSEC, Turkey has cham¬ pioned infrastructure connectivity projects— such as corridor linkages to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline59— and in SEECP, it has spearheaded initiatives on counter-terrorism and migration management.* 40Turkey's record as a mediator spans both the neighbourhood and its near abroad: in the Western Balkans, Ankara launched the Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Turkey trilateral consultation mechanism in 2010 to overcome diplomatic deadlock,41 while in the Black Sea it played a central role in the Grain Initiative alongside Ukraine, Russia and the UN.42 By doing so, Turkey not only secures its own strategic interests but also positions itself as an indis¬ pensable broker of regional stability and multilateral cooperation. Turkey's military engagement in the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio also combines multi¬ lateral deployments with bilateral cooperation. Since 2013, Turkish contingents have served continuously in NATO's SFOR/EUPM and the EU's Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - numbering around 250 personnel as of 202145 - while Kosovo hosts Ankara's second-largest KFOR contribution, peaking at 780 troops under Turkish command in 2023 ,44 No standalone Turkish bases exist elsewhere, but defence cooperation agreements extend Ankara's footprint: Bosnia and Herzegovina updated its Military Cooperation Plan in 2023 to include 57 Birol Akduman: NATO's Southern Flank: The Evolution of Turkey's Strategic Role and Its Implications for Regional Security NATO's Southern Flank: The Evolution of Türkiye's Strategic Role and Its Implications for Regional Security, nsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Ara tirmalan Dergisi, 12(5), 2951-2968. 38 Munevver Cebeci, Turkey and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in: Sasha Toperich Aylin Unver Noi (ed.), Turkey and Transatlantic Relations, pp. 65-81. 39 Deniz Unsal: Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP): A New Cooperation Format between EU, Turkey and Azerbaijan, 15 January 2021, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-trans-adriatic-pipeline-tap-a-new-cooperation-format-between-eu-turkey-and-azerbaijan /2111570 (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 40 Hatice Özdemir Tosun: Turkey Hosts SE Europe Cooperation Process Meeting, 6 November 2020, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkey-hosts-se-europe-cooperation-process-meeting/2054880 (last ac¬ cessed: 09.07.2025) 41 Between 2009 and 2011, Turkey mediated through the Ankara-Belgrade-Sarajevo trilateral mechanism, which facilitated visa liberalisation, the appointment of a BiH ambassador to Belgrade, and Serbia's adoption of the Srebrenica Declaration - earning Ankara recognition as a constructive regional broker. 42 UN: Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre, available at: https://www.un.org/en /black-sea-graininitiative (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 45 Evrensel: Türkiye'nin hangi ülkede, kag askeri var, hangi gerekgelerle bulunuyor?, available at: https: //www.evrensel.net/haber/595467 /turkiyenin-hangi-ulkede-kac-askeri-var-hangi-gerekcelerle-bulunuyor (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 44 Kosovo Online: Turkey at the head of KFOR for the first time, is there a reason for Serbia to be concerned?, 8 October 2025, available at: https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/analysis/turkey-head-kfor-first-timethere-reason-serbia-be-concerned-8-10-2025 (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 14 турција продолжува да ја поддржува се ž ć đ č š ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report comprehensive training and logistics support;45 Serbia and Turkey's 2019 Framework Military Agreement covers joint exercises, EOD and R&D exchanges;46 North Macedonia has sent hun¬ dreds of officers to Turkish academies and refreshed its military-financial pact in 2019;47 and in 2017, Montenegro signed a bilateral defence plan with Turkey 48 This approach lets Ankara swiftly deploy forces or advisors where it sees fit, shape mission mandates to its strategic advantage, and weave Turkish training standards into local militaries for enduring influence. These activities undoubtedly consolidate Turkey's regional influence, but they unfold primarily through NATO frameworks. As such, they reinforce allied security objectives rather than con¬ stituting third-actor interference in the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio. Building on its operational presence in Western Balkans missions and bilateral defence pacts, Turkey's emergence as a regional arms supplier further cements its footprint. Under its strate¬ gic partnership with Kosovo, Ankara donated technical equipment and uniforms before con¬ cluding a Bayraktar-drone deal in 2025.49 This move also led Serbia to abandon earlier plans to acquire Turkish drones, as Belgrade sought to avoid deepened military entanglement with Ankara in light of its security cooperation with Pristina.50 In Ukraine, military cooperation had already been building for several years before the 2022 war, starting with early Bayraktar deliveries in 201951 and expanding into broader naval and drone projects. The launch of a Baykar assembly plant in 202452 therefore symbolised not a sudden wartime shift, but the consolidation of a long-term partnership aimed at enhancing Kyiv's resilience and countering Russian influence in the Black Sea. Georgia likewise augmented its arsenal with Turkish-built armoured vehicles in 2022-25.55 These transfers not only enhance partners' capabilities but also strengthen Turkey's defence-industrial ties across the region. In line with its preference for non-confrontational engagement, Turkey generally steers clear of direct interference in the domestic politics of its Western Balkan and Eastern European partners.54 Its involvement is channelled through parliamentary friendship groups, joint 4 5Talha Ozturk: Bosnia, Türkiye sign military cooperation plan to strengthen future activities, 31 August 2023, avaialble at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bosnia-turkiye-sign-military-cooperation-plan-to-strenqthen-future-activities/2980595 (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 46 Maja Zivanovic/Hamdi Firat Buyuk: Serbia and Turkey Pledge to Boost Defence Cooperation, 7 October 2019, available at: https://balkaninsiqht.com/2019/l0/07 /serbia-and-turkey-pledge-to-boost-defence-cooperation/ (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 47 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of North Macedonia: Turkey continues to support North Macedonia in NATO - the Minister of National Defense Akar in an official visit to our country, 3 April 2019, available at: https://mod.qov.mk/ - - - - - / (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 48 European Commission: Montenegro 2018 Report. SWD(2018) 150 final. 49 Euronews Srbija: Naoru avanje Kosova pove ava bezbednosni rizik: Turska slanjem Bajraktara potvr uje ulogu glavnog snabdeva a Pri tine, 20 July 2023, available at: https://www.euronews.rs/srbiia/politika/94019/naoruzavanie-kosova-povecava-bezbednosni-rizik-turska-slanjem-bairaktara-potvrduie-ulogu-glavnoq-snabdevacapristine /vest (last accessed: 09.07.2025). 50 Vuk Vuksanovi /Filip Ejdus: Wings of Change: The Coming Drone Proliferation in the Western Balkans. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, May 2023. 51 Daily Sabah: Ukraine, Turkey have signed deal for 12 Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, Poroshenko says, 12 January 2019, avail¬ able at: https://www.dailysabah.com/defense/2019/01/12/ukraine-turkey-have-signed-deal-for-12-bayraktartb2-uavs-poroshenko-says (last assessed: 09.07.2025). 52 Pesha Magid: Turkey's drone maker Baykar begins to build plant in Ukraine, 7 February 2024, available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/turkeys-drone-maker-baykar-begins-build-plantukraine-2024-02-06/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 55 Georgian Public Broadcaster: Georgian Defence Forces get NATO-standard armoured vehicles from Turkey, 7 October 2022, available at: https://ltv.ge/lang/en/news/georgian-defence-forces-get-nato-standard-armoured-vehicles-from-turkey/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 54 Mehmet Ugur Ekinci: Turkey's Balkan Policy and Its Skeptics, Insight Turkey, 2/(2), 37-49. 15 ğ ž •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report legislative seminars and civil-service training programmes rather than campaign support, party funding or public endorsements. Ankara does not bankroll independent media outlets, lobby for electoral-law changes or take part in referendum campaigns; instead, it sustains regular dialogue with a wide range of political actors and provides technical assistance aimed at strengthening administrative capacity. While this pattern broadly holds, three contexts illus¬ trate more selective political entanglements. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ankara's long-stand¬ ing alignment with Bosniak elites — particularly through personal ties between President Erdo an and SDA leadership — has at times reinforced perceptions of partisan favouritism. In Kosovo, Turkey's role in bolstering state institutions and the Kosovo Security Force, though framed as strategic partnership, is politically consequential given the unresolved status dispute with Serbia. And in Serbia's Sand ak region, Turkey's close links with Bosniak political and reli¬ gious leaders similarly blur the line between cultural diplomacy and domestic political influ¬ ence. However, taken together, by limiting itself to these less overt channels, Turkey preserves its image as a constructive partner while quietly reinforcing its diplomatic foothold and good¬ will in the region. While Ankara typically shuns overt meddling in partner states, its campaign against the per¬ ceived internal enemies abroad - most prominently the Gülen movement, but also Kurdish activists - is a glaring exception. Since the failed 2016 coup, Turkish authorities have pressed governments to shutter Gülen-Iinked schools and media outlets, freeze assets and extradite alleged affiliates. In Albania, Tirana closed several institutions tied to Gülen network in 2022.55 North Macedonia faced demands to hand over some 15 suspects and to prosecute or seize assets of others which many in Skopje feared could become a de facto precondition for NATO accession and interpreted as political blackmail. In practice, however, the issue did not block the country's Euro-Atlantic path, as Ankara went on to ratify North Macedonia's NATO acces¬ sion protocol without delay.Bosnia saw staff departures at several Gülen schools under mount¬ ing pressure from Ankara.56 Moldova illegally detained and deported seven Turkish teachers in a joint operation with Turkish intelligence in September 2018, provoking European Court of Human Rights fines and ongoing legal challenges.57 Serbia extradited Kurdish activist Cevdet Ayaz in December 2017 despite a United Nations order to delay his removal.58 Ukraine, under bilateral security pacts, sent at least three alleged FETÖ members back to Turkey.59 These in¬ terventions reveal Turkey's willingness to weaponise neighbourly ties to enforce an internal se¬ curity agenda, posing a malign threat to the rule of law and international norms in the very countries it purports to partner with. 55 Tirana Times: Albania closes two education institutions tied to Gulen network, sparking debate over Turkish pres¬ sure, 23 September 2022, available at: https://www.tiranatimes.com/ moe-closes-two-education-institutionstied-to-gulen-network/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 56 Rodolfo Toe: Gulen Schools Fight Provokes New Tensions in Bosnia, 26 July 2016, available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/26/gulen-schools-fight-provokes-new-tensions-in-bosnia-07-26-2Q16/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 57 Madalin Necsutu: Moldova to Reopen File on Illegal Rendition of Turkish Teachers, 17 February 2023, available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2023/02/17/moldova-to-reopen-file-on-illegal-rendition-of-turkish-teachers/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 58 Maja Zivanovic: Serbia Ignores UN and Extradites Kurd to Turkey, 26 December 2017, available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2017/12/26/serbia-extradited-kurdish-political-activist-to-turkey-12-26-2017/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 59 Daily Sabah: Ukraine extradites senior FETO members to Turkey, 6 January 2021, available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/investigations/ukraine-extradites-senior-feto-members-to-turkey (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 16 ğ ğ ğ ğ •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Looking ahead to 2025-55, Turkey's regional footprint is likely to deepen along three trajecto¬ ries: (1) formalising cooperation through regular strategic-council meetings and specialised working groups that embed Ankara within partner administrations; (2) intensifying its security profile via expanded officer training, larger joint exercises— particularly with recent NATO en¬ trants— and targeted arms exports to cement interoperability; and (5) sustaining influence in candidate countries even if political ties cool, which could occur if some join the EU and if EU-Turkey relations fray over diverging views on the rule of law, democracy and human rights. These trends are unlikely to depend solely on President Erdo an's continued rule. Major shifts in Turkish foreign policy are unlikely in the event of a leadership change; opposition parties have criticised Erdo an's domestic governance far more sharply than his external posture.60 When it comes to the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio, the main instruments are rooted in structural interests of the Turkish state and thus expected to endure regardless of leadership change. This suggests that even a post-Erdo an Turkey will likely pursue similar regional ambi¬ tions, reinforcing the forecast of sustained Turkish political presence through 2035. Economic Influence: Evolution, Patterns, and the Economic Sub-Index (20152025) Over the past decade, Turkey has systematically deepened its economic footprint across the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio, transforming from a niche trading partner into a multisec¬ toral force. Ankara has deftly combined trade liberalisation, concessional financing, and highprofile infrastructure projects, creating a complex web of durable economic linkages. This strategy— guided by the "Strategic Depth" doctrine— aimed to diversify export markets, secure new supply corridors, but also project soft power, serving both commercial and geopolitical ends. Yet Turkey's path forward demands agile recalibration: navigating competition from deep-pocketed rivals and strategically pivoting toward green/digital priorities that will define the next decade of its regional influence. Between 2013 and 2023, Turkey's economic sway in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio deepened across the board yet unfolded in distinctly uneven rhythms (see Figures 5 and 4). In North Macedonia, Ankara's footprint surged most dramatically, driven by large-scale infrastructure loans, major transport and energy linkages, and the steady expansion of bilateral trade agreements that together cemented Turkey's reputation as a go-to development part¬ ner. Georgia and Ukraine also enjoyed a clear upward trajectory, buoyed by joint agricultural ventures, growing Turkish-backed manufacturing zones and the emergence of Turkish e-commerce platforms that opened new markets for local producers. Across Albania, Kosovo, Mon¬ tenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey's presence broadened more gradually but steadily: a series of medium-scale construction contracts, targeted credit lines and participa¬ tion in tourism and hospitality investments knitted Ankara into the regional economic fabric without triggering abrupt market dislocations. By contrast, Moldova's momentum stalled under the pressure of generous European Union grant programmes, while in Serbia Turkish engage¬ ment remained modest— focused on selective construction work and textile industry— reflecting the careful calibration of Ankara's outreach in light of Serbia's complex geopolitical balan¬ cing. Altogether, these varied experiences confirm that Turkish economic influence in the 60 Alan Makovsky: An opposition foreign policy in Erdo an's shadow, 8 May 2025, available at; https://www.mei.edu/publications/opposition-foreign-policy-erdogans-shadow (last accessed: 15.08.2025). 17 JnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhoc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report region has been propelled less by impersonal market forces and more by a succession of stra¬ tegic government initiatives, negotiated deals and high-profile flagship projects. Figure 3: The Economic Influence Sub-Index Over Time (2013-2023) Figure 4: Economic Influence Sub-Index Values in 2023 Compared to 2013 Turkey's exports to the region— spanning machinery, construction materials, textiles, and con¬ sumer goods— have shown significant growth, cementing its role as a key supplier and securing deep market penetration.61 This trend is vividly illustrated by a surge in Turkish goods imports 61 Data on Turkish exports are sourced from the WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies) database to ensure cross-country comparability. 18 € € € € € € Invigorating Enlargement and Neignbc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report across both regions, with Albania's intake alone increasing from 255 million in 2015 to 778 million in 2025, raising Turkey's import share in Albania's GDP from 2.4% to 5.6%. Similarly, North Macedonia recorded a substantial jump from 258 million to 649 million, driven by an influx of Turkish construction equipment and packaged foods. In the Western Balkans, Kosovo tripled its intake of Turkish goods, while Montenegro saw over twofold growth, largely via hotel and hospitality supply chains. This pattern of market capture is also significant in the Eastern Trio, particularly in Ukraine, where imports surged to 4,567 million. Separately, in Serbia, Turk¬ ish imports also experienced a dramatic rise to 1,712 million. This trend underscores Turkey's success in leveraging existing preferential trade agreements (FTAs)— progressively expanded to cover services and digital trade— to lock in Ankara as a low-tariff supplier, effectively em¬ bedding its products and standards within the host economies. While Turkey has successfully captured regional markets, the reciprocal flow of exports from the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio signals a growing, albeit asymmetric (as illustrated in Figure 5), commercial interdependence.62 Regional exporters have increasingly tapped into Ankara's manufacturing ecosystem, with Albanian steel, dairy, and olive oil finding new buyers and North Macedonian textile and auto-parts firms more than tripling their shipments to Turkey. The strategic utility of Turkey as a trade partner was further highlighted by Ukrainian sunflower oil and grain exporters, who utilised Turkish ports as alternative entry points during the Black Sea naval blockades following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While these de¬ velopments signal a degree of two-way commercial engagement, the volumes remain modest when compared to the influx of Turkish goods. This apparent trade asymmetry is a calculated outcome, as Turkey's dual approach embeds import dependencies while simultaneously tar¬ geting investments in key regional export sectors— especially agriculture— to secure specific supply chains for its own economy, thereby enhancing its resilience and influence. The result is the creation of a mutually beneficial, albeit unequal, economic corridor that reinforces Tur¬ key's position as the dominant partner. Figure 5: Relative Importance of Turkey in Trade Flows of Western Balkans and East¬ ern Trio, 2023 62 Data on Turkish imports and exports inflows are sourced from the WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies) database to ensure cross-country comparability. 19 € € € € € € € •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Between 2015 and 2025, net Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region surged significantly, albeit unevenly, reflecting targeted strategic deployments.65 Albania attracted 48 million in 2015, rising to 179 million by 2025— approximately 12% of its annual FDI inflows— primarily channelled into renewable energy and road construction. North Macedonia recorded a leap from 25 million to nearly 185 million, driven by greenfield investments in plastics and food processing. Kosovo experienced a dip in 2018 but rebounded to 58 million in 2025 as Turkish banks and telecom firms re-entered the market. Montenegro's FDI inflows also rose markedly from 22.6 million to 47 million. Georgian inflows climbed from $51.4 million to $109.5 million. These flows underscore a strategic preference for sectors generating visible "bread-and-butter" benefits and reinforcing Ankara's image as a development partner, further cementing its influence. The accumulated presence of Turkish capital, or cumulative FDI stock,64 is most pronounced in Albania, where Turkish firms constitute roughly 8% of total FDI stock, including major projects like the Tirana-Elbasan highway concession. In Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, stock levels hover around 5-5%, predominantly via construction conglomerates and regional banking subsidiaries. In Georgia, Turkish investors hold several agribusiness estates and logistics plat¬ forms, elevating their share to just over 6% of the total. While $erbia and Ukraine show lower FDI stock percentages (0.7% and 1%, respectively), an upward trend signals growing— albeit nascent— long-term commitment. Turkey leverages FDI not merely for economic returns but as an intentional soft-power instrument for enduring influence. By investing in critical, high-visi¬ bility sectors, Turkey positions itself as an indispensable development partner, fostering good¬ will and potentially amplifying political leverage. This strategy creates embedded economic interests that are difficult to disentangle, ensuring persistent presence and clout even amid geopolitical shifts. Turkish financial institutions and conglomerates have established themselves as key pillars of influence across the region, securing both a financial and physical footprint. The expansion of concessional and market-rate lending by entities like Turk Eximbank has become a pow¬ erful instrument of economic statecraft, as evidenced by its targeted credit lines for infra¬ structure and energy projects in Albania and North Macedonia.65 Turkish banks, such as Ziraat Bankasi and Halkbank, have become prominent lenders in Albania and North Macedonia, filling critical financing gaps where EU funds are constrained and thereby entrenching Turkey as an indispensable development partner. Beyond lending, direct foreign investment has enabled Turkish conglomerates to secure significant stakes in major infrastructure tenders. For instance, Limak Holding secured a public-private partnership for airport management in Kosovo,66 while Cengiz Holding was involved in major highway sections in North Macedonia.67 Even in $erbia, where the Turkish presence remains modest, Turkish banks have acquired majority shares in 65 Data on FDI inflows are sourced from the WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies) database to ensure cross-country comparability. 64 Data on FDI stock are sourced from the WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies) database to ensure cross-country comparability. 65 Turk Eximbank: International Project Loans, available at: https://eximbank.gov.tr/en/ product-and-services/buyer-s-credits/international-project-loans (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 66 Ex-Yu Aviation News: Limak extends Pristina airport concession, 11 September 2024, available at: https://www.exYuaviation.com/2024/09/limak-extends-pristina-airport.html (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 67 Bechtel: Bechtel Selected to Build Two New Motorways in North Macedonia, 9 March 2025, available at: https://www.bechtel.com/press-releases/bechtel-selected-to-build-two-new-motorways-in-north-macedonia/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 20 İ İ ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Serbian commercial banks.68 This approach, which moves from strategic lending to direct own¬ ership of vital infrastructure, creates long-term economic footholds that are difficult for host countries to remove, granting Ankara potent leverage to shape economic policies and align diplomatic postures, ultimately integrating these states into broader Turkish logistical and eco¬ nomic networks. This strategic financial engagement is buttressed by a sophisticated array of operational mechanisms, with preferential trade agreements serving as the foundational legal platform. Frameworks established with Western Balkan and Eastern Trio countries have been progres¬ sively upgraded with the goal of increasing trade volume, cementing Ankara's position as a long-term commercial partner in the region. At the same time, Ankara systematically links highprofile loan agreements to strategic dialogues, reinforcing a "politics-and-business" dynamic— as exemplified by the Turkey-brokered Belgrade-Sarajevo highway project, a loan-backed in¬ itiative designed to promote peace and stability while securing Ankara's position as a key regional mediator.69 This financial leverage, often accompanied by technical assistance, bol¬ sters Ankara's role as a "prime lender" for capital projects and reveals a highly integrated statecraft model where economic engagement is inseparable from geopolitical objectives. This is further extended into sectoral influence, as seen in Turkey's cultivation of agricultural value chains through subsidised programmes in Moldova and the reconstruction of irrigation systems in Ukraine,70 which interweaves food security with bilateral cooperation.71 Similarly, through TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkey supports initiatives such as agribusiness capacity building in Georgia72 and contributes to the cultural and tourism re¬ vitalisation of Montenegrin coastal towns,75 showcasing a multi-layered approach that fosters resilient local partnerships and strengthens Ankara's long-term presence. As Turkey's economic footprint deepens, Ankara gains significant informal leverage to press for favourable diplomatic alignments, a dynamic that can trigger domestic resistance in cap¬ itals wary of sovereignty erosion. This is particularly visible in the sustained pressure on North Macedonia and Albania regarding extraditions of alleged FETO members, as well as docu¬ mented legislative interference in Moldova concerning national-security deportations. Lever¬ aging economic ties for political pressure— especially on sensitive domestic issues like ju¬ dicial processes or media freedoms— risks blowback, as it can fuel perceptions of meddling in sovereign affairs and ultimately hinder deeper long-term integration. This internal friction 68 Daily Sabah: Turkey's Halkbank acquires Serbia's Cacanska Banka, 20 March 2015, available at: https://www.dailysa ba h, com /fing nee /2015 /05/20 /turkeys-ha I kbank-acquires-serbias-cacanska-banka (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 69 Sergio Cantone: Can a motorway to Bosnia strengthen the ties between Serbia and Turkey?, 14 October 2024, available at: https://www.euronews.com/2024/10/14/can-a-motorway-to-bosnia-strengthen-the-ties-between-serbia-and-turkey (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 70 UkrAgroConsult: Ukraine and Turkey agree to expand purchases of Ukrainian agricultural products, 14 March 2025, available at: https://ukragroconsult.com/en/news/ukraine-and-turkey-agree-to-expand-purchases-ofukrainian-agricultural-products (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 71 Moldova. Org: Moldova, Turkey sign cooperation programme on food security, 18 January 2011, available at: https://www.moldova.org/en/moldova-turkey-sign-cooperation-programme-on-food-security-216269-eng ( I a st accessed: 10.07.2025). 72 T KA: T KA Supports the Agricultural Development of Georgia, 12 November 2019, available at: https://tika.gov.tr/en/detail-tika supports the agricultural development of georgia/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 75 Government of Montenegro: Ibrahimovi , Kayalar: TIKA makes a significant contribution to strengthening Montenegro-Türkiye relations, 26 March 2025, available at: https://www.gov.me/en/article/ibrahimovic-kayalar-tikamakes-a-siqnificant-contribution-to-strengthening-montenegro-turkiyerelations (last accessed: 10.07.2025). 21 ć ć ć Ž ć š ć •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report channelled through the Diyanet Foundation, Turkey's state-backed Presidency of Religious Af¬ fairs. It actively promotes religious cooperation by financing the restoration of mosques, build¬ ing new religious centres, and providing training for imams across the region.92 For instance, Diyanet financed the construction of the central mosque in Pristina and is deeply involved in the restoration of numerous religious sites and the training of imams in Montenegro and North Macedonia.95 However, this overt use of religious tools has also generated criticism, often linked to accusations of "neo-Ottomanism." In some contexts, Ankara's initiatives are per¬ ceived less as an act of solidarity and more as a historical and ideological assertion, which is particularly unpopular with non-Muslim populations and those who harbour historical griev¬ ances against the Ottoman past. This dynamic illustrates that while religious ties provide a powerful foundation for Turkey's soft power, they can also be a double-edged sword, reinforc¬ ing a narrative of external influence that can be viewed with suspicion and resistance. Consequently, public perception of Turkey's influence in the Western Balkans is shaped by a mixture of historical memory, religious affiliation, and contemporary political ties. As the societal influence sub-index suggests, a stark contrast exists between countries with signifi¬ cant Muslim populations and those with historical grievances. In Albania, for example, a 2022 poll shows that a vast majority, over 82% of respondents, view Turkey as having a positive influence.94 In Serbia, perceptions are more mixed: while narratives of Ottoman oppression still inform parts of the public debate, improved bilateral relations and visible cooperation projects have contributed to a steady rise in the share of citizens who see Turkey favourably - from less than 15% in 201095 to 56% in 2024.96 The situation in the Eastern Trio, however, pre¬ sents a more nuanced picture. Here, Turkey's societal influence is less a function of deepseated historical ties and more a reflection of contemporary geopolitical dynamics. In Ukraine, over half of the population holds a favourable view of Turkey, a sentiment largely driven by Ankara's role as a mediator and military supporter in the face of Russian aggression.97 In Geor¬ gia, a 2021 public opinion poll revealed a more complex view: 4% of respondents identified Turkey as a main friend, while an equal 4% viewed it as a primary enemy.98 This perception of Turkey as an enemy has been fuelled by anti-Turkey propaganda, largely based on speculation regarding the possible expiration of the Treaty of Kars, which raised concerns that Turkey might attempt to occupy the Adjara Region. Such narratives were predominantly disseminated by 92 Beyond providing financial support and training assistance to Islamic communities, Turkey has demonstrated a distinctive readiness in Serbia to mediate between rival Islamic factions, thereby positioning itself as a potential unifying force. This approach underscores Ankara's perception of religion not merely as a cultural tie, but as a strategic domain through which it can cultivate influence, strengthen its legitimacy among local Muslim populations, and project itself as an indispensable partner in fostering communal cohesion. For more on this, see: Suboti /Janji : Serbia at the Crossroad between the West and the East, 2020. 95 Janja Muhasilovi : Turkey's Faith-based Diplomacy in the Balkans, in: Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 2018, pp. 3385. 94 Mirsada Hallunaj/Nino Strati: Public perceptions towards European Integration, Influence of External Actors and Government Performance in Albania, May 2023. 95 arko Petrovi /Du an Reiji : Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A Score-Card, in: Turkey Insight, 13(3), 2011, p. 170. 96 Center for Insights in Survey Research: Western Balkans Regional Poll: February - March 2024, April 2024. 97 The Odessa Journal (2024): Survey: the majority of Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards Georgia, 4 March 2024, available at: https://odessa-journal.com/survey-the-majority-of-ukrainians-have-a-positive-attitude-towards-georgia (last accessed: 12.07.2025). 98 Caucasus Research Resource Centre: Caucasus Barometer 2021 Georgia, 2021, available at: https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2021ge/downloads/ (last accessed: 12.07.2025). 28 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report pro-Russian sources." At the same time, a significant portion of the population views Turkey as a key partner, with 25% mentioning it as a top three partner for economic cooperation and 17% for political cooperation.99 100 This underscores that a state's perception, and by extension its societal influence, is not determined solely by its own actions but is also shaped by com¬ peting narratives from other actors, a crucial factor that policymakers on all sides, including those in the EU, must bear in mind. Looking ahead to the 2025-2055 period, Turkey's societal influence is poised to remain a stable and predictable factor in the region, rather than undergoing any dramatic shifts. This is because Ankara's soft power strategy has demonstrated remarkable consistency over the past decade, leveraging a clear set of tools to achieve its objectives. The future of this influence, however, will be increasingly shaped by the democratic and legal trajectory of the candidate countries themselves. As these nations progress on their paths toward EU integra¬ tion and strengthen their commitment to democratic principles, the rule of law, and secularism, a clear contrast will emerge. Turkey's societal model, which is often perceived as traditionalist, increasingly religiously conservative, and characterised by weaker rule of law and human rights, will find itself in direct ideological competition with the European values being pro¬ moted. For policymakers, particularly within the EU, this presents a critical consideration: while Turkey's societal footprint will likely persist with stable or slightly fluctuating influence, its long¬ term resonance and appeal will be tested by this growing divergence in values. It is a dual challenge where Ankara's sustained engagement may either be seen as a complement to re¬ gional stability or as a parallel, and potentially contradictory, model of societal development. Overall InvigoratEU External Influence Index: General Trends of Chinese Influ¬ ence The InvigoratEU External Influence Index represents the arithmetic mean of three sub-indi¬ ces— capturing Turkey's political, economic, and societal influence— and functions as a com¬ prehensive metric (0-10 scale) for assessing the overall trajectory of Turkish leverage across the nine analysed EU candidate countries. Once quantified, the level of influence is catego¬ rised into five tiers— from Very Low to Very High— based on the resulting score, offering a com¬ parative reflection of the depth and impact of Turkey's involvement in domestic affairs (see Figure 4). By aggregating data across these three dimensions, the Index provides a holistic lens through which to understand how Turkish influence has evolved over time, highlighting both overarching patterns and country-specific outliers. 99 Medium: Pro-Kremlin Actors Fuel Anti-Turkish Sentiments in Georgia, 9 August 2019, available at: https: //me¬ dium, com /df ria b/pro-kremlin-actors-fuel-anti-turkish-sentiment-in-georgia-4ee24aal7ceb (last accessed: 12.07.2025). 100 Caucasus Research Resource Centre: Caucasus Barometer 2021 Georgia, 2021. 29 A* ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figure 8: Categorisation of Turkish Influence by InvigoratEU External Influence In¬ dex Score Index Range Influence Cate¬ gory Description 0.0 -1.9 Very Low Little to no evidence of Turkish political, economic, or media presence. 2.0 -5.9 Low Some indicators of Turkish engagement, but limited im¬ pact on national affairs. 4.0 -5.9 Moderate Noticeable Turkish influence across sectors, but not dominant or structurally embedded. 6.0 -7.9 High Strong Turkish presence in key areas; influence is per¬ sistent and strategic. 8.0-10.0 Very High Deep and pervasive Turkish involvement shaping policy, economy, and discourse. Rather than manifesting evenly, Turkish influence across the region has evolved in distinctly different ways across the three dimensions. As illustrated in Figure 9, the aggregated Index values for political, economic, and societal influence over time reflect diverging patterns of engagement and reveal the specific domains through which Turkey has sought to assert its presence. Figure 9: Aggregated Turkish Influence Index by Dimension and Year (2013-2025) The heatmap presents the arithmetic averages of country-level index scores across the political, economic, and societal dimensions, providing a consolidated snapshot of re¬ gional trends over time. Turkish External Influence by Dimension and Year 50 - - - ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report The observed trends across the three dimensions underscore the differentiated nature of Turk¬ ish influence, pointing to how its presence has evolved through distinct modalities of engage¬ ment: Political influence experienced its sharpest increase between 2015 and 2018 (+24.08%), followed by relative stabilisation (+2.51% between 2018 and 2025). This initial surge corresponds to Turkey's intensified high-level diplomatic activity, marked by a notable expansion of personalised presidential diplomacy and formalised cooperation frameworks— such as strategic councils and intergovernmental mechanisms. The more moderate growth in the latter period suggests that Turkey consolidated its political capital where influence had already been established, while encountering greater constraints in environments where diplomatic space had narrowed or competition from other external actors had intensified. Economic influence followed a steady upward path, growing by +9.50% in the first half of the decade and accelerating to +16.44% thereafter. This expansion reflects Turkey's deepening role as a trade and investment partner, underpinned by concessional financing, strategic infrastructure involvement, and institutionalised economic agreements. The cumulative effect of these instruments is the entrenchment of Turkey as a reliable— though not dominant— economic actor across multiple sectors. Societal influence remained the most stable and consistently high-scoring dimension, expanding incrementally from an already elevated base (+5.61% from 2015 to 2018; +4.29% between 2018 and 2025). Its persistence is driven by long-standing cultural and religious connections, the sustained presence of educational and media outreach, and the resonance of identity-based narratives— particularly in contexts where Turkey enjoys historical or linguistic affinity. Overall, the evolution of Turkish influence has been marked less by dramatic shifts than by cumulative layering. While political and economic engagement has grown in scope and com¬ plexity, it is the societal domain that continues to anchor Ankara's presence— projecting a sense of familiarity and continuity that reinforces its strategic ambitions in less overt ways. Figure 10: Shifts in Turkey's InvigoratEU External Influence Index Across the Region (2015-2023) 10 r 9 • 8 7 6 5 4 3 - 2 1 External Influence Index - Turkey Year 2013 2018 2023 and Herzegovina Macedonia Countries 31 - - - •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Figure 11: Country-Level 2025 Scores of Turkish Influence in EU Candidates, ColourCoded by Influence Intensity Turkish Influence in EU Candidate Countries (2023) - Influence Categories Highlighted Beyond the sectoral trajectories discussed above, national-level patterns provide a more gran¬ ular understanding of how Turkish influence has been absorbed, accommodated, or resisted across the region. Figures 10 and 11 capture both the evolution of country-specific scores over the 2015-2023 period and their relative positions in the most recent reference year. The influ¬ ence categories previously introduced (ranging from Very Low to Very High) serve not only as a metric of Turkish presence, but also as a qualitative indicator of how deeply entrenched or limited Ankara's leverage is within each national context. Albania maintains one of the most stable and elevated levels of Turkish influence throughout the decade. While minor fluctuations are observed (from 5.16 to 5.47), the overall trend signals continued strategic cooperation across sectors, especially in infrastructure, media, and education. It remains firmly within the moderate to high influence bracket. Kosovo emerges as the most prominent case of Turkish influence growth, with a sharp rise from 4.07 in 2013 to 5.16 in 2025. This upward trajectory reflects intensified highlevel political alignment, proactive societal engagement— including cultural twinning and religious diplomacy— and a growing presence of Turkish capital and media influence. Kosovo now falls into the upper bound of the moderate influence category, nearing a high score threshold. Georgia displays a modest but steady rise in Turkish influence (4.29 to 4.84), positioning it in the upper segment of moderate influence. Ankara's influence here reflects a long-term strategic partnership, bolstered by strong economic interdependence and complementary geopolitical outlooks. As Georgia aspires to NATO membership, Turkey serves as both a facilitator and a counterweight to Russian influence in the South Caucasus— making its leverage here unusually stable and multidimensional.101 '°' The Index data covers developments until 2025. Subsequent political turmoil in Georgia (2024-25) primarily affected the country's EU trajectory rather than its relations with Turkey, which have remained anchored in economic interdependence and Black Sea security cooperation. 32 - - - - - - •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Bosnia and Herzegovina records a slight increase over time (from 4.52 to 4.64), sustaining a moderate influence level. This enduring presence stems from strong cultural affinity, historical bonds, and Ankara's deep-rooted societal outreach, although the index plateau suggests a certain saturation of influence channels, particularly in relation to the growing competition with other extra-regional actors such as Russia and China. North Macedonia registers consistent growth across all three dimensions, with its index rising from 5.54 in 2015 to 4.54 in 2025. This reflects long-standing institutional openness to Turkey's presence, including cultural, educational, and economic initiatives— making it one of the most receptive environments in the Western Balkans. Montenegro shows significant growth, from 2.50 in 2015 to 5.52 in 2025. This increase reflects rising engagement, especially since the country's NATO accession— through enhanced political and military cooperation. Economic visibility has grown via investments in infrastructure projects, including religious and broader public works. Still, Turkey's ability to deepen its influence is constrained by Montenegro's strong orientation toward EU integration and the limited institutional bandwidth for developing alternative strategic partnerships. Ukraine also shows gradual growth (from 2.59 in 2015 to 5.49 in 2025), largely driven by intensified political and defence cooperation following the 2014 annexation of Cri¬ mea and, more recently, Turkey's support during the ongoing war with Russia. Bilateral ties have deepened around shared concerns over regional security, particularly in the Black Sea basin, where Ankara and Kyiv increasingly coordinate efforts to counterbal¬ ance Russian assertiveness. Nonetheless, Turkey's economic and societal footprint re¬ mains limited, keeping overall influence within the low category. Serbia, despite a modest increase (from 2.25 to 2.55), remains among the countries least affected by Turkish influence. Deep-rooted historical grievances— rooted in the collective memory of Ottoman rule— coupled with strong opposition to Ankara's support for Kosovo, have significantly curtailed Turkey's appeal across political and societal domains. Moreover, Turkey is not among the informal pillars of Serbia's foreign policy orientation, which continues to be anchored in Washington, Brussels, Beijing, and Mos¬ cow. As a result, Turkish influence remains categorised as low. Moldova, which exhibits minimal change over the decade (from 2.15 to 2.42, with stagnation after 2018), illustrates the peripheral nature of Turkish influence in the East¬ ern Trio. The shallow footprint reflects not structural constraints per se, but rather a mutual lack of prioritisation: Moldova lies outside Ankara's strategic orbit, while Turkish initiatives have failed to translate into sustained societal or institutional presence. The country remains at the lower end of the low influence category. Taken together, these country-specific trajectories suggest that Turkey's influence is shaped less by coercive penetration and more by a blend of historical affinity, elite-level diplo¬ macy, and selective economic engagement. Higher index scores tend to correlate with strong societal resonance and sustained political ties— often rooted in shared identity markers or symbolic solidarity. Conversely, a firm commitment to EU accession, a lack of political inter¬ est or frameworks to embed Turkey's initiatives and competing geopolitical loyalties tend to constrain Turkish outreach. The data also reveals that moments of geopolitical fluidity— such as armed conflict (e.g., the war in Ukraine), EU disengagement from enlargement (as observed across parts of the Western Balkans), or regional security realignments (e.g., NATO expansion in the Western Balkans and Black Sea cooperation)— can open windows of opportunity for An¬ kara. Yet long-term consolidation remains uneven and highly context-dependent. 35 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report 5 Key Findings Based on the InvigoratEU External Influence Index (2015-2023), this study reveals that Turkey's growing presence across the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio is shaped less by coercive ambition than by strategic flexibility and adaptive opportunity. Its influence has advanced where local elites are receptive, institutional alternatives are weak, and historical or cultural familiarity offers fertile ground. At the same time, Turkey's reach is neither uniform nor uncon¬ tested. Seven key findings capture the logic, extent, and implications of Turkish engage¬ ment in the EU's neighbourhood: 1. Turkey's influence has advanced incrementally yet effectively. Over the past decade, Ankara has succeeded in consolidating its presence across both the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio not through abrupt breakthroughs, but through a steady accumulation of ties and initiatives. Rather than relying on coercive tools, Turkey has advanced by embedding itself step by step - through visible cultural out¬ reach, carefully targeted investments, and consistent high-level political engagement. This incrementalism has proven to be an asset: it avoids provoking strong resistance, allows Ankara to adapt flexibly to changing local contexts, and produces a cumulative effect that becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. The outcome is that, despite structural limits and uneven depth, Turkey can be seen as one of the few external actors that has managed to expand its footprint continuously over the past decade. 2. Pragmatic complementarity defines Turkey's engagement. Unlike other external actors, Turkey has not sought to position itself in direct opposition to the EU. On the contrary, it often endorses Euro-Atlantic integration and avoids overt interference in domestic political processes— except in matters linked to its internal security agenda, most notably the campaign against the Gülen movement and Kurdish activists. Rather than competing with Brussels ideologically or institutionally, Ankara has adopted a transactional, relationship-based model of influence. Through person¬ alised diplomacy, strategic visibility, and sector-specific deals— especially in infrastruc¬ ture, defence, and culture— Turkey positions itself as a flexible and responsive partner. This non-confrontational posture allows it to maintain ties across political divides, in¬ cluding in countries with strong pro-EU orientations. It also provides Ankara with a unique space: to engage without being seen as a spoiler, and to entrench its influence without demanding normative convergence. 3. EU disengagement enables Turkish leverage. Turkey's gains are most visible where the EU has faltered— either through delayed infra¬ structure delivery, unmet political conditionality, or fatigue in the enlargement process. In countries like Kosovo and North Macedonia, Turkey has filled strategic and symbolic vacuums by offering swift concessional loans through institutions such as Turk Ex¬ imbank, supporting high-profile infrastructure and educational projects via TIKA, and investing in direct political ties at the summit level. Where the EU fails to project a credible horizon or appears absorbed in internal challenges, Ankara's responsiveness is interpreted as commitment. Conversely, in Moldova— where the EU has recently stepped up its engagement through accession negotiations and financial supportTurkey's role remains peripheral and largely reactive. This pattern suggests that Turkish 54 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report influence thrives not because it is imposed, but because it is allowed to expand into unclaimed space. 4. Influence is expanding— but selectively. Between 2015 and 2023, Turkey increased its overall presence across all nine countries analysed in the InvigoratEU Index. Yet the intensity and depth of this expansion vary significantly. The most pronounced growth is observed in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Albania, where shared religious heritage, favourable elite relations, and relatively open institutional frameworks have created conducive environments. By contrast, Mol¬ dova has seen little movement since 2018, while Serbia remains structurally ambiva¬ lent-balancing limited Turkish engagement with its complex alignment with other ac¬ tors. These findings confirm that Ankara does not pursue a uniform model of influence but instead focuses its resources where it expects the greatest return— geopolitically, symbolically, or economically. Turkey's leverage is therefore best understood as oppor¬ tunistic rather than expansionist: it seeks depth where receptivity exists but avoids con¬ testing ground where resistance is entrenched. 5. Societal linkages anchor Turkey's presence. Of the three dimensions tracked by the Index, societal influence consistently scores highest and proves most stable. Turkey's ability to foster cultural familiarity and emo¬ tional affinity— particularly in Muslim-majority areas of the Western Balkans— has al¬ lowed it to cultivate a form of soft power that is difficult to replicate. Ottoman herit¬ age, shared religious symbols, and widespread consumption of Turkish television series have created enduring channels of societal resonance. These are further reinforced through visa liberalisation, student exchange schemes, diaspora linkages, and mosque restoration projects funded by institutions like Diyanet. Public approval rates reflect this embeddedness: in Albania, over 80% of the population views Turkey's role favour¬ ably. While political and economic partnerships might be vulnerable to leadership change or fiscal volatility, societal channels have proven remarkably resistant to short¬ term fluctuations. In this sense, Turkey's cultural diplomacy serves not merely as a sup¬ plement to political power, but as a structural foundation for long-term influence. 6. Political and economic gains face ceilings. Despite visible advances in diplomacy and investment, Turkey's political and economic influence encounters hard limits. In politically consolidated or EU-anchored environ¬ ments, Brussels remains the more dominant partner, particularly in areas tied to fund¬ ing, regulatory alignment, or institutional reform. Even in cases where Ankara has po¬ sitioned itself as a key infrastructure financier, its ability to sustain this role is increas¬ ingly in question due to high inflation, economic instability, and growing concerns over the reliability of its public finances. Furthermore, regional disruptions such as the war in Ukraine have forced Turkey to reallocate diplomatic and security resources, reducing bandwidth for soft engagement elsewhere. These ceilings do not negate Ankara's gains— but they highlight the importance of context: Turkey can embed itself where there is space but cannot displace entrenched frameworks or compete on scale with the EU. 7. Regional strategies diverge sharply. Turkey's foreign policy is highly adaptive and differentiated across sub-regions. In the Western Balkans, Ankara relies heavily on civilisational narratives, cultural diplomacy, and religious outreach to consolidate its presence. Here, Turkey presents itself as a 55 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report familiar, even fraternal, actor— drawing legitimacy from shared Islamic heritage, Otto¬ man memory, and people-to-people connectivity. In the Eastern Trio, however, this model is less effective due to weaker historical ties and different strategic stakes. In¬ stead, Ankara projects itself as a geopolitical balancer, supplying military equipment (e.g., Bayraktar drones to Ukraine), enhancing naval coordination in the Black Sea, and supporting security cooperation as a NATO actor. This divergence underscores Turkey's strategic flexibility, but also its limitations: societal resonance cannot be easily ex¬ ported beyond its civilisational core, and military engagement has yet to produce deeper societal or economic ties in the Eastern Trio. 8. Sustainability hinges on internal and external factors. The trajectory of Turkish influence remains uncertain. Domestically, Ankara faces grow¬ ing constraints: economic fragility, democratic erosion, and uncertain relations with NATO allies all threaten its credibility as a long-term partner. Externally, its role is in¬ creasingly challenged by competing actors. China and Gulf states offer parallel in¬ vestment models, often with deeper pockets, while renewed EU attention in the neigh¬ bourhood could reclaim ground ceded over the past decade. If Turkey cannot deliver on its commitments, or if its assertiveness begins to clash with local priorities, even well-established partnerships may erode. Conversely, should Ankara stabilise econom¬ ically and continue to offer nimble, non-intrusive cooperation, its appeal may persist— particularly in settings where the EU fails to re-establish its own "strategic depth". In either case, Turkish influence will remain a dynamic and contested element of the EU's immediate environment, requiring careful monitoring and calibrated engagement. 6 Recommendations As Turkey consolidates its role as a flexible yet assertive actor in the EU's neighbourhood, the Union must adopt a more pro-active strategic posture that leaves less room for Ankara to expand by default. While Turkish influence is not inherently antagonistic to European interests - indeed, Ankara often endorses Euro-Atlantic integration and contributes to regional security efforts - the challenges emerge when this influence takes on less constructive forms. Turkey's domestic political agenda is frequently externalised, most visibly through pressure on local authorities to act against Gülen-Iinked actors or Kurdish activists, raising concerns of political interference. Likewise, Turkish investment, while valuable in filling infrastructure and financing gaps, has occasionally been associated with non-transparent practices, risks of corruption, and limited alignment with EU regulatory standards. The greater danger for the EU lies in Turkey being perceived by candidate countries as a viable alternative model: formally a candidate state, yet one that diverges sharply from core democratic and rule-of-law benchmarks. The following recommendations therefore aim not at constraining Turkey's presence per se, but at strengthening EU's own credibility, regulatory leverage, and normative appeal - minimising the potential downsides of Turkish engagement while maximising the scope for constructive coop¬ eration. 56 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report 1. Reinvest in credibility through visible and timely delivery. Turkey has excelled in occupying strategic and symbolic vacuums left by delayed EU infrastruc¬ ture projects or stalling political processes. To ensure it remains the primary partner of choice, the EU should ensure the timely implementation of its pledged financial support, particularly under the IPA III and Western Balkans Growth Plan. Public awareness of EU-funded projects should be strengthened through improved outreach and communication strategies, working with independent media and civil society actors to highlight palpable results. Flagship pro¬ jects, such as transport corridors and energy interconnectors, should be fast-tracked and framed as part of a larger geopolitical investment in the two region's European future. In set¬ tings like Kosovo or North Macedonia, where Ankara's responsiveness is particularly well re¬ ceived, the EU must demonstrate that it can be not only a norm-setter, but also a provider of tangible outcomes. 2. Expand EU presence at the local level. Turkey's societal influence often bypasses national elites by engaging local communities di¬ rectly through city twinnings, mosque restorations, and cultural initiatives. The EU should adopt a similar approach by scaling up its local footprint. Delegations and EU offices should deepen ties with local authorities, particularly in regions with high Turkish visibility. Dedicated funding lines should support joint EU-local government initiatives focused on youth engagement, envi¬ ronmental protection, and historical heritage preservation. This decentralised engagement model will make the EU more relatable, foster bottom-up ownership of reforms, and ensure that Europe, rather than external actors, is seen as the most present and responsive partner in local communities. 5. Institutionalise working-level coordination with Turkey on the Western Balkan and Eastern Trio. Rather than treating Turkish influence as a permanent source of friction, the EU should establish more systematic exchanges with Ankara to address shared concerns in the Western Balkans and Eastern Trio region. These can include regular working-level dialogues on regional stability, joint participation in resilience forums, and issue-specific coordination on matters such as in¬ frastructure security or migration. By recognising Turkey as a relevant, though not always aligned, stakeholder, the EU can increase predictability and reduce the likelihood of conflictual overlap. 4. Safeguard EU standards and the principle of conditionality even when candidate countries face political pressure from Turkey. In cases where Turkey exerts political pressure on partner states— particularly through extradi¬ tion demands, potential legislative interference, or media control— the EU should continue to apply principled conditionality. Pre-accession instruments and macro-financial assistance should be tied to the recipient country's adherence to EU standards on the rule of law, judicial independence, and non-discrimination. Quiet diplomacy should also be deployed to support host governments in resisting undue influence without compromising bilateral relations. This is 57 İ İ ć ć ć đ Ž ć š ć Invigorating Enlargement and Neignbc Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Talha Ozturk: Bosnia, Türkiye sign military cooperation plan to strengthen future activities, 51 August 2025, avaialble at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bosnia-turkiye-sign-militarycooperation-plan-to-strengthen-future-activities/2980595 (last accessed: 09.07.2025). The Government of Albania: A New Chapter on Path of Strategic Partnership with Turkey, 6 January 2021, available at: https:/ /kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/40754-2/ (last accessed: 08.07.2025). The Odessa Journal (2024): Survey: the majority of Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards Georgia, 4 March 2024, available at: https://odessa-journal.com/survey-the-majority-ofukrainians-have-a-positive-attitude-towards-georgia (last accessed: 12.07.2025). T KA: T KA Supports the Agricultural Development of Georgia, 12 November 2019, available at: https://tika.gov.tr/en/detail-tika supports the agricultural development of georgia/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). Tirana Times: Albania closes two education institutions tied to Gulen network, sparking debate over Turkish pressure, 25 September 2022, available at: https://www.tiranatimes.com/moecloses-two-education-institutions-tied-to-gulen-network/ (last accessed: 10.07.2025). Toni Alaranta: NATO's Nordic Enlargement and Turkey's Reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the Context of Turkey's Wider Strategic Interests, September 2022. Turk Eximbank: International Project Loans, available at: https://eximbank.gov.tr/en/productand-services/buyer-s-credits/international-project-loans (last accessed: 10.07.2025). UkrAgroConsult: Ukraine and Turkey agree to expand purchases of Ukrainian agricultural prod¬ ucts, 14 March 2025, available at: https:/ / ukragroconsult.com/en/news/ukraine-and-turkeyagree-to-expand-purchases-of-ukrainian-agricultural-products (last accessed: 10.07.2025). UN: Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre, available at: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative (last accessed: 09.07.2025). Vuk Vuksanovi : How the Balkans Were Won: A Turkish Foreign Policy Success Story, 17 October 2017, available at: https:// nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-balkans-were-won-turkishforeign-policy-success-22771 (last accessed: 02.07.2025). Vuk Vuksanovi /Filip Ejdus: Wings of Change: The Coming Drone Proliferation in the Western Balkans. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, May 2025. Vuk Vuksanovi /Sr an Hercigonja: Between Emotions and Realism: Two Faces of Turkish For¬ eign Policy in the Balkans, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, June 2025. Yevgeniya Gaber: The West Must Back Ukraine and Turkey to Counter Russia's Attempts to Control the Black Sea, 5 August 2025, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/the-west-must-back-ukraine-and-turkey-to-counter-russiasattempts-to-control-the-black-sea/ (last accessed: 08.07.2025). arko Petrovi /Du an Reiji : Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A ScoreCard, in: Turkey Insight, 15(5), 2011, p. 170. 44 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex I InvigoratEU External Influence Index". Detailed Breakdown Table 1: InvigoratEU External Influence Index Element of analysis Indicator Sources of evidence Indicator scale (0-5) Weighting the indicator POLITICAL-SECURITY DIMENSION Bilateral and multilateral platforms (overall 25%) Level of bilateral partnership Depth and breadth of formal cooperation Number and importance of signed agreements, presence of joint initia¬ tives 0 - No close partnership 1 - Partnership in development 2 - Limited partnership, e.g., agreements in particular ar¬ eas 3 - Deep, long-term strategic partnerships across multiple sectors 15% Participation in Russia/China/Turkey-led multilateral political initiatives Extent of participation in multi¬ lateral initiatives Membership or observer status, participation in key summits, decision-making roles 0 - No participation 1 - Observer status or ad hoc participation 2 - Membership but limited participation 3 - Membership and signifi¬ cant contributions 5% Bilateral high level visits Frequency and level of state visits Number and level of visits (head of states and gov¬ ernments, ministers) 0 - No visits recorded 1 - Occasional high official and ministries visits 2 - Regular high official visits and ministries visits 3 - Frequent high official and ministerial and visits and by head of states and/or govern¬ ments 5% Internal politics (overall 25%) 45 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Relations with political parties Political influence through party channels Support, funding, or ideo¬ logical alignment with ex¬ ternal actors of key politi¬ cal parties 0 - No significant relations among parliamentarian par¬ ties (PP) 1 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with opposition parties 2 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with junior par¬ ties in government coalition 3 - Ideological alignment and cooperation with major par¬ ties in government coalition 5% Parliamentarian cooperation Engagement in inter-parlia¬ mentary networks Joint parliamentary ses¬ sions, parliamentary dele¬ gation visits, formal coop¬ eration platforms 0 - No cooperation estab¬ lished 1 - Limited cooperation through delegations or infor¬ mal networks 2 - Formalised cooperation 3 - Institutionalised coopera¬ tion with regular exchanges 5% Election interference Evidence of meddling in the election process Instances of cyberattacks, disinformation or foreign funding 0 - No interference recorded 1 - Minor interference in infor¬ mation channels (e.g., disin¬ formation campaigns) 2 - Isolated, uncoordinated interference attempts 3 - Coordinated and signifi¬ cant interference with elec¬ tion outcomes at risk 10% Legislative interference Influence on domestic lawmaking process Lobbying, pressure to pass or reject laws, foreignsponsored policies 0 - No interference recorded 1 - Minimal lobbying or indirect influence 2 - Occasional influence on particular laws 3 - Direct involvement in shap¬ ing key national legislation 5% Military sphere (overall 25%) 46 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Military cooperation Depth and frequency of mili¬ tary collaboration Joint exercises 0 - No cooperation 1 - Military drills in discussions 2 - Bilateral military drills 3 - Bilateral and multilateral military drills 5% Military presence Degree of permanent /tempo¬ rary foreign military presence Troops, foreign bases, joint defence installations 0 - No active presence 1 - Military presence discussed but not implemented 2 - Short-term or semi-perma¬ nent deployments or symbolic presence 3 - Permanent bases or signif¬ icant foreign military infra¬ structure 15% Arms trade Volume and strategic value of equipment trades Volume of arms traded, defence contracts 0 - No notable cooperation 1 - Discussions on arms trade 2 - Notable arms trade 3 - Significant and sustained arms trade with strategic value 5% Foreign policy (overall 25%) CFSP alignment in relation to Russia/China/Turkey Degree of alignment with CFSP on Russia/China/Turkey issues Alignment with High Rep¬ resentative's declarations 0 - Full alignment with CFSP 1- >0; <20% of non-alignment 2 - >20%; <60% of non-align¬ ment 3 - >60% of non-alignment 10% 47 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Involvement in the pursuit of key national interests (e.g. EU/NATO membership, territorial integrity, etc.) - contestation or support Degree of contestation of key national policies or the degree of support for key national pol¬ icies102 Public critics, hostile dip¬ lomatic actions, coercive economic measures, sup¬ port for secessionist movements, etc. (in case of contestation) or Public endorsements, dip¬ lomatic assistance in mul¬ tilateral forums, non¬ recognition of seceding entities etc. (in case of support 0 - No involvement or neutral stance 1 - Low-level involvement through rhetoric 2 - Moderate involvement, characterised by consistent contestation or support 3 - Significant involvement, where external actors actively and strategically support or contest key national interests 15% 102 This indicator evaluates the extent of interest that foreign actors have in the key national interests of individual states. A foreign actor's influence is likely to be less intensive if it shows less interest in a state's key national interests. However, when a foreign actor actively opposes a state's national interests, its influence tends to increase due to deeper engagement. Conversely, there are instances where foreign actors actively support specific key national interests, thereby gaining leverage and fostering closer ties with those states, which also leads to significant influence. For example, Russia's influence in Moldova is considerable as it supports 48 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report ECONOMIC DIMENSION Trade and investment relations (overall 67%) The official level of economic/trade partnership Strength of formal economic/trade agreements Signed trade agreements, economic treaties, cus¬ toms unions, trade promo¬ tion frameworks 0 - No formal economic part¬ nership or negotiations ongo¬ ing 1 - Trade agreements in partic¬ ular sectors 2 - Free trade agreements 3 - Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (sec¬ ond generation free trade agreement) 5% Foreign Direct Investments FDI inflows Annual FDI inflows as a percentage of total FDI inflows 0 - No FDI >1% of total FDI 1 - FDI 1-5% of total FDI 2FDI 5-20% of total FDI 3 -FDI >20% of total FDI 7% FDI Stock FDI stock as a percentage of total FDI stock 0 - No FDI >1% of total FDI 1 - FDI 1-5% of total FDI 2 - FDI 5-20% of total FDI 3 -FDI >20% of total FDI 15% Trade Intensity (goods and ser¬ vices trade) Exports Share of exported goods and services as a per¬ centage of total exports 0 - Trade <5% of total 1 - Trade 5-10% of total 2 - Trade 10-20% of total 3 - Trade >20% of total 25% Imports Share of imported goods and services as a per¬ centage of total imports 0 - Trade <5% of total 1 - Trade 5-10% of total 2 - Trade 10-20% of total 3 - Trade >20% of total 15% Strategic economic dependence (overall 35%) secessionist movements, thereby opposing the country's aspirations for territorial integrity and sovereignty. In contrast, in Serbia, Russia's influence remains strong due to its substantial backing on Serbia's position on the Kosovo issue, making it an appealing partner. 49 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Strategic assets ownership and presence of foreign firms Ownership of key sectors/assets by foreign actors, as well as presence of foreign-owned or partnered firms Control of strategic sec¬ tors (e.g., energy, tele¬ com, transport, banking) by foreign firms/governments 0 - No foreign ownership or minimal ownership of minor assets 1 - Relative majority ownership in one sector 2 - Relative majority owner¬ ship in several sectors 3 - Absolute majority owner¬ ship in at least one sector 11% Energy dependence Share of energy imports from foreign actors Percentage of total en¬ ergy imports coming from one external actor 0 - Energy imports <5% 1 -5-20% energy imported 2 - 20-35% of energy im¬ ported 3 - >35% of energy imported from a single actor 15% Official foreign debt Foreign debt to external actors Foreign debt to a specific country as a percentage of total dept 0 - No foreign debt 1 - Foreign debt <5% of total 2 - Foreign debt <15% of total 3 - Foreign debt >15% to¬ tal 7% SOCIETAL DIMENSION Mobility and connectivity (overall 27%) Diaspora Size and influence of the dias¬ pora community Size of the diaspora pop¬ ulation and their level of influence in local politics, economy and culture 0 - No significant diaspora 1 - Small diaspora with mini¬ mal influence 2 - Moderate diaspora with some influence 3 - Large diaspora with signif¬ icant influence 6% 50 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Visa requirement Ease of travel between coun¬ tries Visa requirements for citi¬ zens, presence of visadree agreements or re¬ laxed visa policies 0 - No visa-free access 1 - Visa required with some fa¬ cilitation 2 - Visa-free access for a shorter stay (up to 50 days) 3 - Visa-free access for a longer stay (more than 50 days) 5% Tourism Volume and impact of tourism coming from China, Turkey or Russia Number of tourists from the external actor and their economic impact 0 - Negligible tourism interac¬ tions 1 - Low tourism interaction (15% of total tourism) 2 - Moderate tourism interac¬ tion (5-10% of total tourism) 5 - High volume of tourism (>10% of total tourism) 5% Education/student exchanges Scale and impact on educa¬ tional exchanges Number of exchange pro¬ grammes, students partic¬ ipating and institutional partnerships as share of total 0 - No notable exchanges 1 - Minimal exchanges or pro¬ grams 2 - Moderate exchanges with some impact 5 - Extensive exchanges with significant impact 10% 51 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Local/provincial government partnership, city twinning Number and effectiveness of local/provincial partnerships Number of twinning agreements and their ef¬ fectiveness 0 - No partnerships or twin¬ ning 1 - Few, ineffective partner¬ ships 2 - Moderate number with some effectiveness 3 - Significant partnerships with proven effectiveness 5% Cultural and informational sphere overall 55%) Foreign media presence and in¬ fluence Extent and nature of foreign media presence Number of foreign media outlets, their reach, and influence on public opin¬ ion 0 - No notable foreign media presence 1 - Minimal presence with lim¬ ited reach 2 - Moderate presence with some influence 3 - Extensive presence with a noticeable influence on shap¬ ing public opinion 20% The presence of foreign cultural centres Impact of foreign cultural insti¬ tutions Number of cultural centres and their role in promot¬ ing foreign culture and language 0 - No foreign cultural centres 1 - Existing but with limited im¬ pact 2 - Existing with moderate im¬ pact 3 - Existing with substantial impact 5% 52 •^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Religious bonds and cooperation Level of religious ties and co¬ operation Depth of religious collab¬ orations and partnerships 0 - No religious ties 1 - Different religion but some ties with local minorities 2 -Majority religion, moderate church relations 3 - Majority religion, well-de¬ veloped church relations 30% Public perceptions (overall 18%) Perception/Public Opinion (on cooperation benefits, on dona¬ tion intensity, on global influ¬ ence, on leader popularity, donor perception) Public opinion on selected as¬ pects Opinion on cooperation benefits, donation inten¬ sity, global influence, leader popularity, and do¬ nor perception 0 - Mostly negative opinion 1 - Mostly neutral or mixed opinions 2 - A generally positive opin¬ ion with some criticism 3 - Mostly positive opinion with broad support 18% 55 InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex 11.7 North Macedonia Figure 18: Turkey's Influence in North Macedonia (2013-2025) Political dimension Economic dimension Societal dimension Average Public perception Bilateral partnership Multilateral platforms High-level visits Political parties Parliamentarian coop. Election inte rf ere nee Legislative interference Military cooperation Diaspora Visa Tourism Education City twinning Foreign media Foreign cultural centres Religion InvigoratEU^ “Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe Military presence Level of economic partnership Arms trade aFD I Inflows CFSP alignment FD I Stock Key national interests a Trade e^orts Trade imports Energy dependence General debt Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership 60 ^e^lnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex 11.8 Serbia Figure 19: Turkey's Influence in Serbia (2013-2023) Türkiye’s infleunce on Serbia 2013 2018 2023 2013 2018 2023 2013 2018 2023 2013 2018 2023 Political dimension Economic dimension Societal dimension Average Bilateral partnership Military presence Level of economic partnership Diaspora Public perception Multilateral platforms Arms trade FDI Inflows Visa High-level visits CFSP alignment FDI Stock Tourism Political parties Key national interests Trade eiports Education Parliamentarian coop. Trade imports City twi ming Election interference Energy dependence Foreign media Legislative interference General debt Foreign cultural centres Military cooperation Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership Religion 61 A ^e^lnvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report Annex 11.9 Ukraine Figure 20: Turkey's Influence in Ukraine (2015-2025) Türkiye's influence on Ukraine io 9 8 7 6 Bilateral partnership Military presence Level of economic partnership Diaspora Public perception M dt ilateral platforms Arms trade FDI Inflows Visa High-level visits CFSP alignment FDI Stock Tourism Political parties Key national interests Trade eiports Education Parliamentarian coop. Trade imports City twinning Election interference Energy dependence Foreign media Legislative interference General debt Foreign cultural centres Military cooperation Foreign firmsand strategic assets ownership Religion 62 ^^InvigoratEU 'Invigorating Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy for a Resilient Europe InvigoratEU | Policy Report About InvigoratEU InvigoratEU is a Horizon Europe-funded project, coordinated by the EU-Chair at the Uni¬ versity of Duisburg-Essen (UDE) together with the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) in Berlin. The project, with a duration of 3 years from January 2024 until December 2026, examines how the EU can structure its future relations with its Eastern neighbours and the countries of the Western Balkans. The consortium has received around three million euros for this endeavour. How can the EU invigorate its enlargement and neighbourhood policy to enhance Europe's resilience? Our first goal is to investigate how to re¬ form the EU's enlargement strategy in a new geopolitical phase, HOW TO RE¬ SPOND to other actors' geopolitical am¬ bitions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans, and HOW TO RE¬ BUILD the EU's foreign policy arsenal in view of a new era of military threats (tri¬ ple "R" approach) combining the mod¬ ernisation and geopolitical logics of EU enlargement, leading to new data - e.g. a public opinion survey in Ukraine, a set of scenarios, an external influence index (Russia, China, Turkey), and a social policy compli¬ ance and cohesion scoreboard. 65 Our second goal is to elaborate an evidence-based, forward-looking vision for the EU's political agenda and institutional frameworks for co-designing a multidimensional toolbox (i.e. two tailor-made toolkits), together with InvigoratEU s Expert Hub, Civil Society (CS) Network, Youth Labs, Workshops for Young Professionals and Policy Debates in a gaming set up, which will result in context-sensitive and actionable policy recommendations for Euro¬ pean and national political stakeholders and (young) European citizens in particular. Funded by the European Union Our third goal is to deploy a CDE (communication, dissemination and exploitation) strategy aiming at recommendations from Day 1 to maximize our scientific, policy and societal im¬ pact in invigorating the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies to enhance Europe's resilience. Ultimately, InvigoratEU is a deliberately large consortium respecting the diversity of Europe and political perspectives; 7 out of 18 are from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the western Balkans (North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), complemented by our Civil Society Network of 9 representatives from all Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. InvigoratEU is funded by the European Union. Disclaimer: Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not nec¬ essarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.